

INCOMPLETE DEVELOPMENTAL COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE CASE OF THE
SHINING PATH OF PERU

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INCOMPLETE DEVELOPMENTAL COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE CASE OF THE
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE SHINING PATH INSURGENCY

Insurgencies in Latin American are not rare, particularly among peasant populations. Generally referring to the use of violence lasting more than a few hours against an established government by a substantial number of people who do not occupy formal authority roles, insurgencies exclude shifts in political control such as military coups and assassinations (Dominquez 807). In fact, Latin American countries in the early nineteenth century resulted from insurgency movements against forces who represented the Spanish crown. In addition, various ethnic groups and political organizations created insurgency movements against the Latin American governments during the twentieth century.

Scholars believe insurgent groups are provoked by four variables- poor economic conditions, ethnic cleavages, and the isolated geographic location of the insurgents' main base of operations (Weitz 398). All of these conditions would play an active role in the success of the deadliest insurgency in the Western Hemisphere to date- the Shining Path. The first of such conditions is highlighted by the economic crisis in Peru during the 1980s, which caused already poor peasants in rural regions to become even more impoverished. Fulfilling the second and third conditions, the largely indigenous culture that would become a great base of support for the insurgency was geographically and

culturally isolated in the Andes Mountains. In addition, the indigenous peasant population greatly differed from the modernized urban population due to differences in ethnicity, language, religion and class. Lastly, a powerful ideologue leading a peasant revolution fulfilled the four variables, creating the catalyst for a powerful insurgency against the Peruvian government.

The Shining Path announced its war against the Peruvian state by burning ballot boxes in the small Andean town of Chushi on May 17, 1980 during the first presidential election since 1963. Later in the year, on December 26, citizens in Lima awoke to find dead dogs adorned with signs reading “Deng Xiao-Ping [the conservative successor to Mao Zedong of China] son of a bitch” (Starn, "Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes" x). The Shining Path, or *Sendero Luminoso* as it is called in Spanish, was a Maoist inspired communist guerilla faction that emerged in 1980 with passionate opposition towards Peru's past military governments. The guerilla group's ultimate goal was to change the country's economic and social structures by overthrowing the legitimate government.

The Shining Path originated in the department of Ayacucho, home to an extremely impoverished indigenous peasantry in the Andean highlands and a lively university culture in the department's capital. The Shining Path flourished since it was isolated in the Andean mountains. The movement grew with relatively little interference from the government due to its separation from the rest of Peru's population.

Although the Shining Path gained support from the highland peasants, the insurrection was driven by middle class university intellectuals attending Huamanga University in Ayacucho. Roughly, 10,000 of the city's 70,000 inhabitants were students

who supported the movement (Klaren 370). It is interesting to note that the ideology for the insurgency movement first developed during an extended period of economic growth and government expansion (1963-1975), not during economic crisis and government cutbacks (Palmer 1).

The San Cristóbal de Huamanga University reopened its doors in 1959 after closing in 1885 (Degregori, “Origins and logic of the Shining Path” 35). It was here that a tiny regional committee of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) began to emerge under the leadership of professor Abimael Guzman Reynosa¹, who would become the ultimate leader of the Shining Path. Serving as an educator and mentor, Guzman recruited students into his Marxist ideology while offering social science scholarships that focused on peasantry studies, agrarian reform, and social classes. Spreading his Marxist ideology, Guzman recruited these students with promises of eventual control over the state. These individuals would eventually become leading cadres of the Shining Path movement.

The PCP gained momentum when other professors joined the movement, thus sharing the group’s ideology and promises with students in the classrooms (Degregori, “Origins and logic of the Shining Path” 35). After traveling to China in 1964 and gain in 1968 during the height of China’s Cultural Revolution, Guzman developed his Maoist communist ideology and formed the secretive Red Flag faction, a pro-Maoist faction of the PCP that became the prototype for the Shining Path (Degregori, “Origins and logic of the Shining Path” 35). After creating a student federation, the Red Flag faction began to expand its base of support and created a municipal federation of community

¹ See Appendix A.

organizations and a People's Defense Front, which supported the idea of free education (Degregori, "Origins and logic of the Shining Path" 35).

However, the front's influence weakened after several of its leaders were arrested. Along with the front leadership, several top Red Flag faction leaders were arrested, including Guzman who spent a few long months in jail. Due to these changes and the eventual break from the Maoist PCP, the Red Faction officially became the Communist Party of Peru or the Shining Path in 1970 (Degregori, "Origins and logic of the Shining Path" 35). Over the next ten years, Guzman developed the Shining Path into a Maoist movement based on cohesiveness and rigid ideology. Guzman carefully formed concentrated nuclei throughout the highlands that were highly dependent upon the party's leadership (Degregori, "Origins and logic of the Shining Path" 35).

The Shining Path's influence and power began to grow throughout the region, which allowed for an assertive impact by 1980 despite its small size (Degregori "Origins and Logic of the Shining Path" 35). Although the Shining Path was not the first Maoist-inspired revolutionary movement, the insurgency was unique in that its power peaked in Peru during the 1980s when most of the leftist movements around the world strayed from Maoist ideology, vocabulary, images, and even dress.

The grass roots organizations of the Shining Path worked for the proletariat cause based on the principle that the party would decide everything and violent war would be its principal task (Degregori, "Origins and Logic of the Shining Path" 37). Thus, the proletariat cadres became the "thousand eyes and thousand ears of the party, the most frankly terrorist face of its undercover power" (Degregori, "Origins and Logic of the Shining Path" 36). Appealing to young peasants from an impoverished and rural

background, the Shining Path offered an “active role in an imminent world proletarian revolution under the wise guidance of charismatic leader,” Guzman. Enticed by the promise of change, many peasants supported the Shining Path as the economy began to decline (Starn, "Maoism in the Andes: The Communist Party of Peru-Shining Path and the Refusal of History" 405).

When the Shining Path announced its war on the state in May 1980, few in Peru thought the movement posed any serious threat to the new democratic system. However, this soon changed when the Shining Path began to dynamite public buildings and power stations, and execute local officials, landowners, merchants, and informers (Cornell and Robert 535). The insurgency’s early success coincided with a subsistence crisis that impoverished the already desperate peasants in the southern highlands. Long-term population pressures and disruptions in production caused by agrarian reform and natural disasters also forced the peasants to migrate in search of work. The government’s lack of assistance produced an “explosive pain and discontent” among the peasants, making them even more receptive to the Shining Path (Cornell and Roberts 380).

Challenged by rapid inflation, Peru quickly experienced a sharp decline in production and employment, further exacerbating inequalities amongst the population. The situation only worsened with the lack of government aid and support. Guzman took advantage of these hardships and emphasized the primacy of the class struggle in Peru. In addition, the leader asserted the need to combat imperialism, the importance of a vanguard party, and the use of violence as a redemption tool against the government. This ideology attracted the impoverished, indigenous peasants and impressionable youth in the region (Cornell and Roberts 406-409). Guzman argued, “The people’s war will

grow more every day until it overturns the old order, the world is entering into a new situation: the strategic offensive of the global revolution” (qtd. in Bosombrio 430). It was at this point that the Shining Path began to embody a radical sense of *indigenismo*, which called for an agrarian communism based on the indigenous peasant community (Berg 84).

The Shining Path depicted the *Guardia Civil* or civil guard, known as the *Sínchis*, as enforcers for local elites and oppressors of the peasants in order to increase recruits (Berg 84). Known for its effective organization, the guerilla movement also gained support from leftist opponents of the Peruvian government in the capital who helped spread the insurgency from the periphery of the country towards the urban center. With increasing influence in Lima and a stronghold over rural areas outside of the government’s effective management, the Shining Path seemed capable of toppling the Peruvian government. For example, it is estimated that violence by the Shining Path and the Armed Forces contributed to over 25,000 deaths (Degregori, "Harvesting Storms: Peasant *Rondas* and the Defeat of Sendero Luminosa in Ayacucho” 140).

Due to the government’s unwillingness to provide social assistance to those suffering from a declining economy, the peasant population in the southern highlands turned to the Shining Path for survival and out of resentment of the government. In 1980, the Shining Path had an estimated 200 to 300 militants. By 1983, this number ranged officially between 500 and 3,000 (McClintock 52). As the Shining Path gained momentum, “the number of attacks increased from 219 in 1980 to 2,050 in 1985, totaling more than 6,000 over the period and causing an estimated \$2,139,542 in economic losses” (Klaren 382). By 1983, over half of the reported terrorist acts were being

committed outside the Ayacucho region, highlighting the Shining Path's growing base of support.

In attempt to eradicate the Shining Path, the Peruvian military became one of the worst human rights abusers, leading many to believe that the insurgency was achieving its goal to bring down the state. Reminded of the atrocious, widespread acts of violence committed by the military junta of Argentina in the late 1970s and the consequent human rights trials resulting in the imprisonment of many government officials, many Latin American countries took a cautious approach to repressive counterinsurgency policies during the late 1980s. Such caution was taken to avoid international criticism of human rights violations and similar punishments. The Shining Path provided a perfect opportunity for the Peruvian government to take a non-repressive approach to dealing with the insurgency forces. Instead, the military pursued violent repression.

The government's lack of a consistent policy undermined its initiatives to defeat the Shining Path effectively. Counterinsurgency policy see-sawed between an Argentine-style solution using repression at the cost of human rights violations and a developmental solution². The latter policy argued for massive social assistance and economic development programs focused on remedying the fundamental causes of the insurgency (Klaren 407). Even with little success using full-scale repression, which often targeted innocent peasants, the military continued to resist the possibility of implementing a developmental counterinsurgency policy.

For example, "an Argentine-style 'dirty-war' against presumed subversives in Ayacucho yielded massacres of journalists, peasants, and prisoners that seemed to

² See Appendix B.

implicate the military as well as Sendero” (Starn, "Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes" 2). The Peruvian administrations did little to help the peasant populations and therefore, did little to divert appeal away from the Shining Path. President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985) defined counterinsurgency as an “internal war” and, in essence, granted the military the liberty to carry out all means necessary to eliminate the enemy (Mauceri 83). The military’s repressive tactics often came with little success and created backlash from Shining Path and its supporters.

Directly related to the government’s dirty war approach to counterinsurgency, the Office of the Attorney General of Peru recorded over 3,200 cases of disappearances between 1982 and 1989. Scholars believe the real number is probably much higher due to fears of harassment or retaliation against lawyers, human rights organizations, witnesses and family members who pursued cases of disappearances (Cornell and Roberts 540). Amongst those killed during the insurgency were 1,197 proven members of the armed forces, 8,079 alleged so-called subversives, and 6,386 civilians (Cornell and Roberts 540). The Armed Forces killed a large number of civilians, highlighting the grave abuses in human rights during the insurgency.

Peasant support for the insurgency only increased and the human rights situation further deteriorated when Belaúnde declared the department of Ayacucho an emergency zone in an attempt to break apart any concentrated pockets of the Shining Path’s influence in the highlands. Peasants who remained in the region were subject to indiscriminate seizure, torture or killings by the armed forces, which were poorly trained, underfinanced, and plagued by political corruption and political factionalism.

According to the Peruvian Peace Commission, there were also an estimated fifty thousand forced migrants, most of who settled in Lima, Ica, and Huancayo (Smith 133). The youths among these migrants created a “a disposable mass, impressionable, in search of an identity, and critical of their parents’ generation, without a place in rural society, [who] could not find a place either in modern Peru, asphyxiated by the crisis and the unemployment” (qtd. in Klaren 381). Since the insurgency’s start in 1980, close to 200,000 internal refugees had been created and nearly forty percent of the country was under martial law (Klaren 407).

President Alan García Perez (1985-1990) openly challenged the military’s “dirty-war” counterinsurgency policy. Such attempts marked the national leadership’s first pursuit of development policy. The new president recognized the role the peasants’ impoverished condition played in their alliance with the Shining Path. Linking violence to underdevelopment and denouncing human rights violations on the part of the military, García pursued a series of developmental programs throughout the country. With support from the populace, which was now open to bold change, García also improved human rights standards and cut military expenditures in defense spending. The new president thus began to limit the authority of the military.

However, public backlash towards unsuccessful economic policies threatened García’s popularity. As a result, the government and the Armed Forces greatly challenged García’s ability to integrate developmental assistance. The Shining Path was able to gain support in light of García’s dilemma and took advantage of the country’s economic downturn and consequent abandonment of development policy.

Although García entered his administration with high approval ratings and great hopes to implement development programs, faltering economic policies, and the military's chokehold often left aid-orientated policies with incomplete resources. Once again, a Peruvian president was forced to relinquish executive control of counterinsurgency to the military. More importantly, García's submittal cost the country its first chance to implement visionary developmental policies. As a result, repression returned as the main counterinsurgency policy used to combat the Shining Path and human rights violations continued.

In 1990, the citizens of Peru made their openness to change known and voted for political outsider, Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000). A political novice, Fujimori sought the guidance of a select group of technocrats and the military to implement his policies to rebuild Peru. Fujimori's alliance with the repressive military precluded any legitimate developmental policy during his administration. Similar to Belaúnde and García, Fujimori lacked expertise during periods of crisis and soon relinquishing the task of counterinsurgency to the military.

Peruvian history once again repeated itself as the military resumed control and pursued a campaign of repression. Highlighting the Armed Forces' autonomy, Fujimori enforced a decree stating ruling members of the military could not be tried in civilian courts for human rights violations (Klaren 413). This decree granted the military virtual immunity and the legal freedom to engage in open repression without any consequence from the civilian community. Thus, any real pressure to pursue a consistent developmental counterinsurgency policy was eliminated.

After the military began to cooperate with peasant forces to combat the Shining Path and the government improved its intelligence tactics to gain insight about the location of top rebel leaders, Guzman was eventually captured in Lima and imprisoned in 1992. Guzman's arrest removed any real power threat by the Shining Path. After twelve years of insurgency, the Shining Path became the largest terrorist movement in the Western Hemisphere known to date and remains active on a small scale in Peru. If the government had integrated developmental counterinsurgency policies, such as economic aid and social support aimed at improving the peasants' conditions, many peasants may have been less inclined to align with the Shining Path for assistance. In addition, implementation of a developmental policy by the government would have greatly eliminated the number of human rights violations in Peru during the insurgency.

Few scholars have focused on the reasons for the lack of serious, consistent developmental policy initiative. Instead, mention has been made to the fact that developmental policy was only one of two options and not seriously pursued, providing no further explanation. The scholarly material instead focuses on the causes for the Shining Path's rebellion, its ideology, the country's military policy, and the impact of such an insurgency in Peru. Researching the reason for the government's lack of developmental policy may provide further understanding of the struggle and the lack of government response. Aware that developmental aid would have great potential for alleviating many of the burdens upon the peasant population, thereby reducing much support for the Shining Path, it is important to question why the Peruvian government so greatly resisted the developmental policy approach as a legitimate and consistent attempt to combat the group.

It is evident from research that a lack of consistent, long-term leadership had a direct effect upon the lack of a formal developmental policy solution to combat the Shining Path in Peru. To determine this direct effect, specific counterinsurgency policies proposed by Presidents Belaúnde, García, and Fujimori will be discussed. Attention will be given to these presidents' policy initiatives and the results of those policies. While exploring these efforts or lack thereof, a clear link may be established between the presidents' narrow focus on the economy, approval ratings, and centralized executive power to the lacking pursuit of a developmental policy and inability to eliminate the root causes for the insurgency.

Many scholars note economic crises as a main challenge to developmental policy. Despite economic crisis in Peru, research will highlight how the government did have adequate resources to implement developmental programs but chose not to. In order to highlight the shortfalls of the Peruvian government, this thesis will compare the case in Peru to a successful example of developmental counterinsurgency in Venezuela. Some may argue that Peru and Venezuela cannot be legitimately compared since the two countries had one main economic difference-Venezuela had large sums of available cash from oil revenues whereas Peru did not. However, research reveals that Peru's resistance to developmental policy was more a result of the presidents' willingness to relinquish power to and pressure from the military. In addition, lack of oversight by Peru's institutional bodies over the autonomous military allowed the military to engage in repressive dirty war tactics, leading to mass human rights violations.

CHAPTER II

DEVELOPMENTAL VERSUS DIRTY WAR COUNTERINSURGENCY

In order to implement effectively any type of policy within a country, the government decision-making body or bodies should completely comprehend why a particular policy is necessary, what it entails, and the effect it will have upon the population. In particular, in order to implement an effective counterinsurgency strategy, a government must first be aware of exactly what group or groups of the population are participating in the insurgency and for what reasons.

In the case of Peru, governmental decision-making power regarding counterinsurgency policies fluctuated between the executive branch and the military. The latter power was in control for a majority of the conflict with the Shining Path. Policymaking power not only see-sawed between the president and Armed Forces, but also fluctuated between two very distinct and opposing counterinsurgency strategies—a developmental strategy and a campaign of repression and total eradication, which will be referred to as a “dirty war” strategy as implemented in Argentina by the military regime during the 1970s.

The “Dirty War” was coined by the Argentine military regime itself in reference to the war it waged against those acting in protest against the government between 1976 and 1983. During this time an estimated 8,960 people were documented as killed or

missing. However, human rights experts believe that the number of the disappeared, or *desaparecidos* in Spanish, is closer to 20,000 (Knudson 1). This estimate is supported by the revelation of former Argentine Navy lieutenant commander Adolfo Francisco Scilingo, who said in 1995 that between 1,500 and 2,000 live and drugged bodies had been thrown into the Atlantic Ocean from airplanes (Knudson 1). Such statistics highlight the sheer brutality used by the Argentine military to repress voices of opposition within the country. Victims included students, labor organizers, members of human rights organizations, and community activists. Those targeted also included artists, singers, and actors who spoke out against the regime in their art. In addition, lawyers defending such victims and the psychiatrists who treated those who survived were also arrested (Knudson 2). The style of such deaths has been compared by some scholars and activists to the atrocities carried out by Nazi Germany during World War II.

Authoritarian military regimes typically either restrict or eliminate the institutional bodies that link the state to civil society, thus eliminating any form of accountability that exists within a democratic regime (Cornell and Roberts 544). Institutions such as legislatures, political parties, and electoral processes are thus restricted or eliminated, providing no filtering system between the government's policies and the mass population. Therefore, it is no surprise that citizens' human rights are often violated under authoritarian regimes, as no system of checks and balances exists to monitor the government's actions.

Since 1945, a repressive counterinsurgency strategy was the policy often implemented in Latin America. The national security doctrine implemented in most

authoritarian regimes enabled the military to act without any oversight by the democratic government. However, this approach did not always end successfully in that many times it failed to break up insurgents' base of operations and it resulted in a grand scale of human rights abuses. The violence associated with a dirty war counterinsurgency campaign often resulted in thousands of victims being arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned, tortured, killed or disappeared (Cornell and Roberts 531). In essence, the dirty war approach to counterinsurgency was a policy of annihilation.

As many countries in Latin America shifted from authoritarian to democratic regimes, including Peru in 1980, the military still retained a great amount of influence in the policymaking process since newly elected civilian governments were likely to have tentative and conditional control over the armed forces. The armed forces are likely to retain "prerogatives" that allow them to implement decisional authority, including veto power, within a variety of institutional and policymaking bodies (Stepan 93-127). The more "prerogatives" the military retains, the less oversight the civilian government and democratic institutions will be able to administrate over the military. Therefore, it is no surprise that the implementation of annihilative counterinsurgency did not end with the fall of authoritarian regimes.

The case of Peru is very comparable to that in Argentina in that both militaries engaged in violent tactics of repression against anyone who posed a real or perceived threat to security. Instead of attempting to reconcile these concerns, the Peruvian military quickly moved to suppress voices of opposition, paying no attention to their disenchantment with the government. Thus, the dirty war approach to counterinsurgency

is characterized by eradication, often through violent means, of any perceived threat to the government.

Argentina's Dirty War clearly shows the devastation that may result when military officials remain largely unaccountable for their decisions due to a lack of any civilian oversight (Mauceri 83). Not taking any lessons from the human rights abuses, the Peruvian government followed suit and adopted the perception that counterinsurgency was an "internal war" in which the particular enemy must be eliminated (Mauceri 83). With the aftermath of Argentina's dirty war not too far in the past, it is interesting to note why such a repressive policy would have ever been followed in Peru.

Developmental Policy

In contrast, developmental counterinsurgency policy involves more attention and dedication to providing economic and social assistance to populations prone to coercion by insurgent forces in efforts to eradicate the root causes of insurgency. Developmental policy requires allotting economic and social assistance to those pockets of the population usually ignored by the government. Scholars focusing on development assert that diverse societal groups, including government, business and civil society, must reach an agreement on a common development vision. In addition, these groups must embark on resolute action to grasp that vision through both collective action and coordinated individual initiative (Soberon 263). In Latin America, the collective action among diverse actors to implement a policy of sustainable development that meets the needs of all parties is referred to a *concertación* (Soberon 263).

With authoritarian military regimes, such policy often means diverting from the norm, which is often characterized by centralized decision-making, repressive policies,

high levels of income inequality, lack of coordination between political bodies, and development organizations, social conflict, and a high level of influence by elites in the political process (Soberon 263). All of such factors were at one time or another characteristic of Peru during the height of the Shining Path conflict. Thus, these conditions provided the perfect opportunity for the government to end the repressive status quo and implement a policy of developmental counterinsurgency. Such a change would require an awareness that counterinsurgency must be conducted while observing internationally recognized human rights standards (Crabtree 109).

In 1980, the per capita income for farming families living in the highlands was 82 percent of what it had been in 1976 (McClintock 61). Also in 1980, people living in this region were consuming as little as 420 calories per day, drastically less than the 1,486-calorie intake reported in 1979 (McClintock 61). Those qualified for unemployment rose from seven percent in 1982 to eleven percent in 1984 and only 35 percent of the workforce had adequate employment by the same year (Crabtree, "Peru under García 29). Furthermore, the lowering of subsidies on basic foods and reduction in government spending in the health and education sectors devastated the already struggling peasants.

In the midst of literally starving to death in some cases, the peasant populations in the Andean highlands desperately needed some form of aid. Voicing promises of change and aid, the Shining Path jumped on the opportunity to assist the peasants in order to gain their support. At this time, the implementation of a developmental policy would have better reconciled the various economic, environmental and social needs of the struggling indigenous populations living within the Andean highlands, the stronghold of the Shining Path's power (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 29). Providing developmental assistance

would have created a stronger base of support for government initiatives within these populations groups, making them less likely to turn to the insurgency for aid.

Some high-ranking officers realized the potential developmental counterinsurgency had to gain support and eliminate the insurgency:

“General Adrian Huaman, commander of the emergency zone who replaced General Noel in early 1984, declared in August that the military was unable to contain the insurgency without social, economic, and humanitarian aid from the government to assist the impoverished population of the region. Huaman was, in effect, an advocate of winning the war through stepped-up aid and development efforts, designed to win over the civilian population” (Klaren 382).

Huaman proposed that the government attack the “root causes” of the Shining Path’s insurgency. In order to do so, Huaman announced that work supplies, such as seeds, fertilizer and pesticides, should be given to the peasants in efforts to promote subsistence. Huaman asserted that nothing had been done for the highlands, which he described as another culture, one that has been forgotten (qtd. in Mauceri 93). In essence, the general proposed that the government shift emphasis away from a purely military to a more political and developmental approach to counterinsurgency. The developmental notion stressed that in order for the government to win support among the peasant communities within the Shining Path’s stronghold, direct assistance, including food, donations, and community development would be required (Crabtree 105).

Huaman addressed the need for the military to abandon full-scale repression, which often targeted innocent peasants, in an attempt to eradicate suspects of the insurgency. Instead, he supported the view that the military actively involve itself in the distribution of resources, expanding its duties to include economic, social and psychological assistance. However, such a developmental policy meant a transition

beyond the usual combative, militaristic role of the armed forces. This change required the military to assume a political role within the scope of social and economic policy, in which the armed forces were unwilling to participate.

During his same declaration, Huaman “openly castigated the government for not adopting social reforms that would benefit the highland regions and warned that, unless such policies were developed, violence in Peru would soon resemble that in Central America” (Mauceri 94). Clearly challenging the military’s counterinsurgency policy, his admonition was rejected by President Belaúnde and the Joint Command of the Armed Forces. Two days later, Huaman was relieved of his position as General Commander of the emergency zone and all hopes of a developmental policy were buried. Huaman’s removal highlights the government’s resistance to developmental policy, at least until the presidency of Alan García.

In addition to providing food supplies and other forms of social assistance, developmental policy also focuses on a fundamental shift in the distribution of income. The government may provide aid to ensure subsistence, but there is no true development unless poor populations are given the chance to support themselves and become self-sufficient. In order to do so, the government must work to reduce the inequalities in income distribution in favor of the poor. Furthermore, unless there was a narrowing in the income gap, the government could not guarantee social peace or democratic stability (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 45). This idea is supported in that as income inequality rose, both urban and rural violence had spread.

During 1985, the poorest forty percent of the Peruvian population received less than twelve percent of family income while the wealthiest ten percent received more than

three times that amount (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 45). In order to amend this income gap, it is important to implement distributive policies that provide economic and social resources to all citizens, particularly the peasantry. However, attempts to narrow the income gap must be managed by an efficient and honest government to ensure those in need truly receive greater income. This would involve the immense feat of transferring twenty percent of the national income to sixty percent of the population (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 47).

In addition, the government would have to tackle poverty in the poorest rural areas, which meant refraining from using low agricultural incomes to supply cheap products in the cities. In essence, a developmental policy would involve both strategies and actions to promote self-subsistence and social programs aimed at increasing income among specific social groups, particularly the impoverished peasants (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 47). These goals were highlighted in the National Development Plan (1986-90):

The main objective is to improve the quality of life of the population, giving special attention to the inhabitants of rural areas of the *Trapezio Andino*, to the peasants of the *sierra* and to the marginal inhabitants of the cities. Accordingly, the short-term strategy has to be distributive. The main measures include the growth of wages in relation to inflation, a fiscal policy geared to favor popular consumption, the promotion of development funds aimed at the peasantry and urban marginal sectors, and- most important of all- a policy of relative prices which favors peasants and informal workers (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 47).

According to the economic thought of the European College of Liberal Arts in Berlin during the 1960s and 1970s, national development will eventually be futile with a lack of an internal market to stimulate production. The adoption of a developmental policy in Peru would mean that the government would be required to significantly

increase the flow of low-interest loans to agricultural producers (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 54). These loans would greatly assist the peasant populations who mainly engaged in agricultural activities as their sole base of income since the loans tended to be more evenly distributed than subsidies programs. However, although these loans did provide much support for the rural populations, they were mainly granted to farmers incorporated into the market economy. These farmers had more resources and were better placed to repay. This discrimination meant poor, small-scale producers in the *sierra* were left out of developmental programs (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 55).

For example, roughly only six percent of the producers in the *sierra* were given the ability to receive credit and technical assistance (Crabtree, “Peru under García 54). Technology is essential to ensuring the peasants would be able to be self-sufficient without depending on unlimited government support. Without such technological assistance, poor, rural agriculturalists are left to survive while working at the status quo, thus preventing any type of true development. The poor farmers who were most in need and did not receive loans or technological support fell subject to the influence of the Shining Path, which pushed for a peasant revolution.

In order to implement effectively any developmental policy, it is necessary for the government to listen consciously to those populations in need in order to assess what development policies would be most beneficial with the available resources. Following the notion of *concertación*-“participatory dialogue, agreement on a common vision and collaborative initiative”- is essential to any approach to sustainable development (Soberon 263). Dialogue between the government and peasant populations indicates recognition of the importance of the communities at the highest level. In addition,

opportunities for discussion allowed for better coordination during government distribution of agricultural resources (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 55).

However, these policy ideas were marked by a lack of operational plans and inefficient action. This initiative “awaked expectations which it failed to satisfy” (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 55). Rather than addressing the systematic problems facing the impoverished peasants, developmental counterinsurgency turned out to be a short-lived experiment that lacked any execution for long-term success. Many assert that a lack of resources in Peru due to economic crisis halted any attempts at implementing counterinsurgency policies. However, this cannot be maintained as the sole reason why developmental policies failed to be incorporated to aid the peasants and eliminate the root causes of insurgency.

Poor coordination at the policy-making level stanching any conceivable developmental initiatives, even during periods of economic boom. For example, when the Peruvian economy improved in 1986 in light of the “demand-led boom for food,” the government had no thorough programs in place to ensure the producers received maximum benefit (Crabtree, “Peru under García 56). Such assistance would have required improving the distribution of technological and agricultural aid to farmers during one of Peru’s best agricultural years in decades. Yet the administration’s shortsightedness prevented any long-term sustainability for the peasant’s high agricultural output (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 57).

In 1988, the Ministry of Agriculture devised the Plan Sierra, which called for \$640 million to be spent over five years in a program to benefit 2000 communities and an estimated population of 2.5 million (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 56). However, this

program came two years too late when Peru was plagued by economic crisis, instability and short-term focus on survival. Insufficient policymaking is not only evident in the failure of agricultural programs but all developmental counterinsurgency initiatives.

Without a clear governmental plan and superior leadership and dedication on the part of policymakers and public sector administrators, most policies are doomed to fail. Also taking into consideration the pressures on the government to first meet the needs of the elite citizenry, it becomes clearer why any attempt at developmental counterinsurgency was doomed to fail in Peru.

CHAPTER III

BETANCOURT'S VENEZUELA AS A SUCCESSFUL MODEL

In order to highlight the shortcomings of the Peruvian presidents' counterinsurgency efforts, it is helpful to compare the counterinsurgency strategies implemented in Peru to a successful developmental model. Charles Anderson proposes three models for development that may be used as a formula when confronting political problems- democratic-reformist, conventional, and revolutionary. The conventional monetarist model is based on the idea that monetary economic policies, particularly taxes, incentives and exchange rates, are the instruments needed to promote a greater level of development within the country (Yepes 149). A revolutionary or structuralist model proposes that development may be achieved by manipulating and modifying social structures. Pursuing the latter model often asserts that the entrepreneurial, military and professional sectors are guilty of exploitation and should therefore be eliminated (Yepes 152).

The third, democratic-reformist model is a moderate, pragmatic approach compared to the other two developmental models. This approach focuses on reducing the gap between the living standards of the modern and traditional sectors, social welfare, and increased taxes (Yepes 152). Core to this model is first, the emphasis on guiding all social sectors towards development, including industrialization and military

professionalism. Second, the government must work to ensure the demands of each sector are met. Third, there must be communication between all sectors (Yepes 152). The last, democratic-reformist model became Venezuela's signature and successful approach to counterinsurgency.

The Venezuelan government also experienced conflicts with insurgent groups during the early 1960s. Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964) represents a successful leader who resisted threats to a democratically elected government, reassured disenchanted citizens, and ultimately eliminated the power base of communist insurgent groups. This comparison is even more useful since the insurgency movement in Venezuela preceded the Shining Path, giving the Peruvian government a successful developmental model to follow when strategizing counterinsurgency policies. Thus, the inadequacies of the Peruvian governments and their policies become visible when compared to successful developmental counterinsurgency measures in Venezuela.

From 1960 to 1964, the *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional* (FALN) and the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR) carried out a rebellion in Venezuela against Betancourt's government. Inspired by successful leftist revolutions in Cuba and the Che Guevara "foco" concept, these two rebel groups expanded their city-based operations and created a rural revolution in attempt to create a center of support in the countryside (Russell, Miller and Hildner 38). Similar to the case of Peru, some university students also joined the insurgency, including those greatly opposed to Betancourt's election and his *Acción Democrática* (AD) party policies. The students acted out this opposition by creating armed camps within the universities and often engaged in acts of terror against the government (Weitz 403).

The leftist groups were inspired to carry out an insurgency in protest of Betancourt's economic austerity program initiated by his AD party. The Acción Democrática of Venezuela was created out of a long process of development that led to the creation of indigenous reformist political parties focused on the reconstruction of the traditional societal organization (Kantor 241). Specifically, these groups emphasized a more equitable rights and distribution than experienced in the past (Kantor 248). These new ideas motivated new forces to enter the political arena with new approaches to old problems. The AD flourished as one of the new forces of influence.

Although the government would encourage foreign investment that benefited the state, the AD government focused on transforming the economy towards production for the internal market. This policy would reverse the typical model of production for the world market, particularly control and profits over Venezuela's natural resources (Kantor 248). Such economic changes were made in hopes of strengthening the Venezuelan state and gaining favor among many voters.

However, Betancourt's internal economic policies were instead met with great opposition. Betancourt wished to reorganize the tax system by placing fewer burdens on the low income populous in an effort to develop the country economically. Idle money and lands would be taxed, particularly unused urban lands (Kantor 248). Taxes upon luxury products would increase and importation would be controlled to stimulate economic development (Kantor 249). The government would propose a protective tariff for Venezuelan production to utilize Venezuelan raw materials (Kantor 249). In addition, the government would control the banking system to insure cooperation between the banking sector and the government economic policies (Kantor 249).

Rebel groups that opposed Betancourt's administration initially engaged in terrorism in the fruitless hope they could spark a military coup against Betancourt to alienate government supporters and thereby gain control (Weitz 401). In 1960, the MIR and *Partido Comunista de Venezuela* (PCV) members of the Executive Committee of the reconstituted *Confederación de Trabajadores de Venezuela* (Confederation of Venezuelan Workers) issued a call for a general strike and a "popular rebellion" against Betancourt's administration (Alexander 60). This first call for violent action resulted in 19 deaths, 265 injuries, 38 car fires, 4 assaults on police stations, and the arson of 4 police stations (Alexander 60).

Created in April 1960, the MIR was made up of radical young students and revolutionary communist allies who remained in Venezuela during the dictatorship of Marcos Perez Jimenez (1952-1958) (Yepes 51). The communist revolutionaries looked to the Cuban model of revolution and began to organize under the leadership of Simon Saez Merida, the ex-secretary general of the AD party, and Domingo Alberto Rangel (Yepes 51). Both leaders stayed true to the revolutionary approach to democratic pluralism, splitting from the AD party in protest against its reforms (Yepes 51). These revolutionaries, along with radical student youths and the PCV, made up the body of the government opposition from 1960 to 1962.

Although the insurgency in Venezuela was not a holistic communist movement like the Shining Path in Peru, the Communist party in Venezuela did support the movement for a time (Weitz 405). The PCV also took note of the successful Cuban insurgency, becoming empowered to try to take over the Venezuelan government by force. Many of these members were radical deserters of the reformist parties who chose

to take a tougher approach toward the government. In addition, Betancourt's hostility towards the Communists further enticed the leftist group to join forces with the insurgents in an attempt to launch a campaign of terror against the Betancourt's administration (Weitz 405).

In a reversal from the Shining Path, the insurgents in Venezuela shifted their terrorist operations from the urban areas to the rural countryside in attempt to gain support among the peasant populations (Weitz 399). Many experts in insurgency believe that guerilla operations best flourish in areas that are not easily accessible to government forces (Weitz 399). Such were the remote Andean highlands, which enabled the Shining Path to operate without interference from the government. However, it has also been proposed that concentrations of operations must not be too far from the nation's urban centers (Weitz 399). Whereas the Shining Path concentrated its early power in the Andean mountain valley, the Venezuelan insurgents pursued a policy of urban terrorism in attempt to enact a military coup against Betancourt (Weitz 401).

A soaring 14.4 percent nationwide unemployment level and a clear division between the military forces allowed the insurgents to believe that the government's fall was very plausible (Yepes 52). In 1962 alone, the guerillas in Venezuela killed or wounded eighty police officers, burned seventy-five buses, robbed banks, indiscriminately bombed several buildings and tried on several occasions to sabotage Venezuela's main oil installations in attempts to intimidate the government (Weitz 401).

In an attempt to disrupt the 1963 elections, the FALN rebel group announced that any citizens going to the polls to vote would be shot (Powell 102). The lack of support for the insurgency became clear when the rebels' hopes for a boycott of the 1963

elections were disregarded by over ninety percent of the registered voters despite threats from the insurgents (Weitz 401). In fact, the public voted in record numbers with thirty-one percent voting in favor of the AD party candidate Raul Leoni and electing 65 AD deputies and 24 congressional representatives (Powell 102).

After the failure of the 1963 boycott, the PCV soon realized that the insurgency lacked public support. Particularly, the insurgent groups were unable to gain support from poor metropolitan residents who aligned with the radical left and right. Therefore, the insurgents were unable to create a base of support in the urban areas to assist their rural operations. Some theorists of insurgency believe that rebels must maintain at least the passive support of a large base of population (Weitz 399). Che Guevara himself said in his *Guerilla Warfare* that, “the guerilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable condition” for success (qtd. in Weitz 402).

It is also interesting to note that the insurgents failed to gain support for their leftist movement in Caracas where Betancourt initially lacked political support. In the 1959 presidential elections, Betancourt received fewer votes in the capital than the other three major party candidates did. Caracas residents had responded to the announcement of his election by rioting in the streets for two days (Weitz 403). Although he did not receive much support in the urban centers, Betancourt won over the remainder of the population and received about forty-seven percent of the total votes (Kantor 238). Betancourt’s popularity amongst the majority of the country allowed him to gain support for counterinsurgency polices aimed at ending the guerilla war.

The Communist party realized the insurgency would not succeed and quickly disassociated itself from the other leftist guerillas (Weitz 405). By 1967, the PCV was

denouncing terrorism, stating that it had “nothing to do with either the revolution or the defense of the popular cause” (Weitz 405). Attempts to wage a guerilla war in the rural areas proved just as unsuccessful as the insurgency measures in the cities and the FALN and MIRA rebel groups quickly abandoned their struggle (Weitz 405). These guerilla insurgents never gained widespread support throughout Venezuela.

So why was the Venezuelan administration so quickly able to expel the insurgents’ power from the political process and eliminate threats of a nationwide insurgency? While the leftist insurgency groups in Venezuela did not have a mystical-like leader such as Guzman in Peru, the Venezuelan rebels did initially appeal to the ethnic cleavages amongst the population, as did the Shining Path.

However, in the case of Venezuela, the reason for the insurgents’ failure in the rural area is directly linked to the developmental aid Betancourt provided to the impoverished populations. Elected by the people, Betancourt was able to implement effective and successful counterinsurgency policies while refraining from violating on most Venezuelans’ civil liberties. In particular, Betancourt incorporated a great surge of state-led *developmentalism*, which centered on industrialization, modernization, and fight to eliminate poverty (Schuyler 10). In part of this policy, the president and his AD party introduced reforms designed to gain peasant support, including finance for improvements in education, housing, and other developmental sectors (Alexander 66-70).

During Betancourt’s administration, more than 1,000 people were killed because of the guerilla insurgency. Of these deaths, anywhere between one hundred to three hundred peasants were killed in the states of Falcón and Lara (Wickham-Crowley 206). Betancourt intelligently realized that the peasant population in these areas could serve as

a valuable alliance in the government's campaign to fight the insurgents. It was therefore essential that Betancourt provide economic and social aid to this population in order to eliminate the root causes of insurgency. Now more able to become self-sufficient, the rural peasants would be less prone to fall under the insurgents' influence and acts of violence.

The Betancourt administration took note that it is difficult for insurgents to gain support of the population in countries where established and broad based political parties exist (Weitz 411). Compared to Peru, the Venezuelan government was neither weak nor ineffective and was able to present a constructive program of action. The government used the country's political organizations to appeal to the poorer populations, maintaining control over most workers and peasants. For example, Betancourt used the mass organization of his AD party and its coalition partner, the Christian Democrats (COPEI), to dissuade the insurgents appeal (Alexander 60). Such political collaboration allowed the administration to secure the peasants' support against the leftist insurgents, making the guerilla's campaign for a rural revolution hopeless.

Essential to developmental policy, the government provided the peasantry with both economic and social assistance. For example, the Agricultural and Grazing Bank during Betancourt's administration made more loans to farmers, especially small landholders (Alexander 67). The government also implemented a large irrigation program to expand and improve the cultivated land in Venezuela. However, Betancourt realized that implementing such policies in the periphery of Venezuela would be terribly difficult without proper infrastructure (Alexander 69).

A lack of supporting infrastructure would be one of the Peruvian administrations' key challenges, but Betancourt's administration chose to make it one of their primary targets. For example, the newly established public electrical generating and distribution company, CEDEFE, supplied electricity for the first time to hundreds of towns in the interior of the country (Alexander 69). This provided the condition for electrical consumption to more than double during Betancourt's presidency. In addition, the government built 1,500 kilometers of highway and 7,000 kilometers of minor neighborhood and access roads in rural areas (Alexander 69). With adequate infrastructure, the government was now able to properly distribute aid and maintain contact with the interior of the country. Such contact diminished any hopes the insurgents may have had to obtain an isolated chokehold over the rural areas.

Other social assistance programs included campaigns to enhance funds for public education and health (Alexander 67). Health programs included focus on sanitation, child protection agencies and ways to better the overall health of the rural population. Differing from the case in Peru, Betancourt's social programs benefited not just the elite population but also assisted the impoverished peasants. Receiving aid from the government, which paid special attention to the Venezuelans' needs, these populations were less inclined to join the insurgency movement and conspire against a government.

Betancourt's AD party also favored workers' rights, which aided the lower class populations in Venezuela. For example, the party favored the creation of a complete social security system and advocated workers' rights to organize trade unions and to strike (Kantor 249). In addition, the administration supported a reduction in work hours,

the implementation of a living wage, and a gradual increase in the length of paid vacations (Kantor 249).

Most central to Betancourt's policy was the implementation of agrarian reform, which was directed at solving problems faced by the marginal masses, specifically the peasant populations. Based on the Agrarian Reform Law of 1960, the Venezuelan government established the legal basis for extensive agrarian reforms supported by the Peasant Federation and thousands of their followers (Powell 109). The reform was signed into law with the intention to create a new class of 300,000 small family subsistence farm-owners (Powell 109). These farm owners would eventually become a productive sector of the national economy (Powell 109).

Land reform was important to Betancourt's development policy. The government provided services on these lands, such as housing, medical facilities, water and sanitation systems, market roads and other various extension services. In addition, farmers were granted loans through the Agriculture Bank and aided with price-support programs. Proving that such aid could appeal to the peasants and thereby earn their support, the Peasant Federation renounced the use of land invasion as a mechanism for pressure on the government (Powell 112).

Between 1958 and 1959, peasants had taken part in several hundred cases of spontaneous land invasions on properties that had been used by Jimenez's dictatorship under the agrarian reform program. Local organizational leaders who secretly remained in the country during the regime, acted out during the transition to democracy and advocated retribution. Such actions forced the government to take notice of the peasants' plight. In fact, 16.1 percent of local organizations had sponsored land invasions, totaling

approximately 550 between 1959 and 1961 (Powell 141). Such numbers indicate the peasants' agitation after the fall of Jimenez's regime. As peasants largely eased their pressures upon the government by the spring of 1961, the government was able to shift focus on other ways to aid the poorer populations and combat the insurgency.

Betancourt also differed from the Peruvian government when he effectively incorporated the rural peasants into the problem-solving process. The peasants organized themselves into local organizations and about 72 percent of the locals held meetings at least once a month (Powell 140). The peasants came to these meetings ready to discuss community problems and make their demands for relief. In addition, these groups provided feedback on the status of ongoing developmental programs and were never afraid to voice complaints about unsolved problems.

Local leaders served as agents for the local peasants and approached field officers or high-level government administrators with the population's demands. For example, a national sample of three peasant groups reports that 78 percent of local peasant organizations petitioned the Ministry of Education, 69.5 percent for land from the National Agrarian Institute (IAN), 66.9 percent for rural housing projects, 65.3 percent for penetration roads, and 65.3 percent for health and sanitary projects (Powell 143). If a greater amount of pressure was required, the local leader could directly call upon the Peasant Federation, state executive committees or the national officials in order to ensure the peasant's requests were heard.

Betancourt's AD party had been incorporating peasants into the political process since the 1940s and 1950s and was therefore able to gain much support amongst these populations during the insurgency (Weitz 411). The government pushed for complete

democracy based on a direct vote. Betancourt gained support from much of the population based upon the notion that the government would remain impartial in all elections and uphold strict rules to prevent bribery or fraud, which interfered with the free election process. In addition, the government guaranteed all civil liberties and respected the freedom of religion. Essentially, the administration advocated a comprehensive democratic system that enabled the peasants to gain a voice in the country. These conditions contributed to the fact that most Venezuelans did not challenge Betancourt's legitimacy during the insurgency (Weitz 411).

Peasant farmers were known to voice their support for the government by participating in public demonstrations. Although large groups of marching, machete-waving farmers took to the streets at times to protest delays in credit payments, peasant farmers mainly marched in support of Betancourt's administration. For example, twice during the height of the insurgency, an estimated 100,000 rural citizens organized and traveled to Caracas by bus and truck to demonstrate their support of the government (Powell 140). Such support highlights how the president was able to appeal to the peasants at the height of the insurgency crisis and guarantee support against opposition forces.

Betancourt differed from the Peruvian administrations in that his aid was focused on the long-term, not just short-term alleviation of the peasants' burdens. Betancourt favored a centrally controlled planning process in order to develop and implement his agrarian reform program. This approach diverted from the practice of speedy and hasty land distribution. In addition, the government refrained from falling pressure to the wants of local organizations (Powell 113).

Further statistics show how the government carefully planned and implemented developmental aid. Government funds for Betancourt's agrarian reform ranged between \$140 million in the 1961 fiscal year to \$85 million in 1963, at the height of his political opposition (Powell 163). The rest of the funds were used for salaries, planning, and research and overhead costs. Between the 1958 and 1966 fiscal years, the government dispersed the greatest amount of funds. For example, in 1961 in the early years of his administration, the National Agrarian Institute (IAN) allotted 199.5 million bolivars, the Agriculture and Livestock Bank (BAP) 162.0 million, and the Ministry of Agriculture (MAC) 257.0 million, totally 618.5 million bolivars compared to 437.1 the preceding year and 449.3 the following year (Powell 164). Fifty to seventy percent of budgetary appropriation during the early 1960s was directly used for land purchases. Such government aid helped place approximately 100,000 rural farming families on roughly 5 million acres of their own land (Powell 163).

The BAP gave loans designed for both commercial and subsistence farmers, aiding those peasants that did not cultivate enough acres of land to qualify for commercial loans. If one cultivated less than thirty hectares, he or she could be eligible for a lower-interest peasant (*campesino*) loan. The amount of such was directly dependent on the crop to be grown and the market price at the time (Powell 165). Such procedures clearly show that Betancourt's administration carefully planned his developmental programs in order to be successful in the end. With proper planning, interaction with the peasants and careful distribution, the government was able to provide economic and social assistance, thus eliminating the root causes of insurgency during the height of Betancourt's opposition.

Lastly, Betancourt's administration would enforce "a high moral and material level for the Armed Forces," which would be placed under the authority of the elected officials and the laws of the Venezuelan state (Kantor 448). Although soldiers did carry out random acts of violence against the peasants in Venezuela, repression was not a government-sponsored policy. These acts of violence were not a part of Betancourt's developmental approach to counterinsurgency and were quickly denounced in the press. One guerilla suggested, "There was probably one new recruit for every woman raped by soldiers" (Wickham-Crowley 234). After a particularly brutal raid on a village in Lara state, the guerillas received a whole new wave of recruits (Wickham-Crowley 206).

Therefore, it was essential that Betancourt denounce these acts and implement peaceful, developmental programs to counteract the military's repressive image among the peasants. Reflective of the government's adherence to human rights, guerilla leader "El Gavilán" (Jose Diaz) was noted as saying contrary to his expectations, he was treated well by the soldiers who captured him after he surrendered outside the Lara hills (Wickham-Crowley 207).

Although the Venezuelan government did carry out some forceful counterinsurgency maneuvers, Betancourt made sure that peasants were not indiscriminately targeted. Guerilla zones were regularly bombed in the country before the army carried out encirclement campaigns to clean out guerilla strongholds. However, the president always made sure that all village peasants in the region were first cleared out (Wickham-Crowley 207). Killing innocent peasants during counterinsurgency campaigns would only push the peasants away from the government, making any government-peasant alliance for counterinsurgency impossible. Furthermore, although

Betancourt suspended some civil liberties in an attempt to control the population and prevent the spread of the insurgency, the president only did so at the call of the Venezuelan people. The AD party learned from its previous mistakes, which resulted in its overthrow by the military in 1948, and regularly conferred with major party leaders, except the Communists (Weitz 410).

Executive oversight, which the Peruvian presidents failed to enforce and maintain, allowed for much of Venezuela's success in developmental counterinsurgency. Furthermore, by asserting control over the military, the government was able to maintain oversight in order to ensure a dirty war counterinsurgency approach was not pursued and human rights were not violated. Peruvian presidents Belaúnde, García and Fujimori instead relinquished all control, eliminating any executive oversight of the armed forces' counterinsurgency campaigns. As we now know, this lack of executive oversight enabled the Peruvian military to carry out its own Dirty War, which led to mass human rights violations.

Betancourt's developmental policies are not only a respected trademark of his presidency, but are also considered a great democratic achievement in Venezuelan history. The presidents in Peru could have followed suit and gained respect amongst the population. Such popular support could have better eliminated the root causes of insurgency and decreased the peasant's willingness to join forces with the Shining Path. However, the Peruvian administrations completely ignored the already isolated peasant populations, enabling the Shining Path to secure a stronghold in the rural Andean highlands. Without any real government efforts to incorporate peasants in counterinsurgency efforts, the Shining Path was able to reign supreme in the region.

CHAPTER IV

WHY CONSISTENT DEVELOPMENTAL COUNTERINSURGENCY FAILED IN PERU

Many scholars note economic crisis is a main challenge to developmental policy. For this reason, some may argue that Peru and Venezuela cannot be legitimately compared since the two countries had one main economic difference-Venezuela had large sums of available cash from oil revenues whereas Peru did not. However, research shows that Peru allotted great sums of money to developmental solutions but misallocated those funds towards projects that did not benefit the indigenous populations.

After applying developmental theory to the actual application of developmental counterinsurgency policy (or lack thereof) in Peru, it will become clear where Presidents Belaúnde, García, and Fujimori went wrong. The comparison between Venezuela and Peru shows that economic crisis cannot be maintained as the sole reason for Peru's abandonment of these developmental initiatives since adequate funds did exist. Instead, the Peruvian administrations' real error laid in bad policymaking decisions, including a lack of oversight over the armed forces.

The following figures highlight the government's misallocation of public funds. Between 1980 and 1981, the government spent \$184 million in the high-technology Majes irrigation project (after \$391 million had already been spent during the 1970s)

despite agronomists' lack of support for the project (McClintock 70). Three years later in 1984, the first stage of the project had not even been completed, reflecting a lack of efficiency in government projects allegedly implemented to assist the peasant populations. Military officials at the time supported the project, saying Majes also benefited national defense due to the proximity of the irrigation project to Peru's border with Chile (McClintock 71). Majes is an example of how projects supported by the military were the primary recipients of government funds, despite non-production and inefficiency.

During a time when the government should have invested in economic and social programs that would have provided resources to eliminate the root causes of insurgency, official figures indicate that military expenditures almost tripled in real terms between 1971 and 1982 (Sheetz 183). Despite possible funding for developmental counterinsurgency, the Peruvian presidents fell susceptible to the military's pressures and quickly abandoned any serious thought for developmental programs. Instead, the administrations shifted available funds to the military to be used in combative measures against anyone suspected of being a member of the Shining Path.

Furthermore, from 1982 to 1990, army personnel grew from 75,000 to 80,000 soldiers. Between 1980 and 1990, air force personnel increased from 9,500 to 15,000 and those enlisted in the navy rose from 20,500 in 1984 to 25,000 in 1990 (Armed Forces Personnel Strength, Selected Years, 1829-1992). In addition, there was a 117% growth in police forces from 1969 to 1987 (Sheetz 183). These figures depict that Peru did have the funds to carry out a developmental solution, but the presidents chose not to.

According to Deger and Smith, as spending on defense expands, either investment or total social expenditures (education and health) will decrease (Scheetz 184). This statement is proven in the case of Peru during the Shining Path insurgency. While defense expenditures rocketed, spending in other developmental areas declined during the insurgency. Such misappropriation of funds is highlighted in the average growth rate for social services, including education (4%) and health services (35%) (Scheetz 183). Both services are essential when attempting to eliminate the root causes of insurgency. However, large arms acquisitions and military spending overshadowed the need to provide peasants with valuable aid, highlighting the administrations' missed opportunity to implement a developmental counterinsurgency policy.

The Peruvian Mindset

During the 1970s, many Latin American countries, including Peru, transitioned from military regimes to democratic governments. After the Peruvian military regime of Juan Valasco Alvarado (1968-1975), General Francisco Morales Bermudez (1975-1980) took over the government after Alvarado's health continued to deteriorate. Morales emphasized in a speech before the elections to the Constituent Assembly that the military would not remain in its "barracks, bases and ships" but would rather remain in "POLITICS in capital letters, which means life of the fatherland, which means sovereignty and development" (Mauceri 88).

Morales' emphasis on development highlighted a key distinction during Peru's military rule from 1968 to 1980 compared to other Latin American military dictatorships—a commitment to redistributive social and economic reforms and the encouragement of the public sectors into the national political process. It was only after Morales

implemented economic austerity measures that revolts broke out in 1977 and 1978, causing the military to implement what would become its standard use of repression (Cornell and Roberts 533). It was during this time that the Shining Path began to emerge and grow, providing a challenge for the newly formed civilian democracy under President Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1980-1985). Consequently, human rights violations surged in Peru as the armed forces attempted to eliminate the insurgent forces.

During his second administration beginning in 1980, President Belaúnde appointed Manuel Ulloa as prime minister. Ulloa integrated neo-liberal, free-market doctrines under the guidance of the “Chicago Boys (Klaren 374). The individuals were trained by Milton Friedman at the University of Chicago and recommended economic policies designed to strengthen the market. Such policies included removing tariff protection from industry and encouraging private foreign investments aimed at reducing inflation and gaining the confidence of investors (Klaren 374).

However, Peru’s neoliberal economic policies were nowhere near as fruitful as one had hoped. Instead, exports fell, imports increased, industry declined, the trade deficit returned and inflation began to rise in the country (Klaren 376). The greatest burden of this sharp decline in the economy rested upon the urban poor and the peasantry in the southern highlands, including the department of Ayacucho. At the time, the incomes of 57 percent of the households in the countryside were considered to be below the poverty line, while the remaining 32 percent were classified below the extreme poverty level (Klaren 376). These statistics highlight how wealth was concentrated into the hands of the top elite.

A study by Muller, Dietz and Finkel illustrates that in addition to securing private interests, participation in illegal protest in Peru is motivated by expectation of reward, including more goods and better living conditions (1263). Political conditions, which most students- including those under Guzman's influence at the Huamanga University in Ayacucho- are discontent, include alienation from the political system and dissatisfaction with the government's performance in income inequality reduction (Muller, Dietz and Finkel 1279-1280). Such dissatisfaction created potential for violent, rebellious political action. As the leader of the Shining Path, Guzman appealed to these disenchanting students for support.

Belaúnde's attempts to reverse income inequalities and the burden upon the poor lacked serious initiative and resulted in few benefits as conditions worsened. Continued economic strictness to reign in the deficit worsened poverty conditions as social welfare and consumer funding were eliminated from Belaúnde's policy agenda. In addition to disparities in income, the economic crisis also threatened the greatest source of income for the peasants, the production and value of their land. Cynthia McClintock argues it was expected Ayacucho peasants would rebel during a crisis in subsistence. Although population growth and land exhaustion (63) created difficulties for the peasants apart from the government, McClintock argues unequal benefits (64), deteriorating trade terms (67), and unwise investments on the part of the government (69) created disparities in land reform. This prompted peasants living at a traditional subsistence level in Ayacucho to rebel against the government.

Belaúnde also failed to address the problem of the poor quality of public administration in Peru, leaving in question what was to be done to improve the way in

which public policy was put into effect (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 58). Belaúnde failed to reduce the size of the public sector, which had been the cause of so many of Peru's economic burdens. In fact, such a large and ineffective administrative machine often got in the way of enterprise, thus challenging any serious implementation of developmental policy. It becomes evident that the state did have available resources to fund developmental counterinsurgency policies, but those resources were swallowed in the public sector. Public funds were misdirected, leaving little or no aid for the peasants. Thus, recognizing that income inequality provides a source of instigation for rebellion, Belaúnde ought not to have ignored the consequences of economic reform upon the entire population while only focusing on economic growth for a few.

Due to the government's inefficiency and unwillingness to provide continual social assistance, the population in Ayacucho and many other areas of the southern highlands consequently turned towards the Shining Path for support. Emphasizing the class disparity in the country and the need to combat the Peruvian government while also promising the peasants an active role in a new government controlled by the vanguard party (Starn, "Maoism in the Andes" 406-409), it was no surprise that the highland peasants sought assistance from other than the government.

The Belaúnde administration did not recognize the great potential that lay in pursuing a developmental solution. Burdened by inflation and job loss, the Belaúnde administration felt pressure to secure the economy and was unable to initiate developmental welfare programs. Yet, the more the country avoided developmental assistance for the peasants, the greater the Shining Path grew. As the Shining Path gained momentum, the number of attacks increased from 219 in 1980 to 2,050 in 1985,

causing an estimated \$2,139,542 in economic losses (Klaren 382). By 1983, over half of the reported terrorist acts were being committed outside the Ayacucho region (Klaren 382), which highlighted the growing appeal towards the movement throughout the country.

Belaúnde's administration responded to the rebellion by passing Legislative Decree 46, an anti-terrorist law that established severe penalties for persons convicted of terrorism (qtd. in Cornell and Roberts 535). The law enabled police to detain any suspected members or sympathizers of the Shining Path for up to fifteen days without court interference (qtd. in Cornell and Roberts 535). However, the administration failed to engage in oversight of the military and many innocent activists in student, labor, peasant, and community organizations were arrested. By Nov. 1983, 2,294 people had been detained, highlighting the worsening human rights situation in Peru (qtd. in Cornell and Roberts 535).

During this time, allegations soared that the military was systematically using torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial executions to eliminate the Shining Path. By December 1983, the attorney general reported that his office had received 1,200 allegations of disappearances in the region (Cornell and Roberts 536). In addition, civilian casualties increased from 2,800 in 1983 to 4,300 the next year (Klaren 381). The military swept through the countryside to eliminate insurgents. However, many innocent civilians were often killed in the process. The indiscriminate style of dirty war counterinsurgency is perfectly highlighted in Peruvian Minister of War General Luis Cisneros' December 1982 statement:

“We are professional soldiers and we are trained to kill. To be successful [in

Ayacucho] we have to begin to kill Senderistas and civilians. We may kill 60 people, and at best, there are 3 Senderistas among them and the police will say that all 60 were Senderistas” (qtd. in Cornell and Roberts 536).

The human rights situation only deteriorated when Belaúnde eventually granting the military all necessary powers to eliminate the Shining Path, which would become a critical and reoccurring error by the Peruvian administrations. Referring to Article 231 of the 1979 Constitution, which stated the Armed Forces would assume internal control when the President of the Republic decides, Belaúnde created political military commands to control the five departments he designated as Shining Path strongholds (Mauceri 90). These states of emergency included Ayacucho, the stronghold of the Shining Path. Essentially, the president ceded all political and administrative authority to the armed forces in these zones, weakening constitutional guarantees and democratic accountability (Cornell and Roberts 532).

Although the decision to give political authority to the military was made by a civilian president, how that authority was to be used was the decision of the military command. Other than his figurative role as commander of the Armed Forces, Belaúnde did not execute any true oversight over the military’s counterinsurgency policies (Mauceri 90). Instead, Belaúnde defined counterinsurgency against the Shining Path as an internal war and deferred responsibility to the military to combat the rebellion (Mauceri 83).

Involved in the process of implementing counterinsurgency policy, leading officers would remain divided over the nature of that commitment (Mauceri 90), making any effective efforts impossible. The civilian government granted the military the liberty to carry out all means necessary to eliminate the enemy. Now with a virtual free reign

over counterinsurgency, the armed forces steered away from policies calling for developmental assistance. The armed forces instead proceeded with the only familiar policy to combat a national security threat: engaging in tactics of repression, which allowed for a wave of human rights abuses that surpassed anything Peru had ever experienced under the previous authoritarian regime (Cornell and Roberts 532).

García's Attempts at Development

With weakened economic conditions hurtling much of the population into greater poverty and a growing terrorist movement within the borders of his country, Belaúnde left Peru in need of leadership capable of eliminating the Shining Path while simultaneously providing for the population. Unlike Belaúnde, García openly challenged the military's "dirty-war" counterinsurgency tactics, marking an opportunity for the national leadership to pursue a developmental policy. Winning the 1985 presidential race by a wide margin, García initially held great support from the populace and threatened the military's autonomy.

At the start of his administration, García emphasized the need for national development, especially in areas where benefits of such development would be equally distributed amongst the population. In order to pursue new development projects, García's government was tackled with strengthening the new state apparatus, making it more effective and ensuring that local level government was more democratic and responsive to constituents' needs (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 59).

Linking violence to underdevelopment and denouncing the military's human rights violations, García pursued a series of developmental programs throughout the country. In particular, García recognized the role the peasants' impoverished state played

in their alliance with the Shining Path. García was aware that the only way to change the country's current counterinsurgency approach would be to introduce changes aimed at strengthening the bureaucracy, thereby making it more efficient. This meant addressing the slow speed of policy implementation, the lack of inter-agency coordination, institutional rivalries, and the lack of accountability and problems of corruption, especially at higher levels within the administration (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 62).

García's first step was to assume all decision-making responsibilities. The new president disposed of a system of cabinet and ministerial coordination and instead carried out decision-making duties with the assistance of a small group of advisors (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 62). In addition, the president became involved in daily policy implementation, thus restraining the free reigns once enjoyed by the ministries, departments, and other state institutions (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 62). Although the bureaucratic machine now moved much quicker since most of the red tape was eliminated, there now existed risk to the quality of the decisions (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 63). However, history reveals that García's decisions had both positive and negative results.

García also reduced the military's influence in a wide range of political decisions, pledging in his inaugural address "the use of death as a means to an end is unacceptable under a democratic system" (Cornell and Roberts 536). This measure established civilian control over the armed forces including all counterinsurgency initiatives. As a result, reports of disappearances fell to an average of 100 a year during García's first two and a half years compared to the average 600 annual disappearances during the last two and a half years of Belaúnde's administration (Cornell and Roberts 536). In addition, after

mass graves were discovered in the highland villages of Accomarca and Pucayacu, García ordered an investigation and fired the chairman of the armed forces Joint Chiefs of Staff (Cornell and Roberts 537).

In addition to improvements in Peru's human rights standards, García also cut military expenditures in defense spending and asserting authority over the free reigns of the military. Such initiatives were all made possible due to his popularity amongst the citizenry who supported such bold changes. During his term, military expenditures totaled an average of 2.4 percent of GDP, down from 4.19 percent during Belaúnde's presidency. General defense spending also declined, constituting an average of 16.0 percent of the public sector outlays compared to 18.6 percent under Belaúnde (Cornell and Roberts 537).

Instead of approving vast military expenses, García allocated funds for developmental programs, particularly by establishing the *Trapezio Andino*, a program that provided peasants in the southern highlands with interest-free loans from the state Agrarian Bank and technical assistance from the Agriculture Ministry (Mauceri 95). Under García's administration, newly appointed Minister of War, General Jorge Flores Torres argued the need for development, emphasizing the urgent need "to promote development in the poorest zones of the country, to overcome the objective conditions which nurture subversion..." (qtd. in Mauceri 95).

Arguing for the same developmental programs as Huaman who served under Belaúnde's administration, Torres' argument would soon meet resistance, not so much from an autonomous military, but because of a lack of proper local government infrastructure. The areas where the government intended to provide developmental aid

tended to be those with the weakest government presence and influence. This was often the case where the Shining Path was most powerful, particularly in the southern *sierra* (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 65). The government not only faced challenges during the policymaking process, but also now had to determine how to implement aid in areas lacking strong state machinery. It therefore became difficult to grant developmental assistance to eliminate the root causes of insurgency in the areas where the insurgents retained their stronghold.

Another impediment to implementing developmental assistance arose out of the government's mismanagement of resources. New developmental projects require vast sums of funds, which should have been readily available in a growing economy. Between 1986 and 1987, Peru experienced higher-than-usual growth, which should have translated into higher level of income for the government (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 59). However, García failed to take proper advantage of the booming economy and instead pursued a fiscal policy that would quickly reverse what quick-lived prosperity the country enjoyed.

For example, García's administration reduced the sales tax from 11 percent to 6 percent in 1985 in order to compensate for income loss (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 60). However, the action had the reverse effect and government income from taxes fell from three percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1985 to 1.3 percent in 1987 (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 60). Second, the new administration froze petroleum prices, which the government had come to rely on to offset the reduced yield from taxes. Compared to bringing as much as five percent of GDP in 1985, petroleum prices now

only yielded 2.2 percent in 1987 after García's fiscal changes (Crabtree, "Peru under García" 60).

In 1987, the economy began to falter once again. A decision that would have negative affects, García announced to Congress that he would nationalize the remainder of the nation's private banks. García not only alarmed the parliament and his own Aprista party, but also polarized the business community. The latter effect resulted with the business sector sending money and investments out of the country in order to protect their assets. As a result, inflation rose, growth waned, tax receipts fell, and the trade surplus fell from \$1.2 billion in 1985, creating a deficit of \$521 million in 1987 (Klaren 394). Not only did García's popularity weaken as a direct result of the economic downfall, but also a poor economy now meant a lack of resources to follow through with developmental programs for the peasants in the southern highlands. This included programs such as *Trapezia Andino*, which came to an abrupt halt as the Agrarian Bank lacked proper funds

Furthermore, the economic crisis created by failed government fiscal policies created a great burden upon the agriculture sector in rural areas, removing what annual growth the impoverished peasants had enjoyed during the first half of García's presidency. As the demand for farm products dropped, terms of trade in agriculture became sharply negative, and close to 6.5 million persons did not earn enough in one month to purchase the minimum basket of goods necessary for adequate subsistence (\$48) (Klaren 396).

However, records show that despite such economic burden, the government had resources available to combat the insurgency. Instead of allocating these funds towards

developmental aid to eliminate the root causes of insurgency, the government instead reverted to spending programs that would support an armed, repressive counterinsurgency policy. Non-official sources indicate that one-third of all expenditures were allotted to the military in 1983 and 1984 for a \$4 billion arms-purchase deal (qtd. in McClintock 72). Such expenditures show that consistent and widespread developmental programs were very possible in Peru. Only consistent development was challenged by a lack of serious implementation and a misallocation of government resources.

García's control over the ministries and government institutions also resulted in negative backlash from those agencies. For example, García faced great opposition from the military, which resented the president's strict control over the armed forces. A consequence of García's threat to military autonomy, the armed forces engaged in a backlash towards the president and refused to carry out their duties to protect the country from the Shining Path insurgency forces. For example, in 1998, as the "Shining Path attacked the police post at Tocache, located in the department of San Martín, [the] country listened by radio and television to messages sent by the chief of the post. Surrounded, he begged" (Obando 391) the leader of the military counterinsurgency commission for reinforcements until he and his staff were murdered eight hours later. Military forces no more than fifty kilometers away sited "bad weather" as the reason for not sending helicopters to help (Obando 391).

Taking advantage of the downturn in the economy, the government's abandonment of development policies, and the military's stubborn lack of involvement, the Shining Path was able to gain support in light of García's dilemma. Falling susceptible to the military's influence, García was forced to reverse the restrictions

against the armed forces and quickly abandoned his efforts to protect human rights.

Making concessions to the damaged business community in light of the economic crisis, García met with Lima business executives, promising them “the military would stay in charge of counterinsurgency operations, and that there [would] be no withdrawal of troops from Ayacucho (Crabtree, "Peru: From Belaúnde to Alan García" 538). Faced with great pressure from the business community and the military, García soon abandoned his developmental efforts.

In July 1988, Garcia proposed new anti-terrorist legislation, which made it possible to prosecute individuals for belonging to an insurgent movement, possessing arms or explosives or expressing sympathy for a group that supported the use of violence. The new law broadly defined the act of terrorism as any act committed with the intention of changing or threatening the constitutional system or hampering with the security of the state. Such a broad definition allowed for conviction without the commission of violent actions (Cornell and Roberts 538).

García also called for the repeal of Law 24,700, which had been in place to guarantee detainees with safeguards during criminal investigations, including medical attention and legal counsel (Cornell and Roberts 538). The law also established that public prosecutors would be in charge of investigations to “defend legality, human rights and the interests protected by the law” (Cornell and Roberts 538). However, the repeal now gave investigative powers to the police, eliminating the institutional mechanism set in place to enforce democratic norms and guarantee civilian liberties (Cornell and Roberts 538).

According to a poll from the Institute for Legal Defense, a nongovernmental human rights organization in Peru, more than ninety percent of those defendants who claimed not to be members of any insurgent organization said they have been mistreated during investigations. In addition, those same defendants said they were not provided a lawyer at the time of their first interrogation or with a free, court-appointed lawyer as required under Peru's statute Cornell and Roberts 538).

Although entering his administration with high approval ratings and great hopes to implement development programs that would eliminate the root causes of insurgency, García's economic policies and pressures from the military left aid-orientated policies with incomplete resources. Once again, the government was forced to relinquish executive control over counterinsurgency to the military, this time at great expense to García's visionary developmental policies.

The Military and Peasants Join Forces: the Creation of *Rondas*

Although approaching the end of a presidential term marked by economic crisis and a rise in insurgency maneuvers, García nonetheless attempted to oversee last minute aid throughout the highlands. However, this form of aid did not focus on economic or social assistance, but rather on arming peasant populations so they themselves could fight against the insurgents. "In late 1989, President Alán García personally traveled to the Apurimac Valley region of Ayacucho to oversee the handling over of weapons to the local *rondas*, or peasant patrols" (Mauceri 101). García rallied the peasants together behind the cause for counterinsurgency, stating the Shining Path was an aggressive war against the peasants and their country. García's initiative gained the support of many military officials who recognized the potential force the peasants could provide in

attacking the Senderos. Without García's action, the military may never have followed suit or realized the great potential the peasants provided towards the county's counterinsurgency efforts.

“The increased reliance on *rondas* coincided with the obvious vacuum that had developed in counterinsurgency strategy by 1988 and the tolerance for ‘private’ responses to insurgents, such as paramilitary groups” (Mauceri 101). By closing peasants’ plant production markets, replacing traditional communal authorities with young cadres, engaging in intolerable punishments that did not obey peasant codes, lacking manly patronage while fleeing from approaching Armed Forces, and practicing vast differences in religious and cultural beliefs (Mauceri 101), the Shining Path lost support as the peasantry became disillusioned with the rebel group.

Taking advantage of this growing rift between the peasants and the Shining Path, the military mended the gaps in counterinsurgency and began to forge close ties with the population by limiting indiscriminate repression, implementing developmental policies and infrastructure projects, and allowing the youth to serve their obligatory military service at home (Degregori, "Harvesting Storms: Peasant *Rondas* and the Defeat of Sendero Luminosa in Ayacucho" 128-157). Establishing *rondas* as a means of “peasant mobilization” in the rural highlands, the military was able to gain considerable support from the peasant populations, which proved imperative to the localized defeat of the Shining Path in Ayacucho (Degregori, "Harvesting Storms: Peasant *Rondas* and the Defeat of Sendero Luminosa in Ayacucho" 128-157).

Many officers began to recognize “the need to combine intimidation and persuasion in a so-called “integral” strategy, including ‘sociopolitical development’ and ‘civic

action' to build support among the peasantry" (Starn, "Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes" 239). In order to combat the insurgency, Starn depicts how the military provided a means for aide-orientated policies, social mobility and material incentives, donating various supplies, medicine, food and weapons in order to gain peasant support, including 200 Japanese trucks as a reward for the *rondas*' collaboration against the Shining Path (Starn, "Villagers at Arms: War and Counterrevolution in the Central-South Andes" 239). In essence, the *rondas* provided a timely and necessary form of counterinsurgency, helping to reduce the costly military patrols plagued by a lack of resources due to economic decline in the country. However, cooperation between the military and rural peasantry was short-lived.

Fujimori and the Return to Repression

As García's term ended, Peru remained in a state of economic crisis and the government was nowhere near eliminating the Shining Path insurgency. Although *rondas* provided some assistance to combat the rebels, consistent national policy measures under wise and efficient leadership were needed to see a complete end to the insurgency. In addition, this needed to be done while avoiding repression against the rural populations living within the strongholds of the Shining Path. In 1990, the populace of Peru made their openness to change known, voting for political outsider, Alberto Fujimori (1985-1992). However, Fujimori would embark on a repressive counterinsurgency campaign, abandoning all hopes for a developmental approach pursued during García's presidency.

Fujimori had a great understanding of the political culture and societal sectors of the Peruvian population, making him an accepted and supported leader. While appealing

to the poor (Oliart 415), utilizing emotional connections, steering away from demanding that the population alter its behavior, initially providing local development projects, and working to represent the needs of the country, Fujimori gained favor throughout Peru. Thus, Fujimori was able to discredit the reverence some still held for Guzman.

While initially promoting welfare programs during the first part of his administration, it is interesting to note that Fujimori did not pursue a consistent developmental counterinsurgency policy, which may surprise those who believed Fujimori to have a giving character. While still a candidate, Fujimori “would arrive in various pueblos in his ‘Fujimobile,’ a cart pulled by a tractor...publicly [he designed himself] to be deliberately rustic in appearance; he used regional clothes and danced to the music of the communities he visited” (Oliart 415). Promising to be a “President Like You” with the campaign motto, “Honor, Technology, and Work,” Fujimori appealed to the impoverished peasant populations throughout the country (Oliart 415).

According to Liliana Choy, a broadcast journalist for *ATV Noticias*, when the president went to a community he often established an accord for a local development project to benefit the area. “In an impoverished meeting he learns about the community’s most urgent priority and then commits to financing the materials, in exchange for which the community commits to providing the labor” (Oliart 417). Examples of such development projects included public schools that he created in his own name, reaping the political benefits while the public received services from the government. Fujimori states:

“I work like this, silently. You all want a new school for your children, and here it is now, so that your children may enjoy it. I do not make false promises. Watch out for those who will come to offer you things and then will not follow

through. You know them by now and you know me and you know that I come through with what I offer” (qtd. in Oliart 417).

Although Fujimori was nowhere near “silent” in his endeavors, he did initially provide developmental assistance to the population, including the peasants. However, the new president would soon abandon these developmental initiatives and return to a campaign of repression. In fact, Fujimori would later be charged for mass human rights abuses that occurred during his presidency.

Although a consistent, wide-scale development policy was not pursued, Fujimori did support the establishment and maintenance of several more *rondas* throughout the country. “Over the next few years, the army distributed more than 10,000 Winchester Model shotguns to peasant *rondas*, often handed out in ceremonies by Fujimori himself...” (Klaren 410). In 1992, Fujimori also pushed Congress to reverse a ban against allowing peasants’ to carry arms, allowing for legitimate distribution to the peasants supporting the military in the elimination of the Shining Path. Although providing weapons did assist the peasants combat efforts, full-scale developmental policy was still not pursued. Sociopolitical and civic action was only provided as long as it benefited the government, not taking the overall interests of the peasants into account. In essence, Fujimori only implemented aid when it improved his overall image, not necessarily taking into consideration the best interests of the rural population.

A political outsider, Fujimori had relatively little support from the organized parties, making legislation and executive powers difficult to implement without meeting resistance. As a result, Fujimori sought the guidance of a select group of technocrats and the military to implement his policies to rebuild Peru, marking the first challenge to any

legitimate developmental policy during his administration. As derived from the Constitution of 1979, policymaking largely rested in the centralized powers of the president, including the authority to issue decrees to implement his policy programs (Klaren 409). “Decrees issued by Fujimori extended the authority of local army commanders beyond policing functions to all government activities in the emergency zones, which cover extensive areas of the country, and gave military units the right to enter prisons and universities, strongholds of the Shining Path” (Hunter 470).

Similar to Belaúnde and García before him, Fujimori was challenged by a lack of expertise in dealing with rebellions, relinquishing the task of counterinsurgency to the military, which pursued a campaign of repression. Highlighting a lack of oversight of the armed forces, Fujimori enforced a decree ruling members of the military could not be tried in civilian courts for human rights violations (Klaren 413). Such a decree granted virtual immunity to military personnel, which now held the legal freedom to openly engage in repression without consequence from the civilian community. Such immunity eliminated any pressure on the military to pursue a consistent developmental counterinsurgency policy.

Later in 1992, President Fujimori carried out an *autogolpe*, which suspended the Constitution, closed Congress and ordered the arrest of several opposition leaders (Klaren 413). During that same year, due to a cooperative effort by the military, peasant *rondas* and government intelligence units, Guzman was eventually captured on September 12 in a suburban safe house in Lima and was later imprisoned (Klaren 415). The Peruvian national intelligence unit also discovered the master computer files to the entire Shining Path organization (Klaren 415). By the end of the year, police had captured nine-tenths

of the movement's leadership (Klaren 415), removing any real power threat from the Shining Path at the time.

Looking back on Fernando Belaúnde's, Alan García's, and Alberto Fujimori's presidencies, it is clear that inefficiency, military pressures and greater interest in popular approval overshadowed any legitimate attempts by the national leaders to steer a consistent developmental counterinsurgency policy. More interested in reversing the sharp decline in the economy, all presidents eventually relinquished their authority as Chief Executive of the Armed Forces.

Twelve years after the insurgency began, the Shining Path insurgency became the largest terrorist movement in the Western Hemisphere known to date. Although it is unknown how long and to what extent the Shining Path would have remained in power if a developmental solution had been pursued by the government, taking the latter approach would have greatly reduced human rights violations committed by the military against wide-scale populations. In addition, implementing developmental aid in the rural regions would have eliminated the government's confusion about the peasants' role during the insurgency. Instead, the government refrained from implementing any serious, consistent development, thus allowing the root causes of insurgency to flourish.

CHAPTER V

COUNTERINSURGENCY AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

The integration of developmental theories with government policies is necessary for efficient and successful counterinsurgency. In an era notorious for human rights abuses throughout Latin American, the Peruvian presidents would have been wise to implement and maintain developmental counterinsurgency measures. It is difficult to say whether the insurgency would have ended much sooner, but it is clear that the Peruvian government would have assisted thousands of impoverished peasants, avoided international criticism, and saved thousands of lives. Economic and social assistance for the Peruvian peasants would have provided an opportunity for the country's leadership to eliminate the root causes of insurgency and thus prevent further military repression.

Venezuelan President Betancourt's developmental policies are not only a respected trademark to his presidency, but are also considered a democratic achievement in the country. The presidents in Peru could have followed suit and therefore gained respect amongst the population. Such popular support could have decreased the peasants' willingness to join forces with the Shining Path, which provided subsistence and hopes for a revolution with active participation in a new Peruvian political system.

As most Latin American countries transitioned to democratic rule in the 1980s, many believed that human rights would be more widely respected. Support from the

peasants would have bettered the presidents' chances of successfully implementing developmental solutions and made the administrations less subservient to military pressures to carry out dirty war counterinsurgency campaigns. However, one is now aware that military influence, poor decision-making, and consequent economic burdens may greatly impede or halt any serious attempt to implement developmental policies.

Without a continuous supply of proper resources, including foodstuffs, infrastructure and weaponry, the peasants were unable to adequately resist the insurgency. Lack of developmental counterinsurgency policy visa vise economic and social aid created the conditions for the Peruvian peasants living in the highlands to fall pressure to the Shining Path's influence. Thus, the failure of the Peruvian government to follow the Venezuelan example led to the inevitable return of military repression against peasants suspected of involvement in the rebellion. Furthermore, those who did not join the rebellion were often killed by the rebel group, further exacerbating the human rights situation in the country.

Nearly ten years after the insurgency began, there seemed to be no stopping the Shining Path. Human Rights Watch was aware that government institutions seemed unwilling to address human rights abuses at the hands of the armed forces. For example, the organization wrote in 1989 that members of García's ruling Aprista Party "have systematically obstructed congressional inquiries into abuses. An independent official, such as judges and prosecutors, have failed to live up to their responsibilities to investigate abuses, at times after government interference" ("Peru").

The U.S. State Department's 2000 Human Rights Country Profile of Peru reported that the practice of torture and other brutal treatment by security forces

continually occurred and was widespread. Torture was particularly common in police cells operated by the National Counterterrorism Directorate (DINCOTE) and in detention facilities on military bases where terrorism and treason suspects were normally held. Meanwhile, psychological torture and abuse, which result from the harsh conditions in which detainees are held, are more characteristic of the prisons (“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000: Peru”).

Common methods of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment included beatings, electric shock, water torture, asphyxiation, and the hanging of victims by a rope attached to hands tied behind the back. In the case of female detainees, torture also included rape. Sleep deprivation and death threats against both detainees and their families were common methods of psychological torture. In addition, victims were frequently blindfolded during torture, therefore unable to later identify their abusers (“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000: Peru”).

Examples of such abuses in 2000 include reports that:

“In April military officials allegedly arrested Amador Carmen Canchaparan on charges of working with the armed opposition and took him to a military base in Huanuco department. There members of the army reportedly tortured him by submerging his head in water, beating him, and applying electrical shocks in order to force him to confess. The officials then threatened Canchaparan with death if he brought charges against them. On May 2, authorities charged officials at Yanag military base with torture and abuse of authority. The prosecutor opened a preliminary investigation into the alleged abuses. The victim remained in custody at year's end, and was being investigated for committing or conspiring to commit terrorist acts” (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000: Peru”).

“On May 25, journalist Fabian Salazar alleged that SIN officers broke into his office the previous evening bound him, confiscated video tapes of government officials that implicated them in corruption, and sawed his arm to the bone. The Government appointed an ad hoc prosecutor to investigate Salazar's claims. Salazar fled the country in June before he was able to provide his testimony, and the investigation was suspended. Salazar subsequently petitioned the IACHR to

investigate. The Government offered to investigate the case again, but Salazar refused, claiming that the Government was biased. While there were a number of inconsistencies in Salazar's account, and even critics of the Government and journalists suspect that he may have exaggerated his claims, a full investigation never was conducted” (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000: Peru).

Now aware of the direct effect the Peruvian administrations' lack of consistent developmental counterinsurgency played on the peasant population, it is important to note the broader implications of military repression. Some twenty-seven years after the Shining Path announced its armed insurgency in Peru, Latin America is still no stranger to armed rebellions. For example, the Colombian government is currently attempting to negotiate a prisoner exchange with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). With a more comprehensive media network, international human rights groups and the public are made aware of daily killings and kidnappings. Also evident of the international community's growing support for human rights in Latin America is the willingness of international governments to assist in the negotiation process with such insurgent groups. For example, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy have expressed their willingness to assist the Colombian government during the negotiation process.

Insurgencies are not just a localized phenomenon in Latin America, but take place all over the world. The United States was eventually unable to conquer guerilla forces during the Vietnam War and is now faced with how to eliminate growing terrorist forces within Iraq. So what can governments around the world now combating insurgencies take away from the case of Peru? Furthermore, in case of future insurgencies, how should governments approach counterinsurgency in order to avoid a dirty war approach?

In order to prevent human rights violations, a constitutional framework is needed to establish safeguards against such violence. Taking effect when the country transitioned to democratic rule in 1980, the Peruvian Constitution was created by a popularly elected constituent assembly. Quick to establish a legal framework to protect human rights, the assembly included an extensive list of individual civil and political rights to guarantee personal liberty and security under the new government (Cornell and Roberts 542). Thus, the 1979 Constitution specifies that all persons have: the right to life; the right to equality before the law; the freedom of expression; the right not to be arrested except pursuant to a judicial authorization; the right to be informed in writing for the reason of arrest; the right to be brought before a judge within twenty-four hours of detainment (excluding cases involving terrorism, espionage and illegal drug trafficking); and the right not to be held in incommunicado detention (“Peru”).

In addition, the constitution gives priority to human rights principles guaranteed in international treaties signed by the Peruvian government, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (qtd. in Cornell and Roberts 542). These treaties state that that in time of public emergency, governments may take measures to derogate from their obligation to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. However, derogations are not to involve blatant discrimination and should not impede on basic human rights (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights).

As the definition of national emergency is very broad, there are a number of interpretations, which may lead to abuse of its application. Able to be renewed as many times as necessary, a state of emergency is valid for 60 days, suspending the constitutional freedoms of movement and assembly. Freedoms from arbitrary arrest and

unwarranted searches and seizures are also suspended. Furthermore, Article 231 of the Peruvian constitution declares that the Armed Forces may assume control of internal order during a state of emergency (“Peru”).

According to Cornell and Roberts, there are two main problems with the conditions to establish derogations, which may easily encroach on the safeguards designed to ensure protection of human rights. First, government leaders may determine any challenge to their authority as a threat to the public interest of national security. In addition, a state of national emergency may become the norm, “leading to a semi-permanent breach of constitutional rights” (Cornell and Roberts 542). Lastly, there is always the threat during states of emergency that the government will trump institutional controls and legal norms set in place to guarantee a system of checks and balance.

All of these problems would eventually become reality in the case of Peru. The Peruvian administrations utilized the state of emergency in eight departments and in Lima during the insurgency, suspending civil liberties. In addition, the government allowed the military to execute counterinsurgency campaigns. With little to no oversight over such measures, the military was able to carry out a dirty war approach with impunity, further worsening the human rights situation in the country. For example, during a state of emergency in July 1984, police and military forces detained up to 19,000 people in an attempt to round-up suspected criminal or opposition activists (Cornell and Roberts 543). However, many of these people were indiscriminate victims too poor to protect themselves.

The threat during states of emergency that the government will trump institutional controls leads to a second lesson governments may take away from the Peruvian case. In

order to prevent human rights violations during counterinsurgency campaigns, a system of accountability must be established to ensure institutional controls do not lose oversight over the military. In particular, government bodies must ensure that armed forces do not take part in a campaign of repression.

This may be done by including safeguards in the constitution, such as Peru's Article 282, which specifies that members of the army and police forces are subject to the Code of Military Justice (Cornell and Roberts 545). However, military jurisdiction did not apply to civilians except for cases involving treason, leaving most cases to fall within civilian jurisdiction, which has proven inadequate in protecting citizens from police and military abuses. Even more disturbing, Peru's Military Code of Justice did not consider murder or torture as a military offense, leaving many officials to only be convicted of negligence or abuse of authority (Cornell and Roberts 546). The latter violations are only punishable with minor sentences, creating a de facto immunity amongst the armed forces. As of 1990, few members of the military had been convicted of a human rights violations despite thousands of disappearances and extrajudicial executions reported since 1980 (Cornell and Roberts 546).

Such lack of legal convictions highlights the military's autonomy from civilian control and lack of oversight by the institutional mechanisms set in place to protect human rights. Furthermore, such impunity represents the inefficacy of the Peruvian judicial system and the government at large to restrict the powers of the military. Lawyers and human rights organizations could do little to defend the detainees as they were often labeled as terrorist by the military and threatened, harassed, and attacked.

In essence, the government did little to protect human rights against indiscriminate killings and torture of the peasant populations during the insurgency. It therefore becomes evident that governments must establish civilian jurisdiction over human rights violations in order to hold the military accountable for dirty war tactics, including murder, torture, disappearance, genocide, the denial of information about detainees, extrajudicial execution, and sexual violations (Cornell and Roberts 551).

Only until recently have Latin American countries taken initiative to bring military officers and government officials to trial for their involvement in human rights violations. More recently on September 21, 2007, the Chilean Supreme Court ruled to extradite Alberto Fujimori back to Peru to face charges of embezzlement and human right abuses allegedly committed while president from 1990 to 2000 ("Chilean Supreme Court Rules Former Peru Leader Fujimori Be Extradited"). In an interview with Radio Programas of Peru, Fujimori admitted, "There were, of course, gross mistakes in the administration of my government ("Chilean Supreme Court Rules Former Peru Leader Fujimori Be Extradited").

Fujimori will face charges on human rights abuses, including the 1992 death-squad slayings of nine students and a professor at La Cantuta University, and the 1991 killings of 15 people at a party in Barrios Altos, a neighborhood of Lima ("Chilean Supreme Court Rules Former Peru Leader Fujimori Be Extradited"). In addition, Fujimori will face corruption charges for allegedly giving payoffs to legislators and to news media, as well as illegal phone tapping and misuse of \$15 million in government funds ("Chilean Supreme Court Rules Former Peru Leader Fujimori Be Extradited"). Fujimori, who had been under house arrest in Chile, has been fighting the extradition ever

since he arrived in Chile from Japan in 2005 in a failed attempt to run in Peru's 2006 presidential elections.

While attending the UN General Assembly in New York City, current Chilean President Michelle Bachelet said September 24, 2007 that her country's decision to extradite Fujimori back to Peru was a decision consequent of the importance Chile places on human rights (Associated Press). Around the time the Peruvian government was working to eliminate the Shining Path, neighboring Chile was under control of a violent military regime, which also engaged in serious human rights violations. Former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet has been accused of ordering killings, abductions, and torture of 1,000 Chileans during his seventeen-year military regime (1973-1990). A former victim of the abuses under Pinochet's regime, Bachelet embodies the new commitment in Latin America and throughout the international community to hold military and government officials responsible for human rights abuses.

To avoid future human rights violations amidst counterinsurgency campaigns, it is important that civilian government institutions retain an established level of control over the Armed Forces. In order to do so, constitutional mechanisms must be in place to restrict the impunity of the military and establish safeguards against human rights violations. Furthermore, a judicial system must be in place to uphold the legal framework designed to protect human rights. Without these elements, the administrator is left weak to assert his power as the commander of the armed forces and leader of the nation.

Proper decision-making is needed to address developmental policies. Without a well-informed and effective administrator, the responsibility of insurgency will revert

into the hands of the military. As a result, any serious consideration of developmental aid will be eliminated. As we now know, economic and social assistance is imperative if a government has any serious hopes of eliminating the root cause of insurgency and limiting the influence of internal guerilla groups. The Dirty War approach first made public in Argentina and then followed by the Peruvian government is not the policy most cohesive with respect for human rights. Instead, governments would be wise to follow former Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt's lead and implement a developmental approach to counterinsurgency. Developmental counterinsurgency policy will allow the government to gain the support of the peasants, retain respect amongst the population, and ultimately eliminate insurgency forces within the country.

APPENDIX A

DEVELOPMENTAL POLICY DEFINED

Developmental policy is defined as massive social assistance and economic development programs focused on remedying the fundamental causes of insurgency (Klaren 407). This strategy is aimed at winning over the “hearts and minds” of the population (Klaren 407), particularly the pockets of the population usually ignored by the government. The developmental notion stresses that in order for the government to win support among the peasant communities within an insurgency’s stronghold, direct assistance, including food, donations, and community development is required (Crabtree 105).

Developmental policy includes efforts by the government to reduce inequalities in income distribution in favor of the poor. Unless there is a narrowing in the income gap, the government cannot guarantee social peace or democratic stability (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 45). In addition, developmental policy is aimed at tackling poverty in the poorest rural areas. In essence, a developmental policy involves both strategies and actions to promote self-subsistence and social programs aimed at increasing income among specific social groups (Crabtree, “Peru under García” 47).

APPENDIX B

LIFE OF ABIMAEEL GUZMAN REYNOSA

Abimael Guzman Reynosa was born out of wedlock in 1934 in Arequipa, the capital of Arequipa province in southern Peru (Klaren 366). After his mother died and father left with another woman, Guzman spent his childhood living with his uncles until the age of twelve. Afterwards, Guzman reunited with his father, a middle-class merchant, with whom it is believed that Guzman had a tense relationship (qtd. in Klaren 366). While living in Arequipa, Guzman attended the local Jesuit high school where he excelled in his studies. Also during this time, Guzman witnessed the Callao Revolt of 1948 and the Arequipa uprising of 1950 against dictator Manuel A. Odría, both of which he said pricked his social conscience (Klaren 366).

While studying philosophy at the University of San Agustín in Arequipa, Guzman developed a strict methodology and a devotion to orthodox communism (Qtd. in Klaren 366). After graduating from San Agustín in 1961 and receiving a law degree the same year, Guzman began to teach at the Universidad Nacional San Cristóbal de Huamanga in Ayacucho in 1962 (Klaren 367).

Already a passionate Marxist, Guzman began to preach his beliefs in the classroom while using the university to recruit, educate, organize and subsidize the creation of a new Communist front (Klaren 368). Guzman mostly attracted the first

generation of Indian peasants from the region to attend the university and join his vanguard. Guzman was also considered a lady's man. In 1964, 29-year old Guzman married 18-year old Augusta La Torre, the daughter of a local communist leader, who helped organize his movement (Klaren 368).

In light of the Sino-Soviet split of 1960 throughout Latin America, a pro-Chinese faction split from the Moscow-orientated communist party in 1964 in Peru (Klaren 638). Guzman took charge of this new Chinese-orientated Red Flag faction. Guzman later traveled to China in 1964 and again in 1967 during the height of China's Cultural Revolution where he was instructed in the doctrines of the "People's War" and revolutionary tactics (Klaren 639). Returning to his position at the university in 1968, Guzman began to organize his Maoist movement according to his experience in China. However, Guzman was soon expelled from the Red Flag faction since he opposed the leftist revolutionary parties' rejection of violent revolution and support for collaboration with Velasco's reform effort.

While studying the writings of Mao during his expulsion, Guzman formed the Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) de Mariategui, the same name he had given his university student group in the 1960s (Klaren 369). Guzman began to criticize Velasco's military regime while advocating the primacy of the peasant in the revolutionary process. Losing control of the university to an alliance of left-wing parties, Guzman resigned from his teaching position in mid-1975 and began to intensify his political work in the countryside in order to prepare for an armed insurgency (Klaren 371). After a few years of preparation, the Shining Path announced its revolutionary intentions on May 17, 1980 during the first presidential election since 1963 (Klaren 372).

Over the next twelve years, the Shining Path strengthened its control throughout the rural departments in Peru and seemed capable of toppling the Peruvian government. While preparing to expand the insurgency's mode of operations in the capital, Guzman was suddenly captured on September 12, 1992 by the Peruvian national intelligence police (Klaren 415). The police were led to Guzman's location while tailing a suspected Shining Path member in route to Guzman's safe house located in suburban Lima (Klaren 415). Guzman was sentenced to life in prison in Peru for his terrorist crimes where he currently remains.

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