

Sharpening the Spear: The United States' Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan

by

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Abstract

The terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 and the United States' response resulted in the U.S. government's unwitting involvement in nation-building and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. The historical defeat of Soviet forces, the ease of removing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and the reluctance of the Bush Administration to engage in nation-building resulted in a reluctance to commit a significant diplomatic, economic, and military effort. The U.S. military recognized that it needed a cost-effective, robust element that could assist the new Afghan government in extending its authority throughout the country. It created Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) composed of specialized military teams and civilian government experts with the mission of improving security and governance and supporting reconstruction and development in the provinces and districts. The expansion of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) beyond the capital was initiated by member countries taking over U.S.-established PRTs. The relatively nominal cost in money and personnel, along with the positive reception of PRTs by provincial governments and the Afghan people, contributed to the U.S. and ISAF expansion of the PRT program to more provinces. The rising expectation of PRTs as a tool for nation-building and a non-kinetic weapon of counterinsurgency is diminishing as government corruption, the drug trade, terrorism, and lawlessness increase, particularly in the south and east. Knowledge of both Afghanistan and PRTs is necessary to determine the cause of problems and to develop solutions. Recommendations by official reports and by both military and non-military scholars are compiled and considered for improving PRT operations.

About the Author

Major Moses Ruiz has served on two PRTs in Afghanistan. He served from June 2003 to March 2004 as the operations officer and civil affairs team leader at the inception of the Hirat PRT. He was awarded the Bronze Star. From April 2005 to July 2006, he served as the civil military operations officer in charge and the civil affairs team leader at the Farah PRT. Major Ruiz began his service as a private first class in 1984. He served over three years on active duty in South Korea and West Germany. His ten years of service in the Texas Army National Guard included a nine-month deployment to Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia i Herzegovina as the base security officer and Battalion S2. He served for two years as a psychological operations sergeant in the Army Reserve. He continues to serve in the Army Reserve as a civil affairs officer and Brigade G2. Major Ruiz's civilian career includes six years as a social studies secondary-school teacher and six years as a crime analyst. He currently lives in Austin, Texas, and is preparing for his unit's deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom.



(Picture of the Hirat PRT grand opening, 1 December 2003. From left to right: saluting, Commander of CJCMOTF Col. Mackey Hancock; unknown; on stand, saluting, master of ceremonies Major **Moses T. Ruiz**; interpreter Hashim Ebrahimi; U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad; Afghan Minister of Defense Ali Jalali; Governor of the Hirat Province Ismail Khan; in front of poll, PRT Afghan guard Abdulla Abdul Rahmani; saluting with rifle, Civil Affairs Soldier Specialist Mary Miller)

Author's Gratitude

I am grateful to my parents, Irene and Joe M. Ruiz, Sr., for providing me the encouragement to continue to advance my education and devote my life to public service through military and government professions.

I am grateful to Ann and Jon Hovde, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army Retired, for their advice and support, without which this paper would not be possible.

Abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
AERU	Afghanistan Evaluation and Research Unit
AMF	Afghan Military Forces
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANBP	Afghan New Beginnings Program
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
CA	Civil Affairs
CDC	community development committee
CENTCOM	Central Command
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation Centers
CJCMOTF	Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centers
CNO	Computer Network Operations
COIN	counterinsurgency
DDR	Disarm, Demobilize, Reintegrate
DFID	Department of Foreign International Development
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
EOD	Explosive Ordinance Disposal
ETT	Embedded Training Teams
EW	electronic warfare
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area
FM	Field Manual
GIRA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HTT	Human Terrain Team
IGO	international government organization
IO	information operations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
JCMB	Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
JFC	Joint Forces Command
JP	Joint Publication
JTAC	Joint Tactical Air Control
MILDEC	military deception

MoD	Ministry of Defense
MoI	Ministry of the Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MPAT	Military Police Advisers and Trainers
NSP	National Solidarity Program
NGO	non-government organization
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA	other government agency
OPSEC	operations security
PAR	public administration reform
PDC	provincial development committee
PKSOI	Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSYOP	psychological operations
QIP	Quick Impact Projects
S/CRS	Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SERE	survival, escape, resistance, and evasion
SIGAR	Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSTR	Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction
TPT	Tactical PSYOP Teams
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USFOR-A COM	United States Forces-Afghanistan Command
USIP	United States Institute for Peace

Chapter 1 Introduction

“We are going to need more effective coordination of our military efforts with diplomatic efforts with development efforts with more effective coordination with our allies in order to be more successful. My bottom line is that we cannot allow Al Qaeda to operate and cannot have safe havens in those regions. We are going to have to work both smartly and effectively, but with consistency in order to make sure those safe havens do not exist.”¹

Two weeks before making this statement, President Barack Obama ordered an increase of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan by 17,000 troops to combat the growing insurgency. He acknowledged that success in Afghanistan cannot be achieved solely by the military. President Obama announced that a new strategy would be forthcoming: “Instead, it will further enable our team to put together a comprehensive strategy that will employ all elements of our national power to fulfill achievable goals in Afghanistan. As we develop our new strategic goals, we will do so in concert with our friends and allies as together we seek the resources necessary to succeed.”² On 26 March 2009, President Obama announced a “comprehensive new strategy” that further increased the number of U.S. military personnel by 4000 to train the Afghan military and police and increased the number of civilian experts. Seven and a half years after the United States launched the effort to destroy Al Qaeda and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for terrorists, the objective was renewed.

¹ President Barack Obama, press conference remarks, 3 March 2009, White House.

² Statement by President Obama, 17 February 2009, White House.

The U.S. objective began shortly after the 11 September 2001 attack on the U.S. homeland. The attack was determined to have been planned, directed, and financed by Al Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden operating in Afghanistan.³ The U.S. military provided weapons and tactical air support to the Afghan Northern Alliance, which defeated the Taliban regime that provided a safe haven to Al Qaeda. During the Bonn Conference in December 2001, the United States enlisted the assistance of the United Nations (UN) and European allies in supporting a transitional administration and continued support for creating a new government that would be democratically elected and capable of providing security and basic services to the Afghan people. The extent of the new Afghan government's authority was limited to the capital. In an effort to assist the Afghan government in extending its authority throughout the country, small civil-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established to assist provincial and district governments in providing security, governance, development, and legitimacy for the Afghan government. Seven years after the Bonn agreement, the money pledged has been spent and the goals set have been achieved. Currently, there are over 62,000 international troops and twenty-six PRTs operating throughout the country, but the Afghan government remains unable to provide security and basic services because of increasing attacks from Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters.

The purpose of this research is twofold: first, to describe U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan using document analysis of various studies and reports, and second, to

³ 911 Commission Report, 2004.

identify common recommendations cited in various research and reports. This research is important because of the Obama Administration's increased efforts in Afghanistan. In addition to the increased number of troops, efforts are underway to open four additional U.S. PRTs. Additional funding is being provided for expanding Afghan security forces and promoting the country's economic development. Richard Holbrooke has been appointed as a special envoy to address the regional problems confronting Afghanistan and Pakistan. Retired U.S. Army Major General Karl Eikenberry has been appointed U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. As the former commander of the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A), Ambassador Eikenberry will bring a wealth of experience to the job.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter 2 presents a theoretical understanding for describing PRTs in Afghanistan. Categories and subcategories were developed within a conceptual framework and are used to organize the literature review and operationalization of the study of PRTs. Chapter 3 describes the many challenges unique to Afghanistan that impact the operations of PRTs. Chapter 4 details the methods used to obtain information about PRTs, describes the procedure of codifying the information, and mentions simple descriptive statistics used to examine the information. Chapter 5 uses an analysis of official documents and research reports to describe PRTs. Organized by the categories of the conceptual framework, this chapter identifies problems of PRT operations and provides composites of recommended solutions. Chapter 6 presents the conclusion and provides recommendations for future studies.

Chapter 2 Literature Review

“So here's the bottom line. The United States has reviewed and redesigned its approach to Afghanistan. We believe that we cannot just win militarily. We have to win through development aid. We have to win through increasing the capacity of the Afghan government to provide basic services to its people and to uphold the rule of law.”⁴

President Obama has followed through with his campaign promise to renew efforts in Afghanistan to fight terrorism and build the capabilities of the Afghan government. The goal is to prevent the country from becoming a safe haven or operations base for international terrorist organizations. U.S. policy objectives are to build the capacity of the Afghan government such that it can extend its authority, evident by its ability to provide security and basic services at the provincial and district levels. U.S. military strategic objectives are to develop the capabilities of the Afghan security forces to defeat the growing insurgency. U.S. policy and strategy is based on nation-building and counterinsurgency theories. One tool in the nation-building tool kit and a weapon in the counterinsurgency arsenal is the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

The purpose of this chapter is to review the scholarly literature on aspects of the U.S. post-conflict reconstruction efforts in war-torn countries. The literature review will provide a theoretical understanding for describing Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.

⁴ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 3 April 2009, remarks by President Obama at Strasbourg Town Hall, Rhenus Sports Arena, Strasbourg, France.

The Lexicon of Post-Conflict

On 25 March 2009, a *Washington Post* article reported on an Obama Administration directive to use the term “overseas contingency operations” to replace the previous administration’s use of the terms “long war” and “global war on terror” (Wilson & Al Kamen 2009, A04). This is an example of the political influence in the use of terms to describe post-conflict operations. During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush opposed U.S. involvement in “nation-building” (Dobbins et al. 2008, 85; Fukuyama 2006, 1; Jenkins & Plowden 2006, 2). The Bush Administration shunned the term “nation-building” and used the term “post-conflict reconstruction” to describe its policies and actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Regardless, whether the U.S. government uses the term “post-conflict reconstruction” or “contingency operations,” U.S. policies and actions are based on the general theory of nation-building and counterinsurgency.

Defining Nation-Building

“Nation-building is a normative concept that means different things to different people” (Stephenson 2005, 1). This review will focus on the nation-building theories described by recognized scholars in the field. Francis Fukuyama denotes two schools of thought among the Western or developed countries that conduct nation-building. Europeans tend to use the term “state-building,” arguing that outsiders can build the government and state institutions that will exercise authority within a defined territory but the development of a sense of national unity must come from the people. “Nations—that is to say, communities of shared values, traditions, and

historical memory—by this argument are never built, particularly by outsiders; rather, they evolved out of an unplanned historical-evolutionary process” (2006, 3). He believes Americans use the term “nation-building” because “this terminology perhaps reflects the national experience, in which cultural and historical identity was heavily shaped by political institutions like constitutionalism and democracy” (Fukuyama 2004, 99). While Europeans and Americans recognize that outsiders can build the state institutions of a country, such as the government departments, security forces, and financial institutions, Americans accept that it is possible for outsiders to develop national unity of the people through democracy. Fukuyama makes this distinction to illustrate the differences between reconstruction and development. He describes reconstruction as actions that can be undertaken by outsiders since it involves “injecting sufficient resources to jump-start the process.” Development “refers to the creation of new institutions and the promotion of sustained economic growth, events that transform the society open-endedly into something that it has not been previously” (Ibid., 5).

Mark Berger defines nation-building as “an externally driven, or facilitated, attempt to form or consolidate a stable, and sometimes democratic government over an internationally recognized national territory . . .” (Berger 2006, 6). He notes that “the term is, of course, used more broadly to refer to the efforts by national elites to create a territorial state and mobilize the population around a shared sense of national identity” (Ibid., 21).

Kate Jenkins and William Plowden recognize that nation-building “involves intervention by an outside power in the internal workings of a state.” They add that it involves military activity and “often closely linked to this, with ‘regime change’—the regime in question being hostile or dangerous to the intervening power.” The rationale is that nation-building is “undertaken either to bring peace or to reconstruct a society badly damaged by internal conflict,” further adding the concepts of a “democratic nation” or “spreading of democracy” (2006, 1).

Scholars from the RAND Corporation have studied and written about nation-building and counterinsurgency for five decades. Dobbins et al. have devised a succinct definition of nation-building: “Nation-building can be defined as the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote an enduring peace and a transition to democracy” (2008, 2).

Scholars differ on when to mark the historical beginning of nation-building. Fukuyama and Berger trace nation-building to the “decolonialization” and independence movement in the early 1900s. All of the scholars mentioned recognize postwar Germany and Japan as successful nation-building efforts. The RAND scholars dismiss U.S. and U.S.S.R. intervention efforts as nation-building, distinguishing the efforts as part of the Cold War struggle to align developing nations into their respective alliance. RAND scholars along with Jenkins and Plowden recognize that contemporary nation-building began in earnest during the post-Cold War era. The time frame is significant, as the post-Cold War era is characterized by American

dominance in the international system and the emergence of international and non-government organizations' involvement in nation-building.

The Nation-Building Process

Building a nation is a significant, complex endeavor. Scholars agree that nation-building requires outside intervention but differ on the approach that outsiders should use in nation-building. Francis Fukuyama (2004, 99) views nation-building in terms of goals. He mentions improving democratic legitimacy, strengthening self-sustaining institutions, eliminating spawning grounds for terrorism, and assisting economic development. He breaks down nation-building into phases. The first phase takes place after the conflict has ended and before reconstruction can begin, and involves the “infusion of security forces, police, humanitarian relief, and technical assistance to restore infrastructure or basic needs” (Ibid., 100). The second phase is more difficult, as it involves creating legitimacy and self-sustaining political institutions. The last phase involves helping these institutions accomplish state functions without outside assistance.

Jenkins and Plowden (2006, 6) offer stages of nation-building. They simplify stage one as “regime change.” The second stage involves creating institutions of “governance.” They define governance as the ability to provide citizens with basic services—security, clean water, adequate food, health care, education, and other basic services. They expand the concept of governance to include “the network of institutions and relationships” through which citizens' views, interests, and preferences can be expressed. They note that “the tasks involved are not simply

operational; they demand hardware, people, managerial skills, trust, and a culture of public service which has to be built up over time” (Ibid., 7).

A common element noted by Fukuyama, Jenkins and Plowden, and Dobbins et al. is the use of foreign military forces and civilian development experts. The military is needed to remove the undesirable or threatening regime or to force peace upon the warring factions. The instability and insecurity may limit the number of civilian development experts and their ability to operate. This translates to the military beginning and continuing to be involved in the process of building governance or institutional capacity. Using the definition that nation-building requires armed force, it follows that the most notable efforts have been led by the United States (Dobbins 2003).


Military Involvement in Nation-Building

The United States has the military capacity to unilaterally remove a regime, for example Afghanistan and Iraq, and the U.S. military leads the developed nations in power-projection capability to force peace on combating elements, as it has done in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Once the regime has been removed or fighting has stopped, the task of maintaining security and restoring government functions and the economy falls heavily on the foreign military forces (Dobbins 2007 et al., iii; Franke 2006, 12; Berger 2006, 9).

The U.S. military recognizes that it has an important function in post-conflict operations, as outlined by DoD Directive Number 3000.05, dated 28 November 2005, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR). The

U.S. military establishes doctrine or a common conceptual framework for military actions. Joint operations⁵ doctrine recognizes six phases of military operations, illustrated in Figure 2.1 (JP 3-0 2008, II-3).

Figure 2-1 Phasing Model




Source JP 3-0 2008, II-3

SSTR generally occurs in Phase IV, when the priority changes from combat operations to stability operations. SSTR operations are characterized by efforts to maintain security, restore the government, and begin the reconstruction process. Within each phase, there is a changing balance of operations, as illustrated in Figure 2.2 (JP 3-0 2008, V-2).

⁵ The term “joint” denotes the use of two or more of the armed services (U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, Coast Guard) in a military operation.

Figure 2-2 Balance of Operations




Source: JP 3-0 2008, V-2

The balance of operations refers to the type of forces and priority of operations involved. A Joint Forces Command (JFC) leads joint operations, and “JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of military power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area” (JP 3-0 2008, V-2). Combat forces such as infantry, armor, and artillery have an increased level of effort during deter, seize, dominate, and stabilize phases. Non-combat forces, such as civil affairs, information operations, medical, engineers, and military police, have an increased level of effort during the shape and enable civil authority phases. “The immediate goal

often is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society” (DoD Policy Directive 2005, 2). U.S. doctrine acknowledges that the scope of SSTR is beyond the capability of the military and requires a “unified action.” Figure 2.3 illustrates the coordination effort made by the military command to achieve a unified action.

Figure 2-3 Unified Action



Source: JP 3-0 2008, IV-27

Joint Doctrine recognizes that it is a difficult adjustment for the military. “This challenge demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks; and coordination with a wider range of other organizations—OGAs (other government agencies), multinational partners, IGOs (international government organizations), and NGOs—to provide those capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors” (JP 3-0 2008, IV-27). The final phase, “Enable civil authority,” means transferring authority and control to the indigenous government, although it can mean to a foreign civilian authority such as UN Mission officials, as was done in Kosovo in 2005. Phase 4, stabilize, and Phase 5, enable civil authorities, are complicated when there is an insurgency.

Counterinsurgency

“The appearance of an intervening force normally produces a combination of shock and relief in the local population. Resistance is unorganized, spoilers unsure of their future. The situation is highly malleable” (Dobbins et al. 2007, xxiv). Over time, resistance to the indigenous government and the foreign military forces can increase in size and violence and become organized, especially if the government is weak. Professional military forces have traditionally prepared and trained to fight other professional military forces. It is an irregular practice to task professional military to provide internal security, fight indigenous armed groups, and undertake initiatives to gain popular support. “The context of irregular war is marked by a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population” (JP 3-0 2008, I-5). This means that both the foreign military

forces and insurgent groups need to gain the support of the people to be successful. This type of irregular war is called an insurgency or “armed nation-building” (Cronin 2008, 2). Patrick Cronin (8) describes irregular war as “profoundly political,” “intensely local,” and “of long duration.”

The U.S. Army and Marines are the services with combat ground forces that are tasked to engage in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The U.S. Army’s field manual (FM) and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication were combined in 2006. It defines an insurgency “as an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control” (FM 3-24 2006, 1-1). The manual details the complexity of COIN operations and is noted for identifying nine paradoxes of military operations in counterinsurgency, listed in Appendix H. The field manual states that “the long-term goal is to leave a government able to stand by itself. In the end, the host nation [HN] has to win on its own. Achieving this requires development of viable local leaders and institutions. U.S. forces and agencies can help, but HN elements must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory (FM 3-24 2006, 1-26). Accepting this concept, Michael Mihalka (2006, 131) draws the conclusion that “an effective counterinsurgency strategy is through state-building.” Rebuilding the governing institutions is not a core competency of the military and will require the involvement of civilian experts. “COIN operations include not only the military personnel but also diplomats, politicians, medical and humanitarian aid workers,

reconstruction workers, security personnel, narcotics officers, contractors, translators, and local leaders” (Cronin 2008, 8).

Civil-Military Organizations

Developed countries normally provide assistance to developing countries through their development agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). An extensive list of international development agencies is provided in Appendix G. The civilians who work within these agencies have the knowledge, skills, and experience in training public administrators and assisting in economic development. These experts are in high demand in post-conflict situations when “. . . the international community is more than likely to assume a degree of authority within the war-ravaged societies in which international forces have intervened” (Van Gennip 2005, 59). This requires the international forces to provide many of the hallmarks of civil government, such as security, rule of law, basic government services, humanitarian assistance, and so forth. Post-conflict reconstruction will require the expertise of the military and non-military personnel of the developed nation(s) involved (Berger 2007; Dobbins et al. 2007; Fukuyama 2004). Development agencies usually operate in permissive areas or in areas that are secure. When the post-conflict security situation deteriorates, the need for civilian expertise remains.

In the past, the military and civilian agencies of developed nations had minimal collaboration at the field or tactical level. The government agencies’ formal, hierarchal organizations limit collaboration to the strategic and operational levels.

Over the course of several interventions, the military has recognized the value of coordinating with civilian agencies, international government organizations, non-government organizations (NGOs), host nation officials, and area stakeholders (Sidell 2008). NATO developed Civil-Military Cooperation Centers (CIMICs), while the United States developed Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs). The centers differ in that CIMICs focus on cooperation with civilian agencies and host nation officials to provide humanitarian and other services needs, whereas CMOCs focus on supporting civilian agencies and local stakeholders to accomplish military needs (Franke 2006, 8). It was these centers that enhanced the lower-level coordination between the military and civilian officials.

Nation-Building at the Provincial or Local Level

The literature on nation-building provides a conceptual understanding at the international and national levels. The literature is useful to coalition or donor nations' practitioners operating at the country's embassies or international agency headquarters in the capital city. Practitioners at this level assist the central government officials—ministers, executive directors, and other government or non-government host nation leaders.

Literature that provides a conceptual understanding of nation-building at the provincial and district levels is lacking. In studying the causes of “failed states,” David Carment acknowledges the lack of conceptual understanding at the local level: “This is because most theories by themselves lack specificity and rarely consider the ‘operational milieu’ in which effective responses have to be generated” (2003, 417).

Literature that provides insights of nation-building efforts at the local level tend to be country or crises specific or highlight meaningful efforts of practitioners, usually referred to as lessons learned or best practices (Borders 2007; Abbaszadeh et. al. 2008). The international- and national-level theories become the bases for provincial- and local-level actions. Recent interventions have seen the provincial- and local-level nation-building efforts, especially in failed states, merge military and civilian efforts, resulting in provincial or local teams. Foreign military and civilian provincial- or district-level teams have operated in past post-conflict reconstruction operations. A notable example is the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) that operated in South Vietnam. CORDS were developed in 1966, based on the theory that a unified chain of command and an integrated military and civilian organization would reinvigorate pacification and reconstruction efforts (Westerman 2008). The loss of “institutional memory” at the end of past interventions resulted in “ad hoc” planning and execution in recent interventions (Sedra 2005, 3).

Raymond Millen (2008, 237) advances the concept of a “dual tract” approach to rebuilding “collapsed states,” at both the national and provincial or local level. He advances the idea that a “neutral element” can act as a conduit between the national and local levels to improve communication and overcome the distrust between the levels of government. Provincial or local teams are described as “an innovative instrument” (Gauster 2008, 3), as “flexible” (Borders 2007), and “...the first model, local in orientation, to combine humanitarian, reconstruction, diplomatic, and military security in one organization focused on stability operation’s complex

relationship of factors” (Wilcox 2007, 1). A provincial or local team that combines military and civilian government personnel would streamline communications and cost-effectiveness. There are several dimensions that need to be considered in describing these teams: function, structure, funding, personnel, and assessments.

Function

In *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building* (2007), the RAND authors provide several considerations for nation-builders. Nation-building would inevitably involve a mixture of national, multinational, and international actors. It would require a determination to either work with the existing institutions or build new ones. Priorities would need to be established and objectives identified. Naturally, the function of a nation-building organization would be “organized around the constituent elements of any nation-building mission” (Dobbins et al. 2007, xix). The “constituent elements” include military and police contingents, civil administrators, and experts in political reform and economic development. Other scholars, such as Jos Van Gennip and Alan Whaites, in addition to the Department of State, have provided a list of functions or “tasks” for nation-building. A nation-building provincial or local team consisting of these constituent elements would have the function of security, governance, and development. Each of these functions will be described in the sections to follow. Table 2.1 lists the various prescriptions for nation-building.

Table 2-1 Nation-Building Tasks

Jos Van Gennip’s four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction (2005, 58)
1. security or establishment of a safe and secure environment through legitimate and stable security institutions
2. justice and reconciliation, which incorporate an impartial and accountable legal system
3. social and economic well-being achieved through emergency relief, restoration of basic services, a viable economy, and sustainable development
4. governance and participation by building viable constitutional structures, and capacity-building in state institutions and public administration and civil society
Alan Whaites’s responsive state-building, three necessary areas of progress (2008, 6)
1. political settlement—understanding between elites that brings about the conditions to end conflict using self-interest and a sense of shared ethos; emergence of a powerful group to impose negotiated settlement; can absorb social change
2. survival functions—control security, raise revenue and the capability to rule through law
3. expected functions—provide basic services
Department of State’s five primary stability tasks (sectors) (FM 3-07 2008, 2-9)
1. establish civil security (security)
2. establish civil control (justice and reconciliation)
3. restore essential services (humanitarian assistance and social well-being)
4. support governance (governance and participation)
5. support economic and infrastructure development (economic stabilization and infrastructure)
RAND’s hierarchy of nation-building tasks (Dobbins et al. 2007, xxiii)
1. security: peacekeeping, law enforcement, rule of law, and security sector reform
2. humanitarian relief: return of refugees and response to potential epidemics, hunger, and lack of shelter
3. governance: resuming public services and restoring public administration
4. economic stabilization: establishing a stable currency and providing a legal and regulatory framework in which local and international commerce can resume
5. democratization: building political parties, free press, civil society, and a legal and constitutional framework for elections
6. development: fostering economic growth, poverty reduction, and infrastructure improvements

Source: Identified in table

The functions are broad and do not identify the practitioners and skill sets needed. A cursory review of these functions could be summarized in the three main

categories of security, governance, and development. A function not mentioned, but nonetheless important, is public diplomacy and information operations. The nation-building functions of security, governance, development, and public diplomacy are described in greater detail in the following sections.

A. Security

The security function is implemented primarily by the military. The lack of internal security leads to conditions in which anti-government, criminal, and belligerent individuals and organizations can thrive. Such actors have demonstrated the ability to operate, plan, and undertake operations against other countries using global communication and transportation networks (Berger 2006, 20). A country that has a weak government and security apparatus is referred to as a “failed” or “crisis” state (FM 3-24 2006, 1-2; FM 3-07 2008, 1-10). The ability of internal actors within a failed or crisis state to affect global security has resulted in external involvement by other countries (Sidell 2008, 13; Canestrini 2004, 10). Roland Paris describes the results of “third-party interveners” to achieve viable security. He concludes that peace is likely when these three conditions arise: 1) warring factions have reached a stalemate; 2) factions recognize that they cannot achieve their goals through conflict; 3) a third party provides incentives for accepting peace or determinants for continuing conflict (2000, 29). “International military forces can separate contending parties, disarm and demobilize former combatants, substitute for or supplement local police, secure borders, deter external interference, and reform or create new indigenous military forces” (Dobbins et al. 2007, 19). However, to undertake these

security functions, a large military force is required. The great expense and reluctance to create perceptions of an occupation pressure intervening nations to limit the size of the international military forces, commonly referred to as maintaining a “light footprint” (World Bank 2007, 5; Sidell 2008, 46).

In a post-conflict environment, the concept of security includes external (the military), internal (national police), law enforcement (local police), intelligence (national security), and special police (border, highway, investigations, prisons, etc.). International military forces have historically been too small to augment or assist all the indigenous security providers. International police forces and contracted private police have been used to supplement or train indigenous police.

U.S. military doctrine recognizes the value of small military units at the local level in maintaining a safe and secure environment. “Small units, operating under mission orders, are particularly well suited for these persistent operations because they often act as their own intelligence ‘sensors’ and can respond quickly to changing circumstances while developing and maintaining a rapport with the local people” (JOC 2006, 36). However, the security tasks involved in nation-building entail the reform of the entire host country’s security sector from the national level (normally defense and interior ministries) down to the military units and local-police level. The provincial or local teams assist the reform of the security sector of the host country by advising, mentoring, and training local officials. Provincial or local teams can contribute to security directly by mediating warring factions; assisting in the

disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating (DDR) of local militias; and providing resources to local security elements (McFate 2008).

B. Governance

The concept of governance includes more than government. “It includes the network of institutions and relationships through which citizens express their views, articulate their sectional interests, communicate with governments, and try to ensure that their preferences are reflected in public policy” (Jenkins & Plowden 2006, 8). U.S. military doctrine defines “governance” as “the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority” (FM 3-07 2008, 2-8). In war-torn countries, local institutions are often non-existent or ill performing as a result of the conflict or intervention.

Rebuilding efforts are driven by government and public administration concepts employed by developed nations. Derick and Jennifer Brinkerhoff (2002, 511) mention that governance and administrative systems are both “part of the problem” and “part of the solution.” Concepts and practices of developed countries, such as new public management, democratization, and modernization, are incorporated in nation-building governance efforts. New public management theory began in the 1980s with a new concept that “the market, not the state, was considered being the best organizing principle for socioeconomic development”

(Brinkerhoff 2008, 986). New public management theory states that government should be minimal, limited to ensuring rule of law, property rights, and a stable monetary policy; promoting private sector investment; and otherwise focused on efforts that support a market economy. The knowledge and abilities needed to implement new public management would require much training and assistance of government officials and community leaders in war-torn countries. The concept of democratization includes participation of citizens through elections, public service, community organizations, and other public forums. Western concepts of democracy recognize basic human rights and include protection of vulnerable populations such as women, children, and ethnic and religious minorities. "In context of nation-building, the process of democratization should be seen as a practical means of redirecting the ongoing competition for wealth and power within the society from violent into peaceful channels, not as an abstract exercise in social justice" (Dobbins et al. 2007, xxxiv). The objective is to create an enduring peace that will extend beyond the war-torn country. "The 'democratic peace' is based on the premise that democratic nations do not wage war against each other" (Canestrini 2004, 3). Developed nations' efforts toward rebuilding a war-torn country into a democracy with a market economy are viewed as modernizing or westernizing and require social change (Suhrke 2007, 1293). Positive or negative views and acceptance of the change that foreign intervention efforts create depend on the degree of difference from current practices, the speed and methods of implementation, and the political, economic, and social trends (Suhrke 2007, 1292).

C. Development

Development in post-conflict is generally viewed as the reconstruction of physical and economic development. In war-torn countries, institutional structures have also been damaged by the conflict. “An enduring component of international assistance in the service of nation-building has been analysis of administrative institutions in poor countries and the design and provision of assistance to address their problems and weaknesses” (Brinkerhoff 2008, 985).

At the provincial level, field representatives of the donor countries’ various government agencies implement the development function. This function is complicated by the varying agendas of the donor government agencies on the preferred development methods and goals. In the larger context of Western donor development thinking, the current constructs of new public management, modernization, democratization, and market economics influence actions at the local level. These concepts expand the traditional view beyond the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure, injection of capital, and private investments to include “rights-based development.” Brinkerhoff describes the “newer ideas” that recognize that people throughout the world have the “rights to basic services, social and political freedoms, economic opportunity, security, and access to justice” (2008, 987). The “basic human rights” concept resonates with Western audiences but tends to encounter resistance from indigenous traditions that are steeped in tradition and community oriented. David Simon has reviewed over twenty-five years of development concepts and offers his own expansive concept. “Human development is

the process of enhancing individual and collective quality of life in a manner that satisfies basic needs (as a minimum), is environmentally, socially, and economically sustainable, and is empowering in the sense that the people concerned have a substantial degree of control (because total control may be unrealistic) over the process through access to the means of accumulating social power” (1997, 185). The herculean task of the foreign development experts at the provincial or local level requires incorporating the various Western development concepts with those of the indigenous traditions in order to achieve local ownership of foreign ideas (Suhrke 2007, 1292).

The military has its own concept of development. The military holds to the idea that development can be used to achieve military objectives (FM 3-07 2008). The selection for project funding considers the possible political, intelligence, and military benefits (JP 3-57 2008). The project benefits are further enhanced by high public visibility (JP 3-13 2006). It is the military’s involvement in localized development, reconstruction, and relief that is the focus of criticism from non-government organizations as a violation of “humanitarian space” (Franke 2006; Barakat et al. 2005). The projects tend to be small, low-cost projects that have a considerable psychological and political impact at the local level.

D. Public Diplomacy and Information Operations

Foreign intervention and assistance can be undermined by poor communications, misperceptions, rumors, and anti-foreign, antigovernment propaganda. A coordinated communication effort is needed by both civilian and

military personnel involved in nation-building in order to inform and influence the people of the war-torn country.

The traditional view of public diplomacy is as a situation “where state and non-state actors use the media and other channels of communication to influence public opinion in foreign societies” (Gilboa 2008, 58). This includes “media diplomacy, where officials use the media to investigate and promote mutual interests, negotiations, and conflict resolution” (Ibid.). Eytan Gilboa notes that advances in communication technology have further complicated the relationship between government, the media, and public opinion. Satellite phones, cell phones, and the Internet have expanded the communication medium. Individuals have the ability to communicate on a global scale. Global communication permits distracting or competing messages to reach targeted audiences. This compounds the efforts of foreign assistance providers and the supported government that are attempting to inform, influence, and persuade targeted audiences’ perceptions and actions.

The military has recognized the impact of communication on shaping perceptions and influencing behavior. This concept has led to the development of information operations (IO). Military information operations are described as “the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision-making while protecting our own” (JP 3-13 2006, 1-1). Information

operations are recognized as a key component in counterinsurgency operations. Civil-military operations, public affairs, and public diplomacy are recognized as related capabilities of information operations. The military recognizes that an effective information operations campaign must ensure that personnel at all levels in the command or organization understand and transmit consistent messages.

Structure

The structure of international nation-building efforts will likely depend on who leads the effort: an international organization (UN), a regional alliance (NATO), a developed nation (U.S.), or a combination of all three. Adding to the complexity would be the clash of organizational cultures between the civilian and military personnel and non-government organizations.

A. External Structure

A nation-building team at a provincial level is impacted by the external organizational structure. The U.S. Ambassador is the “chief of the mission” for all government agencies to include military contingents in foreign countries under normal circumstances. A crisis that requires international intervention places the military in a commanding position. In many situations, the embassies have been evacuated or the remaining country team is inadequately manned to take on the task of leading the post-conflict efforts (Canestrini 2004, 28; Griffin & Donnelly 2008, 8). The military draws a distinction between “warfighting” functions and the units that carry out these functions and support units (FM 3-24 2006, 7-6). The organizational structure tends to separate chains of command between the forces that engage in

stability operations and those fighting an insurgency or terrorism. Unity of effort is such an important concept that the Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency explicitly states that it is “essential” (FM 3-24 2006, 1-22). “*Unity of effort* is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action” (JP 3-0 2008). Unity of effort is fundamental to successfully incorporating all the instruments of national power in a collaborative approach to stability operations (FM 3-07 2008, 1-3). The field manual on stability operations expands the unity of effort concept to include the “whole of government approach,” and a “*comprehensive approach* is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the United States Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to an effort toward a shared goal” (FM 3-07 2008, 1-4). The military considers the other non-military organizations that will operate in a post-conflict environment, but it does not have direct control over the other organizations.

Another external organizational structure concern is known as “stovepipe”. In a stovepipe structure representatives from civilian agencies are controlled and report directly through their respective agency’s headquarters. This line of reporting may or may not go through the country’s embassy. “Stovepipe thinking, operational silos, bureaucratic turf battles, and negative stereotyping have hampered progress and restricted dialogue at multiple levels” (Brinkerhoff 2008, 993). “Also, development practitioners and diplomats continue to work in ‘stovepipe’ agencies with missions,

reporting structures, and programs that lack the capacity for interoperability” (McFate 2008, 18). The ability of provincial-level nation-building teams to perform the nation-building functions will be impacted by the different reporting chains, policies, and procedures of other government organizations.

Government organizations have centralized, hierarchical, vertical structures with narrow accountability similar to the military. Adding to the complexity is the need to work with non-government organizations that maintain a decentralized, fluid, horizontal structure with wide accountability. Volker Franke further points out the differences in NGO culture, operating principles, and normative foundations that result in strained relations between nation-builders and NGOs (16).

B. Internal Structure

The internal structure of a civil-military organization may strain relations. Despite the “whole of government approach,” the military recognizes that there are organizational and cultural differences between the military and civilian personnel (FM 3-07 2008, 1-4). Donald Nightingale and Jean-Marie Toulouse offer a theory of organization that is consistent with a provincial-level nation-building organization. Their theory incorporates five concepts within an organization: “organizational environment, managerial values, organizational structure, interpersonal and inter-group processes, and the reactions-adjustments of organization members,” and argues that these concepts are “linked in an open systems framework” (Nightingale & Toulouse 1977, 264). “The theory states that two aspects of the organization's environment—broad cultural values and beliefs about work, authority, and human

nature, and technological demands and constraints—influence the managerial value system of organization members and aspects of the organization's structure, respectively” (Ibid., 266). Their findings suggest that individuals and the environment have a major impact on the internal organizational structure. Applying this theory to local nation-building teams suggests that the tumultuous environment of a post-conflict country and the personalities of the individuals would significantly affect the nation-building team at the local level.

Funding

There are two aspects to funding provincial- or local-level teams. One is the funding of team operations, and the other is program funding.

A. Funding of Operations

The integration of military and civilian operations in the same teams compounds the funding mechanism. The budget maximizing theory relating to bureaucratic organizations (Niskanen 1971) is applicable to the “stovepipe” and interagency situations. This theory holds that managers seek to enlarge their organizations. It is irrational for managers to relinquish their facilities, equipment, personnel, and funding to other organizations. Contentious funding issues develop at every level in situations involving interagency relations but are compounded when military and civilian personnel are co-located and expected to share resources.

B. Funding of Projects

Program funding is based on donor governments’ prerogatives. Jean-Philippe Therien (2002) offers insights into the development of foreign aid, framing it in a

political left-right debate. The relevance is that recommendations of funding for projects will be based on the local-level provider's own political left-right views. The military favors "the right," or a "broad interpretation" of foreign aid to expand the types of projects and focus on "issue of results." Civilian officials support "the left," or a "narrow definition" that views aid in terms of "moral principles" and concentrates on social welfare or economic development projects. The debate regarding how foreign aid is allocated, despite donor guidelines, continues at the provincial or local level because the post-conflict environment dictates local discretionary authority.

Personnel

The discretionary authority afforded to personnel in a post-conflict environment necessitates a concerted personnel selection and training process.

A. Personnel Selection

Military leadership, understanding the life and death responsibilities of military personnel, is keenly aware of the importance of personnel selection. The military maintains a rigorous selection and training process for all military personnel. The "whole of government" approach to post-conflict situations has made civilian agencies aware of the magnitude of the actions of their personnel. Individuals who work for their organization outside their home country for an extended period of time are considered expatriates (Mol et al. 2005, 591). Research regarding the selection process of civilian personnel working overseas is limited and specifically does not address working in a post-conflict environment with military personnel. Studies of expatriates have shown that the selection process can help predict job

performance. Factors such as personality, work context, cultural context, and experience are important indicators of the ability to work effectively in an overseas assignment (Ibid.).

B. Personnel Training

Military and civilian agencies have traditionally concentrated the training of personnel on the organizations' specific objectives. Nation-building efforts with the "whole of government" approach require knowledge, skills, and abilities that are outside the organizations' scope. Joint training, collaborative training, mutual training, and cross training provide personnel with opportunities for socialization and recognition of their respective responsibilities (Franke 2006, 20).

Assessment

Opposition politicians and domestic media of Western countries question the expense of "lives and treasure" for questionable success or effectiveness in their country's nation-building endeavors. An assessment or evaluation of nation-building is an arduous undertaking. "This is because evaluation, by its nature, needs to attribute value and influence practice, and is therefore necessarily concerned with causation" (Barakat et al. 2005, 834). Evaluating the success or failure of a provincial or local team may present a "wicked issue." Wicked issues "defy efforts to delineate their boundaries and to identify their causes, and thus to expose their problematic nature" (Rittel & Webber 1973, 167). There are many variables that would impact the ability to assess the success or failure of a provincial or local team. The team is operating in a foreign country, in a post-conflict environment, with broad functions,

ill-defined structure, complicated funding, diverse personnel, and the complex dynamics of the local environment. “Thinking about ‘wicked issues’ requires a language that reflects relationships, interconnections, and interdependencies—holistic thinking. This is not the prevailing discourse of classical organizations that are underpinned by notions of rationality, linear thinking, task differentiation, and functionalism” (Williams 2002, 104).

A. Subjective Assessment

Assessments can be subjective and used for political purposes to support an individual’s or organization’s views or to validate an action. “The main barrier to measuring progress is political.” Political spin does not aid decision-makers in determining actual results produced by programs and funding (Cohen 2006, 3). Situations that encompass broad social issues tend to be “qualitative, long-term, holistic, and political” (Barakat et al. 2005, 835).

B. Objective Assessment

Objective assessments are very difficult to make in post-conflict environments. Foremost is the need to determine which measurements to use—foreign or local. International experts may have modern research skills and advanced methods but may lack the cultural awareness and language skills to direct objective research. Local expertise may be limited, the means to collect data sparse or non-existent, and the reliability of the data suspect. The United States Institute for Peace (USIP) has created “metrics” and “frameworks”⁶ in an effort to provide an objective assessment of what

⁶ See <http://www.usip.org/peaceops/mpice.pdf>.

essentially are politically created operations (Cohen 2006). The assessment tools are designed for national-level assessment rather than at the provincial or local level.

Conceptual Framework

Several theories of nation-building and counterinsurgency influence U.S. policies and operations in post-conflict reconstruction. The post-conflict environment requires a concerted military and civilian effort. The development of an insurgency creates security problems that increase the difficulty of nation-building. The intent of maintaining a “light footprint” limits the size of the international intervention. Combining military and civilian personnel, organizing them into small, sustainable teams with the function of assisting provincial- and district-level government, is a cost-effective means of nation-building with limited resources.

The U.S. removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan resulted in a post-conflict situation. The United States is leading the effort to rebuild the nation of Afghanistan. The resurgence of the Taliban has produced a growing insurgency. The U.S. State and Defense Departments use a dual approach to the nation-building and counterinsurgency effort. These U.S. efforts are carried out not only at the national level but also at the provincial or local level.

The provincial-level approach involves employing provincial-level teams. The teams are composed of military and civilian personnel. The military personnel perform the security function. Civilian experts perform the governance and development functions. Military and civilian personnel combine their efforts to perform the public diplomacy/information operations function. The ability of the

teams to carry out the functions is impacted by the internal and external organizational structure, funding for operations and projects, and the quality and capability of the team personnel. The determination of the team's effectiveness is likely to be on the basis of "metrics" or a combination of objective and subjective assessments.

This paper will describe U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating at the provincial and district levels in Afghanistan. The conceptual framework in Table 2.2 is a research tool used to guide the inquiry (Shields & Tajalli 2005) of PRTs. An example of descriptive categories used to organize the data can be found in Texas State applied research studies (Molina 1998, Olldashi 2002; Revel 2006, Ari 2007, West 2007). This study of PRTs will review the functions of PRTs. The PRTs' internal and external structure, funding for operations and projects, and personnel selection and training impact the functions of PRTs. The study reviews the subjective and objective methods of assessing PRT performance.

Table 2-2 Conceptual Framework

Categories/Sub-categories	References
I. Function	Dobbins 2007, DoD Dir 3000.05 2005, FM 3-07 2008, Gennp 2005, Whaite 2008, Natsios 2005
Security	Berger 2006, Paris 2000, Dobbins et al. 2007, JOC 2008, FM 3-24 2006, McFate 2008
Governance	Jenkins & Plowden 2006, Binkerhoff 2002, 2008, JP 3-57 2008, Simon 1997, Shurke 2007
Development	Binkerhoff 2008, JP 3-57 2008, Simon 1997, Shurke 2007, FM 3-07 2008, JP 3-57 2008, FM 3-13 2006, Franke 2006, Barakat et al. 2005
Public Diplomacy, Info Operations	Gilboa 2008, JP 3-13 2006, FM 3-05.30 2005
II. Structure	FM 3-07 2008, Canestrini 2004, Griffin & Donnelly 2008
Internal	Franke 2006, FM 3-07 2008, Griffin & Donnelly 2008, Binkerhoff 2008
External	Franke 2006, FM 3-07 2008, Griffin & Donnelly 2008, Binkerhoff 2008, McFate 2008, FM 3-07 2008
III. Funding	
Operations	Niskanen 1971
Projects	Therien 2002
IV. Personnel	
Selection	Mol et al. 2005
Training	Franke 2006
V. Assessment	Barakat et al. 2005, Rittel & Webber 1973, Williams 2002, USIP 2007
Subjective	Barakat et al. 2005, Cohen 2006, USIP 2007
Objective	Barakat et al. 2005, Cohen 2006, USIP 2007

Chapter 3 Afghanistan

Figure 3-1 U.S. Psychological Operations Leaflet (AF G105, 2002)



Source: <http://www.psywarrior.com/Herbafghan02.html>

In 2002, U.S. Psychological Operations teams distributed thousands of leaflets like the one in Figure 3.1 in an effort to persuade and influence the people of Afghanistan. The message is both pictorial and written in the two predominant languages of Dari and Pashtu. The front states: “A United Afghanistan Offers Peace and Prosperity.” The back states: “A New Government Peace Offers New Freedom” and “The Future of Afghanistan Depends on Your Support of the New Government.” The international community has realized that the effort to unite and gain the support of the diverse people of Afghanistan is a monumental task. Knowledge and understanding of the country and its people will contribute to the task of rebuilding the nation of Afghanistan. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a general overview of the situation in Afghanistan in which PRTs are operating.

At the Crossroads or in the Crosshairs

The area that comprises modern-day Afghanistan has been settled for over 3000 years. Its location grounds the country in the middle of the historic “silk road” trade routes and east-west competition, which provides much wealth and anguish.

The topography is as distinct and harsh as its people. Afghanistan’s 647,500 square kilometers encompass extremes in climate, temperature, and elevation. In the west and south, the summers are bone dry and air temperatures extremely hot, in some areas exceeding 140 degrees Fahrenheit. In the north and east, the mountain ranges are over 7000 meters high, with extremely frigid temperatures during the winter. Only 12% of the land is arable. The population in 2008 was estimated to be 32.7 million people, growing at 2.6 percent a year. The people are distinguished by an unknown number of tribes within seven major ethnic groups and speak two official languages and over thirty minor languages (CIA Factbook 2008).

The history of the area of modern-day Afghanistan is marked by continuous invasions or internal conflict. The modern country of Afghanistan was formed during the colonial period of the 1800s, when it was in the crosshairs of the competing British and Russian empires known as the Great Game. In the early 1900s, the British Empire attempted to control the area but failed. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union attempted to exert control over the area and similarly failed. Many scholars attribute the failures to the rugged landscape and the Afghan people’s aversion to foreigners. It is within this context that the U.S. and international community are attempting to build a modern democratic nation.

The Nation-Building Challenge

Building the Afghan nation is challenged by the short history and unfamiliarity of people with a modern nation-state. The establishment of Afghanistan is credited to Ahmand Shah Durrani, who united the warring Pashtun tribes in 1749. Independence was not fully recognized by the British until 1919, after the third Anglo-Afghan war. Between 1926 and 1973, a Shah (king) ruled the Kingdom of Afghanistan. A military coup by Zahir Shah's cousin, Dauod Khan, resulted in the first and short-lived Republic of Afghanistan. In 1978, Dauod and his family were killed during a bloody communist coup. Subsequently, the Afghan people came under a brutal communist regime propped up by Soviet troops from 1979 to 1989. The Soviet Union could not sustain the increasing losses of its military forces by attacks of mujahedeen⁷ fighters covertly supported by the United States. The mujahedeen captured the capital, Kabul, in 1992 and established an Islamic state. Fighting among the mujahedeen leaders led to the rise and the brutal Islamic regime of Muslim extremists, known as the Taliban, led by Mullah Omar in 1996. The failure of the Taliban to hand over the mastermind, Osama Bin Laden, of the horrific terrorist attack on the U.S. mainland on 11 September 2001 led to the U.S. bombardment of Taliban forces and the military support of the Northern Alliance. By late November 2001, Kabul had been captured and the leaders of the Taliban regime had hid or fled to Pakistan.

The international community, led by the United States, demonstrated a determination to establish a modern, democratic, and capable Afghan government

⁷ A loose alliance of resistance groups and fighters.

and to rebuild the war-torn country. The victorious Afghan leaders agreed in Bonn in December 2001 to establish an Interim Administration and chose Hamid Karzai as chairman. Donors pledged over \$5 billion to support post-conflict reconstruction. In June 2002, an Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Council) elected Karzai the president of the transitional government of Afghanistan. On 4 January 2004, a national Loya Jirga ratified a new constitution and created the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The Afghan people's first experience with a hallmark of democracy occurred in October 2004 with the election of a president of Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai received the majority vote among a slate of eighteen candidates and was inaugurated president on 7 December 2004. The Afghan people gained experience in representative government with the September 2005 election of 249 representatives to the Woliesi Jirga (lower house) of parliament and provincial councils in each of the thirty-four provinces. The Mushrano Jirga (upper house) currently has two thirds of its 102 representatives chosen by the provincial councils and one third by the president. The constitution requires one third to be chosen by district councils. This cannot take place until district councils are elected. The formation of an Afghan democratic government was astonishingly rapid, from December 2001 to September 2005. Consequently, the competence and capability of government officials to administer a democratic government was questionable.

Rebuilding a nation-state requires political stability and resources that Afghanistan does not have. Afghanistan's unitary system with a strong central government concentrates decision-making at the national level. The national

ministries appoint officials, set budgets, and make major decisions for the provincial and district levels. The World Bank 2007 report *Afghanistan: Building an Effective State* called for public administration reform (PAR), noting that “much of the reform effort will have to be directed at de-concentrating line ministry authority” (vii). In addition to the structure, officials lacking adequate education, training, supervision, and public service dedication hamper the government at all levels. There is a recognized need for an overarching strategy for rebuilding the government. The London Donor Conference in February 2006 approved and called for resourcing the Afghan Compact and the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). “Bonn provided a framework for the international community to help Afghans create a legitimate government, while the Afghanistan Compact provides a framework for the international community to help Afghans build a state and develop their country” (I-ANDS 2006, 18). ANDS provides policy goals for the Afghan government at all levels to achieve security, good governance, active civil society, justice, rule of law, and economic growth. ANDS provides political stability, and the Afghan Compact provides resources for building the Afghan state. The state-building efforts, however, are confronted by a growing insecurity.

Lines of Conflict and Reconciliation

Conflict has been a mainstay in Afghanistan. Mohammad Stanekzai identifies the sources of conflict along “geographic lines” and “abstract lines” (Stanekzai 2008a, 6). The political borders of modern Afghanistan reinforce regional disputes, especially the division of the Pashtun tribes by the British-imposed Durand Line that

is the eastern border with Pakistan. There is an ideological struggle between the mostly urban-educated “modernizers” and rural, tribal elders or “conservatives” at the national down to the local levels. “Many local disputes in Afghanistan are related to conflicts over land and access to water” (Stanekzai 2008a, 6). Abstract conflict is based on religion, ethnicity, and internal family feuds. There is a struggle between moderate and extremist elements of Islam. Foreign and Afghan political opportunists have exasperated social strife while gaining popular support and political power by pursuing a divisive agenda based on ethnicity. Despite close tribal and family traditions, conflict still erupts over issues of arranged marriages and communal land. The process of reconciliation has been recognized as a means to address many sources of conflict. A fundamental principle established by a Kabul Policy Action Group is that of Afghan ownership (Stanekzai 2008a, 13). This means that Afghans lead the reconciliation efforts. “In concert with and in support of our Afghan partners, we need to identify and separate the ‘irreconcilables’ from the ‘reconcilables,’ striving to create the conditions that can make the reconcilables part of the solution, even as we kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables” (Petraeus 2009, 3). While the United States generally agrees with President Karzai’s efforts to appeal to moderate Taliban elements, an exception was made with his overtures to Mullah Omar on 16 November 2008 (Baker 2008). The international community struggles with the best means of supporting the Afghan reconciliation process, especially in light of the major disagreements between Afghan officials and the United States and its allies.

Heavy Hand or Light Footprint

The desire of the United States and the international community to maintain a “light footprint” by using the least amount of foreign military and civilian forces and to avoid major conflict has inadvertently contributed to the growing insecurity (Dobbins et al 2003, Jakobson 2005, 8; 146; Sidell 2008, 46; Gauster 2008, 8). Four major contributors to insecurity have been regional power brokers, insurgent groups, narcotic trafficking, and government corruption.

The United States partnered or paid local warlords to support the defeat of the Taliban. This tactic contributed to strengthening the powerbase of local warlords. Using that powerbase, local warlords appointed themselves or their minions to government positions at the provincial and local levels; a noted example is Ismail Khan in the Hirat Province. This resulted in a new national government that had little or no authority outside the capital. Lacking the ability to confront the major warlords directly, President Karzai has laterally moved these local warlords to other provinces or promoted them to the national level; for example, Ismail Khan was appointed as Minister of Mines and Industry in September 2004.

Insurgent groups include the Afghan Taliban, anti-Western elements such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and Al Qaeda (Stanekzai 2008a, 8–9). These groups operate out of safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan. The United States and the international community embarked on an ambitious strategy to engage in counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, demilitarization, and peace enforcement, all the while building Afghan security forces. U.S. counterterrorism against Al Qaeda and counterinsurgency against the Taliban are operated out of large

military bases established in Bagram and Kandahar. The well-financed and -trained foreign fighters of Al Qaeda and the culturally and geographically adept Taliban fighters have increased their attacks every year, resulting in increased casualties to international forces, Afghan security forces, and Afghan civilians. The number of terrorist attacks and direct attacks on international forces has continued to increase every year, but this has been attributed to the increasing number of international and Afghan security forces (Katzman 2008b, 40).

Some international post-conflict nation-building efforts are recognized to have been successful. The Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP) disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated (DDR) the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) that supported the U.S. Coalition in defeating the Taliban. The AMF comprised the numerous private militias whose leaders supported the overthrow of the Taliban. The AMF was a direct threat to the new government. There were insufficient international forces to confront the militias. A delicate process of diplomatic and military persuasion and coercion convinced militia commanders that it was in their best interest to accept DDR. The process started in 2002 and resulted in over 64,000 ex-combatants being “reintegrated” by 2007 (Stanekzai 2008a, 4). The program focused on large, generally pro-Western militias. Remnants of the AMF and all other organized armed groups were declared illegal in July 2004 by presidential decree. The Afghan government and international community created the Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG)⁸ program to target these groups. The program’s

⁸ See <http://www.diag.gov.af>.

success has been in the accounting of weapons collected and the support of local community development projects that provide jobs to illegally armed groups' members.

The Afghan government and international community have received much criticism for the slow pace and large expense of the Security Sector Reform (SSR). At the 2001 Bonn conference, donor countries divided the SSR effort: The United States would assist the Afghan military; Germany would assist the police; Italy would assist the judicial system; the United Kingdom would assist the counternarcotics effort; and Japan would assist in disarmament. The Afghan security sector includes the Ministry of Defense (ANA), Ministry of the Interior (ANP), Ministry of Justice (Courts and Prisons), and Office of National Security. "The objective of SSR is to institutionalize a professional security sector that is effective, legitimate, apolitical, and accountable to the citizens it is sworn to protect" (McFate 2008, 2). Internal resistance and corruption along with donor countries' changes in strategies and priorities have hampered the reforms. "Some donors have displayed limited leadership in both the design of their programs and their attempts to solicit and shape the involvement of other states" (Bhatia et Al 2004, 15). A June 2008 report to Congress, *Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan*, provides a snapshot of the SSR progress. It reported that as of February 2008, the Afghan Army's strength was 49,000 despite a target objective of 70,000 and U.S. financial assistance of \$1.7 billion. An International Crisis Group *Update Briefing* of December 2008, "Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy," details the problems of reforming the

Afghan police. The establishment of the rule of law, both civil and criminal, is based on the capacity of the judicial system. However, the aforementioned report to Congress mentions that “disproportionally low salaries, widespread corruption, poor infrastructure, inefficient organizational structures, untrained professionals, and a lack of equipment and supplies plague the system” (2008, 34).

The increasing cultivation of poppies, from 7.6 thousand hectares in 2001 to over 157,000 by mid-2008 (Campbell & Shapiro 2008, 20), is an indication of the failure of counternarcotics efforts. The increase can be attributed to the differences in strategy of the Afghan government, the United States, and the international community. Afghan farmers receive a larger income from growing poppies, and many are indebted to drug lords for loans to support their families. Drug lords finance illegally armed groups and insurgents to provide protection for their operations. Government officials either participate or are bribed to ignore the drug activities in their area. The Afghan government favors a strategy to discourage farmers from growing poppies. The Alternative Livelihood program offers support for non-illicit crops, credit, agri-business support, access to markets, and other assistance (Lee 2009, 23 and 30). The international community supports enhancing the Afghan police and Ministry of Justice efforts to identify, arrest, and prosecute drug lords and corrupt officials. The United States has advocated the aerial spraying of herbicides to destroy poppy fields. A united strategy is needed to counter the growing drug trade that in mid-2008 produced over 85% of the world’s opium (Campbell & Shapiro 2008, 20).

The increasing instability and insecurity fueled by regional powerbrokers have begun to adversely impact Afghan economic and social development.

Afghan Development

The destruction from twenty-three years of conflict impacted every sector of the economy. The international community has made financial commitments to aid in the reconstruction. The pledges amount to over \$40 billion, as outlined in Table 3.1. This amount is distorted by the fact that assistance programs from international forces are not always included and pledges cover a period of two to five years.

Table 3.1 Donor Conferences and Pledges

City	Date	Pledges	Request	Nations	U.S. pledges
Paris	12 Jun 2008	\$20.5 billion		Over 80	\$10.2 billion
London	31 Jan–1 Feb 2006	\$10.5 billion		Over 60	
Berlin	31 Mar–1 Apr 2004	\$ 8.2 billion	\$26.4 billion		\$ 2.2 billion
Tokyo	21–22 Jan 2002	\$ 5 billion	\$15 billion		

Source: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/prb0735-e.htm>

The impact of donors' pledges has been difficult to measure due to a variety of factors. A small number of donors do not follow through with their pledges. A sizeable amount of funds provided has not been spent, in large measure due to concerns of corruption and lack of capacity. A significant portion of the aid, 40%, is spent on private contracts and consultant fees with businesses and experts from the donor countries (Bayley 2008, 7).

A few programs among the extensive and complex assortment of development programs have had a significant impact at the provincial and local levels. The Afghan Compact was an effort to renew donor confidence and demonstrate the Afghan government's ability to implement a comprehensive development strategy. The five-year agreement created a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) of Afghan and international officials that monitor and report on development progress. The compact focuses on "pillars of activities: security; governance, rule of law, and human rights; and economic and social development, with counternarcotics identified as a 'crosscutting' and 'vital' area of work" (ICG 2007, 5). The compact specifies the roles of the ISAF and the PRTs in promoting security and stability (Ibid.). A limitation of the compact is that it does not specify the methods for achieving "accountable and representative institutions 'at all levels of government'" (Nixon 2008, 13).

The National Solidarity Program (NSP) is a rural development program that provides development funding at the lowest level with project selection made by elected community representatives with expert assistance and oversight. The program was introduced in 2002 under the National Development Framework. The major objectives of the NSP require a stable environment and considerable time and cooperation to implement. The objectives call for the creation of community development committees (CDCs) through secret-ballot elections, assisting the CDCs in developing and prioritizing community development plans (CDPs), providing block grants to fund the CDPs, and "linking" the CDCs to Afghan government agencies, IO/NGO assistance, and donor funding (Lee 2009, 51).

Development assistance has been disproportionately provided to large urban areas. This is attributed to the fact that the headquarters of international and non-government organizations are located in provincial capitals. The presence of Afghan security forces' or international forces' headquarters may provide a perception of greater security in urban areas. Lines of communication and means of transportation to rural communities are hampered by old, failing, or destroyed infrastructure. The expertise and cost needed for infrastructure improvements is beyond the capabilities or mandates of many non-government organizations. The inability to bring development to rural areas has resulted in the loss of the Afghan government's popular support and consequently control of rural areas to insurgents, drug lords, and illegally armed groups. On a grand scale, economic development is gradually becoming uneven, due to the instability of the regions. The relative stability or permissive security environment in the north and west regions provides favorable conditions in which assistance organizations can operate. The instability or non-permissive security environment in the south and east regions, where the need is greater, discourages aid organizations due to organization rules and a high security cost.

Development in Afghanistan is contingent on the complex arrangement between the Afghan government and international donors. The Afghan Compact, the ANDS, and the NSP demonstrate an international resolve to fund and assist development at the provincial and district levels.

Chapter 4 Methodology

The purpose of this chapter is to present the methods used for describing the operations of PRTs in Afghanistan.

The research method employed is qualitative. Qualitative research is appropriate for a government program that operates in a foreign country, was created ad hoc, comprises both military and civilian personnel, and in which the program objectives and procedures regularly change.

Research Method

The research was limited to document analysis due to time, access, and cost constraints. It was not possible to access current PRTs or PRT participants due to the travel time, cost, access, and security situation in Afghanistan. Contact information for former PRT participants was unavailable, as it is considered personal and restricted. Research using common and academic Internet search applications produced a sufficient number of documents from considerably diverse sources.

Document Collection Procedures

The predominant method used was an Internet Google search with the search terms “provincial reconstruction teams” and “Afghanistan.” Scholarly periodical list services such as JSTOR, OCL, ProQuest, and SAGE were used with the same search terms previously mentioned. The reference list on some PRT documents provided an author, a title, an organization, or a search phrase for identifying other PRT documents. Documents were collected over a period of seven months, from September 2008 to March 2009. Documents that were already available to this

researcher were the PRT Handbooks. This researcher's affiliation with the Army Reserve and access to the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) permitted access to secure military websites such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned and related links. It should be noted that no classified information was obtained. Approval was obtained from the source when using information from documents identified as For Official Use Only (FOUO).

The advantages of using documents are stability, exactness, and coverage (Yin 1994, 80). Documents permit the information to be reviewed repeatedly. They also provide details such as names, dates, locations, references, and so forth. A document can be quite extensive and cover many aspects of PRTs.

Document analysis offers improved validity. It improves "the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the meaning of the concept under consideration" (Babbie 2007, 146). Documents are likely to cover a larger range of issues relating to PRTs than interviews or surveys.

The disadvantages of using documents are retrieval, selectivity, access, and bias (Yin 1994, 80). There are numerous limitations of Internet search engines, from the computer application and its provider, for example Google, to the skills of the researcher and the search phrase or logic used. The selection of PRT documents was based on the discretion of the researcher. The focus of this paper is on U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan. Documents concerning primarily PRTs in Iraq or non-U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan were not used. Documents were used that may have included information about PRTs in Iraq or non-U.S. PRTs if the primary focus was U.S. PRTs

specifically or Afghanistan PRTs in general. This researcher is aware of additional reports about PRTs produced by the military or government agencies that are restricted and could not be accessed or obtained in a timely manner. Qualitative research is based, to a large degree, on the researcher's interpretation and discretion.

Document analysis lacks reliability. "Reliability is a matter of whether a particular technique, applied repeatedly to the same object, yields the same results each time" (Babbie 2007, 143). Another researcher may find and use different documents, and the interpretation of the documents will likely differ.

Statistics

The purpose of this research is descriptive. Simple descriptive statistics are used to simplify the data. The statistics are used to describe the distribution, central tendency, and dispersion of the data used in this research.

Operationalization

According to Earl Babbie, "Once you've specified the concepts to be studied and chosen a research method, the next step is operationalization or deciding on your measurement techniques" (2007, 111). The operationalization of the descriptive categories of this study is presented in Table 4.1. The right column identifies the documents that were used to support the conceptual categories in the left column.

Primary documents analyzed include official government documents and scholarly articles and reports. Fifteen documents on U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan were collated. The documents are from government agencies, academic institutions, military institutions, non-government organizations, and research organizations. Two

primary documents did not specify the research methodology, and all documents included references. A list of the primary documents is provided in Appendix D.

Recommendations

A secondary objective of this research is to identify methods for improvement of PRT operations in Afghanistan. The documents used for this effort include journal articles and academic papers. Thirty-one secondary documents were identified that provided 251 recommendations for improving PRTs. The recommendations were placed in an Excel database and coded. An abbreviated code for the categories and subcategories in the conceptual framework was used. Four additional codes were developed for recommendations that did not correspond to the categories or if the recommendations had already been enacted. The recommendations varied widely. There are some aspects of PRTs for which researchers made similar recommendations for improvements. The list of the documents providing recommendations is presented in Appendix E. The list of recommendations is in Appendix F.

Human Subject Protection

The research did not use any human subjects. The Institutional Review Board, Office of Research Compliance, Texas State University–San Marcos, granted an exemption on 19 March 2009, request number EXP2009L9739.

Table 4.1 Operationalization Table of Descriptive Categories

Categories/Subcategories	Documents
I. Function	
Security	Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, CALL PRT Handbook 2007, IIR 2007, Gauster 2008, Perito 2005, Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, Jakobsen 2005, McHugh & Gostelow 2004
Governance	Abbaszadeh et al 2008, CALL PRT Handbook 2007, IIR 2007, Gauster 2008, Perito 2005, Jakobsen 2005, McHugh & Gostelow 2004, USAID 2006
Development	Abbaszadeh et al. 2008, CALL PRT Handbook 2007, IIR 2007, Gauster 2008, Perito 2005, Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, Jakobsen 2005, McHugh & Gostelow 2004, USAID 2006
Public Diplomacy and Information Operations	Abbaszadeh 2008, CALL PRT Handbook 2007, IIR 2007
II. Structure	
External	CALL PRT Handbook 2007, IIR 2007, ISAF PRT Handbook 2006, USAID 2006, HASC 2008, Gauster 2008, Perito 2005, Jakobsen 2005, McHugh & Gostelow 2004
Internal	CALL PRT Handbook 2007, IIR 2007, ISAF PRT Handbook 2006, JWFC 2007, USAID 2006, HASC 2008, Gauster 2008, Jakobsen 2005, McHugh & Gostelow 2004
III. Funding	
Operations	GOA 2008, SIGAR 2009, HASC 2008
Projects	CALL PRT Handbook 2007, SIGAR 2009, IIR 2007, HASC 2008, USAID 2006
IV. Personnel	
Selection	McHugh & Gostelow 2004, USAID 2006, CALL PRT Handbook 2007, IIR 2007, Abbaszadeh 2008, HASC 2008, Gauster 2008
Training	USAID 2006, IIR 2007, Abbaszadeh 2008, HASC 2008
V. Assessment	
Subjective	SIGAR 2009, Perito 2005, McHugh & Gostelow 2004
Objective	CALL PRT Handbook 2007, IIR 2007, Perito 2005, Jakobsen 2005, McHugh & Gostelow 2004

Chapter 5 Sharpening the Spear

A spear is a weapon used very early in human history by hunters and warriors. “Sharpening the spear” is an old military expression that means preparing or improving one’s weapon. PRTs in Afghanistan are established and operated by the military. The military uses terms such as “non-kinetic” and “asymmetric” warfare to describe military efforts to defeat an enemy without using destructive weapons such as guns and bombs. The military recognizes aspects of counterinsurgency that include using political, economic, and information means to defeat an illusive enemy. In a post-conflict country, the military has the responsibility of maintaining security and providing basic services until the indigenous government or international civilian authority can assume responsibility. It is with this understanding that PRTs are viewed as a “weapon” in the fight against an insurgency and as a tool for nation-building. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive description of U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan and to identify aspects of PRTs that can be improved.

The PRT Concept

The map in Appendix A shows the location and lead country of the current twenty-six PRTs in Afghanistan. All international military forces are under the direction of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), currently led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commanded by a U.S. Army general, David D. McKiernan.⁹

⁹ See his official biography at <http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/bio/comisaf/mckiernan.html>.

The U.S. Central Command developed the concept for PRTs in Afghanistan. There are several different models for PRTs. Non-U.S. PRTs in Afghanistan have a significantly larger number of personnel than U.S. PRTs, with more civilian experts and a larger military contingent. Table 5.1 illustrates the differences between U.S. PRTs and Coalition PRTs in Afghanistan. The distinction between U.S. and non-U.S. PRTs developed as a result of lead countries' mandates that delineate security as a military function and assistance as a civilian function (Jakobsen 2005, 15).

Table 5-1 PRT Models in Afghanistan

LEAD NATION	AVERAGE PERSONNEL	LEADERSHIP	DEGREE OF CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION	DEGREE OF RESPONSIVENESS	MISSION	AREA OF OPERATION
United States	50–100 (3–5 civilians)	Military commander	Civilian personnel embedded in military teams	Limited	Emphasis on Quick Impact Projects	Generally volatile areas
United Kingdom	100 (30 civilians)	Civilian lead	Joint leadership, operational autonomy, separate reporting	High	Emphasis on capacity-building	Ability to operate in volatile areas
Germany	400 (20 civilians)	Dual leadership (one military, one civilian lead)	Separate leadership, weekly coordination meetings	High	Emphasis on long-term sustainable development	Generally more permissive areas

Source: Combination of SIGAR 2009, 50; and Jakobsen 2005, 28.

The PRT concept was exported to Iraq in 2004. The U.S. PRTs in Iraq differ in leadership, with a civilian team leader and a military deputy. A smaller version of PRTs are “embedded” with military units called ePRTs. All PRTs in Iraq are under the direction of the Department of State. This report will focus exclusively on U.S. PRTs in

Afghanistan. The U.S. PRTs currently in Afghanistan and information on the provinces in which they are located are highlighted in Appendix B.

The concept for PRTs developed in early 2002 in Afghanistan. The concept evolved from “Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells,” or “chiclets,” which were small teams of Special Forces and Civil Affairs military personnel sent to major provincial cities to assess humanitarian needs, begin small reconstruction projects, and coordinate with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and NGOs already in the area (Perito 2005). The teams operated out of rented houses, drove civilian vehicles, and wore civilian clothes in order to maintain low visibility as a security precaution (Sellers 2007, 5–8).

The U.S. military realized that there was a need for robust teams that could engage local government officials and facilitate local development while maintaining its own security and support. The Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) was established to “provide command and control for all of the Coalition’s efforts to promote humanitarian relief, development, and reconstruction” (DiPrizio 2005, 4). Plans were developed to deploy teams of both military personnel and civilians, to be called “Joint Reconstruction Teams.” At the request of President Karzai, who remarked that “warlords rule regions, governors rule provinces” (Drolet 2006, 5), the name was changed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The name would reinforce the fact that PRTs operate in the provinces with the function of extending the authority of the central government and assisting in coordinating the rebuilding efforts (Perito 2005). The United States established the first PRT in


January 2003 in Gardez, followed by the creation of four additional U.S. and three ISAF PRTs later that year.

The United States initially resisted the ISAF's expansion beyond Kabul (Stapleton 2007, 10). However, the enormity of the assistance needs of Afghanistan and the lack of U.S. capabilities in the country necessitated increased contributions from other allies. Furthermore, Operation Iraqi Freedom shifted the focus of U.S. political, military, and humanitarian assistance away from Afghanistan (Sidell 2008, 45; Stapleton 2007, 10). The United States changed course and encouraged ISAF expansion. The U.S. effort to increase participation by other nations was realized with NATO's assumption of the command of the ISAF in April 2003. It was the first time the NATO Alliance had assumed an active combat role outside Europe. The United States sought and supported ISAF and Coalition partners in becoming "lead nations" for PRTs. The United Kingdom and Germany took control of PRTs that were initially established by the United States in Mazar-e Sharif and Konduz, respectively. ISAF continued to expand in the permissive regions of Afghanistan. Figure 5.1 illustrates that the expansion created new Regional Commands (RC) and established PRTs in the north (Regional Command North – Stage 1) and west (Regional Command West – Stage 2).

The United States continued to expand its counterinsurgency and antiterrorist efforts in the non-permissive south and east, directed by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). The expanded military operations eventually led to dissolving the CJCMOTF and bringing responsibility for the PRTs and civil support directly under

the CJTF. The United States continued to encourage allied nations to support the fight in the volatile south with the establishment of Regional Command South – Stage 3. Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands agreed to become lead nations for Kandahar, Helmund, and Orzgan, respectively. These provinces are hotbeds for the insurgency and the drug trade. The effort to bring all international forces under ISAF was accelerated, with U.S. forces transferred to ISAF command in the establishment of Regional Command East - Stage 4.

Figure 5-1 ISAF Expansion



Source: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/CMAS-6TYK2J?OpenDocument> (produced by SITCEN Geo Branch, NATO 2006)

Appendix C provides a time line of the expansion, changes, and developments that have taken place over the course of eight years of the U.S. and international community's intervention in Afghanistan.

PRT Expansion or Exit Recommendations

PRTs currently operate in twenty-six of the thirty-four provinces in Afghanistan. Out of 251 recommendations, eight specifically advocated expanding PRT operations by opening new PRTs and creating smaller PRT elements at the district level. Four recommendations called for PRTs to consider shutting down or relocating to less secure areas. Planning is underway for creating four additional U.S. PRTs and district support teams (SIGAR 2008, 10). Closing or moving U.S. PRTs would likely be viewed as an end of support to the local government or as an admission of U.S. defeat by the insurgency. Surprisingly, there were no recommendations for turning PRTs over to the Afghan government.

Functions of PRTs

The mission statement for the PRTs is found in the ISAF Handbook, 31 October 2006:

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified areas of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.”

The NATO, ISAF website¹⁰ lists the PRTs' objectives as:

- To support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRA) in the development of a more stable and secure environment;
- To assist in extending the authority of the GIRA;
- To support where appropriate the Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives;

¹⁰ http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html (accessed 18 Dec 2008)

- To facilitate the reconstruction effort and reinforce national development priorities;
- To enable unity of effort amongst civil actors; and
- To demonstrate the International Community's commitment to Afghanistan's future.

A. Security

A function of PRTs is to assist in developing a stable and secure environment.

There are differences of opinion on the meaning and methods used to achieve such a stable and secure environment. The mere presence of the PRT may "serve as a deterrent to insurgents and criminals" (Dziedzic & Seidl 2005, 4). PRT personnel mentor local police officials with the objective of reducing corruption and improving police operations. PRTs coordinate the resourcing of local police with items such as weapons, vehicles, radios, and facilities. PRT personnel participate, advise, and mentor provincial security councils that bring together all local stakeholders to share information, identify security problems, and work to solve them.

Security Recommendations

The twenty-four recommendations related to security call for PRTs to focus on security. There was a consensus that PRTs do not have a sufficient robust military force capable of addressing the security situation either directly or through assisting Afghan security forces. Recommendations include demonstrating a new emphasis on the primary function of PRTs on security by changing the name to Provincial Security or Stabilization Teams. Focusing PRTs on security would require additional police-

mentoring teams that can advise and mentor executive-level police officials regarding strategic planning, budget forecasting, personnel administration, community outreach, and other executive-level responsibilities.

B. Governance

The function of “extending the authority of the Afghan government” is generally interpreted to mean assisting and mentoring provincial and district officials in improving the provision of government services. Incompetence and corruption, added to the lack of resources of local governments, result in limited services to the people. PRTs are expected to work with local officials to improve their abilities to administer local government and build local capacity to maintain security, provide basic services, and facilitate community participation. Currently local customs, taxes, and fee collections are sent to the central government. In turn, the central government determines funding for all local governments. Local government officials would require training and assistance to transition to local planning, forecasting, prioritizing, and decision-making of local government budgets and operations, generally considered as capacity-building.

Governance Recommendations

Ten recommendations related to governance call for increased coordination between PRT personnel and local officials and improved technical assistance, with an emphasis on “capacity-building.” A common element is the inclusion of local Afghan officials in the PRT planning and decision-making process regarding development projects. The PRTs are expected to bridge the communication gap between the

central and local governments. An example is the Afghan National Development Strategy, which specifies development priorities down to the local level. PRTs can assist local officials in forecasting, budgeting, implementing, and communicating to the people the plan and priorities of the ANDS. This may reduce tension created from perceived favoritism of one community over another when schools, clinics, and roads are built.

C. Development

There are two schools of thought regarding U.S. PRT development function. One view is for PRTs to provide small Quick Impact Projects such as wells, irrigation canals, schools, clinics, etc. Non-government organizations (NGOs) tend to have the ability to supply these types of projects. A second view is for PRTs to provide major infrastructure and government support projects such as power stations, power grids, dams, industrial parks, farm-to-market road networks, government centers, and so on. Major funding and specialized experts, which are not available for PRTs, are needed for projects of this magnitude.

Development Recommendations

The nine recommendations related to development call for increased coordination with international (IO) and non-government organizations (NGOs). The idea is that the development effort should be coordinated to prevent redundancy and economize reconstruction efforts with all assistance providers. Improved coordination would ensure that PRTs concentrate on projects that improve infrastructure and security rather than projects normally undertaken by IOs and

NGOs, such as wells, clinics, and schools. Other recommendations emphasize including Afghan officials in the selection, planning, design, and management of projects. One recommendation for PRTs requires project contractors to hire local labor for PRT-funded projects, which would provide a positive income alternative for young men who are recruited by insurgents or drug lords and would also bring cash into the local economy.

D. Public Diplomacy and Information Operations

An implied function of PRTs is that of public diplomacy or, using a similar military term, information operations (IO). The PRT presence alone sends a message of the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan (Stapleton 2007, 11; Perito 2005, 1). Each time PRT members venture out of the PRT compound to meet with local officials, conduct patrols, and build projects, they are engaging in public relations. PRTs have an information operations officer to advise the commander and assist civilian experts in developing the appropriate public information campaign. Debriefing of PRT personnel upon returning from missions, obtaining locally produced publications, networking with local Ministry of Information officials, and taking advantage of opportunities to engage in casual conversations with Afghans are all methods used to determine the perceptions of Afghans regarding the PRT specifically and the U.S. and foreign presence in general. Likewise, PRT personnel can transmit messages either directly (speeches, flyers, posters, U.S. and Afghan publications, radio and TV announcements, etc.) or indirectly (through friendly behavior and recognition and respect for local customs).

PRT Public Diplomacy and Information Operations Recommendations

There are twenty-three recommendations for improving PRT public information efforts. This number is skewed by the recommendations from the Afghan Women's Network (Roberts 2007, 12) and Wadhams and Korb (2007, 1) that call for more female PRT personnel and for PRTs to address women's issues such as increasing funding for projects that assist women, addressing women's rights, and supporting female Afghan officials. The other recommendations call for increasing PRT public information efforts to ensure that the local population is aware of PRT accomplishments. Additionally, PRTs should take every opportunity to improve the public's confidence in their local government officials, such as encouraging and mentoring Afghan officials in conducting media interviews, town hall meetings, and other public events.

PRT Structures


The specific efforts put forth by PRTs are affected by their organizational structure. The external and internal structure drastically impact the ability of a PRT to carry out its functions.

A. External PRT Structure

PRTs are under ISAF regional commands (RCs) except for RC East, where they fall under a U.S. joint task force, as shown in Figure 5.2. Each PRT has an area of operations (AO) that is the province in which it is located. The PRT's area of operation may overlap the area of one or more combat units normally under a U.S. brigade combat team (BCT), which may be under the same task force. The counterinsurgency

and antiterrorism combat operations by BCTs normally take place in RC East and RC South. Some U.S. military units may operate independently of the task force command within the PRT's area, such as the Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) operating with the Afghan Army or Special Operations Forces (SOF). ETT and SOF command are under the command of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A COM).

Figure 5.2 PRT Command and Control




Source: SIGAR January 2009.

The overlapping operations areas and complex command structure necessitate clear lines of communication. The Afghan national government's ability to communicate to the provincial and district governments is limited. PRTs are expected to act as a communication bridge with multiple communication networks, both

military and civilian. PRTs assist communication between military units and local Afghan officials. Simplified external lines of communication for the PRTs are illustrated in Figure 5.3. This illustration does not show communication lines with international organizations such as UNAMA, other UN agencies, or NGOs.

Figure 5.3 PRT Lines of Communication



Source: Developed by the author using multiple sources.

External Structure Recommendations

External organizational structure had the largest number of recommendations (thirty-five). There is a consensus that narrowing the command and reporting structure will improve “unity of action.” It is not likely that donor nations will give complete control of their forces to the ISAF. A recommendation calls for increasing liaison personnel and methods of communication between the various headquarters both vertically and horizontally, such as between the regional commands. Specifically


addressing the PRT chain of command, there are recommendations for the Department of State to lead U.S. PRTs, with the idea that it would provide direct communication with experts who could assist the development and governance functions of PRTs. Several recommendations include improving communications with UN agencies and NGOs.

B. Internal PRT Structure

U.S. PRTs are considered an interagency organization and joint task force. The PRT commander, with other U.S. government agency civilians, constitutes the PRT executive committee. Under such a structure, collective decision-making regarding the PRTs' functions is assumed. The representative from the Department of State, the USAID field officer, and the USDA agricultural expert all report directly to their agencies at the U.S. Embassy. The PRT commander is considered the "first among equals" (GOA 2008, 7). He or she is the official representative of the PRT and commands all the military assets of the PRT. Specialized teams from the various services (U.S. Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force) assigned to the PRT include Civil Affairs (CA), Military Police Advisers and Trainers (MPAT), Information Operations (IO), Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD), medical, intelligence and operations, logistics, and force protection. Other specialized teams may be assigned to a PRT, for example Human Terrain Team (HTT), Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPT), Joint Tactical Air Control (JTAC), and government civilian contractors such as DynCorp police advisers or KBR maintenance support.

A PRT has a number of Afghans living and working on it. The most senior Afghan on the PRT is likely to be the representative from the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MoI). USAID may have an Afghan projects officer, and the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) may directly employ Afghan engineers, office assistance, and local interpreters. Contracted interpreters include U.S. civilians with special clearances or Afghan civilians. A PRT may employ local Afghans to provide external security and other support jobs for it.

Figure 5-4 Example PRT Internal Organization



Source: SIGAR 2008, 53.

External Structure Recommendations

There are twenty-two recommendations addressing the PRTs' internal structure, with five calling for civilian leadership of the PRTs. The problem has been the dominance of the military. The establishment of PRTs by the military and the large military presence result in the military commander assuming complete decision-making, marginalizing executive committee civilian agency representatives.

On this subject the recommendations differ, as there are calls for more authority and resources to be given to civilian experts, as well as calls for a single chain of command under the military PRT commander. The security situation exacerbates this problem, as the military provides security and thus may limit civilians from leaving the PRT because of actual or potential security threats. This severely curtails civilian experts in performing the function of assisting governance, development, and public diplomacy if they are unable to meet with local Afghan officials or contractors at the officials' offices or at the project sites.

PRT Funding

There is no funding mechanism specifically for PRT operations. The cost for PRT facilities and operations is borne by the Department of Defense (DoD). The Department of State does provide some reimbursement for supporting the DoS representative and USAID field officer. A Government Accounting Office 2008 Report estimates that a PRT costs about \$20 million a year. PRT supplies, vehicles, equipment, construction, and operations funds are all encapsulated in the Defense Department's Global War on Terror (GWOT) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) expenditures.

Reconstruction projects are the most important and visible function of a PRT. There are two funding sources for projects, and each has limitations on the amounts and types of projects. The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) is a DoD fund that provides the PRT commander with discretionary authority for non-security-related projects less than \$25,000. Projects costing more require

authorization from higher echelons. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) are funded by USAID after nomination from the field officer at the PRT and are implemented by an off-site USAID-contracted general contractor. Since the establishment of PRTs, the amount of funding for the CERP has continued to increase, but QIPs have decreased in some years, as seen in Figure 5.5.

Table 5-2 PRT Project Funding (millions of dollars)

Fund	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
CERP*		40	130	215	206	208	799
QIP ⁺	11	56	85	20	126	30	328

Source: *(SIGAR 2008, 40) and ⁺(Katzmam 2008, 66)

Coordinating with Afghan officials and international and non-government organizations enhances the impact of PRT projects. Local officials and the population in general are aware that a PRT has substantial project funds, and they regularly solicit the PRT to fund various project proposals. Coordination prevents redundancy, communicates unity of effort, provides opportunities to enlighten all stakeholders of the process and limitations of PRT projects and funding, and may encourage ownership by Afghan government officials.

PRT Funding Recommendations

There were twenty-five recommendations regarding the funding of PRT operations and projects. Recommendations call for increased funding for PRT civilians, equipment, and facilities. The funding of PRT operations through the DoD and the different government sources of funding for projects are viewed as

problematic. Recommendations call for a single funding source specifically for PRT operations and projects. Several recommendations call for inclusion of Afghan government officials in the decision-making process about projects. Other recommendations call for providing the funds directly to the Afghan government, with close mentorship of officials and effective accountability and transparency procedures.

PRT Personnel

The personnel selection process is based on availability and qualifications. Since the PRT concept was developed quickly, personnel requirements were likewise hastily developed. Initially, PRT commanders were selected from the ranks of civil affairs lieutenant colonels. "Selection of the PRT commander can make or break the success of the PRT. PRT commanders need to have the right skill sets and need to be trained appropriately to meet the complex and demanding nature of the job" (Sellers 2007, 55). When civil-military task force command was dissolved, officers from other U.S. Army branches were included in the selection process. In early 2006, the U.S. Air Force and Navy assumed responsibility for commanding U.S. PRTs, which includes selecting Air Force and Navy officers to command PRTs.

A. Personnel Selection

The PRTs' rapid expansion led to an increased demand for civilian experts from U.S. government agencies. The Office of Personnel Management and other agencies' personnel rules limit agencies from ordering qualified experts to deploy to overseas hostile areas without their voluntary consent. Despite increased monetary

and promotion incentives, U.S. agencies were unable to fill many PRT civilian positions. Agencies often contracted personnel from outside the government with minimal qualifications and little to no experience. In July 2004, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The S/CRS website states that “the Core Mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy.”¹¹ A Civilian Response Corps, created to hire, train, equip, and support 600 active and standby civilians who can be mobilized to respond to U.S. stability and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict countries, was not funded until 2008 (Carlson & Dziedzic 2009, 2). The military and civilian agencies recognize that there are an inadequate number of individuals who have the experience needed for working at a PRT. The essential knowledge, skills, and abilities of PRT personnel are continuing to be defined and not only used in the selection process but also incorporated into PRT training.

Recommendations for Personnel Selection

The majority of the twenty-six recommendations under this category call for improved screening so that personnel selected to serve on PRTs have the capability, knowledge, skills, and temperament needed to carry out PRT functions.

Recommendations call for expanding the number of government agencies that

¹¹ See <http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>.

provide civilian experts at PRTs, such as the Departments of Justice, Housing and Human Resources, and Education. Recognizing the limited number of government civilians with the expertise willing to volunteer for a harsh assignment, there are endorsements for increasing the monetary, promotion, and other incentives.

B. PRT Training

There are various programs for training U.S. military and civilian personnel who are deployed to PRTs in Afghanistan. PRT civilians are provided professional training at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute. Their military counterparts receive training by the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). Additional professional training is contracted to universities and private companies. The 189th Infantry Brigade at Fort Bragg, NC, conducts the most extensive interagency pre-deployment training for PRTs in Afghanistan (Honore and Boslego 2007, 85). The U.S. Army has developed a basic curriculum that must be mastered by all individuals deploying. A large component of this training is “survival skills training” that includes first aid; survival, escape, resistance, and evasion (SERE); convoy operations; weapons qualification and familiarization (not required for civilians); media awareness; language familiarization; negotiation skills; working with an interpreter; and various team-building skills.

PRT Training Recommendations

There are twenty-five recommendations that address the training of PRT personnel, including proposals for the synchronized and integrated training of military and civilian personnel. Recommendations call for longer training periods

with increased negotiation, cultural, and language training. Several recommendations recognize the need for additional time and training devoted to team-building prior to deployment. Two recommendations call for increased training and integration of PRT personnel with the Afghan Army and police.

PRT Assessment

Objective means for measuring the effectiveness of PRTs are lacking due to the ad hoc, rapid development of PRTs and the lack of reliable and credible administrative procedures. The political functions of PRTs result in subjective criteria influencing the perceptions of PRTs' effectiveness.

The use of objective criteria to assess the PRTs' performance is limited. Statistics on reconstruction/development projects, such as the number of projects, type, value, area, and population, serve as the most visible assessment tool. There have been occasional efforts to conduct public opinion surveys. However, the cost, level of expertise, and inability to operate in hostile areas limit the use of polling. Recently, the USIP has developed several tools for evaluating efforts in a post-conflict environment. The measures are not specific to PRT operations but do offer consistent and comprehensive criteria that can be used throughout the country.

The lack of guidance in identifying specific data and instructions for data collection result in various and subjective criteria used to determine the effectiveness of PRT operations. The increase or decrease in attacks by insurgents, cooperation or resistance by local officials, large or small attendance to PRT-promoted events, and reports of people smiling and waving or giving cold stares and moving away from

PRT personnel are just a few examples of indicators that are used to determine a PRT's performance. In place of evaluations, best practices and lessons learned are compiled to demonstrate success.

Recommendations for PRT Assessment

There were twenty-three recommendations addressing the assessment of PRT performance. Recommendations call for developing an objective assessment scheme, a baseline PRT standard, defined benchmarks, accurate evaluation metrics, and so forth. The recommendations do not specify what the standards should be. An assessment tool recommended is the civil information management (CIM) system, which is the process of collecting civil information into an electronic database. The recommendations generally recognize the need to create standard criteria with detailed methods and measurements throughout the country to determine whether PRTs are achieving the stated objectives and goals. Although the PRTs were created to address the unique problems and situations in each province, donor countries and the international community require consistent methods and valid measurements in order for the evaluation of PRTs to be considered objective.

Summary of PRT Recommendations

There is a strong interest in improving PRT operations, evident by many reports and articles that provide a significant number of recommendations. Table 5.4 identifies the codes and the corresponding number of recommendations.

Table 5-3 PRT Recommendations Results

Code	count	percentage
Assess	23	9.2
Expand	8	3.2
Exit	4	1.6
Secure	24	9.6
Govern	10	4.0
Publicize	23	9.2
Develop	9	3.6
External	34	13.5
Internal	17	6.8
Select	27	10.8
Train	25	10.0
Fund	25	10.0
H-space	12	4.8
Civilian led	5	2.0
Completed	5	2.0
	251	100.0

Source: Composite of Appendix F.

Summary

The slow and convoluted development of PRTs impacted their use as a tool for nation-building and as a weapon for counterinsurgency. In 2003, the United States opened seven PRTs. Two PRTs were transferred to British and German forces, which had different concepts of PRT functions. In 2004, the United States opened nine PRTs in the volatile southern and eastern regions. Two U.S. PRTs were opened in 2005, and one in 2006. In 2007 and 2008, Afghanistan witnessed a substantial increase in insurgent attacks and an increase in the number of international forces. The only PRT opened in this timeframe was by the Czech Republic. Many of the reports and articles used in this study were written in 2007 and 2008. Plans are underway to open four U.S. PRTs in 2009. Sixty to eighty military and civilian personnel are expected to

assist the improvement of security, governance, and development of the province in which a PRT is located. There is an additional expectation that the PRT can achieve popular support for the Afghan government and U.S. actions. The external and internal command and control structures, the selection and training of personnel, and the amount and process of funding operations and projects directly impact the functions of PRTs. The lack of comprehensive and consistent assessment tools results in evaluations of PRTs based on subjective criteria and political views. The general view of many researchers is that PRTs have a limited but positive impact on the area in which they operate.

After six years of PRT operations, the reality of the situation in Afghanistan's provinces—poor governance, slow development, and growing insecurity—does not meet the expectations the United States had for the PRTs. The Obama Administration's new strategy and the increase in the number of military and civilian personnel, with additional funding, will have a negligible impact if efforts are not made to incorporate the numerous researchers' recommendations in order to improve current PRT operations.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

The new administration of President Obama has made the conflict in Afghanistan a priority. The president has ordered additional U.S. troops and civilians to the country. The administration has outlined a new strategy that is based on theories of nation-building and counterinsurgency. The strategy calls for expanding and strengthening Afghan security forces and improving the capabilities of the Afghan government down to the provincial and district levels.

This study has presented PRTs as an instrument of U.S. nation-building and as a weapon for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan since 2003. Despite the number of foreign troops deployed and the billions of dollars in foreign aid provided, the weakness of the Afghan government is evident by widespread corruption, narcotics trafficking, and increasing terrorist attacks. The research indicates that PRTs have been instrumental in assisting the Afghan government, but there are several aspects of PRTs that could be improved.


PRTs are unique U.S. government, overseas, interagency programs that require considerable public administration skills. A significant function of PRTs involves mentoring local public administrators.

The limited scope of this study and these resources necessitates future studies. A future study could explore the assumption that foreign PRTs are capable of extending the legitimacy and authority of the Afghan government. Considering the various models of PRTs operating in Afghanistan, a gauging study could develop a practical ideal model for PRTs. A study could be undertaken to identify the

correlation between PRT projects and the positive or negative changes in security, governance, and development. A decision-making study could develop the best approach for transition or closing PRTs.

“All politics is local” is a statement from a former U.S. Speaker of the House, Thomas Phillip "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., who warned against ignoring local issues. Nation-building and counterinsurgency are political activities that must be conducted at the local level in order to be successful. PRTs have become the instrument of choice because they operate at the local level. The use of PRTs in the future necessitates that their function, structure, personnel, funding, and assessment continue to be reviewed and improved.

Appendix A Map—ISAF RC and PRT Locations (as of 13 March 2009)



Appendix B List—PRTs in Afghanistan (U.S. PRT highlighted) 1 of 3

Province ¹	ISAF RC ²	Area (km ²) ³	Districts ³	Population ³	Centers ³	Language ³
Kandahar	South	54,022	16	1,058,000	Kandahar	Pashto
Logar	East	3,880	7	349,000	Pul-i-Alam	Pashto, Dari Persian
Badakhshan	North	44,059	29	846,000	Fayzabad	Dari Persian, Pashto
Kunduz	North	8,040	7	883,000	Kunduz	Uzbek, Turkmen, Pashto and Dari Persian
Baghlan	North	21,118	16	804,000	Puli Khumri	Uzbek, Turkmen, Pashto, Dari Persian
Hirat	West	54,778	15	1,643,000	Hirat	Pashto, Dari Persian
Ghor	West	36,479	10	615,000	Chaghcharan	Pashto, Dari Persian
Uruzgan	South	22,696	6	312,000	Tarin Kowt	Pashto
Bamiyan	West	14,175	7	398,000	Bamiyan	Dari Persian and Hazaragi
Faryab	North	20,293	14	884,000	Maymana	Dari Persian, Turkmen and Uzbek
Kabul	ISAF HQ	4,462	15	3,450,000	Kabul	Pashto, Dari Persian, Turkmen and Uzbek
Kapisa	East	1,842	7	393,000	Mahmud-i-Raqi	Dari Persian
Daykundi	South	8,088	8	410,000	Nili	Dari Persian, Hazaragi and Pashto
Nimruz	South	41,005	5	140,000	Zaranj	Balochi, Dari Persian and Pashto
Badghis	West	20,591	7	441,000	Qala i Naw	Pashto, Dari Persian
Balkh	North	17,249	15	1,145,000	Mazari Sharif	Dari Persian, Pashto
Wardak	East	8,938	9	531,000	Meydan Shahr	Pashto
Kunar	East	4,942	15	401,000	Asadabad	Pashto
Panjshir	East	3,610	5	137,000	Bazarak	Dari Persian
Parwan	East	5,974	9	590,000	Charikar	Dari Persian, Pashto
Farah	West	48,471	11	457,000	Farah	Pashto, Dari Persian, Baloch
Paktya	East	6,432	11	491,000	Gardez	Pashto
Ghazni	East	22,915	19	1,093,000	Ghazni	Pashto, Dari Persian and Hazaragi
Nangarhar	East	7,727	23	1,334,000	Jalalabad	Pashto, Dari Persian
Khost	East	4,152	13	512,000	Khost	Pashto
Laghman	East	3,843	5	397,000	Mihtarlam	Pashto, Dari Persian and Pashai
Nuristan	East	9,225	7	132,000	Nuristan	Nuristani, Pashto
Zabul	South	17,343	9	271,000	Qalat	Pashto
Paktika	East	19,482	15	387,000	Sharan	Pashto
Helmand	South	58,584	13	822,000	Lashkar Gah	Pashto
Samangan	North	11,262	5	344,000	Aybak	Uzbek, Dari Persian
Sar-e Pol	North	15,999	6	497,000	Sar-e Pol	Dari Persian, Pashto and Uzbek
Jowzjan	North	11,798	9	477,000	Sheberghan	Uzbek, Dari Persian and Pashto
Takhar	North	12,333	12	871,000	Talugan	Dari Persian, Pashto and Uzbek
		645,807	380	23,515,000		

Sources: ¹ <http://afghansistan.usaid.gov/en/Provinces.aspx>

² ISAF & SIGAR

³ DoD Report 2008

Appendix B List—PRTs in Afghanistan (U.S. PRT highlighted) 2 of 3

Province ¹	PRT ²	Lead Nation ⁴	Mil ³	Civ ³	CERP 2007 Obligated ¹	CERP 2008 ¹	Estimate Cultivation 2008 ¹
Kandahar	Kandahar	Canada					up 10-50%
Loqar	Loqar	Czech					poppy free
Badakhshan	Feyzabad	Germany					down 10-50%
Kunduz	Konduz	Germany					poppy free
Baqhlan	Pol-e Khomri	Hungary					down 10-50%
Hirat	Hirat	Italy					down 10-50%
Ghor	Chaqhcharan	Lithuania					up 10-50%
Uruzgan	Tarin Kowt	Netherlands					up 10-50%
Bamiyan	Bamiyan	New Zealand					poppy free
Faryab	Meymaneh	Norway					down 50% more
Kabul	none	planned U.S.					down 10-50%
Kapisa	none	planned U.S.					down 10-50%
Daykundi	none	planned U.S.					stable
Nimruz	none	planned U.S.					up 50% more
Badghis	Qala-I Now	Spain					up 10-50%
Balkh	Mazar-e Sharif	Sweden					poppy free
Wardak	Wardak	Turkey					poppy free
Kunar	Asadabad	U.S.	89	3	10,559,073	53,297,667	down 10-50%
Panishir	Panshir	U.S.	55	3	5,450,159	6,851,425	poppy free
Parwan	Parwan	U.S.	63	2	6,736,139	11,087,025	poppy free
Farah	Farah	U.S.	99	3	4,300,167	5,446,417	up 10-50%
Paktya	Gardez	U.S.	88	3	4,746,008	2,993,000	poppy free
Ghazni	Ghazni	U.S.	88	3	10,568,059	32,306,067	poppy free
Nangarhar	Jalalabad	U.S.	88	3	12,839,907	21,820,334	down 50% more
Khost	Khowst	U.S.	88	3	17,968,464	18,004,799	poppy free
Laghman	Lachman	U.S.	88	3	3,435,263	72,687,950	down 10-50%
Nuristan	Nuristan	U.S.	88	3	20,546,045	24,686,202	poppy free
Zabul	Qalat	U.S.	99	3	927,174	2,263,000	stable
Paktika	Sharan	U.S.	88	3	23,816,477	5,948,098	poppy free
Helmand	Lashkar Gah	UK					stable
Samangan	none						up 10-50%
Sar-e Pol	none						stable
Jowzjan	none						down 50% more
Takhar	none						stable
					121,892,935	257,391,984	

Sources: ¹ Report to Congress Jan 2009

³ UNODC <http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afg>

Appendix B List—PRTs in Afghanistan (U.S. PRT highlighted) 3 of 3

Province ¹	Attacks 2007 1/1 to 7/13 ²	Attacks 2008 1/1 to 7/13 ²	ANA Units ³	ANP ⁴
Kandahar	330	552	205th Corps HQ, 1st/205th (Camp Shirzai)	ABP
Loqar	76	98	1st/201st (Puli Alam)	
Badakhshan	10	22		ABP
Kunduz	23	68	1st/209th (Konduz)	ANCOP Bn, ABP
Baghlan	44	42		
Hirat	59	60	207th Corps HQ, 1st/207th (Camp Zafar)	ABP
Ghor	11	19		
Uruzgan	41	91	4th/205th (Camp Holland)	
Bamiyan	1	2		
Faryab	18	34		ABP
Kabul	60	81	ANA HQ, NMCC, KMTC, ANATC, NMA, 201st Corps HQ, 2nd/201st (Pol-e Charki)	AUP, ABP, CID, ANCOP, CNPA, APPF, CTP HQs, ANCOP Bn
Kapisa	26	81		
Daykundi	10	8		
Nimruz	22	49		ABP
Badghis	17	69		ABP
Balkh	31	25	209th Corps HQ, 1st/209th (Mazar-e Sharif)	ABP
Wardak	72	133		
Kunar	321	331		ABP
Panishir	0	1		
Parwan	14	34		
Farah	72	90	2nd/207th (Farah)	ANCOP Bn, ABP
Paktya	124	169	203rd Corps HQ (Gardez)	ANCOP Bn, ABP
Ghazni	113	221		
Nangarhar	170	193		ABP
Khost	240	301	1st/203rd (Camp Clark)	ABP
Laghman	72	107		
Nuristan	40	41	3rd/201st (Jalalabad)	ABP
Zabul	163	158	2nd/205th (Qalat)	ABP
Paktika	102	151	2nd/203rd (FOB Rushmore)	ABP
Helmand	107	323	3rd/205th (Camp Sharabak)	ABP
Samangan	4	3		
Sar-e Pol	14	2		
Jowzjan	5	14	209th Corps HQ, 1st Bde	ABP
Takhar	14	17		ABP
	2426	3590		

Sources: ⁶ http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/08/afghanistan_mapping.php

Appendix C List—Time Line of Events (PRTs, US Amb, ISAF, CJTF) 1 of 2

Month/	Date	Event	PRT Lead Nation/US Amb	ISAF Rotations and Commanders	US Cmds
Oct-01	7-Oct-01	First US Forces in Afghanistan			
Nov-01	13-Nov-01	Kabul Falls			
Dec-01	1-Dec-01	Operation at Tora Bora		20 Dec 2001 ISAF established	
	5-Dec-01	Interim Afghan Govt (Bonn Agreement)		ISAF I - MG John McCall (UK)	
2002					
Jan-02		CJCMOTF stood-up	Bagram		
			Interim US Ambassador Ryan Crocker		
Mar-02	2-16 Mar 2002	Operations Andacoda	US Ambassador Robert Finn		
	28-Mar-02	SCR 1401 establish UNAMA	UN Special Rep Amb Lakhdar Brahimi, Deputy Jean Arnault, PA&Dev Nigel Fisher		
Jun-02				ISAF II - MG Hilmi Akin Zorlu (TK)	CJTF 180
Jul-02					LG Dan K. McNeill
2003					
Jan-03				ISAF III - LG Norbert van Heyst (DE)	
Feb-03	1-Feb-03	PRT opening - GARDEZ (Paktia)	US		
Mar-03	2-Mar-03	PRT opening - BAMIAN	US shortly New Zealand		
Apr-03	10-Apr-03	PRT opening - KONDUZ	US - Oct 03 Germany (Belgium, France, Hungary, Switzerland, Spain, Netherlands)		
Jul-03	1-Jul-03	PRT opening - MAZAR-E SHARIF (Balkh)	British - (Sweden lead, also Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, Norway, Romania)		
Aug-03	11-Aug-03	NATO assumes command of ISAF		ISAF IV - LG Goetz Gliemerath (DE)	
Nov-03	1-Nov-03	PRT opening - BAGRAM (Parwan)	US/S Korean		CFC-A stoodup
			US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad		
Dec-03	1-Dec-03	PRT opening - HIRAT	US - 2005 Italy		
	1-Dec-03	PRT opening - KANDAHAR	US - 2006 Canada		
2004					
Jan-04	14 Dec 03 - 4 Jan 04	Constitutional Loyal Jirga			
	1-Jan-04	PRT opening - JALALABAD (Nangarhar)	US		
Feb-04	1-Feb-04	PRT opening - ASADABAD	US	ISAF V - LG Rick Miller (CA)	
Mar-04	1-Mar-04	PRT opening - GHAZNI	US		
	1-Mar-04	PRT opening - KHOWST	US		
	31 Mar-1 Apr 2004	Afghanistan Donor Conf	Berlin, Germany		
Apr-04	1-Apr-04	PRT opening - QALAT (Zabul)	US		
May-04					CJTF-78
Jul-04	1-Jul-04	PRT opening - MAYMAHNEH (Faryab)	UK - lead by Norway other Scandinavian countries contribute		
	1-Jul-04	PRT opening - FEYZABAD	Germany (Croatia, Czech Rep, Denmark)		
Sep-04	1-Sep-04	PRT opening - SHARANA (Paktika)	US	ISAF VI - LG Jean Louis Py (FR) Eurocorp	
	1-Sep-04	PRT opening - FARAH	US		
	1-Sep-04	PRT opening - LASHKAR GAH (Helmand)	US - 2006 British		
	1-Sep-04	PRT opening - TARIN KOWT (Uruzgan)	US - Netherlands		

Appendix C List—Time Line of Events (PRTs, U.S. Amb, ISAF, CJTF) 2 of 2

Month/	Date	Event	PRT Lead Nation/US Amb	ISAF Rotations and Commanders	US Cmds
Oct-04	1-Oct-04	PRT opening - PUL KHUMRI (Baghlan)	Netherlands - Oct 06 Hungary		
	9-Oct-04	Presidential Elections			
Dec-04	7-Dec-04	President Hamid Karzai Inaugurated			
2005					
Feb-05				ISAF VII - LG Ethem Erdagi (TK)	
Apr-05		PRT Opening - METHERLAM (Laghman)	US		MG James Knips
Jul-05		PRT Opening - QALA I NOW (Badghis)	Spain		
Aug-05		1-ANDS begun	US Ambassador Ronald E. Neuman		
		PRT Opening - CHAGHCHARAN (Ghor)	Lithuania	ISAF VIII - LG Mauro del Vecchio (IT)	
		NSP begun			
Sep-05	18-Sep-05	Parliamentary/Provincial Elections			
Oct-05		PRT Opening - PANJSHIR	US		
Dec-05	20-Dec-05	First assembly of Parliament			
2006					
Feb-06	31 Jan - 2 Feb 06	Afghanistan Donor Conf (Afghan Compact agreed)	London, UK		
May-06				ISAF IX - LG David Richards (UK)	
Jul-06	21-Jul-06	NATO Conf - Afghanistan Recon	Budapest, Hungary		
Oct-06	1-Oct-06	ISAF over all Afghanistan		RC East US under ISAF	CJTF-A folded
Nov-06		PRT Opening - NURISTAN	US		
		PRT Opening - VARDAX	Turkey		
2007					
Feb-07				ISAF X - GEN Dan K. McNeill (US)	
Mar-07					CJTF 82 - MG David Rodriguez
Apr-07			US Ambassador William B. Wood		
2008					
Mar-08	20-Mar-08	PRT Opening - LOGAR	Czech Republic		
	29-Mar-08	new Special Rep UNAMA	Amb Kai Eide		
May-08	13-15 May 08	ISAF Conf - Afghan PRTs	Maastricht, Brussels		CJTF 101
Jun-08	11-Jun-08	Afghanistan Donor Conf (ANDS approved, launched)	Paris, France	ISAF XI (US)	
Jul-08					
Oct-08	3-Oct-08	ISAF Conf - PRTs in Afghanistan	Vilnius, Lithuania		
Nov-08					
Dec-08					
2009					
Jan-09			US Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke		
Feb-09			US Ambassador Karl Sikenberry		
Mar-09	27-Mar-09	New US strategy announced			
Apr-09	1-Apr-09	Conference on Afg in The Hague			
May-09	20-May-09	Presidential Elections			
2010					
	mid 2010	Parliamentary/Provincial Elections			
		4 new PRTs expected to open			

Appendix D List—Primary Documents

Document	Author	Date	Organization	Methodology	Recommendations	PRTs covered	pages	Annexes
Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations	Robert Perito, Project Advisor	Jan-08	Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University	Nine graduate students conducted field research visiting 7 capitals, interview representatives from govt, NGO, think tanks and media Fall Semester 2007		reviewed CA, DE, IT, LI, UK, 14 US	pp 1-18	A-F, pages 22-51
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan	Markus Gauster	Jan-08	George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies	not specified		compaired US, 14 DE, UK	pp 1-62	none
Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan	Gerard McHugh, Lola Gostelow	2004	Save the Children	review of documents and interviews with representatives from government and non-government organizations	6 considerations	US, UK	pp 1-51	2 pages 52-55
PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful But Not Sufficient	Peter Viggo Jakobsen	Jun-05	Danish Institute for International Studies	survey of literature (p 31)	15 PRT Specific	4 US, DE, UK	pp 1-51	none
Provincial Reconstruction Teams	Michael J. Dziedzic, COL	Sep-05	United States Institute of Peace	not specified		US	pp 1-15	none
The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan	Robert M. Perito	Oct-05	United States Institute of Peace	extensive interviews with American and foreign officials, soldiers and representatives of NGOs from authors visit Jun 05		7 US	pp 1-15	none
Provincial Reconstruction Teams: An Interagency Assessment	USAID Sharon Morris, James Stephenson, USJFCOM Paul Ciminelli, Donald Muncy, DoS Tod Wilson, Al Nugent	Jun-06	USAID	interviews with key officials, three week in country assessment, interview over 100 officials, visited 4 PRTs and RC South and 2 BN TFs, meet PRT reps during 2 day conf in at US embassy, military officials at Bagram		16 US	pp 1-23	A-C pages 24 - 33
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afg	IIR 10 member team	Apr-07	CALL	5 mems in country 22 Mar - 8 Apr 2007, visited 7 PRTs, RC North & East, ISAF in Kabul, observations, interviews and document analysis		25 US	pp i-ix, 1-35	noen
Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lesson We Need to Learn from PRTs in Iraq & Afg	Lorry M Fenner, Staff Lead, Suzanne McKenna, Project Lead	Apr-08	HASC Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee	14 congressional and staff delegation trips, 5 to PRTs and US Emb in Iraq & Afg, NATO/ISAF HQ, US military bases and institutes, 8 hearings with 30 witnesses, 50 briefings by govt and NGO, USIP 2005 of PRT members, interviews		US	pp 1-73	none
ISAF PRT Handbook	MAJ Matthew Swannell, Editor	######	ISAF	culmination of nearly 4 years of inputs from PRT operators from both CFC-A, ISAF, international development agencies, and the Afghan govt	7 general	US	pp 1-30	1-23, pages 1-1 to 23-2 PART 2 References
Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures	not identified	Sep-07	CALL	comes from multiple sources inside and outside the USG with the understanding that the manner in which PRTs operate is likely to change over time	Appendix 15-18 Best Practices	All	Section	A-D, pages 31-144
Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afg & Iraq	not identified	Oct-08	GAO	reviewed past GOA reports, interviewed officials from DoS, USDA, USAID, DoD in DC and Central Command in FL, reviewed ISAF handbook and CERP info	Appendix D Best Practices	US	pp 1-29	A - Afg specific, pages 66-69
Quarterly Reprint to U.S. Congress	MG Arnold Fields (USMC Ret), SIGAR	Jan-09	SIGAR	meet with Afg govt officials, representatives from US agencies and military, Coalition partners and visited 5 PRTs. 2 project sites	none	US	Afg PRT specific: pp 48-58	A - Afg specific, pages 66-70
Provincial Reconstruction Teams	not identified	Nov-07	USJFC JWC	review joint doctrin and DoD directives, JCOA lesson learned, informal discussions with former PRT members and DoD, DoS officials involved in PRT implementation	none	US	pp 1-17	none

Appendix E List—Documents with Recommendations

Year	Mon	authors	Title	Subject	Type	Org	Publisher	Local	Recommend
2007		Afg Women's Network	Operationalizing Gender in PRTs in Afg	PRT	rprt	NGO	Afghan Women's Network	Kabul, Afg	20
2008	dec	bebber	The role of PRTs in COIN: Khost Province Afg	PRT	art	MIL	Naval Postgraduate School	Newport, RI	6
2007	Winter	brown	US PRTs in Afg: best practices and recommended improvements	PRT	art	MIL	Connections, The Quarterly Journal,	Garmish, DE	11
2006	mar	dreyer	Retooling the nation-building strategy of Afg	Afg (PRT p.11)	thes	MIL	USAWC	Carlisle Barracks, PA	4
2006	mar	drolet	PRTs: Afg v Iraq - Should we have a standard model?	PRT	thes	MIL	USAWC	Carlisle Barracks, PA	7
2005	sep	dziedzic&seidl	PRTs and Military relations with Ios & NGOs in Afg	PRT	rprt	TT	USIP	Washington D.C.	4
2008	jan	Gauster	Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan	PRT	rprt	MIL	GCM Ctr for Sec Studies	Garmish, DE	14
2004		Save the Child	PRT & Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afg	PRT	rprt	NGO	Save the Children	London, UK	
2008	apr	HASC	Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons we need to learn from PRTs in Iraq & Afg	Afg (PRT p.43)	rprt	GOV	Subcomm on Oversight & Investigations, House Armed Services Comm	Washington D.C.	17
2007	dec	hernandorena	US PRTs in Afg: 2003-2006 Obstacles to Interagency Cooperation	PRT	art	MIL	Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC	Carlisle Barracks, PA	4
2005	may	hoshmand	PRTs in Afg	PRT	thes	UNIV	Sch of Public Policy, Univ of Maryland	College Park, MD	4
2007	arp	IIR (FOUO)	PRTs in Afg	PRT	rprt	MIL	Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)	Ft. Leavenworth, KS	23
2005	jun	jakobsen	PRTs in Afg: Successful but not sufficient	PRT	rprt	TT	Danish Inst for Internatl Studies (DIIS)	Copenhagen, DK	4
2008	jan	Jones&Pickering	Revitalizing our efforts, rethinking our strategies	Afg (PRT p.21)	rprt	TT	Afghan Study Group, Ctr for Study of Presidency	Washington D.C.	6
2008	mar	Jones&Devold	Saving Afghanistan: An appeal and plan for urgent action	Afg (PRT p.12)	rprt	TT	Strategic Advisors Group, Atlantic Council of the US	Washington D.C.	4
2004		Save the Child	PRTs and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afg	PRT	rprt	NGO	Save the Children	London, UK	6
2005	oct	McNerney	Stabilization and reconstruction in Afg: Are PRTs a model or a muddle?	PRT	art	MIL	Parameters, USAWC Quarterly	Carlisle Barracks, PA	7
2008	oct	millen	Managing Provincial Reconstruction Activities	PRT	art	MIL	Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC	Carlisle Barracks, PA	7
2008	mar	Oxfam	Afghanistan: Development and Humanitarian Priorities	Afg (PRT p.8)	rprt	NGO	Oxfam	London, UK	5
2004	may	peck	PRTs: Improving or Undermining the Security for NGOs and PVOs in Afg	PRT	thes	MIL	Naval War College	Newport, RI	4
2005	oct	perito	The U.S. experience with PRTs in Afg	PRT	rprt	TT	USIP	Washington D.C.	7
2007	nov	reitjens&bolle	Linking PRTs to Security Enhancement in Afg	PRT	art	UNIV	Journal of Peacebuilding & Development Ctr for Global Peace, American Univ	Washington D.C.	3
2005	mar	sedra	Civil Military Relations in Afg: The PRT debate	PRT	rprt	GOV	Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Strategic Datalink, Dept of Foreign Affairs and Internatioanl Trade	Ottawa, ON, Canada	10
2007	sep	sellers	PRTs: Improving Effectiveness	PRT	thes	MIL	Naval Postgraduate School	Monterey, CA	6
2008	jun	Stanekezai	Afghanistan: Not Lost, But Needs More Attention	Afg (PRT p. 5)	rprt	TT	USIP	Washington D.C.	3
2006	jun	USAID	PRTs in Afg: an interagency assessment	PRT	rprt	GOV	USAID	Washington D.C.	16
2008	jul	Westerman	Provincial Reconstruction in Afg: An exam of the problems in integrating the mil, poli & dev dimensions w/reference to the US exper in Vietnam	PRT	thes	UNIV	Pembroke College	Cambridge, UK	4
2008	jan	WWS	Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations	PRT	thes	UNIV	Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton Univ	Princeton, NJ	14
2007	oct	Young	Overcoming the obstacles to establishing a democratic state in Afg	Afg (PRT p.14)	rprt	GOV	Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC	Carlisle Barracks, PA	3
2007		Zenkevicius	Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Rebuilding Afg-Is that Post-conflict Reconstruction?	Afg (PRT p.36)	art	UNIV	Baltic Security & Defence Review, Baltic Defence College	Tartu, Estonia	5
2007	Nov	Wadhams&Kor	The Forgotten Front	Afg (PRT p.34)	art	TT	Center for American Progress	Washington D.C.	7

Appendix F List—Recommendations (251) 1 of 10

Author, Year	Recommendations 28, Definitions 30	Code	Year
Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005	provide assistance: fill civilian PRT positions, pre-deployment orientation on assistant strategies, consult mechanisms, measures of effectiveness and end-state objectives, shift to local capacity bldg, advise from Kabul if not PRT civilian	assess	5
Perito, 2005	develop accurate evaluation metrics, consistent staffing and quality control	assess	5
Drolet, 2006	develop specific metrics for performance and incorporate into overall strategy	assess	6
McNerney, 2006	improve ability to measure effectiveness	assess	6
USAID, 2006	map causes of conflict and develop targeting programs	assess	6
Westerman, 2008	develop objective assessment scheme	assess	6
Roberts 2007	ensure institution memory: best practices, lessons learned	assess	7
Roberts 2007	collect sex-disaggregated data during assessments	assess	7
IIR, 2007	development and understanding of appropriate MOE/MOP in reconstruction operations	assess	7
IIR, 2007	p. 33: CIM (civil information management) is a major area that must be included early in the overall campaign plan . . . Asymmetric Software Kit (ASK)	assess	7
Sellers, 2007	use civil information management (CIM)	assess	7
Wadhams & Korb, 2007	p. 35: create baseline PRT standard (standardize between NATO and U.S., same basic functions)	assess	7
Gauster, 2008	improvement of intelligence for the evaluation of local structures and power structures	assess	8
Gauster, 2008	constant internal reflection on PRT activities to increase effectiveness	assess	8
Gauster, 2008	external evaluation of the concepts, efficiency, and effectiveness of PRTs	assess	8
HASC, 2008	DoD & DoS strategy approach for PRT use: end, ways, means to determine, align and measure progress and goals, performance monitoring systemic meeting milestones and objectives	assess	8
HASC, 2008	DoD & DoS report to Congress security & support to PRTs	assess	8
HASC, 2008	DoD and CJCS direct lessons learned and best practices considered in SSTR planning	assess	8
HASC, 2008	DoD include interagency in lessons learned info sys	assess	8
Jones & Devold, 2008	With experience gained in the past few years in running PRTs, the whole concept should be part of the assessment review, with an eye not only on best practices and better coordination, but also on whether some PRTs should be merged.	assess	8
Jones & Pickering, 2008	There is also a need for a set of metrics to evaluate PRT operations.	assess	8
Jones & Pickering, 2008	need to coordinate among themselves on a regular basis (and not settle for quarterly conferences) to exchange ideas on “best practices”	assess	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	metrics follow objectives; impact-based, defined benchmarks	assess	8
Sedra, 2005	PRTs should have civilian lead	civil led	5
Barton, 2007	clarity of leadership and well-integrated teams	civil led	7

Hernandorena, 2007	establishing operational guidelines to create seamless cooperation between the different components of U.S. PRTs: leadership opportunities for civilians, command PRTs	civil led	7
Bebber, 2008	civilian lead: PRT teams in Afghanistan should be led by the civilian agencies, much like those in Iraq are headed by DoS foreign service officers	civil led	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	PRTs should be civilian led, supported by mil.: mandatory, standard, interagency, pre-deployment training	civil led	8
Jakobsen, 2005	p. 37: All coalition PRTs should be transferred to ISAF.	completed	5
Sellers, 2007	create an interagency command for SSTR	completed	7
Wadhams & Korb, 2007	p. 34: improve coordination between PRTs (regional coordination)	completed	7
Brown, 2007	developing modular teams	completed	7
Brown, 2007	outsource to the public and/or private services expertise	completed	7
HASC, 2008	DoD should determine overall CA requirements, support SSR as core mission, SSR competencies are being developed for non-CA, innovative authorities to bring in CA competencies, active/reserve mix is appropriate, joint cmd. structure for CA	completed	8
Peck, 2004	PRT obj., CoAs, RoEs clearly articulated to and coordinated with NGOs	develop	4
Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005	coordinating and sharing info: Afghan govt. coordinates more assistance, PRT ESC/WG coordination includes NGOs, ACBAR coord., common NGO positions toward PRTs, WG for NATO PRTs	develop	5
Sedra, 2005	PRTs should focus on infrastructure rehabilitation and SSR rather than QIP development projects	develop	5
USAID, 2006	re-compete QIP to draw in implementing partners that can operate in unstable provinces	develop	6
Roberts, 2007	create or include women in projects	develop	7
Roberts, 2007	create safe place to engage women	develop	7
IIR, 2007	p. 20: include local leaders, planners, and architects in development of short-term and long-term projects	develop	7
IIR, 2007	all contracts include the use of local labor sources	develop	7
Parker, 2007	clarify U.S. policy on delivery of assistance	develop	7
McHugh & Gostelow, 2004	have a clear exit or transition strategy	exit	4
Sedra, 2005	PRTs must develop an exit strategy	exit	5
HASC, 2008	DoD & DoS should notify Congress when disbanding PRT	exit	8
Oxfam, 2008	In accordance with their interim status, exit strategies should be developed for each PRT.	exit	8
Jakobsen, 2005	p. 37: The number of PRTs should be increased and the pace of deployment stepped up.	expand	5
Dreyer, 2006	(2) radically increase the number of PRTs operating in the country and expand their mandate to include a more active security function (include ANA in PRTs; improve military and civilian cooperation and coordination at US PRTs; train, deploy, and support civilian and military together)	expand	6
McNerney, 2006	open more PRTs, or extend operations through satellite locations (mini-PRTs) to key districts	expand	6
Bebber, 2008	Focus on Districts: What is needed are District Development Teams (smaller units composed of Coalition and Afghan forces that are located in the districts, able to interact with local villages daily).	expand	8
Gauster, 2008	installation of more PRTs including outpost (PRT satellites)	expand	8
Millen, 2008	every province should have a PRT, ideally near the provincial capital	expand	8
Millen, 2008	major cities should also have a PRT due to their substantial needs	expand	8

Millen, 2008	The camp [PRT] must be located and designed for expansion, ideally near an airfield.	expand	8
Hoshmand, 2005	maintain close ties with UNAMA & Afghan Central govt.	external	5
Perito, 2005	CFC, ISAF, and Afghan govt. need to develop central coordinating mechanism and a set of guidelines for managing PRT program	external	5
Rubin et al., 2005	p. xv: configuring the PRT into a more integrated nationwide stabilization force	external	5
Hoshmand, 2005	operational mandate from DoS S/CRS	external	5
Drolet, 2006	designate lead agency	external	6
McNerney, 2006	improve civilian-military coordination	external	6
USAID, 2006	CFC-A and Emb. reinvigorate an in-country interagency coordinating body	external	6
Drolet, 2006	develop sound, consistent policy at strategic level	external	6
USAID, 2006	ISAF, USG, GOA common political vision & strategy for PRTs	external	6
IIR, 2007	centralize the scarce functional specialty experts at the regional level	external	7
Parker, 2007	better integrate PRT mission with war-fighting activities	external	7
Brown, 2007	create U.S. interagency PRT action group for all PRT-related issues at the U.S. embassy	external	7
Barton, 2007	clear strategic direction, operational flexibility, and improved connectivity	external	7
Brown, 2007	task-organizing PRTs to focus additional non-kinetic resources in the TF cmdr.'s main effort and utilizing the principle of economy of force	external	7
Brown, 2007	locate PRT with maneuver elements	external	7
IIR, 2007	p. 19: PRT planning must be integrated regionally and nationally by the RCs, ISAF HQ, and Embassy.	external	7
IIR, 2007	use of liaison officers	external	7
IIR, 2007	p. 11: Unity of effort and unity of command dictate a centralized method of receiving and reporting information to external agencies. Unified structure and reporting mechanisms at higher echelons	external	7
Parker, 2007	PRT strategic coordination must remain centralized . . . to prevent duplication of effort with NGOs.	external	7
Wadhams & Korb, 2007	p. 34: improve coordination between PRTs and military battle groups (used British, Canadian & Dutch model)	external	7
Zenkevicius, 2007	p. 36: all PRTs structures should be standardized	external	7
HASC, 2008	Interagency needs to better integrate programs, policies, and activities	external	8
HASC, 2008	DoD needs to improve integration of interagency in all six phases of operations	external	8
HASC, 2008	DoD & DoS need to clarify roles and responsibilities in SSR	external	8
Bebber, 2008	Unity of Effort: PRT should be the lead unit in managing the counterinsurgency	external	8
Gauster, 2008	improvement of the network between all relevant forces	external	8
Gauster, 2008	strengthening of capacities at the provincial and district levels to tighten the connection between the provinces and Kabul	external	8
Jones & Devold, 2008	Coordination . . . so that what happens in one province is related to both neighboring provinces as well as the national effort.	external	8
Jones & Pickering, 2008	PRTs should reflect the strategic overview of U.S. and NATO efforts in Afghanistan and play an assigned role, tailored to local circumstances.	external	8
Jones & Pickering, 2008	PRTs need an agreed concept of operations and basic common organizational structure as well as goals and objectives so they provide a standard range of services	external	8

Millen, 2008	leading a PRT is a substantial matter of prestige for Coalition partners, but if the donor nation is unwilling to fulfill its obligations entirely, the Coalition must refuse the offer	external	8
Oxfam, 2008	and they should only exist where security conditions make them absolutely necessary [World Bank, July 2007]	external	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	U.S., NATO set common standards for PRTs	external	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	PRT part of larger set of responses to post-conflict	external	8
Young, 2007	The PRTs also need more international and Coalition involvement, relying less on U.S. military forces and other personnel.	external	8
Peck, 2004	PRTs must receive adequate resourcing and support	fund	4
Perito, 2005	own administration and logistical support for interagency representatives	fund	5
Drolet, 2006	fully resourced with both personnel and funding	fund	6
Dreyer, 2006	(1) continue the current security sector reform program, but apply diplomatic pressure (and perhaps economic incentives) to persuade the lead donor countries to redouble their commitments and efforts in terms of personnel assigned and money spent	fund	6
Dreyer, 2006	(3) Develop mechanisms to channel a much greater percentage of foreign aid funds through the Afghan government.	fund	6
McNerney, 2006	equip PRTs with best communications and transportation assets and plentiful funds for a diverse array of projects	fund	6
USAID, 2006	PRT access funds and capabilities at operational/tactical level	fund	6
USAID, 2006	USDA & other interagency need to dedicate funds for PRT serving reprs.	fund	6
USAID, 2006	ISAF ensure each PRT has resources to achieve objectives	fund	6
USAID, 2006	PRT assets and funds tailored to specific cultural and security contexts, more specialized skills	fund	6
Barton, 2007	improved liquidity (more funding)	fund	7
Hernandorena, 2007	substantially increase civilian involvement in and support for PRTs: significant increase of funding and personnel from civilian agencies	fund	7
Sellers, 2007	quick access to funds	fund	7
Wadhams & Korb, 2007	p. 34: streamline PRT funds (civil & mil. can access funds, new funding mechanism, block grant of money, waive legal restrictions)	fund	7
Gauster, 2008	improvement of the communications and transportation facilities	fund	8
HASC, 2008	review CERP to ensure programs, GOA can support/maintain projects	fund	8
HASC, 2008	U.S. GOA study all PRT funding to determine expenditure on PRTs	fund	8
HASC, 2008	share expenses for training, exercises, and experiments	fund	8
Jones & Pickering, 2008	There is a need for a common source of quick-disbursing funds for PRTs so they can support short- and long-term development projects.	fund	8
Millen, 2008	PRT needs to have twice as many accommodations	fund	8
Oxfam, 2008	at a macro level, donor funds should be rerouted from PRTs to national government through the internationally administered Afghanistan Trust Funds	fund	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	common pool and quick disbursement for PRT funding	fund	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	S/CRS better funded, more control over PRTs	fund	8
Young, 2007	Each Afghan province needs more input and accountability with regard to funding for the PRTs. Current policy keeps the authority for making financial decisions in the hands of the donor nations. The provincial governors, elected councils, and tribal elders need an active voice in how their provinces are administered and governed.	fund	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	whole-of-govt. strengthen through funding: integrate various agencies/depts.; adequate, timely appropriations	fund	8

McHugh & Gostelow, 2004	prioritizes the role of emerging local political leaders and institutions	govern	4
Hoshmand, 2005	direct CA to provide technical assistance to build up local govt. capacities	govern	5
Drolet, 2006	PRTs coordinate more than reconstruction projects	govern	6
McNerney, 2006	greater emphasis on capacity-building programs that improve local governance and help tie local officials and institutions to the central government	govern	6
Wadhams & Korb, 2007	p. 35: improve coordination between PRTs and the Afghan government (link efforts to build capacity, increase Afg. reps. on PRT, train Afg. officials working on PRTs)	govern	7
Zenkevicius, 2007	p. 36: all reconstruction projects should be run by Afg. government or NGOs, with funds directly to Afg. govt.	govern	7
Gauster, 2008	special focus on Afghan autonomy and responsibility (local ownership)	govern	8
Stanekzai, 2008	p. 6, integration: PRTs should act in concert with the Afghan government and other international actors, such as the UN. Recognizing the importance of building up local governance structures, in August 2007 the Afghan government created the Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). The IDLG, UNAMA, and PRTs should coordinate support to provincial authorities based on IDLG priorities. There will be a coherent development strategy only when PRTs are harmonized with the ANDS and IDLG. PRTs should also support the implementation of NPPs at the provincial level. Provincial stabilization will not materialize unless NATO and the U.S. effectively reorganize and coordinate PRTs.	govern	8
Westerman, 2008	common Afghan-focused goals	govern	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	strengthen/expand programs that include local stakeholders	govern	8
Peck, 2004	NGOs need to revise perspectives of neutrality	H-space	4
Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005	preserve humanitarian space: orient training role to NGOs/IOs	H-space	5
Jakobsen, 2005	p. 37: More must be done to win the hearts and minds of the humanitarian organizations.	H-space	5
Sedra, 2005	PRTs should not implement HA unless in emergency situations	H-space	5
Sedra, 2005	PRT activities should be clearly differentiated from NGOs: rename PSTs, mil. Pers. always in uniform, training to PRT personnel on civ.-mil. relations and NGOs	H-space	5
Sedra, 2005	PRTs must refrain from utilizing aid conditionality	H-space	5
Roberts 2007	gender perspective in HA ops	H-space	7
Brown, 2007	PRT organize regular NGO meetings, coordinate, synchronize, leverage resources and activities	H-space	7
IIR, 2007	p. 31: PRTs must be sensitive to these concerns and take NGOs on their own terms	H-space	7
Oxfam, 2008	the military should undertake relief work only in exceptional circumstances [World Bank, July 2007]	H-space	8
Rietjens & Bollen, 2007	p. 5: increase coordination among themselves and with international humanitarian actors to avoid duplication of effort and ensure continuity	H-space	8
Rietjens & Bollen, 2007	p. 5: focus on support to international organizations and NGOs in their reconstruction and development activities, as these activities require training, expertise, and a long-term approach, which many military lack	H-space	8
Sedra, 2005	PRTs should institutionalize coordination mechanism with NGOs	internal	5
Perito, 2005	interagency agreement on individual roles, missions, and job descriptions	internal	5
USAID, 2006	guidance to direct PRT cmdrs. incorporates non-DoD into PRT planning and decision-making	internal	6

USAID, 2006	guidance that clearly outlines each PRT's participating interagency dept.'s mission, role, responsibility, authority	internal	6
Drolet, 2006	clear structure and function for the organization	internal	6
IIR, 2007	p. 5: consider employing the organizational structure for standalone PRTs	internal	7
Hernandorena, 2007	establishing better interagency cooperation in U.S. PRTs with specific guidelines that explain the roles, missions, and authority of individual team members	internal	7
IIR, 2007	lines of authority should be arranged so that there is one single chain of command that supports an integrated IA effort	internal	7
Zenkevicius, 2007	p. 36: all civilian personnel responsible for reconstruction, police, and judicial reform, etc., should report to the PRT commander	internal	7
Gauster, 2008	more authority and resources for civilian experts	internal	8
Gauster, 2008	clearly define command and control competencies	internal	8
HASC, 2008	DoD & DoS should unify leadership and command of PRT to match accountability & authority, ensuring unity of effort	internal	8
Millen, 2008	in addition to a maneuver component, PRT contingent must have civil affairs, psychological operations, and construction units as well as civilian offices	internal	8
Stanekzai, 2008	p. 6: standardization: Although some variation may be necessary, the PRTs require greater unity. Currently, 26 PRTs operate in nearly the entire country. However, because of their differing abilities and national origins, coordination is a challenge.	internal	8
Westerman, 2008	establish an effective chain of command	internal	8
Westerman, 2008	flexible and coherent management structure	internal	8
Sedra, 2005	PRTs must be "owned" by local communities and central govt.	publicize	5
Dreyer, 2006	(4) Develop and execute a public diplomacy campaign to capitalize on the "information" element of national power	publicize	6
Roberts 2007	improve public awareness of PRTs	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	always promote Afghan women's attendance to provincial & district meetings	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	incorporate gender into all reform processes	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	provide PRT females better access to women	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	consider vulnerable groups	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	include organizations that cater to women	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	obtain community buy-in for engagement with women	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	use dialog and comms. as primary tools to address gender issues	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	supporting women's rights is not against the culture	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	PRT ESC should consult women's groups	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	develop policy note on gender equality/mainstreaming	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	women in govt. should be an indicator or measure of progress	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	issue gender guidelines	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	create gender adviser	publicize	7
Roberts 2007	develop institution understanding of gender mainstreaming	publicize	7
Barton, 2007	expanded involvement of a wide range of local people in participatory practices	publicize	7
Wadhams & Korb, 2007	p. 35: increase consultations with Afghan women (discuss priorities and concerns; females on PRTs will have to do this task)	publicize	7
Jones & Pickering,	PRTs need to provide information about their accomplishments to Afghans and the international community.	publicize	8

2008

Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	PRT leaders/supervisors use public relations, manage expectations	publicize	8
Rietjens & Bollen, 2007	p. 4: involve more Afghan people in their activities, as this would contribute to a demand-driven approach as well as to sustainability and capacity building	publicize	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	PRT objectives clearly defined	publicize	8
Peck, 2004	PRTs must not serve as substitute for combat or peacekeeping forces	secure	4
Peck, 2004	PRTs should have security focus	secure	4
McHugh & Gostelow, 2004	adhere to clearly defined mission	secure	4
McHugh & Gostelow, 2004	ensure secure environment	secure	4
McHugh & Gostelow, 2004	military contingent capable of addressing security threats	secure	4
Perito, 2005	change name to Provincial Security Teams, concentrate on security	secure	5
Rubin et al., 2005	p. xv: This should include renamed Provincial Stabilization Teams focused on security sector reform and strengthening government administration.	secure	5
Rubin et al., 2005	p. xv: as well as regional mobile units with a more robust mandate to back up the demobilization of armed groups	secure	5
Dziedzic & Seidl, 2005	provide security: promote safe/secure environ., expand PRT less-secure areas, work with local leaders/army/police, move away from quick impact projects	secure	5
Jakobsen, 2005	p. 37: all PRTs should adopt a security-first approach similar to the one employed by the British-led Mazar PRT	secure	5
Sedra, 2005	should focus on security	secure	5
USAID, 2006	ISAF should review combat power and reach-back capabilities	secure	6
USAID, 2006	PRT should stay at mid-range or semi-non-permissive environment: not combat but not peace	secure	6
USAID, 2006	review and adapt PRT security measures	secure	6
Zenkevicius, 2007	p. 36: all PRT actions should focus on fulfilling tasks associated with ensuring security and supporting governance	secure	7
Zenkevicius, 2007	p. 37: PRTs should become a platform for further reconstruction through building secure environment, not running reconstruction by themselves	secure	7
Barton, 2007	target deployment to critical provincial areas of continued insecurity	secure	7
IIR, 2007	p. 30: relationships between PRTs, their organic security forces, and other security forces in the area must be well defined and understood by all cadres should live in their assigned population centers or operate from the PRT camp	secure	7
Millen, 2008	Secure the Population: PRTs must be adequately staffed and equipped to take charge of police and Army training. A more robust PRT team, supplemented with the ETT personnel, could ensure that security training was integrated into an overall governance and development plan.	secure	8
Bebber, 2008			
Gauster, 2008	increase combat effectiveness in order to support PRTs in critical situations	secure	8
Oxfam, 2008	PRTs should adhere to their mandate: to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment	secure	8
Rietjens & Bollen, 2007	p. 4: dedicate more resources to security enhancement	secure	8

Stanekzai, 2008	p. 6: focus on core missions: The military elements of PRTs should focus on security sector reform, specifically supporting local initiatives to demilitarize and disband illegal armed groups and accelerating training of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan National Army (ANA). For their part, the civilian components of PRTs should help provide support in NPP implementation at the provincial level and build their outreach capacity to remote areas and underserved communities that other programs do not cover.	secure	8
Perito, 2005	selection/deployment of capable, experienced interagency reps.	select	5
Drolet, 2006	experienced personnel placed into key PRT positions	select	6
McNerney, 2006	broad range of development and rule of law civilian expertise	select	6
USAID, 2006	interagency needs to develop policies and incentives to fill civilian positions	select	6
USAID, 2006	U.S. ensure minimum staffing and funds to ISAF PRTs	select	6
Brown, 2007	ensure that these organizations are equipped with experienced officers, non-commissioned officers, and civilians with the right skill sets	select	7
Brown, 2007	screening reservist PRT augmentees for functional expertise could provide a basis for several CAPT Bs	select	7
Brown, 2007	selection of PRT cmdr.: better choice is an experienced foreign affairs or civil affairs officer (trained soldier diplomat, culturally astute, far more exposure to interagency process)	select	7
IIR, 2007	PRT members should be identified early, organized, and provided sufficient preparation time and training to fulfill their new roles	select	7
IIR, 2007	p. 10: the senior IA partners of PRTs must be carefully screened and selected based on a proven ability . . . experienced in negotiation, strategic planning (including financial management and how to write project proposals), situational awareness and concept of incident command	select	7
IIR, 2007	commanders of PRTs carefully screened and selected on their ability to build effective IA teams	select	7
IIR, 2007	PRT members must be open-minded and willing to negotiate and, ultimately cooperate with one another	select	7
IIR, 2007	p. 25: military members of the PRT will be expected to provide oversight and mentorship in the functional specialty areas	select	7
IIR, 2007	p. 26: ISAF/CJ-9 must employ knowledgeable individuals in the policy development process to ensure PRT reconstruction efforts are better synchronized with long-term efforts	select	7
Parker, 2007	deploy more CATA teams at PRTs	select	7
Sellers, 2007	better selection of personnel	select	7
Sellers, 2007	strengthen their civilian component	select	7
Barton, 2007	a broader pool of available civilians	select	7
Brown, 2007	include reps from DoJ, HHS, DoEd, etc.	select	7
Wadhams & Korb, 2007	p. 34: increase the number of civilians in PRTs (recruit from NGOs or other govt. agencies besides DoS & USAID)	select	7
Gauster, 2008	increase civilian key expertise to train local administration and security forces	select	8
Gauster, 2008	more expertise in the fields of development, agriculture, and rule of law	select	8
HASC, 2008	DoD & DoS improve selection processes, career incentives, and forms of recognition	select	8
Jones & Devold, 2008	PRT staffing is too heavily weighted toward military personnel for force protection, when more civilian personnel who are expert in reconstruction tasks are needed to do the nation-building job of the PRT.	select	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	reevaluate hiring and work practices to ensure best people chosen	select	8

	The 26 provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) need many more mentors with political, economic, and reconstruction expertise. These teams would greatly benefit from more agency and personnel support from the U.S. State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and U.S. Department of Agriculture. These personnel must be skilled and experienced, not the mostly junior employees these U.S. government agencies are currently contributing in small numbers. Familiarity with Afghan culture and languages, particularly Dari and Pashto, would be extremely helpful. These department workers must stay for longer periods in order to build experience and trust with the provincial governments and local populace.	select	8
Young, 2007			
Peck, 2004	increase training and integration of ANA & ANP	train	4
McHugh & Gostelow, 2004	civ.-mil. personnel appropriately trained for their mission and operating environment	train	4
Hoshmand, 2005	focus military assets on SSR, training ANP and ANA	train	5
Hoshmand, 2005	joint training for PRT civ. & mil. staff	train	5
Perito, 2005	DoS should prioritize assignments and provide adequate training	train	5
Sedra, 2005	individual PRTs should clearly elaborate & articulate their mandates and objectives prior to deployment	train	5
McNerney, 2006	train, deploy, and support civ.-mil. as team	train	6
USAID, 2006	USG team training for all PRT personnel	train	6
USAID, 2006	PRT mgmt. & info. sys. that support civilian interagency	train	6
Hernandorena, 2007	significant joint pre-deployment training for U.S. PRTs: training together as a team prior to deployment	train	7
IIR, 2007	p. 15: collective PRT training is best conducted with all members slated to deploy to the operational area	train	7
IIR, 2007	Combat Training Centers offer unmatched resources to prepare a PRT for employment, including the opportunity to integrate with a maneuver force operating in a PRT AO	train	7
IIR, 2007	p. 19: PRT members should be identified early, organized, and provided sufficient preparation time and training to fulfill their new roles	train	7
IIR, 2007	given ample resources to establish and maintain communications with the unit it will replace	train	7
IIR, 2007	p. 28: PRT commanders need to be educated on the roles and capabilities of their CA/CIMIC soldiers and ensure they are fully integrated into all plans and operations	train	7
Sellers, 2007	joint training and exercises for future civil-military teams	train	7
Brown, 2007	identify, fund, and integrate modular teams into regular military training exercises at Army's JRTC, NTC, JMNTC	train	7
Jones & Devold, 2008	PRT personnel should remain in the country at least twelve months . . . so they can establish relationships with leadership in the local area.	train	8
Abbaszadeh et Al, 2008	deployment synchronized across agencies	train	8
Bebber, 2008	Develop Human Capital: PRTs must implement training programs for local public administrators focusing on the basic skills necessary for the technical, professional administration of government. This should also include media training . . . for the new crop of journalists who put out information on television, on the radio, and in newspapers each day.	train	8
Bebber, 2008	Staffing and Time in Country: PRTs should become self-contained units, with substantially more preparation . . . should be built around two-year tours, with a minimum of six months' cultural and language training and 18 months in country.	train	8

Gauster, 2008	trust-building between civilian and military experts	train	8
HASC, 2008	DoD, DoS, USAID integrate training of PRT mil. & civ., standardize classroom and field trng. of both SSR and FP and combat lifesaving, earlier integration with maneuver units	train	8
HASC, 2008	ensure DoD that filled professional positions receive FS Institute training	train	8
HASC, 2008	Sec. Army report on institutionalized PRT trng.	train	8

Appendix G List—International Development Agencies

Country	Development Agency	Abbrv
Canada	Canadian International Development Agency http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/afghanistan-e	CIDA
Denmark	Danish International Development Agency http://www.afghanistan.um.dk/en	DANIDA
European Union	European Union http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/afghanistan/index_en.htm	EU
France	Agence Française de Développement http://www.afd.fr/jahia/Jahia/lang/en/home/Qui-Sommes-Nous/Filiales-et-reseau/reseau/Portail-afghanistan	AFD
Germany	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/670.htm	GTZ
Iceland	Icelandic International Development Agency http://www.iceida.is/english	ICEIDA
Netherlands	Department of Development Cooperation of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://afghanistan.nlembassy.org/rebuilding_and_dc	DGIS
Norway	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation http://www.norway.org.af/development/	NORAD
Spain	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo http://www.aecid.es/web/es/centros/AFGANISTAN_OTC.86.html	AECID
Sweden	Styrelsen For Internationalellt Utvecklingssamarbete http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=245&a=853&language=en_US	SIDA
United Kingdom	Department of Foreign International Development http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Where-we-work/Asia-South/Afghanistan/	DFID
United States	United States Agency for International Development http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/index.aspx	USAID
United States	Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, Afghanistan Reconstruction Task Force http://www.trade.gov/afghanistan/	DoC ITA
international	Asian Development Bank http://www.adb.org/afghanistan/	ADB
international	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development www.oecd.org	OECD
international	United Nations Development Program http://www.undp.org.af/	UNDP
international	World Bank http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,menuPK:305990~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:305985,00.html	WB

Appendix H List—Paradoxes of COIN Operations

- Sometimes, the more you protect the force, the less secure you may be.
- Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.
- The more successful the counterinsurgency is, the less force can be used and the more risk must be accepted.
- Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
- Some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot.
- The Host Nation doing something tolerably is normally better than the U.S. doing it well.
- If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next.
- Tactical success guarantees nothing.
- Many important decisions are not made by Generals.

Source: FM 3-24 2006, 1-27-28.

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