The Bureaucratic Process and the Use of Force at the Austin Police Department

By
Rico Corporal

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Abstract

Graham Allison revolutionized the study of organizational theory with his book *Essence of Decision*. In *Essence* he develops three models that attempt to explain the bureaucratic processes and decision-making in government. Those models are termed the rational actor, organizational process, and bureaucratic politics models. Allison uses these models to explain President John F. Kennedy’s actions and decision-making during the Cuban Missile Crisis. That crisis began when the United States discovered that Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the Soviet Union, had placed missiles in Cuba. The Soviet strategy brought the United States and Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war. Allison’s models have been tested by scholars in the context of presidential decision-making, international relations, and federal government bureaucracy.

This paper applies Allison’s bureaucratic politics model to the Austin Police Department’s decision-making process. Specifically, the bureaucratic politics model is used to analyze the decision process surrounding the suspension from duty of Officer Scott Glasgow for shooting and killing Jesse Lee Owens, a 20-year-old African American male.

This research does not focus on the shooting incident, but the bureaucratic processes used by the Austin Police Department in deciding to discipline Glasgow. For the most part Allison’s models have been used to analyze international events. This is its first use in a local criminal justice decision.
Chapter 1. Introduction

In Graham Allison’s book Essence of Decision, he discusses three models—rational actor model, organizational process model, and bureaucratic (governmental) politics model. Allison attempts to explain how foreign policy decisions are made in the presidency, and uses the Cuban Missile Crisis to test all three models.

The most analyzed and perhaps most controversial of the three models is the bureaucratic politics model. According to the Bureaucratic Politics Model, organizational “outcomes” are a result of “pulling and hauling” or politics (Allison and Zelikow, 255; 1998). Scholars have used this model to test hypotheses about certain presidential decisions in foreign policy. Scholars have also applied this model to other situations. There are, however, few studies (if any) that apply the bureaucratic politics model to local government decision making bodies.

During the winter of 2004, Chief of Police Stanley L. Knee made a controversial decision to suspend Officer Scott Glasgow after an incident where the suspect died. The purpose of this research paper is to use the bureaucratic politics model to explore how Austin Police Department (APD) reached the decision to suspend Officer Scott Glasgow following the shooting death of Jesse Lee Owens, a 20 year old African American male.

Facts of the Case

The following text is from a memorandum written in February, 2004 by the Chief of Police Stanley L. Knee to the Director of the Civil Service Commission Vanessa Downey-Little.
On June 14, 2003, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer Glasgow was on duty driving a police car. Glasgow saw a Dodge Neon that had been reported stolen, at the intersection of airport Boulevard and E. 12th Street. In accordance with his training, Department policy and officer safety principles, Glasgow notified the police dispatcher, began following the vehicle, and planned on waiting until his backup arrived before trying to apprehend the driver (Jesse Lee Owens). Without any prompting from Glasgow, Owens pulled over and stopped in the 1700 block of Tilley Street. Even though Owens was not an immediate threat to Glasgow or anyone else, Glasgow decided to affect the arrest by himself, rather than containing the situation and waiting for his backup to arrive.

Glasgow positioned his vehicle to the left of the Neon, with the right front of his squad car about equal to the Neon’s driver’s door. The distance between the squad car and the Neon was approximately 2 feet. Glasgow positioned his vehicle in the manner in order to gain a better angle should Owens decide to flee on foot. Glasgow was not trained by the Austin Police Department to use this technique. When Glasgow’s squad car came to a stop to the left of the Neon, Glasgow exited his driver’s door, drew
his weapon (in his right hand), and took cover/safety between his left front tire and his driver’s door. From this position of cover, Glasgow began yelling several times at Owens to put his hands up. Owens complied and put his hands up. Even though his backup had still not arrived, Glasgow chose to leave his position of cover/safety and approached the driver’s door of the Neon with his weapon pointed at Owens. Glasgow tried to open the driver’s door but it was locked. Glasgow ordered Owens to open the door several times and Owens complied. When Glasgow pulled on the door, it would not fully open because he had inadvertently parked the squad car so close to the Neon that the driver’s door hit the squad car’s right front bumper. Glasgow ordered Owens to put his hands outside the driver’s door, and Owens complied with that order. Glasgow then ordered Owens to get out of the vehicle, but Owens would not comply with that order. Owens repeatedly asked Glasgow, “what’s the problem officer?” Glasgow would not tell Owens “what the problem” was.

Owens did not respond to Glasgow’s order to get out of the vehicle, so Glasgow decided to reach over the driver’s door (the window was up) and grab Owens’ right arm, which Owens immediately pulled away. At this point, Owens was
actively resisting Glasgow’s attempts to gain control of him. Instead of breaking off physical contact with Owens until his backup arrived, which he should have done, Glasgow chose to re-engage Owens. Glasgow decided to handcuff Owens’ right hand only, so he used his left hand to remove his hinge handcuffs from its carrying case on the left side of his body. Glasgow attempted to handcuff Owens’ right hand while holding his weapon in his right hand. Glasgow was not trained by the Austin Police Department to use this technique. Before Glasgow could handcuff Owens’s right hand, Owens began reaching to his right. Glasgow thought Owens might be reaching for a weapon, and rather than disengaging and seeking a position of cover/safety, which he should have done, he reached over the top of the driver’s door into the driver’s compartment (the window was still up) and grabbed Owens shirt. Glasgow was not trained by the Austin Police Department to use this technique. While Glasgow was grabbing Owens’ shirt, he felt the driver’s door close on both his arms, pinning them between the top of the door and the roof of the Neon. Glasgow has reached so far into the vehicle that his arms were caught in the door all the way up to his armpits. Glasgow heard the Neon being put into drive and was unable to extricate
himself from the life threatening position. He looked down and saw that Owens was holding the door closed. At that point, Owens began to accelerate down the street. Glasgow tried to free himself from the door, but was not able to do so. Glasgow started to run with the car but lost his footing and was being dragged down the street. Glasgow still had his service weapon in his right hand, which was inside the driver’s compartment of the Neon. Believing that his life was in imminent danger, Glasgow began firing his weapon into the vehicle, striking Owens at close range five (5) times. After Owens was shot, Glasgow was able to free himself from the vehicle. Owens drove a short distance and crashed the Neon. Owens was pronounced dead at the scene. Glasgow suffered non-life-threatening injuries and was treated Brakenridge Hospital.

A thorough investigation of this incident by the Internal Affairs Division (IAD), a department within APD that investigates officers’ use of force, concluded that the use of force by Glasgow was justified because his life was in danger. In addition, the IAD concluded Glasgow violated two department policies. First, Glasgow failed to follow the department’s high-risk traffic stops procedures. Those department’s procedures require officers to make initial contact and dispatcher notification, select the stop location, signal the suspect vehicle to pull over, make the actual stop, take command
of the situation, wait for arrival of help at the scene, remove the suspect(s) from vehicle, and clear the vehicle. Second, Glasgow’s attempt to arrest Owens by himself was in clear violation of department procedures. As a result of these violations, Glasgow was placed on ninety-days’ suspension. He was required to complete additional training within six months upon returning to duty. In order to return on duty, Glasgow was required to have a fitness for duty evaluation by a qualified professional in order to return to duty.

Chapter Summaries

The purpose of this research paper is to explore the bureaucratic politics model and its applicability to the APD’s decision to suspend Officer Scott Glasgow. To accomplish the research purpose, this study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews literature concerning the origins of policing in the United States, including an African American perspective (since the suspect killed by Officer Glasgow was African American). This chapter also reviews policing models that have played a significant role in shaping policing in the United States, and how policing has changed over the years. Chapter 3 explores Allison’s decision models with an emphasis on the bureaucratic politics model, the conceptual framework of this study. Chapter 4 discusses the Austin Police Department’s use-of-force policy. Included is this chapter is the definition of use of force. This chapter also analyzes the structural process by which APD investigates and makes decisions. Chapter 5 operationalizes the working hypotheses addressed in chapter 3, which emphasizes the decision-making process. Chapter 6 focuses on the results of the study. In addition, it discusses the findings in each working hypotheses by analyzing the literature, the documents, and the interviews. Chapter 7, the final chapter, identifies
modifications to the bureaucratic politics model and consequently, how it may better apply to local organizations.

Chapter 2. Literature Review

Chapter Purpose

This chapter examines literature that discusses the internal structure and organization of police departments. The police culture in the United States is also discussed.

Historical Background

Throughout history, laws have existed to govern the conduct of individuals and prescribed the appropriate punishment for violations of the law (Miller and Hess 2002). The earliest data about codified punishment date back to 2300 B.C. when the Sumerian rulers systemized offenses against society. Rulers have been modifying such codes ever since (Miller and Hess 2002). Miller and Hess have examined the Anglo-Saxon heritage of the police force.

“The beginnings of just laws and social control were destroyed during the Dark Ages as the Roman Empire disintegrated, Hordes of Germanic invaders swept into the old Roman territory of Britain, bringing their own laws and customs. These German invaders intermarried with the conquered English, the result being the hardy Anglo-Saxon (Miller and Hess 2002, 3).

Anglo-Saxons placed their farms in small groups that were self-governing to police themselves under King Alfred the Great. Males were required to join in a group of ten families called tithing. The tithing system established the principle of the community crime control and enforcement law (Miller and Hess 2002). When William the
Conqueror, a Norman, invaded England in 1060, the tithing system was discontinued because of his concern for national security (Miller and Hess 2002). He replaced the tithing system with a form of “home rule,” which consisted of fifty-five military districts called shires. Each district was headed by a Norman officer called a reeve, which created the title shire-reeve (this is the origin of sheriff). William the Conqueror also required all free men to swear to be loyal to the king’s law and maintain peace in local areas. This system was called the Frankpledge system (Miller and Hess 2002).

During the seventeenth century, law enforcement was divided into day watch and night watch. The day watchers were called constables; they served as jailers and administered other governmental duties (Miller and Hess 2002). Average citizens worked the night watch. These citizens took turns watching for fires, bad weather, and disorderly people. If the watchman or another citizen witnessed a crime, they were required to give a loud warning, so citizens would come and chase the culprits (Miller and Hess 2002). By the Eighteenth century, citizens had begun to pay others to take their place as watchmen; and thus began the modern police force (Miller and Hess 2002).

England’s Industrial Revolution caused major changes in social norms. Crime was also part of the social change; the crime rate in England rose dramatically (Oliver 2001). In response to the problem, the government changed the structure of the police force.

Sir Robert Peel proposed the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, borrowing the idea from an earlier government magistrate by the name of Patrick Colquhoun (Oliver 2001). Colquhoun had introduced the idea of a metropolitan police in 1729, but it was not well received by the citizens. When Peel reintroduced the idea century later, it was hotly
debated among the citizens. Many feared that a metropolitan police force would result in greater government control over everyday citizens (Oliver 2001). Despite the concerns of citizens, Parliament passed the legislation and it became law. After Parliament passed the new law, Robert Peel was selected to lead the organization (Oliver 2001).

The new police organization was structured among military lines. Police officers’ uniforms were “three-quarter-length royal blue coats, white trousers, and top hats.” The headquarters was located in an old place that previously housed Scottish royalty—thus the location became known as Scotland Yard (Oliver 2001). When Sir Robert Peel organized the police department, he introduced a method called community policing.

Here in the United States, the Founding Fathers very much disliked the idea of British soldiers controlling colonists and taking over homes (Miller and Hess 2002). The Founders wanted the new nation to have laws that protected citizens from the abuse of power. Thus the Bill of Rights guaranteed basic liberties to prevent the abuse of power (Miller and Hess 2002). In New England, however, the system of maintaining order was similar to that of the British system (Miller and Hess 2002).

Unlike Britain, which had established the metropolitan police, the United States used a day-and-night watch system similar to the British. By the 1830’s a few large U.S. cities created separate day watches. Philadelphia, in 1838, became the first city to pay those who worked the day-and-night watches (Miller and Hess 2002). Boston followed suit with a six-officer force. New York City, in a bold move, took a major step in consolidating day-and-night watches using a police chief in 1844. The New York Police Department (NYPD) modeled itself after England’s metropolitan police under Peel’s principles. In 1857, Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, New Orleans, Newark, Cincinnati, and
Philadelphia followed the NYPD and consolidated its forces and copied England’s metropolitan police. These newly placed police chiefs soon became burdened with many problems (Miller and Hess 2002). “What those chiefs of police found in their newly consolidated forces was undisciplined crews composed,” as one commentator described it, “principally of the shiftless, the incompetent, and the ignorant. Tales abound of police officers in the 1850’s who assaulted their superior officers, who released prisoners from custody of the officers, were found sleeping or drunk of duty, or who could be bribed by almost anything” (Miller and Hess 2002).

Although their police had many problems, citizens could count on the police for assistance. At the beginning of the Nineteenth century, the police was the only arm of the government assisting citizens seven days per week and twenty-four hours per day (Miller and Hess 2002).

In the South, police officers were used to control black slaves_ who outnumbered whites. Officials in the South created special police forces that patrolled areas for runaway slaves (Miller and Hess 2002). These officers could go onto plantations and break into the slave quarters; punish slaves found outside the farm; and search for, beat, and kill slaves violating the code (Miller and Hess 2002).

Over time, police departments in the United States began reforms to change organizational structure and police culture.

**Policing Models**

During the early Twentieth century, the three major policing models_ political model, reform model, and community model_ significantly changed the policing in the United States. This section takes a closer look at these models.
Political Model

Until the 1920’s, politics dominated the police organizations in the United States. England, where the police department was centralized under the monarch and the police chief(s) had the authority to terminate officers. However, the U.S. police departments were decentralized and were under the authority of local politicians for whom they worked (Miller and Hess 2002). The police chief did not have the authority to terminate officers. Politics influenced every aspect of law enforcement including who was employed, who was promoted, arrest practices, where officers worked, and the services they provided (Roberg, Kuykendall, Novak 2002). Officers were decentralized and community sensitive and had enormous discretion in how to enforce the law. Politicians played more of a role in enforcement priorities than the chief of police (Roberg, Kuykendall, and Novak 2002). Because of the close relationship officers had with the community, they also had personal relations with citizens and functioned as community workers in many respects (probation officers and providers of food and shelter). As cities began to grow and became more complex to manage, police departments came under severe criticism because of corruption (Roberg, Kuykendall, Novak 2002).

To put an end to corruption within police departments, President Herbert Hoover created the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement in 1929 to study the criminal justice system (Hess and Miller 2002). Hoover appointed former Attorney
General George W. Wickersham as chairman. When the committee presented the results of its study, it focused on two main sections: Report 11 and Report 14. Report 11, “Lawlessness in Law Enforcement,” concluded that police brutality, “the third degree”—inflicting excruciating pain, physical and mental to get confessions—was practiced widely. Other tactics included threats, intimidation, physical brutality, and illegal detention. Report 14 described the leadership in police organizations and recommended centralized administrative control and higher standards for personnel. Report 14, in effect, called for higher levels of police professionalism (Hess and Miller 2002).

Overall the Wickersham Commission produced six major recommendations and called for a complete overhaul of police departments. The recommendations were organized around organizational decentralization, professional standards of behavior and development of policies and procedures, more education and training, selection and promotion based on merit, commitment to the goal of fighting crime, and use of the latest in scientific and technological developments (Roberg, Kuykendall, Novak 2002). The restructuring of police organizations led to what is called the reform model, in which departments put into practice the reforms made by the commission.

Reform Model

The reform model, spearheaded by August Vollmer and O.W. Wilson, dramatically changed the way in which police departments functioned (Miller and Hess 2002). The reform model’s premise is that police officers should base their decisions on department policies and the standards of the law, and that politics has no room in police departments (Roberg, Kuykendall, Novak 2002). Proponents of the reform model argued that fighting crime should be the main focus of police departments, and that performance
should measured by rapid responses to calls, the number of arrests made and citations
issued, and the crime rate (Roberg, Kuykendall, Novak 2002).

According to Hess and Miller (2002), during this time the relationship between
the police and the public began to change. Citizens came to consider the police as
professionals, and their close relationships with the community declined. Soon police
officers were completely detached from the communities that they served.

During the reform era, the concept of the “thin blue line” emerged. This phrase
refers to those who stand between law-abiding, peaceful citizens and villains or hardened
criminals who want to violate them (Hess and Miller 2002). The police further distanced
themselves from the public by eliminating the foot patrol; the squad car could respond
more rapidly. The public’s image changed from the traditional police on foot patrol to
officers zooming across big cities chasing bad guys (Hess and Miller 2002).

By the 1960’s, criticism began to plague the police and their crime-fighting
methods. Some critics of law enforcement began to question the reform model claiming
that police officers were completely detached from citizens (Roberg, Kuykendall, Novak
2002). The attempt to reform the police culture and eliminate abuse and corruption had
led to police departments that were too bureaucratic and isolated from the needs of
citizens (Roberg, Kuykendall, Novak 2002).

Now that automobiles had changed the way in which police officers operated,
they did not have to interact with citizens. In fact, the windshield of the police car
became a symbol of a partition between the police and citizens (Roberg, Kuykendall,
Novak 2002). Proponents of the reform model argued that it was important that police
officers be impartial because of our democratic society. The old television show Dragnet
provides a good example of the Reform Model when Sgt. Friday said “just the facts, ma’am” (Roberg, Kuykendall, Novak 2002). Critics also argued that the way in which the police were fighting crime was inappropriate. Furthermore, critics believed the police was not responding to serious crime. For example, the police reports only identified two categories of police activity: “crime fighting” and “non crime fighting.” This format overlooked other important crimes such as domestic violence. Reformers recommended that officers perform more social task (Roberg, Kuykendall, Novak 2002).

The 1960’s also was a turbulent time for the United States. Police methods were challenged as the country experienced social changes.

The Civil Rights Movement, which began in the 1950’s, took on central significance and exposed the unequal social, political, and economic systems in the United States. Clashes between Blacks and the police became common. The ways in which police officers handled protest marches and civil disobedience were extremely harsh (Hess and Miller 2002). The assassinations of President Kennedy, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, and Robert Kennedy really made Americans realize the very moral fabric of the country was deteriorating. Millions of television viewers here and around the world watched in horror as the police beat demonstrators at the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. The anti-war movement placed police officers in the middle of a country that was rapidly changing (Hess and Miller 2002).

With so many social changes happening at once, the police lacked the equipment and training to confront these great challenges. Segments of society associated the police with a corrupt system. Police officers were referred to as “pigs,” especially by students and entertainers. Some citizens believed that officers were the barrier between peace,
equality, and justice. The police were at war with society. The media coverage of how the police handled demonstrators angered Americans and they demanded change (Hess and Miller 2002).

Efforts were launched to improve relations between the police and the public: public relations and community relations.

**Public Relations** (PR) are efforts to enhance the image of a person, corporation, or other entity.

Police used PR devices such as open houses and speaking engagements (schools, community events) as image building tools. Many police departments established a public relations office and hired specialist in image building (Hess and Miller 2002). The Law enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was created in 1968 to respond to the negative image of the police. Over the next few years, LEAA gave billions of dollars to the “war on crime” to fund programs and studies for law enforcement. In an effort to help the justice system, $9 billion was given to help improve police departments, courts, and correctional systems (Hess and Miller 2002).

**Community Relations** are efforts to interact and communicate with the public that include community-team policing, community resource officers, and school liaison officers. Community relations seek to bring officers and the community together.

With reforms now in place at police departments the next model, Community Policing, is important in reestablishing citizens-police relations.

**Community Policing Model**

In the 1980’s, the police departments began to fight crime using a more community-oriented approach. Police departments around the country began
experimenting with Herman Goldstein’s problem oriented-approach in policing. As a result, the emphasis shifted toward crime prevention rather than simply crime fighting (Hess and Miller 2002).

The community policing model has its origin in the 1968 Kerner Commission Report released by the President Lyndon B. Johnson’s National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorder. The report utterly condemned racism in the United States and suggested that police officers should begin policing in Black communities, which the police did not do. The report called for the police to aid Black communities to cut off racial violence (Hess and Miller 2002).

As time passed, many police departments began to respond to citizens’ desire to change the culture of policing. Today, the police constantly interact with the public through community problem-solving (Hess and Miller 2002). In addition, the police are responding more to the needs and desires of the communities in which they serve. Now officers handle cases of sexual assault, domestic violence, sexual abuse of children, drunk driving and missing children; the ability to handle such cases is proof of the changes police departments have undergone (Hess and Miller 2002). Under the political and reform models, police would not get involved in such issues because the nature of the police system, laws, and culture. Citizens want officers to be proactive as well as catching and putting away criminals. Table 2.1 summarizes the evolving strategies of the police.
Traditionally the police have reacted to calls by citizens. Community policing, on the other hand, takes a proactive approach; police departments anticipate problems and find solutions (Hess and Miller 2002). In addition, anticipating problems also means being accountable for actions and not responding to different problems with the same solution. It is impossible to get different results with the same method. Officers must realize that to get different results, different methods must be activated (Hess and Miller 2002).

According to law scholars, “Community-oriented policing is proactive, solution-based, and community driven. It occurs when a law enforcement agency and law-abiding

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citizens work together to do four things: arrest offenders; prevent crime; solve on going problems; and improve overall quality of life” (Hess and Miller 2002, p.8).

Hess and Miller insist the community policing is conceived as a goal to solve problems in communities, good relations with citizens is the end product (Hess and Miller 2002, 15). The Hess and Miller state that

“Several major features associated with policing are vital such as regular contact between officers and citizens; a department–wide philosophy and department-wide acceptance; internal and external influence and respect for officers; well-defined role-does both proactive and reactive policing a full service officer; direct service-the same officer takes complaints and gives crime prevention tips; citizens identify problems and cooperate in setting up the police agenda; police accountability is ensured by the citizens receiving the service in addition to administrative mechanism” (Hess and Miller 2002, 15).

The officer is the leader and catalyst for change in the neighborhood to reduce fear, disorder, decay, and crime.

The police chief is responsible for the delivery of law enforcement and social services within his/her jurisdiction. Police officers educate the public about safety through neighborhood watch programs, which help promote the flow of information to the police (Hess and Miller 2002). With constant interaction with citizens, trust is built and long-term and regular contacts with officers develop. The police officers are accessible to citizens twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week (Hess and Miller 2002).

Police officers come from the community and have a stake in satisfying citizens. Officers are role models (especially for the youth) because of the constant contact with citizens (Hess and Miller 2002). Officers encourage citizens to solve their own disputes; everyone—including mail carriers, animal control, fire fighters, and community leaders
is encouraged to be involved in the community and help solve problems (Hess and Miller 2002). Officers gather resources from within the community, including citizens, public and private agencies, and private businesses. The success of the program is determined, in part, by less fear in the neighborhood (Hess and Miller 2002).

There are some drawbacks to community policing. Public safety may decline because of the lack of interest by the public to participate in crime control. The police may become too lenient with law breakers and will be unable to control the community (Hess and Miller 2002). Roberg, Kuykendall, and Novak worry that citizens will become a special interest group as the police strive to make changes in their approach to the community (Roberg, Kuykendall, Novak 2002). As a result, the role of police officers as crime fighters would diminish. In addition, officers would eventually be irrelevant because they are catering to the public (Hess and Miller 2002).

Community policing can pose a threat to government agencies because of the police’s close ties to citizens (Hess and Miller 2002). Other government agencies will watch closely to ensure that police departments do not become much too powerful (Hess and Miller 2002). Departments in need of resources can call on citizens to help support the police. This has caused tension among the police chiefs, mayors, and the city councils. Community policing could also create problems for police departments because citizens can have a say in the internal affairs of the department (Hess and Miller 2002).

Last, community policing could worsen police-citizen relations because of the difference in how the poor and rich are treated by the police. In affluent neighborhoods, community-oriented policing is embraced, whereas in poor urban areas the police focus their efforts on crime fighting and law enforcement (Hess and Miller 2002).
Community policing has certainly improved relations between citizens and the police. Although, there are flaws, major improvements have been made. The following section addresses another model called Compstat, which has revolutionized city policing.

**Compstat**

According to Walsh, “Compstat is a goal oriented strategic management process that uses technology, operational strategy and managerial accountability to structure the delivery of police services and provide safety for communities.” (Walsh 2001, p.347). This concept was developed by former NYPD chief William Bratton and continued by his successor Howard Safir (Walsh, 2001, p. 347).

There have been numerous debates about how to effectively transform the management style of police organizations. Some police chiefs would rather continue with old management models, such as the reform model, which emphasize efficiency and control (Walsh 2001). Others maintain that community policing is an effective way to address the needs of diverse communities and maintain public safety. Lastly, other police scholars believe that crime prevention, order maintenance, and community safety are all a part of managing the entire police organization (Walsh 2001). According to some experts, these debates prove that a paradigm shift. The old traditional beliefs about policing must change in order to better serve communities and address new problems (Walsh 2001).

The reform model dominated police organizations between the 1930’s and 1970’s. The top–to-bottom system controlled patrol officers’ discretion concerning crime fighting and, the day-to-day operations were controlled by top executives within the departments (Walsh 2001). The focus was on how to fight crime and not on the final product of police action. During this period great technological achievement such as the
automobile, telephone, and radio facilitated the replacement of foot patrol officer with patrol cars with radios. The police became distant from communities and neighborhoods they served (Walsh 2001).

The compstat model emphasizes decentralization of the police department. For example, Walsh writes that New York City Police began having weekly crime control meetings in 1994 to increase the flow of information between department executives and commanders of operational units. Police Chief Bratton designed the meetings so commanders and their officers would be held accountable for crime in New York. These meetings allow executives to discuss high-profile crimes and review tactics and results directly with commanders, cutting out the methods of bureaucratic communication that hinder organizations from performing effectively (Walsh 2001).

Bratton gave control day-to-day operations to precinct commanders. During compstat meetings, executives interviewed and evaluated precinct commanders’ operational strategies and outcomes (Walsh 2002). This made the commander solely responsible for analyzing problems and developing a plan of attack to fight crime before the next meeting. This same format is used by commanders and their sergeants today (Walsh 2001).

Compstat model involved the entire organization and stayed true to the mission of the organization. Between 1993 and 1998, New York City’s crime rate declined 50.05%. New York City dropped from 114th to 163rd in the ranking of the 200 most dangerous cities in the U.S. with population above 100,000 (Walsh 2001).
Bratton developed four principles that summarize Compstat: accurate and timely intelligence, rapid deployment of personnel and resources, effective tactics, and relentless follow-up and assessment.

Walsh writes that although compstat has become popular among police departments around the country, the model has downfalls. Excessive use of force complaints had risen to almost 50%, which New York City experienced. In addition, commanders began falsifying statistics to deceive top executives who evaluate their performance. Also, competition between commanders and labor unions concerning contracts controlling staffing is just some of the problems that the compstat model failed to address.

**Introduction to African American Perspective**

This study now turns to the perspectives of African Americans and their complex relationship with the police. It is essential that this topic be addressed because Officer Scott Glasgow, a White police officer, shot and killed Jesse Lee Owens, an African American male.

**African Americans and the Police**

Throughout history, relations between African Americans and the police have been difficult. In most cities White (Caucasian)-dominated power structures controlled police organizations. Police organizations could enforce an implicit agenda of segregation without laws in the north and other regions; the actual laws were mainly in effect in the south (Dunham and Alpert 2001). Today, now more than ever, the increase in crime in black communities keeps police officers and blacks in contact. However, this contact is not always positive. Officers continued discrimination against people of color,
and their refusal to establish relationships with the community has furthered a crisis that must end. Policies established by police officers are dictated and forced upon the black community. Sociologists further note that no other ethnic group in the United States is more disenfranchised than Black Americans. According to Dunham and Alpert there are many African Americans scholars (including those with doctoral degrees) who have backgrounds in sociology and criminology, yet their perspectives are not sought by the police who work in Black communities (Dunham and Alpert 2001). Advice from Black scholars is generally ignored or not requested when polices are being developed; as a result, the African American perspective is not considered.

Dunham and Alpert write that African Americans are often objects of policing, and the scholars in the community are ignored by their White counterparts. Some White scholars with backgrounds in criminology believe they know what is best for the black communities (Dunham and Alpert 2001). Indeed, industries and criminal justice programs have been established around analyzing (police-black citizen) relations and the daily lives of Black and Brown people. When meetings are held, and even in classroom instruction, Blacks scholars are excluded from giving their input about what is best for their community (Dunham and Alpert 2001). When Black scholars do write about how to police their community it is not in the mainstream magazines or journals but only in black literature (Dunham and Alpert 2001).

Most police scholars fail to write that early police forces were established to maintain slavery in the South. When slavery was finally abolished, some southern cities began strictly enforcing segregation laws. In addition, many in the South began to advance the cause of white supremacists (Dunham and Alpert 2001). Dunham and Albert
insist that police scholars rarely acknowledge the treatment of Blacks by police officers in their written material. For example, many books on police organization never mention that Blacks were not allowed to be police officers, or that the Ku Klux Klan and police officers were co-conspirators (often one in the same). Most scholarly writing about police organizations, however, discusses the police helping the homeless or police corruption that led to reforms (Dunham and Alpert 2001).

In police literature, emphasis is placed on reform models because of the nature of politics in policing and corruption in the departments. In discussing these reform models, it is said that the establishment had gotten a “moral conscience” and decided it was time for reforms (Dunham and Alpert 2001). The reforms that have taken place in the establishment are significant, if not historic. However, the police literature fails to mention that the reform model ushered in an increased intolerance for Blacks and it likewise neglects to mention the widespread racial injustice (Dunham and Alpert 2001). Included in these reforms were laws to keep segregation in place.

The reform model provided a staging ground for race-based violence and brutal behavior by officers, including lynch mobs made up of officers who hunted and shot Blacks like animals. Violence by officers often sparked riots by blacks in the United States. The race riots that shocked the nation were sparked by different sets of rules for policing Whites and Blacks (Dunham and Alpert 2001). The police brutality against Blacks was horrific in nature, and included dogs being set on Blacks because of the skin color. This is why relations between Blacks and the police are strained even after the civil rights era (Dunham and Alpert 2001).
Mark Maurer of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights states that, since the civil rights movement, African Americans represent a large percentage of the prison population. Beginning in the 1980’s the war on drugs initiated by the government contributed to the African American incarceration rate. African Americans at times are targeted by police officers in large urban areas (Maurer 1999). There is a huge law enforcement presence in low-income communities, and drugs are more likely to be distributed openly. In suburban areas, drugs sales take place behind closed doors to avoid police detection.

**Models and the Officer Glasgow Case**

The political, reform, community policing, and compstat models demonstrate the enormous complexity of managing police organizations. These models have evolved over the last century because of corruption and changes in the social fabric of the country. The study turns to analyzing each of the models by using the Glasgow case.

**Glasgow Case and the Political Model/Era**

While the political model would have benefited Officer Scott Glasgow, the justice system would have failed Jesse Lee Owens and his family. During the era of the political model, politicians used police departments to their own advantage. The police chief was a figurehead without the power to enforce the rules and regulations. Politicians controlled every aspect of police organizations including who was promoted, where officers worked, their salaries, and merit. Because Officer Glasgow was a White officer and the victim, Jesse Lee Owens, was African American, this incident perhaps would not even have risen to the level of a case to consider. Certainly suspension and/or a trial would seem out of the question. During the time of the political model, Glasgow would have
never been investigated, especially since Owens had allegedly stolen the car. Politicians made no effort to reach out to Blacks; as a result, Blacks were alienated from the entire justice system. Often rules and procedures were broken because officers lacked discipline, training, and lacked respect for the community they served.

**Glasgow Case and the Reform Model/Era**

As mentioned previously, the reform model brought professionalism and centralized police organizations. The reforms gave the police chief great power over rules and procedures, training, budgets, and officer discipline, which was badly needed after the chaos of the political model. Although reforms were made in police departments, it did not change how the police treated African Americans. If the culture were different, it could have effective how African Americans were treated. It was the underlying assumptions about how to run society, combined with the reform model, which led to the problem.

During the reform era, segregation (explicit and implicit) and intolerance were enforced by the police. The Glasgow case would not have been an issue during this time because discrimination against African Americans was not really on the agenda. The reform model was developed to change the police culture and how departments were administered. In fact, relationships between citizens and the police were discouraged; the police were just responsible for apprehending criminals who broke the law.

There were many protests by outside groups and the community about how Glasgow handled the arrest of Owens. The incident received much media attention and backlash from the African American community. The Austin Police Department
investigated, and concluded that Officer Glasgow should be suspended from duty. This, of course, did not occur under the reform model, but a new era of policing. The reform model would not work today because the changes in our society, now more than ever, require officers to establish community relations to help apprehend criminals.

_Glasgow Case and Community Policing_

Community policing is an enormous improvement over the political and reform models. It encourages interaction with the community, including training citizens in community crime fighting and informing citizens about what the department is doing. One of the ways the community was informed about the Glasgow case was through the Public Information Office within the APD. The APD uses its website, television, newspaper, phone, and fax to inform the public about events happening in the department. The public was informed about the outcome of the Glasgow case through all the above mentioned mediums. Although many in the community wanted Glasgow fired from the police force, the police maintained the image of being honest and straightforward by keeping the public informed about the decisions the department (mainly the chief of police) made. Officers do patrol neighborhoods, as Officer Glasgow was doing when he saw the victim in the stolen Neon car.

It seems that the community model includes some aspects of the reform model where the patrol car plays a vital role. The Public Information Office is a huge step in community relations because the department wants the community to know that the APD is there to serve them.
Compstat and the Glasgow Case

Compstat is certainly one model that gets results. This model is responsible for lowering the crime rate in New York City, and it has been duplicated by large city police departments throughout the United States. Compstat is more decentralized and more similar to community policing. The difference between community policing and compstat is that compstat includes the latest in technology to assist police officers in crime fighting, and more responsibility is given to lower-level officers. One of the principles of compstat is timely and accurate information. This method was applied when Glasgow spotted the stolen vehicle and quickly confirmed it over the radio. One of the downfalls to compstat is that arrests are quantified as performance. This could create an incentive to increase arrests without paying attention to broader goals. Competition between commanders competing based on the number of criminals apprehended could create a huge problem. As mentioned previously, commanders are evaluated by their performance in their precinct and, this trickle down to the regular officer who may be under pressure to make arrests. Could this be why Glasgow violated APD polices and procedures? It certainly is a possibility.

The next chapter explains Graham Allison’s models and how they may be applied to the Glasgow case. To explain Allison’s models, this paper takes a different course and focuses on international and foreign policy, because Allison’s models were developed in the international strategic context. Then the models are applied to the Glasgow case.
Chapter 3. Allison’s Models

Chapter Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, this chapter explores how Allison used his models to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis, and applies those models to the Scott Glasgow case. Second, this chapter introduces the working hypotheses for this study.

Introduction to Allison’s Models

Graham Allison has revolutionized the study of organizational theory with his famous book Essence of Decision. In Essence of Decision, Allison thoroughly examines the Cuban Missile Crisis that took place during the presidency of John F. Kennedy. That event was one of the most frightening experiences in the nation’s history because the United States of America and the Soviet Union came very close to a nuclear exchange. If war had come, 100 million Americans would have perished as well as 100 million Soviets (not to mention millions of Europeans).

The Cuban Missile Crisis began when an American U-2 spy plane discovered Soviet Missiles on the island nation of Cuba. President Kennedy met with his chief advisors, the Executive Committee of the President (ExCom), to decide what to do. Members of the Executive Committee of the President were Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of States Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John McCone, Secretary of Treasury Douglas Dillon, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen, Undersecretary of State George Ball, Deputy Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Martin, Soviet Expert Llewelyn Thompson,
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor; and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. After a series of meetings, President Kennedy decided on a blockade to prevent Soviet ships from reaching Cuba. The leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, called President Kennedy to negotiate an end to the crisis. Khrushchev ordered his ships to return to the Soviet Union and negotiated a deal with President Kennedy to withdraw all Soviet missiles from Cuba. The complete withdrawal of missiles from Cuba came with a cost to the United States. The agreement between Kennedy and Khrushchev included the total withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey. Although the Cuban Missile Crisis lasted only thirteen days, it certainly was one of the most dangerous moments in twentieth century history.

In Allison’s study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, he developed three models in an attempt to describe organizational and decision-making processes on the level of the presidency: the rational actor, organizational process, and bureaucratic politics models. Although these models focus on the presidency and foreign policy, they have been used to analyze other subjects. This paper examines the relevance of Allison’s models to the Austin Police Department and the Glasgow case. The main focus is the bureaucratic politics model, which is the conceptual framework of the paper.

**Organizational Process Model**

Allison created the organizational process model to explain the structure of government bureaucracies. According to that model, the government is a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own. Government behavior can be looked at as “outputs” from large organizations operating in certain or specific patterns of behavior (Allison and Zelikow 1998). “Outputs” are actions
taken by the organizations after a decision is made. As an example, Allison cites the Chinese entry into the Korea War. When Chinese soldiers began firing on United Nations soldiers, it was a government action. These soldiers were acting upon orders from their commanders, and the commanders were following instructions from their political leaders. Second, these soldiers had to be equipped and fed. A decision was made on how to feed and equip the soldiers in a war environment. The result was the soldiers being fed and equipped (Allison 1971). Government must be responsive to many problems; therefore, the government is divided into quasi-independent agencies to focus on specific problems (Allison and Zelikow 1998).

To perform difficult tasks, organizations must be coordinated; with coordination there must be what is called standard operating procedures (SOP), rules on how things should be done. In order to perform in the apparatus, there need to be people (Allison and Zelikow 1998).

Government is made up of many different organizations with a set of SOPs for programs that must be administered (Allison and Zelikow 1998). Government leaders have successfully created organizations, from municipal water authorities to armies, which have proven to be amazingly efficient and effective. The field known as public administration came into being around 1840’s to promote scientific management. Experiments with scientific management resulted in organizations becoming more efficient; however, inexperienced personnel were replaced with trained professionals (Allison and Zelikow 1998). Scholars suggest that although the organizational architects plan for efficiency, organizations must constantly address new problems. The reason is
that the organization is encompassed by other organizations both private and public (Allison and Zelikow, 1998).

Government organizations are inheritably different from their private counterparts. Government organizations are created by political processes; however, those government organizations have unique constraints. They cannot keep excess funds, they have very little control over production and cannot control goals, they must follow rigid internal and external rules, and the organization’s performance cannot easily be rated (Allison and Zelikow 1998).

Organizations want and need efficiency to accomplish a mission. Organizations have to develop specialized capabilities to tackle problems and be flexible when new problems arise (Allison and Zelikow 1998). Private organizations do not lack purpose; however, government organizations may have several different purposes which are preferred by their creators: the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government. Government organizations usually include their purpose in their mission statement (Allison and Zelikow 1998).

Organizational Process Model and the Missiles in Cuba

According to Allison, the missiles installed in Cuba were a Soviet organizational output. A decision was made by the Soviet leadership to place missiles in Cuba; the output was the missiles being placed in Cuba. The agencies responsible for the installation of the missiles were the Soviet Ministry of Defense, the KGB (Soviet secret police), and the Soviet Navy. The Ministry of Defense had to plan the entire operation, which included budgets for building, shipping, and installing the missiles in Cuba. The KGB was responsible for the clandestine operations; the agency had to make sure that the
missiles were not detected by U.S. spy planes (Allison 1971). They were also responsible for the camouflage of the missiles in Cuba. The transportation and training of personnel who were responsible for maintaining and launching the missiles in the event of a nuclear exchange fell on the Soviet Navy. The missiles had to be placed in specially built bunkers in Soviet ships in order for them to be transported to Cuba undetected. Once the missiles arrived in Cuba, they had to be secretly unloaded and placed in their proper locations. Overall the Soviet Union had approximately 20,000 personnel in Cuba to maintain base operations.

Spy planes flying over Cuba and the naval blockade of Soviet ships were also organizational outputs. President Kennedy allowed the Air Force to fly U-2 spy planes over Cuba, which is how the United States discovered the missiles. After a series of meetings by the ExCom concerning how to deal with the crisis, a blockade of Soviet ships was determined to be the best alternative. President Kennedy ordered all military personnel on high alert as the Navy began its blockade of Soviet ships. The crisis ended after Khrushchev ordered the ships to return to the Soviet Union.

**Organizational Model and the Glasgow Case**

As previously mentioned, government behavior can be explained by organizational output, the result of government decisions. The government is made of loosely allied organizations that are designed to solve various problems. They are quasi-independent in that they have their own SOPs that determine how decisions are made.

The Austin Police Department has procedures in place that specify how to discipline officers. Officer Glasgow’s suspension was the result of an organizational output. Glasgow violated department procedures; he failed to adhere to APD’s high-risk
traffic procedures and attempted to arrest the suspect without backup. When an officer
violates department procedures, the matter goes to the Internal Affairs Division for
investigation. The commander IAD advises the chief of police on what disciplinary
actions should take place. The organizational output was that Glasgow was suspended
from the force for 90 days. In addition, he was required to take six months of remedial
training and a fitness for duty evaluation in order to return to duty.

**Rational Actor**

The rational actor model studies the foreign affairs of governments. In other
words, governments select a specific course of action that will maximize success in
attaining their goals and objectives (Allison 1971). Allison begins the study by asking
the following questions, “If one is confronted with an international event, how would one
proceed? Why did the Soviet Union install missiles in Cuba?” In the rational actor model,
the government is the “unitary decision maker,” and the agent. The government has a
strategic goal and calculates the consequences of a strategic move from the chosen action.
The action taken by the government is in response to the crisis the government faces at
the time; the government seeks opportunities to counter crises that arise in the
international arena (Allison 1971). The action as a rational choice is dependent on the
strategic goal of the nation or government. All governments seek to enhance their
national security by having goals and objectives that coincide with national interest.
There could be many options the government could choose when pondering its strategic
interest; however, proceeding with any course of action will result in a domino effect of
consequences. The government selects the best course of action that serves the highest
priority in national security (Allison 1971).
Rational Actor and the Cuban Missile Crisis

The question that many scholars of political science ask is, Why did Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev place missiles in Cuba? The theory most often cited is that Khrushchev wanted to counter the large superiority the United States had in the arms race. By placing missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev could easily strike the United States and utterly destroy its major cities, since Cuba is only fifty miles off the coast of Florida. The Soviet Union had never before placed missiles outside its borders.

Why did the United States choose a blockade to stop the Soviet Union from loading missiles into Cuba? Did the United States fear the first-strike capability of the Soviet Union? The United States could not tolerate enemy missiles being placed in a nation governed by a dictator whom the U.S. had tried to overthrow. When President Kennedy and his advisors discussed options to counter this bold move by the Soviet leader, they found that any one of those options could result in a nuclear exchange that could kill millions. The president was presented with six options: air strikes; invasion; blockade; secret approach to Fidel Castro, the leader of Cuba; diplomatic pressure; or doing nothing. President Kennedy chose the blockade and risked the chance of nuclear war. The Soviet ships turned and headed back to the Soviet Union ending the crisis.

Rational Actor and the Glasgow Case

In the rational actor model, the government chooses the best option when a crisis occurs. There are two questions that could be asked in the case of Officer Glasgow. Why did the Austin Police Department decide to suspend Glasgow? Why did Officer Glasgow make the decision to violate APD high risk traffic procedures and attempt to arrest the suspect, Jesse Lee Owens?
The decision by the APD to suspend Officer Glasgow could have stemmed from options presented to the chief of police if no action was taken. The APD, as an arm of the government, is charged with protecting and serving the citizens of Austin. In the rational actor model, the APD represents the government. Glasgow had to be made an example of for violating the department’s policy. The chief of police had to follow the advice of his chief advisor, the IAD commander.

The decision to suspended Glasgow also was a strategic move to try and make amends with the community, especially the African American community, which was up in arms at what they considered to be an easy way out for Glasgow. Glasgow was acquitted of murder charges by the Travis County Court because Glasgow’s life was in danger. While Glasgow was attempting to arrest Owens, Owens drove off, prompting Glasgow to shoot Owens. The move to suspend Glasgow for ninety days did not satisfy the community, but the department also knew it had to administer justice and discipline Glasgow for his actions.

**Bureaucratic Politics Model**

In Allison’s bureaucratic politics model, government officials are central players in a competitive game (Allison 1971). The game is called politics—“bargaining along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within government.” Government behavior is a result of “bargaining games.” The bureaucratic politics model does not focus on a single actor; rather, many actors are viewed as players (Allison 1971). These players focus on many issues, they have no strategic objectives. These players make important decisions through politics or what Allison calls “pulling and hauling” (Allison 1971).
Problems in foreign policy are so numerous that policymaking has to be decentralized and given to individual organizational leaders. The individuals may disagree on how to resolve a problem and provide recommendations, which may conflict with the other players’ perspectives (Allison 1971). Also, these leaders who administer the apparatus of government organizations have major responsibilities (Allison 1971). These responsibilities may lead to politics or bargaining games. Leaders administering government organizations find themselves making decisions which result from bargaining or pulling and hauling (Allison 1971).

There are issues that players’ have to contend on the daily basis. Once the players resolve the issue of the day, they will surely pursue the next important issue on their agenda (Allison, 145). “Choices by one player includes (to authorize action by the department, to make a speech, or to refrain from acquiring certain information), resultants as minor games (the wording of a cable decision or departmental action worked out among lower-level players), resultants of central games (decisions, actions, and speeches bargained out among central players), and “foul ups” (choices that are made because they are not recognized or are raised to late, misunderstanding etc)” (Allison 1971).

Allison insists that to know how government decisions come about, it is vital to know who the players are, examine the coalitions and bargaining, and look at some element of confusion (Allison 1971).

The next section explores the working hypotheses (conceptual framework) used to analyze the empirical investigation. Table 3.1 links the conceptual framework to the literature.
**Working Hypotheses**

This research uses working hypotheses as a conceptual framework. “The working hypotheses serve as guide to organize the investigation. They provide something to go on” (Shields, 1998, p. 215).

Allison’s bureaucratic politics model has been used widely to explore foreign policy process and the presidency. This study represents one of the first attempts to apply the Bureaucratic Politics Model to a local government decision. While this model would seem to apply to many types of governmental decisions, it has not been applied in a high profile police decision and its usefulness as a device to study local government is yet to be determined.

The bureaucratic politics model (Allison, 1971, p.162) asked the following questions: Who Plays? What determines each players stand? What determines his perceptions and interests to lead to the stand? What determines each player’s impact on results? What is the game?

Working Hypotheses 1
There is more than one individual involved in the policy.

According to Allison (Allison 1971) the decisions and actions by a government is the result of political resultant. Resultants mean that solutions are not chosen during meetings with principals but these meetings results in compromise, conflict, and confusion with government officials who have diverse views, interest, and unequal influence in policy making. These activities are political because within these meetings bargaining occurs among officials through government channels.

Working Hypotheses 2
Each individual player has a stand.
Allison writes that each player has a stand on issues which may cause bargaining to occur. Because each player is over an organization, they analyze issues based on the objectives of their organization. Not only do individual players have stands because of the objectives of their agencies, but strong personalities and perspectives will conflict and the end result is bargaining. Players’ parochial views will have an impact on decision-making because of the mission of the organization. Therefore, one could conclude that the players come to the bargaining table with different objectives. However, the players eventually have to hammer out some sort of solution regardless of strong opinions.

According to Allison, players are responsible for determining results. After endless hours of debating, the ExCom submitted six options for resolving the crisis to President Kennedy. The president’s advisors played a huge role in solving the crisis. Furthermore, Allison states that decisions could depend on the power and resources of certain players. For example, the Secretary of Defense has much power because of the vast resources of his agency and the huge budget. This may have been considered when the president decided to blockade Soviet ships.

James Forrestal, former Secretary of Defense made the following statement about government:

I have always been amused by those who say they are quite willing to go into government but they are not willing to go into politics. My answer…is that you can no more divorce government from politics that you can separate sex from creation (Allison 1971, 147).
According to the bureaucratic politics model, players make decisions by pulling and hauling, which is politics. According to literature, there are always factors that each individual player must consider (e.g., such as their department’s organizational structure and mission). Along with this comes the politics of decision-making.

**Table 3.1 Literature Link to the Conceptual Framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Hypotheses</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WH1: There is more than one individual involved in the policy.</td>
<td>Allison, 1971; APD policies and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2: Each individual player has a stand.</td>
<td>Allison, 1971; APD policies and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2a: Players have parochial priorities that determine stand.</td>
<td>Allison, 1971; APD policies and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2b: Players have different objectives.</td>
<td>Allison, 1971; APD policies and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH3: Players are an important factor in determining results.</td>
<td>Allison, 1971; APD policies and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH4: Players know the politics(game).</td>
<td>Allison, 1971; APD policies and procedures</td>
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**Summary of Working Hypotheses**

The working hypotheses examined in this study required the researcher to explore the decision-making process used by the APD when disciplining its officers. WH1 states that there is more than one individual in the decision-making process. Just as President Kennedy had advisors, the Austin Police Department has people in place to make decisions on how officers are disciplined. WH2 and the sub-working hypotheses state
that a player (e.g., someone within the APD) has a stand (based on their APD departmental responsibilities). Furthermore, these players have narrow views and different objectives that influence their decisions (to discipline Glasgow). WH3 states that players are important factors in determining results (based on how much power each bureau chief has within the department). Those who possess the most power are most likely to determine the outcome. WH4 states that players know the politics. The politics according to Allison is bargaining (pulling and hauling). In the APD, players bargain behind closed doors to decide whether officers should be disciplined.

The bureaucratic politics model’s applicability to the Glasgow case is examined in chapter 5. The next chapter examines the structure of the Austin Police Department and gives additional details of the internal decision-making process.
Chapter 4. The Austin Police Department’s Decision-Making Process

Chapter Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, this chapter examines the mission of the police. Second, the APD use of force policy is explained. Last, this chapter explains the structure of the APD’s decision-making process with respect to officer discipline.

Role of Police

The police wield enormous power. According to Dunham and colleagues the police are “an armed force for protection and participation” (Dunham, Palacos, Cromwell 2002, 131). Since the police are permitted to carry weapons, it follows that using force could be necessary when protecting the community (Dunham, Palacos, Cromwell 2002). The fact that the police carry weapons means that citizens can be coerced into following the rules of law; therefore, the police are in complete control and there is nothing an individual can do (Palacos, Cromwell, and Dunham 2002).

Another important fact is that the primary role of the police is to protect citizens within the community. As a result, force can be used to promote safety in the community (Palacos, Cromwell, and Dunham 2002). Police have a responsibility for safeguarding the public as well as those who violate the law, by trying to inflict harm on themselves or violence toward other individuals. When dealing with such individuals, the police must be prudent and follow department guidelines to protect other individuals and themselves. When force is used, the police should use the appropriate amount of force necessary to bring order (Palacos, Cromwell, Dunham 2002).
Last, the community and the police are interrelated. The police are individuals from the community; as police officers, they continue to function in the community they serve (Palacos, Crowell, Dunham 2002). In return, the community enters into a covenant with the police, giving them authority to withhold “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” from violators of the law.

It is certainly easy to understand why the abuse of power by officers is a concern to the community and politicians alike. Numerous events have validated concerns about use of force. The community policing model itself raises concern because the federal government gives financial incentives that some say leads to “aggressive” policing. “Aggressive” policing falls under the ZERO TOLERANCE, which, occurs when police officers exceed the required force needed to arrest criminals (Palacos, Crowell, Dunham, p.131). The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 gave the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division the power to initiate civil suits against police agencies whose officers use excessive force.

The media play a role in how the police are viewed. When a suspect is beaten by police officers, the media broadcasts the story endlessly. The unrelenting focus on one beating incident leads many viewers to believe that police use of excessive force is widespread, studies show evidence to the contrary (Crowell, Palacos, Dunham 2002).

The following paragraphs are taken from the APD Use of Force Policy and the Internal Affairs Policies and Procedures.

**Use of Force Policy**

The Austin Police Department Policies and Procedures on the Use of force by Officers is a policy statement for departmental use only and not for criminal or civil
proceedings. The policy on the use of force is not a creation of any higher standard of safety or care in an evidentiary sense with respect to third party claims. Violators of the use of force policy will perform only the basis for departmental administration action; the policy is not a standard for the use of force higher than the laws that are created.

A police officer’s duty is to protect the life and property of residents. It is the policy of the Austin Police Department that officers shall only use the minimum level of force that is reasonably necessary to bring an incident under control while protecting the lives of the officer or another. The amount of force used should be that amount of force which is essential for the officer to attain the objective.

**Force**

Force is defined as any physical action that causes apparent injury, or causes a person to complain of pain or injury. Deadly force is any force able to cause death or serious bodily harm. The use of a firearm is deadly force. Other types equipment such as impact munitions, a nightstick or automobile may be deadly depending on the technique. Deadly force may be used only when an officer believes that another person is threatening to kill or physical harm either the officer or another.

Less-lethal force is all force other than deadly force. Less-lethal force can be used against another person for affecting the arrest, to search or defend others, and to prevent another from committing suicide or inflicting serious bodily harm to him/her. Less-lethal force must be the minimum amount that is reasonable in light of circumstances. The amount of force used should be sufficient for the officer to complete the objective. Less-lethal force allows the officer options in resolving high-risk situations.
using the lowest level of force possible. It is imperative officers remember that the use of less-lethal force could still result in serious injury or death.

**Austin Police Department Techniques and Weapons**

There are a variety of control techniques that can be used by an officer in obtaining lawful objectives, such as oral direction and empty-hand control techniques. These techniques, when appropriate, should be used. If these techniques are not effective, or are not appropriate to the circumstances, then there are a variety of weapons and other techniques available to the officer. Each officer should be aware of the capability and restrictions concerning the weapons and techniques. The officer will use the weapon or technique that is consistent with the policy stated above.

**Firearms**

Firearms are used based on discretion of police officers and the type of situation. Nevertheless, firers shall not be considered a threat unless: their actual use in the situation would be proper; the threat of death or bodily harm by production of weapons is limited to creating and apprehension that the officer will use deadly force if necessary. Firearms should not be discharged: when a warning is issued; misdemeanor case, unless the suspect is threatening death or physical harm either to the officer or another. Officers should not fire from a moving vehicle or at a vehicle fleeing from the scene, except when the suspect threatens death or serious physical injury to either the police officer or another and when all other reasonable means of defense have failed.
Impact Weapons

Impact weapons are baton (long, short, side-handle, or expandable), Orcut Police Nunchaku, and other weapons or objects that is used to strike. The impact weapon is not designed to be used as a brutal weapon to bludgeon a suspect. When using impact weapons, blows should be delivered only to certain target areas of the body that may make the suspect temporarily incapacitated. No impact weapon should be thrown at suspect authorized by Austin Police Use of Force Policy. Officers must exercise prudence when using impact weapons to strike suspects; the impact weapons should only be used when other methods have failed.

Use of Electronic Weapons

Electronic weapon is a less-lethal electronic shocking device. If electronic weapons are used against suspects it will not cause any injury. Electronic weapons however, constitute the use of force, and should not be used unless the use of force is justified. The officer must be trained in the use of an electronic weapon before it is authorized for use. Using electronic weapons for other uses such as horseplay or practical jokes; demonstrations without the knowledge of a supervisor or to harass a suspect or prisoner is prohibited.

Use of Chemical Weapons

Chemical weapons are considered soft intermediate weapons and training in their proper application is required prior to their issue or use. They are designed to temporary incapacitate a suspect without causing physical injury. Some uses of chemical weapons are to head off human and animal attacks, temporarily incapacitate violently resisting
subjects, encourage barricaded subjects to leave a closed area, and disperse violent crowds or riots.

Police officers should not use chemical weapons on suspects exhibiting only verbal and/or passive résistance to arrest or authority. Officers cannot use chemical weapons on suspects who are restrained, unless the suspect continues to violently resist and lesser means of controlling the suspect have failed.

Persons who have been subjected to chemical weapons should, as soon as they are under police control, be provided ways to clean the chemical agent in order to lessen the discomfort of the suspect. If symptoms remain, medical attention should be administered to the suspect. Police officers should ensure that when transporting prisoners who have been subjected to chemical weapons, the prisoner is not placed in prone position. Police officers must be especially careful when restraining unruly suspects after the use of chemical weapons. Officers should allow the Paramedics to transport prisoners to the nearest hospital for medical treatment. Officers should advise jail personnel when an arrested subject has been subjected to chemical weapons. Any use of chemical weapons requires APD employees to comply with the reporting procedures specified in this order.

**Use of Impact Munitions**

Impact munitions are extended range impact weapons designed to temporarily incapacitate non-compliant suspects who are armed with weapons other than firearms or who are exhibiting violent or aggressive behavior. Impact munitions can be used, to incapacitate a suspect who is armed and threatening harm to others, to incapacitate an armed suicidal person, to assist in arresting an unarmed non-compliant subject whose behavior is a threat to the public and police officers, and in riot control officers cannot
fire impact munitions into a crowds, but is allowed to use area target munitions to clear specific areas or disperse crowds.

Impact munitions should never be used against a suspect armed with a weapon, or when the suspect is an immediate threat to the officer or the public, except personnel assigned to a unit specifically trained and authorizes for use. The use of pact munitions is restricted to open or public areas. Before arrest, Officers should advise jail personnel when an arrested suspect has been hit with impact munitions. Any use of impact munitions requires the officer to comply with the reporting procedures specified in this order.

**Reporting Procedures**

When force is used by officer, it should be documented in the Use of Force Report Form with a detailed description of the type of force used (hands, stun gun, impact weapon, chemical weapon, less lethal munitions, handgun). The report should also state whether medical treatment was administered prior to incarceration. In case arrests are made, a Use of Force Report Form should be completed and the type of force used should be documented in the report. An incident report with the title of the incident should also be completed indicating the type of force used, but the details of its application and results should be only for the Use of Force Report Form.

For purposes of reporting, the temporary discomfort that the suspect experience does not constitute a complaint of injury. Some injuries suspects sustain such as a broken rib or collarbone are seldom seen. The Use of Force Report Form should be based on a constant and complaining of pain that exceeds initial arrest procedure, which would lead administration officials to conclude that the suspect could have been injured. When a
person needs medical attention because of an officer’s use of force: the officer’s immediate supervisor should be contacted, a polarized pictures of the injury should be taken, each officer with knowledge of the incident will write a supplement, and a copy of the incident report, a copy of the Use of Force Report Form and the photograph must be given to the Internal Affairs Division for investigation.

When an officer is the victim of an assault, his/her immediate supervisor must be contacted. The supervisor will ensure that another official initiates the incident report listing the assaulted officer as “victim.” If the officer received injuries, Polaroid photos of their injuries must be taken and attached to the report. Whenever employees of the APD are injured or killed his/her residence address and telephone number will not be filed in the incident report.

Whenever an officer arrests a person for resisting arrest, resisting the arrest of another, resisting a search or resisting transportation the employee must contact his/her supervisor. The supervisor must meet with the officer and review the circumstances of the arrest. No suspect should be booked for resisting a charge without this review and approval by the supervisor. All completed Use of Force Report Forms must be routed to the Training Academy regardless whether the suspect received treatment. In addition, any time an officer uses force against a person, and the use of force results in obvious bodily injury or an injury that would require medical attention, the officer will either request paramedics to treat the person, or transport the person to the nearest medical facility for treatment.
**Review Process**

The Training Division is responsible for entering the completed Use of Force Report Forms into a research database. Forms lacking proper information must be returned to the supervisor of the involved officer(s), requesting that the forms be completed properly. The Training Division must review database and prepare an annual analysis of use of force by Department police officers. The purpose of the review and analysis is to study whether there is policy, training, equipment, or discipline issues that should be addressed.

**Report Protections**

The Use of Force Report Forms is formally considered part of an officer’s personnel file and must be protected and not be released to the public. Other reasons for non-disclosure where appropriate, should be in response to open records requests and court subpoenas. Information for statistical purposes, that does not contain information identifying any of the participants, can be made public.

**Austin Police Department’s Decision-Making Process**

The mission of the Internal Affairs is to review officer(s) involved in critical incidents and investigate complaints received on sworn and non-sworn employees of the APD. The APD complaints, whether received from citizens or Department employees, is thoroughly investigated to ensure the integrity of the department is protected.

**General Policy**

The Internal Affairs Division is responsible for investigating violations of department policies and Civil Service rules resulting from alleged or suspected violations of the law and alleged or suspected violations of department policies and Civil Service
rules without a criminal component. In addition, critical incidents, regardless of any allegations of officer(s) misconduct, such as patrol or foot pursuits resulting in serious bodily injury or death, officer(s) involved shootings, and administrative complaints must be investigated. Other City of Austin law enforcement department employees at the request of their administration and with the approval the Chief of Police must be investigated.

Austin Police Department investigates (including other units of the APD) alleged criminal activity by an employee, the Chief of Police and an Internal Affairs supervisor is contacted immediately. Internal affairs must conduct an investigation of suspected misconduct separate of the criminal investigation. Internal Affairs must investigate complaints made by Department employees and citizens, including anonymous persons. All employees must cooperate with Internal Affairs as if they were addressing the Chief of Police. Employees who fail to cooperate with Internal Affairs are disciplined.

Confidentiality of Information

All information given to Internal Affairs for investigation is strictly confidential. Employees will not disclose or discuss details of case with anyone except: Internal Affairs investigators assigned to the case, the employee’s attorney, the employee’s chain-of-command or other persons designated by the Chief of Police.

All Internal Affairs employee, including administrative staff, will not disclose or discuss information about any investigation with anyone who does not specifically have to know anything concerning the case.
Complaint/Critical Incident Process

The Internal Affairs conducts evaluation of critical incidents or complaints to determine the level of investigation required. The complaints are classified as one of four types of investigations, depending on the nature of the complaints: Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D.

Class A complaints are allegations that are very serious and can be extremely complex investigations, which include, but are not limited to, allegations of: criminal misconduct, excessive force with injury requiring medical attention, serious violations of policy rules and regulations, and conduct that challenge the integrity good order or discipline of the department.

Class B complaints are basically less serious violations of department policy and rules and regulations. They include allegations of less serious violations of department policies and procedures (profanity, belittling language, inadequate police service, and minor traffic violations); excessive force without injury or with minor injuries that does not require hospitalization; and equipment damage or loss of property. Class B internal complaints are generated from within the department. These will generally be investigated by the employee’s chain-of-command. Class B external complaints come from outside the department. These are generally investigated by Internal Affairs.

Some Class B complaints that are far less serious may, if investigate further, involve allegations of a more serious in nature. In this situation, the decision will be made by the Internal Affairs commander whether to investigate.

Class C Complaints are complaints that do not fit into the Class A or Class B category. Although the complaint does not rise to the level of a department violation,
there may be training or performance issues that need addressing. The complaint is of less serious nature and the complainant refuses to cooperate pursuant to Texas State Law (the complainant refuses to sign a statement or cooperate after being contacted by Internal Affairs). In addition, if there is an allegation of possible ongoing criminal activity, the investigation of which may be jeopardized if Internal Affairs becomes involved at that time. Allegations of this nature are investigated by Internal Affairs after a criminal investigation.

Class C complaints are reviewed by the Internal Affairs Division, the officer’s chain-of-command, the assistant chief of the Professional Standards Bureau, and the Chief of Police or his/her designee. If all parties involved are with the initial classification, the complaint is closed administratively. If administrators conclude that an additional investigation is needed, the complaint is reclassified as either a Class A or Class B complaint and handled accordingly. Internal Affairs is to give copies of all closed Class C complaints to the assistant chief of the employee who is the subject of the investigation.

Class D complaints are complaints that do not involve misconduct on the part of an employee, and recorded for information purposes only. Class D includes situations which the complaint simply wants clarification on an officer’s conduct; the complainant wants clarifications on or disagrees with APD policy; there is solely disagreement about whether a complainant should have been arrested or issued a traffic citation; and the complainant is making a clearly irrational complaint such as officers using telepathic powers to harm him/her. Complaints classified as Class D complaints do not require an
investigation. However, these contacts are recorded by Internal Affairs for documentation purposes only.

**Responsibility**

The commander of the Internal Affairs Division is responsible for notifying the assistant chief of the Professional Standards Bureau (Chief of Staff) or his/her designee of all serious complaints that include allegations of criminal misconduct by an APD employee, breaches of departmental integrity, complaints that may result in criticism of the department, unusual complaints that may be closely scrutinizes, and a weekly list of all completed investigations, which have been sent to the employee’s chain-of-command for review.

The commander of Internal Affairs must directly contact the Chief of Police when complaints are received that require his/her immediate attention.

The assistant chief of the Professional Standards Bureau (Chief of Staff) is responsible for informing the Chief of Police of all serious complaints which includes reports of criminal misconduct by APD officers, breaches of departmental integrity, usual complaints that are likely to be closely scrutinized.

The assistant chief of the Investigations Bureau, verbally and by memorandum, investigates all reports of criminal activity by officers. In addition, the assistant chief of the Investigations Bureau must ensure the appropriate investigation is conducted.

Internal Affairs investigates officers involved in critical incidents such as Class A complaints and administrative complaints. Internal Affairs field investigators will investigate Class B external complaints. The supervisor of the officer being investigated
can participate in the investigation. The officer’s chain of command is responsible for
investigating Class B internal complaints.

Investigative Process

The person assigned to conduct an investigation cannot be the complainant, the
ultimate decision maker on disciplinary action, and personally involved the alleged
misconduct. Non-sworn employees that are being investigated must be notified through
their supervisor to report to the assigned investigator to give a sworn statement.

The investigator assigned to a particular case must prepare a written Notice of
Allegations that explains the complaint in detail to the accused employee. A police
officer who is being investigated must receive a written Notice of Allegations at least 48
hours before to his or her first interview. The officer will be advised, in writing, of the
date and time of the interview and that interview must be tape-recorded. Officers can
waive the 48 hour Notice of Allegations prod and proceed with the initial interview.

The Internal Affairs detective, while conducting an on the scene investigation, he
or she can interview an officer without the Notice of Allegations. The Notice of
Allegations must be issued soon after.

Investigations of police officers must be conducted during the officer’s normal
working hours unless warranted by the Chief of Police or the Commander of Internal
Affairs requires interviewing at another time. The police officer is compensated for the
interview time on an overtime basis.

A sworn employee who is the subject of an investigation has the right to be
informed of the identity of every investigator who will be participating in any
interviewing of the officer. The interviewing of an employee who is subject of an
investigation may not be unreasonably long. In some instances, because of the complexity of a case, it could take long hours to complete the interview. The investigators must allow reasonable interruptions to permit the employee to attend to personal physical necessities. An investigator cannot threaten an employee who is the subject of an investigation. An investigator must inform the employee that failure to answer truthfully the questions asked related to the investigation, or failure to cooperate with Internal Affairs during the investigation, will result in departmental discipline. If prior notification of intent to record an interview is given to the instigator, the employee being interview may record the interview.

During the investigation, if there are any incoherent statements between allegation and the employee, efforts must be made to rectify the problem. A supervisor in the employee’s chain-of-command or attorney for the employee may be present during the interview to observe only, but will not participate in the interviewer act as a consultant. Failure to comply with the rules will result in removal of the supervisor or attorney from the interview room. The investigative techniques employed by Internal Affairs cannot include orders to employees from the Chief of Police, the assistant chief of the Professional Standards Bureau, or the commander of Internal Affairs directing the employee to conduct a videotaped reenactment, be photographed, participate in a physical lineup, submit financial disclosure statements, and produce documents reasonably related to an investigation.

The Chief of Police or assistant chief of the Professional Standards Bureau can command an employee to take a polygraph examination, if the Chief of Police or assistant chief considers the circumstances to be extraordinary or believes the integrity of
an employee or the Department is in question. The officer must take a drug or alcohol tests and a psychological evaluation. The investigator must prepare a detailed report, but not limited to the following: introduction of complaint, general description of the allegations made by the complainant, employee’s responses, list of civilian witnesses, list of police witnesses, and physical evidence, discrepancies, summary of the facts concerning each allegation, and signature of the investigator and his or her supervisor.

On Class A Complaints, Internal Affairs must make a recommendation for classification to be given to the assist an chief of the Professional Standards Bureau and the employee’s chain-of-command for review. For Class B external complaints, an investigation packet must be given to employee’s commander. The responsibility to recommend the final classification of a complaint is the employees. The final recommendation of the chain of command is given to the Chief of Police.

**Sustained Complaints**

Internal Affairs recommends the Class A complaint against an employee. The employee will be informed in writing of the recommendation. Internal Affairs must send a copy of the investigation packet to the employee’s chain-of-command for review. Internal Affairs sends employee’s assistant chief, and the assistant chief of the Profession Standard Bureau a copy of the investigative report. If the assistant chief of the employee concurs with complaint and the discipline recommended, a written reprimand or less, the assistant chief will ensure discipline is administered. Documents explaining the discipline, along with all copies of the investigator packet and investigate reports must be returned to Internal Affairs. If suspension from duty is recommended, the appropriate
assistant chief will contact Internal Affairs requesting that a disciplinary review board be scheduled.

The Austin Police Department’s Use of Force Policy and the decision-making process to discipline officers is very comprehensive. The next chapter discusses the research methodology.
Chapter 5. Methodology

Chapter Purpose

This chapter discusses the methodology used to analyze the Glasgow case. This study uses four working hypotheses derived from Allison’s bureaucratic politics model to explore the policies and decisions surrounding the Glasgow and Owens incident. The hypotheses are operationalized in table 5.1.

Case Study

According to Robert Yin, author of Case Study Research Design and Methods, there are several ways that social scientist conducts research. Yin writes that experiments, surveys, histories, and analyzing archival data are methods researchers use. Furthermore, Yin states that a case study should include “how” or “why” questions are asked (Yin 2003).

Document Analysis

Document analysis was chosen as a technique for this research for two reasons. First, because of a pending civil suit connected to the Glasgow-Owens case, APD employees were prohibited from discussing the facts of the case with outsiders. Therefore, the researcher could not conduct interviews regarding the case. Second, document analysis can be useful when looking at case study. Document analysis is a fine research tool because it can take many forms and could be used when collecting data. There are a host of documents a researcher can use for case studies including letters, memoranda, agendas, minutes from meetings, written reports, and proposals (Yin 2003.).

Document analysis has its strengths and weakness. The strengths of document analysis: documents can be studied over and over again; created because of a case study;
contains exact names and details; and broad coverage. On the other hand, document analysis has weaknesses: inaccuracies due to poor recall; reflects unknown bias of the author; and interviewee gives only what interviewer wants to hear (Yin 2003).

**Research Steps**

To be as precise as possible, four specific actions were taken in this research effort. The author went to the Travis County Court House and obtained a copy of the Glasgow case filing, *The State of Texas vs. Scott Glasgow*. This way, the author knew all the facts that were contained in the court case. Second, because APD personnel could not discuss specifics of the case, the author spoke with the Public Information Office and obtained copies of internal documents that detail how investigations are conducted when an officer violates policies of the department. The Public Information Officer explained the titles and some job descriptions of the bureaus chiefs involved in the discipline process. Although the Public Information Office was helpful, information was very limited. Third, the author downloaded related newspaper articles and memorandums that were released to the public by the APD’s Public Information Office. Last, the author contacted the Austin-American Statesman Newspaper to speak with a staff writer who wrote numerous articles on the Glasgow case. Unfortunately, the writer declined to be interviewed because of the nature of the case.

The preference in all research is to have multiple sources to verify and further authenticate findings (Yin 2003). Resources and time restraints limited a full scale research. Furthermore, exploratory (working hypotheses) focus on the early stages of research (Shields 1998). This is an exciting study because it uses a conceptual framework that mainly focuses on federal bureaucracy, the presidency, and foreign
policy. This paper attempts to test the conceptual framework using a local criminal justice decision.

**Operationalization and Conceptual Framework**

As shown in Table 5.1 below, the evidence that supports the conceptual framework comes from the Internal Affairs Policies and Procedures and the Use of Force Policies of the Austin Police Department.

**Table 5.1 Operationalization of the Conceptual Framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Hypotheses</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WH1: There is more than one individual involved in policy.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APD Use of Force Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2: Each individual player has a stand.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2a. Players have parochial priorities that determine stand.</td>
<td>APD Use of Force Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2b. Players have different objectives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH3: Players are an important factor in determining results.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH4: Players know the politics (game).</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chapter operationalized the working hypotheses. The next chapter explains the results of the research.
Chapter 6. Results

Chapter Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the findings of the working hypotheses from chapter 3. The findings include a discussion of whether the working hypotheses fit the procedures workings of the Austin Police Department.

Evidence

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Use of Force Policy and the Internal Affairs Policies and Procedures support the working hypotheses. This chapter includes the evidence to prove or disprove the working hypotheses using information obtained from the Austin Police Department. This chapter presents the results of each working hypotheses with separate tables, and concludes with one table summarizing each working hypotheses.

Measurement

Because there are mixed results for the working hypotheses, the scale of measurement is as follows: True, Somewhat True, False, and Somewhat False. The measurements are included in the table for each working hypotheses with an explanation.

WH1: There is more than one individual involved in policy.

The Austin Police Department Policy and Procedures states that the commander of internal affairs, assistant chief of professional standards (Chief of Staff), assistant chief of the Investigations Bureau, and the Chief of Police are the key individuals involved in the decision-making process to discipline officers. Leaders of the interdepartmental bureaus certainly have influence on whether the chief of police suspends an officer for excessive use of force. The commander of Internal Affairs Division, according to APD
policies, wields the most influence out of the other bureaus involved in the process. The Internals Affairs Division Commander advises the Chief of Police about police discipline.

Although the Chief of Police makes the final decision to discipline officers, the IAD commander’s opinion weighs very strongly with the chief of police. The reason is that IAD acts in place of the chief of police when conducting investigations. When Officer Glasgow was being investigated for the shooting death of Jesse Lee Owen, it was the IAD commander who recommended his suspension according to the memorandum written by Police Chief Stanley Knee. Although the Chief of Staff has power, he/she seems to be influenced by the recommendation of the IAD commander. The assistant chief of investigations is just responsible for ensuring that the investigation goes smoothly and is fair. Although he/she may have an opinion, it is not weighed as heavily as that of the commander of the Internal Affairs Division. See Table 5.1 for results of WH1.

**Table 6.1: WH1 Players Involved in Decision**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stands and views of players</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WH1. There is more than one individual involved in policy.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy Use of Force Policy</td>
<td><strong>Somewhat True:</strong> The Chief of Police makes the final decision regarding officer discipline, although Internal Affairs has a huge role in recommending discipline.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
WH2: Stands and views of players

Each player has an opinion of what should be done to an officer if excessive force is used; although the chief of staff and the assistant chief of Investigations can influence decisions in some cases. The IAD commander’s opinion seems to be the only opinion that counts. The chief of police makes the final decision. In the case of players and their concern for their departments power seems to be non-existent. All department heads seem to follow the policies and procedures of the department. There is no main objective that heads of departments are trying to accomplish that involves politics.

APD policies outline the responsibilities of each individual bureau involved in the decision-making process. The assistant chief of professional standards or chief of staff is a significant player within the APD. The chief of staff oversees the daily internal workings of the department. All reports of officer use of excessive force are given to this individual. The chief of staff is the eyes and ears of the police chief; this individual has power within the department.

The assistant chief of the Investigations Bureau must immediately notify the IAD commander and chief of police of any criminal misconduct by an employee. Responsibility also includes conducting investigations.

In the Glasgow case, department heads did what their jobs require. According to documents, all investigations go through intense scrutiny. The Glasgow case went through the entire process, according to the memorandum written by Chief Knee. The decision to suspend Glasgow was based on evidence that he violated department procedures. There is no evidence of parochial views and personal objectives. There would not be anything to gain. Everyone involved was doing his/her job. Because the
researcher did not have access to inside decision-making, this research cannot discuss the stand of each individual player.

**Table 6.2: Stands and views of players**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Hypotheses</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WH2: Each individual player has a stand.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy</td>
<td><strong>True</strong>: Each individual has an opinion because of being a part of the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of Force Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2a. Players have parochial priorities that determine stand.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy</td>
<td><strong>False</strong>: Each player has a department process to follow. One of the main goals is to protect the integrity of the department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of Force Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2b. Players have different objectives.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy</td>
<td><strong>Somewhat True</strong>: Players have different objectives regarding duties and responsibilities. There is no evidence that bargaining is going on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of Force Policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WH3: Players’ influence and power**

The chief of police is the most powerful figure in the department. He ultimately makes the final decisions on cases. This is proven in the memos and department policies; the decision to discipline officers belongs to chief of police. As mentioned previously, the IAD commander investigates and gives an opinion as to what should happen to the officer. The assistant chief for Investigations Bureau also has power, but it is not equal to that of Internal Affairs or the Chief of Staff. There seem to be no department wars or objectives that hinder decision-making. The Glasgow case was based on facts that were collected during the questioning of Glasgow by police. It was obvious that he violated department polices and procedures. There was no need for department bureaucracy or turf wars to interfere with the case. The players are not equal in power. The Chief of Staff
has power and usually steps in to handle situations such as the Glasgow case. In some instances, the chief of staff acts as the chief of police.

According to APD polices and procedures, the commander of internal affairs, the assistant chief of professional standards, and the assistant chief of the investigations bureau are major players in the decision-making process that led to the suspension of Officer Glasgow. These bureau chiefs must communicate constantly and notify the chief of police of any breakthrough in investigations. The outcome of their investigations determines the decision to discipline officers. The chief of police takes into account their suggestions, and Internal Affairs has the greatest influence.

**Table 6.3: WH3: Power and Influence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Hypotheses</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WH3: Players are an important factor in determining results.</td>
<td>Internal Affairs Policy</td>
<td>Somewhat true: Each player has a stand. However, the Commander of Internal Affairs has enormous power in recommending discipline.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**WH4: Players and Politics**

APD policies and procedures seem to indicate that politics may not have influenced the decision to suspend Glasgow. The APD is structure on how to handle officer misconduct seems straightforward.

The chief of police, commander of Internal Affairs Department, Chief of Staff, and assistant chief of the Investigations Bureau may agree that public opinion was not favorable to the decision, especially in the African American community. Many believed that Glasgow should have been fired from the force instead of receiving a ninety-day
suspension. There is no evidence to suggest that department officials wanted to satisfy the community, although some in the community believed justice was not served. In addition, there is no evidence to suggest that there was “pulling and hauling” involved in the Glasgow decision. It was a straightforward decision. Glasgow violated department procedures. According to documents and memorandums, there is no room for politics because of the structure of the decision-making process.

**Table 6.4: WH:4 Players and Politics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Hypotheses</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WH 4: Players know the politics.</td>
<td>Internal Affairs Policy</td>
<td><strong>False</strong>: Researcher could not prove politics was involved. Researcher only had policy rules to go on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Hypotheses</td>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>Measurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH1. There is more than one individual involved in policy decision.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy Use of Force Policy</td>
<td>Somewhat True: The Chief of Police makes the final decision regarding officer discipline, although Internal Affairs has a huge role in recommending discipline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2: Each individual player has a stand.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy Use of Force Policy</td>
<td>WH2: True: Each individual has an opinion because of being a part of the process. WH2a. False: Each player has a department process to follow. One of the main goals is to protect the integrity of the department. WH2b. Somewhat True: Players have different objectives regarding duties and responsibilities. There is no evidence that bargaining is going on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2a. Players have parochial priorities that determine stand.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH2b. Players have different objectives.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH3: Players are an important factor in determining results.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy</td>
<td>Somewhat true: Each player has a stand. However, the Commander of Internal Affairs has enormous power in recommending discipline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WH 4: Players know the politics.</td>
<td>APD Internal Affairs Policy</td>
<td>False: Researcher could not prove politics was involved. Researcher only had policy rules to go on.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 7: Conclusion

Chapter Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to critique the bureaucratic politic model and to offer suggestions about how it may be applied to local agencies and organizations.

Critique of Bureaucratic Model

No doubt that Graham Allison made a significant contribution when he introduced his models. In fact, Allison’s models are still recommended to people interested in the study of organizational theory. Moreover, Allison’s models are still used by college professors to lecture to their students about management and organization. The bureaucratic model is a good paradigm with which to begin a research project, but needs to be revised to apply to one agency.

There have been many studies testing the bureaucratic politics model, ranging from the Iran hostage crisis to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. These studies focused on the huge bureaucracy of federal government and how agency heads protected their influence in decision-making, which resulted in bargaining. The researcher suggests that the model be revised to apply to local organization. For example, The Austin Police Department, like all government agencies, has standard operating procedures in place to serve the citizens of Austin. According to APD policies and procedures, each department head has a duty to ensure the integrity of the agency is protected. This means that all bureau chiefs must do all they can to ensure officers are investigated and disciplined if evidence points to misconduct. Each individual department head ensures that their department is following procedure. The Chief of the Investigations Bureau makes sure criminal investigations are conducted properly. The Commander of Internal Affairs
conducted an investigation based on violations of department policies. The Chief of Staff administers the day-to-day operations. The Chief of Police makes the final decision to suspend officers (according to documents). When applying the Bureaucratic Politics Model to a local organization, perhaps the researcher should eliminate parochial views and politics and focus more on organization’s structure and determine if the model works for the organization.

**Department Heads and Decision-Making**

Allison suggests in the bureaucratic model that decisions are made in chaos and confusion. It’s hard to conceive that every important decision that government officials make is made in confusion and chaos. It almost makes it seem as if there is no order, and the head of each agency has no control over a meeting. The researcher recognizes that leaders of departments may have strong personalities and meetings could get heated. However, the author did not find this to be the case during research into the Austin Police Department. Decisions seem to be straightforward, without any bureaucratic bickering over territory and struggles for the ear of the leader.

**Agency Heads and Subordinates**

The author also finds issue with the “pulling and hauling” in the bureaucratic model. Behind closed doors, bargaining is taking place on policy decisions. The question that arises is, why would the leader of an organization bargain with his/her subordinates? The leader makes decisions and gives directives; the leader does not bargain with subordinates. Austin Police Department policies state that the Chief of Police makes the final decision to discipline. IAD recommends the appropriate form discipline. In this case, there is no evidence to suggest that bargaining took place between
the Chief of Police and the Commander of Internal Affairs. Bargaining may have
occurred among subordinates (though there is no proof) when looking over a case;
however, the Chief of Police did not bargain, but made a decision to discipline Glasgow.

Further Study

As mentioned previously, the bureaucratic politics model is a great start for
organizational study. The model does give the reader a glimpse at what may go on
behind closed doors. The author recommends that the model be tested on more local
organizations. The bureaucratic politics model does not apply to this specific case,
although some aspects do such as there are more than one player involved in the decision
making process, which the researcher concluded this is somewhat true. The researcher
believes the organizational process model is more appropriate for the Glasgow case
because of the model’s focus on standard operating procedures.
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