A Description of Domestic Partner Benefit Policies of State, County, and City Governments

by

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Chapter One

Introduction

The gay and lesbian movement working for the equal rights of homosexuals was organized as early as 1897 (Adams, 1995:19). This effort in advancing the rights of the gay and lesbian community over the past hundred years has drawn attention to many areas of perceived inequality. One of these areas is the absence of legally recognized same-sex marriage. The inability of a same-sex couple to marry and receive the rights and benefits of marriage has led some employers in recent years to offer domestic partner benefits to their employees. Domestic partner benefits are the subject of this research study.

On June 26, 2003, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Lawrence v. Texas that a Texas sodomy statute was unconstitutional. It was considered by some a declaration of liberty for members of the gay and lesbian community and effectively overturned a 1986 ruling on a similar Georgia statute. The impact, if any, of this ruling on same-sex marriages is currently unclear, but it puts a very emotional and passionate issue before the public (Greenhouse, 2003: A1 &17). In late June 2003, Canada’s federal government decided not to protest court rulings that determined denying homosexual marriage violated constitutional commitments to civic equality. It appears that Canada will now begin recognizing same-sex marriage (Sullivan, 2003: 1). Massachusetts supreme judicial court is expected to rule soon on a case filed by same-sex couples seeking recognition of their marriages. This could make Massachusetts the first state to recognize same-sex marriages (Boston - CNN). In Texas, the subject of same-sex marriage was recently in the public eye when the State passed a law specifically
prohibiting same-sex marriage and establishing the State’s intent not to recognize same-sex marriages in other states. These legal decisions do not directly impact domestic partner benefits at this time, but they could have far-reaching effects in coming years and also keep the issue in the public eye.

A public employer first offered domestic partner benefits in the United States in 1985 in the City of Berkeley in California (Laarman, 1992:1). Currently, more than 3,500 employers have extended some form of domestic partner benefits to their employees (Elswich, 2001: 1).

Domestic partner benefits exist and have expanded in great measure because it is illegal for people of the same sex to marry anywhere in the United States. The creation of “civil unions” in Vermont may eventually impact the need for domestic partner benefits. Nevertheless, the absence of other state laws providing similar recognition and the newness of the Vermont law leaves domestic partner benefits as the predominant alternative for same-sex couples seeking benefits similar to those of married couples.

Many employers make some form of domestic partner benefits available to their employees; however, what those benefits consist of varies greatly (Adams & Solomon, Employer’s Guide: 11). Employers may choose to offer non-health related benefits, items like sick or bereavement leave for a domestic partner or they may choose to make available a full range of benefits, such as health, dental, and vision insurance. The combination of these benefits and others may offer domestic partner benefits similar to those available to opposite-sex married couples. In addition to the variations in the benefits available, there are differences in qualification for the benefits. The difference in
Research Purpose

The purpose of this research is to describe domestic partner benefits in state, county, and city government. While the literature indicates many possible components of these policies, it does not provide a particular framework to describe the policies or any detail which elements are part of existing policies. The intent of this research is to develop a framework from the literature and then measure actual policies in use by government entities for the presence of those elements using descriptive categories. Policies were analyzed using content analysis and a coding scheme that included health, dental, and vision insurance, retirement benefits, leave policies, and requirements and documentation to establish a domestic partnership to receive benefits. State, county, and local governments were selected for this study because they make up a significant portion of public sector employment and provide a manageable number of entities’ policies to measure.

Description of the Chapters

Chapter two provides background on the circumstances that have lead to domestic partner benefits. Specifically, it addresses how the legal environment for the gay and lesbian community has contributed to domestic partner benefits. A summary of the history and evolution of domestic partner benefits is also included.

Chapter three describes some of the factors employers consider when determining whether to offer domestic partner benefits. It also develops and explains the conceptual
framework for the research study, linking the literature to the descriptive categories used in the research.

Chapter four explains the methodology used in the study, content analysis. The conceptual framework is linked to the coding sheet used in the content analysis. Strengths and weaknesses of this approach are outlined and the population and method used to obtain data is explained.

Chapter five outlines the findings from coding the policies and includes summary tables with the results.

Chapter six summarizes the finding of the research and draws conclusions about the research.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

The purpose of this chapter is to review literature on the history and status of same-sex marriage and show how the complex environment of same-sex marriage and its alternatives have influenced the evolution of domestic partner benefits. This chapter summarizes the history of the gay and lesbian movement, describes proponents’ and opponents’ arguments on same-sex marriage, explores the legal circumstances of same-sex marriage, and examines the history of domestic partner benefits. The prohibitive legal environment surrounding same-sex marriage and the alternative approaches to creating a similar institution have encouraged the creation of domestic partner benefits offered by employers. In describing domestic partner benefit policies, it is important to understand the history and circumstances that have contributed to the creation of these benefits. The history of same-sex marriage and the roots of domestic partner benefits begin with the gay and lesbian movement for the improvement of rights for homosexuals.

History of the Gay and Lesbian Movement

The Scientific-Humanitarian Committee was founded May 15, 1897 in Berlin. The establishment of this organization started the civil rights movement for homosexuals (Adam, 1995: 1 & 19). In 1924, a formally organized gay movement reached the United States. The Society for Human Rights was incorporated in Chicago on December 10, 1924 (Adam, 1995: 46).

The gay and lesbian movement did not receive much public attention until a strong and organized reactionary movement mobilized. While Senator Joseph McCarthy’s House on Un-American Activities Committee had many targets, one of those
targets was homosexuality. Barry Adam (1995: 62) describes the attack in terms of “manhood”. National self-esteem was compromised by this betrayal of manhood in male homosexuality. It was through these hearings that homosexuals began to be identified as “security risks” by the State Department. The reaction that ensued resulted in the removal of thousands of gays and lesbians from jobs as well as imprisonment in jails and mental hospitals (Adam, 1995: 79). In spite of the attacks of the 1950s, gay and lesbian groups were forming throughout the United States increasing from 15 groups in 1966 to 50 in 1969 (Adam, 1995: 79).

In June of 1969, one of the pivotal events of the gay and lesbian movements occurred. New York City police raided a Greenwich Village bar named Stonewall. While a raid was not uncommon, the reaction from the gay and lesbian community was unique. The police squad raiding the bar was trapped inside and an angry crowd threw rocks, pennies, and bottles at the bar. It would later be called the Stonewall riots and marked a beginning to “a quick explosion and diversification of organizations of all types as American homosexuals claimed identity as a distinct minority, created and explored cultural patterns suitable for their needs, and summoned into being the community which had been envisioned decades before” (Ridinger, 1996:63). Barry Adam (1995:84) characterized the movement following Stonewall:

Gay liberation never thought of itself as a civil rights movement for a particular minority, but as a revolutionary struggle to free the homosexuality in everyone, challenging the conventional arrangements that confined sexuality to heterosexual, monogamous families

While the movement grew following Stonewall with liberation groups starting in every major city and university campus in the United States, repeals of laws protecting
the rights of homosexuals started by the late 1970s. The rise of the religious right in public opposition to the gay and lesbian movement took center stage in 1977 with Anita Bryant\(^1\) at the helm. Anita Bryant was successful in her effort to defeat a gay-rights bill in Dade County, but it has been argued that her very public criticism may have encouraged the gay and lesbian community to a more public approach, strengthening the gay and lesbian movement (Thompson, 1994: 146).

In 1981, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) first appeared in medical literature in the United States. The illness received little public attention until the mid-1980s when it began to afflict those who received the disease from blood transfusions (Adam, 1995: 155). Some conservative forces of the time used the illness as a means to forward a moralist agenda claiming a “suffer the consequences” approach to the illness. The AIDS epidemic impacted the gay and lesbian movement in a couple of important ways. The indiscriminate reach of AIDS brought people into the movement that might not have otherwise taken an interest and it institutionalized gay-friendly organizations, portraying members of the gay community as caregivers, educators, and volunteers in the AIDS crisis (Adam, 1995: 157).

The first National Coming Out Day was held October 11, 1988 in an effort to increase the visibility of the gay and lesbian community. On February 14, 1991, San Francisco’s domestic partnership law took effect as 275 gay and lesbian couples registered their relationships (Thompson, 1994: 331 & 377). Throughout the 1990s, the gay and lesbian movement made many strides in the establishment of rights. The many events and changes in the gay and lesbian movement can not be easily summarized.

\(^1\) Anita Bryant was a former Miss America and the spokeswoman for the orange industry. She formed a coalition to defeat a Dade county gay rights bill in 1977 (Thompson, 1994: 146).
However, it is important to understand that this movement has contributed to the gay and lesbian communities’ standing and pursuit of same-sex marriage and domestic partner benefits. Marriage has been just one of many rights for which the gay and lesbian movement continues to strive.

**Importance of Marriage**

Marriage is a central institution for society in general. The state of marriage is often held up as an indicator of society’s strengths and weaknesses. Arland Thorton and Linda Young-DeMarco (1030) completed a study in 2001 identifying the strong emphasis given to marriage, children, and family life in America today. Their study also indicates that young people place great importance on a good marriage and family life (1030). The importance placed on marriage and the rights associated with it have not been confined to the heterosexual world. The rights of gay and lesbian couples to marry or obtain some sort of status for their relationships has become more highly publicized than the issue of gays in the military (Kaplan, 2001: 57).

**Opposition to Same-sex Marriage**

There is opposition to the extension of marriage and its benefits to same-sex couples. One of the primary objections raised is that of morality. David Chambers (1996: 16) points out that “heterosexual conservatives object to same-sex marriage either on the grounds that sex between persons of the same sex is immoral or pathological or on the grounds that permitting same-sex couples will somehow contribute to the crumbling of the ‘traditional’ family”. Julie Johnson (1997: 6) also acknowledges this fear of damage to the “institution of marriage” because allowing same-sex marriages could lead to the acceptance of polygamous or incestuous relationships.
Lynn Wardle (2001: 779) claims that:

Arguments that legalizing same-sex marriage will enhance the lives or lifestyles of gay or lesbian individuals, or of gays and lesbians as a special class, simply misses the target. What must be demonstrated, rather, is whether (and, if so, how) legalizing same-sex marriage will contribute to promoting the public interests in marriage, and to achieving the social policy purposes for which laws establishing marriage have been enacted.

Wardle (2001: 773) argues that the burden of proof rests with those advocating change in the status of marriage because “marriage is of such profound importance to society that there is great danger if its meaning and definition become ambiguous” (2001: 780).

Richard Posner (1992: 311) has argued that allowing same-sex marriages would be interpreted as “a stamp of approval on homosexuality” even that “a homosexual marriage is desirable, even a noble condition in which to live”. M.D. Freeman characterizes John Rawls and Ronald Dworking2 along similar lines. He asserts this about Rawls and Dworking:

On John Rawls (1999: 9):

For, while a society may for constitutional or prudential reasons have to tolerate conduct considered by many to be immoral (especially when it takes place in private), it does not follow that it has an obligation to accept or endorse that conduct, for example by making available an institutional resource such as marriage.

On Ronald Dworking (1999: 10):

There is a difference between punishing an activity (of which Dworkin does not approve) and withholding state legitimacy from an institution in which that activity is practiced. It is unlikely that a legislature could be persuaded to recognize same-sex marriages without expecting to bring to bear its own conception of the value of those marriages.

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2 John Rawls and Ronald Dworking are well known political philosophers on issues such as political liberalism, equality rights, ethics, and social justice.
In a practical sense, Posner (1992: 313) argues that authorizing same-sex marriage would have a detrimental impact because of the many benefits associated with marriage including “inheritance, social security, income tax, welfare payments, adoption, the division of property on termination of the relationship, medical benefits, life insurance, immigration, and even testimonial privilege”.

Opposition to same-sex marriage flows not only from outside the gay and lesbian community, but also from within it. As emphasis in the gay and lesbian community turned to “monogamous same-sex commitments”, an agenda perceived by some as following the moral majority, gay organizations moved away from a defense of sexual freedom, a previously hot issue (Kaplan, 2001: 57). Additionally, with regard to marriage itself, skeptics in the lesbian and gay community have focused on the “negative meanings they attach to the institution (marriage) itself” (Chambers, 1996: 2). There is also concern about the effect that availability of same-sex marriages might have on those in the community who “opted out” (Freeman, 1999: 7). For example, homosexuals that choose not to marry might be characterized as sexually promiscuous or immoral.

**Proponents of Same-sex Marriage**

Same-sex marriage also has its proponents that use normative and practical reasons in their arguments. William Eskridge (1996: 9) has argued the normative value of same-sex marriages for society as well as the gay and lesbian community. He claims that marriage has a “civilizing” effect on both communities and leads to a “greater degree of domestication”. He contends it would lead to a reduction in sexual promiscuity and in turn a reduction in the risk of exposure to HIV.
Beyond the normative concerns addressed by Eskridge are the practical considerations of same-sex marriage. Extension of benefits is one of the primary reasons lesbian and gay couples want to get married according to Paula Ettelbrick (1996: 105 & 115).

Proponents of same-sex marriage assert that marriage benefits are one of the justifications of same-sex marriages. The special status of marriage has importance in areas beyond social security benefits or welfare payments. The granting of decision-making powers to relatives when an individual can no longer make decisions for themselves is common and typically granted to the spouse (Chambers, 1996: 4). The allocation of assets to the spouse of an individual when they die without a Will is an advantage of marriage currently unavailable to same-sex couples (Chambers, 1996: 4).

Additional benefits afforded to married couples include: the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, “requiring employers with fifty or more employees to extend unpaid leave of up to twelve work weeks during each year to an eligible employee to care for a spouse with a serious health condition” (Chambers, 1996: 5). There are also federal and state laws that bar the state from forcing married people to testify in a criminal proceeding against their spouse (Chamber, 1996: 5). While these benefits may be unavailable to same-sex couples through traditional methods, some are taken up and provided through domestic partner policies by employers.

In addition to the benefits associated with marriage, same-sex marriage is also seen as an advancement of rights (Dority, 1996: 1):

Over the years, these formerly ‘traditional’ elements of marriage have changed to reflect the ideal of individual equality under the law. Securing same-sex marriage is, quite simply, another advance in the struggle to
extend to all American citizens the equal right to enter into a contract with their life partner of choice.

The advancement of rights and the extension of benefits are tied to one another. Morris Kaplan (2001: 60) points out that “denial of these resources to same-sex couples is a fundamental inequality that reinforces the stigmatization of homosexuals in our society.”

**Benefits Untied to Marriage**

Some argue that benefits and resources of any kind should not be affiliated with marriage at all, even for opposite-sex marriages. Suzanne Sherman (1992: 1) claims that benefits should not be attached to marital status for anyone. Instead, the law should address the individual.

Nancy Polikoff (1993:1549) argues along the same lines:

For those who support lesbian and gay marriage because it would allow us access to the package of benefits now associated with heterosexual marriage ... advocating lesbian and gay marriage is an obvious choice. I do not share that vision. Advocating lesbian and gay marriage will detract from, even contradict, efforts to unhook economic benefits from marriage and make basic health care and other necessities available to all.

In addition to claims that benefits should not be affiliated with marriage, there is concern that allowing same-sex marriages will give favor to individuals in “two-person units” with romantic ties over those that are single or living in groups (Chambers, 1996: 17). The recognition of same-sex marriage, along with opposite-sex marriage, excludes people that are single or living in groups from marriage benefits and rights.

The absence of legally recognized same-sex marriage in the United States has contributed to the existence of domestic partner benefits. For some, these benefit policies serve as an alternative for same-sex couples seeking marriage-like benefits. In every
effort to reform public policy or change the status quo, there are legal considerations. The opponents and proponents of same-sex marriage have seen most of the battles to reform policy waged in federal and state courts as well as the halls of the United States Congress and state legislatures.

**Legal Components**

The United States Supreme Court has not addressed same-sex marriage\(^3\); however, in 1987 the Court upheld the right of prisoners to marry in *Turner v. Safley*\(^4\).

Justice O’Connor wrote in the majority opinion:

> Inmate marriages, like others, are expressions of emotional support and public commitment. These elements are an important and significant aspect of the marital relationship.

This definition of marriage is significant because, as discussed later, one of the chief oppositions to same-sex marriage has come through the definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman with less emphasis on the “emotional support and public commitment” elements mentioned by Justice O’Connor (Freeman, 1999:4).

While the Court has not ruled on same-sex marriages, state courts have. The first state high court ruling on same-sex couples came in 1971, when the Supreme Court of Minnesota denied same-sex couples the right to marry in *Baker v. Nelson* (Gonen, 2001: 330; Johnson, 1997: 6). Since that time, many claims have been made for same-sex marriages (Johnson, 1997: 6). The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution contains the Equal Protection Clause and a list of fundamental rights that can not be abridged without due process. Those in favor of same-sex marriages argue

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\(^3\) The United State Supreme Court did hold a Texas sodomy statute unconstitutional on June 26, 2003 in *Lawrence v. Texas*. The impact, if any, of this ruling on same-sex marriages is currently unclear (Greenhouse, 2003: A1 &17).

\(^4\) *Turner v. Safley* does not specifically address anything about same-sex marriages, but it is important here because of the elements Justice O’Connor selects to note in addressing the importance of marriage.
that prohibiting same-sex marriage violates the equal protection clause which asserts that a state shall not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (Moss, 2002: 101). Additionally, the denial of marriage to homosexuals may subject same-sex marriage to scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution (Moss: 2002:102). Kevin Moss (2002:102) argues that among the fundamental rights the Supreme Court has recognized under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is the right to marry.

Most rulings against same-sex marriage have been based on a lack of precedent, thus states have been able to proscribe establishment of the institutions (Gonen, 2001: 330). Opinions from the courts ruling against same-sex marriage have in large part utilized a definition of marriage that limits it to a union between one man and one woman. This definition is rooted in a historical standard of marriage that prohibits same-sex couples from marrying by definition (Johnson, 1997:6).

One significant ruling concerning same-sex marriage came from the Supreme Court of Hawaii in Baehr v. Lewin on May 5, 1993 (Gonen, 2001: 332; Kersch, 1997:117). The court held by a three-to-one margin that the state’s ban on same-sex marriages constituted gender discrimination because it allowed a woman to marry a man, but did not allow a man to marry a man. The Hawaii high court considered this a violation of the state’s equal protection clause (Gonen, 2001: 332; Kersch, 1997:117).

Lino Graglia (2001: 1013) has criticized this and other actions by the courts, arguing that judges are functioning outside their “proper role”. He argues that the proper role of the courts does not include making policy through judicial action. In response to

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5 The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution in the Fourteenth Amendment states that: “nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” – United States Constitution
the ruling by the Hawaii Supreme Court, the State of Hawaii passed amendments to their state constitutions banning same-sex marriages, effectively undoing the court decision (Gonen, 2001:333)\(^6\).

In addition to the actions to change state constitutions, response to the *Baehr* decision also came on a national level (Johnson, 1997:1). In 1996, the United States Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) (Gonen, 2001:334; Johnson, 1997:1). According to Johnson (1997:1):

DOMA contains two substantive provisions. One provision defines ‘marriage’ and 'spouse' for federal purposes as requiring two persons of the opposite sex. The other substantive provision, Section 2 of the Act, provides that states do not have to recognize a same-sex marriage performed and valid in another state.

This statute, for regulatory purposes, precludes same-sex unions and “forestalls” constitutional challenges to state laws being passed prohibiting same-sex marriages (Gonen, 2001: 334).

The second section of DOMA, providing that states do not have to recognize a same-sex marriage valid in another state, was authorized under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution that “allows Congress to prescribe ‘by general Laws’ the effect that one state’s ‘public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings’ will have in every other state” (Johnson, 1997:1)

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\(^6\) Alteration of state constitutions was referenced by Chief Justice Jeffrey L. Amestoy of the Vermont Supreme Court in his opinion telling the Vermont legislature to either offer marriage licenses to same-sex couples or extend something similar (France: 2000:28).
Full Faith and Credit

Full Faith and Credit is a significant and historical issue. Debates between the Anti-Federalists, advocating the Union as a collection of sovereign states, and the Federalists, emphasizing the unitary nature of the Union, are the predecessors to current debates about the obligations of states to recognize a marriage performed in another state (Kersch, 1997: 119). Theodore Lowi argued that “regulations concerning health, safety, and morals of the community” were matters for states to resolve while issues of economic development were for the federal government to address (Kersch, 1997:120). Under Lowi’s definitions, Kersch would argue the federal government overstepped it bounds in dictating a matter greatly concerned with the morals of the community.

The legal concept of comity – “that the courts of one sovereign will as a matter of deference or respect rather than obligation give effect to the laws or judicial decisions of another sovereign” – is a “central doctrine” in the law of Federalism (Kersch, 1997: 120). This legal concept is particularly relevant to DOMA and the exclusion of same-sex marriage from Full Faith and Credit because it limits the reach of individual states’ laws. According to Kersch (1997:121):

A regime defined by comity is held together less by legal rules entailing the coercive settlement of disputes than by deference and accommodation. Smoothly functioning comity regimes are made possible by widespread adherence to a series of norms. Three such norms have traditionally governed the cross recognition of marriage in the American federal system. Under the norm of respect, a marriage valid where it was celebrated is valid elsewhere. Accordingly, most married couples can travel freely without concern that their marriage may be without effect in another state. Under the norm of good faith, states may refuse to recognize a marriage solemnized in another state if the couple went there to avoid the restrictions imposed by their own state’s marriage laws. Under the norm of hewing to the mainstream, many states, either through statutory or common law, refuse to recognize marriages that are “odious” or “contrary to a strong public policy.
It is rare for an important political issue to be the subject of “cross recognition issues” (Kersch, 1997:121) and when a conflict has arisen concerning marriage, the state of residence has often prevailed because they have a “stronger interest” in the marriage (Kersch, 1997:123).

Prior to DOMA, Congress had only clarified or extended Full Faith and Credit, never before limiting it as it did in this legislation (Johnson, 1997:1). This was also the only instance under which the federal government “would not accept state determinations of who was married for federal purposes such as immigration, Social Security, tax, Medicare, family leave, and determination of pension for federal workers (Kersch, 1997:118). Understanding Full Faith and Credit as it applies to DOMA is significant to understanding the status of same-sex couples. Defining marriage as opposite-sex only and allowing states to refuse recognition of same-sex marriages from other states contributes to the unique circumstances domestic partner benefits exist under.

Legal Analogies

The legalities surrounding same-sex marriage take many forms as evidenced by the state constitutional issues, criticisms of the role of the courts, creation of a definition of marriage by the federal government, and use of the Full Faith and Credit clause. Some advocates of same-sex marriage have drawn parallels to other marriage issues that have also relied upon a traditional definition of marriage only to ultimately be invalidated.

Barbara Dority (1996:1) has pointed out that less than thirty years ago interracial couples were prohibited from marrying in parts of the United States. Similar to the traditional definition of marriage as a union of one man and one woman referenced earlier, there was a time when marriage was defined as a union between people of the
same religion or one where a wife was the property of her husband (Dority, 1996:1). Dority (1996:1) argues that a historical standard does not necessarily make it right or justified. As previously addressed, the traditional definition of marriage used to prohibit same-sex marriages is based on a historical definition of a union between a man and woman.

Freeman (1999:3) uses a similar analogy in criticism of an often used argument against same-sex marriage. Opponents of same-sex marriage have argued that access to same-sex marriage is not justified because relatively few are seeking it. However, in 1967 the Court struck down the miscegenation statutes even though relatively few people of different race married.

Another analogy often drawn in support of same-sex marriages and their legal status is slavery. The common thread between the two is the legal recognition by individual states as discussed regarding comity and Full Faith and Credit. In both cases, “a fear of moral infection” motivates one state to resist the “penetration of its borders by a status believed to be immoral and conferred by another state” (Kersch, 1997:128). The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 forced free states to give “active succor to the peculiar institution” by among other things, empowering federal marshals to utilize the state citizenry to enforce the law. This action was followed by an infamous Court ruling, Dred Scot (1857), in which the Court ruled that slave status was not dissolved when a slave traveled over state lines (Kersch, 1997:128).

Similar to the actions by many states now, free states began to pass laws prohibiting slavery. Ken Kersch argues that this method of progress may be beneficial to the movement for same-sex marriages by diffusing some of the political tension and
promoting “political dialogue about the marital arrangement”. He suggests that having states pass laws establishing their position may raise awareness of the issue and begin productive discussions (1997:132). Nevertheless, Kersch (1997:133) also acknowledges the challenge that the movement faces: “In contrast to the racial civil rights movement, the gay rights movement has yet to build up sufficient popular, legislative, and judicial support to sustain a judicial declaration that same-sex marriages constitute a national civil right.”

The Alternatives

In the absence of a legally recognized same-sex marriage, alternatives have emerged to fill the void for same-sex couples. David Chambers suggests “that nearly all reform to correct disparate treatment in our society is incremental”. He goes on to argue that the reform finally arrives when a “disfavored” group’s claims are finally recognized by the state (1996:18). He points to the incremental change in the legal status of a child born out of wedlock and the relationship of unmarried opposite-sex couples (1996:18). In addition to these incremental movements, there have been incremental steps taken in the legal arena surrounding same-sex marriages. As previously noted, the gay and lesbian movement is not a recent one, however, its great visibility to the general public only began following the Stonewall riots in 1969 and the movements’ battles with Anita Bryant in the late 1970s.

While there are certainly those completely opposed to any recognized legal union between people of the same sex, there is another alternative for those advocating same-sex marriage or a compromised end for those opposed to same-sex marriage. Some have advocated a method that extends appropriate benefits and protections to same-sex unions,
but does not define it as “marriage” (Chambers, 1996:16). As mentioned before, there are some in the gay and lesbian community opposed to marriage as an institution. The institution of marriage has a history as a “hierarchical male-female relationship” and may not be a good fit for the gay and lesbian community.

On December 20, 1999, the Supreme Court of Vermont issued a ruling encouraging the legislature to either provide a marriage license to same-sex couples or set up a domestic partner system extending rights similar to those of opposite-sex couples because the current system violated the state constitution (France, 2000:28). Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe believes the decision, “all but encourages the legislature to grant analogous benefits but not marriage per se to gays and lesbians” (France, 2000:28).

In contrast to the decisions by other states to change their constitutions to prohibit same-sex marriage, Vermont’s legislature passed a new law. The alternative to “marriage” became a reality when Governor Howard Dean\(^7\) signed “civil union” legislation on April 26\(^{th}\) 2000. The law “grants all rights and responsibilities of marriage to lesbian and gay couples without explicitly calling it marriage” (Gonen, 2001:330 & 336). The rights and responsibilities included in the legislation are “health care, compensation, protection from abuse, probate, property, adoption, and insurance”. The legislation also provides for the dissolution of a civil union only in family court using the same procedures used in divorce (Gonen, 2001:336). While this new recognition is significant for gay and lesbian couples in Vermont, it does not directly effect the recognition of marriage by other states because no other state has “civil unions” or provisions affiliated with it. Even if it were considered “marriage”, the provisions of DOMA would allow states not to recognize it.

\(^7\) Howard Dean has recently announced his intention to run in the 2004 Presidential election.
Other legal creations have arisen in the area of same-sex marriage that are not “marriage” although none as significant as Vermont’s “civil union”. In 1997, Hawaii’s state legislature enacted the “Reciprocal Beneficiaries Law” which allows two single adults legally prohibited from marrying each other to receive the benefit of some spousal rights. This legislation includes provision for same-sex couples and blood relatives. Some of the benefits included are hospital visitation, insurance, property, tort standing, and inheritance rights. Reciprocal beneficiary designation can be terminated by either party and end when either party marries (Gonen, 2001:333). This was the first statewide offering of domestic partnership in the United States (Curry, 2002:1/3).

Another alternative is to allow same-sex as well as opposite-sex couples to register as “domestic partners” and afford the couples all or some consequences and benefits of marriage (Chambers, 1996: 16). Domestic partner statutes are often an attempt to manage some of the difficulties of state’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriage and are usually passed in the form of local ordinances. They may be as far-reaching as offering benefits similar to marriage or as limited as allowing for a public registry that carries with it basic recognition by some level of government that the relationship exists (Gonen, 2001:341). In the far-reaching arena, the ordinances may change the meaning of terms such as “spouse” and “family” so that benefits are similar to those of married couples. On the other end of the spectrum, the laws may spell out particular benefits for domestic partners or offer none at all. Some benefit areas often influenced are health care and correctional facility visitation, emergency notification, succession real estate rights, university housing privileges, parental rights with respect to
a partner’s child in school, inclusion of domestic partner income in child support
calculations, and surrogate decision-making (Gonen, 2001:342-343).

In the foreword to Harold Lustig’s book *Four Steps to Financial Security for Lesbian and Gay Couples*, Kelly Bonnevie (2002:xiii) addresses one of the unique
circumstances of gay and lesbian couples. She points out that “despite progress the gay
and lesbian community has made in recent years, there are still areas where the courts and
the laws don’t protect us in the same way they protect other people.” The unique
situation of the gay and lesbian community as evidenced by the status of same-sex
marriages has made alternatives like domestic partnerships, civil unions, and reciprocal
benefit laws significant. In the absence of statutes or ordinances legally recognizing the
relationships of gay and lesbian couples, domestic partner benefit policies offered by
employers have filled a void for many members of the gay and lesbian community.

**History of the Domestic Partner Benefit**

In 1982, the *Village Voice*\(^8\) started offering domestic partner benefits. The *Voice*
was the first employer in the United States to extend benefits to same-sex couples (Vogel,
2001:679-680). Domestic partner benefits are generally part of an employers’ benefit
policy and may include coverage similar to that married employees receive for their
spouses or be more limited in scope. They might include health, dental, and vision
insurance; sick and bereavement leave; accident and life insurance; death benefits; and
parental leave or any combination and others (Curry, 2002: 1/7). The individual
employer can set up any collection of benefits they wish to offer their employees for a
domestic partner. In 1985, the City of Berkeley was the first public sector employer in
the United States to extended domestic partner benefits to their employees (Laarman,

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\(^8\) The *Village Voice* is a New York City magazine
Since that first offering of domestic partner benefits, more than 3,500 public and private employers have extended domestic partner benefits (Vogel, 2001:679-680). Domestic partner laws, discussed earlier, have created and encouraged an environment for domestic partner benefits. Some cities have established domestic partner registries that create some legal obligations. Domestic partner benefits have often followed from employers in areas with domestic partner laws, but have also been created by employers without domestic partner, reciprocal benefits, or civil union statutes (Laarman, 1993:1).

According to Jill Elswich (2001:3), “Nearly half (47) of the companies that landed on Fortune magazine’s coveted list of the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For’ for 2000 provide domestic partner benefits.” She also reports that “from 1999 to 2000, the number of Fortune 500 companies offering the benefits jumped by 25%”.

With an understanding of the advocates and opponents of same-sex marriage, the unique legal environment same-sex couple function within, and the rise and history of domestic partner benefits, the next chapter discusses domestic partner benefit policies. The considerations weighed in developing these policies and the components of domestic partner benefits policies are described and the conceptual framework is developed in Chapter 3.
Chapter Three  
Research Setting  

The unique environment discussed in Chapter two has lead to the creation of domestic partner benefits and influences the policies offered. Chapter three explains the status of domestic partner benefits and some factors considered by employers offering the policies. In the final section, the categorical scheme used to describe domestic partner benefit policies is developed and explained.  

Domestic Partner Benefits Today  

Domestic partner benefits are considered taxable income by the Internal Revenue Service unlike the benefits offered to married couples (Vogel, 2001:702). DOMAs definition of marriage makes this applicable even in Vermont where civil unions are legal. DOMA’s definition of marriage sets the standard for all federal laws, including the collection of federal taxes so civil unions do not qualify because they do not meet the standard for marriage under DOMA.  

While DOMA clearly outlines what a marriage is and is not, exactly what constitutes a “domestic partner” for employee benefits is not so clear, although Linda Laarman offers this definition: “an adult who lives with an employee but who is not related to the individual by blood, marriage (legal or common law), or adoption” (Laarman,1992:1). This definition includes same-sex as well as opposite sex partners, a point of consideration in the creation of domestic partner benefits and in determining qualifications for the benefits. Employers face three general questions when considering domestic partner benefits. Employers must first decide whether to extend domestic
partner benefits, then decide what qualification must be met to receive the benefits, and finally decide which benefits to offer.

Should Domestic Partner Benefits be Offered?

Domestic partner benefits are offered for a variety of reasons. In 1996, a significant number of companies began to offer the benefits because the City of San Francisco required contractors with the City to offer the benefits in order to do business with the City. While the ordinance was ultimately ruled unconstitutional\(^9\), the City does report which companies offer benefits to create some pressure on employers to offer domestic partner benefits (Elswich, 2001:1).

Generally, the reasons for extending domestic partner benefits are similar to the reasons any benefits are offered to employees. They may arise out of a commitment to “equality, diversity, and competitiveness” on the part of the employer (Elswich, 2001: 1). Some employers have established their own nondiscrimination or diversity policies that cover the gay and lesbian community and the provision of domestic partner benefits is just an extension of their commitment to these policies. Additionally, some employers, especially when dealing with a tight labor market, add domestic partner benefits in an effort to compete for and retain employees (Adams & Soloman, Reconciliation: 1). The emphasis on “equal pay for equal work” has encouraged some of the benefits. Since employee benefits are considered part of an employee’s compensation, to limit benefits availability to “spouses” would disadvantage gays and lesbians who cannot legally benefit from those policies (Adams & Soloman, Reconciliation: 1).

\(^9\) San Francisco’s ordinance required any business contracting with the City to offer domestic partner benefits to its employees everywhere the company did business. It was ruled unconstitutional because the ordinance was regulating beyond the City’s jurisdiction (Elswich, 2001:1).
Employers may also be more inclined to offer domestic partner benefits as recognition has increased regarding the many benefits domestic partners have been denied, including health benefits, pension plans, family and bereavement leave, and travel and moving expenses subsidized by an employer (Laarman, 1993: 2). There is also the possibility that employees, sometimes in the form of unions and gay and lesbian groups, have put pressure on employers to offer such benefits (Laarman, 1992: 1).

There are deterrents to offering domestic partner benefits. One of the greatest deterrents to the extension of health plan coverage is cost. The extension of “leave, travel, and relocation expense policies and other ‘minor’ employee benefits to cover domestic partners” is more likely while less have extended health and pension benefits because of cost (Laarman, 1993:2). However, Elswich (2001:1) has argued that offering this benefit is “fairly inexpensive” with enrollment rates of 1% or less.

The cost issues are not limited to the employer. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) have hesitated to extend benefits to domestic partners because of cost worries. Two primary areas of concern related to cost are fraud and AIDS. There is a concern that employees will portray a sick friend or someone other than a true domestic partner as such for insurance coverage, increasing the cost to the insurer. While there are many other expensive illnesses insurers cover, there is also a fear that insurers will be covering more individuals “with the potential of contracting AIDS” (Laarman, 1993: 2). This hesitation or refusal by HMOs can make it difficult for employers interested in offering benefits to negotiate a contract beneficial not only to employees with domestic partners but for other employees as well.
Another significant deterrent to offering domestic partner benefits is the potential for negative reaction. Employers may be the subject of a boycott by the public, although the opposite reaction has also been reported (Laarman, 1993:2). They may also worry about a negative reaction from shareholders (Adams & Solomon, Reconciliation: 1).

Within the organization, other employees may be displeased with increased cost in their health plan as a result of domestic partner coverage (Laarman, 1993:3).

**Qualifications**

Setting qualifications is the second step in establishing domestic partner benefits. One of the most significant decisions in any domestic partner benefit policy is whether to extend the benefits to opposite-sex partners in addition to same-sex partners. Some employers will allow only same-sex partners access to the benefits because they are legally prohibited from marrying (Adams & Solomon, Reconciliation: 1). One rationale for this is the opportunity opposite-sex partners have to get married and obtain coverage through traditional marriage (Laarman, 1992:1; Fried, 1994: 16). Barbara Fried (1994: 16) noted in a case study at Stanford University that discrimination against unmarried heterosexuals is not comparable to the “marginalization” of gays and lesbians.

Proof or evidence of the relationship may be another requirement to receive domestic partner benefits. Employers may call for “employees to swear to the validity of their domestic partnerships on an affidavit as part of an internal domestic registry” (Adams & Solomon, Reconciliation: 1). Another obligation might be for employees to “certify certain facts – for example, that they have lived together for some period of time and intend to continue living together indefinitely, that they own property in common, and that they view their relationship as equivalent to that of spouses” (Laarman, 1993: 2).
Certification may also be affiliated with the couple registering as domestic partners if the municipality or other government entity offer such a program (Laarman, 1993: 2). Laarman also points out that some employers may establish specific time frames after one domestic partnership ends before another can be added (1993: 2).

**Which Benefits to Offer**

The third consideration employers face is deciding which domestic partner benefits to extend. Previously noted deterrents to extending domestic partner benefits may again come into consideration in deciding which benefits to offer.

Some employers offer only benefits such as subsidized travel, relocation expenses, employee discounts, sick and bereavement leave for a domestic partner’s illness or death. Others employers have offered these benefits in addition to health, dental, and vision insurance (Adams and Solomon, *Reconciliation*: 1; Laarman, 1992: 1) Additional possibilities for coverage may include: accident and life insurance, death benefits, and parental leave for a co-parented child. Some benefits are more easily implemented than others. Sick, bereavement, and parental leave are not as difficult to implement as health, dental, and vision insurance because they don’t require working with an insurance company that may be reluctant to extend coverage (Curry, 2002: 1/8).

Even though employees are responsible for the benefits as taxable income, employers must decide whether the employee or the employer will pay the cost of the benefits or if the employer will pick up the cost of coverage (Curry, 2002: 1/7).

Domestic partner benefits do not create a marriage between domestic partners; however, advocates argue they have at least partially filled a void in the gay and lesbian community. While same-sex marriage is not recognized, domestic partner benefits have
allowed members of the gay and lesbian community access to benefits and responsibilities similar to those of opposite-sex couples in marriage.

There are many possible variations in the content of domestic partner benefit policies. No consistent set of policies or combination of policies is present in the literature. While the literature identifies many variations in policies, which options are in use by public employers is not clear. The purpose of this research is to describe the domestic partner benefit policies of state, county, and city governments in the United States.

**Conceptual Framework**

The conceptual framework for this research is descriptive categories. The research is descriptive and categories are linked to research with a descriptive purpose (Shields, 1998: 217). Descriptive categories are also particularly valuable to this research purpose because of its flexibility. The initial categories established may ultimately provide an incomplete framework, but descriptive categories can be modified and the elements re-classified to better meet the descriptive purpose (Shields, 1998: 218). Categories are used as the framework to describe the domestic partner benefit policies of state, county, and city governments in the United States.

Joseph Adams and Todd Solomon (*Employer’s Guide*: 11) identify three broad categories that can be used to classify elements of domestic partner benefit policies. Their categories draw in part on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The three categories they use to break down domestic partner benefits are ERISA Welfare Benefits, ERISA Pension/Retirement Benefits, and Non-ERISA Benefits. Requirements and Qualifications and Documentation make up two additional
categories (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 18 & 21-27). These five broad categories disaggregate the policies into elements that can be classified and sorted based on the issue addressed. The categories are summarized and linked to relevant legislation and literature in Table 3.1.

**ERISA Welfare Benefits**

The ERISA Welfare Benefits category includes health, dental, and vision insurance and “COBRA-like” benefits (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 11 & 38). ERISA Welfare Benefits include provision of health, dental, or vision insurance to an employee’s domestic partner. These are the most commonly funded benefits in traditional policies and might be part of a domestic partner benefit policy (Curry, 2002: 1/7; Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 11). COBRA-like benefits are also in the category. The Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985 requires employers to allow continuation of insurance benefits for 18 months after termination for employees and their spouses (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 38; Lustig, 1999: 124-125). While there is no federal requirement for these benefits as there is with married couples, employers may choose to offer COBRA-like benefits as part of the domestic partner benefit policy. The domestic partner covered would receive coverage similar to that of a traditional spouse if the employer includes it in their domestic partner benefit policy.

**ERISA Pension/Retirement Benefits**

The ERISA Pension/Retirement Benefits category includes defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans pertinent to domestic partners (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 12). Defined benefit plans generally provide employees be paid a
specified monthly amount starting at age 65. The plan pays over the life of the participant or the joint life of the participant and their spouse. An employer may allow domestic partners in calculating joint life expectancy. In providing payment of benefits to a surviving domestic partner, the income from these plans is taxable, as it is for traditional spouses. However, without a provision allowing the domestic partner as beneficiary, funds in a particular defined benefit plan would not be paid to the domestic partner, but returned to the plan (Lustig, 1999: 189). Defined contribution plans provide for payment of benefits to a designated beneficiary or the estate of the participant if the participant is unmarried. An employer could allow an unmarried participant to name their domestic partner as beneficiary (Adams and Solomon, Employer’s Guide: 12; Curry, 2002: 5/27)

Non ERISA Benefits

Non-ERISA Benefits are employment-related benefits without significant administrative attention. The Non-ERISA Benefits category includes sick leave, bereavement leave, and “Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)-like” leave (Adams and Solomon, Employer’s Guide: 12-13). Sick and bereavement leave, as it relates to a spouse, generally provides for employees to take sick or bereavement leave when a spouse or immediate family member becomes ill or passes away (Adams and Solomon, Employer’s Guide: 13; Fried, 1994:8). The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 allows an employee to take medical leave due to illness of a child, spouse, or parent. It does not include domestic partners (Adams and Solomon, Employer’s Guide: 13). An employer may provide for extension of each of these benefits to domestic
partners by including domestic partners in the allowable groups as a spouse or immediate family (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 13; Curry, 2002:1/7; Fried, 1994:9).

**Requirements / Qualifications**

Requirements and Qualifications includes a variety of qualification possibilities. Before extending benefits to domestic partners of employees, employers may require that certain conditions be met. The availability of the benefit policy to opposite-sex domestic partners is one important qualification (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 18; Curry, 2002: 1/7; Fried, 1994: 3). Employers may also require that the employee not be married and additionally requires they have not been married for a particular length of time (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 23; Fried, 1994:1). Shared residence and common necessities of life (basic needs of life in common) are two more qualifications measured in this category. Minimum periods of time these two conditions have been met could also be required (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 22; Curry, 2002:1/7; Fried, 1994:1). Minimum age of the employee and domestic partner (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 23) and the employee’s and domestic partner’s intention to remain together indefinitely could also be required (Adams and Solomon *Employer’s Guide* 23; Fried, 1994:1). Finally, the employer may require that the domestic partner not be related to the employee by blood closer than would bar marriage (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 23; Fried, 1994:1).

**Documentation**

The final category is Documentation. In stipulating that these qualifications have been met, an employer often requires an employee and their domestic partner provide particular documentation (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 22; Curry, 2002:1/7;
Fried, 1994:1). This documentation may be in the form of a sworn affidavit, registration with an internal registry maintained by the employer’s human resources department, or registration with an external registry maintained by a local government (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 22; Curry, 2002:1/7; Fried, 1994:1). Official notification that a domestic partnership has been terminated is another possible documentation requirement (Adams and Solomon, *Employer’s Guide*: 24; Curry, 2002:1/7; Fried, 1994:4).

**Summary**

This chapter explained the status of domestic partner benefits and factors considered by employers offering the policies. The conceptual framework was developed and explained. Domestic partner benefits policies are analyzed using content analysis which is discussed in the next chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ERISA Welfare Benefits</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ERISA Pension/Retirement Benefits</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined Contribution Plan (e.g. 401K)</td>
<td>Adams and Solomon (2000), Curry (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non ERISA Benefits</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Requirements / Qualifications</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Documentation</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Four
Research Methodology

Introduction

As previously discussed, the purpose of this research is to describe domestic partner benefit policies. This chapter begins by explaining how the conceptual framework developed in chapter three translates to an operational item on a coding sheet used to analyze the policies. The descriptive categories in Table 3.1 translate into items on a coding sheet. The policies collected can easily be described using this coding sheet making content analysis a good technique for this research purpose. The strengths and weaknesses of content analysis pertinent to this research are identified and the population and method of obtaining data for the research is explained.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is used to measure domestic partner benefit policies. It is the study of recorded communication (Babbie, 2001: 304). Content analysis can be used to answer, among others, the “what” questions of social research (Babbie, 2001:305). This method of research involves the examination of social artifacts (Babbie, 2001: 304). Earl Babbie (2001: 304-305) identifies some of the suitable items for study in content analysis as: books, magazines, Web pages, poems, newspapers, songs, paintings, speeches, letters, e-mail messages, bulletin board postings on the Internet, laws, and constitutions.

Operationalize Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework is operationalized to connect the descriptive categories: ERISA Welfare Benefits, ERISA Pension/Retirement Benefits, Non-ERISA Benefits, Requirements / Qualifications, and Documentation, to the data collected using
content analysis. The coding sheet (See Appendix B) is developed from the elements of the conceptual framework in Table 3.1 based on the literature. Table 4.1 shows how the descriptive categories of the conceptual framework are linked to the coding sheet.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1: Coding sheet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Categories</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ERISA Welfare Benefits</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBRA-like benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ERISA Pension/Retirement Benefits</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined Benefit Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined Contribution Plan (e.g. 401K)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non ERISA Benefits</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bereavement Leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick Leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLA-like leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Requirements / Qualifications</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same-sex only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not married*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared residence*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common necessities of life*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum age of parties**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intimate relationship*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intent to remain together indefinitely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not related by blood closer than would bar marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Documentation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affidavit (Sworn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal registry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External registry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Termination notification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Domestic partner benefit policies are measured to determine if the elements of the conceptual framework are specified or not specified in the policies. Additionally, within the Requirements / Qualifications category elements: not married to anyone else; shared residence; common necessities of life; and intimate relationship, are measured for the length of time the requirement must be met in months and for numerical age in the minimum age of the parties. These interval measures are in addition to the specified and not specified nominal measures. Table 4.2 outlines the measures used.

Simple descriptive statistics are used. Percentages and frequency statistics are used with the nominal measures and means can be used for the interval measures as necessary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coding of Measurement</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Numerical Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum age of parties to receive benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of months requirement must be met</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strengths and Weaknesses**

Content analysis has strengths and weaknesses or limitations. The actual content available for analysis may be limited. Only those policies provided on request can be measured. Reliability can also be a problem in content analysis. While most of the elements being coded are straightforward and clear, interrater reliability could be an issue. In an effort to overcome this weakness, a sample of the policies was coded by another rater to improve the validity of the coding sheet as a method of measurement.
Content analysis also has advantages as a research method. Content analysis is an unobtrusive research method that allows the study of a subject without affecting the subject (Babbie, 2001:304). This characteristic is appealing in this research study because domestic partner benefits and the circumstances discussed in Chapter two can evoke great emotion from many perspectives. Content analysis as a method of research is also economical in terms of “time and money” and allows for the recoding or repetition of study if necessary (Babbie, 2001: 314). In the case of this study, the policies could be recoded if an important element or category emerges in the analysis of the policies. Content analysis also allows for the use of different levels of measurement (Babbie, 2001: 311). This is another valuable characteristic because in coding the policies, multiple levels of measurement may be necessary. A nominal measurement is used to code whether the particular element is specified in the policy (1) or not specified in the policy (0). An interval measure could be used in coding minimum number of months for which an element must be met and in coding the minimum age required to receive the benefits of the policy.

**Unit of Analysis**

Units of analysis are “the units that we make descriptive and explanatory statements about” (Babbie, 2001: 306). The units of analysis for this research are the state, county, and city domestic partner benefit policies, obtained from state, county, and city governments.

**Population**

It would be rather difficult and costly to request the domestic partner benefit policies of every state, county, and city government in the United States. However, the
purpose of the research is to describe domestic partner benefit policies, so the population consists of state, county, and city governments that have domestic partner benefit policies. Lambda Legal Defense (LLD) and the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) maintain lists of government entities offering domestic partner benefits. The population for this research consists of LLD’s list of state, county, and city governments offering domestic partner benefits supplemented with additional state, county, and city governments on HRC’s list. The combination of these lists totaled 130. In an effort to improve the response rate, the names of the employees at each entity responsible for administration of benefits or the director of human resources were determined when possible through entities’ websites. Letters requesting the policies were sent to their attention. Of the 130, 92 responded to a request by mail for the entities domestic partner benefit policy and any supporting documentation (71 %). Thirteen of the 92 responded indicating they do not have domestic partner benefits or do not have a particular policy outlining their provisions. This results in the use of 79 policies for the research. While these 79 policies are not inclusive of the entire population of state, county, and city governments offering domestic partner benefits, they provide a good representation of the policies in use today. A list of the 79 state, county, or city governments whose policies are analyzed is included in Appendix A.

**Summary**

This chapter described how the conceptual framework was operationalized. An explanation of the research methodology and its strengths and weaknesses for this research study was also provided. Additionally, the chapter explained the collection of
the data and the population used for the study. Chapter five will detail the results of the content analysis.
Chapter Five

Research Results

The purpose of this study is to describe domestic partner benefit policies of state, county, and city governments. This chapter reviews the findings from analysis of state, county, and city government domestic partner benefit policies. Policies from 79 governments (see Appendix A for listing) were content analyzed using descriptive categories developed from literature on domestic partner benefit policies.

Summary tables for each descriptive category and subcategory are provided and explained. The findings are based on particular items developed from the literature being specified in the policy or not being specified in the policy.

Percentages are based on an adjusted population. For ERISA Welfare Benefits, ERISA Pension / Retirement Benefits, and Non ERISA Benefits an adjusted population of 72 was used for calculations. This adjusted population excludes seven policies that were either registration or affidavit requirements only with no information on benefits. For Requirements / Qualifications and Documentation categories an adjusted population of 75 was used for calculations. This adjusted population excludes four policies that provided no requirements.

ERISA Welfare Benefits

ERISA Welfare Benefits included health, dental and COBRA-like benefit subcategories. Most policies specified health and dental benefits. The vast majority (93%) specified health insurance and approximately seventy percent specified dental insurance. Vision benefits were specified much less at only 30 percent. Refer to Table 5.1. COBRA-like benefits were unusual. In the population, less than half (40%) specified
COBRA-like benefits in some manner. Of those that specified them, most specified they were provided and about thirty-five percent specified that they were not. In the population, few specified availability of COBRA-like benefits (26%) and fewer (14%) specified the benefit is not offered. Refer to Table 5.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Cobra Provided</th>
<th>Cobra Not Provided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Those specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dental</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBRA-like benefits</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=72

**ERISA Pension / Retirement Benefits**

ERISA Pension / Retirement Benefits are practically nonexistent. Out of 72 policies, three specified defined benefit plan. Defined contribution plans were completely nonexistent with no specifications for the subcategory in any policies. Refer to Table 5.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Percentage Specified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defined Benefit Plan</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined Contribution Plan (e.g. 401K)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N =72
Non ERISA Benefits

Non ERISA Benefits included *bereavement*, *sick*, and *FMLA-like* leave. These subcategories were not specified in most policies. Refer to Table 5.3. Just over a third of the policies specified *bereavement* leave. *Sick leave* was specified in about 30 percent of the policies. *FMLA-like* leave was specified in a quarter of the policies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Percentage Specified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bereavement Leave</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick Leave</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLA-like leave</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=72

Requirements / Qualifications

The Requirements / Qualifications category included eight subcategories: *same-sex only*, *not married*, *shared residence*, *common necessities of life*, *minimum age*, *intimate relationship*, *intent to remain together indefinitely*, *not related by blood closer than would bar marriage*. *Not married*, *shared residence*, *common necessities*, and *intimate relationship* were additionally measured for any time frame for which these requirements must have previously been met. In each of these subcategories when a time frame was indicated it was either six months or twelve months as indicated in the table.

*Same-sex only*

Most policies did not specify *same-sex only*. Just under a third (31 %) specified *same-sex only*. Of those specifying *same-sex only*, the majority (74 %) were just *same-
sex while a quarter (26%) specified same-sex only until age 62\(^{10}\). Refer to Table 5.4. As a percentage of the population, few (23 %) specified same-sex only and fewer (8%) specified same-sex only until age 62. Refer to Table 5.4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Additional Requirements or Specification</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Same-sex only</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>Same-sex Unconditioned</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Those specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Same-sex Until Age 62</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Those specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
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<td>Time frame categories</td>
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<td>Six Months</td>
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<td>*Not married</td>
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<td>9.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Time Frame Categories</td>
<td></td>
<td>Intimate relationship</td>
<td>18.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intent to remain together</td>
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<td>indefinitely</td>
<td>46.7</td>
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<td>*Not related by blood closer</td>
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<td>would bar marriage</td>
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<td>Minimum Age</td>
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<td>18 Years of Age</td>
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<td>*Minimum age of parties</td>
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<td>State Minimum to Marry</td>
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<td></td>
<td>93.3</td>
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<td>95.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 75
* Requirement specified in majority of policies

\(^{10}\) The specification for same-sex only until age 62 is consistent with the State of California’s requirement to register as a domestic partner with the Secretary of State.
Time Frame Categories

Table 5.4 shows that almost all (97%) of the policies analyzed specified a requirement that *parties not be married*. This category was additionally measured for a time frame requirement. Few policies specified a time frame in this category (12%) and most of those that did specified six months (71%).

The *shared residence* subcategory was the most specified item in the Requirements / Qualification category at almost 99 percent. Of the subcategories specifying a time frame, it was also the subcategory with the most time frame specifications (44%). The specification for six and twelve months was pretty evenly split (21% and 23%). Refer to Table 5.4.

The final category with a time frame was *common necessities of life*. It was a specified requirement in 95 percent of the policies. A time frame was rarely specified in this category (5%).

No Time Frame Categories

*Intimate relationship* was the least specified requirement in the study. Just fewer than twenty percent of the policies specified this requirement. *Intent to remain together indefinitely* was specified in almost half the policies measured (47%). *Not related by blood closer than would bar marriage* was the final category measured in Requirements / Qualifications. This subcategory was specified in the vast majority (91%) of the policies. Refer to Table 5.4.

Minimum Age

*Minimum age* was the second most specified requirement behind shared residence. Almost all of the policies (97%) specified a *minimum age*. The vast majority
of those specifying a *minimum age* indicated 18 (96%) while just four percent of the policies specified the *minimum age* as the state minimum age to marry. Refer to Table 5.4.

**Documentation**

The documentation category included subcategories for affidavit, internal registry, external registry, and termination notification. The most prevalent documentation requirement was an affidavit (95 %). With only one policy requiring it, the internal registry documentation was the least specified. As indicated in Table 5.5, approximately 25 percent of the policies specified an external registry. Termination notification was specified in the majority of the policies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Percentage Specified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Affidavit (Sworn)</td>
<td>94.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal registry</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External registry</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Termination Notification</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 75
* Documentation required in majority of policies

The next chapter summarizes the findings and draws conclusions about the research results.
Chapter Six

Conclusion

This chapter summarizes the findings of the research. The purpose of this research study was to describe domestic partner benefit policies of state, county, and city governments as they exist today. As Chapter two explains, domestic partner benefits are a creation of a unique set of circumstances.

The literature provides many suggestions on what domestic partner benefits might consist of, but there is an absence of details on more prevalent requirements or benefits specified in these policies. The purpose of this research was to develop a description of the content of domestic partner benefit policies.

Material Measured

Content analysis was conducted on the policies provided by state, county, and city governments in response to a request for their domestic partner benefit policy with any supporting documents. The requests were made to either a human resources directors or another employee indicated for benefits responsibilities based on research of entities Web sites (See Appendix D). The documents were received by regular mail and e-mail. Their format varied from a clearly laid out policy identifying benefits offered including leave policies and all requirements to copies of city council meeting minutes when policies were adopted. Most policies provided details of benefits and requirements in the form of an affidavit. Some only provided one or the other resulting in the adjusted population numbers explained in Chapter five. Many of the policies made no specification or mention of their leave policies as they relate to domestic partners which will be addressed in reviewing the results for the Non ERISA benefits.
Summary of Findings

This section summarizes the overall finding from the research. Table 6.1 provides a summary of the primary findings of the research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1: Summary of Findings</th>
<th>Percentage[^1]</th>
<th>Conclusions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ERISA Welfare Benefits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Health</td>
<td>93.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>*Dental</td>
<td>70.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vision</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBRA-like benefits</td>
<td>40.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ERISA Pension/Retirement Benefits</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rare</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defined Benefit Plan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined Contribution Plan (e.g. 401K)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non ERISA Benefits</strong></td>
<td>Few</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bereavement Leave</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sick Leave</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMLA-like leave</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Requirements / Qualifications</strong></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same-sex only</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Not married</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Shared residence</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Common necessities of life</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Minimum age of parties</td>
<td>97.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intimate relationship</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intent to remain together indefinitley</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Not related by blood closer than would bar marriage</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Documentation</strong></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Affidavit (Sworn)</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal registry</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External registry</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Termination notification</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^1]: These percentages are based on the adjusted populations explained in Chapter 5: n=72 for the benefit categories and n=75 for the requirement and documentation categories.

* Item was specified in majority of policies
ERISA Welfare Benefits

The results of the ERISA Welfare Benefits category indicate that *health* and *dental* benefits are being offered by these public sector entities in most policies. *Health* benefits are more prevalent than *dental* benefits, but that may be consistent with offerings for traditional spousal coverage. The same may be true for *vision* benefits which are significantly less likely to be in a domestic partner benefit policy according to these results.

*COBRA-like* benefits were a unique situation in analyzing the policies. The intent was to code this category just as health, dental, and vision, however, COBRA appeared in the policies two different ways. The literature indicated *COBRA-like* benefits might be offered, but no mention was made of a specification that they were not available. There was content addressing the availability of *COBRA-like* benefits and there was also content specifying that they were not available. The percentages in Table 6.1 for *COBRA-like* benefits show the percentage of policies that provided a determination either way. Employers may be trying to clarify that domestic partners are not eligible for the federally mandated option to continue coverage provided for spouses so the employee or domestic partner is not surprised by the lack of the benefit should circumstances arise. Most of the time, policies are not providing a determination on *COBRA-like* benefits.

ERISA Pension / Retirement Benefits

According to this research, it is highly unlikely that a domestic partner benefit policy from a state, county, or local government will offer benefits related to pensions or contributor plans to domestic partners. The absence of any specification related to *contributor plans* may be because these plans generally allow the employee to specify
anyone as a beneficiary. There would be less need for an employer to offer this benefit, but specifications informing employees that their domestic partners are generally acceptable beneficiaries was not addressed. These plans were not in any policy. The defined benefit plans, the technical term for a pension, appeared in only three policies out of 72. It may be that this element has not received the attention that other benefits have so employers have not taken the interest in pursuing it. The contributor plans may be excluded because the employer does not have any responsibility to allow or exclude domestic partners as mentioned and the pension fund changes for domestic partners may be very difficult to set up depending on how the plan is administered or who is responsible for overseeing the fund.

Non ERISA Benefits

Conclusions in Non ERISA Benefits are more difficult to draw. It would be unwise to accept the percentages show in Table 6.1 for these types of leave as an accurate portrayal of the actual leave policies of state, county, and city governments. Unless this type of benefit has just lost employee interest in the pursuit of more health related benefits, it does not make sense that 93 percent of employers offer health insurance, a more costly item, and 33 percent offer bereavement leave, a much less costly benefit to offer. It is more plausible that these entities do not detail their leave policies as a part of there domestic partner benefit policies, or that they consider bereavement, sick, and FMLA-like leave personnel policies not specifically relevant to the request for their domestic partner benefit policies. As noted in Chapter two, leave based benefits are more likely to be offered because they involved less administration and coordination outside the employer to change. The results of this research are not strong enough to dispute that.
It would have been advisable to specify leave policies as they relate to domestic partners in the request for policies.

**Requirements / Qualifications**

The percentages in Requirements / Qualifications are descriptive of the likely requirements of a domestic partner benefit policy. Domestic partner benefit policies will likely contain a requirement for *shared residence* of the two parties. Time frame requirements for these categories are not likely, but if one is indicated, it will likely be for *shared residence*. *Minimum age* is also very likely to appear in a policy and the age specified will tend to be 18. As an unlikely, but plausible alternative, the employer may specify the minimum age for marriage in the state. This particular specification may be an attempt to establish requirements as similar as possible to those required for marriage.

A *common necessities of life* requirement is likely to be a part of the policy, but a time frame requirement is not. This conclusion holds true for the *not married* category as well. The research indicates both will be in the policy, but a time frame was rarely specified. The final requirement a policy probably will contain is *not related by blood closer than marriage*. It was a prevalent specification in the policies measured.

A policy may contain a requirement indicating *intent to stay together indefinitely*, but it is equally likely that it will not. About half of the policies specified this requirement so it would be difficult to say that this requirement is common in policies. A requirement unlikely to appear in a domestic partner benefit policy is *intimate relationship*. This requirement appeared in fewer than 20 percent of the policies. While that is generally assumed in considering domestic partner benefits, it may be less
prevailing because of privacy concerns or it may be construed as discouraging participation if an employee is uncomfortable attesting to that requirement.

*Same-sex only* was the most surprising requirement. As the literature indicates, domestic partner benefits have grown largely out of an attempt to provide benefits similar to those that are available to married couples in the absence of same-sex marriage. With that background it was surprising fewer than 30 percent of the policies specified this requirement. As addressed in the literature review, this may be an attempt to offer the same benefits to all employees regardless of their sexual orientation or head off lawsuits by employees that are in opposite-sex relationships, but don’t choose to get married. A number of the policies that indicated *same-sex only* did outline their justification for same-sex only requirements indicating the unavailability of marriage to these couples. The 30 percent also includes those policies that specified same-sex only until age 62. This particular requirement is consistent with the State of California’s requirements to register with the Secretary of State as a domestic partner.

**Documentation**

Conclusions in the Documentation category are pretty clear. Results indicated that an *affidavit* would likely be required for domestic partner benefits. The vast majority of policies required a sworn *affidavit* attesting that the requirements had been met. *Termination notification* was almost as prevalent as the affidavit. *External registry* requirements are not likely. This may be a result of a lack of availability of an external registry, although internal registries are even less likely\(^\text{12}\). It appears from the research that *affidavits* are the more likely way to ensure requirements are being met and attest to their truthfulness.

\(^{12}\) Only one policy required an internal registry.
Based on this research, a description of domestic partner benefit policies can be developed. Using a 70 percent determination, a domestic partner benefit policy offers health and dental benefits. Requirements to receive benefits include: not married, shared residence, common necessities of life, minimum age of 18, and not related by blood closer than would bar marriage. Additionally, an affidavit is required attesting that requirements have been met. The policy will also require notification if the relationship terminates.

**Surprises**

As previously addressed, the low percentage of policies requiring same-sex only was surprising given the history and circumstances leading to the development of domestic partner benefits. Also unforeseen were the results related to COBRA-like benefits. Inclusion of content specifying the exclusion of COBRA-like benefits was unexpected. The poor results in the Non ERISA category previously mentioned were disappointing. When requests were made for domestic partner benefit policies, a specification for leave policies as they relate to domestic partners would have been helpful in receiving more conclusive results in this category.

**Future Research**

Further research in the area of domestic partner benefit leave policies would be a good course of research. Requests for information on particular leave policies might yield valuable data and offer a better representation of the benefits employers are providing. It would be interesting to see how many employers that offer domestic partner benefits provide leave policies relevant to domestic partners in a different document or if those leave policies are handled in a more informal manner using supervisor discretions.
not necessitating formal policies. Additionally, it would be appealing to cross the results of this study’s effort and look at domestic partner benefit policies in the public sector with comparable policies in the private sector. While the private sector is much larger and the literature indicates many are offering these policies, it would be interesting to see if significant differences exist in their content.
References


### Appendix A: Policies Analyzed

**City Policies Analyzed**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Baltimore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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**County Policies Analyzed:**

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<td>Westchester</td>
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**State Policies Analyzed:**

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<td>California</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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*Denotes state capital.
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<td>Health</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Dental</td>
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<td>Vision</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COBRA-like benefits</td>
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</tr>
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<td><strong>ERISA Pension/Retirement Benefits</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non ERISA Benefits</strong></td>
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<td>Sick Leave</td>
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<td>FMLA-like leave</td>
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<td>Common necessities of life*</td>
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<td>Minimum age of parties**</td>
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<td>Intent to remain together indefinitely</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Termination notification</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Request Letter

Rebecca Anderson  
4900 E. Oltorf, #1034  
Austin, Texas 78741  
(512) 389-2322  
ra1022@swt.edu

{DATE}

{Insert Name}  
{Insert Title}  
{Insert Entity}  
{Insert Address 1}  
{Insert Address 2}

Dear {Name}:

As a graduate student at Southwest Texas State University in pursuit of a Master of Public Administration, I am conducting research on domestic partner benefit policies in the public sector. My research study includes a content analysis of actual policies offered by public entities. I am requesting a copy of the domestic partner benefit policy offered by {insert entity} to its employees with any supporting documents available.

I would be happy to receive a copy of the policy either by regular mail or e-mail. I have included my mailing address and e-mail address above. Please feel free to contact me with any questions by e-mail or phone.

Sincerely,

Rebecca Anderson
## Appendix D: Entities Contacted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Contact Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alameda</td>
<td>Director  Human Resources Department  City Hall, 2263 Santa Clara Avenue  Alameda, CA 94501  <a href="http://www.ci.alameda.ca.us/hr/index.html">http://www.ci.alameda.ca.us/hr/index.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alameda County</td>
<td>Naomi O. Burns, Director  Human Resources  Lakeside Plaza Building  1405 Lakeside Drive  Oakland, CA 94612-4305  <a href="http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/hr/index.htm">http://www.co.alameda.ca.us/hr/index.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albany County</td>
<td>Patricia Miller, Director  Human Resource Department  P.O. Box 1293  Albuquerque, NM 87103  <a href="http://www.cabq.gov/hrd/">http://www.cabq.gov/hrd/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Arbor County</td>
<td>Jill Neuville, Director  Human Resources Department  2100 Clarendon Blvd, Suite 511  Arlington, VA 22201  <a href="http://www.co.arlington.va.us/pers/index.htm">http://www.co.arlington.va.us/pers/index.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>Department of Personnel &amp; Human Resources  68 Mitchell Street, Suite 2150  Atlanta, Georgia 30303  <a href="http://www.ci.atlanta.ga.us/citydir/human_info.html">http://www.ci.atlanta.ga.us/citydir/human_info.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austin</td>
<td>William F. Vernile, Director  Human Resources  60 West Main Street  Avon, CT 06001  <a href="http://www.town.avon.ct.us/Public_Documents/AvonCT_HR/index.htm">http://www.town.avon.ct.us/Public_Documents/AvonCT_HR/index.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>Elliott L. Wheelan  Director of Human Resources  100 Holliday St  Baltimore, MD 21202  <a href="http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/government/personnel/index.html">http://www.ci.baltimore.md.us/government/personnel/index.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar Harbor</td>
<td>Dana J. Reed  Town Manager  93 Cottage St.  Bar Harbor, ME 04609  <a href="http://www.ci.bar-harbor.me.us/jobs/">http://www.ci.bar-harbor.me.us/jobs/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>April Meadow, Director  Human Services Department  455 North Rexford Dr., Suite 210  Beverly Hills, CA 90210  <a href="http://www.beverlyhills.org/presence/connect/CoBH/Homepage/Local+Government/Departments+and+Offices/Human+Services">http://www.beverlyhills.org/presence/connect/CoBH/Homepage/Local+Government/Departments+and+Offices/Human+Services</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beverly Hills</td>
<td>April Meadow, Director  Human Services Department  455 North Rexford Dr., Suite 210  Beverly Hills, CA 90210  <a href="http://www.beverlyhills.org/presence/connect/CoBH/Homepage/Local+Government/Departments+and+Offices/Human+Services">http://www.beverlyhills.org/presence/connect/CoBH/Homepage/Local+Government/Departments+and+Offices/Human+Services</a></td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix D: Entities Contacted (Continued)

Bloomington
Director
Employee Services
City Hall
401 N. Morton St.
Bloomington, Indiana 47404
http://www.city.bloomington.in.us/

Boston
Vivian Leonard, Director
Human Resources
Room 612
1 City Hall Plaza
Boston, MA 02201
http://www.cityofboston.gov/contact/default.asp

Boulder
Director
Human Resources
1777 Broadway
Boulder, CO 80302
http://www.ci.boulder.co.us/hroe/

Brattleboro
Director
Human Resources
230 Main St # 208
Brattleboro, VT 05301

Brewster (Town of)
Charles Sumner
Town Administrator
2198 Main St
Brewster, MA 02631
http://www.town.brewster.ma.us/

Brookline
John Dunlap
Human Resources
Town Hall, 333 Washington Street
Brookline, MA 02445
http://www.town.brookline.ma.us/humanresources/

Broward County
Division of Human Resources
Human Resources Staffing Center Annex B
115 South Andrews Avenue
Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301
http://www.broward.org/Guests/hui03400.htm

Burien
Director
Human Resources
415 S.W. 150th Street
Burien, WA 98166-1973
http://www.ci.burien.wa.us/

Burlington
Harry Snyder
Human Resources Director
149 Church Street
Burlington, VT 05401-8489
http://www.hrjobs.ci.burlington vt.us/

California
Public Employment Relations Board
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814-4174
http://www.perb.ca.gov/

Camden (Town of)
Beth MacDonald
Town Clerk's Office
29 Elm St.
Camden, ME 04843
http://town.camden.me.us/Town.cfm

Carrboro
Director Human Resources
Carrboro Town Clerk
301 W Main St
Carrboro, NC 27510
### Appendix D: Entities Contacted (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Contact Person</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>City, State Zip</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chapel Hill</td>
<td>Pam Eastwood, Director</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>Chapel Hill, NC 27516</td>
<td><a href="http://www.townofchapelhill.org/town_departments.htm">http://www.townofchapelhill.org/town_departments.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>121 North LaSalle Street Room 100</td>
<td>Chicago, IL 60602 <a href="https://w11.ci.chi.il.us/chi_dop/">https://w11.ci.chi.il.us/chi_dop/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claremont</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Personnel Department</td>
<td>P.O. Box 880, Claremont, CA 91711-0880</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ci.claremont.ca.us/">http://www.ci.claremont.ca.us/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland Heights</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Personnel Division</td>
<td>City Hall, 40 Severance Circle</td>
<td>Cleveland Heights, OH 44118 <a href="http://www.clevelandheights.com/">http://www.clevelandheights.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado Springs</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>PO Box 1575, M/C 1543 Colorado Springs, CO 80901-1575</td>
<td><a href="http://www.springsgov.com/SectionIndex.asp?SectionID=17">http://www.springsgov.com/SectionIndex.asp?SectionID=17</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concord</td>
<td>Greg Jones, Assistant City Manager/Director of Human Resources</td>
<td>1950 Parkside Drive, MS/30 Concord, CA 94519</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ci.concord.ca.us/hr/hr.htm">http://www.ci.concord.ca.us/hr/hr.htm</a></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Connecticut Department of Labor</td>
<td>Communications &amp; Public Information</td>
<td>200 Folly Brook Boulevard Wethersfield, CT 06109</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/gendocs/telephone.htm">http://www.ctdol.state.ct.us/gendocs/telephone.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contra Costa County</td>
<td>Eileen K. Bitten, Assistant Director</td>
<td>Human Resources Department</td>
<td>651 Pine Street, 2nd Floor Martinez, CA 94553-1292</td>
<td><a href="http://www.co.contra-costa.ca.us/">http://www.co.contra-costa.ca.us/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook County</td>
<td>Mark Kilgallon</td>
<td>Human Resources Department</td>
<td>118 North Clark Street Room # 834 Chicago, IL 60602</td>
<td><a href="http://www.co.cook.il.us/agencyDetail.php?pAgencyID=9">http://www.co.cook.il.us/agencyDetail.php?pAgencyID=9</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Corvallis</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Personnel Division</td>
<td>P.O. Box 1083 Corvallis, OR 97339-1083</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ci.corvallis.or.us/index.php">http://www.ci.corvallis.or.us/index.php</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cromwell (Town of)</td>
<td>Director Human Resources</td>
<td>Town Clerk's Office</td>
<td>41 West St Cromwell, CT 06416-2142</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cromwellct.com/default.htm">http://www.cromwellct.com/default.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland County</td>
<td>Human Resources Director</td>
<td>Executive Department</td>
<td>142 Federal Street Portland, ME 04101</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cumberlandcounty.org/EXECmain.html">http://www.cumberlandcounty.org/EXECmain.html</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: Entities Contacted (Continued)

Dane County
Harriett B. Rowland, Manager
Employee Relations Division
Room 418, City-County Building, 210 Martin Luther
King Jr. Blvd.
Madison, WI 53703
http://www.co.dane.wi.us/emprel/emplrel.htm

Decatur
Director
Human Resources
P.O. Box 220
Decatur, GA 30031
http://www.decatur-ga.com/

DeKalb County
Director
Human Resources
1300 Commerce Drive, Room 100
Decatur, GA 30030
http://www.co.dekalb.ga.us/meritcom.htm

Denver
Bill Miles
Director
1437 Bannock St.
Denver, CO 80202
http://www.denvergov.org/HROffice/659contact.asp

District of Columbia
Director
DC Office of Personnel
441 4th Street, NW, Suite 300S
Washington, DC 20001
http://dcop.dc.gov/main.shtm

Durham
Alethea C. Bell, Director
Human Resources
101 City Hall Plaza
Durham, NC 27701
http://www.ci.durham.nc.us/departments/hr/

East Granby (Town of)
Director Human Resources
East Granby Town Clerk
9 Center St.
East Granby, CT 06026

East Lansing
Sally Schepis, Compensation/Benefits Manager
Human Resources
410 Abbott Rd., Rm 101
East Lansing, MI 48823
http://www.cityofeastlansing.com/

Eastchester
Jim Cavanaugh
Town Supervisor
40 Mill Road
Eastchester, NY 10709
http://d896788.u33.xonos.com/departments/supervisor.htm

Eugene
Director
Human Resource and Risk Services
777 Pearl Street
Eugene, OR 97401
http://www.ci.eugene.or.us/HRRS/HRRS.htm

Exeter (Town of)
Barbara Blenk, Director
Human Resources
10 Front Street
Exeter, NH 03833
http://www.exeternh.org/tm/index.html

Gainesville
Director
Human Resources
P.O. Box 490
Gainesville, FL 32602-0490
http://hr.cityofgainesville.org/
Appendix D: Entities Contacted (Continued)

Glendale
Brandy Turner, Human Resources Manager
Human Resources
950 South Birch St.
Glendale, CO 80246
http://www.glendale.co.us/departments/HR/

Greenburgh (Town of)
Terry Pasquale, Personnel Manager
P.O. Box 205
Elmsford, NY 10523
http://www.greenburghny.com/Cit-e-Access/ContactInfo/?TID=10&TPID=1429

Gresham
John McMillan, Director
Human Resources Department
1333 NW Eastman Parkway
Gresham, OR 97030
http://www.ci.gresham.or.us/departments/hrd/

Hartford
Elizabeth Dunn
Personnel Department
550 Main St. 1st Floor - Room G3
Hartford, CT 06103
http://www.hartford.gov/personnel/

Ingham County
Harold Hailey, Director
Human Resources
5303 S. Cedar St.
Lansing, MI 48911
http://www.ingham.org/pe/data.htm

Iowa City
Sylvia Mejia
Personnel
410 E Washington St.
Iowa City, IA 52240
http://www.icgov.org/dept.asp

Ithaca
Schelley Michell-Nunn
Director of Human Resources
Second Floor of City Hall, 108 East Green Street
Ithaca, NY 14850
http://www.ci.ithaca.ny.us/index.asp?Type=B_BASI_C&SEC={446AAC99-54F8-4EAC-80FF-ECA09D2C8341}

Kalamazoo
Director
Human Resources
241 W. South Street
Kalamazoo, MI 49007
http://www.ci.kalamazoo.mi.us/

Key West
Director, Sandy Gilbert
Human Resources Department
P.O. Box 1409
Key West, FL 33041-1409
http://www.keywestcity.com/

King County
Anita Whitfield, Manager of Human Resources
King County Administration Bldg.
500 Fourth Ave., M.S. ADM-HR-0450
Seattle, WA 98104
http://www.metrokc.gov/ohrm/

Laguna Beach
Director
Human Resources
505 Forest Avenue
Laguna Beach, CA 92651
http://4.18.61.11/hr/employment.htm

Lawrence
Director
Human Resources
6 East 6th Street
Lawrence, KS 66044
http://www.lawrencehumanrelations.org/index2.html
### Appendix D: Entities Contacted (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Beach</td>
<td>Long Beach</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department of Human</td>
<td>Department of Human</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>333 West Ocean Blvd,</td>
<td>333 West Ocean Blvd,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Floor</td>
<td>13th Floor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Beach, CA 90802</td>
<td>Long Beach, CA 90802</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.ci.long-beach.ca.us/hr/index.htm">http://www.ci.long-beach.ca.us/hr/index.htm</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>700 East Temple Street</td>
<td>700 East Temple Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, CA 90012</td>
<td>Los Angeles, CA 90012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Los Angeles County</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
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<td>Los Angeles County Human</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>3333 Wilshire Blvd</td>
<td>3333 Wilshire Blvd</td>
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<tr>
<td>Los Angeles, CA 90010</td>
<td>Los Angeles, CA 90010</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/jobs.html">http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/jobs.html</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/jobs.html">http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/jobs.html</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rm. 501, City-County Bldg.</td>
<td>Rm. 501, City-County Bldg.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madison, WI 53703</td>
<td>Madison, WI 53703</td>
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<td><a href="http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/jobs.html">http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/jobs.html</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/jobs.html">http://www.ci.madison.wi.us/jobs.html</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mansfield</td>
<td>Mansfield</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 S Eagleville Rd., CT</td>
<td>4 S Eagleville Rd., CT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storrs Mansfield, CT 06268</td>
<td>Storrs Mansfield, CT 06268</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marin County</td>
<td>Marin County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura S. Armor</td>
<td>Laura S. Armor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3501 Civic Center Drive</td>
<td>3501 Civic Center Drive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Rafael, CA 94903</td>
<td>San Rafael, CA 94903</td>
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<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>One Ashburton Place</td>
<td>One Ashburton Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCormack Building</td>
<td>McCormack Building</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boston, MA 02108</td>
<td>Boston, MA 02108</td>
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<tr>
<td><a href="http://www.state.ma.us/hrd/">http://www.state.ma.us/hrd/</a></td>
<td><a href="http://www.state.ma.us/hrd/">http://www.state.ma.us/hrd/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Miami Beach</td>
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<tr>
<td>T.C. Adderly, Director</td>
<td>T.C. Adderly, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>Human Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1700 Convention Center Drive</td>
<td>1700 Convention Center Drive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miami Beach, FL 33139</td>
<td>Miami Beach, FL 33139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlebury</td>
<td>Middlebury</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources Director</td>
<td>Human Resources Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlebury Town Clerk</td>
<td>Middlebury Town Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 Main St., VT</td>
<td>94 Main St., VT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middlebury, VT 05753</td>
<td>Middlebury, VT 05753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Employee Relations</td>
<td>Department of Employee Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 East Wells Street</td>
<td>200 East Wells Street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee, WI 53202-3554</td>
<td>Milwaukee, WI 53202-3554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Viejo</td>
<td>Mission Viejo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Division</td>
<td>Personnel Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200 Civic Center</td>
<td>200 Civic Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Viejo, CA 92691</td>
<td>Mission Viejo, CA 92691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monroe County</td>
<td>Monroe County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheila Barker, Director</td>
<td>Sheila Barker, Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Services Department</td>
<td>Administrative Services Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100 Simonton St. 2-268</td>
<td>1100 Simonton St. 2-268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key West, FL 33040</td>
<td>Key West, FL 33040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D: Entities Contacted (Continued)

Monterey County
Director
Human Resources Division
230 Church Street, Building 3
Salinas, CA 93901
http://www.co.monterey.ca.us/personnel/location.htm

Montgomery County
Benefits Administration and Records Management
101 Monroe Street
Rockville, MD 20850
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/content/ohr/index.cfm

Multnomah County
Benefits Administration
Human Resources
PO Box 14700
Portland, OR 97293-0700
http://www.co.multnomah.or.us/dbcs/hr/

Nantucket
Personnel Officer
Town of Nantucket
16 Broad Street
Nantucket, MA 02554
http://www.town.nantucket.ma.us/employment/employment.html

New Castle County
Director
Human Resources
87 Reads Way
New Castle, DE 19720
http://www.co.newcastle.de.us/HumanResources/HumanResources1.htm

New Orleans
Director
Chief Administrative Office
1300 Perdido Street, Room 9E06
New Orleans, LA 70112
http://www.new-orleans.la.us/home/ucjobs/

New York
Public Information Officer
New York State Department of Labor
State Office Building Campus, Room 500
Albany, NY 12240-0003
http://www.labor.state.ny.us/agency/contact_us.html

New York City
Elizabeth Keller
Executive Director, Human Resources
New York City Department of Employment
220 Church Street
New York, NY 10013

North Stonington (Town of)
Director Human Resources
Town Clerk's Office
40 Main Street
North Stonington, CT 06359

Oak Park
Village of Oak Park
123 Madison Street
Oak Park, IL 60302
http://vil.oak-park.il.us/Human_Resources/Human_Resources.html

Oakland
Walter Johnson
Director of Personnel
One Frank H. Ogawa Plaza
Oakland, CA 94612
http://www.oaklandnet.com/government/op/OP_Site1/index.html

Oakland
Cathy Raymond, Human Resources Director
Human Resources Department
P.O. Box 1967
Olympia, WA 98507-1967
http://www.ci.olympia.wa.us/hr/
Appendix D: Entities Contacted (Continued)

Oregon
Eva Corbin, Deputy Administrator
Labor Relations
Human Resource Services Division
155 Cottage Street, NE U30
Salem, OR 97301-3967
http://www.hr.das.state.or.us/

Palo Alto
Leslie Loomis, Director
Human Resources Department
250 Hamilton Avenue
Palo Alto, CA 94301
http://www.cityofpaloalto.org/hr/

Petaluma
Dennis Morris
Director
11 English Steet
Petaluma, CA 94952
http://www.ci.petaluma.ca.us/hr/index.html

Philadelphia
Lynda Orfanelli, Director
Personnel Department
Municipal Services Building
16th Floor, 1401 JFK Blvd.,
Philadelphia, PA 19102-1675
http://www.phila.gov/personnel/contact.htm

Phoenix
Director
Human Resources
200 W Washington St
Phoenix, AZ 85003

Pima County
Gwyn Hatcher, Director
Human Resources Department
150 West Congress St., 4th Floor
Tucson, AZ 85701
http://www.co.pima.az.us/hr/index.html

Pittsburgh
Barbara M. Parees
Director
Personnel & Civil Service Commission
Room 431 City-County Building 414 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Portland
Human Resources
City Hall
Office, Room 115
389 Congress Street
Portland, ME 04101
http://www.ci.portland.me.us/jobs2.htm

Provincetown
Office of the Town Manager
Provincetown Town Hall
260 Commercial Street
Provincetown, MA 02657
http://www.provincetowngov.org/employ.html

Riverside County
Director
Human Resource Department
P.O. Box 1569
Riverside, CA 92502
http://www.co.riverside.ca.us:8080/hr/page71.html

Rochester
Employee Benefits Director
Bureau of Human Resource Management
30 Church St # 103a
Rochester, NY 14614
http://www.ci.rochester.ny.us/apps/ber/cityjobs.nsf
Appendix D: Entities Contacted (Continued)

Sacramento
Director
Personnel Services
921 Tenth Street
Sacramento, CA  95814
http://www.cityofsacramento.org/personnel/

Sacramento County
Director
Employee Benefits Office
700 H Street, 6th Floor
Sacramento, CA  95814
http://hra.co.sacramento.ca.us/employ/ben/content.html

San Diego
Director
Human Resources
202 C Street
San Diego, CA  92101
http://www.sannet.gov/directories/contact.shtml

San Diego County
Director
Human Resources
1600 Pacific Hwy., Rm 207
San Diego, CA  92101
http://www.co.sandiego.ca.us/cnty/cntydepts/general/human_resources/job.html

San Francisco
Andrea R. Gourdine
Human Resources Director
1 Dr. Carlton B. Goodlett Place
San Francisco, CA  94102
http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/site/dhr_index.asp?id=24

San Francisco County
Director
Human Resources
http://www.ci.sf.ca.us/site/dhr_index.asp?id=25

San Luis Obispo County
Richard Greek, Director
Personnel Department
County Government Center, Room 384
San Luis Obispo, CA  93408
http://www.co.slo.ca.us/Personnel_Inter.nsf/index.html?OpenPage

San Mateo County
Director
Human Resources
400 County Center
Redwood City, CA  94063
www.co.sanmateo.ca.us

Santa Barbara
Director
Human Resources
Post Office Box 1990
Santa Barbara, CA  93102-1990
http://ci.santa-barbara.ca.us/departments/administrative_services/human_resources/

Santa Barbara County
Scott Turnbull, Employee Benefits Manager
Human Resources Department
1226 Anacapa Street, Suite 1
Santa Barbara, CA  93101
http://www.countyofsfb.org/personnel/default.html

Santa Clara County
Director
Department of Human Resources
2221 Enborg Ln
San Jose, CA  95128
http://www.sccgov.org/site/0,4760,sid%253D11701,0.0.html

Santa Cruz
Erwin Young
Human Resources Director
809 Center Room 6
Santa Cruz, CA  95060
http://www.ci.santa-cruz.ca.us/
Appendix D: Entities Contacted (Continued)

Santa Cruz County
Director
Human Resources
701 Ocean Street
Santa Cruz, CA  95060
www.co.santa-cruz.ca.us

Scottsdale
Dan Schmidt, Director
Human Resources Department
3939 N. Drinkwater Bl
Scottsdale, AZ  85251
http://www.scottsdaleaz.gov/departments/deptDetail.asp?deptID=27

Seattle
Norma McKinney, Personnel Director
Personnel Department
Dexter Horton Bldg., 710 2nd Ave. 12th Floor
Seattle, WA  98104
http://www.cityofseattle.net/Personnel/

Simsbury (Town of )
Mary A. Miller, Human Resources Director
Human Resources Department
933 Hopmeadow Street
Simsbury, CT  06070
http://www.townofsimsbury.com/services/human.html

Snohomish County
Bridget Clawson, Director
Human Resources
3000 Rockefeller, M/S 503
Everett, WA  98201
http://www.co.snohomish.wa.us/humanres/index.htm

Sonoma County
Ray Myers, Director
Human Resources Department
575 Administration Dr Ste 116B
Santa Rosa, CA  95403
http://www.sonoma-county.org/hr/index.htm

Springfield
Joseph D. Dougherty
Personnel Department,
Room 018, City Hall
36 Court Street
Springfield, MA  01103
http://www.cityofspringfieldma.com/personnel.htm

Summit County
Director
Human Resources
PO Box 68
Breckenridge, CO  80424-0068
http://www.co.summit.co.us/HR/hr_home.html

Takoma Park
Director
Human Resources
7500 Maple Ave
Takoma Park, MD  20912
http://www.cityoftakomapark.org/jobs/index.html

Tempe
Director
Human Resources
20 E. Sixth Street
Tempe, AZ  85281
http://www.tempe.gov/hr/

Travis County
Linda Moore Smith, Director
Human Resources Management Department
1010 Lavaca St., 2nd Floor
Austin, TX  78701
http://www.co.travis.tx.us/human_resources/default.asp

Tucson
Director
Human Resources
P.O. Box 27210
Tucson, AZ  85726-7210
http://www.cityoftucson.org/humanre/index.html
Appendix D: Entities Contacted (Continued)

Tumwater
Eric Trimble, Director
General Services Department
555 Israel Rd. SW
Tumwater, WA 98501
http://www.ci.tumwater.wa.us/Departments/Personnel/person.htm

Vancouver
Director
Human Resources
610 Esther St.
Vancouver, WA 98660
http://www.ci.vancouver.wa.us/vanhrrs/hrrs.htm

Ventura County
Clare Turner, Deputy Director, Benefits
Human Resource Department
800 S Victoria Ave.
Ventura, CA 93009
http://www.ventura.org/hr/

Vermont
Anne V. Ginevan
Commissioner
Department of Employment and Training
PO Box 488, 5 Green Mountain Drive
Montpelier, VT 05601-0488
http://www.det.state vt.us/contact.cfm

Washington
Gene Matt, Director
Department of Personnel
Washington State
PO Box 47500
Olympia, WA 98504-7500
http://hr.dop.wa.gov/home.html

Washtenaw County
Director
Human Resources
220 North Main
Ann Arbor, MI 48107-8645
http://www.ewashtenaw.org/contactus.html

Wayne County
Director
Department of Personnel/Human Resources
Wayne County Building
600 Randolph, Room 107
Detroit, MI 48226
http://www.co.wayne.mi.us/personnel/job_default.htm

West Hollywood
Director
Human Resources
8300 Santa Monica Boulevard
West Hollywood, 90069
http://www.weho.org/index.cfm

West Palm Beach
Director
Human Resources
1000 45th Street, Suite 12
West Palm Beach, FL 33407
http://www.cityofwpb.com/hr.htm

Westchester County
Director
Westchester County Department of Human Resources
148 Martine Avenue, Suite 100
White Plains, NY 10601
http://www.westchestergov.com/hr/default.htm