

CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES AS FOUND IN
THE ARTICLES OF *ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY*

BY

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Abstract

The purpose of the Applied Research Project is to describe the content and methods used in recent Armed Forces & Society articles that deal with civil military relations in emerging democracies. This study examines how civil military relations are treated in 20 articles. Each article describes the state of civil military relations (or some facet of Civil-Military Relations) in a country that can be classified as non-Western and an emerging democracy. The articles are also "case studies". This study analyzes the case study methodology used in the articles.

The normative literature review derives from traditional Civil Military Relations literature. The conceptual framework consists of descriptive categories for the Civil-Military Relations such as the Civilian Control, Civil Military Problematic, Professionalism, Institutional Structures and Challenges. The study uses content analysis of the articles to do a meta-analysis. A methodological template (Jensen and Rodgers, 2001) is borrowed and incorporated in the coding sheet. The categories are rationalized into variables, data is aggregated through frequency distributions.

The results show that the cases in general do not discuss theory of civil-military relations substantially. Institutional structures are discussed more than other categories. Institutional structure consists of the role of the parliament and role of bureaucracy. There is limited discussion of professionalism. The recent articles (both forthcoming and a few already published) seem to be stronger with regard to theory and methodology.

It seems that emerging democracies have specific characteristics, sometimes shared across regions (such as Latin America, or Eastern and Central Europe, Africa, Asia). This

study defines the importance of continuing comparative studies, and the transnational influence of civil-military relations theory. Effective Civil-military relations are connected to the strength of democracy. This may well be a future study

Chapter One

Introduction

Armed Forces & Society is a leading peer-reviewed interdisciplinary and international journal. Its goal is spirited discussion about events and their policy consequences for the military and society at large. This journal facilitates together discussion from all social scientists in the areas of sociology, history, psychology, legal and economy. It is the interdisciplinary journal of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, a forum for the interchange and assessment of research and scholarship in the social and behavioral sciences focused on the military establishment and civil-military relations. The late Morris Janowitz, acknowledged as the founding father of military sociology founded the seminar in 1960. (*Armed Forces & Society* brochure, 2002)

The journal publishes on military establishments, civil military relations, the use and limit of force in armed conflicts and peacekeeping operations, security and other related topics. The journal publishes empirical, theoretical informed articles, research notes, book reviews and review essays. Its articles may adopt an interdisciplinary, comparative or historical prospective, use quantitative or qualitative methods and range from policy-relevant to theoretical themes, but they always meet high standards of scholarly argument, evidence and readability (*Armed Forces & Society*, website. 2002).

The role of military changes with time. Its challenging duty is to serve the nation and the world in responding to the needs of security and other functions the military assumes. Nowadays it is obvious that the role of military is not solely to protect and

maintain national security. Peacekeeping is an important function adding to the complexity of the civil-military relations. The phenomenon of terrorism demarks new challenges. The international arena suffers of unjust and aggressive military actions, thereby blurring the boundaries and relations between military and political leadership. The military role intensifies and coalesces when governments are corrupt and use the military to suppress citizens. Conversely, the military itself can overrule the governments and popular will. Civil-military theory addresses these issues of civilian control, and democratic civilian control. Where the armed forces are obedient and share the responsibility with the civilian leadership, elected democratically by the people.

Burk (forthcoming) analyzes the role of military to maintain and to protect the democratic values of its society. There is a distinction between the mature democratic countries and the rest of the world with regard to the civil military relations. Huntington and Janowitz founded the theory of civil-military relations in late twentieth century. The theory does not apply to developing countries in the main. There are many changes the world currently faces - especially after the Cold War - that increase with the danger of terrorism. Hence, there is room for Civil-Military Relations theory to broaden and investigate the issues in an international context.

Purpose

The purpose of this Applied Research Project is to describe the content and methods used in recent *Armed Forces & Society* articles that deal with civil military relations in emerging democracies. Hence, this study examines how civil military

relations are treated in these articles. Each one describes the state of civil military relations (or some facet of Civil-Military Relations) in a country and is a "case study."

Thus this study also analyzes the case study methodology used in the articles. Jensen and Rogers (2001:235) argue that case studies have the potential to contribute to a broader understanding of our world. As such, a set of cases as a whole should be analyzed (meta-analysis) in order to accumulate the knowledge contained in each. This study is, thus, a meta-analysis that attempts to gather the knowledge contained in these recent *Armed Forces & Society* case studies. Morris Janowitz is the key figure who has contributed many scholarly works of Civil-Military Relations theory. He was the editor of the journal *Armed Forces & Society*. This Applied Research Project is inspired by the current editor of *Armed Forces & Society*¹ and aims to generate suggestions. The current editor of the journal insists that the articles have accumulation of knowledge (at least for certain regions) and that they discuss the theory substantially.

Dr. Patricia Shields, the current editor of journal *Armed Forces & Society* wants to find out how the articles published in the journal are dealing with the theory of Civil-Military Relations. She insists that the articles have to link their research to the big picture in traditional theory. Janowitz wanted to extend the knowledge in the field, and this Applied Research Project aims at examining if the articles deal with overlapping issues. How aware are the authors of a transnational impact of the civil-military relations.

¹This project is to help the editor who is director and advisor of MPA program at Southwest Texas State University. Dr. Shields was pleased I undertook this project because of my ethnicity from an Emerging democratic country of Southeast Europe, Albania, less likely to be biased and have an interest and familiarity with the region. Further suggestions are made to the editor for authors in the future.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter 2 describes the civil military relations as a normative theory and identifies the theoretical constructs as found in literature. This chapter sets the foundation for the conceptual framework, which is used to organize the empirical portion of the research. Chapter 2 includes literature on Civilian control, the civil-military problematic and professionalism in the military.

Chapter 3 connects the importance of the case study and accumulation of knowledge technique to contribute in the field. This chapter introduces the template borrowed from Jensen and Rodgers (2001) (see Table 3.1) which is used as the coding sheet for accumulation of knowledge technique of the research.

Chapter 4 includes the content accumulation of knowledge, content analysis methodology on twenty case studies (twenty journal articles). Chapter 5 discusses the results of the statistical analysis, frequency distribution. Chapter 6 summarizes the applied research findings and offers conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter Two

Civil-Military Relations

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to describe and define aspects of civil-military relations in traditional literature. This chapter provides the foundation for the conceptual framework, which later is converted to categories for the content analysis portion of empirical analysis. The literature review is substantially based on scholarly works of Morris Janowitz and Samuel Huntington, the two deans of Civil-Military Relations theory and other contemporary scholars who view civil-military relations theory after the major changes such as the end of Cold war or the anti-terrorism war.

Civil-military relations are one aspect of national security policy. The aim of national security policy is to enhance the safety of the nation's social, economic, and political institutions against threats arising from other independent states.... Civil-military relations are the principal institutional component of military security policy (Huntington, 1957:1).

Morris Janowitz and Samuel Huntington are two founders of modern Civil-Military Relations theory. Their scholarship has guided the research on Civil-Military Relations for over 50 years. Currently, changes in the world stage make these theories less applicable.

Janowitz² (1977) argues that there is insufficient study of Civil-Military Relations in developing countries. The main problematic of modern theory is the balance between maintaining military force strong enough to protect and sustain democratic values of the society, and the civilian control to be able to prevent any military takeover of the government. Initial sections of this literature review define elements of the field of Civil-

Military Relations. James Burk (forthcoming) views the field theory in normative terms. He maintains that it is a major concern how Civil-Military Relations sustain and protect democratic values. This is a highly complicated issue, all the more so after the end of the 'Cold War'. In the West, the United States emerged as a single super power without a well-defined threat. Complicated tasks of peacekeeping and anti-terrorism now command more attention. The Eastern Block saw its political and economic systems turned to on their heads. In both the East and West, ways of understanding the role of the military as a security and political institution changed. The external 'enemy' is no longer a large threat. For example, in the case of Eastern Europe transition from a Communist system to a democracy produces internal questions of finding a role and place for a military that is compatible and supportive with emerging democratic institutions. Hence, the militaries of 2002 function under different circumstances and are often under stress. The remainder of this chapter summarizes and synthesizes the normative nature of Civil-Military Relations and identifies and defines some key theoretical constructs central to the discussion.

Civilian Control

In established democracies, civilian control is not a problem, but in emerging democracies, this issue is more complicated. This chapter describes the normative nature of Civil-Military theory as found in literature. Huntington (1957) says that it is difficult to define 'civilian control', although the rise of the military profession helped to define it.

Objective civilian control as opposed to **subjective civilian control** is an important distinction in democratic civil-military relations.

² Janowitz was also the first editor of the well-known international journal *Armed Forces & Society*.

Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilizing the military. Whereas objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state. The essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism. (Huntington, 1957:83)

Objective civilian control is dependent on a professional officer corps. “A highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority with the state.” (Huntington, 1957: 84) Huntington maintains that this relationship explains the limits of the military power. Objective civilian control increases agreement among the civilian groups and the professional officer corps thereby obeys the civilian legitimate institutions. Military power is minimized and military security is therefore enhanced. Huntington suggests that 'objective' control is most evident in democracies, whereas 'subjective' control happens more frequently in undemocratic situations. He further maintains that civilian sector is better off if it refrains from military matters; and conversely, the military benefits from keeping out of politics. Janowitz agrees with Huntington when Huntington says that military should be “politically neutral”, but Janowitz refers to the phrase as "problematic", because democratic theory requires military professionals to be neutral, non-partisan, and fully committed to the rules of the political process. (Janowitz, 1977) Janowitz argues that "subjective" civilian control also occurs when the military wants to check the civilian government. This last argument explains subjective civilian control in some Latin American and African countries.

Peter Feaver (1996) believes that an expert (such as a military general) is not in position to determine the value the people will ascribe to various issues. Only civilians can decide the level of acceptable risk for society. Civilians are supposed to remain the

political masters. "The military quantifies the risk, the civilian judges it. Only civilians can say what probability of success they are willing to pay for, when the military can say technically the level of armaments. Civilians have the right to be wrong" (Feaver, 1996: 154). Robert Dahl maintains that civilians are politically and morally competent to make decisions even if they do not possess the relevant technical expertise (As cited in Feaver 1996).

Janowitz points out that the most successful military regimes are or will be those that are able to share political power with or even transform themselves into more civilian-based political institutions (Janowitz, 1977). "Janowitz understood civilian control in terms of societal control rather than state or institutional control" (Feaver, 1996).

Regarding the Civil-Military relations in Central and Eastern Europe, Cottey et al. (forthcoming) argue that there is a distorted conceptual focus on 'democratic control' of the armed forces. It assumes that the primary problems are the threat of a Praetorian military and that the solution has to enforce civilian executive control over it. Instead, the authors suggest that the relationship between democracy and civil-military relations needs to be understood in terms of democratic governance of the defense and security sector.³ Burk (forthcoming) is concerned about how civil-military relations can sustain and protect democratic values. He suggests that normative theory helps to grasp the field and further notes that democratic values in the case of when "Those with authority ought to be elected representatives of the people, and that these representatives ought to

³ Cottey et al. argue that the re-conceptualization of "democratic control" can be understood by shifting from the "first generation" problem (in Eastern and Central Europe) of reforming core institutions for the political control of armed forces to the 'second generation' problem of establishing effective structures for the democratic governance of the defense and security sector.

exercise ultimate authority over the uniformed military elite" (Burk, Pg.2). Burk further argues that in mature democracies, the central issue is how to maintain a military that sustains and protects democratic values at the same time.

Civil-Military problematic

The overall goal of the literature review is to describe and define central civil-military relations' theoretical constructs. The civil-military problematic is an important part to the overall theory.

According to Janowitz, (1961) the professional soldier, by definition of military honor, is "above politics" in domestic affairs. He maintains that military men⁴ are civil servants, therefore elected leaders are assured of the military's **partisan neutrality**.

Feaver (1996) maintains that the civil military problematic is logically paramount above other national security issues. The others serve as instruments, and are appraised according to how they assist or hinder the central civil-military challenge.

Obedience is another complex matter, even if there is no problem of a rapacious military. Will the military obey its civilian masters? The armed forces need the **coercive power** to protect society, but the risk is that the army may use that power to follow its own interests. Burk (forthcoming) maintains that relying on **coercion** as opposed to reason and persuasion can threaten liberal democratic values. He suggests that coercion should be minimized. Huntington notes:

The military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society. Military institutions, which reflect only social values, may be

⁴ Please note the use of the term "man" betokens the book's publication date, 1957.

incapable of performing effectively their military function. On the other hand, it may be impossible to contain within society military institutions shaped purely by functional imperatives. The interaction of these two forces is the nub of the problem of civil-military relations (Huntington, 1957, pg. 2).

Huntington asserts that it is impossible to be expert in both military science and party politics.⁵ A point of view of Civil-Military Relations theory is that political involvement can be dysfunctional. "Participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism" (Huntington, 1957:72). If politics becomes central there is a risk that the profession will divide against itself. The military officer, Huntington notes, must remain **neutral politically**. "The area of military science is subordinate to, and yet independent of, the area of politics" (Huntington, 1957: 71). The military profession serves the ends of the state. Civilian control exists when there is a proper subordination of an autonomous profession to the ends of policy.⁶

The military man must be alert to the political implications of their military attitudes and be willing to accept the final decisions of the statesmen. The military man has to make his military plan first, and then adjust it to the needs as advised by political advisors (Huntington, 1957:72).

The military may be minimized by society to avoid a military coup, but a small or weak military increases the external threat. The problem of a military coup is critical. There are other threats to civilian control the military poses such as failing to obey directions or abusing delegated authority (Feaver, 1996). Huntington maintains that the military has to be strong enough to face its enemies, and correspondingly wield coercive power. "Because of this power, it may enforce its will to the community that created it....

⁵ Military is very specialized. "Is divided into constant and variable components". Constant being the human nature and physical geography. The variable being tactics, logistics. (Huntington, 1957, Pg. 71)

⁶ The responsibilities of the military man are 1. Representative function "To represent the claims of military security within the state machinery" 2. Advisory role, to analyze the implications of the alternative actions of state on military point of view. 3. "Executive function, to implement state decisions with respect to military security" whatever decision it is, even if it is against his opinion.

A direct seizure of political power by the military is the traditional worry of civil-military relations theory” (Feaver, 1996: 152).

Huntington (1957) maintains that the **balance of power** and respect between the civilian and military groups is the key to avoid uncalculated risks. Douglas Bland (as cited by Cottey et. al, forthcoming) argues that the assumption about the problematic civil-military relationship is flawed. He suggests that civilian control of military is best understood through regimes of '**shared responsibility**' between the civilian leaders and military officers.

Cottey et al. (forthcoming) argue that democratic civil-military relations need to be conceptualized in terms of democratic legitimacy, governance and accountability of a state's civil-military relations. They maintain that this re-conceptualization of civil-military relations more explicitly incorporates the relationship between democracy and the military and suggest five refinements of the theory. First, the main problematic of civil-military relations should not be focused only on the threat of military coup, but also should be seen in a different and broader approach than the concept of military Praetorianism. Second, civil-military relations should incorporate a wider conception of democratic control of armed forces including foreign policies. Democratic control of armed forces, the authors argue, implies that the definition and development of defense policy should be under the control of democratic authorities, and the military should restrict itself to implementing their decisions. Third, civil-military relations should include ways to prioritize executive control of the military. Democracy should involve a **balance of power** between the executive, legislature and judiciary (or in other countries the respective democratic powers). Democratic societies also have wider public debate

with respect to key issues such as national security policy. Fourth, investigating carefully the meaning of terms 'military' and 'armed forces'⁷ and the last term should be the primary focus of attention. Fifth, should not restrict the problem as only 'institutionalist' debates. It is important to think of civil military relations in a holistic manner.⁸ Effective civil-military relations take into account the larger democratic milieu - both institutional and political. A chief executive who functions in this kind of democratic environment determines priorities.

The role of the military has changed over time. For example, at present the military engages in peacekeeping and humanitarian **functions**. The new and various military functions complicate the issue of civil-military relations. The coercive power the military has can create problems during implementation of these functions. After September 11, the military in the US has taken on additional security duties, such as safeguarding airports and public institutions from terrorist attacks. Obedience of the military to democratic control is crucial. The literature suggests that a professional officer corps is a necessary component of effective civil-military relations.

Professionalism and military

Civil-military relations' theory demonstrates the importance of professionalism in the military. Both founders of Civil-Military relations (Huntington and Janowitz) theory concur with Feaver (1996) about the role of professionalism in the military corps.

Huntington (1957) suggests that professionalism distinguishes the military officer of late

⁷ Regarding military forces in other countries, like in Eastern and Central Europe, there are other forces like paramilitary and interior ministry forces, that are different than just usual (i.e. navy, airforce and army); like in the case of Kosovo, Milosevic used other forces than the military. (Cotter et al. forthcoming)

20th century from the fighters of previous ages. The existence of the officer corps as a professional body gives the modern problem of civil-military relations a unique character. The shift in the officer corps from amateurism to professionalism was virtually always associated with a shift in the rank and file from career soldiers to citizen soldiers.

“The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man” (Huntington, 1957:7). Huntington (1957) maintains that professionalism is the characteristic of the modern officer as it is the characteristic of a doctor. A professional officer commands respect, as opposed to the politician who may command power or the businessman who may command income. The career officer is professional in the sense of one who pursues a 'higher calling' or vocation in the service of society.

Huntington (1957) distinguishes the characteristics of a career officer as: 1) expertise, 2) responsibility, and 3) corporatism. Expertise is acquired through prolonged education and experience. A soldier's expertise is a segment of the cultural tradition of society. Responsibilities need to be more fully developed. Corporatism refers to officers as members of a profession that share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen (Huntington, 1957). The military profession is monopolized by the state versus other professions such as medicine. “The principal focus of civil-military relations is the relation of the officer corps to the state” (Huntington, 1957:3).

The military profession exists to serve the state. Military force is a hierarchy of obedience. Each level within must be able to have loyal and instantaneous obedience of subordinate levels. Without these

⁸ In Central and Eastern Europe, the 'first generation' reform, the authors refer to as structural reform. But now they suggest that after a decade from the end of Cold War, the problem is 'second generation', which is about the consolidation of the structural framework and filling these structures with 'substance'. Which are related to issues state capacity. (Cotter et al. forthcoming)

relationships, the military professionalism is impossible. **Obedience** is the military virtue upon which all other virtues exist (Huntington, 1957:73).

"A professional officer is imbued with the ideal of service to the nation" (Huntington, 1957:35). The military leader favors protecting the state through guarantees and alliances, on condition that these will increase the strength, rather than the commitments to those (Huntington, 1957). The military leader has an important role in one of the power structures in society.

It is the people and the politicians, public opinion and governments, who start wars. It is the military who have to fight them. Military force does not cause wars. The military ethic thus draws a sharp distinction between armed strength and bellicosity, the military state and the warlike state (Huntington, 1957:70).

The first uses ordered power, "discipline, hierarchy, restraint, steadfastness" (Huntington, 1957: 70). Irresponsible enthusiasm, violence, and adventure characterize the second. As a result the military man is usually against immediate involvement in war.

Cottey et al. (forthcoming) argues that "**shared responsibility**" between civilian leaders and military officers is important to maintain civilian control. A well-trained professional officer corps understands the limits and benefits of democratic values. Burk (forthcoming) argues that it is important for civil-military relations theory to understand the democratic values that the military is supposed to protect and sustain. Burk further analyzes that Huntington's liberal theory centers on protecting democracy, whereas Janowitz's civic republican theory focuses on sustaining democratic values. Burk finds Janowitz's theory preferable because Janowitz recognizes that the boundaries between the military and the political spheres are blurred, and, as a result there may be new forms of

tension between them. Overall, Burk suggests a unified theory where the military should protect and sustain the democratic values and practices of its society.

Further research and experience on the topic will enhance the underlying paradigm. Huntington and Janowitz's theory led the field for half a century, especially for established democracies. Their theory is less applicable for the developing countries as Janowitz suggests.

Developing nations

The civil-military relations problematic as presented here, focuses on established democracies. The study of civil-military relations in developing countries adds both new questions and complicates the issue. The overall applied research project focuses on the civil-military relations in emerging democracies as discussed in recent articles of *Armed Forces & Society*. The next section discusses the limited literature that deals with civil military relations in developing countries.

Janowitz (1967) notes that the notion of a "conservative military" (well understood in industrial countries) has no meaning for developing nations. In stable industrialized societies militaries exist to "conserve" the existing order (this is associated with an existing nation state). Whereas, in developing countries, societies are often unstable and militaries might be associated with a former revolutionary movement that has recently gained power. Alternatively, in some African countries loyalties are fixed to tribe⁹ rather than a nation state. What happens with civil-military relations when the military is primarily composed of one tribe and a new president is elected from another

⁹ Or in some other places like in Balkan (former republic of Yugoslavia), or Afghanistan.

(possibly antagonistic) tribe? Developing nations may have different systems or institutional structure than the Western nations. There may be a way to consider and involve their history, culture and regional characteristics. Practically “Military institutions of the developing nations have been based on the wholesale transplantation of Western military technology and, in varying degrees, of Western organizational format” (Janowitz, 1977:13). Janowitz (1977) argues that in Western industrialized nations with parliamentary regimes, the **institutional separation of forces of national** defense from the agencies of internal policing is considered vital for the maintenance of democratic society. In developing nations this separation is less in demand and frequently missing.

The role of coercion in the developing nations requires a perspective that encompasses more than the military, one that can include coercive institutions, such as police and paramilitary formations, and the various forms of repression. The relative absence of coercion in the initial seizure of power gives way to more reliance on 'systemic' coercive control to maintain power. However, it must be continually emphasized that these levels hardly approximate those of totalitarian regimes (Janowitz, 1977: 20).

Janowitz (1977) maintains that most studies of developing nations focus on the barriers – economic, social, and cultural – to development or the special conditions under which economic growth takes place. This approach neglects the critical role of institution building in developing countries that indicates a regime's capacity to govern - as shown by its ability to consolidate and remain in power - is related more to its institution building capacities than economic, social or cultural barrier to development. Institution at the center of concern usually deal with the maintenance of internal and external security. Clearly the military has a key role here. A nation’s military leaders are self-conscious men who come to recognize that the fate of their nation is related to regional and international developments.

More study is needed in the international arena – including developing countries in the field of civil-military relations. Janowitz (1977) further notes that there is significant scholarship about languages, cultures and history “Rather than the analysis of a societal perspective and the particular effect of military institutions” (Janowitz, 1977:11). This type of assessment was neither complete nor extensive. He suggested ways that the study of military institutions and their influence on society (and vice versa) could be more comprehensive. Janowitz concerns addressed a world where the Cold War dominated. The current world security environment has subsequently changed. Cottey et al. (forthcoming) suggest needed refinement in civil-military relations theory. The overall relations in the world are less protected by national boundaries. The shrinking of the earth has made transnational interconnections inescapable. The research in the field is mainly about the Civil-Military Relations in mature democratic countries. James Burk (forthcoming) maintains that military regulation --even among mature democracies-- is not a matter only for national governments. Transnational coalitions are a necessity. This is even truer for emerging democracies. More in-depth analysis of these institutions is needed.

Civil-Military Relations theory is relatively new, only half a century old. Additional contributions to the field are needed. A comprehensive framework is necessary, which will guide the contemporary issues in the field. The need for guidance is urgent for the developing countries, where the arms and trained killers are often without coherent control. As Burk says: “The domain of democratic civil-military relations theory is vaster today and demands a more varied and comprehensive theory than it has yet received” (Burk, forthcoming: 23). *Armed Forces & Society* is an example of a journal

that promotes further study in the field especially trying to enhance the international dialogue about the civil-military relations in both mature and emerging democracies.

Institutional Structures

Role of Executive and Bureaucracy

Cottey et al. (forthcoming) make a strong case that there are unique issues and perspectives that should be taken into account in modern civil military relations theory. The remainder of this chapter examines the problems and the development of democratic institutions in young democracies that support civil military relations and visa versa. Defense policymaking, its development and implementation are keys to democratic control of armed forces. Cottey et al. (forthcoming) maintains that this is dependent on state capacity: the state's ability to provide **political leaders** with the necessary information and analyses; a realistic assessment of resources available for policies and relations between the resources and policy choices; and the **bureaucratic structures** necessary to implement policy decisions. In addition to macro level institutions, (defense ministry), qualified trained civil servants at lower levels of government are important. "In a democracy a key principle is that the bureaucratic administration should enable the democratically legitimized **executive** to assert its political authority" (Cottey et al. forthcoming:13).

'**Civilianization**' of defense bureaucracies has been an important element in the consolidation of democratic armed forces in central and Eastern European countries. Several problems with civilianization of armed forces have been identified. First, newly appointed civilians have limited knowledge and experience in defense and security matters. Second, political appointees' positions are often unstable because they change

with government bureaucracy. Third, low pay of civil servants, as compared to the private sector, is also problematic. Finally the lack of **technical systems** for management of complex policy issues (such as the defense budget) makes implementation of the policies challenging. As result, top policy makers may rely on the military sidestepping the civilian bureaucracy.

Along with the bureaucratic role in civil-military relations, the legislative branch has major part in increasing democratic control.

Role of Legislature

Legislative bodies or parliament play a vital role in democratic control of the armed forces and civil-military relations in general. Cottey et al. (forthcoming) suggest that a problem that Central and Eastern European countries face is "The development of effective systems for **parliamentary oversight** of civil military relations and defense policy". (Cottey et al. forthcoming:12) The authors argue that the democratically elected legislature is the institutional expression of popular accountability. The elected officials examine and approve legislation and broad public policy and defense budget.

The role of the legislature in civil military relationships is crucial. Laws and effective oversight of parliament of armed forces depends on both "The formal constitutional or legally defined powers of the legislature and the capacity of the legislature to exercise those powers in an effective and meaningful way in practice" (Cottey et al. forthcoming:16). Lack of parliamentary interest in defense and security issues; limited access to information; a lack of resources to support the oversight function; and a lack of expertise among parliamentarians are some of the problems that Central and Eastern European countries are facing in regard to parliamentary oversight.

NATO is trying to raise the defense and security questions in the political agenda of member countries, which have the tendency to push the defense and civil-military issues down the parliamentary agenda because of other priorities. NATO membership or candidacy implies that parliaments of these countries should pay close attention to security issues. Another point is that in some of these countries, even though the parliament may possess extensive powers, its lack of **expertise**, interest, and information, compounds the reality, as a result there is very little oversight.

'Second Generation' Challenges for Central and Eastern Europe countries.

There is a divergence between the emerging and the mature democracies in what the theory should address. The theories that stem from the Janowitz' and Huntington's ideas may assume functional in place of democratic institutions. Their civil-military relations theory takes into account institutional capability as the stages of democratic development evolve. In other words, how do the leaders of young democracies develop a defense policy that includes planning and implementation? This section deals with the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern European countries. During the first 10 years since the end of Cold War institutional structures were established and adjusted to the new democratic states. The next steps of implementing these structures and principles are new challenges for these countries. These countries are struggling with formulating and implementing effective security policy. Cottey et al. (forthcoming) explore problems that are faced in 'second generation' challenge for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

"The **engagement of 'civil society'** as a core component of oversight and accountability in defense and security" (Cottey et al.) is an important element of democratic civil-military relations that is usually neglected. Civil society includes formal and informal organizations and groups that contribute to the issues of defense and security policy such as: media, **non-governmental organizations**, and defense academics in universities (Cottey et al.). Cottey et al. maintain that civil society helps in three functions: first, it is an alternative, non-governmental source of information on defense and security sector, second, civil society provides the opportunity for popular input, criticism on defense and security issues, and third, it can act as an important mechanism for holding other actors in the civil-military relationship to be accountable.

Expertise of parliamentary oversight is another challenge. Most of the parliamentarians are not military officers knowledgeable in the field and hence depend on the military to inform them. Such information is usually biased, and insufficient.

Burk (forthcoming) suggests that **transparency** is important for checks and balances among branches of governments in order to prevent abuse of power. The interest in defense and security policies is also key to keep the process current. Most of Central and Eastern European countries face serious economic pressures. People are less concerned with military and defense issues, rather than economic security as the focus of attention. Hence, the parliamentarians shift their attention to economic and other immediate crisis. It is a major challenge to shift interest to defense and security issues. But now, with the terrorism being so close as the ear to one's face, the governments, parliaments and people in the world will realize how important it is to have mature and

healthy civil-military relations. Widening and deepening of the practice of democratic governance of defense is what is needed in the emerging democracies.

The role of international organizations such as creation of European Union and NATO, Burk (Forthcoming) says that criteria for member or candidate nations have to meet. A problem is that the well-established nations are imposing the same homogenous standards for the developing countries that they expect for themselves. The example of these two international organizations shows the efforts to be made for cooperation at the transnational level. Cottey et al. (forthcoming) maintain that the conditionality of close integration with NATO has increased the importance of defense and security among governments. Burk (forthcoming) suggests that besides military activity, cooperation with **civilian organizations**, which are often (sovereignty free and independent), is required in humanitarian intervention.

Corruption is not a characteristic of professional armed forces. Burk (forthcoming) maintains that active citizen participation will help to avoid it. Corruption remains a challenge for the emerging democracies. Their leaders are often involved in scandals, a major test for civil societies.

Internal Security Forces

In some countries such as in the Balkans, where a nation is composed of several ethnic groups, often in disagreement, the civilian leadership has found it necessary to have some loyal 'internal forces'. These forces should not be used to violate the human rights or kill innocent civilians and citizens, as Milosevic used them in Kosova and Bosnia. Cottey et al. (forthcoming: 22) suggest that more research is needed about the

"nature, role and governance of interior ministry troops, paramilitary police and other non-regular armed forces".

Conceptual Framework

Civil military relations chapter is based on the conceptual framework as derived from literature (Refer to Table 2.1). **Civilian control** is a primary concern. As Janowitz argues since the military receives more than half of the budget, civilian control has to be stronger. Scholars in the field discuss this topic heavily. Huntington, on the other hand, says that objective rather than subjective civilian control is more effective. The other categories outlined in the literature are: professionalism; relations with international organizations; and the role of governmental branches. Other categories outlined in the literature are: the civil military relations problematic, professionalism and military, Institutional structures and Second Generation challenges.

Civil military problematic is distinguished by coercive power that the military should have in order to protect and maintain the security of the country and democracy; -- but, at the same time, with all this coercive power, the military must obey the civilian leadership; balanced power; partisan neutrality, and functions of the military other than security. The power is a problem that distinguishes the civil-military relations. The literature discusses widely the dysfunction and negative effect of the military if it gets involved in politics. Different functions that the military undertakes at present, adds to the complexity of problematic in general.

After discussion of the civil-military problematic, **professionalism** is identified as a solution from the founders of the civil-military relations theory. The Professional

Officer Corps is a model to serve the country and society's best interests. Shared responsibility between civilians and military will keep the balance of power.

Institutional Structures are another important category as discussed widely in literature by Burk and Cottey et al. The category is demarked by the Role of Executive, the Role of Bureaucracy, Technical Support and the Role of Legislative – all examined as part of foundation to the democratic structures. Government structures are essential for democracy to be strong. They are a foundation for its operation, protection and maintenance. When these institutions are firmly established, then policy planning and implementation can flow in an orderly manner. In emerging democracies, building structures of democratic institutions was a first generation issue. Currently, these countries are going through new challenges.

Such **Challenges** (second generation issues) are the last category of the conceptual framework. Some of the challenges are categorized as: engagement of 'civil society'; transparency/openness to public records; press and media; expertise of parliamentary oversight; civil autonomous organizations present; relations with international organization (status of membership with NATO for Europe); corruption and internal security forces. All these issues are tied together and examined in literature by Cottey et al. After the Cold War, emerging democracies have passed through a transition from dictatorship to democracy. There are surfeited lingering issues that do not allow effective changes to take place. The international organizations help to educate the public and push the governments of these countries to embrace transformation and reorganization. The democratic structure and governance are key to harmonized civil-military relations.

Table 2.1 Conceptual Framework tied to the literature

| | |
|--|--|
| <p>Civilian control</p> <p>Objective civilian control</p> <p>Subjective civilian control</p> | <p>Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1977), Feaver (1996), Burk (forthcoming)</p> |
| <p>Civil military problematic</p> <p>Coercive power</p> <p>Balanced power</p> <p>Partisan neutrality</p> <p>Obedience to the state leadership</p> <p>Functions of military other than security</p> | <p>Janowitz (1961), Feaver (1996), Burk (forthcoming), Huntington (1957), Cottey et al.(forthcoming) Feaver, '96</p> |
| <p>Professionalism and Military</p> <p>Professional Officer Corp [armed forces, army, Navy, Air force]</p> <p>Shared responsibility</p> | <p>Huntington (1957), Cottey et al.(forthcoming), Burk (forthcoming) Janowitz (1977)</p> |
| <p>Institutional Structures (Civilian leadership)</p> <p>Role of Executive</p> <p>Role of Bureaucracy</p> <p>Technical support</p> <p>Role of Legislative</p> | <p>Edmunds et al. (forthcoming) Burk (forthcoming) Janowitz '60</p> |
| <p>Challenges (2nd generation issues in case of Europe):</p> <p>Engagement of 'civic society'</p> <p>Transparency-openess to public records; Press and Media</p> <p>Expertise of parliamentary oversight</p> <p>Civil autonomous organizations present,</p> <p>Relations with International Organization (status of membership with NATO for Europe)</p> <p>Corruption</p> <p>Internal security forces</p> | <p>Cottey et al. (forthcoming) Burk (forthcoming) Feaver, '96</p> |

Chapter three

Case Study

Introduction

The examination of the articles in this study aims at extending Janowitz's tradition. He was the first editor of journal *Armed Forces & Society*. The overall purpose of this Applied Project is to describe the content and methods used in recent *Armed Forces & Society* articles that deal with civil military relations (as case studies) in emerging democracies. This chapter describes the case study technique as a method to enhance knowledge in the field of civil-military relations. The articles used in the analyses are case studies in themselves. This chapter also presents meta-analysis, the accumulation of knowledge method that is the overall method of this Applied Research Project.

Cottey et al. (forthcoming) suggest that a comparative study of the Defense and Security sector vis-à-vis bureaucratic-administrative reform is helpful. Janowitz has mentioned that earlier essays stimulated a number of **case studies** that have prepared the groundwork for a contemporary reassessment of military and coercion in the developing nations (Janowitz, 1967:12). It is thus appealing to examine some of the characteristics of case study technique. "Case studies contain golden nuggets that await discovery" (Jensen and Rodgers. 2001:236) Furthermore, Jensen and Rodgers (2001) developed a methodology to accumulate case studies. Their framework is used in this study and is elaborated in the chapter. "Qualitative case methods include many different approaches

and have enjoyed a resurgence and refinement in technique particularly in the past decade” (Orosz as cited by Jensen and Rodgers; 2001:238).

Definitions

Current analysis of civil-military relations in emerging democracies either is concerned with theory building or examines the state of civil-military relations in a particular country or two. These individual studies that look at a particular country are "case studies". As such they provide a snapshot of the issue and problems, solutions in civil-military relations in emerging democracies. There is little systematic analysis across a large set of countries. (Cottey et al. forthcoming)

Further Yin (1994:55) maintains that the "Case study research is among the hardest types of research to do". He notes that all research methodologies contain three conditions: the type of research question, the extent of control the investigator, and the focus is contemporary. Within this framework Yin (1994:23) defines a case study as an "empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used". In addition case study research "allows an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events – such as individual life cycles...and international relations" (Yin, 1994:14).

Meta-analyses, accumulation of knowledge

In *Armed Forces & Society* and the field of civil-military relations in general, the wisdom of the case study has not been systematically expounded-accumulated. "The foundation of science is the accumulation of knowledge from the results of many studies"

(Hunter et al. 1983:10). Jensen and Rodgers (2001)¹⁰ suggest that accumulation of knowledge problem of case studies can be solved by using meta-analysis. “Meta-analysis aims to solve the related issues of accumulation and generalizability; the accumulation of case studies using meta-analysis allows specific tests of generalizability. Meta-analysis is a method of combining findings across research studies that has become increasingly popular in the social sciences” (Hedges and Olkin 1985; Hunter et al. 1983).

Generalizability that sometimes is a problem for the case studies, can be achieved by meta-analysis.

When the findings of case studies are analyzed cumulatively, the foundation for both criticisms vanishes because the generalizability of each study is addressed while the richness of detail is preserved. A case study can be qualitative or quantitative. It may be descriptive without quantitative hypothesis testing and still contain useful information (Jensen and Rodgers. 2001:237).

A case study in itself uses a real-life context to uncover certain phenomenon and case studies lend themselves to multiple approaches and therefore a comprehensive research strategy (Yin, 94:13). Case studies have the potential to contribute both qualitatively and quantitatively. Jensen and Rodgers (2001) advocate using meta-analysis of case studies to accumulate knowledge.¹¹

The case study technique is widely used in the field of civil-military relations, easily be defined as a contemporary issue. Case studies generally draw upon a full variety of evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews and observations (Yin, 1984:20). Punch

¹⁰ Dr. Shields, who is the current editor of the interdisciplinary journal *Armed Forces & Society* suggested this article to me. I give her the credit for the advice.

¹¹ Jensen and Rodgers borrow the table at the end of this chapter on case studies. I give full credit to them for using the table to cumulate knowledge for the purpose of my research project.

(1998) maintains that case studies facilitate in depth analysis. The method takes into account its complexity and has a focus that considers the wholeness or unity.

Measures of quality should make sense for the methodology being used, with an understanding that good-quality studies, using a variety of methodologies, will add up to produce knowledge over time and that knowledge accumulation is actually dependent on the use of multiple methodologies. Exclusion of any methodology undermines knowledge accumulation (Jensen and Rodgers. 2001:236).

Jensen and Rodgers maintain that meta-analyses address the knowledge accumulation problem, because the studies that are aggregated for the analysis use different formats, designs, and methodologies. "A view of quality based on knowledge accumulation respects all types of case studies, since each provides something that others miss" (Jensen and Rodgers. 2001:239).

Template for accumulation of knowledge

Below is the template developed by Jensen and Rodgers (2001) and used in this applied research project to conduct the content analyses of the case studies (articles).

frame, as Yin (1994) mentioned is conditioned to deal with contemporary issues. This chapter in general emphasized the importance of meta-analysis use in the field of civil-military relations theory. The next chapter will discuss the methods used for this research and will examine knowledge accumulation in the field as discussed in the articles of *Armed Forces & Society*.

Chapter Four

Methodology

Introduction

This chapter explains the methodology used to describe recent articles in *Armed Forces & Society* that are case studies of emerging democracies. The methodology employs content analysis in order to do a meta-analysis of trends in Civil-Military Relations (theory and practice) among emerging democracies as presented in *Armed Forces & Society*. The Applied Research Project's purpose is to describe the civil-military Relations topics discussed in *Armed Forces & Society* articles. The framework and technique used to code the articles is operationalized and illustrated in this chapter.

Meta-Analysis of Case Studies

Meta-analysis --content analysis of case studies--- is the research methodology used to describe civil-military relations theory in emerging democracies as found in the articles of *Armed Forces & Society*.

Dr. Shields, editor of *Armed Forces & Society*, was inspired by Jensen and Rodgers' article (2001) about meta-analysis and case studies. This is one of the reasons a series of case studies were analyzed. It is also appropriate to consider the articles as case studies and utilize content analysis on twenty cases to accumulate knowledge in the field. "Case studies contain golden nuggets that await discovery" (Jensen and Rodgers. 2001:236). Further, Jensen and Rodgers (2001) developed a methodology to cumulate knowledge by analyzing case studies. The framework is used in this study and is

elaborated in this chapter. This study requires modified categories as tailored to the research. Meta-analysis as a technique is complex. The template of Jensen and Rodgers (2001) is adjusted to fit the needs of this research. Both authors (2001) emphasize its important contribution: "Meta-Analysis aims to solve the related issues of accumulation and generalizability" (Jensen & Rodgers, 2001: 237).

Content Analysis

Content analysis is a research method that is suited to descriptive categories. A coding sheet is organized and developed for this research project. The coding sheet or operationalized table derives from literature on civil-military relations theory and Jensen and Rodgers' (2001) template for case study meta-analysis (Refer Table 4.1). Several adjustments are made from the suggested model. [See Table 3.1 for the original template suggested by Jensen and Rodgers (2001:241)]. The conceptual framework was used to develop the coding sheet for civil-military relations comprised of five major categories.

Table 4.1 Coding sheet for reporting *Armed Forces & Society* case study articles

| | | | | |
|---|------------|-----------|----------|--|
| Research question: what is the primary research question of the case study? Implicit Explicit Not Clear | | | | |
| Research entity: country (ies). (Name of Country) | | | | |
| Information breakdown: | | | | |
| Civilian control | | | | |
| Objective civilian control | SD* | LD | N | |
| Subjective civilian control | SD | LD | N | |
| Civil military problematic | | | | |
| Coercive power | SD | LD | N | |
| Balanced power | SD | LD | N | |
| partisan neutrality | SD | LD | N | |
| obedience to the state leadership | SD | LD | N | |
| Functions of military other than security | SD | LD | N | |
| Professionalism and Military | | | | |
| Professional Officer Corp [armed forces, army navy, air force] | SD | LD | N | |
| Shared responsibility | SD | LD | N | |
| Institutional Structures (civilian leadership) | | | | |
| Role of Executive | SD | LD | N | |
| Role of Bureaucracy | SD | LD | N | |
| Technical support | SD | LD | N | |
| Role of Legislative | SD | LD | N | |
| Challenges (2nd generation issues in case of Europe): | | | | |
| Engagement of 'civic society' | SD | LD | N | |
| Expertise of parliamentary oversight | SD | LD | N | |
| Transparency/openness to public records; Press and Media | SD | LD | N | |
| Civil autonomous organizations present, | SD | LD | N | |
| Relations with International Organization (status of membership with NATO for Europe) | SD | LD | N | |
| Corruption in military | SD | LD | N | |
| Internal security forces | SD | LD | N | |
| Design: Is the study a snapshot, longitudinal, pre-post, patchwork, or comparative design? | | | | |
| Sources: | | | | |
| How are the sources used? Strong Adequate Weak | | | | |
| What sources are used: | | | | |
| Interviews | Yes | NO | | |
| Documents | Yes | NO | | |
| Newspapers | Yes | NO | | |
| Critical events Intervention, Critical events: | | | | |
| Post Cold War | Yes | NO | | |
| Post Revolution | Yes | NO | | |
| None | Yes | NO | | |
| Time frame: Number of years | | | | |
| Results: How did outcomes change over time (improve, deteriorate, or show no change)? | | | | |
| * SD = Substantially discussed LD = Limited discussed N = None | | | | |

The categories coded in operationalization table (Table 4.1) in information breakdown are pointed out in literature about the Civil-Military relations. Civilian control is one of the main categories specified through objective and subjective civilian control, measured as variables. The findings for variables regarding the civil-military relations are

based on whether the articles discuss the subcategories 'Substantially', 'Limited' and 'None'. The scale for the coding sheet for the civil-military relations portion (see Table 4.1) is SD = Substantially Discussed, LD = Limited Discussed and N = None. When the articles discussed a variable such as objective civilian control for one paragraph or more, the variable is rated as 'Substantially discussed'. When a variable is mentioned in two to three sentences that variable is rated as 'Limited discussed'. Subjective civilian control as discussed in the literature is rated in the context of the literature. When the articles discuss the category in general but do not mention the variable, it is rated as 'Limited discussed'. For example, in the article of David Betz (forthcoming) about Russia, objective and subjective civilian control are rated as 'Substantially discussed'. **Civil military problematic** is measured by coercive power, obedience, partisan neutrality and other functions that the military undertakes are two other variables for the category. **Professionalism and Military** is another category. 'Professional officer corps' and 'shared responsibility' are the variables measured. For example, in the case of Singh Bilveer's (2000) article about Indonesia, eleven out of total twenty variables, are rated as 'Limited discussed', such as: balanced power, shared responsibility and transparency with media.

Regarding **Institutional Structures**, it seems that there is a distinction between Eastern European countries, and the rest of the emerging democratic countries in Africa and South America. In emerging democracies in Eastern and Central Europe, institutional structures are identified in variables such as role of the executive, role of bureaucracy, technical support systems and role of legislature. The last category measured is second generation **challenges** as identified in variables such as: Engagement of 'civil society',

Transparency/openness to public records, press and media, expertise of parliamentary oversight, civil autonomous organizations present, relations with international organizations (status of membership with NATO for Europe) and corruption in military and internal security forces. For example in the case of Ukraine's article, with exception of expertise of parliamentary oversight that is rated as 'None', the other variables in the 'Challenges' category are rated as 'Substantially discussed'.

Since the *Armed Forces & Society* articles are case studies in themselves, the coding sheet (Table 4.1) shows the rest of the coding to rate the case study, their methodology as identified by Jensen and Rodgers's (2001) template. The research question variable is operationalized as 'Explicit', 'Implicit' and 'Not Clear'. It is difficult to subjectively decide this question. When the articles express clearly: "the purpose of this article is..." then is rated as 'Explicit'. When it is not mentioned, is rated as 'Not Clear'. It is important for the articles to express the research question clearly. For example in the case of Singapore article, the research question is stated explicitly.

'Research entity' is identified with 'country'. Three articles discuss two countries as comparative cases, such as the example with Romania and Bulgaria. In other articles where one country is identified, there is room to mention that also some other countries are discussed little. Two variables are identified for this question. One is 'country'. Another is for 'country two'. One of the two countries is put in 'country two' variable. **Design** has 5 categories (See Table 4.1). For example the article about Romania and Bulgaria is a comparative case study. **Measurement** as found in the Jensen and Rodgers' table (See Table 3.1) is replaced with sources in the coding sheet (Table 4.1). Sources are straightforward. They are answered as 'Yes' or 'No'. The variable 'how are the sources

used' is rated based on the following question, how many sources were used. For example, in the article of Ukraine, there are three kinds of sources used, and the variable about is rated 'Strong' sources. Threats to validity are not applicable for this particular project. Regarding outcomes as another option, it is interesting for scholars to discover what is an 'outcome' for civil-military relations. Another variable is the 'number of years', based on the difference between the earliest year mentioned in the article and its date of submission (year of publishing minus a year). The last variable measured in the coding sheet is 'results': how did they change over time? (Refer to Table 4.1) The conclusions of each article are observed to rate this variable.

Strengths and weaknesses of Content Analyses

Every research methodology has strengths and weaknesses. Babbie (1995) explains the advantages of content analysis such as its economy in both time and money. Another advantage is security; once the documents or the material are collected it is the researcher's job to do the coding. The articles were easily accessible in the *Armed Forces & Society* office or the library.

One of the drawbacks of content analysis is subjectivity. This is a big problem in my case because the difference between 'Limited discussed' and 'Substantially discussed' may be great. It is difficult to decide in many of the variables such as the strength and relevance of the sources of scholars' articles for instance. For example, 'Strong' is used when they use two or more categories like documents and interviews, or when they use one category such as the interview technique. When there are over five different

interviews the variable is rated 'Adequate'. Another disadvantage is also that the categories chosen for content analysis are selected by the researcher and hence exclusive.

Population

The population of this Applied Research Project is twenty articles (20 case studies) taken in a row sequentially from the latest to the earlier articles. The articles chosen are from issues beginning in 1997 and ending in 2001 issues of the *Armed Forces & Society* journal, concerning emerging democracies. Some articles are forthcoming. For example Boubacar N'diaye (forthcoming) from Kenya and Natalie Mychajlysyh (forthcoming) about Ukraine (refer to Table 4.2).

Unit of analysis is the **article** of the journal. Each article describes the state of civil military relations (or some facet of Civil Military Relations theory) in a country and is a 'case study'. Note that there is no one to one correspondence with a particular country because some articles compare two countries and these countries may be counted twice and not repeated in the final output display separate.

Table 4.2 List of Articles (Population of Study)

| No. | Author, Name | Country | Volume, Issue | Year |
|-----|---|---------------------------|---------------|-------------|
| 1 | Walter Parchomenko | Ukraine | 28-2 | 2002 |
| 2 | Mark Yaniszewski | Poland & Hungary | 28-3 | forthcoming |
| 3 | Marybeth Ulrich | Czech Republic & Slovakia | 28-3 | forthcoming |
| 4 | Daniel N Nelson | Romania & Bulgaria | 28-3 | forthcoming |
| 5 | Natalie Mychajlysyh | Ukraine | 28-3 | forthcoming |
| 6 | David Betz | Russia | 28-3 | forthcoming |
| 7 | Boubacar N'diaye | Kenya | 28-3 | forthcoming |
| 8 | Victor D Cha | South Korea | 28-1 | 2001 |
| 9 | Douglas W Trefzgar | Guatamala | 28-1 | 2001 |
| 10 | Larry L Watts | Romania | 27-4 | 2001 |
| 11 | Martins Filho R Joao & Daniel Zirker | Brazil | 27-1 | 2000 |
| 12 | Singh Bilveer | Indonesia | 26-4 | 2000 |
| 13 | Metin Heper & Aylin Guney | Turkey | 26-4 | 2000 |
| 14 | James Winkates | South Africa | 26-3 | 2000 |
| 15 | Kisanganin F Emizet | Congo | 26-2 | 2000 |
| 16 | Renato Cruze De Castro | Philippine | 26-1 | 1999 |
| 17 | Derek Da Cuhna | Singapore | 25-3 | 1999 |
| 18 | Elizabeth P. Coughlan | Poland | 24-4 | 1998 |
| 19 | Aldo A. Benini, Anthony V. Minnaar, and Sam Pretorius | South Africa | 24-4 | 1998 |
| 20 | Eric Young | Zimbabwe | 24-2 | 1997 |

Statistics

Descriptive statistics (frequencies and percentage) are used to summarize the results of the content analysis. Frequency distribution and percentages aggregate the information contained and discussed in the articles. What are the results regarding the accumulation of knowledge and the methodology? This project shows a general view of the population of articles chosen about emerging democracies. If the majority of the

articles do not mention of theory categories and case studies technique, this project will give some recommendations for future authors.

Summary

This chapter discussed the population of twenty articles of *Armed Forces & Society*. The method used for the entire project is meta-analysis content analysis of case study articles. The main questions are of descriptive nature, and a few of them are exploratory. For example how are the sources used? (Refer to Table 4.1) The questions derive from the literature and the template Jensen and Rodgers suggested (2001). The next chapter discusses the results of the statistical analysis based on data collection as explained in this chapter.

Chapter five

Results

Introduction

The purpose of chapter five is to review the findings from the content analysis of the *Armed Forces & Society* "article" case studies. Both the results of the Civil-Military Relations, content part of the articles and the case study findings are summarized.

Research question

The findings reveal that a typical article discusses the research question explicitly 55%. For example, Mychajlyshyh (forthcoming) in her study of Ukraine identifies: "The primary purpose of this article is to examine Ukraine's record in establishing democratic civil-military relations since its independence in 1991 and to identify..." as the research question. Coughlan (1998) in her study of Poland identifies: "This article looks at recent development in civil-military relations theory ...I argue that conflict is both normal and necessary...". Ten percent of articles discuss the research question implicitly and thirty five percent are not clear in developing a research question see Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Research question

| Number of articles (20) | Frequency | Percent |
|------------------------------------|------------------|----------------|
| Implicit | 2 | 10 |
| Explicit | 11 | 55 |
| Not Clear | 7 | 35 |
| Total | 20 | 100 |

Country

Nineteen countries were represented in the study. Three countries are examined in paired comparison case studies. Four countries Poland, Romania, South Africa and Ukraine are repeated twice in the population of 20 articles. Table 5.2 lists the countries used in the cases and identifies when a country is in 2 articles and when it is in a comparative study.

Table 5.2 Country discussed in article

| Country 1 (20 articles) | Frequency |
|-------------------------|-----------|
| 1.Brazil | 1 |
| 2.Check Rep.* | 1 |
| 3.Congo | 1 |
| 4.Guatemala | 1 |
| 5.Indonesia | 1 |
| 6.Kenya | 1 |
| 7.Philippine | 1 |
| 8.Poland* | 2 |
| 9.Romania* | 2 |
| 10.Russia | 1 |
| 11.South Korea | 1 |
| 12.Singapore | 1 |
| 13.South Africa | 2 |
| 14.Turkey | 1 |
| 15.Ukraine | 2 |
| 16.Zimbabwe | 1 |
| 17.Bulgaria* | 1 |
| 18.Hungary* | 1 |
| 19.Slovakia* | 1 |

* Countries that were in comparative studies.

Civilian Control

The findings showed that 45% of the articles included a substantial discussion of objective control. For example, N'diaye (forthcoming) discusses both Objective and Subjective civilian control 'Substantially' (See Table 5.3). Twenty- percent of the articles discussed objective civilian control limited, and 35% of the articles did not discuss objective control. Regarding subjective control, 40% of the articles discussed subjective

control little. And 30% of the articles discussed it substantially and 30% did not discussed subjective control. For example, both Objective and Subjective control are not discussed in the article of Brazil.

Table 5.3 Civilian control

| Type of Control N = 20 | Level of Discussion (Percent (%)) | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|------|-------|
| | Substantially discussed | Limited discussed | None | Total |
| Objective Civilian Control | 45 | 20 | 35 | 100 |
| Subjective Civilian Control | 30 | 40 | 30 | 100 |

Civil Military problematic

Civil military problematic is an important category. The findings reveal that 50% of articles do not discuss aspects of the problematic identified in the literature (See Table 5.4.) Three of the five subcategories (coercive power, balanced power and functions other than military security) are not discussed in the articles. For example, Winkates (2000) in his article of South Africa, discusses only 'functions of military other than security' substantially, but he does not discuss the other sub-categories of 'civil military problematic'. Obedience to the state leadership was discussed in 40% of the articles. For example, N'diaye (forthcoming) in his article of Kenya discusses 'obedience to the state leadership' substantially and was the only article that discussed 'balance of power' substantially.

Table 5.4 Civil Military Problematic

| Civil-military problematic N=20 | Substantially discussed | Limited discussed | None | Total N=20 |
|--|----------------------------|----------------------|------|---------------|
| Coercive power | 15% | 35% | 50% | 100% |
| Balanced power | 5% | 45% | 50% | 100% |
| Partisan neutrality | 40% | 30% | 30% | 100% |
| Obedience to the state leadership | 30% | 40% | 30% | 100% |
| Functions of military other than security | 40% | 10% | 50% | 100% |

Professionalism and military

Professional officer Corp is discussed only in 20% of articles substantially as revealed by statistical analyses. For example, Ulrich (forthcoming) in her article of Check Republic and Slovakia discusses Professional Officer Corp substantially. Parchomenko (2002) in his article of Ukraine discusses the Professionalism substantially. Shared responsibility is discussed only in 2 articles substantially and is not discussed in 75% of articles (See Table 5.5). For example, Derek Da Cuhna (1999) in his article of Singapore does not discuss professionalism.

Table 5.5 Professionalism and military

| Professionalism and military (N=20) | Substantially discussed | Limited discussed | None | total |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Professional Officer Corp | 20% | 55% | 25% | 100% |
| Shared responsibility | 10% | 15% | 75% | 100% |

Institutional Structures

The articles included a substantial discussion of the executive role (80%). The role of the legislative also included substantial attention in 60% of the cases. For example, Betz (forthcoming) in his article of Russia discusses all the subcategories of Institutional structures substantially. Technical support systems are not discussed in 60% of articles. For example, De Castro (1999) discusses the subcategories of institutional structures substantially with the exception of Technical support system, that does not mention. Other subcategories are discussed substantially in majority of articles as seen in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Institutional Structures

| Institutional structures (N=20) | Substantially discussed | Limited discussed | None | Total |
|--|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Role of Executive | 80% | 15% | 5% | 100% |
| Role of Bureaucracy | 85% | 10% | 5% | 100% |
| Technical support systems | 10% | 30% | 60% | 100% |
| Role of Legislative | 60% | 15% | 25% | 100% |

Challenges (2nd generation issues in case of Eastern and Central Europe)

This category has quite a number of subcategories that are measured as variables. The results show that transparency and media are discussed substantially in half of the articles (50%) see Table 5.7. For example, Nelson (forthcoming) in his article of Romania and Bulgaria discusses transparency/openness to public records, press and media, substantially. Parchomenko (2002) in his article of Ukraine discusses Transparency, Press and Media substantially. Engagement of civic society is discussed limited in 55% of the articles. For example, Coughlan (1998) in her article of Poland, discusses engagement of civic society little.

Table 5.7 Challenges of Emerging Democracies

| Challenges (N=20) | Substantially discussed | Limited discussed | None | Total |
|---|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Engagement of civic society | 30% | 55% | 15% | 100% |
| Expertise of parliamentary oversight | 30% | 15% | 55% | 100% |
| Transparency-openness to public records; press and media | 50% | 30% | 20% | 100% |
| Civil autonomous organizations present | 25% | 25% | 50% | 100% |
| Relations with international organizations (NATO, etc) | 35% | 40% | 25% | 100% |
| Corruption | 45% | 45% | 10% | 100% |
| Internal security forces | 20% | 35% | 45% | 100% |

Design

The results show that most of the articles (17 out of 20) are snapshots. Only three of them are comparative. For example, the articles about Rumania and Bulgaria; Poland and Hungary; and Check Republic and Slovakia are comparative case studies. The rest of articles are snapshots. See Table 5.8.

Table 5.8 Design of articles

| Design of articles | Snapshot | Longitudinal | Pre-post | Patchwork | Comparative design | Total |
|--------------------|----------|--------------|----------|-----------|--------------------|-------|
| Frequency | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 20 |
| Percent % | 85% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 15% | 100% |

Sources of evidence and data used by the articles

Most of the sources used are adequate and strong. One article uses weak sources. 95% of articles use newspapers as sources and also 80% of articles use documents. Half of articles used interviews. See Table 5.9 for illustration. For example, Yaniszewski (forthcoming) used interviews, documents and newspapers in his article of Poland and Hungary. A particularly weak sources was used in South Africa article about Kwazulu-Natal.

Table 5.9 Sources of evidence and data used by the articles

| Sources used | Strong | Adequate | Weak | Total |
|--------------|------------|-----------|--------------|-------|
| Sources | 40% | 55% | 5% | 100% |
| | Yes | NO | Total | |
| Documents | 80% | 20% | 100% | |
| Newspapers | 95% | 5% | 100% | |
| Interviews | 50% | 50% | 100% | |

Critical events Intervention, Critical events:

Most of the articles (70%) discuss post Cold War. Half used post revolution as a critical event. See Table 5.10 for illustration. For example, the articles of Ukraine, Russia and Eastern and Central Europe countries discussed post Cold War period. Some of the other articles such as the South African or the Latin American countries examine some military coups attempts. For example, Emizet (2000) in his article of Congo discusses military coups.

Table 5.10 Critical events Intervention, Critical events:

| Critical events | Yes | NO | Total |
|------------------------|------------|-----------|--------------|
| Post 'Cold War' | 50% | 50% | 100% |
| Post revolution | 70% | 30% | 100% |

Years discussed in articles

Thirty five percent of articles cover 10 -year period, which reflects the post-Cold War years. For example the articles of Ukraine discuss the 10 year post -Cold war period. Two articles discuss a period of 11-30 years. Four articles discuss the period of 31-50 years. For example the article of Kenya mentions 33 years. Seven articles discuss or at least mention a period of fifty years or more. See Table 5.11 for the rest of years discussed in articles.

Table 5.11 Years discussed in articles

| Years | Frequency | Percent |
|----------------|------------------|----------------|
| 0 -10 | 7 | 35 |
| 11 - 30 | 2 | 10 |
| 31 - 50 | 4 | 20 |
| 50 + | 7 | 35 |

Results of events

The majority of articles showed no discussion of the overall change in events in the conclusion and summary of the article. Thirty five percent of articles showed improvement in civil-military relations. And only two articles indicated deterioration (See Table 5.12). For example, N'diaye (forthcoming) in his article of Kenya in the summary of the article, mentions "Kenya is still vulnerable to military intervention in the political process...", which clearly shows deterioration of obedience to civilians, and thus not balanced civil-military relations.

Table 5.12 Results of civil-military relations

| Results (N=20) | Improve | Deteriorate | Did not addressed | Total |
|----------------|---------|-------------|-------------------|-------|
| Frequencies | 7 | 2 | 11 | 20 |
| Percentages | 35% | 10% | 55% | 100% |

Summary of Results

This chapter organizes and summarizes the data collected from the content analysis of case studies (articles) of *Armed Forces & Society* Journal. Articles were analyzed in March 2002. But the population of 20 articles was taken from the latest (some of them are forthcoming, submitted and approved to publish) to 1997 articles. They were only articles of Emerging Democracy Countries. A conclusion and assessment of statistical results is provided in Chapter six. The concluding chapter also recommends suggestions for further research and for the editor of *Armed Forces & Society*.

Chapter Six

Conclusion

Introduction

This chapter summarizes the applied research project methodology and results in light of the conceptual framework developed. Conclusions of findings and recommendations are also included.

Summary of findings

The purpose of the Applied Research Project was to describe the content and methods used in recent *Armed Forces & Society* articles that deal with civil military relations in emerging democracies. Hence, this study tried to examine how civil-military relations are treated in these articles. Each article describes the state of civil military relations (or some facet of Civil-Military Relations) in a country and is a "case study." Thus, this study also tried to analyze the case study methodology used in the articles. The results of the research showed that a typical article in the journal has an explicitly articulated statement of purpose. A typical article discussed objective control substantially as part of civilian control of civil-military relations. A typical article does not discuss civil military problematic in general. This is an important category to be part of the framework for future discussion. Professionalism and military is discussed little or not, for example 'shared responsibility' in most articles. Institutional structures are discussed in majority of articles substantially, especially role of president and bureaucracy are discussed substantially in many articles.

The last category of civil military theory that is the challenges of civil military relations is discussed little in most of articles. This was taken from the summary table of all the categories and subcategories, Table 6.1. Improvement is needed with regard to the conceptual framework of the articles.

Methodology of articles (case studies)

Regarding the case study technique. Most of the articles are snapshots. And only 3 of them are comparative. There is place to extend the variety of case study method of articles. It is often difficult to determine the design of the articles. Frequently, the research design of articles are not clearly specified. Sources used are adequate in most of them, but many articles have strong sources. The most frequently used source is newspaper. But documents are widely used in 80% of articles. Refer to table 5.9 for more information. The last variable measure was the results. Almost 11 out of 20 articles do are not clear either do not discuss the results, or show no change in general for the country. Place for improvement in the summary. It seems that the authors are not clear that what they are doing is a case study. A suggestion to the authors is consider better using this tool. There can also be more quantitative measurements in the case studies.

Another finding is that the traditional literature, especially Huntington and Janowitz who are the founders of the civil-military relations theory is not as much applicable to the emerging democracies. Especially in the African or Asian or Latin American countries. For Eastern Europe it seems there are things in common especially of the Former Soviet influence. These countries are still struggling to build healthy democratic and functional regimes. After the first decade (1990 – 2001) eastern European countries are facing different issues and problems. The democratic structures were

established in the first decade. In this new second decade (2001 – Present), there are a lot of democratic policy making and implementation issues. These countries have to collaborate more in regional level, and try to come up with systems that will fit to their experiences and history. Western and mature democracies can always provide lessons to other countries. Nevertheless, a new age requires new theoretical constructs. There are efforts from new scholars to improve the field of civil military relations, such as what the editor and collaborators of *Armed Forces & Society* are doing. The modest efforts of this Applied Research project are a continuation of assisting to improve the discipline.

Summarized table of Civil Military relations as discussed in the articles
Table 6.1

| Categories | Mode | Overall |
|---|-------------------------|--|
| Civilian control | | Mixed |
| Objective civilian control | Substantially discussed | |
| Subjective civilian control | Limited discussed | |
| Civil military problematic | | Mixed |
| Coercive power | None | |
| Balanced power | None | |
| Partisan neutrality | Substantially discussed | |
| Obedience to state leadership | Limited discussed | |
| Functions of military other than security | None | |
| Professionalism and Military | | Mixed |
| Professional officer Corp | Limited discussed | |
| Shared responsibility | None | |
| Institutional Structure | | Mixed with 3 out of 4 substantially discussed |
| Role of executive | Substantially discussed | |
| Role of Bureaucracy | Substantially discussed | |
| Technical system support | None | |
| Role of legislative | Substantially discussed | |
| Challenges (2nd generation issues for Eastern and Central Europe) | | Mixed |
| Engagement of civil society | Limited discussed | |
| Expertise of parliamentary oversight | None | |
| Transparency, Press and media | Substantially discussed | |
| Civil autonomous organizations | None | |
| Role of International organizations (NATO etc.) | Limited discussed | |
| Corruption | Limited discussed | |
| Internal security forces | None | |

Recommendations to improve *Armed Forces & Society* articles

Many articles do not discuss substantially some of the important categories on the civil military relations that derived from literature. There is not much accumulation of knowledge in the field. The authors should link the articles better to the larger concepts of civil military relations theory.

I tended to be liberal in rating the variables, nevertheless, rating of the articles was problematic. Besides the subjectivity that rating has, some of the articles are not very clearly expressed with regard to conceptual framework. Cottey et al. can be a good guide to the authors of the journal. Cottey et al. do a good synthesis of the issues of Civil Military Relations with reference to Literature. Personally, I believe that this project started from very modest almost no knowledge in the field. And further research can be more exploratory or explanatory.

Future research

Improvement can be made in this project.

- Some other categories can be added or the conceptual framework could be more synthesized.
- Culture, benefits, education, training, armaments and size of military, culture of country, economic stability, strength of government (degree of change or democratization) regional characteristics can be some categories or subcategories to consider for future projects.
- More suggestions can be made regarding the methodology of the articles.

- A good suggestion would be: "What is an outcome for the Scholars as regarding Civil Military relations. Authors should discuss the resolution or recommendations for the civil military relations.

Conclusion

The research provided a big and general picture of the civil-military relations' theory in emerging democracies as found in articles of *Armed Forces & Society*. This research also showed the assessment of the case study methodology the articles used. The research done in this paper is preliminary and only general in nature. The categories focused on "what is discussed in the articles of the journal about them?". "Is there any accumulation of knowledge by the authors in general?" There is a place to continue this study in the future. The study aimed at doing a general assessment of the journal of *Armed Forces & Society* and was inspired by the editor of the journal. Recommendations for future research are suggested.

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