Perception of Effectiveness of Texas National Guard Personnel About the Texas National Guard Counter Drug Program

Jacob Rodriguez

Summer 2001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

This research project addresses U.S. counter drug efforts in general and supply reduction efforts in specific. The purpose of this study is first to examine recent developments in drug trafficking and the military's role in drug efforts, and then to describe the attitudes and perceptions of effectiveness of Texas Guard personnel about military involvement. The study seeks to determine if National Guard personnel believe they are effective in this area and to uncover ways to improve results in supply reduction. Ultimately, this research provides valuable insights and suggests a slight modification in the military's and the National Guard's role in counter narcotics policy, specifically moving from tactical and operational roles and intelligence products to a more proactive and strategic posture.

This research is compelling because it is such an important policy issue and because so little research is done on National Guard counter drug programs. Some books, like J.F. Holden Rhodes' *Sharing the Secrets: Open Source Intelligence and the War on Drugs*, devote significant attention to the issue. More commonly, a paragraph or two, at best, is all that appears.

The United States is an economic and military giant. America is clearly the dominant world player and faces few direct threats to its national security at present. Few overt threats weigh heavily on the minds of the American people. The subtle threat of drugs, however, emerged over the past twenty to thirty years, and it is not so subtle anymore. As America looks out over oceans and beyond the horizon to identify and confront its enemies, illicit narcotics attack American society from its own back yard. The narcotics problem today is the most immediate and serious threat to American national security (Snow, 1998: 70). A stifling amount of crime in the United States originates from the traffic and consumption of drugs. Streets have become unsafe in many areas, but this phenomenon is no longer isolated to the inner city. Drugs

have spread from the inner city to middle class and affluent neighborhoods, to suburbia, and even to small town America (Snow, 1998: 223). Drug consumption eliminates the potential of many young people, significantly decreases productivity in the work place, and causes thousands of deaths each year.

The military and the National Guard have therefore been tasked to lend their unique skills in the hope that those skills may lead to progress in supply reduction areas of the drug effort. National Guard aid to law enforcement has led to significant seizures of illicit substances. Yet the National Guard rarely receives the credit it deserves. Because the National Guard is regulated to a support role, perhaps it is logical that law enforcement agencies receive most of the credit for successful stings and other drug related operations. Perhaps the National Guard prefers to remain in its less conspicuous role. Such a low profile likely contributes to the level of success the National Guard has had in this area. Drug traffickers, unaware of the threat the National Guard poses to their operations, are more likely to succumb to that threat. It is also likely that if the National Guard were to receive more attention in drug efforts, questions of U.S. civil liberty would naturally, and rightfully, arise. To say the least, formulating and adapting U.S. policy on this issue is difficult. Decision-makers must constantly balance the civil rights of the citizenry with the demand from them to rectify the drug problem.

While the extent and specific nature of military and National Guard involvement may be under debate, there is little question that the National Guard should be involved at some level and that National Guard contributions in drug efforts to date have been effective. Interviews with General Smith of the Texas Air National Guard and Lieutenant Colonel Tinsley of the Texas National Guard indicate as much. Both respondents stated that while the Texas National Guard budget is limited (currently about $14 million), the National Guard is able to interdict

billions of dollars worth of illicit drugs every year. So, as Lieutenant Colonel Tinsley put it, the Texas National Guard is "cost-effective" and "cost efficient" on that basis. And, as she also said, the taxpayers certainly get the most bang for their buck. This statement is consistent with the implications in the literature. It is theoretically possible for National Guard and military counter drug support to put a significant dent in drug flow to the United States, but budget realities do not permit allocation of funding to come anywhere close to the matching monetary resources available to drug traffickers.

General Smith conceded that the program only intercepts about 10% of drug traffic in Texas. He also stated that 10% might be a generous estimate. But, no matter which estimate one may use, the Texas National Guard prevents billions of dollars worth of drugs from reaching U.S. citizens and children each year. That is certainly "a plus for American society."

What makes such cost effective and efficient results possible are the technology and skills the Texas National Guard provides law enforcement. Law enforcement agencies would not have these resources available otherwise, for various reasons. Lieutenant Colonel Tinsley added two other important points consistent with the literature. The first was that military intelligence is one of those valued skills that law enforcement greatly benefits from, identifying its potential to provide the information needed to bring down entire trafficking organizations. The second point was that many National Guard personnel are "*strategically* located throughout the entire state, especially in the state of Texas, to support law enforcement agencies." For this reason, as Holden-Rhodes states in his book, it would be fairly easy for the National Guard to adjust its support roles to a more strategic posture, especially the intelligence role, while continuing to tactically and operationally support law enforcement agencies when appropriate.

The valuable perspective of military and National Guard personnel is too often overlooked. This is likely both a cause and a result of the fact that the National Guard is under-emphasized in the literature. This study seeks to fill this apparent void in the literature, at least in part.

Chapters II and III review the relevant literature on the topic. Chapter II covers the international drug trafficking setting facing the United States. It emphasizes Mexico as the primary current drug trafficking concern for the United States and especially the Texas National Guard. It then addresses overall U.S. drug policy on the issue as the contextual basis for the following chapter, which covers the military's role therein and leads into the actual survey of Texas National Guard personnel.

Chapter IV covers both the conceptual framework and methodology used in this study. The conceptual framework is the basis for construction of the survey instrument. The survey itself first determines the attitudes of Texas National Guard personnel about military involvement in U.S. counter drug efforts and then determines what their perceptions of effectiveness are about that involvement (these are the two research questions in this study). Because National Guard/military personnel have been directed to participate in counter drug efforts by federal authority, it is worthwhile to ask if they believe they should be involved, if that involvement is within the bounds of civil liberty, and if that involvement is effective. This is why the above research questions are important. The attitudes of these personnel have the potential to provide valuable insights into the overall effectiveness of supply reduction efforts. This research project seeks to uncover any such insights, albeit at a preliminary level. Recognizing the relative scarcity of literature on this particular topic, this study will ideally serve as a basis for future, more in depth research into this important issue.

Chapter V discusses the results of the survey. Several tables are provided to summarize the findings. This chapter directly leads into the conclusion. In the end, there is room for improvement. The drug industry is highly flexible and adaptive. Therefore, U.S. policymakers must look for ways to adjust to the problem in order to continue to make progress and improve the security of the nation.

In addition, this project includes three supplemental essays relevant to the topic. While they are not directly related to the study, they add depth of understanding to the broader issue. Together they demonstrate the complexities of the drug problem and show how U.S. and Mexican interests are intertwined in this area. The essays discuss the economic effects of drug money on the Mexican economy, the threat to political legitimacy in Mexico caused by the corrupting forces of drug trafficking, and a speculation on the future of Mexico and the implications for U.S. security interests.

CHAPTER II: RECENT HISTORICAL AND INTERNATIONAL SETTING

Mexico is "the linchpin in the drug arena" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 6). This chapter is divided into two parts based on this assertion. The first part of the chapter discusses Mexico's role in the drug industry. Mexico is emphasized because of geographic proximity to the United States and the nation's recent emergence as a primary external source of many illicit substances. The section begins with a background discussion of the drug problem and its implications for U.S. national security. The section then briefly covers the recent historical developments that brought Mexico to the forefront of drug trafficking. The chapter then discusses Mexican production and transit of illicit drugs and briefly addresses Mexican cartels.

The second part of the chapter covers overall U.S. foreign supply-side policy designed to combat the problem that has crept up to the southern border. This section specifically addresses the annual ritual of "certification" as well as crop substitution and eradication programs. The chapter then concludes, emphasizing that while supply reduction efforts alone are not the answer to the drug woes of the United States, they are an integral component of the overall effort.

BACKGROUND

As bad as the drug problem is for the United States, it is important to realize the problem affects the Western Hemisphere and the world. Some would even argue that countries like Colombia and Mexico have suffered far greater consequences than the United States has from the repercussions of the drug trade.[1] Mexico has acknowledged narcotics (and the criminal organizations who perpetuate their trade) as its greatest national security issue in such documents as the *US/Mexico Bi-National Drug Threat Assessment*. Mexican domestic use of cocaine has grown due to increased traffic through the country. Since the profit in the drug trade increases in

[1] Scholars, such as Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan Linz, Seymour Lipset (1999), Paul Stares (1996), Ethan Nadelmann (1997), and many others, cite several circumstances of drug related corruption that undermine governmental structures in both Columbia and Mexico.

transit, several Mexican cartels have arisen to capitalize on that profit. Colombian revenue is estimated to annually average $300 million. Mexican traffickers earn even more (Stares, 1996: 54). Mexican cartels are characteristically dynamic and flexible and are therefore very difficult to combat (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 130). Traffickers now ship narcotics largely within legitimate cargo, making several high-tech and expensive interdiction defenses obsolete and useless.[2] The greater problem with these organizations for Mexico, however, is not the drug trade itself or the subsequent crime it produces. Rather, the more significant concern is that drug trafficking organizations threaten Mexican institutional democracy (Clawson, 1997: 6). Mexican cartels, with their vast monetary resources, have corrupted the Mexican government to a level unparalleled anywhere in the world. In this respect, the drug problem has caused injustices and inefficiencies in many, if not all, areas of Mexican government and society.[3]

The drug trade is the Western Hemisphere's and the United State's greatest threat. The biggest problem for the United States within the drug trade is Mexico and powerful trafficking organizations that deliver the majority of illicit substances across the border. Mexico, in this respect, poses a significant threat to the United States as a major actor in the international drug trade.

To effectively impede the drug trade, one must aggressively confront drug flow through and from Mexico. Cooperative interagency and international drug efforts should therefore be increased in order to help impede the drug trade as a whole and increase U.S. national security.

---

[2] This statement refers primarily to radar technology designed to monitor suspicious air and water craft, such as aerostat radar balloons. Facing this problem, sophisticated and powerful x-ray technology has been developed to examine legitimate cargo at points of entry. The volume of shipments crossing the border still poses a problem, especially with the freedom of movement the North American Free Trade Agreement allows. Nevertheless, such technology greatly helps to shield the border.

[3] For more detailed information on this point, please see Essay II.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to describe the international setting that makes military involvement (particularly strategic intelligence support) vital in order to realize success in U.S. supply reduction efforts.

Mexico is both a source country of production and a transit zone for narcotics. The country has historically been a producer of marijuana but also produces "black tar" heroin and is now engaged in the production and transit of methamphetamine to the United States. Mexico is also the largest single transit region of South American cocaine. The following sections address drug trafficking in Mexico, beginning with a recent history.

A Summarized History

U.S. counter drug efforts were considered “low intensity” until the Nixon administration (Bertram, 1996: 5). As the drug trade exploded in the 1970’s (DEA – Traffickers From Mexico, 2000), however, the U.S., under President Nixon, embarked on a much larger counter drug program and focused primarily on reducing supply. “The battle against the drug supply continued under Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter,” although with much less publicity (Bertram, 1997: 5). Colombian drug trafficking organizations dominated the trade during this time and throughout the 1980’s (DEA – Traffickers From Mexico, 2000).

Colombian traffickers were forced to move shipment operations through Mexico during the 1980’s because of pressure from U.S. law enforcement in the Caribbean islands and at the points of entry in Florida. Mexico was attractive because of the extensive 2,000-mile border it shares with the largest drug market in the world. This area is largely rural, difficult to patrol with several mountainous regions, and has characteristically weak law enforcement and judiciary structures (DEA – Traffickers From Mexico, 2000). The adjustment was successful and the U.S. drug problem continued to worsen. For this reason, Presidents Reagan and Bush departed from

the less rhetorical approach of Ford and Carter and again outspokenly attacked drug supply (Bertram, 1996: 5).

Mexican traffickers began as transporters for Colombian groups, earning between $1,500 and $2,000 per kilogram of cocaine. But in the latter part of the 1980's, Mexican traffickers became more capable and developed the ability to ship drugs throughout the U.S., not just to various Colombian distribution cells and storage areas. Mexican groups demanded a larger share of the earnings. A "payment-in-kind agreement" was eventually reached in which Mexican traffickers would receive up to fifty percent of the value of any given shipment. This did carry a certain benefit for Colombian traffickers, especially after four large shipments of their cocaine were seized in 1989. The new agreement cut Colombian losses in half, should any product be seized in the United States. This agreement also made the Mexican traffickers more than extensions of Colombian organizations and paid a great deal more, allowing them to develop their own "distribution strategies." Mexican and Colombian organizations eventually split the United States. The Colombians controlled the East, while Mexican traffickers dominated the Midwest and Western regions of the country. Mexican criminal groups soon developed into full-fledged and sophisticated cartels "in their own right, especially after the arrest of the Cali mafia leaders in 1995" (DEA – Traffickers From Mexico, 2000).

During the late 1980's and early 1990's, combined U.S. and Colombian efforts achieved the effective destruction of the infamous Medellín Cartel and the apprehension of the heads of the Cali Cartel. The success achieved in disrupting Colombian operations allowed Mexican traffickers to capitalize on the deep cocaine networks branching into the United States previously controlled by Colombian cells. Mexican traffickers now use these networks to transit their own

products, including methamphetamine (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 135).

The disruption of drug trafficking, albeit a temporary one, was a significant success. The drug industry, however, proved to be highly adaptive and elastic. For this reason, U.S. drug policy changed in the mid 1990's under President Clinton.

The Clinton administration decreased efforts to interdict drugs in the transit zone and at the points of entry. "Source-country efforts continue, however, albeit with more emphasis on fostering economic development and democratic institution building while supporting the efforts of foreign law enforcement agencies against the major trafficking organizations" (Stares, 1997: 45). Despite the policy adjustment, the United States continued to act according to historical tendency and rely heavily on supply reduction efforts (Stares, 1996: 46). Attacking the supply side of the problem, however, will become increasingly difficult. According to Paul Stares, free trade agreements like NAFTA and the proposed open hemisphere trade plan scheduled for 2005 will increase problems associated with supply reduction and make it all the more difficult to reduce the flow of drugs throughout the hemisphere (1996: 87).

Mexican trafficking organizations have capitalized on their newfound control of the networks once dominated by Colombians, greatly increasing their influence in the United States. In 1990, Mexican dominated distribution surfaced in California and other areas of the Western United States. In 1997, Mexican distribution branched into the Midwest and continues to move eastward. Mexican traffickers have already established bases in Chicago and New York (Martinez McNaught, 2 February 1999). To go along with ambitious expansions, Mexican Cartels have connections with international Mafia organizations such as the Cosa Nostra, La Cosa Nostra (New York), the Chinese Triads, and the Japanese Yakuza (United Nations

International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 132). Because Mexican drug trafficking organizations have become more independent in their own right, the following sections briefly discuss Mexican drug production and transit.

MEXICAN DRUG TRAFFICKING

Production

Marijuana

Mexico is the biggest supplier of marijuana to the United States. An increase in high-grade sinsemilla marijuana has been observed in recent years. The primary production zone is in the Southwest area of the country and is grown year round (Current Drug Situation Summary, 1997: 7), although marijuana is grown in every state in the country (The Latin America Unit of Strategic Intelligence Section, 1995: 6).

Methamphetamine

Mexico is also the largest external supplier of methamphetamine to the United States. The United States itself has several domestic producers of methamphetamine, the numbers of which are significant. The organization among U.S. domestic producers, however, is very undeveloped at the present time.

Methamphetamine is a new advent that is attractive to Mexican cartels because it has a greater profit margin than the more traditional stimulant narcotic cocaine. Methamphetamine also carries with it the added benefit to Mexican organizations of not having to depend on South American, specifically Colombian, cartels for a product (Current Drug Situation Summary, 1997: 7).

Mexican cartels began to increase the production of methamphetamine when the Cali cartel of Colombia was inhibited by counter-drug efforts in the country. Use of the drug is

especially common in the Midwest and South of the United States, particularly in the states of Florida, Georgia, Iowa, and Missouri and is spreading eastward. Methamphetamine is so popular because it is cheaper (it can be made from materials found in a common grocery store) than cocaine and, although very similar to cocaine, has a much longer lasting effect (DEA Factsheet, 2000).

Heroin

Mexican opium poppy for the production of heroin is primarily grown in the states of Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa, and Guerrero. Mexican production increased during the period from 1992-1994 to meet a corresponding increase in U.S. demand for the substance (Current Drug Situation Summary, 1997: 2). In 1998, one-fifth of all DEA heroin seizures originated in Mexico.

Today there is a new generation using heroin. The drug has become cheaper and purity levels have become far better, ranging from thirty percent to levels somewhere in the nineties as compared to ten percent purity common of heroin ten years ago. These higher purity levels allow the substance to be snorted or smoked, attracting younger users previously discouraged from taking the drug by the method of injection necessary for the use of lower quality heroin (DEA Factsheet, 2000).

High-grade heroin can originate in either Colombia or Mexico. The improved quality of heroin may be a marketing strategy by drug traffickers to provide an alternative to cocaine and to diversify products. This strategy may also be intended to target and attract new consumer groups (DEA Factsheet, 2000) (which is exactly what happened in an affluent suburb in Texas).

Plano

In Plano, Texas, a wealthy town on the outskirts of Dallas, several teenagers died of heroin overdoses in the latter part of the 1990's. Heroin was introduced to the area in 1996 and became an epidemic in 1997. An increasing number of teenagers began to snort heroin of an estimated thirty five percent purity level. The sources of the drug were reportedly Mexican dealers (Gegax, 1999: 54).

Heroin caused several deaths and other tragedies in the town. A male in the 7th grade was left dead in a church parking lot by friends after overdosing. A young woman on the swim team was caught trading sex for the drug. A young marine died from a heroin overdose while on leave visiting his family (Gegax, 1999: 55).

After three years and extensive law enforcement efforts by local police, the problem slowly began to show signs of easing. But the reality is that the local law enforcement of Plano has only displaced the problem, not solved it. Heroin is likely to surface in some nearby area and have similar tragic results. Nineteen children died in all (Gegax, 1999: 56).

Transit

Colombian cocaine and refined heroin are both trafficked through Mexico. Drug transit through Mexico increased with the expansion of the drug trade as a whole during the 1970's and developed a structural division of labor early on (Keen, 1996: 514). Recreational use of cocaine in the United States reached a high point during the 1980's because of the influx of drugs (Clawson, 1997: 103). The Medellín and Cali Cartels provided 76% of cocaine to the United States, depending on Mexican organizations to deliver their product to Colombian controlled distribution cells across the border (Keen, 1996: 482). During this period the U.S.-Mexican border became overrun with narco-traffickers (Ruiz, 1992: 470). Currently, Colombian

organizations depend on Mexican cartels to pay off Mexican officialdom, but Colombians are now attempting to create direct ties to high government leaders in Mexico (Clawson, 1998: 45).

Cocaine

Coca for the production of cocaine is first grown in Peru, Bolivia, or (to a lesser extent) Ecuador and then processed in Colombian laboratories (Crow, 1992: 804). Recently, coca production has moved to Colombia as well. After processing, cocaine is shipped through Central America to Mexican traffickers.

Mexico has been the chief transit region of Colombian cocaine since the 1980's. Today, Mexico accommodates two-thirds of all cocaine from South America, making the country the single largest transit region to the United States (DEA – Traffickers From Mexico, 2000). The other mediums of transit are the Caribbean or direct insertion into the United States, by way of the east, west, and gulf coasts.

Mexican Cartels

The organizations that traffic these drugs are a formidable force. In a testimony before Congress on 25 February 1997, the director of the Drug Enforcement Administration said of the Mexican cartels: "these sophisticated drug syndicate groups from Mexico have eclipsed organized crime groups from Colombia as the premier law enforcement threat facing the United States" (Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999). This fact will direct the focus of United States narcotic law enforcement and relations with Mexico well into the next century.

While an in depth discussion of individual organizations is inappropriate here, it is important to recognize that these criminal gruops will pose an ever-increasing threat to United States national security. The following sections and the next chapter detail the efforts and

policies designed to stem drug supply provided in large part by Mexican drug trafficking organizations to the United States.

EFFORTS AND POLICIES

Drug policy for the United States is governed by the National Drug Control Strategy, produced by the Office of National Drug Control Policy in Washington D.C. This document is a general guide for the more than fifty federal agencies tasked to combat the drug problem. The strategy also contains direction in specified areas and serves as a frame for all aspects of society to work toward a solution, incorporating demand reduction, interdiction, and source country efforts (Schaler, 1998: 31).

The character of the policy document has changed in recent years. Compared to National Drug Control Strategies of the late 1980's and early 1990's, later issues make more mention of demand reduction, emphasizing education, anti-drug advertisements, and drug treatment programs.[4] Drug producing nations assert that the United States focused on supply side strategies in the past because it has been historically incapable of controlling its own demand problems. These countries have long believed the solution to the drug problem lies in U.S. demand reduction programs. Therefore, drug-producing nations view the increased emphasis on demand reduction in the United States as a positive adaptation in the policy. Many drug-producing nations, however, would like to see the United States increase its demand reduction efforts even more. Such disagreements have characterized the relationship between the United States and drug-producing nations on this issue. The United States and many drug-producing nations, especially Mexico, disagree on the level of emphasis that supply and demand strategies should have in U.S. drug policy as well as the level of guilt each nation has for the perpetuation

[4] Although this study focuses on supply reduction, it is important to note this trend and the importance of demand reduction programs.

of the drug problem. These differences have strained relations between the United States and drug-producing countries. Although recent U.S. rhetoric accepting some culpability for the persistence of the drug problem improved relations, negative sentiments about U.S. hypocrisy still exist, even if to a lesser degree, and could cause problems for cooperation in other areas within and outside of the narcotics problem (Suchlicki, 1996: 202).

Despite increased emphasis on demand reduction programs, supply reduction programs remain an important part of the drug effort. As will be discussed in the introduction to the following chapter, U.S. drug control policy must include both supply and demand reduction strategies. The goal is to decrease supply, or quantity, of drugs to the point that the price of them will become high enough to discourage or preclude use. This goal has not been realized to date. A higher price for drugs may also provide incentive for drug traffickers to increase supply. A corresponding decrease in demand for drugs is needed to offset that incentive.

Drug control is certainly a complicated and difficult undertaking. The point is that demand and supply reduction efforts are equally important. The rest of this chapter discusses various supply reduction strategies. One approach is known as "certification." The United States uses the unilateral certification process to entice drug-producing nations to cooperate with its international supply reduction programs.

Certification

Congress passed the certification process into law during 1986 at the height of the crack epidemic. The law requires the President to certify that other nations are doing their part in counter drug efforts, based on initial recommendations by the "State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs" (Falco, 1995: 15). Consequences of decertification by the United States include reduction or cessation of U.S. monetary aid, the loss

of U.S. support in loan requests to the World Bank and other international lending institutions, and a negative stigma in the international community (Falco, 1995: 15).

Certification is based on the perception of cooperation, not necessarily the results of another country's efforts. The President must certify that nations are making sincere counter drug efforts by 1 March of each year. So, every February nations up for certification (including and especially Mexico) release lavish plans to stop drug flow in an effort to persuade the United States ("Judging the Mexican Drug War," 1999).

Many journalists, scholars, and international leaders view the whole process as both ineffective and hypocritical. One reason is that U.S. demand is undeniably a significant part of the global drug problem. A second reason is that international circumstances often preclude the U.S. from making honest assessments about nations' efforts. As long as certification is law, the U.S. should tell the truth about the efforts of other countries, especially when it comes to Mexico ("Judging the Mexican Drug War," 1999). Every year around certification time newspapers such as *The New York Times* publish articles providing evidence that Mexico is not sincerely trying. When examining the 1999 estimate of $15 billion worth of narcotics passing through Mexico every year, it is hard to assert otherwise (Dillon, 1999).

The problem is that Mexico is a NAFTA partner. Decertifying Mexico and imposing economic penalties would hurt the economies of both countries. One potential option to certifying Mexico when policy-makers do not feel the nation deserves it might be a congressional waiver. Decertifying Mexico and applying the congressional waiver would still allow for the funding of Mexican agencies that are actively combating drugs. This option is viable from many perspectives (in theory) and commands wide support. It would, nonetheless, severely strain relations between the United States and Mexico and damage economic interests

on both sides of the border. Although the President can decide to lighten the severity of any punishment, it would simply be embarrassing to impose one in the first place ("Drugs, Latin America and the United States," 1998). Therefore, even though the President has the ability to decertify a nation while subsequently waiving all sanctions on grounds of national security, Mexico will almost certainly never be decertified, even though its past sincerity is readily questionable ("Judging the Mexican Drug War," 1999).

What is not questionable is the functional value of certification, especially with regard to Mexico. The certification process is law, and so it is an annual ritual. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it is an ineffective tool. Mexico has not deserved to be certified in recent memory, but the U.S. has no other choice in today's integrated world that inter-twines the United States and Mexico in a number of areas. Journals, such as *The Economist*, suggest that although certification is at present law and that it is perfectly legitimate for the United States to determine where and how it should spend its money, the law should be changed, or even eliminated ("Drugs, Latin America and the United States," 1998). The current manner in which the United States determines how to spend counter drug money in other countries amounts to indiscrete finger pointing.

One possible alteration in the policy would be to engage in multilateral certification through an international organization like the United Nations or the Organization of American States ("Drugs, Latin America and the United States," 1998). A multilateral process would command significantly more legitimacy than the unilateral U.S. model. Otherwise, the United States will continue to be forced to "choose between damaging relations with American allies and whitewashing their poor performance" ("Judging the Mexican Drug War," 1999).

Supply Reduction Efforts

U.S. supply reduction efforts occur in three stages. The first stage is in the source country. These operations include encouraging or pressuring nations (as discussed above) to conduct their own crop substitution and eradication programs (Bertram, 1997: 11). The reliance on the host nation itself to implement these programs implies a need for institution/nation building and democratization.[5] The second stage attempts to interdict drugs in the transit zone and at the borders. The final stage involves demand reduction efforts (Bertram, 1997: 11). This section discusses crop substitution and eradication as the primary international supply reduction efforts. Interdiction and the military's role therein are discussed in the following chapter.

Crop Substitution

Crop substitution programs attempt to entice drug-growing farmers to cultivate legal crops instead. Crop substitution is the main "positive [drug supply] control method" (Stares, 1996: 66). These programs have achieved some success, but on the whole they have not effectively decreased drug supply to the United States (Stares, 1996: 66).

Crop substitution programs do not fail simply because of the disparity in profits between illicit and legal crops (Andreas, 1991-1992: 120). "Contrary to a widely held belief, net income is not always higher than that from legal crops" (Clawson, 1998: 143). Studies conducted by USAID in Peru and Bolivia during the early 1990's demonstrated that income generated from citrus fruit, bananas, and other products were comparable to that generated from coca, and pineapples yielded even more. There are actually several reasons that crop substitution has failed to reduced supply (Clawson, 1998: 143).

One reason crop substitution programs have not achieved their goal is that "more lucrative crops are typically consumed locally, and local markets are not large enough to sustain

[5] The importance of democratization in the Mexican case is discussed in Essay III.

a large-scale shift in production" (Stares, 1997: 66). It is often difficult for farmers in Latin America to reach markets outside their local areas. Infrastructure may be inadequate, farmers may lack the means of transportation necessary, or both. Geographical remoteness significantly increases the cost of transportation. In fact, transportation costs can range from 60 – 85% of the product's value in some instances (Clawson, 1998: 149). To encourage farmers to grow drug plants, traffickers go to the farmers and assume all transportation costs (Clawson, 1998: 151).

A second reason crop substitution programs have had limited success is that the time it takes for a farmer to see a return on legal produce is often longer than from drug crops. For instance, coca has a very short gestating period compared to most legal crops (Stares, 1997: 66). Therefore, farmers readily plant coca for a more immediate profit even though in some cases other crops may yield more long-term proceeds if cultivated on a similar scale.

Ecological problems also affect crop substitution programs. Using coca as an example again, coca is produced in areas where most other agricultural products have difficulty growing. The plant is grown on the steep slopes of the Andes that experience heavy rainfall, have acidic soil, and are inaccessible to modern farm equipment. Crop substitution, then, does not always mean replacing drug crops with legal ones on the same site. Substitution programs can mean relocation for drug farmers, which may or may not be desirable for individuals. Whatever the case for the individual farmer, this fact complicates the matter (Clawson, 1998: 148).

Yet another problem impacting crop substitution has to do with guerrillas that infest many drug producing nations. These guerrillas have a tendency to destroy infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) in many drug-producing regions, which further increases the incentive for farmers to avoid high transportation costs by cooperating with drug traffickers. Of more concern,

however, is the fact that guerrillas have formed loose agreements with drug traffickers to protect drug crops in order to finance their insurgency (Clawson, 1998: 150).

These impediments to crop substitution are substantial in and of themselves. Beyond these problems, drug traffickers often bribe farmers to guarantee they continue to plant drug crops (Clawson, 1998: 150). All this notwithstanding, the literature indicates that crop substitution programs have potential to impact drug supply.

Although there are barriers to crop substitution programs, there are also incentives. Incentives include a decrease in the price of drug crops (Clawson, 1998: 153) (which can be achieved through various means and is the primary goal of supply reduction efforts as a whole) (Clawson, 1998: 154), stronger legal economies, and avoidance of violence from drug traffickers, guerrillas, and the state (Clawson, 1998: 155). A reasonably capable legal economy combined with security from violence would certainly cause a significant shift from illicit to legal crops. Drug farmers are under constant threat from traffickers and guerrillas (to continue growing drug crops) and from the state (to substitute drug crops). In many cases, state agents can be as violent as traffickers and guerrillas, and sometimes even more so (Clawson, 1998: 155).

Unfortunately legal economies in most drug producing nations are inadequate to support all current drug farmers. In Bolivia, for example, even if all drug farmers could be enticed to abandon the drug market entirely, nearly one-half of the farmers would not be able to earn enough income to subsist ("Bolivia goes to war against coca," 1998: 43).

In the past, crop substitution simply meant trading one crop for another. Recently, a more comprehensive approach, called "area development," has been developed to address the economic realities that many drug farmers face (Clawson, 1998: 156). The five aspects of this

approach are 1) introducing the new crop; 2) developing legal markets; 3) industrialization; 4) developing a social infrastructure; and 5) organizational development (Clawson, 1998: 157).

The first step is straightforward. This step also constituted the extent of previous crop substitution programs. It is important to recognize that introducing the alternative crop does not necessarily mean introducing it in the same location where the drug crops are grown. As previously mentioned, this can cause farmers to relocate (Clawson, 1998: 157).

Developing legal markets entails supporting the farmers as they transition to legal products, not simply giving them seeds and wishing them luck. This step largely seeks to reduce the gross cost of transportation remote farmers must contend with in legal markets. The goal here is to improve roads and transportation routes as well as to provide farmers with means of transportation at discount rates well under the usual 60 – 85% cost discussed above. Building packing and storage facilities is also included in this step (Clawson, 1998: 157).

Industrialization is related to the development of legal markets. It provides processing technology to improve the life of the product and to "increase the value-to-weight ratio" of legal crops. Yet, to date, little process improvement has occurred (Clawson, 1998: 157).

The development of social infrastructure seeks to provide "facilities or services designed to improve the quality of life in the zones that produce narcotics crops" (Clawson, 1998: 158). This includes building and funding schools, clinics, facilities for running water, etc. Such infrastructure indirectly (but significantly) reduces drug farmers' resistance to substitution programs (Clawson, 1998: 158).

Organizational development "entails promoting cooperatives of farmers that can aggregate products for sale to processors, intermediaries, or consumes and that can deliver government services to scattered peasant households." Farmers' organizations that support legal

production become a self-reinforcing social pressure that increases the chance drug farmers will transfer to, and remain in, the legal sector. The extent that these organizations can be developed, as the literature suggests, "is crucial to the success of alternative development" (Clawson, 1998: 158).

Area development is an improvement over previous concepts of crop substitution. These comprehensive programs, however, have seldom been applied successfully. The reason crop substitution in any form has yet to be successful is that it is applied in an isolated manner. The literature states that if area development could be implemented throughout drug producing nations the results would be far better (Clawson, 1998: 159).

The lessons from past experience show that crop substitution programs can have good results, particularly when they are applied to entire drug producing regions and include "investment in transportation infrastructure, marketing assistance, and other alternative development programs" (Stares, 1996: 67). When economies of drug producing nations improve, more drug farmers will engage in legal production (Stares, 1996: 67). Of course, improving these economies is no easy task. In order for crop substitution to achieve an effective reduction in supply, local government support is necessary. According to Patrick Clawson and Rensselaer Lee, a sincere and capable local effort would be much more effective than anything the Untied States can do (1998: 238). This of course implies the need for a strong local government, which itself implies the need for nation building and democratization in drug producing countries. Strengthening and democratizing governmental institutions in these countries is also difficult to achieve. As weak, financially deficient, and corrupt governments hinder crop substitution efforts, so to do they impede eradication.

Crop Eradication

Crop eradication is the principle "negative [drug supply] control method" (Stares, 1997: 64). Crop eradication programs attempt to decrease drug supply to the United States by destroying the drug crops where they are grown. Destroying crops may be accomplished in a number of ways, but aerial spraying is the most common and the most efficient. While crop eradication may be efficient, the literature in several instances questions its effectiveness.

Eradication programs have been "impressive" since the mid 1970's and early 1980's (Stares, 1997: 28), when such efforts in South America became the first "front" in the drug war (Andreas, 1991-1992: 106). But invariably, the decreased production was temporary (Stares, 1997: 29). The reason is that after crops are destroyed in one area, production emerges elsewhere. For example, during the late 1980's, eradication of opium poppy in Mexico resulted in new growth in Guatemala (Stares, 1997: 36). Eradication has failed to keep up with such new and flexible growth (Andreas, 1991-1992: 109). For this reason, eradication has been labeled an efficient but ineffective method in reducing drug supply to the United States (Andreas, 1991-1992: 110).

Past lack of effectiveness results from a corresponding lack of comprehensiveness in the programs. The literature suggests that more comprehensive implementation of eradication programs, as with substitution programs, would result in both efficient and effective reductions in drug supply. "In the case of coca cultivation, which is geographically concentrated, a comprehensive eradication program systematically implemented in a sustained manner by all the Andean countries might reduce production enough to significantly raise whole sale and retail prices" (Stares, 1997: 65). For other drug crops, for which production is more widespread, such programs would be more difficult to implement (Stares, 1997: 65). Nevertheless, the possibility

to achieve real results exists. Achieving those possible results, however, is difficult due to the sheer volume of drug farmers and the profit incentive farmers have to adapt to pressures induced by eradication.

The number of drug farmers is almost inconceivable. There are "hundreds of thousands" of coca farmers alone. Furthermore, "the profit incentive and the ease of growing coca create conditions for almost infinite supply" (Bertram, 1996: 18). In fact, coca produced by these farmers is sufficient to supply three times the amount needed to satisfy U.S. demand (Bertram, 1997: 14). These vast amounts of drug crops alone make it difficult to eradicate at a level that affects supply. Incentives for drug producing nations to half-heartedly implement eradication programs also complicate the matter.

"Immediate economic and political interests dictate against a crackdown on coca" and other drugs because they represent the "most significant and dependable source of dollars and jobs" in many drug-producing nations (Andreas, 1991-1992: 113). Drug crops represent the livelihood of many farmers ("Bolivia goes to war against coca," 1998: 43). An effective destruction of coca would devastate local and regional economies and have serious political ramifications for politicians who implemented the program (Andreas, 1991-1992: 113). Sincerely implementing such a program would at least result in political suicide and at worst lead to open violence in many areas.

Another incentive drug-producing nations have to half-heartedly carry out eradication programs, ironically, has to do with funding from the United States. While displaying sub-optimal results in counter drug efforts could result U.S. decertification and loss of significant funding, complete destruction of the drug industry in any given nation would also result in loss of funding. Logically, without a reason for aid, the aid would cease. Drug-producing nations,

particularly in Latin America, essentially receive money for promising to fight drug trafficking. So they do, offering up just enough token results to remain certified and to keep the money coming without achieving any real impact on the problem (Andreas, 1991-1992: 115).

Beyond economic and political incentives to lackadaisically eradicate drug crops, there is the issue of traditional use ("Bolivia goes to war against coca," 1998: 43). Many drug crops were used in traditional medical practices and religious ceremonies in drug-producing nations long before the United States developed a drug problem. The coca plant is cited here as an example again. Traditional coca growth and use dates back four to six thousand years. Besides significance for religious ceremonies and ability to treat a wide range of ailments, coca is a considerable part of the natives' regular diet as a good source of nutrients, including iron and calcium. Because coca is a stimulant and relieves hunger, thirst, and altitude sickness, the Indians of the Andes also use the plant to cope with hard manual labor at high altitudes (United Nations Drug Control Programme, 1997: 34).

The issues of volume, political economy, and tradition are enough to make effective and efficient eradication difficult at best. Misconceived notions of environmental damage complicate the matter even more so.

Environmentalists in the United States and drug producing nations criticize crop eradication efforts, especially aerial spraying, as detrimental to the environment (Stares, 1997: 64). Environmentalists assert that the variety of dangerous chemicals used to spray drug crops poisons the ground water, kills other foliage unintentionally and unnecessarily, etc. This may be so. The argument offered up by environmentalists and drug traffickers alike is convincing. The assertion, however, is a partial truth that omits a more significant side of the story.

Proponents of the argument often fail to mention that drug farmers themselves do much more damage to the environment than eradication programs ever could (Clawson, 1998: 198). Such damage includes excessive and illegal deforestation and the use of dangerous chemicals to refine drug crops into marketable illegal narcotics. Again, using coca as an example, "coca farmers use more pesticides and insecticides each year than would be required to eradicate the crop entirely; indeed, some farmers use five times as much as would be applied in an eradication program" (Clawson, 1998: 198). This fact is not generally known because it is rarely, if ever, presented to the public.

If the incentives to apathetically implement eradication programs could be overcome, and the environmental issue put in perspective, or at least presented accurately, real results could be achieved. Long-term reductions in drug supply are possible if eradication programs are "implemented on a large scale, sustained over time, and extended to any new areas opened up as the older . . . growing regions are sprayed" (Clawson, 1998: 240). Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, overcoming these obstacles is no easy task. Host nation support is vital. Unfortunately, corruption pervades the institutions of many drug-producing nations. Essays II and III discuss this issue using the Mexican case. Mexico demonstrates that governmental corruption hinders overall supply reduction efforts and that corruption has serious long-term implications for the well being of the drug producing nation.

In sum, supply reduction efforts can be effective with a certain level of comprehensiveness. The primary obstacle to achieving the level of comprehensiveness necessary is funding. The drug industry generates $300 + billion each year. The realities of the U.S. budget only permit $18 or so billion to be dedicated to the problem. While this is a large amount, U.S. funding of drug efforts comes nowhere near the revenue generation of the drug

industry (Perl, 1992: 26). Sophisticated mathematical analysis is not required to see that there is a large disparity in available resources. Budget constraints dictate that the United States can never dedicate the resources to eliminate supply entirely (Bertram, 1997: 19). That statement is not a concession of defeat. Nor is it to say that supply reduction efforts should be abandoned. Ceasing such efforts simply because of past ineffectiveness would lead to higher drug trafficking and use rates. Although not as effective as many would like, supply reduction efforts are an integral and necessary part of overall strategy (Perl, 1993-1994: 143-151). The question becomes, then, how to get the most for your money. How does the United States get the most out of the resources already allocated to supply reduction programs? This is where the military comes in and is the subject of the following chapter.

CHAPTER III: THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN COUNTER NARCOTICS

The previous chapter discussed the setting the military operates in with regard to counter drug efforts. The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature pertaining to the military's role. It addresses how the military became involved in these efforts, the transformation of drug trafficking from a criminal justice concern to a matter of national security, and the amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. The chapter then discusses the military's and the National Guard's place within supply reduction/interdiction efforts and the importance of strategic intelligence, which has been previously under emphasized (or not emphasized at all), in this area.

Because this chapter, and this paper, focuses on the area of supply reduction, it may be easy to interpret the content as advocating supply reduction as the primary method of overall counter drug strategy. An effective drug control policy, however, is comprehensive. The effort must attack both the supply and demand side of the problem (Bergantz, 1992: 67). Demand reduction programs include education regarding the dangers of drug use (particularly targeted at young people) and drug treatment programs for those who have drug problems. While demand reduction is important, supply side strategies (such as crop substitution and eradication in source countries, interdiction at the border and in the transit zone, and diplomatic efforts to encourage governments of source countries to attack local drug production and transit) should be continued.[6] Eliminating them would allow greater volumes of illegal drugs into the country and into the hands of our citizens.

CALLING ON THE MILITARY

The drug problem in the United States has become so pervasive that government officials have called on the military to lend its unique services. The literature, however, poses some

[6] It is sometimes believed that there is little incentive for source countries to attack the drug problem because it is often a stimulus to the local economy, or even its driving force. This is not accurate, however. For more information on this phenomenon using the Mexican case as an example, please refer to Essay I.

concerned questions about military involvement. These questions include: Should the military be involved in the first place (Bergantz, 1992: 67)? If so, what is its proper role (Bergantz, 1992: 67)? Assuming assignment of proper roles, can the military be effective in them (Sanchez, 1991, 137)? Are there political reasons to restrain the military from becoming extensively involved (Sanchez, 1991, 137)? If there are, what constraints should there be on military involvement (Bergantz, 1992: 67)? And ultimately, are there better, more effective ways to approach counter drug efforts (Sanchez, 1991, 137)?

In short, the literature suggests the military should be involved in a support role and that it can certainly be effective. But there are reasons to restrict the military's involvement to a support role, particularly the preservation of civil liberty. And finally, the best approach to counter drug efforts is a comprehensive one that integrates both supply and demand strategies to reduce drug flow and consumption in order to improve the well being of our nation. The following sections address these issues in detail.

A Matter of National Security

The literature frequently cites illicit drugs as a national security threat. This new, expanded status was granted to drug trafficking during the 1980's. On 14 October 1982, President Reagan "declared a 'War on Drugs'" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 41). He formally upgraded drug trafficking from a domestic criminal justice issue to a national security concern when he "signed National Security Decision Directive No. 221, entitled *Narcotics and National Security*, in April 1986" (Nadelmann, 1997: 476). Current trends in globalization and international interdependence will likely cause drug trafficking to increasingly be considered a national security matter (Nadelmann, 1997: 477).

Increased counter drug efforts are a direct result of this view. The general thought of policy makers is that "drugs attack the physical and social health of the American way of life. Thus, recent policy . . . and most importantly national security, demand military involvement in drug control" (Bergantz, 1992: 67). The involvement of the military in law enforcement efforts, however, is a serious matter, and it took a Congressional amendment to allow it. That amendment had implications for both domestic matters and international affairs.

Posse Comitatus

The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the military from acting in a civil law enforcement capacity. In an emergency situation, however, the military can be used for domestic law enforcement. Presidential authority to dictate emergency action comes from Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Furthermore, court rulings do not prohibit indirect military participation in law enforcement (Sanchez, 1991: 119). Absent outright prohibition, it remained possible that the military could be allowed to perform law enforcement related functions.

The late 1970's and early 1980's presented a situation that grabbed the attention of U.S. lawmakers. Drug trafficking and U.S. drug consumption increased at a faster rate than any other time in history. This is what prompted President Reagan to enlist the help of the military in counter drug efforts (Bertram, 1996: 112). But military involvement was, and still is, controversial (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 53). The Posse Comitatus Act, as it stood, severely restricted the use of the military in law enforcement activities. It took an amendment to the Act to loosen those restrictions.

Posse Comitatus was amended in 1981 (Bergantz, 1992: 68), and Public Law 97-86 mandated the military to use indirect methods to aid law enforcement in the area drug control (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 55). These indirect methods included the provision of training,

equipment, engineering services, and transportation for various law enforcement agencies in pursuit of counter drug efforts.

President Bush went a step further in 1989 and increased the military's role when he signed the National Defense Authorization Act. This Act enhanced the military's responsibilities by making the Department of Defense the lead agency for detection and monitoring of drug traffic, charging the military with integrating command, control, and communications into an effective interdiction net, and granting the military the duty "to approve and fund state governors' plans for using the National Guard in State interdiction and enforcement" (Bertram, 1996: 114-115).

This advanced military role corresponded with the increasing consideration of drug trafficking as a national security threat. Such sentiment gathered momentum throughout the 1990's as the drug problem worsened. Many government officials began making strong public statements about the urgency of the problem, re-emphasizing its implications for national security. One early example was in 1992 when Congressmen Les Aspin and Dan Nichols said 'it has become abundantly clear that international drug trafficking is a national security matter' (Bergantz, 1992: 68).

As one might expect, the amendment to Posse Comitatus under President Reagan and President Bush's National Defense Authorization Act were significant events for U.S. civil-military relations (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 55), prompting many concerns about the protection of U.S. civil rights. Would this amendment begin a trend toward more direct military involvement? What could, or would happen if the military became more directly involved? As a result of these concerns, military aid to law enforcement in counter drug efforts did not include the direct law enforcement functions of "searches, seizures or arrests" (Bergantz, 1992: 68). Another limiting

factor on military involvement was that the military could not participate if readiness for traditional missions would be adversely affected (Bergantz, 1992: 68). These restrictions somewhat calmed peoples' fears about threats to individual liberty, but they did not do so entirely.

Traditional/Historical Aversion

"American political culture may be accurately characterized as having an aversion to military power and authority" (Sanchez, 1991: 117). Therefore, to most Americans, involving the military in law enforcement activities, directly or indirectly, may seem entirely unprecedented, and even dangerous. There is, however, a history of *direct* military involvement in law enforcement.

Early in American history both the Army and Navy conducted law enforcement operations internal and external to U.S. territory. These operations included anti-piracy, attacks on slave traders, and attacks on Indian war parties. The Army also conducted raids into Mexico in pursuit of border bandits and other law enforcement activities (Nadelmann, 1997: 20).

There are even more recent examples of these practices. In 1986, Congress authorized the Legal Detachment Program (LEDET). This program places Coast Guard personnel aboard Naval vessels. The Coast Guard falls under the Navy in times of conflict but is officially accountable to the Department of Transportation. Therefore, Posse Comitatus does not apply to the Coast Guard. The Navy intercepts ships suspected of transporting illegal drugs and Coast Guardsmen apprehend the traffickers. This is a creative way around prohibition of direct military law enforcement (Sanchez, 1991: 123).

So there is a historical precedent for military involvement in law enforcement. Recognition of this fact may cause even more unsettlement among the American people. The

precedent makes it possible for further intensification of the military's role, making it all the more important to guard against such escalation.

From Reluctance to Embracement

The American people were not alone in their misgivings about the amendment. The military was very reluctant initially (Bergantz, 1992: 69). This reluctance endured throughout the 1980's (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 56).

One reason for the initial reluctance was the military did not want to accept new roles while facing force and budget cuts (Bergantz, 1992: 69). It further viewed such law enforcement activities as "demeaning" and beneath traditional military responsibilities (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 62). The Department of Defense also did not want to be drawn in to what was perceived as another department's problem, fearing the potential to become the scapegoat (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 63).

Nevertheless, this initial reluctance quickly subsided with the end of the Cold War. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the military found itself searching for ways to justify its funding and its numbers. The military embraced counter drug efforts as a way to achieve this end. Military officials knew then, as they know now, that once funds are approved and appropriated, it is rather difficult to discontinue that funding. In order for funding to be revoked or decreased, there must be a significant change in the environment. The end of the Cold War constituted such a change (Bertram, 1996: 129-130).

There is another rather pessimistic view of military acceptance of its new role in counter drugs. Some saw it as a less expensive way to maintain U.S. "global hegemony" (Nadelmann, 1997: 467). Exerting U.S. economic and military influence around the world during the Cold War was unquestionably expensive. In some people's view, projecting U.S. law enforcement

values onto the international stage, particularly through drug efforts, is a much cheaper way to maintain influence. This is a possibility given that the projection of these values is less expensive than direct military deployment and economic investment, even when considering the additional funding of the military to perform counter drug functions (Nadelmann, 1997: 476).

These two observations may or may not have some degree of truth to them. Whatever the case may be, the fact remains military involvement is needed, the military now accepts this tasking, and civilian law enforcement alone cannot be effective in supply reduction efforts (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 38). This is readily apparent when the magnitude of the problem is put in context. For instance, it is estimated that in 1992 drugs drained the U.S. economy of $150 billion, plus an additional $60 to $80 billion in costs associated with missed work, medical expenses, etc. In all, illegal drugs cost the U.S. between $210 and $230 billion that year, a sum greater than the cost of the Gulf War (Bergantz, 1992: 69). A solution to a problem of this magnitude must be one that helps to direct and focus law enforcement efforts in a more efficient way. The military can provide the means to achieve that efficiency.

International Implications

While the amendment to Posse Comitatus has serious implications for civil-military relations in this country, it also affects spheres beyond domestic U.S. affairs. Some evidence of U.S. drug control serving as a way to maintain hegemony is observed in the fact that U.S. counter drug efforts increased U.S. law enforcement overseas more than any other area (Nadelmann, 1997: 467). One outgrowth of these overseas efforts has been U.S. military cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies (also in an indirect, support role) against drug trafficker facilities in Latin America. Nevertheless, direct, overt military law enforcement overseas is unlikely in the future because of national sovereignty issues (Sanchez, 1991: 132),

even though U.S. domestic law does not prohibit military law enforcement in other nations (Sanchez, 1991: 134). It would just be bad policy to do so. Yet, there are two exceptions to this general convention.

One example of overt use of the military in a law enforcement capacity overseas was Operation Just Cause. During this operation, the military apprehended Panamanian General Manuel Noriega for drug trafficking. The U.S. justified this action citing the necessity "to secure U.S. interests and to protect American lives" in Panama (Sanchez, 1991: 135).

A second exception to direct military involvement in interdiction comes from the 1989 National Security Decision Directive issued by President Bush. This directive allows U.S. Special Forces to accompany military and law enforcement forces of other nations on "patrols" in search of drug trafficking facilities in the host nation (Sanchez, 1991: 140). Other than these cases, the more significant concerns have to do with the application of the military at home.

APPLYING THE MILITARY

After the military was involved, it became important for it to recognize its place in the overall effort. To date, this has not been successfully achieved. Within the umbrella of counter drug efforts, the military can contribute most effectively in the area of supply reduction because of its unique abilities (Bergantz, 1992: 68). Of the military's many capabilities, the provision of intelligence is the most important in supporting law enforcement drug control efforts (Bergantz, 1992: 67).

Intelligence does not simply entail surveillance and reconnaissance, although it does include these functions. More importantly, the military has the capability to provide the strategic, predictive type of intelligence that can make the difference in the drug effort by providing the level of efficiency and focused direction previously mentioned. Because the

military alone has the capability to provide this type of intelligence,[7] and because illegal drugs now constitute a national security threat, the military's participation is not only justified, it is warranted (Bergantz, 1992: 68). But the literature identifies shortfalls toward this end with the military center tasked with drug operations – Joint Task Force 6 (JTF-6) located at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas.

JTF-6

Joint Task Force 6 was established on 15 September 1989. This task force coordinates all military support for law enforcement agencies (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 91). Its original area of operation was limited to the Southwest border states. But, in 1995, the commander of U.S. Army Forces Command directed JTF-6 to assume responsibility for the entire country. Today, JTF-6 has responsibility for all the United States except for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In June 1997, U.S. Southern Command assumed responsibility for these U.S. territories (Joint Task Force Six, 2001).

Military support to law enforcement is initiated by a valid request from the given agency (Joint Task Force Six, 2001). Law dictates that each mission must be requested by a civilian law enforcement agency before it can take place (Newman, 1997: 40). These missions are tactical in nature and driven solely by the immediate needs of law enforcement. Such support is important and does have its place. But even though law enforcement is partial to this support because it provides tactical intelligence and frees up its own assets to pursue arrests, it is not the best approach.

"Drug analysts, who usually play down the success of interdiction efforts, point out that even the U.S. military has failed to materially stem the flow of drugs into the country" (Newman,

[7] This statement is made excluding the nation's elite intelligence agencies, specifically the National Security Agency (NSA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who work closely with the Department of Defense in providing security for our nation.

1997: 40). Among the skeptical are a number of military officials. One reason the military has been unable to "materially stem" drug flow is because the military is directed by tactical law enforcement needs. The literature suggests supply reduction and interdiction efforts should not be administered this way. Rather, strategic intelligence (discussed specifically in the following section), provided by the military, should guide law enforcement efforts. Another reason for criticism is that drug traffickers, facing the massive military radar networks, have begun to increasingly ship drugs with legitimate cargo. Despite criticism, this fact implies an even greater need for strategic intelligence.

It is interesting to note that even on the JTF-6 website[8] tactical support missions are listed first and intelligence missions last.[9] Order of mention on a website is not the problem itself. But it is a symptom of a larger trend. Results have been sub-optimal because the military is precluded from contributing in the area it can be of most benefit. And just as the military originally feared, critics began pointing the finger at the military years ago. This criticism is both inaccurate and unfair. But if the military can move beyond tactical law enforcement requests (while still serving them when appropriate) and focus more on strategic intelligence, as J.F. Holden-Rhodes suggests, positive results in supply reduction will be achieved.

Strategic Intelligence

Despite all its efforts, the U.S. still lacks an accurate understanding of the drug problem. This is the most likely reason for past inefficiency. Inadequate knowledge of the problem is a direct result of the primary emphasis on law enforcement and a general lack of appreciation for the complexity of the problem. Such misunderstanding has resulted in sub-optimal use of military intelligence assets (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 44).

---

[8] This website can be accessed at http://www-jtf6.bliss.army.mil/html/cdsupport.html.

[9] As long as this orientation persists, achieving any real progress will be difficult at best, and the military's fear of becoming the scapegoat will become more likely.

For 20 years or more, drug intelligence has been conducted with a mind toward catering to the immediate, tactical needs of law enforcement. The National Drug Control Strategy recognizes that 'the war against drugs cannot be fought – much less won – without good intelligence' (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 42). The "good intelligence" alluded to in this statement includes, but is much more than, the tactical products currently being used. Strategic intelligence is the tool to be relied upon in foreign policy and strategy and related matters of national security, which, as noted in the previous chapter, includes drug trafficking (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 2). It is this type of intelligence, "the type that can only be provided by the military – that can make a difference" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 60).

Berkowitz and Goodman, as quoted in J.F. Holden-Rhodes' book *Open Source Intelligence and the War on Drugs*, define strategic intelligence as "analysis produced in a process clearly separate from that used to develop policy, based on combined sources of information, and intended to go beyond simple descriptions of military deployments or political events" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 5). In other words, strategic intelligence can provide the big picture, predicting trends that allow for the best allocation and direction of resources.

Because of the limited benefit observed through interdiction in the past, as of 1996 there has been a trend to move away from interdiction and to rely more on other areas of drug control (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 20). Interdiction of illicit substances is quite a daunting task. "Each year 574,000 airplanes, 177,000 ships and boats, 118 million automobiles, and 422 million people cross our 12,000 miles of coastal and 7,500 miles of land borders. Each could be carrying well-hidden illicit drugs" (Bertram, 1996: 20). And there is simply no established link between funding of interdiction efforts and drug availability over time (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 34). Perhaps it is correct to scale back such efforts, but, again, they should not be abandoned entirely.

If increasing funding is not the answer, it would seem more efficient use of resources is, further highlighting the need for more strategic intelligence products.

Holden-Rhodes (1997) notes the bottom line is that intelligence has not been optimally utilized (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 34). Law enforcement intelligence, focused on interdiction efforts for the sole purpose of achieving arrests, lacks the essential elements of "interpretation and forecasting" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 29). Yet, intelligence is of greatest benefit because it can provide "definitive" insight into the nature of drug trafficking that would greatly benefit the drug effort (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 30).

One example of sub-optimal, law enforcement directed utilization of intelligence in the interdiction effort has been the tendency to use intelligence resources in an attempt to intercept drugs at the points of entry. Contrary to common belief, however, points of entry are not where the most significant interdiction successes occur (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 87). Drug seizures are much more common 20 miles inland from the borders (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 165). It is entirely logical, then, that funding for border interdiction be reduced. Doing so would not significantly hinder the effort, if at all. What follows is the use of human intelligence combined with proactive measures on the U.S. side of the border would probably be more effective in intercepting drugs than massing resources at the points of entry (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 87).

Yet, even the military has not recognized the strategic value of intelligence as "the primary tool" to be used in the drug effort. This is partly because the 1989 Defense Authorization Act was not clear about military authority to direct civilian agencies. So the military assumed the position that it only had 'the authority to require consultation' of law enforcement agencies. The outcome is that the military can only conduct its detection and monitoring mission with the consent of civilian law enforcement (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 79).

Therefore, the immediate needs and goals of law enforcement have become the driving force behind drug operations. This posture is a problem for several reasons. For one, it is not conducive to the production of needed strategic intelligence. As previously stated, law enforcement is tactically orientated toward arrests and the gathering of information to increase the probability of convictions. This posture lacks the big picture perspective. So when law enforcement requests information from the military, that information tends to be limited in scope and to fall short of the larger strategic orientation.

"In simple terms, what is needed is 'local strategic intelligence,' based upon evaluated information, that can be shared amongst law enforcement agencies" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 95). This statement implies two things. One is that the directing force behind drug operations should be military intelligence. This may seem to be a strong assertion. The military's approved role, however, is consistent with it. Its primary mission of detection and monitoring is "first and foremost an intelligence mission" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 63). The second implication is the importance of the National Guard at the local/regional level in drug intelligence efforts.

The National Guard and Strategic Intelligence

The literature identifies the National Guard as the "unsung hero" in counter drug efforts and states that, "in reality, the only real effective use of military units in the war on drugs was done by the National Guard" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 77). And even more flattering, "the blueprint for the future" can be seen in the Guard units of California, New Mexico, and Texas (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 77). To date, however, the National Guard has been sub-optimally utilized as well. Like the military in general, the National Guard has yet to embrace intelligence as the means to improve its performance within its designated supply reduction role. The focus has been on transportation, aerial surveillance and reconnaissance, domestic drug crop

eradication, direct assistance of Border Patrol and Customs agents, and equipment sharing with law enforcement agencies (Bertram, 1996: 128). It would be highly preferable for the blueprint of the future to include National Guard localized strategic intelligence.

The National Guard's use of intelligence, like the military in general, has been limited to "sustaining law enforcement operations" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 77). The literature has already established the importance of strategic military intelligence at both the national and local levels. The National Guard could move in this direction with relatively minimal effort. National Guard units are already in place in local/regional areas, they are intimately familiar with those areas, and the National Guard has intelligence analyst capability (Texas National Guard, 2001). Progress in supply reduction and interdiction is related to the extent that National Guard assets are effectively used. Combining traditional National Guard logistical support functions (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 77) with local strategic intelligence should create the basis for much success and progress in supply reduction.

Current National Guard Bureau approved support missions include the following, in order listed on the Texas National Guard official website (http://www.agd.state.tx.us/C-DRUG.HTM): linguistics/translation, communication, operational/investigative case support, intelligence, engineering, transportation, training, and aerial reconnaissance and observation (Texas National Guard, 2001). It is interesting to note, again, that intelligence is fourth on the list, and behind operational/investigative case support, which is defined as "assistance to law enforcement agencies in developing investigations and cases for prosecution." This is indicative of the problem. It is debatable whether the National Guard should be involved in developing cases for prosecution anyway. Furthermore, if law enforcement alone is incapable of making

marked progress in interdiction/supply reduction efforts, it seems highly illogical that it would be allowed to dictate military function therein.

Law enforcement alone is inadequate precisely because it lacks the intelligence capability the military has. This is not to say the approved support missions are unimportant. The military/National Guard has superior abilities in linguistics, the development and maintenance of communications systems and networks, engineering, transportation, training, and surveillance (Texas National Guard, 2001), and these roles greatly aid law enforcement. But literature on the topic (particularly J.F. Holden-Rhodes) seems to indicate that the foremost concern should be the achievement of local strategic intelligence products that would help law enforcement better perform its function. Strategic intelligence should be at the top of the list, bolded, underlined, and with stars by it. Unfortunately it is not. If it were, better results would be much more likely. If the function of the military, especially the National Guard remains the same, the literature not only predicts continued disappointing results, but future problems of military infringement on civilian rights is also likely.

CONERNS AND SUGGESTIONS

The National Guard enjoys the unique status between the authority of the Pentagon and the state governor. While the Guard receives federal money, its counter drug operations are carried out under state authority. Because the Guard falls, in part, under state authority, Posse Comitatus restrictions do not apply. Therefore, the National Guard can take a more active and direct role in drug enforcement (Kitfield, James, 1993: 11). This can be both positive and dangerous.

One the one hand, it is easier for the National Guard to become proactive in drug efforts than it is for other components of the military. This proactive stance includes the pursuit of

strategic intelligence beyond the direction of law enforcement, at the same time understanding these intelligence products are for the direct benefit of law enforcement. While law enforcement would have access to these products, law enforcement agencies would not limit National Guard intelligence efforts to those directed at arrests and convictions. Predictive National Guard intelligence would become the driving force, directing and enabling law enforcement to become more effective and efficient in their efforts, thus contributing to significant progress. This is the preferred, proper order of things. Intelligence (the determination of targets, trends, and probable activity) should direct shooters and operators, not the other way around. We have already seen the disappointing results of the latter posture.

One the other hand, because there are fewer restrictions on the National Guard in this area, Pentagon officials are concerned about "mission creep" (Kitfield, 1993: 13), or the gradual escalation and alteration of the mission resulting from inadequate or inaccurate specification of that mission at the outset.[10] The National Guard is more susceptible to mission creep in this situation because of its unique status under state authority. This is even more of a concern given increasing civilian tolerance of the military involvement (particularly the National Guard) in civil affairs (Kitfield, 1993: 11).

Evidence of such tolerance was seen in the use of the National Guard to quell the L.A. riots (Kitfield, 1993: 11). There are also surprising examples of direct National Guard involvement in counter drug activities that go beyond traditional support roles. In 1993 the Pennsylvania governor used the National Guard to remove drug dealers from neighborhoods and

[10] A recent example of "mission creep" is Somalia, during which the original humanitarian assistance mission gradually became a peacekeeping one "including the disarming of the Somali clans, rehabilitating Somali political and economic institutions and establishing a secure environment throughout Somalia" (Johnson, 1997: 92). This conflict demonstrated "the hazards of becoming involved in a protracted conflict with an unclear exit strategy and fuzzy military objectives" (Johnson, 1997: 93). The military is likewise concerned about escalation and alteration of originally designated roles in the drug effort.

to board up known drug houses. The people in these neighborhoods responded favorably to the action. Many neighborhood residents reportedly felt much safer (Kitfield, 1993: 10). In Sumter, South Carolina, National Guard personnel actually accompanied police on patrols (Kitfield, 1993: 11). "While the police officers made all arrests, the rules of engagement allowed the soldiers to fire at suspects if their own lives or a police officer's life was threatened" (Kitfield, 1993: 13). Yet another example was in Puerto Rico when Governor Pedro Rossello called upon the National Guard to aid police purging various neighborhoods of drug traffickers and enclosing those neighborhoods with gates. At first, guardsmen manned those gates exclusively. Eventually, the police took their place (Kitfield, 1993: 12-13).

Despite the characteristic aversion to military authority, these cases are evidence that the American people have become more tolerant of it, especially in the area of drug enforcement. A military expert at the Brookings Institution said 'Americans are more willing to accept a military presence on their streets to combat the seemingly intractable problem of domestic crime' (Kitfield, 1993: 12). This is particularly true with respect to National Guard involvement. The phenomenon is due to the magnitude of the problem and the perceived benefit of applying military capability. This capability becomes even more attractive when it can be directly applied through National Guard units under state authority.

Nevertheless, as the co-director of the Rand Corporation Drug Policy Research Center Jon Caulkins said in 1996, "it's a mistake to view the military as the linchpin of drug control" (Newman, 1996: 41), mainly because of that slippery slope into mission creep and toward curtailed freedom. "Anytime you contemplate going further beyond the National Guard's traditional missions, you have to give serious thought to the precedent you're setting and the symbolism involved" (Kitfield, 1993: 12). In the end, the extent the military becomes directly

involved in law enforcement, and to the extent law enforcement militarizes itself, the people of the United States cede liberty.

All this implies that the escalation of the military's traditional missions is dangerous, and that it is not the area that can have the most impact on the problem. While the National Guard should not accompany police in squad cars and on raids of drug houses, it should be involved in the area of strategic intelligence toward the end of providing law enforcement with the predictive direction that will allow those agencies to better perform their function. This posture would increase the National Guard's involvement but maintain the rights of the citizens[11] because the military would move away from participating in patrols, searches, seizures, and arrests. *This posture regulates the military to its proper support role* and the one that can make the most difference. In short, it keeps the military off the street and allows the military to make its most important contribution.

Still, civil libertarians and the American people in general may fear further military involvement in civil affairs, whatever that involvement entails. Perhaps this is a good thing. It serves as a check that preserves our liberty. On the other hand, it seems that strategic intelligence should drive supply reduction operations. The military can contribute best in this area. If it is determined that military strategic intelligence in counter drug efforts crosses the line, then a civilian agency should provide it and the military's overall role should be eliminated or significantly decreased. Otherwise, the military's involvement, including the National Guard, is a waste of time, money, and personnel resources that are greatly needed elsewhere.

That sentiment is already visible among military professionals. "Eventually one JTF-6 staff member [said] 'we'd like to get out of this business'" (Newman, 1997: 40). One option

[11] The Department of Defense (DoD) is permitted to collect intelligence on U.S. citizens who are reasonably suspected of international drug trafficking activity (From a lecture by Joel Cassman, State Department representative, given at the United States Air Force Academy, Spring 1999).

might be having the CIA exclusively provide the needed strategic products using military information gathering platforms. This surveillance role would still be in keeping with the military's detection and monitoring responsibility. But, since the military has been tasked to participate, it should be allowed to contribute in the best way it can.

The literature tells us that assigning more Guardsmen to the border to search through cars and containers is not the answer. Making more military transports available to law enforcement personnel is not the answer. Working to increase the number of tactical intelligence products for the purpose of isolated convictions of drug offenders is not the answer. Strategic intelligence for the purpose of predicting trends in drug trafficking is. And as long as the military is going to be involved, this is where its primary emphasis should be.

Measures of Effectiveness

Currently "there are no effective measures of effectiveness . . . in the drug intelligence arena" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 27). This is a big problem. Traditionally, measures of effectiveness in drug control have been limited to "drugs seized, the interdiction rate, the price of drugs, and the support factor" and suggests that future measures include "1) qualitative and quantitative measures of effectiveness; 2) intelligence sharing; 3) centralized command, decentralized operations; 4) an emphasis on developing more and better human intelligence sources; and 5) directing support to state and local law enforcement agencies" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 178).

The problem is that "no one set of measures can be applied to the war on drugs. Each agency has special requirements, hence the need for evaluation techniques that accurately weigh actions against missions and produce a picture of performance" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 178). Measures of effectiveness are an important aspect of drug strategy, and that is why they are

mentioned here. But the depth of this requirement is beyond the scope of this study and more appropriately handled by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Nevertheless, the conceptual framework discussed in the next chapter attempts to determine what the (perceived) level of effectiveness of Texas National Guard personnel about the counter drug program is. Ideally this study would serve as an initial step in developing or improving measures of effectiveness for the Texas National Guard program. Short of this ideal, hopefully this study will at least be the impetus for the National Guard to evaluate the program and make any adjustments necessary in order to better fulfill its role within the larger effort and to better serve the people of Texas and this nation.

CHAPTER IV: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to link the literature with the research questions through the conceptual framework and then to discuss the methodology used to address those questions. For Question 1, which determines the attitudes of Texas National Guard personnel about military involvement in counter drug efforts, the relevant literature is varied. Therefore, the framework for this question is derived from a multiplicity of sources. For Question 2, which determines the perceptions of effectives of Texas National Guard personnel about their involvement, several sources also touch on the issue. The framework for this question, however, primarily comes from linking two government documents.

The chapter first discusses the framework itself. Tables depicting the framework and descriptions of the relevant terms are provided. The methodology section of the chapter then operationalizes the conceptual framework (or describes how the framework is used to measure the attitudes and perceptions of Texas National Guard personnel) before addressing the strengths and weaknesses of survey research and the sampling method used. While the methodology of this study is preliminary in nature, the study should ultimately be viewed as a potential pilot for a larger effort to research this topic.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conceptual framework is a tool that helps organize the relevant concepts. The type of framework used is descriptive categories. "Categories as an explicit conceptual tool . . . give questionnaires a conceptual framework, and as a result, coherence" (Shields, 1998: 214). The conceptual framework links the literature on the topic to the research questions themselves. The survey instrument is derived directly from the organized concepts in the conceptual framework.

The framework is separated into sections that apply to Question 1 and Question 2. For Question 1, the conceptual categories are a way to organize an overview of the issues pertaining to military involvement in counter drug efforts. For Question 2, the conceptual categories help to organize the perceptions of effectiveness of Texas National Guard personnel about the Texas National Guard Counter Drug Program. The conceptual framework is graphically illustrated in the tables below.

Table 4.1 – Conceptual Framework for Question 1.

Question 1. – What are the attitudes of members of the Texas National Guard about military involvement in counter drug efforts?

Concepts/Categories	**Literature**
Overview of Military Involvement in Counter Drug Efforts	Bergantz, 1992 Holden-Rhodes, 1997 Nadelmann, 1997 Bertram, 1996
Constraints on Military Involvement in Counter Drug Efforts	Bergantz, 1992 Holden-Rhodes, 1997
Protection of U.S. Civil Liberties in Military Counter Drug Efforts	Sanchez, 1991 Bergantz, 1992 Holden-Rhodes, 1997 Kitfield, 1993 Newman, 1996
Alternative Approaches to Military Involvement in Counter Drug Efforts	Sanchez, 1991 Holden-Rhodes, 1997 Newman, 1996

The concepts in this table are the prevailing themes in the literature on the topic, as discussed in the previous two chapters. First and foremost, there is the question about whether the military (or any component of the military, which includes the National Guard) should be involved in the first place. Since the military is involved in the drug effort, the next natural question is what the depth and scope of that involvement should be. This raises the concern of the protection of U.S. civil liberties. This concern leads many of the sources in the literature

previously reviewed to seek possible alternatives that will both protect U.S. civil liberties and increase the effectiveness of the military and its components in the drug effort.

Table 4.2 – Conceptual Framework for Question 2.

Question 2. – What are the perceptions of effectiveness of Texas National Guard personnel about the Texas National Guard Program?

Concepts/Categories	Literature
Military Roles in Counter Drug Efforts Texas National Guard Approved Missions *Linguist and Translator Support *Communication Support *Operational/Investigative Case Support *Intelligence Analyst Support *Engineer Support *Ground and Aerial Transportation Support *Military Specific Training to Law Enforcement * Aerial Reconnaissance and Observation	Bergantz, 1992 Holden-Rhodes, 1997 Joint Task Force Six, 2001 Bertram, 1996 **Texas National Guard, 2001**
Military Effectiveness in Achieving Counter Drug Supply Side Goals Key Supply Side Goals (Impact Targets) *Reducing the Availability of Illicit Drugs in the United States *Reducing the Drug Shipment Rate from Source Zones *Reducing the Rate of Illicit Drug Flow Through Arrival Zones *Reducing Domestic Cultivation and Production of Illicit Drugs *Reducing the Drug Trafficker Success Rate in the United States	Sanchez, 1991 Newman, 1997 Holden-Rhodes, 1997 **ONDCP *Performance Measures of Effectiveness, 1999***

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, several sources address the effectiveness of the military in counter drug efforts, either explicitly or implicitly. The foundation for this part of the conceptual framework, however, comes from the connection between the Office of National Drug Control Policy's *Performance Measures of Effectiveness: Implementation and Findings, 1999* and the approved missions of the Texas National Guard. In their publication, the Office of National Drug Control Policy presents many measures of effectiveness addressing several goals

and objectives of the nation's overall strategy. The "Executive Summary" of the document lists five key supply-side drug strategy impact targets. These impact targets, or goals, are fairly straightforward and are listed in the table above. The missions of the Texas National Guard are also listed in the table above. These missions may not be as easily understood and so are defined in the following sub-section.

The Texas National Guard program is affiliated with the Department of Defense's supply reduction role. This program can then be evaluated on the extent to which it contributes to the effective achievement of these impact targets. Such an evaluation is similar to a survey of internal customers. Total Quality Management (TQM) methods suggest collecting this type of information (Krajewski, 1999: 215-216, 218).[12] Therefore, obtaining this type of information from the Texas National Guard is consistent with a larger tradition.

Definition of National Guard Approved Missions

The literature, beyond government documents, does not explicitly define the approved missions of the National Guard, or the larger military for that matter. But, for the most part, the nature and particulars of these missions are easily discerned. Specific definitions are provided by the Texas National Guard at their website (Texas National Guard, 2001).[13]

Linguist and Translator Support

This mission includes the translation of various media materials from other languages (primarily Spanish) to English. Linguist support is closely linked with the intelligence mission. The various media sources translated by National Guard linguists include both audio and video tape recordings and both official and unofficial written communications and documents.

---

[12] Total Quality Management is "a comprehensive management process focusing on the continuous improvement of organizational activities to enhance the quality of the good and services supplied," (Mathis, 2000:77).
[13] The Texas National Guard website can be accessed at http://www.agd.state.tx.us/C-Drug.HTM.

Communication Support

As previously mentioned, part of the military's responsibility in counter drug efforts is to maintain an effective command, control, and communications network. The National Guard's communication support mission is integral to timely gathering and dissemination of information to law enforcement agencies. National Guard personnel are tasked to "establish, operate, and maintain communications systems, base stations, and equipment" (Texas National Guard, 2001).

Operational/Investigative Case Support

This mission tasks National Guard personnel to directly aid law enforcement in investigations and putting together cases to improve the chances prosecutions will lead to convictions of suspected drug traffickers. As mentioned in the previous chapter, National Guard personnel are as inadequately prepared for this role as law enforcement is for the production of predictive, strategic intelligence products. Of all the National Guard support missions, this one is the most suspect.

Intelligence Analyst Support

The intelligence role of the National Guard in counter drug efforts has the most potential to make a significant impact. This mission includes the development and maintenance of technology systems and databases as well as the application of National Guard intelligence analysts. So far, intelligence analysts have been forced to operate at the tactical level, focusing on isolated investigations and cases. The literature indicates that ideally, in the future, this mission will begin to develop a strategic aspect that will greatly improve supply reduction/interdiction success.

Engineer Support

For this role, National Guard engineers aid law enforcement or other civilian personnel in and provide equipment for "clearing, building, excavation, and demolition" of structures or materials used in counter drug efforts. Such activity might include building bridges that will shorten travel time for law enforcement to arrive at trafficking areas, or destruction of condemned drug houses. This is a very broad and useful asset at the disposal of law enforcement.

Ground and Aerial Transportation Support

The transportation mission has three aspects. It includes transporting law enforcement members and equipment as well as individuals apprehended for drug trafficking. It also includes transporting people, equipment, and supplies related to the National Guard Demand Reduction Program. This study focuses on the National Guard's supply reduction role, but it is important to briefly note that the agency is also active in attempting to educate and persuade children and young adults to refrain from, or to stop, using drugs.

Military Specific Training

In this mission, law enforcement members benefit from developing skills beyond those associated with traditional law enforcement methods. Such training might include advanced small group tactics and various self-defense methods. This mission also includes familiarization with the operation of military equipment used in counter drug efforts.

Aerial Reconnaissance and Observation

The National Guard, using its aviation assets, helps to identify and observe domestic drug cultivation fields (primarily marijuana), air strips, drop zones, shipment routes, aircraft, boats,

and vehicles suspected of being used in drug trafficking activity. The impressive array of technology used in this role includes thermal and infrared imaging systems.

METHODOLOGY

The conceptual framework is used to develop the questionnaire that first determines the attitudes of Texas National Guard personnel about being involved in counter drug efforts and then determines their perceptions of effectiveness of approved missions in achieving goals (impact targets) set out by the Office of National Drug Control Policy. The first part of the conceptual framework (Question 1) becomes the first page of the survey. The first three rows of this part of the framework correspond to the first three items. The respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement. Respondents rated the first three items on a 1 to 5 scale (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree). A mean response of 3.00 or greater indicates general agreement (among respondents) with an item. Means of 4.00 or higher indicate exceptionally strong agreement.

The fourth row becomes the fourth item of the survey. It asks the respondent if he or she has any suggestions for adapting the current military/National Guard approach to counter drug efforts. Three suggestions are provided as examples. These are relying more on strategic intelligence, deferring some, or all, current missions to civilian agencies, and directly aiding law enforcement agencies more frequently. Respondents were able to indicate agreement here by checking “Yes” or “No.” The question was also left open to encourage respondents to provide any other insights or suggestions. In compiling the responses into the statistical program *Statistical Package for the Social Sciences* (SPSS), Yes answers were coded as “2” and No answers were coded as “1.” Therefore, a mean response closer to “2” indicates stronger general

agreement with an item. The following is a graphic depiction of the operationalization of Question 1.

Table 4.3 – Operationalization of the Conceptual Framework for Question 1.

Question 1. – What are the attitudes of members of the Texas National Guard about military involvement in counter drug efforts?

Overview of Issues Pertaining to Military Involvement in Counter Drug Efforts

Concepts/Categories	Survey Item	Survey Response
Military Involvement in Counter Drug Efforts	The Military/National Guard Should be Involved in Counter Drug Efforts	1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neutral 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree
Constraints of Military Counter Drug Efforts	The Military/National Guard Should Only be Involved in a Support Role in Counter Drug Efforts	1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neutral 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree
Protection of U.S. Civil Liberties in Military Counter Drug Efforts	Military/National Guard Indirect Involvement in Counter Drug Efforts is Within the Bounds of U.S. Civil Liberties	1. Strongly Disagree 2. Disagree 3. Neutral 4. Agree 5. Strongly Agree

Alternative Approaches to Military/National Guard Involvement in Counter Drug Efforts

Concepts/Categories	Survey Item	Survey Response
Alternative Approaches to Current National Guard Involvement	Do You Suggest Any Alternative Approaches for Military/National Guard Supply Reduction Efforts?	Optional Comments - Look for References to Intelligence in General and Strategic Intelligence in Specific

The second part of the framework (Question 2) represents the rest of the survey. The eight approved missions are evaluated here on their ability to effectively contribute to the achievement of the five major impact targets defined by the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

The survey continues for five pages because each goal is placed on a separate page, with all National Guard missions on each page. The same question is essentially asked over and over again. "Is this mission, in your opinion, effective in achieving the goal indicated at the top of the page?" This makes the survey appear longer than it really is. In reality, the time needed to fill out the survey should not exceed five minutes. The survey instrument itself is included as an appendix. The following is a graphic depiction of the operationalization of Question 2. The table is included on the following page because of its size.

Table 4.4 – Operationalization of the Conceptual Framework for Question 2.

Question 2. – What are the perceptions of effectiveness of Texas National Guard personnel about the Texas National Guard Program?

Concepts/Categories	Key Supply-Side Drug Strategy Impact Targets	Survey Items/Survey Response
Military Roles and Military Effectiveness in Counter Drug Efforts	Reduction of the availability of illicit drugs in the United States	Question 1 - The National Guard approved missions are rated on a 1 to 5 scale on their ability to contribute to the effective achievement of the first Impact Target. The National Guard approved missions are: linguist and translator support; communication support; operational/investigative case support; intelligence analyst support; engineer support; ground and aerial transportation support; military specific training to law enforcement; and aerial reconnaissance and observation.
	Reduction of the rate of shipment of illicit drugs from source zones (primarily Mexico)	Question 2 - The same evaluation system above is applied to the second impact target.
	Reduction of the rate of illicit drug flow through arrival zones (primarily the Texas-Mexico Border)	Question 3 - The same evaluation system above is applied to the third impact target.
	Reduction of domestic cultivation and production of illicit drugs	Question 4 - The same evaluation system above is applied to the fourth impact target.
	Reduction of the trafficker success rate in the United States	Question 5 - The same evaluation system above is applied to the fifth impact target.

While more detailed research is needed to develop other performance measures of effectiveness for other agencies, and perhaps even more detailed ones for the Department of Defense and the National Guard, this framework serves as a good preliminary starting point for gauging the effectiveness of drug control in the Texas National Guard.[14] This is important

[14] Descriptive categorical conceptual frameworks are particularly useful in synthesizing "vast arrays" of "expert opinions," especially when new research argues that "the literature has left something important out" (Shields, 1998:

because, as the literature indicates, the National Guard can provide the local level support that can make the difference in the effort, especially through strategic intelligence. While the literature states that the military in general and the National Guard in specific have not yet moved in this direction, perhaps this study will be the stimulus to set that process in motion and eventually lead to greater well being and greater security for the nation.

Survey Research

The primary research method in this study is survey research, although interviews of Texas Air National Guard Brigadier General Mike Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Gladys Tinsley, former personnel director of the Texas National Guard Counter Drug Program, were also done. This method is most appropriate in this case because of time constraints. The desired sample was located nearby in Austin. Beyond this, however, survey research is useful in "describing the characteristics of a large population" (Babbie, 1999: 251). For instance, this study seeks to describe the attitudes about military involvement in drug efforts and the perceptions of effectiveness of all Texas National Guard personnel about those efforts. Surveys also "make large samples feasible" (although there are only 30 respondents in this case) (Babbie, 1999: 251). Survey research is flexible and therefore useful in measuring somewhat ambiguous concepts, such as attitudes and perceptions mentioned above (Babbie, 1999: 251).

These strengths make survey research useful, especially given the time constraints. Nevertheless, there are weaknesses associated with survey research. For instance, survey instruments "often represent the least common denominator in assessing people's attitudes" (Babbie, 1999: 251). For this reason, surveys can frequently overlook what is most important to respondents. Therefore, survey research can be somewhat superficial (Babbie, 1999: 251) and

---

214), such as research on attitudes and perceptions of National Guard members and the importance of strategic intelligence in counter drug efforts.

even sometimes leads to the method's categorization as artificial (Babbie, 1999: 252). In general, "survey research is . . . weak on validity and strong on reliability" (Babbie, 1999: 252). There are ways around this problem, such as intricate statistical analyses, but it is nonetheless an aspect of the method (Babbie, 1999: 251).

The survey instrument used in this study could be criticized for having some or all of the above weaknesses. One likely criticism might be that the study is superficial because it resembles exploratory research, the type of research used initially when little is known about a topic. Any superficiality associated with this study is acceptable, however, because the literature seems to lack abundant subject matter on the attitudes and perceptions of National Guard personnel in this area. It is therefore understandable that the study is somewhat cursory. Recognizing the void in the literature, this study takes what is available, develops the conceptual framework, and attempts to fill that void. Perhaps the study will encourage more research in this area. The close connection of the conceptual framework and the literature addresses some of the common weaknesses of the survey research method and makes this study much more valid.

So, survey research is a legitimate method, as long as both its strengths and weaknesses are taken into account. As previously mentioned, this particular research project is preliminary in nature. While it may be able to provide valuable insights into supply reduction from people who work in this field every day, future research will be necessary to translate these insights into concrete determinations of effectiveness.

Sampling

The method used to obtain the sample was convenience sampling. This is a type of non-probability sampling based on feasibility, or what Babbie calls "Reliance on Available Subjects" or "Purposive or Judgmental Sampling" (Babbie, 1999: 173-174). While relying on available

subjects is justifiable on grounds of feasibility, the researcher must be careful in generalizing the findings of the study and should indicate the method and related issues to the reader (Babbie, 1999: 173). The sampling method for this study has been indicated here.

It is also sometimes appropriate to choose a sample "based on your judgment and the purpose of the study." (Babbie, 1999: 174). One example of an appropriate time to use this method is when a researcher desires to "study the leadership" of an organization or program (Babbie, 1999: 174). As mentioned above, the purpose of this study is to describe the attitudes and perceptions of Texas National Guard personnel about their counter drug program. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to visit the headquarters of these operations in Texas and take a convenience sample of people who work in this field everyday.

The sample itself includes 30 members of the Texas National Guard located at Camp Mabry in Austin, Texas.[15] More sophisticated sampling methods would normally be preferred. Time constraints, however, dictated reliance on these methods.

For this reason, a parsimonious approach was used. Parsimony is, in short, achieving optimal results by using the fewest number of resources (or respondents). "Parsimony can be introduced with a good understanding of the problem and the important factors that influence it. Such a good conceptual theoretical model can be realized through . . . interviews with the concerned people, and a thorough literature review of the previous research work in the particular problem area" (Sekaran, 2000: 25). This is what the first two chapters and the two interviews with General Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Tinsley are intended to achieve.

[15] The responses were obtained over the period from 19 April 2001, the date of initial delivery of the surveys, to 1 June 2001, the date the 30th survey was returned.

CHAPTER V: RESULTS

The purpose of this chapter is to present the results of the survey. The chapter is divided into two sections corresponding with the two research questions. The results for Question 1 are summarized below. For Question 2, five tables, corresponding to the five impact targets, are provided. Again, each National Guard mission is evaluated on its ability to contribute to the effective achievement of these five goals.

MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The responses for Question 1 (What are the attitudes of members of the Texas National Guard about military involvement in counter drug efforts?) demonstrated general agreement with the statements on the survey. Table 5.1 summarizes the responses on the first page.

Table 5.1 – Results Summary Table for Question 1.

CONCEPTS/STATEMENTS	Mean Response (N=30)	Standard Deviation	Percent of Respondents Indicating Agreement (4 or Higher)
The Military Should be Involved	**4.17**	0.8743	83.3
The Military Should Only Have a Support Role	3.77	1.2780	63.3
Indirect Involvement is within U.S. Civil Liberties	3.70	1.0875	53.3
			"2" Corresponds with "Yes"
Alternatives			
Relying More on Strategic Intelligence	1.43	0.5040	40.0
Deferring Some or all Missions	1.34	0.4837	33.3
More Direct Aid at the Points of Entry	1.83	0.3790	83.3

*For scale, please refer the survey instrument in Appendix II.

Based on the percentage column, Texas National Guard members believe most strongly that they should be involved in counter drug efforts and that involvement should increasingly include more direct aid to law enforcement and customs agents at the points of entry. Yet, over 60% of the respondents feel the National Guard should only be involved in a support role, and only about half of them believe their involvement is within the bounds of U.S. civil liberties (10% felt National Guard involvement in counter drug efforts was not and 36.7% had neutral

responses). Most interesting, however, was that only 40% of the respondents believed the National Guard should focus on producing more strategic intelligence products.

Of all 30 respondents, only 3 provided optional comments. One amusingly expressed displeasure with the pay allowances of National Guard personnel. Another stated "the National Guard should be given a more active role in all aspects of supply reduction." This statement seemed to correspond to the general sentiment of the respondents reflected in the summary table above in which "military/National Guard involvement" and "more direct aid" received the highest percentage of agreement (83.3%).

The final, and most interesting, statement was, "strategic intelligence is no more predictive than tactical intelligence. Strategic vs. tactical is a matter of area focus, NOT whether it is more predictive." The literature, however, differentiates between the two. The difference has to do with focus and scope. As stated in the "strategic intelligence" section of this study, tactical/operational, law enforcement oriented intelligence products lack the essential elements of "interpretation and forecasting" (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 29). Strategic intelligence, on the other hand, provides the big picture and is of the greatest benefit because it can provide that "definitive" insight (Holden-Rhodes, 1997: 30).

MILTARY ROLES AND EFFECTIVENESS

The rest of the survey addresses the second research question - What are the perceptions of effectiveness of Texas National Guard personnel about the Texas National Guard Program? Summary tables of the results and discussions for each of the five impact targets are provided below. As with Question 1, the results of Question 2 indicate a general belief among Texas National Guard personnel that their approved missions are effective in achieving the five key impact targets set out by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (all mean responses are

greater than 3.00, although there is variation in the percentage of respondents who specifically indicated agreement with each item).

Reducing Availability

Table 5.2 – Effectiveness of Missions in Reducing Availability of Illicit Drugs

MISSION	Mean Response (N=30)	Standard Deviation	Percent of Respondents Indicating Agreement (4 or Higher)
Linguist/Translator Support	3.63	1.0662	63.3
Communication Support	3.87	0.8996	80.0
Investigative Case Support	3.97	0.8503	76.7
Intelligence Support	**4.10**	0.9595	80.0
Engineer Support	3.73	1.0483	63.4
Transportation Support	**4.20**	0.7611	86.7
Military Specific Training	**4.00**	0.9097	80.0
Aerial Reconnaissance	**4.30**	0.7497	90.0

*For scale, please refer the survey instrument in Appendix II.

As previously stated, a mean response of more than 3.00 indicates general agreement with an item. Mean responses of 4.00 or higher indicate exceptionally strong agreement. The mean responses demonstrate that Texas National Guard members believe that their approved missions are effective in reducing availability of illicit substances in the United States (see Table 5.2). The percent of respondents indicating agreement with an item never fell below 63%, the lowest score in the table. The missions receiving this low score were Translator and Engineer Support. One mission, Investigative Case Support, had nearly 77% of respondents indicate that it is an effective mission for this particular goal. Five of the missions scored 80% or higher, with Reconnaissance receiving the high score of 90%.

Reducing Shipment Rate from Source Zones

Table 5.3 – Effectiveness of Missions in Reducing the Drug Shipment Rate from Source Zones

MISSION	Mean Response (N=30)	Standard Deviation	Percent of Respondents Indicating Agreement (4 or Higher)
Linguist/Translator Support	3.73	1.0483	73.3
Communication Support	3.87	0.9371	80.0
Investigative Case Support	**4.07**	0.7849	80.0
Intelligence Support	3.97	0.9279	76.7
Engineer Support	3.53	0.9371	56.6
Transportation Support	**4.03**	0.6687	86.7
Military Specific Training	3.90	0.8847	76.6
Aerial Reconnaissance	**4.17**	0.7466	86.6

*For scale, please refer the survey instrument in Appendix II.

Here again, based on the mean response column, the respondents indicated a belief that their missions effectively contribute to the success of the second impact target, reducing the shipment rate from source zones (see Table 5.3). Seven of the eight missions score relatively high in mean response and percentage indicating agreement. One mission does stand out here. The Engineer Support mission has the lowest score in both the mean response and percentage columns. Nevertheless, the mean response of 3.53 signals a general conviction that the mission is effective in achieving this goal.

Reducing Drug Flow Through Arrival Zones

Table 5.4 – Effectiveness of Missions in Reducing the Rate of Illicit Drug Flow Through Arrival Zones

MISSION	Mean Response (N=30)	Standard Deviation	Percent of Respondents Indicating Agreement (4 or Higher)
Linguist/Translator Support	3.70	1.0875	66.6
Communication Support	3.93	0.8683	79.7
Investigative Case Support	**4.07**	0.8277	83.3
Intelligence Support	3.93	0.9072	76.7
Engineer Support	3.53	1.0080	56.7
Transportation Support	**4.13**	0.6814	89.7
Military Specific Training	**4.00**	0.8710	83.4
Aerial Reconnaissance	**4.17**	0.6989	90.0

*For scale, please refer the survey instrument in Appendix II.

For this goal, the respondents again rated Engineer Support the lowest. The other missions scored generally high (see Table 5.4). The Reconnaissance mission had the highest mean score and the highest percentage of respondents indicating a belief that it is effective in achieving this goal (90%).

Reducing Domestic Production

Table 5.5 – Effectiveness of Missions in Reducing Domestic Cultivation and Production of Illicit Drugs

MISSION	Mean Response (N=30)	Standard Deviation	Percent of Respondents Indicating Agreement (4 or Higher)
Linguist/Translator Support	3.23	1.1043	43.3
Communication Support	3.63	0.8899	63.3
Investigative Case Support	**4.03**	0.6687	86.7
Intelligence Support	**4.00**	0.9469	76.6
Engineer Support	3.40	0.8944	46.7
Transportation Support	**4.00**	0.7428	80.0
Military Specific Training	3.90	0.8449	80.0
Aerial Reconnaissance	**4.23**	0.7739	86.7

*For scale, please refer the survey instrument in Appendix II.

This goal demonstrated the widest range in percentage of those indicating agreement with the items (see Table 5.5). Again, the Engineer Support mission scored low in both categories. In this case, however, the Translator Support mission scored even lower. The mean response of 3.23 leans more toward a neutral response and only 43.3% of the respondents believe it is effective in reducing domestic production of drugs. The mean response and percentage scores for Reconnaissance were again the highest.

Reducing Drug Trafficker Success

Table 5.6 – Effectiveness of Missions in Reducing Drug Trafficker Success Rate in the United States

MISSION	Mean Response (N=30)	Standard Deviation	Percent of Respondents Indicating Agreement (4 or Higher)
Linguist/Translator Support	3.60	1.1626	56.7
Communication Support	3.93	0.8683	80.0
Investigative Case Support	**4.07**	0.8277	83.3
Intelligence Support	**4.10**	0.8847	80.0
Engineer Support	3.53	0.9732	53.4
Transportation Support	**4.00**	0.8710	76.7
Military Specific Training	**4.03**	0.9643	76.7
Aerial Reconnaissance	**4.13**	0.8996	80.0

For this goal, Engineer and Translator Support again scored the lowest in the percentage column. Reconnaissance scored the highest again, along with Communication and Intelligence at 80.0% (see Table 5.6). In all, certain trends can be observed from these results, which are discussed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

The results of the first part of this study, Question 1, serve as the contextual background for Question 2. Again, the study first determines the attitudes of Texas National Guard personnel about military involvement in counter drug efforts. Question 2 then determines their perceptions of effectiveness about that involvement.

Based on the results of the survey, Texas National Guard members, in general, believe they should be involved in counter drug efforts and that they should increasingly be more directly involved. It is paradoxical, however, that 83% of the respondents believe they should more directly aid law enforcement at the borders and points of entry while over 60% believe the National Guard should only be involved in support role. This result is indicative of the disagreement and conflict associated with the issue as a whole. A similar dichotomy is observed in the fact that only half of the respondents conclusively responded that military/National Guard involvement is within the bounds of U.S. civil liberties. And, as previously stated, one of the most interesting results of the survey was that only 40% of the respondents believe that the National Guard should focus on producing more strategic intelligence products. This result substantiates the assertion in the literature that the National Guard has not yet realized the value of strategic intelligence in the local/regional sphere it operates in. The comment that "strategic intelligence is no more predictive than tactical intelligence" in drug efforts demonstrates the limited law enforcement orientation the military/National Guard currently maintains and the general misunderstanding of the problem as a whole.

While the first part of the study determined that Texas National Guard personnel believe the military should be involved, analysis of the results of the second part of the study describe how effective they perceive their current involvement to be. The respondents, in general, rated

each mission as effective. Every mission received an average mean response greater than 3.00. The results do suggest that Texas National Guard members believe some missions are more effective than others. The results of the second part of the survey are summarized in the table below.

Table 6.1 – Ranking the Mean Scores of Each Mission

RANKINGS OF MEAN RESPONSE SCORES FOR SUPPORT MISSIONS

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
IMPACT TARGET								
Reducing Availability of Illicit Drugs	Aerial Reconnaissance (4.30)	Transportation Support (4.20)	Intelligence Support (4.10)	Military Training (4.00)	Case Support (3.97)	Communication Support (3.87)	Engineer Support (3.73)	Translator Support (3.63)
Reducing the Drug Shipment Rate from Source Zones	Aerial Reconnaissance (4.17)	Case Support (4.07)	Transportation Support (4.03)	Intelligence Support (3.97)	Military Training (3.90)	Communication Support (3.87)	Translator Support (3.73)	Engineer Support (3.53)
Reducing the Rate of Illicit Drug Flow Through Arrival Zones	Aerial Reconnaissance (4.17)	Transportation Support (4.13)	Case Support (4.07)	Military Training (4.00)	Intelligence Support (3.93)	Communication Support (3.93) - Tie for 5	Translator Support (3.70)	Engineer Support (3.53)
Reducing Domestic Cultivation and Production of Illicit Drugs	Aerial Reconnaissance (4.23)	Case Support (4.03)	Intelligence Support (4.00)	Transportation Support (4.00) - Tie for 3	Military Training (3.90)	Communication Support (3.63)	Engineer Support (3.40)	Translator Support (3.23)
Reducing Drug Trafficker Success Rate in the United States	Aerial Reconnaissance (4.13)	Intelligence Support (4.10)	Case Support (4.07)	Military Training (4.03)	Transportation Support (4.00)	Communication Support (3.93)	Translator Support (3.60)	Engineer Support (3.53)

The five key impact targets, or goals, are in the first column. The ranking columns, 1 through 8, are listed across the top of the table. For each goal, the missions were rank ordered by the mean response they received for their ability to achieve that goal. For example, Aerial Reconnaissance received a mean score of 4.30 for the first goal. This was the highest mean score for the first goal, and so Aerial Reconnaissance is placed in the "1" column. Translator Support had the lowest mean score for the first goal, 3.63, as so is place in column "8."

The two most obvious trends in the table are that Aerial Reconnaissance ranked first for all five key supply side goals and that Communication, Engineer, and Translator Support

consistently occupied the final three positions. The following table summarizes the mean rank of each mission. The mean rank was obtained by adding the five rankings each mission received in the above table and then dividing by five, the number of goals and times each mission was ranked.

Table 6.2 – Mean Rankings of Each Mission

MISSION	MEAN RANK
Aerial Reconnaissance	1
Investigative Case Support	3
Transportation Support	3
Intelligence Support	3.4
Military Specific Training	4.4
Communication Support	5.8
Linguist/Translator Support	7.4
Engineer Support	7.6

Based on these tables, Texas National Guard personnel believe that Aerial Reconnaissance is the single most effective mission. The second most perceived effective missions are Case and Transportation Support, which received the same average ranking. Intelligence, the mission of particular interest in this study, ranked fourth overall, followed by Military Specific Training at fifth and Communication Support at sixth. The Communication mission ranked sixth four out of five times. The only time it did not rank sixth was when it tied for fifth with Intelligence for the third impact target. Finally, Engineer and Translator support continuously shared the final two positions in an alternating manner. There is little difference in the mean rank of these two missions (two tenths of a point). The difference was that Engineer Support ranked last one more time than Translator Support.

Reconnaissance, Case Support, Transportation, and Intelligence, in order, occupy the top positions. These results, consistent with the literture, demonstrate a mindset that is tactically

oriented toward the immediate needs of law enforcement. Aerial Reconnaissance is an intelligence related mission. So, in a sense, based on the reviewed literature, the fact that it was consistently rated as the most effective mission is positive. It is disappointing, however, that two other tactically oriented missions, Case and Transportation Support, occupy the second position above Intelligence proper. Intelligence received a mean rank only slightly lower than Case and Transportation Support, but it is lower nonetheless.

Training and Communication scores can be described as marginal. One possible reason for this is that while military training improves the functionality of law enforcement to an extent, the improvement is likely limited. And while military communication systems are superior to those of law enforcement, the communications systems law enforcement agencies currently have are probably adequate for accomplishing their tasks.

The respondents rated Translator and Engineer Support as the least effective missions in achieving the five key goals. Perhaps this is because the Texas National Guard Counter Drug Program deals primarily with traffickers who speak Spanish. There is certainly no shortage of Spanish speakers in the state of Texas, in law enforcement agencies or otherwise. And, as with Communication, there is probably a limit to the perceived benefit that combat Engineering can add to the pursuit of law enforcement.

Again, the respondents, overall, rated each mission as effective. But the level of perceived effectiveness of each mission can be differentiated. It seems that Texas National Guard personnel believe Reconnaissance, Case Support, Transportation, and Intelligence are the most effective missions. The logical conclusion here is that the Counter Drug Program of the Texas National Guard should emphasize them in particular. Since Translator and Engineer

Support are perceived to be the least effective, attempts to streamline the effort and/or free up resources might include decreasing emphasis on these two missions.

The point to be accented here, however, is that, as the literature states, intelligence is an under-appreciated mission and that the potential of strategic intelligence in counter drug efforts has not been fully grasped. The results imply National Guard intelligence support is being devoted to supporting law enforcement pursuit of cases. This may be important, and law enforcement may certainly benefit from this type of National Guard support. But that is not to say that strategic intelligence should not be a focus. In light of the literature and the results of the survey, one possible modification to the current approach might be to reduce efforts in the marginal and least effective missions and apply those resources to a new local/regional strategic intelligence mission.

The National Guard has the best track record of all military components in counter drug efforts. It is therefore logical that it has the most potential to make the strongest contribution in the future. The National Guard has the assets and the personnel to provide strategic intelligence products. An added benefit is that its members are already strategically located, especially in Texas, one of the largest drug corridors in the entire world. It seems the National Guard can move toward a more strategic posture with relative ease. This would be the ideal. While members of the Texas National Guard on average do not believe relying more on strategic intelligence would benefit the effort, the literature indicates it will. In fact, the literature implies that using resources in this way would be more effective in achieving counter drug goals, which would likely increase efficiency and save money as well.

The results of this study will hopefully inspire further research into this important issue. In the future, it would be both interesting and useful to give this, or a similar, survey to various

law enforcement agencies at all levels of government, the public, and a wider and more random sample of the National Guard and the military in general. Results from more conclusive studies may help to streamline National Guard efforts by eliminating missions that are not effective, thereby freeing up resources for those missions that are. The National Guard, because of its legal status, abilities, and location, holds vast potential to significantly impact drug supply. Recognition of this fact, and further research on it, can only benefit the nation.

ESSAYS

Essay I – "The Drug Money Myth"

The statement that drug money benefits countries where cartels are based is simply a "myth" (Chaux, 1989). Drug trafficking and money laundering undermine existing economic systems and structures and can have absolutely devastating results. Both Colombia and Mexico face the subversion and destabilization of their legal economies by drug dollars (Peeler, 1998: 72).

Mexico should take heed from the Colombian situation. The future of democracy in Colombia is shaky (Peeler, 1998: 170) at best because of narcotics trafficking, significant guerrilla activity, and a severely subverted economy to go along with correlating violence and corruption. The main obstacle to addressing these problems, in Mexico as in Colombia, is that doing so causes negative short-term economic results (Peeler, 1998: 170).

The fact is that the drug trade is a big employer in Mexico. The Mexican Attorney General's office says that as many as 300,000 people are employed by the drug trade. And this figure is not inclusive of jobs created indirectly in "transportation, security, banking, and communication (Andreas, 1998: 160). Therefore, the impetus exists to only address aspects of the problem that are sufficient to maintain a certain level of operability and legitimacy of the state (Peeler, 1998: 172). This type of behavior, however, has a "deinstitutionalizing" effect on the economy and the state itself and entails a corresponding "demoralizing" effect on society (Diamond, 1999: 273-274). If left unchecked, this will lead to more severe subversion of the Mexican government and economy, ultimately ending in the nation's conversion into a narco-democracy.

Large inflows of illegal drug money inevitably affect other sectors of the economy. The injection of large amounts of currency energizes the economy in the short term. This injection, however, often creates a strong corrupting influence (Rotella, 1998: 254). And although inflow of money is positive from a macroeconomic perspective, smaller and weaker economies can run the risk of severe inflation problems due to high international demand (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 142). This is the case in Mexico. The argument can be made that Mexico's problems with inflation, now and in the past, are and have been due in large part to floods of laundered drug money from the United States. This situation also hurts "export-oriented, import substituting industries" when drug profits come to constitute a major amount of the proceeds gained from exports. This could help to explain, in part, why Import Substitution Industrialization failed in Mexico (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 143).

What is known as Dutch disease can also result from large amounts of laundered drug money. Dutch disease is a distortion in an economy characterized by one economic sector experiencing a boom while others stagnate. Large influxes of foreign drug money lead to stagnation in the sectors that are not affected by this drug money, either directly or indirectly (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 142). This "imbalanced distribution of resources" adversely affects development, especially over time (Eliana Cardoso, 1997: 34).

An increase in the real exchange rate associated with such an imbalance can also prevent, or even reverse, diversification to the point that the country may become dependant on illicit drug money (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 143). In such a

situation, actors grow drug crops and these crops are given primary attention while other types of business (to include agricultural cultivation of legal produce) become neglected.

Another negative reality associated with drug profits is that influxes of drug money are often squandered on "non-productive" consumption. Examples include purchases of large tracts of land that are not developed properly (or at all), numerous vehicles, unnecessarily large mansions, and a variety of other obscenely over-priced personal luxuries. Drug trafficking organizations simply do not spend their profits in areas that result in public good. Only small amounts of drug money find their way to productive sectors of the economy. This is partly because traffickers need to hide and launder their profits, which results in "sub-optimal" investment. "Patterns that result in unsound investments necessarily redirect income from sound investments which is inevitably detrimental to economic growth." Stagnant economic growth in turn contributes to the widening gap between the rich and the poor. Drug producing and transit countries, such as Mexico, do not benefit from drug money for these reasons (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 143).

Businesses supplemented with drug money hurt the economy as well. Legitimate sectors of the economy have difficulty competing with those backed by drug money. Drug-backed businesses can decrease their prices to levels that legitimate businesses simply cannot match. Sometimes drug-backed companies can even afford to lower their prices to a level that does not yield a profit (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 144), although profits are shown on paper.

In the end, drug money and its laundering contributes to inaccurate and inefficient monetary policy. Economic officials have difficulty accounting for transnational flow of currency because of black market floods of drug money. "The two most important data sets

governments use for planning," national income and the balance of payments, cease to have meaning (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 144). In a country already experiencing economic difficulty, drug money can have severely destabilizing effects. Mexico's economic situation is better than most of Latin America, but it is by no means ideal, and drug money poses serious threats to both the country's economic and democratic development.

Essay II - The Threat to Political Legitimacy

Mexico's transition to consolidated democracy is also threatened by drug trafficking (Executive Office of the President, 1999: 83). The underlying danger is that the Mexican government will loose the faith of its people amidst social decay facilitated by government officials who cease to perform their intended functions and fill their coffers through corrupt means. Such a situation ultimately contributes to the loss of legitimacy for the Mexican government and an unwanted security problem for the United States on its southern border.

Drug corruption in Mexico is not a recent phenomenon. As early as 1983 the U.S. press criticized the Mexican government for its institutional corruption. It seemed Mexico was unable, or even worse, unwilling to make adequate efforts to fight drugs. This was an early bone of contention between the two countries that has seemingly endured (Suchlicki, 1996: 151).

Mexican corruption came to the forefront in 1985 with the kidnapping, torture, and murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena. U.S. investigators implicated numerous high-ranking government officials and drug traffickers in the case. The Camarena case is important in the historical context of U.S.- Mexico relations on drug trafficking and related corruption.

In part, what makes Mexican corruption unique is its geographic proximity to the United States. Mexico borders the single largest drug-consuming nation in the world. It is arguable

that the existence of such a large demand for drugs so near Mexico drives drug trafficking in the country and causes the correlating high levels of corruption.

Although there are honest officials in Mexico, their numbers are decreasing because of the increasing temptation of drug money. Even if an official is forthright enough to initially withstand this temptation, traffickers often threaten the official and/or his family. This makes accepting the bribe even more attractive than it already was. In effect, "the lure of drug dollars has virtually overwhelmed preexisting resistance to corruption" (Nadelmann, 1997, 227).

The best example of the potential destabilizing affect of the drug trade is Colombia where drug trafficking has caused what some people refer to as narco-terrorism. Observing the similarities, one must wonder if Mexico will become another Colombia. Today, Colombian guerrillas control vast amounts of the countryside. In order to finance their operations, they have formed loose agreements with drug traffickers. In exchange for much needing funding, they protect drug crops. Astonishing comparisons can be made between the two countries' drug trafficking organizations and guerrilla groups (Diamond, 1999: 253).

The increased number and power of drug trafficking organizations in Mexico could plausibly lead to "Colombianization," as respected Mexican investigative journalist Eduardo Valle labels it. He identifies a frightening difference, however. Whereas criminal organizations in Colombia directly negotiated with the government, in Mexico such relations have been hidden, and the cartels in Mexico have become "a state within the state" (Rotella, 1998: 245). This is a much worse situation than in Colombia because drug criminals are deeply integrated into the government itself. Colombia is increasingly unable to address drug threats and trafficker sponsored violence. These challenges manifest themselves from outside government institutions

(Peeler, 1998: 66). How much more difficult will it be for Mexico, then, to root out its criminal element from deep within its own bureaucracy?

Mexico has officially recognized drug corruption is a significant threat in various official publications, such as the *US/ Mexico Bi-National Drug Threat Assessment*. The nation presumably realizes that drug trafficking begets corruption, and corruption facilitates drug trafficking. "One basic problem in the fight against crime and especially drug trafficking [in Mexico] has been internal corruption in the ranks of the Federal Prosecutors, the Federal Judicial Police and other public servants of the Attorney General's Office." (Attorney General's Office of Mexico, 1998: 23). As top agencies facilitate drug trafficking in and through Mexico drug consumption is increasingly becoming a problem, posing yet another threat to the country (US/Mexico Bi-National Drug Threat Assessment, 1997: 15).

What makes corruption in Mexico particularly difficult to overcome is the fact that it "has been the glue for many implicit political pacts among elites and has been integral to patron-client and state-society relationships" (Diamond, 1999: 249-250). In other words, corruption is part of Mexican political culture, engrained over time in a historical context, and accepted as a way to get things done. But this is not a good formula for democratic progress or the fight against narcotics trafficking. Such historical political acceptance of corruption has made it relatively easy for Colombian based organizations to "arrange payoffs to key officials in . . . the attorney general's office, the Mexican State Judicial Police, and other important institutions." (Clawson, 1998: 45). Although political corruption may have been a source of stability in earlier parts of Mexican history, especially after the revolution, political corruption has evolved into narco-political corruption, a species that undermines democracy and social fabric by its very nature.

This reality has prompted some foreign policy analysts to conclude that Mexico is not becoming a narco-democracy, but that it already is one (Stares, 1996: 98). The definition of the term is a "country where drug traffickers bought themselves significant political clout and periodically resorted to violence as a way to maintain it" (Oppenheimer, 1996, 305). This is certainly the case in Mexico, most accented during several murders of prominent Mexican officials in 1994 during the twilight of the Salinas administration. In fact, narco-politics in the country have become a "seemingly invincible form of power" (Rotella, 1998: 239-240).

The drug trade is changing, with Mexican organizations becoming increasing independent of those in South America. Mexico is of particular concern because it is becoming more of a threat, and efforts to reduce this threat are severely hampered by the high level of corruption throughout the vast majority, if not all, governmental agencies in the country. Corruption in Mexico is the biggest obstacle the United States faces outside of its own demand for narcotics. President Vicente Fox is the key to the future. He may prove those who doubt his sincerity and/or ability in cleaning up Mexican corruption correct, or he could establish a precedent in honesty, help democratize Mexico, and significantly improve the drug situation.

Essay III – Looking to the Future

If corruption can be decreased in Mexico, other drug efforts can be more effectively implemented. If Mexico can significantly improve its drug efforts, recognizing the danger to its own society, it will act as a buffer to drugs for the United States as well as improve its own economic and political functionality. What is needed is more diligent interagency and international cooperation. U.S. policy and efforts will increasingly pursue a balance between supply and demand strategies. This is the only way to succeed in effectively fighting drug trafficking. It is not a question of either supply or demand efforts. Both areas of focus are

necessary. Demand reduction is integrally important to success. It is something the United States can control and is currently pursuing with vigor. Impacting the supply side of the problem is more difficult to achieve for the United States. Progress will largely depend on the ability and willingness of future Mexican presidents to attack drug and political corruption (which are often one in the same), beginning with President Vicente Fox.

Beyond Zedillo

Positive things happened under the administration of President Ernesto Zedillo. The presidency is not as sacred as it used to be. Part of the reason is that in 1997 the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its congressional majority (Diamond, 1999: 535-536). The election reforms Zedillo instituted during his administration contributed to Fox's victory over Francisco Labastida and the PRI on 2 July 2000 (Ferris, 2 July 2000). Zedillo spent $1.7 billion since 1998 on reforming elections. That money contributed to the cleanest election since the PRI took power because it helped keep the PRI's efforts to buy and coerce votes to a minimum.

It cannot be said that the PRI did not try though. PRI influence is still strong among government workers (who owe their jobs to the previous party) and the rural poor. In a characteristic effort to guarantee the poor vote, the PRI governor of the Yucatán offered household appliances and home improvements (Ferris, 2 July 2000). Future election reforms must directly address such corruption (Ferris, 9 July 2000). Political analyst Jose Antonio Crespo said that most Mexican people still feared openly identifying such tactics saying 'when you speak up in isolated areas, you are not protected' (Ferris, 2 July 2000). In the end, however, the average Mexican education level of only 7 grades, drug trafficking, and governmental corruption "disgusted Mexicans" and finally led to the PRI's loss of the presidency (Ferris, 2 July 2000).

The old guard PRI was extremely angry with Zedillo after the PRI's loss. The party leadership openly blamed him for economic decisions that increased the gap between the haves and have-nots in Mexico. They also criticized Zedillo for being overly accommodating to Fox and the opposition (Ferris, 9 July 2000).

Although Fox is from the conservative National Action Party (PAN), he has assured the Mexican people his government will be inclusive of the other two main parties (Ferris, 2 July 2000). The Mexican people, and the United States, will look for Fox to keep this and other promises that won him the election.

Other pledges included maintaining a pluralistic government in which positions are awarded on merit, ridding the government of corruption, doubling the education budget, and increasing the Mexican economic growth rate by 7 % per year (Ferris, 2 July 2000). One of Fox's main reforms intended to reduce drug corruption is the creation of a new "Department of Security" to oversee federal police agencies. Federal police currently fall under the Internal Affairs Department. Under PRI control, this department was accused of numerous illegalities. Fox said 'this separation is crucial to eliminating corruption and pressure on citizens and espionage, which we have denounced before' (Ferris, 5 July 2000). To help remedy misuse of government monetary resources, Fox also plans the creation of an independent oversight agency similar to the U.S. General Accounting Office (Ferris, 5 July 2000).

The PAN is seen as being very conservative, and Mexicans have expressed concern that Fox will not be receptive to the poor rural population, a traditional PRI stronghold (not that the PRI was adequately concerned with their plight either) (Ferris, 9 July 2000). However, poverty will be another area of concern for Fox's administration. To address the blatant poverty in

Mexico, Fox plans to increase "investment and open up lines of credit closed off to most Mexicans."

Foreign investment is critical to Fox's strategy. He hopes to increase outside investment in Mexico to $20 billion annually from the current level of $12-$13 billion. Joel Estudillo of the Mexican Institute of Political Studies points out that such reforms all serve to 'reduce the power of the presidency,' a change for the better that will "give Mexico the opportunity to really reform government" (Ferris, 5 July 2000). In reference to the PAN's victory in the Mexican Senate and Chamber of Deputies (winning 38% of the seats to the PRI's 36%), Estudillo also stated that this situation creates incentives for all parties, including the PRI, to push for "checks and balances," an atmosphere extremely favorable for moving Mexico in a more truly democratic direction (Ferris, 5 July 2000).

Nevertheless, the bulk of power in Mexico still rests with the president. He is "central" to policy. For any real progress to occur in Mexican counter drug efforts and democratization, changes must originate in the presidency. If he is honest and sincere, the changes will flow throughout governmental institutions (Diamond, 1999: 535). The process, however, will take considerable time and effort. Vicente Fox acknowledged this reality in saying, "this is an ambitious program that takes time. But it is the only way, at the end, you will have changed the culture. The president has to (provide) the very first example of ethics, ethical values and morality and behavior. Unfortunately, in this country we haven't had that. The example has been the contrary" (Ferris, 5 July 2000).

There are still countless corrupt individuals throughout Mexican governmental institutions. Not much has yet changed since Andres Oppenheimer said that Mexico is "a country of men – not of institutions" (Oppenheimer, 1996: 214). In other words, governmental

institutions do not function as they should because they are infested with corrupt agents. But Vicente Fox is the best hope yet for Mexico to become a country of just institutions.

Honest institutions will help to combat drug trafficking and resultant corruption in Mexico. As previously mentioned, the corrupting power of drug trafficking corrodes society. This reality implies effective political and economic policy is a necessity to effectively combat drug trafficking (Diamond, 1999: 16). But arriving at any such policy is no easy task, especially in Mexico.

Why is such policy difficult to achieve? Policy is often formulated as a result of pressure from outside interest groups and often created for sub-optimal reasons. Such policy is flawed and it is possible that subverting these policies [i.e. corruption] sometimes results in a net gain for society. But there is a problem in determining when it is acceptable to engage in illegality in the face of unjust legal statutes. Distrust of the government and corresponding corruption arise because the scope of the government is limited. This provides an opportunity for people to provide resources the government cannot, like vast monetary resources from drug trafficking and pay-offs that are much more than can be obtained through legal and government mandated methods (United Nations International Drug Control Program, 1997: 151).

Although corruption yields positive effects for some, it inevitably causes distortions in and subverts the local economy, affecting many others in negative ways. The extent of corruption in any given case is inevitably linked to local values. Likewise, there is a link between these values and policy. So it can be very easy to justify bending the rules in the name of progress or in the name of social order (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 152).

Social order has historically been the favorite excuse of corrupt Mexican officials. If, at the same time, officials begin to be viewed as self-interested beyond the acceptable levels of corruption based on the values of the locality, then society will experience severe demoralization (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 153). Inevitably, "the institutions of social order break down under the impossible strains . . . [of] governmental neglect" (Rotella, 1998: Cover). In the end, the ultimate and most unfortunate casualty is "democracy itself" (Rotella, 1998: Cover). Progress in both counter drug efforts and democratization will depend largely on the extent that Fox can implement effective political and economic policy.

Political-Economic Policy

Remedies to this situation (that Fox and other future Mexican presidents should seek to implement) should include focusing on economic ethics that are concerned with the direct outcomes of policies rather than the popularity of those policies. It is important to recognize that economic reform simply entails difficulties in the short term, even to the point that many people will be worse off than they were before reform efforts began. In the long run, however, everyone benefits from market-oriented structural reforms. There will be more economic prosperity in society as a whole and, therefore, less impetus to engage in illegal and/or corrupt activities (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 152).

Structural adjustment is one thing; reform of actual behavior is another. "Reform of behaviour modes is very difficult to bring about through a policy decision." But, there is evidence that constraints impact "economic, political, and social behaviour" (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 152). Therefore, a second method to help remedy the dreadful situation in Mexico would entail strict laws and prosecution of corrupt government

officials. President Fox appears determined to root out corruption. Future Mexican presidents will hopefully build on this trend.

Finally, the economy should be reorganized with laws linking and governing both the political and business sectors (United Nations International Drug Control Programme, 1997: 153). Narco-political corruption in Mexico is not isolated to either of these sectors. The two are co-mingled. It is therefore logical that there is a need for laws that extend into and link both.

These remedies would be the ideal for Mexico. Enacting them, however, will be difficult. Reform in Mexico will have to take place over many years and through a number of honest presidents. Narco-political corruption, if not effectively rooted out, will be detrimental to international drug efforts and could be the downfall of democracy in Mexico. In any case, watching and studying Mexico in the 21st century should be an interesting undertaking.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I – Interview Transcripts

Question: How effective do you think the counter drug program is, as far as the National Guard is concerned? And do you think the National Guard should be involved in the first place?

Answer, Brigadier General Mike Smith, Texas Air National Guard:

Well, the first question is how effective are we. I think that given the limitations and resources that we deal with, I think we're very effective. If you look at this from the stand point that the drugs that our young men and women [National Guard personnel] find and the assistance that they give to law enforcement, the drugs that don't reach consumers because our people are there, you have to say that the several billions of dollars of drugs each year that we find is a major benefit to the nation at large, strictly because those are the drugs that do not get to the hands of consumers and our young people. Our citizens are not subjected to that drug traffic. So, I would say that we are very effective. It's pretty well admitted that we don't get but about, perhaps, 10 percent - and you can argue that figure one way or the other - 10% of the drugs being shipped, but that's largely because the drug traffickers are being smarter. If you assume a 10% intercept figure, however, that's 10% of a very large quantity of drugs coming into the country that we're stopping that never reach the consumer. You can equate that to dollars and equate that to personnel hardships [referring to limited funding and manpower], but however you cut it it's a plus for the American society.

Question: How effective do you think the Texas National Guard counter drug program is?

Answer, Former personnel director of the Texas National Guard Counter Drug Program Lt Col Gladys Tinsley, Texas National Guard:

Considering the personnel resources, the equipment resources that we have available to conduct in all of our missions, I think that we provide the most cost-effective, cost-efficient

counter drug support for all of the law enforcement agencies that we do support at the present time. We have technology that streamlines the processes of the customs ports of entry - all of the various ports from El Paso down to the valley to include three ports in Houston. So, cost-effectively we're not tracking from this rate, but we are also ensuring that it's looking fair that if available to be found that we can find it efficiently. At what cost to the person who's hauling it- a way to investigate- the vehicles are dismantled. So, I think that's probably one of the most effective things that we've done over a period of time using technology, which spreads our people out a lot farther, so that you don't need human eyes when we have equipment that's doing things that human eyes can't see anyway. We have Intel analysts who are out in the field. You don't see the results, though, right away because they have long-term cases. You're not going to see results in a week, but you will see results years later when major organizations fall apart because of the Intel networks that have brought together information to the law enforcement agencies to be able to dismantle an organization. Anywhere to case support people who are down at the state and local levels who have organized databases to collect the information for the law enforcement agencies in a manner that they find more useful; and to use all the military technology and the military way of organization that we use to put together information so it's useful for them to bring down organizations. So, when you say are we effective, I would say yes. How effective are we? No one knows how much drugs [enter the country]; everything is an estimate, but I would say when you look at our budget when we went to a maximum high of 19 million in one year to now we're seeing at 14 million this year. We bring in billions of dollars in drug-assisted seizures. Do we get our bang for our buck? I would say yes. That is only in Texas.

Question: Do you feel that the National Guard should be involved in this in the first place?

Answer: Lt Col Gladys Tinsley:

I think the National Guard plays a vital role in this arena because we're a state militia. We were already here with the hurricanes, the tornadoes, and any other natural disaster, and when President Bush, in 1989, said that this was a threat to our security and when we speak now in today in terms of homeland defense the National Guard is strategically located. The people of the National Guard are strategically located throughout the entire state, especially in the state of Texas, to support law enforcement agencies. So they are a valuable resource ready to go to certain locations where we do need them. On occasion if we do need to move them somewhere it's for strategic reasons. Nowhere else would you find that. You couldn't get that from the total head component because most of them are at a major installation, whereas the reserve National Guard are already in small communities. We hold specialty in skills and ability that we require from the military that has enhanced the operations of law enforcement, which they would have not had otherwise. We have the technology that, because of some of the law enforcement budgets, that they would not have otherwise. So, what we bring to the table is very valuable to them, and anytime we talk with them we will hear that from them. I have never left a mission - maybe it didn't go as well as they wanted it to – but I have never seen a mission that was unsuccessful in what they were hoping to gain.

APPENDIX II – Survey Instrument

Military Involvement in Counter Drug Efforts

What is your level of agreement with the following statements?

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral (neither agree nor disagree)	Agree	Strongly Agree

Circle the Appropriate Response:

The Military/National Guard **should be involved** in counter drug efforts

1 2 3 4 5

The Military/National Guard **should only be involved in a support role** in counter drug efforts

1 2 3 4 5

Military/National Guard **indirect involvement** in counter drug efforts **is within** the bounds of **U.S. civil liberties**

1 2 3 4 5

Do You Suggest Any Alternative Approaches for Current Military/National Guard Supply Reduction Efforts? For example:

Relying more on strategic (predictive) intelligence rather than tactical (operational/investigative) intelligence Yes _____ No _____

Deferring some or all current National Guard approved missions to law enforcement or other civilian agencies Yes _____ No _____ (please list below)

Aiding Border Patrol and Customs agents on the border and/or at the points of entry more frequently Yes _____ No _____

Please provide any other suggestions or comments:

Reducing Availability of Illicit Drugs

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding National Guard approved missions in counter drug efforts.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral (neither agree nor disagree)	Agree	Strongly Agree

Circle the appropriate response:

Linguist and Translator Support is effective in **reducing the availability of illegal drugs** in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Communication Support is effective in **reducing the availability of illegal drugs** in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Operational/Investigative Case Support is effective in **reducing the availability of illegal drugs** in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Intelligence Analyst Support is effective in **reducing the availability of illegal drugs** in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Engineer Support is effective in **reducing the availability of illegal drugs** in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Ground and Aerial Transportation Support is effective in **reducing the availability of illegal drugs** in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Military Specific Training to Law Enforcement is effective in **reducing the availability of illegal drugs** in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Aerial Reconnaissance and Observation is effective in **reducing the availability of illegal drugs** in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Reducing the Drug Shipment Rate from Source Zones (Primarily Mexico)

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding National Guard approved missions in counter drug efforts.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral (neither agree nor disagree)	Agree	Strongly Agree

Circle the appropriate response:

Linguist and Translator Support is effective in **reducing the drug shipment rate from source zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Communication Support is effective in **reducing the drug shipment rate from source zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Operational/Investigative Case Support is effective in **reducing the drug shipment rate from source zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Intelligence Analyst Support is effective in **reducing the drug shipment rate from source zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Engineer Support is effective in **reducing the drug shipment rate from source zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Ground and Aerial Transportation Support is effective in **reducing the drug shipment rate from source zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Military Specific Training to Law Enforcement is effective in **reducing the drug shipment rate from source zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Aerial Reconnaissance and Observation is effective in **reducing the drug shipment rate from source zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Reducing the Rate of Illicit Drug Flow Through Arrival Zones (specifically the Texas-Mexico Border)

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding National Guard approved missions in counter drug efforts.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral (neither agree nor disagree)	Agree	Strongly Agree

Circle the appropriate response:

Linguist and Translator Support is effective in **reducing the rate of illicit drug flow through arrival zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Communication Support is effective in **reducing the rate of illicit drug flow through arrival zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Operational/Investigative Case Support is effective in **reducing the rate of illicit drug flow through arrival zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Intelligence Analyst Support is effective in **reducing the rate of illicit drug flow through arrival zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Engineer Support is effective in **reducing the rate of illicit drug flow through arrival zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Ground and Aerial Transportation Support is effective in **reducing the rate of illicit drug flow through arrival zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Military Specific Training to Law Enforcement is effective in **reducing the rate of illicit drug flow through arrival zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Aerial Reconnaissance and Observation is effective in **reducing the rate of illicit drug flow through arrival zones**

1 2 3 4 5

Reducing Domestic Cultivation and Production of Illicit Drugs

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding National Guard approved missions in counter drug efforts.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral (neither agree nor disagree)	Agree	Strongly Agree

Circle the appropriate response:

Linguist and Translator Support is effective in **reducing domestic cultivation and production** of illicit drugs

1 2 3 4 5

Communication Support is effective in **reducing domestic cultivation and production of illicit drugs**

1 2 3 4 5

Operational/Investigative Case Support is effective in **reducing domestic cultivation and production** of illicit drugs

1 2 3 4 5

Intelligence Analyst Support is effective in **reducing domestic cultivation and production** of illicit drugs

1 2 3 4 5

Engineer Support is effective in **reducing domestic cultivation and production** of illicit drugs

1 2 3 4 5

Ground and Aerial Transportation Support is effective in **reducing domestic cultivation and production** of illicit drugs

1 2 3 4 5

Military Specific Training to Law Enforcement is effective in **reducing domestic cultivation and production** of illicit drugs

1 2 3 4 5

Aerial Reconnaissance and Observation is effective in **reducing domestic cultivation and production** of illicit drugs

1 2 3 4 5

Reducing Drug Trafficker Success Rate in the United States

Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements regarding National Guard approved missions in counter drug efforts.

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral (neither agree nor disagree)	Agree	Strongly Agree

Circle the appropriate response:

Linguist and Translator Support is effective in **reducing** the **drug trafficker success** rate in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Communication Support is effective in **reducing** the **drug trafficker success** rate in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Operational/Investigative Case Support is effective in **reducing** the **drug trafficker success** rate in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Intelligence Analyst Support is effective in **reducing** the **drug trafficker success** rate in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Engineer Support is effective in **reducing** the **drug trafficker success** rate in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Ground and Aerial Transportation Support is effective in **reducing** the **drug trafficker success** rate in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Military Specific Training to Law Enforcement is effective in **reducing** the **drug trafficker success** rate in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

Aerial Reconnaissance and Observation is effective in **reducing** the **drug trafficker success** rate in the United States

1 2 3 4 5

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andreas, Peter R., Eva C. Bertram, Morris J. Blachman, and Kenneth E. Sharpe. "Dead-End Drug Wars." *Foreign Policy*. vol. 85. Winter 1991-1992.

Andreas, Peter. "The Political Economy of Narco-Corruption in Mexico." *Current History*. April 1998.

Attorney General's Office of Mexico, The. *Mexico's Fight Against the Scourge of Drugs: A Record of Achievement*. December 1998.

Babbie, Earl. *The Basics of Social Research*. Boston: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1999.

Bergantz, Joseph L. Colonel, U.S. Army. "Military Support of the National Drug Control Strategy." *Military Review*. June 1992.

Bertram, Eva, Morris Blachman, Kenneth Sharpe, and Peter Andreas. *Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996.

"Bolivia Goes to War Against Coca." *The Economist*. 19 September 1998.

Cardoso, Eliana and Ann Helwege. *Latin America's Economy: Diversity, Trends, and Conflicts*. 6th ed. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997.

Chaux, Victor Mosquera. "My Country Isn't Profiting From Cocaine." *The Washington Post*. 4 January 1989.

Clawson, David L. *Latin America & the Caribbean: Lands and Peoples*. Boston: Wm. C. Brown Publishers, 1997.

Clawson, Patrick L. and Rensselaer W. Lee III. *The Andean Cocaine Industry*. New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1998.

Current Drug Situation Summary. United States Air Force Special Operations School, Hurlburt Field, FL, 1997.

Diamond, Larry and Jonathon Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Linset. ed. 2nd ed. *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.

Dillon, Sam. "Clinton Indicates Support to Mexico in Battling Drugs." *The New York Times*. 16 February 1999.

Drug Enforcement Administration. *Dea Factsheet*. [On-line]; available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/factsheet/fact0200.htm; accessed 19 June 2000.

Drug Enforcement Administration. *Traffickers From Mexico*. [On-line]; available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/traffickers/mexico.htm; accessed 13 March 2000.

"Drugs, Latin America and the United States." *The Economist*. 7 February 1998.

Executive Office of the President, The Office of National Drug Control Policy. *The National Drug Control Strategy, 1999*.

Executive Office of the President, The Office of National Drug Control Policy. *Performance Measures of Effectiveness: Implementation and Findings*. Supplement to *The National Drug Control Strategy, 1999*.

Falco, Mathea. "Passing Grades." *Foreign Affairs*. vol. 74, no. 5. *Foreign Affairs*. September/October 1995.

Ferriss, Susan. "Emotions, history are on the line in election." *The Austin American-Statesman*. 2 July 2000.

Ferriss, Susan. "Fox maps out path for reform." *The Austin American-Statesman*. 5 July 2000.

Ferriss, Susan. "Mexico confident Fox's win will bring peaceful revolution." *The Austin American-Statesman*. 9 July 2000.

Ferriss, Susan. "Mexico's unflappable PRI shaken by loss in election." *The Austin American-Statesman*. 9 July 2000.

Gegax, Trent T. and Sarah Van Boven. "Heroin High." *Newsweek*. 1 February 1999.

Holden-Rhodes, J.F. *Sharing the Secrets: Open Source Intelligence and the War on Drugs*. London: Praeger Publishers, 1997.

Joint Task Force Six. [On-line]; available at http://www-jtf6.bliss.army.mil/; accessed 22 March 2001.

Johnson, David E. *Modern U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Wielding the Terrible Swift Sword*. McNair Paper 57. Washington D.C.: Institute for National Security Strategic Studies, National Defense University, July 1997.

"Judging the Mexican Drug War." *The New York Times*. 16 February 1999.

Keen, Benjamin. *A History of Latin America: Independence to the Present*. 5th ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996.

Kitfield, James. "The War at Home: The military's growing involvement in the domestic war on drugs has some delighted and relieved, others nervous." *Government Executive*. December 1993.

Krajewski, Lee J. and Larry P. Ritzman. *Operations Management: Strategy and Analysis*. 5th ed. New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1999.

Latin America Unit of the Strategic Intelligence Unit, The. Drug Enforcement Administration. *Mexico and Central America Country Briefs*. May 1995.

Martínez McNaught, Hugo. "Es Quintana Roo Bodega del Narco." *El Norte*. 2 Febrary 1999.

Mathis, Robert L. and John H. Jackson. *Human Resource Management*. 9th ed. Cincinnati: South-Western College Publishing, 2000.

McKenna, James T. "Multinational Exercise Targets Drug Traffickers." *Aviation Week & Space Technology*. 1 April 1996.

Nadelmann, Ethan A. "Common Sense Drug Policy." *Foreign Affairs*. vol. 77. no. 1. January/February 1998.

Nadelmann, Ethan A. *Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.

Newman, Richard J. "A timeout in the military's war on drugs." *U.S. News and World Report*. 4 August 1997.

Newman, Richard J. "Unwinnable War." *U.S. News and World Report*. 4 November 1996.

Office of International Criminal Justice. *The Mexican Cartels: A Challenge for the 21st Century*. [On-line]; available at http://www.ascp.uic.edu/iasoc/crim_org/vol12/art_mexcart_p1..cfm. accessed 31 March 1999.

Oppenheimer, Andrea. *Bordering on Chaos: Mexico's Roller-Coaster Journey Toward Prosperity*. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996.

Peeler, John. *Building Democracy in Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Perl, Raphael F. "Clinton's Foreign Drug Policy." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. vol. 35, no. 4. Winter 1993-1994.

Perl, Raphael F. "United States Andean Drug Policy: Background and Issues for Decisionmakers." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*. vol. 34, no. 3. Fall 1992.

Rotella, Sebastian. *Twilight on the Line: Underworlds and Politics at the U.S.-Mexico Border*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998.

Ruiz, Ramon Eduardo. *Triumphs and Tragedy: A History of the Mexican People*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992.

Sanchez, Peter M. "The 'Drug War': The U.S. Military and National Security." *The Air Force Law Review*. 1991.

Schaler, Jeffrey A. ed. *Drugs: Should We Legalize, Decriminalize, or Deregulate?* Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1998.

Sekaran, Uma. *Research Methods for Business: A Skill-Building Approach*. 3rd ed. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000.

Shields, Patricia M. "Pragmatism as Philosophy of Science: A Tool for Public Administration." *Research in Public Administration*. vol. 4. 1998.

Snow, Donald M. *National Security: Defense Policy in a Changed International Order*. 4th ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Stares, Paul B. *Global Habit: The Drug Problem in a Borderless World*. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1996.

Suchlicki, Jaime. *Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA, Chiapas, and Beyond*. New York: Brassey's, Inc., 1996.

Texas National Guard. *Counter Drug Program*. [On-line]; available at http://www.agd.state.tx.us/C-Drug.HTM. accessed 1 March 2001.

United Nations International Drug Control Programme. *World Drug Report*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

US/Mexico Bi-National Drug Threat Assessment, May 1997.

US/Mexico Bi-National Performance Measures of Effectiveness. February 1999.

U.S./Mexico High Level Contact Group. Fourth Plenary Meeting of the U.S./Mexico High Level Contact Group on Drug Control. The White House Conference Center, Washington D.C. October 22-24, 1997.