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GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC

OR

GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLICANS?

Political Party and Ideological Preferences of American Enlisted Personnel

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Political Party and Ideological Preferences of American Enlisted Personnel

by

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Dedication

To Jeannine, who inspired, supported, prodded, and encouraged.

To the American enlisted men and women, who continually amaze and inspire me.

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This dissertation actually began thirty years ago when I first found myself in charge of some four dozen Navy enlisted Sailors and discovered that they represented a long and valued tradition of service to the United States. While they were often disregarded as undereducated, economically limited, and limited social misfits, I found it not to be true then and certainly not true today. Then in 1996, I was Captain of USS Duluth, an 18,000 ton amphibious ship in the Pacific Fleet, and responsible for the lives and safety of 450 Sailors and some 900 embarked Marines, most of whom were enlisted men, and my appreciation and fascination with their dedication, skill, and intelligence was deepened further. My intent is to tell part of their story to the nation that hired them.

Part of the process of completing a piece of research such as this is learning that a project of this size is a collaborative process. Many have participated in that collaboration and, at the risk of leaving someone important off the list, I will acknowledge them.

While teaching Leadership and Ethics at the University of Texas, I was fortunate to have had Rachel Hertz Cobb, then a Ph.D. candidate in English, assigned to me as a writing mentor, assisting my students with developing their writing skills. She not only assisted those students, most of whom are now on active service as officers in the Navy or Marine Corps, but also guided my own writing, including this tome with countless edits and solid advice.

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much of my writing over the years, taking me to levels I would never have imagined possible. The time he spent on this dissertation, which was far beyond the call of duty, prodding me to do better, is greatly appreciated.

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Bat Sparrow phoned me one day while I was in my office in the Naval Science Department at the University of Texas. He had been assigned to chair a committee to decide if this old Navy Captain should be permitted to enter the Government Department's graduate program. His questions were helpful in forcing me to decide why I really wanted to pursue a doctorate after an already full naval career. I was pleasantly surprised one day when he asked me to co-write a paper on American civil-military relations, which we presented at an American Political Science Association meeting. His

faith in my academic pursuits were inspiring, kept me moving ahead, and are in no small way responsible for my scholarly successes.

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And, how can I go far without acknowledging Jeannine, my wife, who spent as many years in the Navy as did I, who was associated with those same enlisted personnel and their spouses, and, after having been a “deployment widow” all those times, became a “dissertation widow” for a while, as well. But she, too, encouraged me to “get that thing done,” for which I am eternally grateful.

However, despite the able assistance and flawless guidance of all, the work herein is mine and I take full responsibility for any errors in fact and form.

GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC

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Political Party and Ideological Preferences of American Enlisted Personnel

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2009

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While much research has been conducted into the political behavior and attitudes of American military officers, little has been accomplished with respect to enlisted personnel. Most reports assume that the American military identify largely with the Republican Party and are mostly conservative in attitude. The most recent large-scale study, the TISS *Survey on the Military in the Post Cold War Era* conducted by Feaver and Kohn in 1998-1999, confirmed those assumptions among senior officers and is often quoted as representative of the entire military. However, the demographic characteristics of enlisted personnel predict different behavior. The enlisted ranks of the American military are over-represented by minorities who traditionally identify with the Democratic Party. The present study gathered data on enlisted personnel, by means of a

survey, to determine whether that specialized population is significantly different in attitude and behavior from that of the officer corps and of the general American population. Enlisted personnel identify with the Republican Party in about the same proportion as do the general American population. However, only about half as many enlisted personnel identify with the Democratic Party as do civilians. Enlisted personnel are also about three times more likely to identify as Independents as do other Americans.

Active-duty enlisted personnel demonstrate a 1.7 to 1 partisan (Republican to Democrat) ratio, similar to that found in the veteran enlisted sample (1.8 to 1) and the officer sample (1.6 to 1). The civilian sample shows a .95 to 1 partisan ratio. Thus, active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with a political party are about twice as likely to identify with the Republican Party as are civilians. However, active-duty enlisted personnel are nearly four times as likely as civilians to report being Independent, and are substantially less likely than civilians to identify with the Democratic Party. The Republican to Democrat ratio may well explain the commentary about and observations of a Republican dominated military. Despite the fact that the overall proportion of Republicans within the military is no greater than that found within the general population, that there are twice as many individuals who will state that they are Republicans as those who will state that they are Democrats can easily give the impression of a heavily Republican population. However, active-duty enlisted personnel remain strongly independent when compared to the civilian population. Of special note is a markedly higher political efficacy among military enlisted personnel than is found within the general American population.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Recent events have made the American military a population of increasing interest to political scientists, military historians, political sociologists, and other writers. The highly publicized and apparently successful use of force by the American military in 1991 against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm highlighted a new prowess reestablished after the embarrassment of Vietnam. Then, with the heavily military nature of the response to the events of September 11, 2001, and the quick and successful toppling of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the issue of whether the American military was the most competent force in the world, and an institution that was highly regarded by the public, appeared sealed. The increased use of the National Guard and Reserve forces on active combat duty has most likely brought more of the public into direct contact with the military and seems to indicate that the military's public profile, whether positive or negative, is unlikely to diminish in the near future.

Several specific developments raise a set of potentially troubling issues. In the 1990s, concern began to grow in journalistic and academic civil-military circles that a "gap" existed in political attitudes and behavior between the American populace and the military (Ricks 1997; Holsti 1998, 1999, 2001). Extensive research into the attitudes and behavior of the officer corps and civilian elites confirmed the existence of a separation between civilian thinking and that of military personnel. However, despite all previous work and assumptions, little research has been conducted into the political beliefs of enlisted personnel. Given that enlisted personnel make up 85 percent of the

military population, an inadequate understanding of those personnel results in a lack of understanding of the military as a whole. Since the enlisted population is significantly different demographically from both the officer corps and the general population, and since, as we will see, this group is apparently voting at a higher rate than Americans as a whole, they are manifestly a population worth studying.

The 2000 Presidential election was highlighted by the controversy in Florida over whether or not certain overseas absentee ballots, most of which were from military voters, could be counted. The Democratic Party's initial strategy to encourage the disqualification of those ballots indicated an assumption that those votes were disproportionately in favor of the Republican candidate. This, combined with research showing that overseas absentee ballots are significantly more likely than domestic absentee ballots to be disqualified by local election boards (Alvarez et.al., 2007, US GAO 2001), brings into question exactly how the military does vote and whether, as commentary in the civil-military field might suggest, the military population may possibly be a critical voting group, if not a bloc (Inbody 2008). Republican politicians appear to assume that the military will vote largely in their favor, at least in presidential elections. Democrats, on the other hand, are accused of "tone deafness" toward the military vote (Feaver 2004).

With the creation of the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in 2002, the first joint combatant command with primary military authority and responsibility within the borders of the United States, the possibility of domestic use of the military in the "Global War on Terror" with potential questions about the use of the *posse comitatus*,

emerged for the first time since the Civil War. In September 2008, NORTHCOM announced that, for the first time, a specific Army unit was assigned to its command for use within the borders of the United States (U.S. Northern Command 2008). This poses obvious questions of civil-military relations. If we are to understand better the dynamics of civil-military relations in day-to-day operations and whether or not such new issues and organizations pose any threat to the proper functioning of a democratic society, it has become crucial that we know as much as possible about the nature of the personnel who make up the vast majority of the American military.

* * * * *

This study is designed to explore the apparent contradiction between reported political attitudes and behavior of American military enlisted personnel and those that are predicted by demographics. The history of military voting at least since the American Civil War, as well as more recent observations, suggests that the party identification of military personnel leans toward the Republican Party. The demographics of the American military would not tend to support such a proposition, however. We know that minority groups, which, in the general population, traditionally identify with the Democratic Party, are disproportionately represented in the U.S. military (Kane 2005, 2006; Watkins 2008; Inbody 2008). Given such over-representation, a question arises as to whether the assumptions mentioned here about a Republican bias within the military are in fact accurate.

Without a comprehensive study of enlisted personnel, the extent to which the military matches the American population in terms of attitudes and political

identification is an open question. While the political behavior and attitudes of officers, especially senior officers, are understood quite well, at least as recently as 1998 (Feaver & Kohn 2001), enlisted personnel have not been the subject of research to any great extent other than in some sociological studies (Moskos 1970; Ingraham 1984; Bachman 1997, 2000; Segal et al. 2001). To assume that the attitudes and culture of enlisted personnel are but a reflection of those held by the officer corps and particularly of senior officers would be a mistake and would ignore many years of commentary, observation, and academic study.

The assumption that military personnel tend to vote for Republican candidates is inconsistent with what we would expect if we extrapolate from the overall demographics of American voting behavior to that of the military. If, particularly within the enlisted ranks, a bias does exist within the American military toward Republican Party identification, then it may be that, as to the military, demographics are not the usually reliable predictor of political behavior that they are for the civilian population. If that is the case, the unpredicted political behavior of military personnel warrants inquiry into its causes and the reasons for the irregularity.

The enlisted ranks of the American military have always made up the largest portion of the military population. However, officers, given their position as decision-making elites in most societies, have more often been the subject of study by political scientists. Huntington (1957), in his seminal study of American civil-military relations, relegated enlisted personnel to the status of tradesmen and reserved the title of “military professional” solely for officers, thus consigning enlisted personnel to the proverbial

back seat. However, it is a mistake to dismiss the significance of enlisted personnel so quickly, because they make up some 85 percent of the total strength of the American military. Of the approximately 1.4 million men and women wearing the uniform of the United States, about 1.1 million of them are enlisted personnel, and one should attend to them through detailed study.

There has been traditionally a social divide between enlisted personnel and officers. Officers are either “commissioned” by the President or given a “warrant” of service by Secretary of their branch of service. Such commissions and warrants have no time limit and the holder of such a document remains on service until the individual officer is released by the government or resigns. Enlisted personnel, by contrast, sign an enlistment contract for a set period of service, at the end of which they are free to return to civilian life. The terminology used to describe the process of proceeding from one rank to the next is also different for officers and enlisted personnel. Officers are “promoted.” Enlisted personnel “advance.” Officers are always saluted by juniors. Enlisted personnel, regardless of rank, are never saluted.

The structure of the enlisted ranks is more complicated than that of officers, revealing a tradesman-like specialization of personnel into specific areas of expertise and technical training. Although each service has a unique enlisted rank structure, all of the services have a common “pay-grade” structure that makes comparison between them possible. A Private First Class in the Army, a Seaman in the Navy, a Lance Corporal in the Marine Corps, and an Airman First Class in the Air Force are all in E-3 pay-grade. (See Appendix D for a summary of this pay-grade/rank structure.)

The demographic composition of the enlisted force is also different from that of the officer corps. It is different from that of the American population as well. If the American military presented an accurate descriptive representation of the U.S. population, by definition it would mirror the characteristics of the American population and, by extension, its voting demographics. However, it does neither. As of December 2008, while whites made up about 80 percent of the ages 18 to 44 civilian population, whites are only about 69 percent of the enlisted population. Blacks, while just under 12 percent of civilian 18-44-year-olds, comprised nearly 19 percent of the military population. Thus, relative to all appropriate comparison groups, whites are under-represented within the enlisted ranks of the American military while blacks are over-represented. Among 18-44-year-olds, other racial groups appear in the military in roughly the same proportion as they do in the overall population. (See Table 1.1.) However, women, who make up over half the American population, represent only about 15 percent of all military personnel.

Table 1.1 U.S. Enlisted Population by Race (Dec 2008)¹

	White	Black	Other
Enlisted Force	68.9	18.6	12.5
Age 18 - 44	80.1	12.6	7.3
U.S. Population	74.1	13.4	12.5

¹ DOD data obtained from Defense Manpower Data Center, Information Delivery System. Data retrieved on 12 February 2009 from <https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/ids/genericsubmit.do?module=1&report=23>. U.S. and age 18-44 data drawn from U.S. Census Bureau. Data retrieved on 12 February 2009 from <http://www.census.gov>

That the demographic data of enlisted military personnel are not representative of the general American population bears on the “civil-military gap” debate and the relationship between it and the nature of the American military. At question in the debate is whether military personnel hold attitudes significantly different from the U.S. population as a whole, and if so, whether those differences pose any danger to the ideal of civilian control of the military.

Claims that the military is populated by members from the economically poorest backgrounds and that the children of the rich do not enlist contribute to the notion that the economically and politically disadvantaged are doing the “dirty work” of the advantaged. This recently prompted a call by one member of Congress to reinstitute the draft, based on the claim that conscription is necessary to ensure that military service is equally shared across the entirety of American society (Rangel 2006a; Youngblood 2009).

The notion of a gap between the norms and attitudes of the general population and those of the U.S. military has been discussed in some depth for at least the past five or six decades. The debate, initiated by Huntington (1957), who argued that a gap must necessarily exist in order to ensure the best military protection of society, and Janowitz (1960), who argued that specific steps must be taken to ensure there is no gap, continues unabated today within journalistic, academic, and military circles.

The divides that developed between civil and military society during and immediately following the Vietnam War heightened the sense of a gap in attitudes and

norms. The end of the draft began a slow process of creating a military that was increasingly segregated from civilian society. New norms of behavior, which essentially ended illegal drug use in the military, further created a sense of departure from the apparent norms of civil society. The continuing decline in military experience among the American population as well as members of Congress raises questions about how much of the decision-making elite and the electorate has any direct contact with the active-duty military personnel who actually fight the nation's wars (Powell et al. 1994; Ricks 1997; Cohn 1999).

The controversy surrounding the fate of overseas military absentee ballots in the 2000 presidential election in Florida, marked by the Democratic Party's initial strategy to encourage the disqualification of those ballots in Florida, highlighted an assumption that those votes were disproportionately in favor of the Republican candidate. The Republican Party's reaction, to insist that all of the ballots be counted, indicated a similar assumption on their part.

Controversy over the handling of the military vote, rather than being resolved after the 2000 election, has increased in recent years. In particular, how absentee ballots are distributed, returned, handled, and counted by election authorities has been at the center of growing attention on the part of military and civilian governmental officials as well as the press. The assumptions generated by the Florida presidential election in 2000 provide the most notable case, but concerns over military voting have since become a recurring phenomenon, with instances reported in the 2004, 2006, and 2008 elections (Ryckaert 2002; Davies 2004; Knowlton 2007; U.S. Department of Justice,

2008). Given that a high percentage of the overseas absentee ballots come from active-duty military personnel and their families, such issues raise questions as to how absentee ballots are treated by various state laws and how they are handled by local election officials.

Recent research shows that overseas absentee ballots are significantly more likely than domestic absentee ballots to be disqualified by local election boards (Alvarez et.al. 2007; US GAO 2001). Watchdog groups such as the National Defense Committee have begun to monitor how military personnel are treated by various localities with respect to the right to vote and are taking legal action to enforce their rights under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA).

This activity surrounding the enfranchisement of military personnel naturally begs the question of exactly how the military does vote and, as some commentary in the civil-military field has suggested, whether the military population may possibly be a critical voting group, at least locally (Tiron 2008; Stiehm 2008; Inbody 2008). To date, however, there have been no detailed studies of the political attitudes and behavior of American military enlisted personnel. Some surveys published in the press have indicated that enlisted personnel strongly support Republican administrations, but all such surveys have been limited to the readership of *Military Times* newspapers and are recognized to be limited in scope and overall accuracy (Trowbridge 2004). Other surveys by the more well-known polling organizations have limited their surveying to the families of military personnel (Gallup, USA, 2007).

Just as it is a mistake to assume that the attitudes of officers and enlisted personnel are the same, it is also an error to assume that the two populations vote alike. A simulation of the 2000 presidential election conducted within the ranks of the American military highlighted this difference. This election simulation, a preliminary study for this dissertation, divided the September 2001 end-strength of the U.S. military into six groups: White Male, White Female, Black Male, Black Female, Other Male, and Other Female. Then, using data about the voting behavior of each demographic subgroup from the 2000 general election American National Election Study (ANES), a prediction of how many military personnel would vote for each of the candidates was calculated. It demonstrated that, had each demographic grouping within the military divided its vote as had the same group in the general population, 54.4 percent would have voted for Al Gore and 42.2 percent would have voted for George W. Bush, a 1.2 to 1 vote in favor of the Democratic Party's candidate (Inbody 2008).

This outcome for a military population generally assumed to have a Republican bias is at least cause to look with more detail at the political attitudes and behavior of those in uniform. Either observers hold incorrect assumptions about the politics of the American military or demographic characteristics do not predict voting behavior in this special population with the expected reliability we have come to associate with studies of voting in the civilian population.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In order to resolve the apparent contradiction of a Republican, conservative military that is over-represented by minority groups that normally identify with the Democratic Party, this research will specifically aim to provide answers to two questions:

1. To what extent do the political attitudes and behavior of enlisted personnel differ from or resemble those of the officer corps and the general American population?
2. If enlisted personnel do identify more with the Republican Party than does the American population, what factors would explain such attitudes and behavior?

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

In order to obtain the data necessary to answer the questions raised above, a survey was developed using questions from the Triangle Institute *Surveys on the Military in the Post-Cold War Era* and from the American National Election Study, along with others developed by the author. The survey was delivered to potential respondents both electronically and manually. Responses were taken over the six month period surrounding the November 2008 national election.

Data obtained from the use of the *Survey on Enlisted Personnel* (SOEP) and other surveys conducted during the same approximate period enabled analysis of

differences and similarities between various groups. The active-duty enlisted force was compared to veteran enlisted personnel, the general U.S. population, and the officer corps. The details of the survey instrument and methodology will be discussed in Chapter 5.

The results revealed a population that is much closer in behavior and identity to the general American population than had previously been reported and showed the group to hold more liberal social attitudes than might be expected. The data showed that the average American enlisted person is highly motivated to serve, but believes that the American people do not really understand the sacrifices that military personnel make on behalf of society. Enlisted personnel reveal themselves highly motivated to vote, likely to participate politically, and quite aware of and with opinions on various important civil-military relations issues.

ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION

The present study will be presented in the following manner. The theoretical background of the American civil-military debate will be presented in Chapter 2. The chapter will conclude with a detailed exploration of the cultural gap debate and how that debate bears on this study. Chapter 3 will concentrate on the demographic characteristics of enlisted personnel, including not only racial/ethnic and gender data, but the educational, socio-economic, and regional backgrounds of the enlisted population. Then, given the recent controversy about whether military personnel have been adequately enfranchised, particularly with respect to absentee balloting, Chapter 4

will discuss what is known about military voting behavior, the military's propensity to vote, and the controversy over absentee balloting. These three chapters – civil-military relations theory, military demographics, and military voting – lay out the substantial and scholarly foundations upon which the study is based. The method for discovering the data necessary to provide answers to the questions posed earlier in this chapter will be laid out in Chapter 5. In that chapter a description of the survey instrument will be presented along with details of the survey sample. Chapter 6 will provide a description of the findings of the survey divided into several categories: party identification, political attitudes, and various military, civil-military, and social issues. Chapter 7 will present conclusions and the implications of the study's findings.

Chapter 2: American Civil-Military Relations

The research questions for this project are derived from observations about whether or not a gap in partisanship and ideology exists between civilian and military cultures, more specifically with respect to enlisted personnel. The theoretical debate and critical concern have centered less on whether such a gap ought to exist, but rather whether it is possible for the gap to be too wide, because too large a gap might threaten effective civilian control of the military.

This chapter will explore the theories that explain the importance of understanding the similarities and differences between the civilian and military worlds. First, what did the founding fathers think about civil-military relations and what insights are gained into their ideas by reviewing the *Federalist Papers*? Then, what are the principal theoretical debates in the field that explain the different aspects of American civil-military relations, and, in particular, what do the works of Huntington (1957) and Janowitz (1960) reveal? What are the important characteristics of the military and civilian worlds and what are the primary issues that drive and constrain relations between them?

The next section will start with an examination of the “Cold War Puzzle,” the failure of Huntington’s theory to explain adequately what actually occurred in American civil-military relations, and the resultant agency theory alternative. Then, after a glance at issues arising from the Vietnam War, the chapter will explore the so-called “Post-Cold War Crisis” with an in-depth look at the literature of the apparent “culture gap” between the civilian leadership and the military.

LIBERAL THEORY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS

At the heart of civil-military relations is the problem of how a civilian government can control and remain safe from the military institution it created for its own protection. A military force that is strong enough to do what is asked of it must not also pose a danger to the controlling government. This poses the paradox that “because we fear others we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution we created for protection” (Feaver 1996b).

The solution to this problem throughout most of American history was to keep its standing army small. While armed forces were built up during wartime, the pattern after every war up to and including World War II was to demobilize quickly and return to something approaching pre-war force levels. However, with the advent of the Cold War in the 1950s, the need to create and maintain a sizable peacetime military force engendered new concerns of militarism and about how such a large force would affect civil-military relations in the United States. For the first time in American history, the problem of civil-military relations would have to be managed during peacetime.

The men who wrote the Constitution of the United States were fearful of large standing armies, legislatures that had too much power, and perhaps most of all, a powerful executive who might be able to wage war on his own authority. All were objects of concern because of the dangers each posed to liberal democracy and a free citizenry. While it is often impossible to “gauge accurately the intent of the Framers” (Brennan 2005), it is nevertheless important to understand the motivations and concerns of the writers with respect to the appropriate relationship between civil and military

authority. The *Federalist Papers* provide a helpful view of how they understood the relationship between civil authority, as represented by the executive branch and the legislature, and military authority.

In *Federalist* No. 8, Alexander Hamilton worried that maintaining a large standing army would be a dangerous and expensive undertaking. In his principal argument for the ratification of the proposed constitution, he argued that only by maintaining a strong union could the new country avoid such a pitfall. Using the European experience as a negative example and the British experience as a positive one, he presented the idea of a strong nation protected by a navy with no need of a standing army. The implication was that control of a large military force is, at best, difficult and expensive, and at worst invites war and division. He foresaw the necessity of creating a civilian government that kept the military at a distance.

James Madison, another writer of several of the *Federalist Papers*, expressed his concern about a standing military in comments before the Constitutional Convention in June 1787:

In time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to the Executive Magistrate. Constant apprehension of War, has the same tendency to render the head too large for the body. A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive, will not long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense against foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at home. Among the Romans it was a standing maxim to excite a war, whenever a revolt was apprehended. Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the pretext of defending, have enslaved the people. (Farrand 1911, 1:465)

The Constitution placed considerable limitations on the legislature. Coming from a tradition of legislative superiority in government, many were concerned that the

proposed Constitution would place so many limitations on the legislature that it would become impossible for such a body to prevent an executive from starting a war.

Hamilton argued in *Federalist* No. 26 that it would be equally as bad for a legislature to be unfettered by any other agency and that restraints would actually be more likely to preserve liberty. James Madison, in *Federalist* No. 47, continued Hamilton's argument that distributing powers among the various branches of government would prevent any one group from gaining so much power as to become unassailable. In *Federalist* No. 48, however, Madison warned that while the separation of powers is important, the departments must not be so far separated as to have no ability to control the others.

Finally, in *Federalist* No. 51, Madison argued that to create a government that relied primarily on the good nature of the incumbent to ensure proper government was folly. Institutions must be in place to check incompetent or malevolent leaders. Most importantly, no single branch of government ought to have control over any single aspect of governing. Thus, all three branches of government must have some control over the military, and the system of checks and balances maintained among the other branches would serve to help control the military.

Hamilton and Madison thus had two major concerns: (1) the detrimental effect on liberty and democracy of a large standing army and (2) the ability of an unchecked legislature or executive to take the country to war precipitously. These concerns drove American military policy for the first century and a half of the country's existence. Until the 1950s, the maintenance of a large military force by the United States was an exceptional circumstance and was restricted to times of war. Following every war up to

and including World War II, the military was quickly demobilized and reduced to near pre-war levels.

INSTITUTIONAL AND CONVERGENCE THEORIES

In 1945, the United States began a demobilization of the massive military force that had been built up during World War II. Strong public and bipartisan pressure succeeded in forcing the government to bring American soldiers home and to reduce the size of the armed forces quickly. Strikes and even some rioting by military personnel at overseas bases in January 1946 pressured President Truman to continue the process despite growing concern about the Soviet Union and an increasing recognition that the United States was not going to be able to retreat into the isolationism of the pre-war years. Attempts in Congress to continue conscription to provide a trained reserve as a replacement for a large standing military force failed and, in 1947, the World War II draft law expired (Pollard 1985; Chambers 1987; Flynn 2000).

By the summer of 1950, the armed forces of the United States had fewer than 1.5 million personnel on active duty, down from a high of 12 million in 1945. By the next year, however, in response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea, the size of the U.S. military was again on the rise, doubling to more than 3.2 million personnel. Reaching a high of 3.6 million in 1953, the total number of personnel on active duty in the U.S. military never again dropped below two million during the 40-plus years of the Cold War. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the

size of the active-duty force had, by 1999, dropped to just under 1.4 million personnel. As of February 28, 2009, a total of 1,398,378 men and women remain on active duty.

The size of the U.S. military in the latter half of the twentieth century, unprecedented in peacetime, caused concern in some circles, primarily as to the potential effect of maintaining such a large force in a democratic society. Some predicted disaster and were concerned with the growing militarization of American society. These writers were quite sure that a distinctly military culture was inherently dangerous to a non-militaristic liberal society (Buck 1949; Cook 1962; Horowitz 1963; Coffin 1964; Swomley 1964; Knoll and McFadden 1969; Hayes 1973). Others warned that the ascendancy of the military establishment would fundamentally change American foreign policy and would weaken the intellectual fabric of the country (Mills 1956, 1958). However, most of the arguments were less apocalyptic and settled along two tracks. The two tracks, highlighted, respectively, by Samuel P. Huntington's *Soldier and the State* and Morris Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier*.

The debate focused primarily on the nature of the relationship between the civilian and military worlds. There was widespread agreement that there were two distinct worlds and that they were fundamentally different from one another. The argument was over how best to ensure that the two could coexist without endangering liberal democracy.

Institutional Theory. Huntington (1957) described the differences between the two worlds as a contrast between the attitudes and values held by military personnel, mostly conservative, and those held by civilians, mostly liberal (Fox 1961; Karsten, et

al. 1971; Hayes 1973). Each world consisted of a separate institution with its own operative rules and norms. The military's function was furthermore inherently different from that of the civilian world. Given a more conservative military world which was illiberal in many aspects, it was necessary to find a method of ensuring that the liberal civilian world would be able to maintain its dominance over the military world.

Huntington's answer to this problem was "military professionalism."

Huntington focused his study on the officer corps. He first defined a profession and explained that enlisted personnel, while certainly part of the military world, are not, strictly speaking, professionals. He relegated them to the role of tradesmen or skilled craftsmen, necessary but not professionals in his definition of the term. It was professional military officers, not the enlisted technicians of the trade of violence, or even part-time or amateur reserve officers, who would be the key to controlling the military world.

Professionalizing the military, or at least the officer corps, which is the decision-making authority within the military world, emphasizes the useful aspects of that institution such as discipline, structure, order, and self-sacrifice. It also isolates the corps in a specialized arena in which the military professionals would be recognized as experts in the use of force. As recognized experts not subject to the interference of the civilian world, the military's officer corps would willingly submit itself to civil authority. In Huntington's words, such an arrangement maintained a "focus on a politically neutral, autonomous, and professional officer corps" (Huntington 1957, viii).

In order for the civilian authority to maintain control, it needed to have a way to direct the military without unduly infringing on the prerogatives of the military world and thus provoking a backlash. Civilian leadership would decide the objective of any military action but then leave it to the military world to decide upon the best way of achieving the objective. The problem facing civilian authority, then, is in deciding on the ideal amount of control. Too much control over the military could result in a force too weak to defend the nation, resulting in failure on the battlefield. Too little control would create the possibility of a coup, i.e., failure of the government.

Huntington's answer to the control dilemma was "objective civilian control." This was in contrast to "subjective control," in which direction would be more intrusive and detailed. To put it simply, the more "objective civilian control," the more military security. Civilian control, then, is the independent variable for the subsequent dependent variable of military effectiveness.

If civilian control is the critical variable for military effectiveness, it begs the question of how civilian control is then to be determined. Huntington identified two shaping forces or imperatives for civilian control – (1) functional and (2) societal. He broke the societal imperative into two components, ideology and structure. By ideology, he meant a world-view or paradigm: liberal anti-military, conservative pro-military, fascist pro-military, and Marxist anti-military. By structure, he meant the legal-constitutional framework that guided political affairs generally and civil-military affairs specifically (Huntington 1957, 79, 92; Feaver 1996, 159).

If Huntington's imperatives are the independent variables, then the variable of civilian control becomes in turn an explanatory variable for military security. However, Huntington says that both societal imperatives, ideology and structure, are unchanging, at least in the American case. If that is the case, then the functional imperative is fully explanatory for changes in civilian control and subsequently military security. In short, if external threats are low, liberal ideology "extirpates" or eliminates military forces. If external threats are high, liberal ideology produces a "transmutation" effect that will recreate the military in accordance with liberalism, but in such a form that it will lose its "peculiarly military characteristics." Transmutation will work for short periods, such as to fight a war, but will not, over time, assure military security (Feaver, 1996). This appears to explain well the pattern of American militarization and demobilization, at least until the initiation of the Cold War.

With the understanding that the rise of the Soviet Union created a long-term threat, Huntington concluded that the liberal society of the United States would fail to create adequate military forces to ensure security over the long term. The only circumstance he could foresee that would permit adequate military security was for the United States to change the societal imperative. "The tension between the demands of military security and the values of American liberalism can, in the long run, be relieved only by the weakening of the security threat or the weakening of liberalism" (Huntington 1957, 457). The only way the United States could adequately provide security in the face of a long-term threat such as the Soviet Union, in other words, was for American society to become more conservative.

Convergence Theory. The other principal thread within the civil-military theoretical debate was that generated in 1960 by Morris Janowitz in *The Professional Soldier*. Janowitz agreed with Huntington that separate military and civilian worlds existed, but differed from his predecessor regarding the ideal solution for preventing danger to liberal democracy. Since the military world as he saw it was fundamentally conservative, it would resist change and not adapt as rapidly as the more open and unstructured civilian society to changes in the world. Thus, according to Janowitz, the military would benefit from exactly what Huntington argued against – outside intervention.

Janowitz introduced a theory of convergence, arguing that the military, despite the extremely slow pace of change, was in fact changing even without external pressure. Convergence theory postulated either a civilianization of the military or a militarization of society (Lyons 1961; Horowitz 1963; Wool 1968; Knoll and McFadden 1969; Hayes 1973.) However, despite this convergence, Janowitz insisted that the military world would retain certain essential differences from the civilian and that it would remain recognizably military in nature (Janowitz 1973).

Janowitz agreed with Huntington that, because of the fundamental differences between the civilian and military worlds, clashes would develop which would diminish the goal of civilian control of the military. His answer was to ensure that convergence occurred, thus ensuring that the military world would be imbued with the norms and expectations of the society that created it. He encouraged use of conscription, which would bring a wide variety of individuals into the military. He also encouraged the use

of more Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs to ensure that the military academies did not have a monopoly on the type of officer in the military services. He specifically encouraged the development of ROTC programs in the more elite universities so that the broader influences of society would be represented by the officer corps. The more such societal influences present within the military culture, the smaller the attitudinal differences between the two worlds and the greater the chance of civilians maintaining control over the military. Janowitz, like Huntington, believed that the civilian and military worlds were different from one another; while Huntington developed a theory to control the difference, Janowitz developed a theory to diminish the difference.

In response to Huntington's position on the functional imperative, Janowitz concluded that in the new nuclear age, the United States was going to have to be able to deliver both strategic deterrence and an ability to participate in limited wars. Such a regime, new in American history, was going to require a new military self-conception, the constabulary concept: "[T]he military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory..." (Janowitz 1960, 418; Feaver 1996). Under this new concept of the military establishment, distinctions between war and peace are more difficult to draw. The military, instead of viewing itself as a fire company to be called out in emergency, would then be required to imagine itself in the role of a police force, albeit on the international level rather than domestically. The role of the civilian elite would be to interact closely with the military elite so as to ensure a

new and higher standard of professional military education, one that would ensure that military professionals were more closely attuned to the ideals and norms of civilian society.

VIETNAM, THE COLD WAR PUZZLE, AND THE AGENCY THEORY ALTERNATIVE

The Vietnam War opened deep arguments about civil-military relations that remain powerful influences today. One centered on a contention within military circles that the United States lost the war because of unnecessary civilian meddling in military matters. It was argued that the civilian leadership failed to understand how to use military force and improperly restrained the use of force in achieving victory. Among the first to analyze the war critically using Clausewitz as the theoretical basis, Summers (1984) argued that the principal reason for the loss of the Vietnam War was a failure on the part of the leadership to understand the goal, which was victory. The Army, always successful on the battlefield, ultimately did not achieve victory because it was misused and misunderstood. Summers demonstrated how the conduct of the war violated many classical principals as described by Clausewitz (1989), thereby contributing to failure. He ended his analysis with a “quintessential strategic lesson learned”: that the Army must become “masters of the profession of arms,” thus reinforcing an idea along the lines of Huntington’s argument for strengthening military professionalism.

McMaster (1997) observed that it was easier for officers in the Gulf War to connect national policy to the actual fighting than was the case during Vietnam. He concluded that the Vietnam War had actually been lost in Washington, D.C., before any

fighting occurred, due to a fundamental failure on the part of the civilian and military actors involved to argue the issues adequately. McMaster, who urged a more direct debate between civilians and the military on defense policy and actions, and Summers, who argued for a clear separation between civilians and the military, both pointed out controversies over the proper roles of civilian and military leaders.

Despite those controversies and the apparent lessons learned from the Vietnam War, some theorists recognized a significant problem with Huntington's theory insofar as it appears to question the notion of a separate, apolitical professional military. While there is little argument that separate civilian and military worlds exist, there is significant debate about the proper interaction between the two. As discussed above, Huntington proposed that the ideal arrangement was one whereby civilian political leaders provided objective control to the military leadership and then stepped back to permit the experts in violence to do what was most effective. He further stated that the most dangerous arrangement was one whereby civilian leaders intruded extensively in the military world, creating a situation whereby the military leadership was not politically neutral and security of the nation was thus threatened both by an ineffective military and by provoking the military to avoid taking orders (Huntington 1957).

Arguably, however, and despite Huntington's urging otherwise, U.S. civilian leadership had been intrusive in its control over the military, not only during the Vietnam War, but also during much of the Cold War. During that time, the military elite had been extensively involved in the politics of defense budgets and management, and

yet the United States had managed to emerge successfully from the Cold War. Despite that, none of Huntington's more dire predictions had proven true.

In response to this apparent "puzzle," Feaver (1996, 2003) laid out an agency theory of civil-military relations, which he argued should replace Huntington's institutional theory. Taking a rationalist approach, he used a principal-agent framework, drawn from microeconomics, to explore how actors in a superior position influence those in a subordinate role. He used the concepts of "working" and "shirking" to explain the actions of the subordinate. In his construct, the principal is the civilian leadership that has the responsibility of establishing policy. The agent is the military that will work – carry out the designated task – or shirk – evading the principal's wishes and carrying out actions that further the military's own interests. Shirking at its worst may be disobedience, but Feaver includes such things as "foot-dragging" and leaks to the press.

The problem for the principal is how to ensure that the agent is doing what the principal wants done. Agency theory predicts that if the costs of monitoring the agent are low, the principal will use intrusive methods of control. Intrusive methods include, for the executive branch, such things as inspections, reports, reviews of military plans, and detailed control of the budget, and for Congress, committee oversight hearings and requiring routine reports. For the military agent, if the likelihood that shirking will be detected by the civilian principal is high or if the perceived costs of being punished are too high, the likelihood of shirking is low.

Feaver argued that his theory was different from other theories or models in that it was purely deductive, based on democratic theory rather than on anecdotal evidence, and better enabled analysis of day-to-day decisions and actions on the part of the civilian and military leadership (Feaver 2003; Owens 2003). It operated at the intersection of Huntington's institutional approach and Janowitz's sociological point of view. Huntington concentrated on the relationship between civilian leadership and the military *qua* institution while Janowitz focused on the relationship of the military *qua* individuals to American society. Agency theory provided a link between the two enabling an explanation of how civil-military relations work on a day-to-day basis. Specifically, agency theory would predict that the result of a regime of intrusive monitoring by the civilian leadership combined with shirking on the part of the military would result in the highest levels of civil-military conflict. Feaver (1998) suggested that post-Cold War developments had so profoundly reduced the perceived costs of monitoring and reduced the perceived expectation of punishment that the gap between what civilians ask the military to do and what the military would prefer to do had increased to unprecedented levels.

THE CULTURE GAP THESIS

Most of the above discussion assumed that a separation between the civilian and military world was inevitable and likely necessary. The argument had been over whether to control the gap between the two (Huntington) or to minimize the gap by enacting certain policies (Janowitz). Following the end of the Cold War in 1989,

however, the discussion began to focus on the nature of the apparent gap between civilian and military cultures and, more specifically, whether that gap had reached such proportions as to pose a danger to civilian control of the military. Part of the debate was based on the cultural differences between the more liberal civilian society and the conservative military society, and on the recognition that such differences had apparently become more pronounced than in past years.

Alfred Vagts (1937) had already begun the discussion from an historical point of view, concentrating on the German/Prussian military experience. He was perhaps most influential with his definition of “militarism,” which he described as the state of a society that “ranks military institutions and ways above the prevailing attitudes of civilian life and carries the military mentality into the civilian sphere” (Vagts 1937, 11-15). Louis Smith (1951), whose work pre-dated Huntington's, discussed issues of congressional and judicial control over the military as well as executive civilian control of military matters. However, all that discussion predated a general recognition that the American experience was going to change in the post-World War II era. Once it became apparent that the American military was going to maintain historically high levels of active-duty personnel, concerns about the differences between civilian and military cultures quickly came to the forefront. The ensuing debate can be generally divided into three periods with different emphases in each.

The first period, roughly beginning with the end of World War II and ending in about 1973 with the end of the military draft, was primarily concerned with defining civil-military relations, understanding the concept of professionalism, and learning how

civilians actually controlled the military. As discussed above, Huntington and Janowitz dominated the debate.

The second period started in about 1973, with the end of conscription and the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force, and continued until the end of the Cold War. This period was concerned with the supposed lessons of the Vietnam War, how the volunteer force changed the nature of the armed forces, and whether those changes led to wider gaps between military and civilian societies.

The third period, beginning with the end of the Cold War and continuing today, has seen an increasing interest in and concern about the existence of a “civil-military culture gap.” The discussion has centered around three questions: (1) whether such a gap exists in the first place, (2) if it does exist, whether its existence matters, and (3) if it does matter, what changes in policy might be required to mitigate the negative effects of such gap. Most agree that a gap does exist, but there is widespread disagreement as to whether the gap matters. There has been even less discussion about what policies may be required to mitigate any such gap. However, few have predicted disaster in civil-military relations and most of the discussion has centered on the nature of the gap and what might be causing it. In this section, the discussion will concentrate on the third period and will explore the issue by examining the debate surrounding three questions:

(1) What is the nature of the gap? (2) Why does the gap matter? and (3) How can the problem be corrected?²

What Is the Nature of the Gap?

While the debate surrounding a presumed culture gap between civilian and military societies had continued since at least the early 1950s, it became prominent in the early 1990s with the conclusion of the Cold War. The promised “peace dividend” led to a debate over changes in American national security strategy and what that would mean in terms of the transformation of the mission, composition, and character of the armed forces.

The gap debate revolved around two related concepts: (1) the notion of a cultural gap, i.e., the differences in the culture, norms, and values of the military and civilian worlds, and (2) the notion of a connectivity gap, i.e., the lack of contact and understanding between them (Cohn 1999). Few argued that there was no difference between the two worlds, but some were convinced that the difference itself was the primary danger. Maynes (1998) worried that a military force consisting primarily of personnel from the lower socio-economic classes would ultimately refuse to fight for the goals of the upper classes. Tarr and Roman (1998, October 19), on the other hand, were concerned that the similarities between military elites and civilian elites enabled a

² The organization of this section is based on a descriptive methodology used by Lindsay Cohn (1999) who posed four questions: (1) what is the nature of the gap, (2) what has caused the gap, (3) why does the gap matter, and (4) how the problems, if any, are to be corrected. In the present study, Cohn’s first two questions are combined.

dangerous politicizing trend among the military. Chivers (1999, September 14) represented a small number who believed that the differences between the cultures were so small as to be essentially irrelevant.

Reasons for the cultural and connectivity gaps vary widely. The self-selective nature of the All-Volunteer Force is seen by some to have led to the unrepresentative nature of the armed forces (Eitelberg and Little 1995; Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Maynes 1998). One argument, put forward by a Navy Chief of Chaplains, was that the drawdown in the size of the military was exacerbating differences and making the separation between the military and civilian societies potentially even more divisive. He worried that unless an effective dialogue could be maintained between the military and civilian branches of society, especially in the area of ethical decision-making, the American military risked losing the support of society or becoming dangerously militaristic (Muchow 1995). Others argued that the increase in diversity among military personnel has actually strengthened ties between society and the military, especially those ties weakened by the results of the Vietnam War (Tasker 1990; Binkin 1993). Most were persuaded that the societal effects of the Vietnam War remained central to the cultural differences (Stiehm 1996; Snider and Carlton-Carew 1995; Will 1997, May 25; Danzig 1999).

One unique view, which does not neatly fall into either of the cultural- or connectivity-gap categories, centers on the organizational differences between the military and civilian societies. This view claims to explain much as to why the military has been or may be used to press ahead of society's norms (Kier 1999). This view goes

beyond the simpler cultural-gap approach and emphasizes the ability of the military society to control the behavior and attitudes of its members in ways not possible in the more open civilian society, as evidenced by such phenomena as desegregation of the military and inclusion of women in the military (Cohn 1999).

Why Does the Gap Matter?

Ultimately, the cultural gap matters only if it endangers civilian control of the military or if it reduces the ability of the country to maintain an effective military force. Those who concentrate on the nature of the gap tend not to be concerned about dangerous trends. However, those who are concerned about the lack of understanding between the civilian and military worlds are uniformly convinced that the civil-military relationship in the United States is unhealthy (Maslowski 1990; Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Chivers 1999; Feaver 1999). Specifically, they have voiced concerns about a military that may become openly contemptuous of civilian norms and values and may then feel free to openly question the value of defending such a society (McIsaac and Verdugo 1995). Others worry whether an inexperienced civilian government will undermine the military by ineffective or inappropriate policies, thus threatening U.S. national security (Eitelberg and Little 1995; Kreisher 1996; Levins 1996; Duncan 1997).

This debate has generally settled on whether or not the gap is too wide. If too wide, civilian control of the military may be jeopardized due to serious misunderstandings between the two worlds. While most agree that such a gap is to be

expected and, in and of itself, is not dangerous (Sarkesian, et al. 1995; Segal 1995; Kreisher 1997; Simons 1997), some do concede the aspects of that gap have led directly to misunderstandings between the two worlds. In particular, some have argued that the culture of political conservatism and the apparent increase in partisanship of the officer corps has approached a dangerous limit (Kohn 1994; Bacevich 1997). Nearly all agree that it is possible for the cultural gap to be either too wide or too narrow, but there is wide disagreement as to where the current situation rests on that continuum. While Kier (1999) argues that “structure and function do not determine culture,” most agree that a difference between the two is necessary because civilian culture was “incommensurate with military effectiveness” (Cohn 1999).

Correcting the Problem

Assuming that a problem exists, many have offered suggestions for narrowing the gap and correcting the problems arising from it. In general, those suggestions are along three lines. The first is that the military must reach out to the civilian world. Given the essentially universal agreement that civilians must control the military, the duty falls upon the military to find ways to talk to civilians, not the other way around (Gilroy 1995; Sarkesian et al. 1995; Levins 1996; Williams 1998; Danzig 1999; Shelton 1998). The second is that civilians must articulate a clear vision of what they expect in terms of the military mission (Duncan 1997, Bacevich and Kohn 1998; Maynes 1998; Ricks 1998a, 1999b; Moskos, Williams, and Segal 2000). And the final suggestion is that the most practical and effective means of bringing about dialogue and understanding

is to be bilateral education, in which both military and civilian elites would jointly attend specialized schools. Such schooling would emphasize military-strategic thinking, American history and political philosophy, military ethics, and the proper relationship between civil and military authority (Nye 1996; Sarkesian 1998; Shelton 1998; Williams 1998; Rosenfeld 1999).

Some argue that the root problem is that the military is self-selecting, rendering the culture a self-perpetuating one. Solutions such as the reinstatement of the draft and a European-style national service obligation have been offered (Ricks 1997b; Simons 1997; Moskos 1999; Rangel 2006a; Philips 2009, March 23), but none appear to have made any progress toward adoption.

WHAT ABOUT ENLISTED PERSONNEL?

Nearly all of the above discussion centered on civilian and military elites, as those groups have been the decision-makers with respect to defense and national security policy. Thus, little discussion focused on enlisted personnel, largely because little primary research into the political attitudes of enlisted personnel has been conducted. However, a single article in *Atlantic Monthly* about a group of Marine enlisted personnel generated extensive debate as to whether a dangerous divide exists between the military and civilian worlds. Journalist Thomas Ricks (1997a) followed a platoon of Marine recruits through basic training in 1995, monitoring the change in their attitudes as compared to the societies from which they came. He cited specific examples of how the recruits saw themselves as morally superior to their former peers in light of

their boot camp experience and more fit to be citizens of the United States.³ He wondered if, because of their more conservative outlook on life, the new Marines accurately understood American society.

In the wake of Ricks' article, numerous writers used his observations as evidence of a growing divide in the United States that portended, at one extreme, a danger to national security and, at the other, a pathology that required correction (Feaver and Kohn 2001; Rubin and Keaney 2001; Bicksler et al. 2004; English 2004; Feaver 2005; Gibson 2008). The discussion recalled post-Vietnam War arguments that the civilian culture had degraded and was perhaps not worthy of defense by the military.

The debate is not yet resolved. Aside from the article by Ricks and other scattered journalistic and scholarly commentary, the position of the enlisted person within the American civil-military debate remains unexamined. Especially unresolved is where that population fits into the culture gap debate. As previously discussed, most writers assume that the opinions of officers are predictive of those held by enlisted personnel. There is reason to question this assumption.

One solution offered to correct the apparent gap between military and civilian cultures is a return to conscription. At the heart of the call for conscription is a belief that the people filling the enlisted ranks are not descriptively representative of the American population and therefore pose an unacceptable risk to American civil-military

³ Ricks originally wrote the piece while a visiting scholar at the Foreign Policy Institute and Strategic Studies Institute at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in 1996. Later that year he revised it while participating in the Project on U.S. Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies.

relations. That risk is a growing sense that citizens from the lowest socio-economic strata of the American population are fighting the wars of the privileged few. If a principal source of concern about the civil-military gap is about the nature of those in the enlisted ranks, then theory that omits those personnel or studies that assume they are the same as, or at least similar to, officers, are ignoring an important segment of the military population.

Before we can undertake the study to determine any attitudinal or behavioral differences, we need to know more about the demographics of the modern military and in particular those of enlisted personnel. Chapter 3, following, will provide those details and will be the factual basis upon which further analysis will be based. Then, as this study is also interested in voting behavior of enlisted personnel, Chapter 4 will discuss what is known about military voting participation and issues related to absentee balloting.

Chapter 3: The Present State of the Military: Demographics

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the demographics of the modern armed forces are examined with a concentration on enlisted personnel. Given the relationship between voter demographics and voter behavior, it is essential that the armed services demographics, particularly the characteristics of enlisted personnel, be presented to show how they may be different from those of officers or the general American voting population.

The fundamental questions asked in this study grew out of an observation that reported political behavior and attitudes of the American military appeared to be at odds with what would be expected given the military's demographic composition. This chapter will establish the "ground truth" of the present state of American military demographics, particularly those of enlisted personnel, using official data from Department of Defense (DOD) sources and supported by other data sources.

The current military enlisted force will be reviewed based on five demographic characteristics: racial and ethnic background, gender, household income, educational background, and geographic origin. The data presented here are drawn from recruits, i.e., personnel who have just been enlisted in the services, as well as the remainder of the active-duty enlisted component. Recruit data highlights the nature of the individuals entering active duty before any socialization effect of the armed forces can take effect. Data about the active-duty enlisted component present the overall characteristics of the

entire force, including the effects of socialization and any effects that may cross age cohorts.

RACIAL AND ETHNIC BACKGROUND

Maintaining equitable racial and ethnic representation within the U.S. military has been an ongoing concern for recruiters. While specific racial quotas are not assigned to individual recruiters, the military carefully tracks the racial and ethnic makeup of its personnel. The various services' goals are to maintain within the military approximately the same proportion of the various races as is present in the U.S. population. The statistics are tracked annually and provided to Congress in Fiscal Year End Strength Reports.

During the Vietnam War, public support for conscription had begun to wane. The military services were increasingly concerned that the quality of conscript was less than satisfactory, resulting in a series of severe disciplinary incidents. In 1969, President Richard Nixon established the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force to develop a plan to return to an all-volunteer military.

The draft law's expiration on June 30, 1973, and the evolution of the subsequent All-Volunteer-Force, raised concern as to whether an effective force could be maintained by drawing only from volunteers (Kohn, 1974; Davis, 1974; Bachman et.al., 1977). Particular attention was paid to whether the “burden of war” might fall disproportionately on particular sectors of the population, especially minorities and the poor (Armor & Gilroy, 2007). The sudden and steady increase in enlistments by blacks

reinforced worries that the poor and disadvantaged were being burdened with fighting the nation's wars. In 1973, the proportion of the active-duty force that was black was about 14 percent; by 1980 that proportion had increased to nearly 22 percent.

The increase in such enlistments was credited by a presidential task force on military manpower to "the proud heritage of Black service in the military [...] which has contributed strongly to the prestige of military service in the Black community." The same task force observed that the military offered "better opportunities for responsible work at fair compensation than are available to [blacks] in many segments of the private sector." By 1982 all services had established affirmative action plans to determine whether minorities, particularly blacks, were adequately represented. Where such was not the case, the minorities were "targeted for increased placement efforts" (Hardyman, 1988).

Recruits.⁴ Beginning in 2003, The Heritage Foundation conducted a series of analyses on the quality of recruits and the active-duty enlisted component. Drawing on data from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Defense Manpower Data Center, the researchers were able to point out trends in recruiting not previously known (Kane 2005, 2006; Watkins

⁴ In this study, races will be divided into three categories: (1) White, (2) Black, and (3) Other. Given the relatively small numbers of personnel identifying as Asian, Native Hawaiian, American Indian, and Native Alaskan races, all have been grouped together as "Other." Hispanic data gathered before January 2003 is generally not comparable to data reported after that date because of different methodologies used to gather it. Because of the resulting discontinuity in data, no attempt is made to show a time series for Hispanic recruits before 2003.

and Sherk 2008). Those data and reports were made available to this project and permission was given to reproduce several tables.

In 2006, 65.3 percent of all recruits with no prior military service were white. At the same time, whites made up about 62 percent of the U.S. male population aged 18 to 24, resulting in a “recruit-to-population” ratio of 1.05.⁵ In the same year, black recruits made up 12.34 percent of total recruits but just 11.87 percent of the male population aged 18 to 24, a recruit-to-population ratio of 1.04, or about the same as for whites. Other races had ratios less than 1.0, meaning they were under-representative of the population. A notable exception among “other” races were American Indian/Aleut (Native Alaskan) recruits which had a 2.96 recruit to population ratio. (See Table 3.1.)

⁵ It is difficult to decide the appropriate population to use in comparison. Since 85 percent of recruits are male, it makes more sense to compare recruits to the age 18-24 male population rather than to the entire 18-24 population.

Table 3.1 Racial Composition of New Enlisted Recruits, 2006 – 2007

	2006 Percentage of Total U.S. Male population, 18-24 years old	2006 Percentage of Total Recruits	2006 Recruit to Population Ratio	2007 Percentage of Total Recruits	2007 Recruit to Population Ratio*
White	61.99%	65.32%	1.05	65.50%	1.06
Black	11.87%	12.34%	1.04	12.82%	1.08
Asian/Pacific Islander	3.49%	3.31%	0.95	3.25%	0.93
Multi-racial	1.56%	0.57%	0.37	0.66%	0.42
American Indian/Aleut	0.73%	2.16%	2.96	1.96%	2.68

Groups with recruit-to-population ratios greater than 1.0 are over-represented among enlisted recruits and groups with ratios less than 1.0 are under-represented.

* 2007 ratio calculated using the 2006 population estimates

Used by permission: Heritage Foundation (Watkins & Sherk, 2008)

Using the same technique as with the races listed above, we can see that Hispanics are also under-represented among new recruits with recruit-to-population ratios of 0.66 in 2006 and 0.65 in 2007. (See Table 3.2.)

Table 3.2 Hispanic Proportion Among New Enlisted Recruits, 2006 – 2007


	2006 Percentage of Total U.S. Male population, 18-24 years old	2006 Percentage of Total Recruits	2006 Recruit to Population Ratio	2007 Percentage of Total Recruits	2007 Recruit to Population Ratio*
Hispanic	20.02%	13.19%	0.66	12.93%	0.65
Not Hispanic	79.98%	86.81%	1.09	87.07%	1.09

* 2007 ratio calculated using 2006 population estimates
Used by permission: Heritage Foundation (Watkins & Sher, 2008)

Active Enlisted Component. Just as with the U.S. population, whites are the largest single racial group within the U.S. military, comprising about 69 percent of the enlisted force. Despite these figures, since the end of the Vietnam War, whites have been under-represented when compared to the U.S. age 18-44 population.⁶ Blacks, however, have been over-represented since at least 1975. As of January 2009, blacks comprised 18.6 percent of the enlisted force. The other races within the military, which make up 12.8 percent of the enlisted force, are under-represented in the military as compared to the U.S. population. The proportion of other races in the enlisted force has been steadily increasing, however, for more than three decades. (See Figure 3.1.)

⁶ The U.S. age 18-44 population is used as the appropriate comparison group to the active-duty enlisted population. Most enlisted personnel will have left active service or retired before reaching age 44. A small percentage of very senior enlisted may remain in the service after that age, however.


Figure 3.1 Race as a Percentage of the Total Force, 1975 – 2008



Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, 2009.

Blacks make up a substantially larger proportion within the military than in the U.S. population, especially within the Army. However, more recently, the number of black recruits has been declining. A sharp decline in black enlistment has been noted since September 11, 2001, and especially since the U.S. intervention in Iraq, which has led to a decrease in the black proportion of the enlisted force. The black active-duty enlisted component since 1973 as compared to civilian blacks aged 18 to 24 is shown in Figure 2.6. Despite the recent decline, the proportion of blacks within the U.S. military remains higher than found in the general population.

Figure 3.2 Black Active Enlisted Component Compared to Civilians Ages 18 to 24 (1973 to 2007)




Source: OUSD, P&R, Population Representation of the Military Service, 2000, Table D-17 and Defense Manpower Data Center, Active-duty Accession Enlisted Gains Report, 2008

GENDER

Gender is the demographic element within the military most strikingly unrepresentative demographic within the military when compared to the American population. The female proportion of active-duty enlisted personnel is about 14 percent, while women make up 52 percent of the U.S. population. However, the percentage of women in the military has been increasing steadily since the end of the Vietnam War. In 1972 women made up less than two percent of the military population. By 1986, that percentage had increased to 10 percent and reached 15 percent in 2002. (See Figure 3.3.)


Figure 3.3 Female Enlisted Members as a Percentage of the Total Active-Duty Force (1970 - 2007)



Source: OUSD, P&R, Population Representation of the Military Service, 2005, Table D-13 and Defense Manpower Data Center, Active-duty Accession Enlisted Gains Report, 2008.

Recruiting of women increased dramatically following the Vietnam War, not reaching a peak until the turn of the century. In 1972, women made up less than two percent of all recruits. By 1980 more than 13 percent of recruits were women. By 2000, women comprised more than 18 percent of recruits. However, the proportion of female recruits began to decline after 2001. (See Figure 3.4.)

Figure 3.4 Female Enlisted Members as a Percentage of All Recruits
(1970 – 2007)



Source: OUSD, P&R, Population Representation of the Military Service, 2005, Table D-5 and Defense Manpower Data Center, Active-duty Accession Enlisted Gains Report, 2008.

As a subgroup, black women are significantly over-represented in the military. Of the 164,343 women on active duty in all services as of January 31, 2009, 51,074 (31.1 percent) are black while 88,408 (53.8 percent) are white, proportions that are out of keeping with general U.S. demographics. In the Army, the over-representation of black women is even more pronounced, with black women representing nearly 39 percent of female active-duty and white women representing about 49 percent. Among senior enlisted women in the Army, black women outnumber white women by 2.16 to 1, indicating that reenlistments among black women are higher than among white women.⁷ The same is not true for males in the Army, where white men outnumber black men by a ratio of over 2-1.

⁷ The senior enlisted pay-grades are E-6 through E-9, generally known as Staff Non-commissioned officers (SNCO). In the Army, there are 7,761 black women in those pay-grades while there are only 3,596 white female SNCOs.

HOUSEHOLD INCOME

The DOD does not maintain data on the family income of recruits, nor does it collect income data for individuals entering active service. Since the majority of enlistees are entering into their first full-time job, in the absence of data regarding their own income it makes most sense to determine the household income of the family from which the enlistee came. As household income is a key component of socioeconomic status (SES), it is important to have some measure of it. As the recruits often have little income history of their own, here the income of family of origin – a staple partial measure of SES – is used.

Data approximating each recruit's family income is estimated by using the address of each individual recruit and Census tract data.⁸ Census tracts are relatively small, homogeneous areas that average approximately 4,000 residents. Individual recruits' hometown data, including their addresses and five-digit zip codes, are available from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Census tract data is available from the U.S. Census Bureau.

The estimates of household income are calculated by applying the mean household income for each census tract to each recruit from that tract. For example, in the Heritage Foundation studies using these data, ten military recruits in 2006 came from


⁸ Based on data collected from the Defense Manpower Data Center and the Department of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, October 2002 - September 2005, Non-prior Duty Active-duty Accessions (<http://www.defenselink.mil/prhome/>) , and the U.S. Census Bureau (<http://www.factfinder.census.gov>).

census tract 013396 in San Diego. Each of those 10 recruits was assigned the mean annual income of \$57,380 from that tract as found in the 2000 Census (Watkins & Sherk, 2008). The mean estimated household income for all 2006 recruits was calculated as \$54,834 per year. The mean household income for recruits in 2007 was \$54,768, slightly higher than the national mean household income of \$50,428.⁹ (See Figure 3.5 for the distribution of household incomes of recruits and the general population by income quintile.)

The lowest two quintiles, representing mean household incomes under \$42,040, are under-represented among recruits in both 2006 and 2007. Individuals in the highest two quintiles, representing mean household incomes greater than \$51,127, make up 40.0 percent of the population but produced 49.3 percent of the recruits in both 2006 and 2007 (Watkins & Sherk, 2008). The lowest two quintiles produced 28.9 percent of the recruits in 2006 and 29 percent in 2007. Research for 2003, 2004 and 2005 shows similar results (Kane, 2005, 2006). (See Table 3.3.)

⁹ The personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator is used and amounts are expressed in 2008 dollars. The PCE is an estimate of inflation among major categories of expenditure by consumers and is the preferred measure of inflation.

Figure 3.5 Enlisted Recruit Mean Household Income by Quintile, 2006 and 2007



Used by permission, Heritage Foundation (Watkins & Sherk, 2008)

Military enlistees, at least since 2003, disproportionately have come from upper-middle income families. Just less than two-thirds of all recruits have come from the middle three quintiles of households. The 20 percent of households with the lowest income in the United States produce only about 11 percent of recruits.

Table 3.3 Household Incomes of U.S. Military Recruits by Quintile, 2003 – 2007

Household Income	U.S. 18-24	Recruits 2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Poorest	19.79%	14.61%	14.14%	13.66%	10.60%	10.70%
Next Poorest	20.04%	19.56%	19.24%	19.21%	18.30%	18.30%
Middle	20.05%	21.15%	21.21%	21.46%	21.70%	21.70%
Next Richest	20.10%	22.52%	22.70%	22.82%	24.30%	24.40%
Richest	20.02%	22.17%	22.72%	22.85%	25.00%	24.90%


Recruits minus U.S. 18-24	2003 Diff	2004 Diff	2005 Diff	2006 Diff	2007 Diff
Poorest	-5.18%	-5.65%	-6.13%	-9.19%	-9.09%
Next Poorest	-0.48%	-0.80%	-0.83%	-1.74%	-1.74%
Middle	1.10%	1.16%	1.41%	1.65%	1.65%
Next Richest	2.42%	2.60%	2.72%	4.20%	4.30%
Richest	2.15%	2.70%	2.83%	4.98%	4.88%

With Differences by Comparison to U.S. ages 18-24 population¹⁰
 Table data and format used by permission of the Heritage Foundation.

The mean annual income levels of the households from which recruits are drawn have risen slightly for at least the past decade. Over the same period, the mean income of recruit households has been consistently higher than the mean income of the third quintile of households, further supporting the proposition that recruits in today’s military are increasingly from the upper middle class. (See Figure 3.6).

¹⁰ The data shown in the table for U.S. ages 18-24 data for all years are based on U.S. Census Bureau data for 2000 (Kane, 2006; Watkins & Sherk, 2008).

Figure 3.6 Mean Recruit Household Annual Income Compared to National Mean Household Annual Income by Quintile, 1999 – 2007



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Income Tables, Table H-3, Mean Household Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent All Races: 1967 to 2007.

These findings are supported by a 2007 Congressional Budget Office study provided to Rep. John Murtha, the Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, which reported that recruits and enlisted personnel were not as likely to belong to the lowest or the highest income groups, but were generally distributed among middle-income families (Congressional Budget Office, 2007). While it is generally true that recruitment is easier during downturns in the national economy, comments by public officials stating that the majority of enlisted personnel come from communities of high unemployment, implying that the recruits have no other options, are inaccurate and reflect at best an earlier time in American history.¹¹

¹¹ Charles Rangel (2006b), in an interview conducted by Chris Wallace on Fox News, stated, “I want to make it abundantly clear: if there’s anyone who believes that these youngsters want to fight, as the Pentagon and some generals have said, you can just forget about it. No young, bright individual wants to

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

The military of today requires recruits that are capable of managing highly technical equipment. Even an Army or Marine Corps rifleman, historically the lowest person in the military hierarchy, is not the “cannon fodder” of past wars. All of today's American infantry Soldiers and Marines are the equivalent, or better, of an elite soldier of earlier days. In order to ensure the recruitment of personnel of sufficient quality who can adequately handle modern requirements, the military services generally require that 90 percent of recruits have graduated from high school and that all but a small portion have scored above the 50th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).

Recruits. The percentage of recruits who have completed at least a high school education has dramatically increased over the past three decades. In 1973, the first year of the All-Volunteer Force and the last year of conscription, only 65 percent of non-prior-service enlistees had completed high school. Most of the current assumptions about the generally low level of educational attainment among enlisted personnel likely stem from that period or before.

The high school graduation rate of recruits remained low throughout the rest of the 1970s, although policies were established by the Department of Defense to encourage recruiting of individuals with high-school diplomas. Following the dramatic increases in military pay that began in the early years of the Reagan administration, recruiting became easier and the high-school completion rate among recruits began to increase sharply, reaching 89 percent by 1983 and 94 percent by 1993. (For the


fight just because of a bonus and just because of educational benefits. And most all of them come from communities of very, very high unemployment. If a young fella has an option of having a decent career or joining the army to fight in Iraq, you can bet your life that he would not be in Iraq.”

purposes of calculating the high-school graduation rate among recruits, the attainment of a GED is not considered by the DOD to be the equivalent of a diploma.)

Of the branches of the military, the Army has had the greatest difficulty in maintaining the goal of 90 percent of all recruits having a high school diploma. This has been especially true in the past few years. The other services have not had the same difficulty, largely owing to lower enlistment goals as well as selective enlistments, i.e., potential recruits deciding to enlist in the other services and avoiding the Army. While the overall high-school diploma attainment rate for the Department of Defense for 2005, 2006, and 2007 has been above 90 percent, the Army's percentages for the same periods were 84, 73, and 71 percent, respectively. Despite the Army's difficulties, since 1981 the high school graduation rate of all DOD enlistees has consistently been higher than that of the general age 18-24 population. (See Figure 3.7.)

One difficulty in enlisting high-quality individuals into military service has been high school graduates' propensity to enter post-secondary education, most often immediately following graduation. The number of individuals who enlist in military service following completion of college has historically been low, suggesting that promising recruits are thus permanently diverted from military careers (National Center for Education Statistics, 2005). In 1973, 33 percent of 18 to 19-year-old males were enrolled in higher education. By 2003, this figure stood at 47 percent (National Center For Education Statistics, 2004). In 2003, 61 percent of males and 68 percent of females went on to college immediately after high school.

Figure 3.7 Percentage of Recruits Who Are High School Graduates Compared to Civilians Ages 18 to 24
1973 – 2007¹²



Source: OUSD, P&R, Population Representation of the Military Service, 2005, Table D-7 and Defense Manpower Data Center, Active-duty Accession Enlisted Gains Report, 2008

Given the rank structure of the military, most enlisted recruits do not have college degrees. However, in fiscal year 2006 2.7 percent of all recruits had completed some college courses and another 4.2 percent had already completed an Associate's Degree or better.¹³ Those percentages were similar for fiscal year 2007.

Overall, more than 98 percent of enlisted recruits have a high school diploma or GED equivalent. In fiscal year 2005, only 1.2 percent of recruits had not graduated from high school or completed a GED equivalent, as compared to between 21 and 25 percent

¹² Data for the U.S. population ages 18 to 24 without high school diplomas are not available for years prior to 1977.


¹³ The U.S. Government defines its fiscal year as beginning on October 1. Thus, fiscal year 2007 began on October 1, 2006, and ended on September 30, 2007.

of Americans ages 18 to 24 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2005).¹⁴ By fiscal year 2007, 1.4 percent of recruits had not attained a high school equivalent education as compared to 20.8 percent of the U.S. 18-24-year-old population (Watkins & Sherk, 2008). Within the Department of Defense, the Army enlists a majority (59 percent) of the non-high-school graduate recruits, but even that makes up only 1.5 percent of all Army recruits.

The educational attainment of recruits has been consistently higher than the average attainment of the age 18-24 group in nearly every census tract, at least since 1999 (Kane, 2005, 2006). Following September 11, 2001, the gap between recruits and the age 18-24 population increased for about two years, indicating that the quality of recruits was increasing during that period. That trend of increased educational attainment by recruits reversed slightly after a peak in 2003, but still remains above the pre-September 11, 2001, levels. After the 1992 peak of 97.74 percent high achievement among recruits, a slight downward trend can be observed. (See Figure 3.8.) In general, however, the military continues to draw recruits who are above the average educational attainment for the age 18-24 population in the United States.

¹⁴ While the U.S. Census Bureau 2000 Census reported that 25 percent of Americans ages 18 to 24 had not graduated from high school (or equivalent), the Current Population Survey reported that 21 percent of Americans ages 18 to 24 had not graduated from high school or achieved a GED equivalent.

Figure 3.8 Percentage of Recruits Who Are High School Graduates, GED, or with Higher Education



Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Active-duty Accession Enlisted Gains Report, 2008

Active-Duty Component. Active-duty personnel often take advantage of service-provided opportunities to advance their education. Service personnel are able to offset the cost of education by filing for tuition assistance, which pays for about 75 percent of the cost of classes. The military and colleges and universities arrange for night classes on many bases and ships. Online degrees are also popular with many service personnel because of the flexibility of course offerings and scheduling. For example, the North Carolina Community College system offers online programs to military personnel and their families at all of their campuses and also provides extension services on various military bases in North Carolina. San Diego Community College claims to provide educational services to over 50,000 military personnel at bases throughout the United States (Carroll, 2008).

While fewer than five percent of recruits have education beyond high school, most enlisted personnel without a high school diploma go on to obtain their GED and many complete at least some college education while on active duty. While the

percentage of recruits who enlist with less than a high school education hovers just below 1.5 percent, fewer than one half of one percent of all enlisted personnel on active duty have not achieved at least a GED, indicating a continued interest in education beyond enlistment. All the military services provide means by which enlisted personnel can complete a GED while on active duty. In 2007, 11.3 percent of enlisted personnel had achieved some college level education.¹⁵

GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN

Knowing the region of origin for military personnel resolves two questions. First, it becomes apparent whether any one part of the country is providing more than its proportional share of the military force. Second, and more importantly for this study, such knowledge will provide information as to what proportion of military personnel are eligible to vote in any given state or region. The data necessary to resolve those two issues are available from the Department of Defense in two separate databases. For the first issue, data on hometowns of recruits will provide the answer. For the second, we can determine where each active-duty military member can vote by finding his or her legal place of residence.

Military personnel are required to maintain a current home of record (HOR) on file with their respective services. This HOR is their legal permanent residence. It is normally the location from which the service-person entered active duty and is where

¹⁵ The Department of Defense defines college experience as attendance, full- or part-time, in any 2- or 4-year college or university in a class for which credit may be applied toward a degree. Thus, the usual service schools that most personnel are required to attend are not counted as college experience.

the individual service-person is permitted to register to vote. For example, a soldier stationed and maintaining a residence in Fort Bliss, Texas, but whose home of record is in Albany, New York, must register to vote in New York as that state is his legal residence.

A service-member deciding to establish a legal residence in a given state for the purpose of voting is required by regulation to change the home of record to match. Other local laws with respect to legal residence and voting registration may apply as well. However, even though service-members are required to change their home of record, they do not always comply, and errors do exist within the DOD database. Despite such shortcomings, the DOD database provides the best information available.

Though the data is organized by state, it is useful to group states into regions to obtain a clearer understanding as to which parts of the United States tend to support the military with recruits and enlisted members. For this study, the United States is divided into four regions and nine divisions based on the U.S. Census Bureau practice – (1) Northeast, (2) Midwest, (3) South, and (4) West. Each is further subdivided into either two or three districts. Territories such as American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and Guam are not included in this study, as voters in those areas are not presently permitted to vote for President of the United States. (See Table 3.4 for U.S. regions and districts and which states are assigned to each.)

Table 3.4 U.S. Regions and Districts

Region	Division	States¹⁶
Northeast	New England	Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island
	Mid Atlantic	New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania
South	East South Central	Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama
	South Atlantic	Maryland, West Virginia, Delaware, District of Columbia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida
	West South Central	Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana
Midwest	East North Central	Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio
	West North Central	North Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, Missouri
West	Mountain West	Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico
	Pacific West	Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, California

Based on U.S. Census Regions and Divisions (Watkins & Sherk, 2008)

Recruits. In order to determine regional comparisons in military recruiting, it is helpful to find the recruit-to-population (RTP) ratio. This is calculated by comparing the region’s or district’s percentage of total recruits to the same region’s or district’s percentage of the total U.S. 18-to-24-year-old male population. For the present study, recruiting statistics for 2007 were obtained from Defense Manpower Data Center and compared to the 18-to-24-year-old male population for the same period as compiled by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) from the Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota (Watkins & Sherk, 2008; Ruggles, et al., 2008). The resultant recruit-to-population (RTP) ratios for the various regions and districts are then

¹⁶ As citizens of the District of Columbia are permitted to vote for President, Washington, D.C., will be counted as a separate entity within the South Atlantic sub-region.

compared to show the proportion of total recruits coming from each part of the United States.

The South is over-represented among military recruits with an RTP ratio of 1.19. The Northeast is under-represented, with an RTP ratio of 0.73. Wide variation exists among individual states, however. Montana, with only 0.3 percent of the U.S. age 18-24 male population, provides 0.5 percent of the total recruits for an RTP ratio of 1.67. Others at the higher end of the scale include Nevada (1.50), Oregon (1.39), and Maine (1.35). Washington, D.C., has the lowest RTP ratio of 0.25, providing only 0.05 percent of all recruits from about 0.3 percent of the 18-to-24-year-old male population. Other states at the lower end of the scale include North Dakota (0.53), Utah (0.56), Rhode Island (.058), and Massachusetts (0.60). See Table 3.5.


The West South Central district has an RTP ratio of 1.26, the highest of any district in the United States. Three of the four states in that district (Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas) are ranked in the top ten of states by RTP ratio. Texas alone, with 8.3 percent of the age 18-24 male population, produced nearly 11 percent of all military recruits in 2007 followed by California with just over 10 percent. California, with about 13 percent of the age 18-24 male population, had an RTP ratio of 0.80. Of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 29 states, representing about 51.9 percent of the 18-to-24-year-old male population, have an RTP ratio of 1.00 or greater. (See Figure 3.9.)

Table 3.5 Military Enlisted Recruit-to-Population Ratios by Region/District, 2007

Region/Division	Percent Total 2007 Recruits	Percent Total 18-24 y/o U.S. Males	Recruit/Population Ratio
Northeast	12.81	17.58	0.73
Mid Atlantic	9.51	13.10	0.73
New England	3.30	4.50	0.73
Midwest	21.56	22.02	0.98
East North Central	14.76	15.10	0.98
West North Central	6.80	6.90	0.99
South	42.97	36.23	1.19
East South Central	6.28	5.70	1.10
South Atlantic	21.62	18.50	1.17
West South Central	15.07	12.00	1.26
West	22.66	24.17	0.94
Mountain	7.70	7.20	1.07
Pacific	14.96	17.00	0.88

Source: Heritage Center for Data Analysis (Watkins & Sherk, 2008)

Figure 3.9 Enlisted Representation Ratios for 2007



States Ranked from Highest Recruit-to-Population Ratio to Lowest

Data calculated from DMDC data and IPUMS (Ruggles, et.al., 2008)
 Used by permission, Heritage Foundation (Watkins & Sherk, 2008)

Active Enlisted Component. As with recruits, the proportion of active-duty enlisted personnel varies by state and region within the United States. DOD statistics record the home of record for each member, permitting a tabulation of active-duty personnel by state. Comparing that tabulation to the voter eligible population (VEP) in each state results in the military percentage of the voter eligible population.

The voter eligible population is a subset of the voter age population (VAP). The VAP is calculated by simply tallying all citizens who are of voting age. VEP is a subset of VAP that excludes those individuals who are incarcerated, convicted felons, and others not permitted to vote by law. For the purposes of this study, the VEPs calculated by the United States Elections Project at George Mason University are used (McDonald, 2008). States are grouped into regions and districts in the same manner as for recruits above.

As with recruits, the South has the highest military percentage of the voter eligible population (0.58 percent.)¹⁷ The Northeast has the lowest percentage with only 0.41 percent of its VEP being active-duty military. The national military percentage of the VEP, meanwhile, stands at 0.48 percent.¹⁸ Among the South's districts, the West South Central district (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) has the highest percentage of all districts, with 0.64 percent. In the Northeast region, the Mid Atlantic

¹⁷ All numbers are understated by an unknown amount. The United States Air Force did not provide data as to home of record for its 390,253 personnel. No attempt was made to include the Air Force numbers in the regional or district numbers.

¹⁸ Again, U.S. Air Force numbers are not included. If those numbers are included, the national military percentage of the VEP is 0.68 percent.

district (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania) has the lowest military VEP percentage, at 0.39 percent.

As for the individual states, Montana and Wyoming have the highest military percentage of the VEP at 0.74 percent followed by Texas (0.68 percent), Alaska (0.67 percent), South Carolina (0.66 percent), and Virginia (0.63 percent). The states with the lowest percentages are Massachusetts (0.26 percent), Connecticut (0.29 percent), and Minnesota (0.29 percent). (See Appendix C for a listing of the active-duty military population as a percentage of the voting eligible population by state.)

Thus, with respect to the questions posed about the regional origin of enlisted personnel. The South, and particularly the Southwest, provides more than the average proportion of enlistees, and the Northeast is especially under-represented. The same is true with respect to the active duty percentage of the voting eligible population. See Table 3.6.

Table 3.6 Military Personnel as a Percentage of Voter Eligible Population by Region/District, 2008

Region/Division	Home of Record Total	Voter Eligible Population	Military Percentage of VEP
Northeast	174,239	42,911,339	0.41%
Mid Atlantic	109,883	27,869,757	0.39%
New England	64,356	15,041,582	0.43%
Midwest			
Midwest	190,895	47,168,371	0.40%
East North Central	131,350	33,016,448	0.40%
West North Central	59,545	14,151,923	0.42%
South			
South	415,428	72,116,665	0.58%
East South Central	63,004	12,721,905	0.50%
South Atlantic	214,462	37,830,641	0.57%
West South Central	137,962	21,564,119	0.64%
West			
West	216,785	42,221,707	0.51%
Mountain	68,674	13,006,392	0.53%
Pacific	148,111	29,215,315	0.51%
U.S.	1,387,600	204,418,082	0.48%

Source: Home of Record Totals, DMDC, 2008.
 Voter Eligible Population, United States Elections Project
 George Mason University, 2008.

SUMMARY

Some observers insist that the military of today is largely made up of the poor and disadvantaged who have no alternative but to enter military service. Examples include writers for the *Washington Post* (Tyson, 2005), the *Los Angeles Times* (Bowman, 2006), and the *New York Daily News* (Gonzalez, 2005). Others argue that the military has been forced to accept unqualified recruits in order to meet its recruiting goals (Bowman, 2005). Congressman Charles Rangel of New York has been advocating

a return to conscription for several years, largely based on an assumption that the military is a “mercenary force” and “is dominated by men and women who need an economic leg-up” (Rangel, 2006a).

Contrary to the above-mentioned assertions, today's active-duty military is not principally a body of economically-disadvantaged people, as it may have been thirty years ago. Many reported stereotypes of military personnel are apparently based on outdated information. While it was true, as recently as the 1960s and 1970s, that the average enlisted person came from a poor socioeconomic background, was undereducated, was more likely to be unable to get a job in the civilian market, or chose to enter the military to avoid incarceration, it is not true today.

The active-duty enlisted force of today is drawn largely from middle-income families, is more highly educated than the equivalent general population, and is more likely to come from a rural, rather than an urban, household. Since September 11, 2001, recruits are more likely to have come from families with higher incomes than was the case before that date. Similarly, recruits from the lowest two quintiles of household income are under-represented.

Chapter 4: Voting and the American Military

Underlying this research project, and at issue in it, are long-held assumptions about the voting behavior of the American military. The interest in how military personnel vote, however, is not matched with reliable data. To establish what is known at present, this chapter will review the history of American military voting behavior and issues related to absentee voting. The chapter will begin by looking at the role the American Civil War played in the development of absentee voting for military personnel. Then follows, to the extent to which information is available, a more general examination into the identification of military personnel with political parties and their participation in electoral matters during the century between the Civil War and the Vietnam War. The chapter will conclude with an examination of legislation regarding military and overseas voting, with particular emphasis on two specific issues related to military voting: (1) the Federal Voter Assistance Program (FVAP) and how it has affected military voter turnout, and (2) military absentee balloting.

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE SOLDIER VOTE

An historical review of American military voting cannot go far without mentioning the impact of the Civil War. For the first time since the end of the American Revolution, a national election was carried out while large numbers of soldiers and sailors were away from their home states. When the war began in 1861, the regular U.S.

Army consisted of only 16,367 officers and men. The Navy listed just 9,057 officers and men on its rolls. By July 1, 1862, the Union Army had grown to 186,751 men and by the end of that year its numbers had reached more than half a million (527,204). By the time of the November 1864 general election, the Union Army consisted of approximately one million men in uniform, most of whom were stationed outside their home state. In the last year of the war, the Navy had about 59,000 personnel, nearly all of whom were assigned to ships at sea (Soley, 1887; Davis, 1973; Starr, 1989; Geary, 1991; Hagan, 1991).

The election of 1862 was the first electoral contest in the history of the United States to raise widespread questions about the voting rights of soldiers and sailors. Before then, with a small regular Army and an even smaller Navy, few local government officials were concerned about absentee voting issues, it being expected that all citizens would simply vote in their local precincts. Many state constitutions restricted voting to locations within state boundaries. Such limitations effectively made voting by soldiers assigned to locations away from their home state illegal. Some state constitutions permitted voting from locations away from the home precinct if the voter was away on official state or federal business. Soldiers, however, were generally excluded from that provision (Benton, 1914; Winther, 1944).

By the election of 1864, steps had been taken by most states to ensure that their soldiers in the field could vote. Some states permitted soldiers to vote by proxy, with vote choices sent home to an individual who would cast votes on the soldier's behalf. Wisconsin was the first state to legalize absentee voting in 1862, and some states went

so far as to send election commissioners to their state regiments in the field to monitor the proceedings.

Support for such measures was not uniform, however, with Democrats generally in opposition on the assumption that soldiers would vote for the Republican Party candidates. The Illinois state legislature, controlled by Democrats, refused to pass a law permitting soldiers to vote by absentee ballot. Indiana refused to permit any soldier to vote. In September 1864, Abraham Lincoln wrote to General William T. Sherman, who was at that time in Atlanta, Georgia, encouraging him to permit Indiana's soldiers to return home to vote in the state elections (Lincoln, 1894). This pattern of partisan support for military absentee balloting, based on expectations of which political party such measures would support, would be repeated in the future.

Despite provisions by most states, efforts by the Democratic Party ensured widespread disenfranchisement of Union soldiers. Only about 150,000 of the army's more than 1 million soldiers were able to cast absentee ballots from the field in the 1864 general election. However, many soldiers were able to return to their home states to vote in that election and thus did not submit absentee ballots. No record was kept of the number of soldiers who voted in their home states. Of those soldiers who were able to cast an absentee ballot, 119,754 (or 78 percent) voted for Abraham Lincoln, while only 34,291 (22 percent) voted for McClellan, the Democratic Party candidate (Zornow, 1954; Campbell, 2006).

PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Information about the party identification of military personnel during the century following the American Civil War is fragmentary. However, there are clues to be found by examining veterans' organizations and the legislative actions taken by the Republican and Democratic Parties with respect to military voting, and by exploring the assumptions made about which party would most benefit from encouraging the military vote.

Shortly after the Civil War, in 1866, a group of northern veterans formed the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). The first modern veterans' organization, it essentially functioned as part of the Republican Party by supporting the campaigns of former Union soldiers running for political office. Following a decline in membership which began after 1872 and reached a low of about 26,000 in 1876, the GAR shifted its emphasis to supporting appropriate pensions for veterans and widows of veterans. By 1890, membership had surged to 409,489 and the GAR's influence and support of the Republican Party remained as strong as ever. The group claimed it had saved the Republic and condemned the Democratic Party as Copperheads, traitors who had been against the war and who would have permitted the southern states to secede from the Union (Dearing, 1952; McConnell, 1992).

While veterans of the American Civil War, as represented by the Grand Army of the Republic, were strongly Republican, the party identification of active-duty military personnel during the late nineteenth century is not as clear. Officers maintained close relationships with members of Congress and state governors, but such behavior was

mostly geared to acquire rank or obtain positions within the small Army of the post-war years. There is little evidence to suggest that officers publicly expressed any particular party identification, but since most were Civil War veterans, they were likely to be sympathetic to the Republican Party. There is evidence, however, to suggest that enlisted personnel were largely apolitical, not participating in any partisan activity and likely not voting.

A large percentage of active-duty enlisted personnel during the late 19th century were recent immigrants, comprising as much as a quarter of the Army and even more in the Navy (Gould, 1869; White, 1972, 1974; Harrod, 1978; Valle, 1980; Kohn, 1981). While immigrants were often permitted (and even recruited) to vote in the large cities and tended to identify with the Democratic Party, soldiers had little access to the electoral process because they were assigned to remote posts in the American West, fighting in the Indian wars (Rickey, 1999; Campbell, 2005). Most enlisted personnel during the later 19th century were undereducated, came from economically deprived backgrounds, had criminal records, or were running from the law. With soldiers generally considered to be social outcasts, there was little public or political interest in supporting measures to enable soldiers to vote. An October 1866 editorial in *The Nation* argued that soldiers were not worthy of the right to vote and should not be granted suffrage as they rarely had opportunities to read or to educate themselves on electoral matters and argued further that allowing them to vote would open up new avenues for election fraud. Most worrisome to the editorialist was that the soldier harbored a “spirit of despotism” which would be “incompatible with the preservation of free institutions”

(Ought Soldiers To Vote?, 1866, October 25). The combination of these factors ensured that the enlisted man in the decades following the Civil War had little opportunity to participate in elections, regardless of his desires in the matter (Utley, 1973, personal interview April 8, 2008).

Since the end of the Civil War, American military personnel had generally been apolitical, not only in terms of public support for one political party or another but also in terms of whether they voted at all. The Spanish-American War did not involve long-term or large-scale military deployments and the brief 18-month involvement of U.S. troops in World War I encompassed only the 1918 mid-term elections and thus did not involve a presidential vote.

Between the Civil War and the years following World War I, the nature of the American military had not changed significantly. Despite short-term increases in size during the Spanish-American War and World War I, by the 1920s the Army and the Navy were once again relatively small organizations, with most soldiers and sailors assigned to remote outposts or kept on board ships, largely isolated from society and uninvolved in political activity. The apolitical nature of the military continued through the 1930s, with usually less than 30 percent of the officers voting, indicating their lack of involvement in partisan politics as well. General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of Staff from 1939 until 1945, even openly questioned whether it was ethical for a military officer to vote for a presidential candidate (Pogue, 1963; Clifford, 1991), and General Dwight Eisenhower apparently never voted until after he left active duty, believing that the military should maintain a strict distance from politicians (D'Este,

2002). There is no data on enlisted voting during that period, but is assumed to have been at even lower rates than for officers.

The rate of voting by soldiers declined further during the war years of 1942 to 1945 and remained low until the early 1950s, when participation began gradually to increase. The officer voting turnout, however, had reached only 40 percent by 1956 and the enlisted turnout rate was probably even lower (Van Riper & Unwalla, 1965; Alvarez et. al., 2007). Military personnel likely did not vote for a reason long common to the armed forces: soldiers and sailors were often stationed at remote bases or overseas with limited access to mail. The stationing of individuals away from home and out of communication resulted in their paying less attention to electoral matters at home and made access to voting procedures problematic at best.

THE FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND MILITARY VOTER TURNOUT

The apolitical nature of armed forces personnel meant that interest in assuring the military could vote remained low to non-existent for quite some time. The ability of the soldier or sailor to vote remained in the hands of the individual states. Although most states had enacted laws permitting military personnel to vote during World War I, the varying state laws made it difficult for military personnel to cast a vote. By 1940, most states required registration to vote, but in 18 of them, registration had to be in person and soldiers were subject to that rule. Adding to the barriers to voters, most southern states also had a poll tax, with only Mississippi and South Carolina exempting soldiers from having to pay it. Some states had constitutions that did not permit

absentee voting, and of those that did permit the practice, some specifically prevented soldiers and sailors from taking advantage of the provision. Other restrictions that made it difficult for military personnel to vote included the requirement to obtain affidavits sworn before an officer or to obtain a proxy. Further complicating the matter for deployed troops were the varying deadlines for filing absentee ballots.

In 1941, the beginning of direct American involvement in World War II, no coordination of access to voting for military personnel existed at the federal level. The War Department required that “everything possible” be done “to enable the personnel of the Army to exercise their right to vote” but did little more than direct soldiers to “write to the Secretary of State of their home state requesting information under the laws of that state.” Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt expressed his doubts: “I am not at all certain that much can be done about it,” he said. He suggested that the Army and Navy “remind the boys by posting notices...summarizing the laws in each state” (Anderson, 2001). Apparently, few soldiers were able to negotiate the complex steps required to cast a vote and in November 1942, the first mid-term election conducted during World War II, only one-half of one percent of the five million active-duty service personnel voted (Leviero, 1955).

The first attempt by the national level of government to increase military voter turnout came in July 1942, when Rep. Robert L. Ramsay (D-WV) introduced a national military voting rights bill, which called for special elections on military bases to be supervised by the Secretary of State in each state in which the base was located. The War Department and the National Association of Secretaries of State opposed the bill, as

it was introduced. Major changes were made to the bill and provisions were ultimately made for the Army and Navy to provide postcards for each military voter to send to their individual Secretaries of State. The state secretaries, upon receipt of the card, were required to send the soldier a ballot with the names of those running for federal offices. Included was an oath, to be sworn in front of an officer, that the applicant was a qualified voter under the laws of the particular state.

The bill was opposed largely by southern members of Congress because it was said to violate states' rights and it included a provision to eliminate poll taxes. One southern Congressman argued that voting was not a matter of right, but rather a privilege solely within the purview of the state (Anderson, 2001). Despite significant differences within the Democratic party, largely splitting along regional lines with the southern members of Congress voting against it, the *Soldier Voting Act of 1942* (P.L.712-561) passed both houses of Congress on September 16, 1942, and was signed into law by President Roosevelt.

As the 1944 general election approached, some Democratic Party leaders saw an opportunity to benefit from the military vote and pressed for more aggressive military voter legislation. Simultaneously, Republican leaders believed that a reduced military vote would bring advantage to their party and, in a move opposite of that taken by the party in the Civil War, opposed changes to the Soldier Voting Act. The Democratic Party was able to overcome Republican resistance and amendments to the 1942 law were passed and became law on April 1, 1944. The amendments consisted largely of recommendations to the states in the form of requests to ensure all soldiers and sailors

were provided with an opportunity to vote. There was little in the form of substantive requirements, but it did include a provision for a limited federal ballot (APSA, 1952; Anderson, 2001).

Of about 9.2 million voting-age personnel on active duty in 1944, 4.4 million requested ballots for the 1944 general election and about 2.6 million returned them, a 29.1 percent voting turnout rate based on the then-minimum voting age of 21. In the same year, the turnout rate among eligible civilians was about 60 percent. The military absentee vote comprised about 5.6 percent of the total popular vote for president. No data exists on the voting patterns of military personnel who happened to be in the United States and in their home precincts (APSA, 1952).

While no data was collected by the government regarding military voting in the 1946, 1948, or 1950 elections, it was generally assumed that military voter turnout had decreased after the 1944 election. In 1951, President Truman asked the American Political Science Association to convene a special committee to examine service voting and make recommendations for legislative and administrative action. The report, published in 1952, resulted in passage of the *Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955* (P.L. 84-296), which provided for voting support not only for overseas-based military personnel but for overseas-stationed civilian government employees as well.

This law also required the President to designate the head of an executive department as the coordinator of federal functions described in the law. President Eisenhower designated the Secretary of Defense, who subsequently delegated authority to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, as coordinator of the Federal


Voting Assistance Program (FVAP). The Director of the FVAP was responsible for ensuring that all overseas citizens, whether they are military personnel or employees of the federal government, are provided with the necessary information to be able to vote in all elections.

In 1975, drawing on 20 years of experience, including the Vietnam War, Congress passed the *Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act* (P.L.94-203) which repealed and updated the 1955 law to clarify reporting requirements and procedures. It also guaranteed absentee registration and voting rights for citizens outside the United States regardless of whether they maintained a U.S. residence or address. Since then, the *Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986* (UOCAVA) (P.L. 99-410) has further updated the earlier acts of Congress and ensured certain rights for overseas citizens as well as military and other government personnel assigned overseas, including the unrestrained ability to vote. It specifically directed states to provide overseas personnel with the ability to vote in all elections, including general, primary, special, and runoff elections. Within the 1986 act was a renewed requirement that the President report to Congress on the effectiveness of the program following each election.

Military voter turnout did not immediately change following the FVAP's inception in 1955. However, as the 1976 law was passed, with renewed interest on the part of Congress, which required reports by the Secretary of Defense on the effectiveness of the program, voting participation by military personnel *has* increased dramatically. The turnout rate by military personnel in 1976 was less than 40 percent,

some 15 percent lower than the civilian turnout rate, but by 1984 the voting turnout rate by military personnel reached 55 percent which, for the first time, exceeded the national voter turnout rate. By 1992, the military voter turnout rate was 67 percent. A decline in military turnout was noted in the 1996 election (64 percent), but the U.S. turnout rate also dropped significantly that year, to 49 percent from 55 percent in the 1992 election. (See Figure 4.1.)

Figure 4.1 Military Voter Turnout in General Elections, 1976 – 2004
Compared to U.S. Voter Age Population Turnout



Source: Military turnout - Federal Voting Assistance Program, 2009
U.S. turnout - United States Elections Project, George Mason University¹⁹

The required report to Congress following the 2000 general election showed that 69 percent of all military personnel cast ballots, as compared to 54.2 percent of voting-eligible civilian population. In 2004, the military percentage increased to 79 percent, with 72 percent of overseas personnel and 76 percent of those within the continental

¹⁹ Voter Age Population (VAP) obtained from United States Election Project, George Mason University. Data retrieved 12 January 2009 from <http://elections.gmu.edu/index.html>. Military voter turnout rates were obtained by personal correspondence from the Federal Voting Assistance Program, Department of Defense on March 2, 2009.

United States voting, while the turnout rate among civilians that year was 60.1 percent. Slight increases in both the military and civilian voter turnout are expected in the 2008 general election, and the gap between military and civilian voter turnout rates will probably continue to increase somewhat. (See Table 4.1.)²⁰

Table 4.1 Military Voter Turnout, 2000 and 2004 (%)
Compared to the Voter Eligible Population ²¹

<i>Election Year</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2004</i>
Military Turnout	69	79
VEP Turnout	54.2	60.1
Mil-VEP Gap	14.8	18.9

ABSENTEE BALLOTING

A large body of literature exists describing the changes in absentee voting laws, beginning with the flurry of activity during and immediately after World War I on the part of individual states to grant their soldiers an absentee voting capability. The subsequent writing on the subject was descriptive in nature, generally concentrating on the general processes within each state and on legal and constitutional issues, with little directly relating to military access to absentee balloting (Ray, 1914, 1918a, 1918b, 1919,

²⁰ Federal Voting Assistance Program, Seventeenth Report, October 2005. The data for the FVAP reports to Congress are generated by a survey conducted by the RAND Corporation. Voter turnout is self-reported and so may be inflated to some extent; however, even taking into account such over-reporting, it is apparent that the military as a whole votes at a significantly higher rate than does the general population, even in mid-term elections.

²¹ Voter Eligible Population (VEP) obtained from United States Election Project, George Mason University. Data retrieved 12 January 2009 from <http://elections.gmu.edu/index.html>. Military voter turnout rates obtained from Federal Voting Assistance Program, Department of Defense.

1926; Steinbicker 1938). The experience of granting absentee voting rights to soldiers during World War II resulted in some additional comment about procedure and discussion of the congressional partisan infighting that occurred in producing the 1942 bill and the 1944 amendment (Winther, 1944; Martin, 1945). As mentioned above, the American Political Science Association produced a report in 1952, at the request of President Truman, describing the process and for the first time in detail presented some of the barriers preventing soldiers and sailors from actually being able to execute a vote by absentee ballot (APSA, 1952; Keyssar, 2000).

More recently, research has concentrated on methods to increase absentee voting, primarily by reducing the administrative and practical operational barriers to voting, but the unique problems in accessing the overseas military community have not been discussed in detail (Dubin & Kalsow 1996a, 1996b; Oliver 1996; Patterson & Caldeira 1985).

Following the 2000 general election and the attention generated by the handling of absentee ballots in Florida, the specific problems with balloting by military personnel came into the spotlight and prompted detailed recommendations and analysis of alternative methods of casting votes, including various electronic methods (Alvarez et. al 2007, 2008; Hall 2008). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) launched its own investigation, and in a statement before a congressional subcommittee on military and overseas citizens' absentee voting, David M. Walker, the Comptroller General of the United States, reported that multiple difficulties were posed to absentee balloting by the wide variation in state laws, complex election laws, and different deadline

requirements (GAO 2001, May; Hall 2008). In response to some of the GAO's observations and recommendations, the FVAP developed an electronic registration and voting experiment in time for the 2004 election, but the system was not used due to concerns raised about the system's security (GAO 2006, September).

Some have argued that military personnel have not and do not face difficulties in voting (Mazur 2007). However, studies conducted since the 2000 general election show that both civilians and military personnel living overseas have a more difficult time casting absentee ballots than those casting absentee ballots in the United States. Citizens living overseas report having difficulty in registering to vote and in meeting deadlines. Furthermore, evidence from studies on absentee balloting in California shows that overseas ballots were twice as likely not to be returned and three times more likely to be challenged as compared to non-overseas absentee ballots. For example, about half of the UOCAVA absentee ballots sent to overseas personnel were not returned. Of those cast, just fewer than 10 percent were challenged and not counted, principally because they arrived after the deadline (Cain et. al 2008; Alvarez et. al 2005, 2007). However, there appears to be little partisan connection with respect to the UOCAVA voters who fail to return their ballots or which ballots are ultimately counted (Alvarez et. al 2005).

The numerous problems posed to overseas voters by the myriad state laws and restrictions have not gone unaddressed by the federal government. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has enforced UOCAVA by bringing suits against various states in federal court. In 2006 alone, lawsuits were filed against Alabama (*United States v State of Alabama, 2006*), Connecticut (*United States v State of Connecticut 2006*), and North

Carolina (*United States v. State of North Carolina, 2006*) based on complaints about how each handled election deadlines, transmitted ballots to overseas voters, and established deadlines for receiving absentee ballots (DOJ 2006, June 8).

In the Alabama case, the United States filed a Notice of Dismissal once Alabama enacted legislation to extend the time between primary and run-off elections to 6 weeks, and allowed UOCAVA voters' ballots to be received and counted until noon on the seventh day after the run-off election. In the Connecticut case, a stipulated agreement between the DOJ and the state resolved the issue by permitting the use of the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot by UOCAVA voters and allowed extra time for the receipt and counting of ballots. The agreement also required the Secretary of the State of Connecticut to work with the DOJ to develop procedures to ensure compliance with UOCAVA in future elections for federal office. In the North Carolina Case, the DOJ and the state initially entered into a consent decree in time for the May 2006 primary elections. The two parties eventually agreed to a dismissal of the consent decree after North Carolina enacted legislation to provide permanent relief for future elections by expanding the time between primary and run-off elections from four to seven weeks and extended voters' opportunity to send and receive absentee ballots via facsimile to all categories of voters protected by UOCAVA (DOJ 2008, July 25). Despite these agreements between the federal and state governments, problems for overseas voters continue to surface (Hall 2008).

SUMMARY

Voting participation by American military personnel has been minimal for most of the history of the United States. The primary reason is wide variances in state laws that present legal and practical barriers to remotely stationed military personnel and serve to restrict access to a ballot. Coordinated action on the part of the federal government to reduce those barriers began during World War II but only became effective with the enactment of the *Uniformed Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of 1986*. The passage of legislation previously enacted by Congress during wartime years exhibited strong partisan differences, apparently based on views about which political party the law would benefit electorally. It was only when legislation was considered during peacetime years, as with the *Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955*, that legislators acted in a more non-partisan manner. Other than during the Civil War, there is little evidence to indicate that the American military's preference for one political party or another was any different from that of the general population.

The primary result of federal absentee voting legislation and enforcement action by the executive branch has been to increase military voting participation dramatically. While historically, the military turnout rate has been significantly lower than that of the civilian population, in recent years military voting exceeds that of the general population by more than 15 percent.

Chapter 5: Data Collection and the Survey Instrument

At the core of this study is the question of the reported cultural gap between the military and civilian societies. The theoretical discussion has shown that most writers believe that it is necessary for some gap to exist, but it is possible the gap to become excessive. The review of demographics presented the over- and under-representation of various segments of the population in the military as well as well as enlistees' geographic dispersion, such that certain regions of the United States provide greater than the expected proportion of enlistees, thus potentially exacerbating any gap. Absentee voting is apparently problematic, but the military population votes at a higher rate than does the general American population, raising questions as to how the demographic composition of the armed forces might affect voting preferences.

In order to find answers to the questions at the core of this research project, it is necessary to determine the voting choices of American military personnel, particularly enlisted personnel. At present, no reliable data exist on the voting behavior of enlisted personnel. The single best study on politics and the military, the TISS survey, did not focus on the enlisted ranks but rather concentrated on senior officers and civilian veteran and non-veteran elites. Data from *Military Times* surveys are helpful, but the authors of those reports admitted that their data were not complete and were drawn solely from the readership of that newspaper (Trowbridge 2004). Thus, it became necessary to develop a new resource with more reliable data about enlisted personnel.

The Department of Defense (DOD) maintains detailed databases on its personnel, both military and civilian. Demographic data such as race, ethnicity, gender, home of record, and educational attainment are collected and made available to users by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Arlington, Virginia. DMDC is assigned to the Under Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Readiness (OUSD M&R), a principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense. Access to data by non-federal governmental requestors is normally provided via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. For the purposes of this research project, and because of the researcher's former active-duty military status, a special arrangement with OUSD M&R provided exceptional access to the database without an attendant requirement to use the FOIA. Data was normally provided within two days following requests to DMDC. Unless noted as having come from a standard DMDC report, all personnel data came to the researcher in the form of Microsoft Excel files from DMDC.

U.S. law prohibits the polling of active-duty military personnel about their voting practices (U.S. Code, Title 18 1948). Proxies for that information, based on earlier electoral behavioral research, must therefore be used. The best such proxies are party identification and ideology, which have proven over time to be exceptionally accurate predictors of voting choices. As the law does not prohibit asking such proxy questions, to do so is technically legal, but the military services are wary of any questioning of active-duty personnel on political matters and the services generally refuse to cooperate directly. That tendency proved true in the case of this research.

A letter was sent to the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness, Dr. David S. C. Chu, requesting the cooperation of the Department of Defense (DOD). (See Appendix E for a copy of this letter.) The response indicated that, while the DOD thought the project was worthwhile, regulations prevented direct support. However, the suggestion was made to contact other individuals within the office who might provide some unofficial support.

Contact with those individuals resulted in information about a number of other offices, both within and outside the Department of Defense, which were able to provide suggestions on how to contact an audience of enlisted personnel without the necessity of using DOD channels. While being unable to obtain direct access to active-duty personnel with assistance from the Department of Defense was a setback, the unofficial contacts enabled access to resources that led to more potential survey respondents.

Anticipating such resistance from the DOD, alternative methods of reaching the target population had previously been determined, based not only on the information provided by the Department of Defense, but also on my own lengthy active-duty service in the United States Navy. Several commanding officers whom I knew were most helpful despite knowing that the Department of Defense and the military services were not officially supporting the study. The result of those contacts was good access to the Navy and the Marine Corps and somewhat less access to the Army and Air Force.

Another means of contact was a social networking website, TogetherWeServed.com, which caters to active-duty and veteran military personnel. The posting of information about the survey allowed access to several thousand potential

respondents, most of whom are current and former Navy personnel. Friends and family currently on active duty in the other services helped provide access to Marine Corps and Army personnel via the same website. All those I contacted were asked to direct potential respondents to the website I established for the survey.

Because access to more potential respondents was needed, email was also used. Contacts with several acquaintances still on active duty in the various services led to compilation of a list of 1,657 email addresses known to be of active-duty military personnel. A solicitation email was sent to those subjects, and 482 responses were obtained, a 29.1 percent response rate, with just over half of those responses from active-duty personnel. A small number of surveys (46) were administered in person with a paper instrument to military personnel encountered by the author during the course of daily work in central Texas.²²

The website CivMilResearch garnered another 568 responses. A special survey administered to the active-duty enlisted personnel at the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Units at two universities, the University of Texas at Austin and Auburn University, resulted in 39 respondents. Another 83 responses were obtained by a combination of telephone interviews and responses to emails to various associations known to have numerous active-duty enlisted personnel as members. Thirty-eight responses were deleted by the author after determining they were submitted by those

²² Of the total hand-completed survey instruments, 45 were military personnel in the Austin area, mostly assigned to Camp Mabry. Another 34 were from San Antonio, mostly from Randolph Air Force Base with some from Fort Sam Houston. An additional 12 were from the Texas National Guard on permanent active-duty assigned to Army units.

who had never been in the military, were obviously faked, or were not sufficiently complete.

Several hundred responses were obtained by using the social networking website Facebook.²³ A paid advertisement was arranged that put a link on the homepages of all members of Facebook who indicated a connection with the military. The advertisement was left active for about six weeks and resulted in responses from a large number of active duty personnel, particularly from the U.S. Army and Army National Guard.

The survey instrument was hosted online by servers at Survey Monkey, a professional online survey development company. The collected data were downloaded in a Microsoft Excel format and with some manual modification to the variable names in the file, imported into SPSS for analysis. Survey Monkey also provides an online means of rudimentary analysis, including filtering and a limited ability to cross tabulate.

SURVEY SUBJECTS

The survey resulted in 2,652 valid respondents, all of whom are or were active-duty American military personnel. Of the respondents, 1,452 were on active duty with the remainder being non-active-duty veterans or Guard/Reserve personnel. The veteran group was made up of three subgroups: (1) retired military, (2) National Guard or Reserve personnel not currently on active-duty, and (3) other formerly active-duty personnel now discharged from active service. Of the active-duty personnel, 1,243 were enlisted personnel, the primary target of this study. The sample is summarized in Table 5.1 below.

²³ Facebook is located at <http://www.facebook.com>.

Table 5.1: Summary of Survey Responses

<i>Source</i>	<i>Response</i>	<i>Active</i>		<i>Veteran</i>		<i>Invalid</i>
		Officer	Enlisted	Officer	Enlisted	
Email	482	46	214	5	201	16
Hand	46	0	39	0	7	0
Website	2,040	159	894	167	800	20
NROTCU	39	2	37	0	0	0
Other	83	2	59	13	7	2
Total	2,690	209	1,243	185	1,015	38

The distribution of the active-duty respondents by gender, service, and pay-grade reveals that the senior pay-grades (E-5 and up) were over-represented in the survey. (See Tables 5.2 and 5.3.) This distribution is similar to that of the *Military Times'* electronically administered surveys. The reason for the lack of participation by the most junior enlisted personnel (E-3 and below) is unknown, but it is likely due to lack of access to computers during normal duty hours as well as differing internet use by that age group. Research by the Pew Internet and American Life Project indicates that younger internet users are more likely to use social networking sites, rather than email, for communication (Lenhart & Madden, 2007). Of 55 emails sent to known E-3 and below personnel, only seven garnered a response. The best response was from the paid advertisement on Facebook, which, along with TogetherWeServed, yielded another 88 responses. Ultimately, a total of 262 E-4 and below responded to the survey, or about 21 percent of all active duty enlisted responses.

Over a sixth (16.7 percent) of the sample was female (see Table 5.2), a proportion only slightly higher than the proportion of women in the active-duty enlisted

population, which is 14 percent. As with the overall sample, the female sample was skewed to the more senior ranks but at about the same proportion as the male sample. The distribution of respondents by service showed over-representation of the Navy, perhaps not surprising given the service connection of the researcher, and under-representation of the Air Force (See Table 5.3). While the over-representation of respondents from the Navy is easily explained by the author's career in that service as well as holding a senior rank that permitted access not easily obtained by other researchers, that service connection did not yield similar results with the Army or Air Force. It did, however, yield some good response from the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has proven to be the most resistant to political surveying of its personnel, to include the TISS surveys.

Table 5.2 Active-duty Enlisted Sample by Pay-grade and Gender

<i>Pay-grade</i>	<i>E-1</i>	<i>E-2</i>	<i>E-3</i>	<i>E-4</i>	<i>E-5</i>	<i>E-6</i>	<i>E-7</i>	<i>E-8</i>	<i>E-9</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
Male	0	7	80	164	191	231	251	68	43	1035	83%
Female	1	5	2	3	37	134	10	9	7	208	17%
Total	1	12	82	167	228	365	261	77	50	1243	100%

Table 5.3 Active-duty Enlisted Sample by Pay-grade and Service

<i>Pay-grade</i>	<i>E-1</i>	<i>E-2</i>	<i>E-3</i>	<i>E-4</i>	<i>E-5</i>	<i>E-6</i>	<i>E-7</i>	<i>E-8</i>	<i>E-9</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
Army	1	12	10	60	90	95	74	27	7	376	30%
Navy	0	0	21	31	54	186	86	8	9	395	32%
Marine	0	0	51	55	30	54	34	16	9	249	20%
Air Force	0	0	0	21	54	30	67	26	25	223	18%
Total	1	12	82	167	228	365	261	77	50	1243	100%

An examination of the race or ethnicity of respondents shows a slight under-representation of whites (66 percent) and blacks (only 16 percent of those responding) and an over-representation of other races (18 percent) (see Tables 5.4 and 5.5). Non-proportional representation in the sample will be compensated for during analysis by use of weighting based on the known population distribution.

Table 5.4 Active-duty Enlisted Sample by Service and Race

<i>Pay-grade</i>	<i>Army</i>	<i>Navy</i>	<i>Marine</i>	<i>AF</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Proportion</i>
White	231	166	110	107	614	66%
Black	28	64	44	10	146	16%
Other	54	45	21	51	171	18%
Total	313	275	175	168	931	100.00%

Table 5.5 Active-duty Enlisted Sample by Race and Gender

	<i>Male</i>		<i>Female</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	N	Pct	N	Pct	N	Pct
White	541	58%	73	8%	614	66%
Black	92	10%	54	6%	146	16%
Other	153	16%	18	2%	171	18%
Total	786	84%	145	16%	931	100%

Totals may not add due to rounding

The data-collection period for SOEP began August 23, 2008, and ended March 26, 2009, a period of 216 days, or about seven months, with a midpoint of December 8, 2008. For purposes of comparison to the active-duty military population, the end-strength as reported by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) on November 30, 2008, will be used. The numbers of each of the six demographic groups used in the present study as reported on that date as well as the respective percentage of the total is shown in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Active-Duty Enlisted Personnel Population Statistics, November 30, 2008

Ethnicity	Active-duty Enlisted Strength			Active-duty Enlisted Percentage of whole		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
White	715,966	88,313	804,279	61%	8%	69%
Black	166,710	50,890	217,600	14%	4%	19%
Other	120,838	24,666	145,504	10%	2%	12%
Total	1,003,514	163,869	1,167,383	86%	14%	100%

Source: DMDC, January 15, 2009
Totals may not add due to rounding

The percentages in Table 5.6 will be used as the weights for each of the appropriate demographic subgroups. For example, while only 10 per cent of the sample

was black male (see Table 5.5), for the purposes of analysis, that subgroup will be weighted as though it were 14 percent of the sample. In this case, once any given characteristics have been determined for black males, the impact of that subsample will be applied to the entire sample by increasing its effect by a factor of 1.4 (14/10). The same procedure will be applied to the other five demographic subgroups.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

The questions in the survey instrument were drawn primarily from the Triangle Institute for Strategic Studies' "Survey on the Military in the Post Cold War Era."²⁴ Additional questions from the American National Election Study (ANES) were also used, as were some general demographic questions devised by the author based on similar questions in standard survey instruments. The questions were purposely designed to be identical or as close as possible to those used in other studies, to enable direct comparisons between the data from this study and those collected by earlier studies.

The initial question, which asked if the respondent would voluntarily participate in the survey, was followed by the RIGHT DIRECTION/WRONG TRACK question from ANES.²⁵ The next two items were typical questions about political efficacy, also

²⁴ Peter D. Feaver, Richard H. Kohn, and Lindsay P. Cohn, "Introduction," *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, eds., [Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001]. Janet Newcity, "Description of the 1998 – 1999 TISS Surveys on the Military in the Post Cold War Era." Paper prepared for the TISS Project on the Gap Between Military and Civilian Society, 1999. Retrieved 15 August 2008 from http://www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/newcity_survey_description.pdf.

²⁵ ANES 2008 Pre-election Questionnaire, question A13, "Do you feel things in this country are generally going in the RIGHT DIRECTION, or do you feel things have pretty seriously gotten off on the WRONG TRACK?" Retrieved Nov 13, 2008 from http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/2008prepost/2008prepost_qnaire_pre.pdf.

from the National Election Study, asking whether the respondent believed the political process was too complicated and whether voting mattered.²⁶ Because these questions had been asked of the general population by the National Election Study during the same time period as the present survey, direct comparisons of the responses of service personnel to those of the general U.S. population was possible.

The next questions were drawn directly from the Triangle Institute survey. The specific questions were selected to determine attitudes of the enlisted military population as compared to those of the officer corps, known from previous studies. Because the sample actually collected included a large number of veterans in addition to the active-duty personnel, comparisons of attitudinal differences in views of military and civilian cultures between those on active duty and veterans were possible.

Questions 4 through 15 asked whether a series of terms applied or did not apply to either the military or civilian culture. Questions 16 through 27 asked the respondent's opinion on whether a series of statements about the military hurt or had no effect on military effectiveness. Questions 28 through 37 asked whether the respondent agreed or disagreed with a series of statements that people have made about the American military. Questions 38 through 42 sought the respondent's opinion on a number of statements concerning the military's role in civilian society. Finally, questions 43 through 52 asked for opinions about statements concerning the relationship between civilian and military society. These last two sets of questions would ultimately provide the best insight into attitudes about the civil-military relationship.

²⁶ ANES 2008 Pre-election Questionnaire, question E9a. "Sometimes, politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on." Retrieved Nov 13, 2008 from http://www.electionstudies.org/study pages/2008prepost/2008prepost_qnaire_pre.pdf.

The final series of TISS-based questions asked about the respondent's attitude toward the military service and reasons for enlisting in the first place. The survey ended with a set of questions, developed by the author and based on TISS and other surveys, on various demographic signifiers such as race, ethnicity, gender, home of record, educational level, and parental education level, as well as political ideology and party identification.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE SURVEY

After initial development in paper format, the survey instrument was converted to the online format on Survey Monkey. A limited number of military acquaintances were asked to respond as a preliminary test. That experience led to further modifications to the format and the questions, resulting in a second online version, which version was provided to the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps Units at the University of Texas and at Auburn University. All 46 active-duty enlisted personnel in those two programs were invited to participate, resulting in 37 responses for an 80.4 percent response rate.²⁷ Two officers, the Commanding Officers of those respective NROTC Units, also provided responses that were added to the officer database. Based on that experience, additional modifications were made to the questionnaire, and the final version was subsequently developed. Once posted online, the survey was made available for the project.

²⁷ The respondents were Navy Seaman To Admiral 21 (STA-21) and Marine Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MECEP) participants, all of whom were enlisted personnel on active-duty receiving officer candidate education and training in the Naval Reserve Officer Corps. NROTC Midshipmen, who are not on active-duty, were not surveyed.

The responses obtained from the first online version were not included in this study, as most came from officer personnel some of the questions showed significant format differences from the later versions. Responses from the second version, completed almost entirely by enlisted personnel, were included as all the questions were identical to the final version. Some minor modifications to the database from version two of the survey were required to ensure that it imported successfully into SPSS with the data from the third, and final, survey. Two questions asked in the final version of the survey were not asked in the second. The text of the final version of the survey is included in Appendix A.

Chapter 6: Findings and Analysis

The principal purpose of the *Survey on Enlisted Personnel* (SOEP) was to generate data that would lead to answers for the research questions posed earlier in this dissertation. The two questions are:

1. To what extent do the political attitudes and behavior of enlisted personnel differ from or resemble those of the officer corps and the general American population?
2. If enlisted personnel do identify more with the Republican Party than does the American population, what factors would explain such attitudes and behavior?

Answering the first question requires determining the party identification and political ideology of active-duty enlisted personnel and then comparing those findings with what is known about other groups, specifically the officer corps and the general American population. Additionally, given the information available from the data acquired through the survey, a comparison also can be made between the attitudes and behavior of active-duty enlisted personnel and those of veteran enlisted personnel. Whether an answer is required for the second question depends on what is discovered about the first.

RESEARCH QUESTION #1: PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND IDEOLOGY

The first course of action is to determine the party identification (PID) of active-duty enlisted personnel and to compare the findings with the party identification of veteran enlisted personnel, officers, and the general American population. In the survey, respondents self-reported party identification on a seven-point scale – Strong Republican, Moderate Republican, Independent-Leaning Republican, Independent, Independent-Leaning Democrat, Moderate Democrat, and Strong Democrat. Other party identifications were scored as Independents. In order to analyze the results accurately, sampling errors, specifically those for race and gender, were corrected by weighting each of six subgroups – white males, white females, black males, black females, other males, and other females – in accordance with their proportion in the active-duty enlisted population. (See Table 5.6.).

The PID comparison of the various groups is based on five samples. The samples of active-duty personnel and veteran enlisted personnel were drawn from the present survey (SOEP) as was the modern officer sample. The civilian sample was drawn from the American National Election Study for 2008 (ANES 2008) survey data. For purposes of comparison to previous research, officer attitudes were also drawn from the 1998 TISS survey.

The second course of action was to determine the political ideology of active-duty enlisted personnel and compare the findings to the political ideology of veteran enlisted personnel, officers, and the general American population. Respondents' self-reported political ideology on a five-point scale: Strongly Liberal, Somewhat Liberal,

Middle of the Road, Somewhat Conservative, and Strongly Conservative. As with party identification, each demographic subgroup will be weighted appropriately to correct for sampling errors. Finally, along with the determination of party identification and political ideology, any reported shifts in PID since September 11, 2001, will be explored as will questions of political efficacy among the comparison groups.

Party Identification. The data obtained by the SOEP from active-duty enlisted personnel were divided into the six demographic subgroups. The reported party identification was applied to the total number of enlisted personnel in each subgroup, and three broad categories were produced: Republican, Democrat, and Independent/Other. Those who reported identifying as Republican or Democratic were further divided into the categories of strong, moderate, or leaning. In the case of the TISS officer sample, only the three broad categories of Democrat, Republican, or Independent/Other were available.

Results. About 41 percent of the weighted active-duty enlisted sample reported a Republican PID. (See Table 6.1) About 24 percent reported a Democratic PID, while about 35 percent reported identifying as Independent or having some party identification other than Republican or Democrat. The 2008 ANES study reported the general American population having a Republican PID of about 43 percent, only two percent different from active-duty enlisted personnel. However, it also reported a Democratic PID of about 45 percent, about 21 percent higher than for active-duty enlisted personnel.

Active-duty enlisted personnel were about three times more likely than the general population to report themselves as Independent/Other. A greater proportion of the civilian sample reported a strong or moderate partisan position (Republican – 76 percent; Democrat – 76 percent) than did the active-duty enlisted sample (Republican – 66 percent; Democrat 71 percent). Thus, it would appear that active-duty enlisted personnel, while identifying with the Republican Party in about the same proportion as the general population, are less likely to be strong partisans (either Republican or Democrat) and more likely to report being Independent. Enlisted personnel are also substantially less likely than civilians to identify with the Democratic Party.

Table 6.1 Party Identification
Comparison of Active Enlisted, Veteran Enlisted, Officers (1998), Officers (2008), and Civilians

Party Identification	Active Enlisted	Veteran Enlisted	Officers (1998)	Officers (2008)	Civilian (ANES)
Strong Republican	11	14	-	12	18
Moderate Republican	16	18	-	32	15
Lean Republican	14	12	-	8	9.28
Total Republican	41	44	60	52	43
Independent	35	32	28	16	12
Lean Democrat	7	7	-	12	11
Moderate Democrat	10	8	-	4	15
Strong Democrat	7	9	-	16	19
Total Democrat	24	24	11	32	45
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N =	1195	1079	1086	209	1617

Sources: Officers (1998) from TISS data, Civilians from ANES 2008 data.
All other data from the SOEP
Totals may not add due to rounding

The finding of a smaller proportion of Democrats than in the general population while the proportion of Republicans was about the same as in the general population led to calculation of a ratio of Republicans to Democrats (partisan ratio) and the ratio of Independents to those who identify with a political party (independent ratio.) (See Table 6.2.)

Table 6.2 Party Identification (PID) Ratios

PID Ratios	Active-duty Enlisted	Veteran Enlisted	Officer (1998)	Officer (2008)	Civilian (ANES)
Partisan Ratio (R/D)	1.7:1	1.8:1	5.5:1	1.6:1	.95:1
Independent Ratio (I/R+D)	.54:1	.41:1	.39:1	.19:1	.14:1

Data for calculations drawn from Table 6.1

Active-duty enlisted personnel demonstrate a 1.7 to 1 partisan ratio (Republican:Democrat), a ratio similar to that found in the veteran enlisted (1.8 to 1) and the 2008 officer sample (1.6 to 1). The civilian sample shows a .95 to 1 partisan ratio. Thus, active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with a political party are about twice as likely as civilians to identify with the Republican Party. However, active-duty enlisted personnel are nearly four times as likely as civilians to report being independent. Active-duty enlisted personnel are substantially less likely than civilians to identify with the Democratic Party. The Republican-to-Democrat ratio may well explain the observations of a Republican dominated military. Despite the fact that the overall proportion of Republicans within the military is no greater than that found within the general population, that there are twice as many individuals who will state that they are Republicans as those who will state that they are Democrats can easily give the

impression of a heavily Republican population. However, active-duty enlisted personnel remain strongly independent when compared to the civilian population.

The skewness of partisanship toward the Republican Party can be partially explained by the relatively high number of recruits who come from parts of the country in which the Republican Party maintains a strong following, i.e., the South and Mountain states (see Chapter 3, especially Table 3.6). Many of the regions of the United States that have a strong Democratic Party following – the Northeast and parts of the Midwest – are not as strongly represented among recruits. Why so many Independents are found within the military is not as easy to explain, but it may stem from the laws that restrict open involvement of military personnel in political activity and the enforced apolitical environments on military bases and ships.

Another likely explanation for the lack of Democratic identifiers in the military may be self-selection. A comparison of statistics between Texas and California, two states that combined produce over one-fifth of all recruits annually, reveals just how powerful is the effect of self-selection. Texas, a state that typically produces a Republican majority in general elections, produces about 11 percent of all recruits, and California, a state that typically votes Democratic, produces about 10 percent of recruits each year. Of personnel hailing from Texas, about 63 percent report a Republican Party Identification (PID). About 20 percent reported being independent, while only about 17 percent reported a Democratic PID. In California, about 35 percent report a Republican PID while over 50 percent report being independent, and only a miniscule 5 percent of enlisted personnel reported identifying with the Democratic Party. This pattern repeats

itself in other traditionally Democratic-voting states such as Washington and Oregon, where 44 percent of enlisted personnel from those states report being independent while less than 18 percent report being Democrats. Republicans make up about 38 percent of Washingtonian and Oregonian enlisted personnel.

Party Identification Findings – Active Duty Enlisted

Finding #1: American military enlisted personnel are *less strongly partisan* than the general American population.

Finding #2: American military enlisted personnel are about *as likely* as the general American population to identify with the Republican Party.

Finding #3: American military enlisted personnel are about *half as likely* as the general American population to identify with the Democratic Party.

Finding #4: American military enlisted personnel are about *four times as likely* as the general American population to report themselves as independents or as identifying with a party other than the Republican or Democratic Parties.

Officers. Previous research has shown that over 60 percent of the officer corps identified with the Republican Party and that about 11 percent identified with the Democratic Party, with about 28 percent identifying as Independent/Other (Davis 2001, 104). In order to see what changes may have occurred in officer PID in the ten years since the TISS survey was completed, a small number of officers (209) was surveyed by

the SOEP. The more recent data show that a Republican bias remains within the officer corps, although identification with the Democratic Party appears to have been significantly higher in 2008 than was found to be the case in 1998. However, it is premature to conclude much from a comparison of the two samples because of the small size of the SOEP officer sample, the heavy weighting of the TISS sample with senior officers, the occurrence of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, and the presidential candidacy of Barack Obama.

The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq likely have had at least two simultaneous effects – intensification of support for the Republican Party by those who previously identified with that party and intensification of alienation with the Republican Party by those who had previously identified with the Democratic Party or had been independent. The candidacy of Barack Obama has most likely increased support of the Democratic Party on the part of black service personnel along with their simultaneous alienation from the Republican Party. The drop in black recruits following September 11, 2001, is a strong indicator of dissatisfaction with the Republican administration’s policies on the part of the black community.

Party Identification Findings - Officers

Finding #5: American military officers are *more likely* to identify with the Republican Party than does the general American population.

Finding #6: American military officers are *less likely* to identify with the Democratic Party than does the general American population.

Finding #7: American military officers are *more likely* than enlisted personnel to identify with the Republican Party.

Finding #8: American military officers are *less likely* than enlisted personnel to identify as independents or with a party other than the Republican or Democratic Parties.

Veteran Enlisted Personnel. A large number of respondents to the SOEP were enlisted personnel who are now veterans (N=1079). This provided an opportunity to detect differences between the attitudes of those still on active duty and those who have since left active duty. As one might expect, there is great similarity between the two samples, but enlisted personnel on active duty as of 2008 were more likely to report identifying as independent than did the veterans. Veterans reported a Republican PID at about the same rate as the general population, but were much less likely to identify as Democrats.


Party Identification Findings – Veteran Enlisted Personnel

Finding #9: Veteran enlisted personnel are *less likely* than active-duty enlisted personnel to identify as independents or with a party other than the Republican or Democratic Parties.

Finding #10: Veteran enlisted personnel are about *twice as likely* as the general American population to identify as independents or with a party other than the Republican or Democratic Parties.

To present the gap data more graphically, we subtract the proportions of each category (Republican, Independent, and Democrat) within each of the various comparison groups from the active-duty enlisted proportions and show the result as a difference plot or gap. (See Figure 6.1) A bar reaching in the positive (up) direction is a category in which the active-duty enlisted sample has demonstrated a higher proportion than the comparison group. A bar reaching in the negative (down) direction is a category in which the active-duty enlisted sample has demonstrated a lower proportion than the comparison group. As discussed above and clearly shown in Figure 6.1, active-duty enlisted personnel are more likely than any of the other sample groups to report identifying as independent. The figure also shows that enlisted personnel are less likely to identify with the Republican Party than any of the comparison groups and, with the exception of officers in 1998, less likely to identify with the Democratic Party.

Figure 6.1 Party Identification Gap Analysis
 Comparison of Veteran Enlisted, Officers (1998), Officers (2008), and Civilians
 to Active-duty Enlisted Personnel



Party Identification Shifts Since September 11, 2001

The data obtained by the SOEP suggests a shift in party identification among officers between 1998 and 2008. In order to understand better the dynamics of party identification among enlisted personnel, it was helpful to determine if any change had occurred in recent years. As no previous survey of enlisted personnel had been conducted, it was necessary to find an alternative method to detect any changes that may have occurred. Given the suggestion that the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have had either an intensification of previously held attitudes or a frustration with military policy, we asked the respondent to

self-report if they had experienced any shift in party identification. The SOEP asked two questions:

Q #69. Has your party identification changed over the past seven years?

The available responses were “Yes,” “No,” or “Don’t Know.”

Q #70. Since the events of 9/11 and the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, would you say that you are (1) more strongly Democrat, (2) less strongly Democrat, (3) more strongly Republican, (4) less strongly Republican, (5) switched from Democrat to Republican, (6) switched from Republican to Democrat, (7) Are more strongly independent than before, (8) are less strongly independent than before, and (9) haven’t moved/don’t know.

The data available from the SOEP permitted analysis of reported PID changes by active-duty enlisted personnel, veteran enlisted personnel, and officers. As no similar questioning had been conducted of the general American population, it was not possible to compare the military population with civilians.

The first analysis was a cross-tabulation of reported PID with reported change in PID. Among active-duty enlisted Republicans, 84 percent $((22+16)/45)$ reported either being more strongly Republican or no change in intensity of PID, whereas among Democrats, 77 percent $((12+5)/22)$ reported being either more strongly Democrat or no change in intensity of PID. Among Independents, 88 percent $((15+14)/33)$ reported either being more independent or no change. Among veteran enlisted Republicans, 78 percent $((28+11)/45)$ reported either being more strongly Republican or no change,

whereas among Democrats, 78 percent ((13+4)/23) reported being either more strongly Democrat or no change. Among Independents, 89 percent ((18+6)/27) reported either being more independent or no change. Among officer Republicans, 84 percent ((32+14)/55) reported either being more strongly Republican or no change in PID, whereas among Democrats, 65 percent ((17+2)/29) reported being either more strongly Democrat or no change. Among Independents, 75 percent ((8+3)/16) reported either being more independent or no change.

Thus, in the case of both active-duty and veteran enlisted personnel, over three-quarters of the sample reported either no change in PID or strengthening of a pre-existing PID. Among active-duty enlisted personnel, the data suggest less of that effect with Democrats than with veteran enlisted personnel, where the data suggests the effect is more pronounced among independents than among Republicans or Democrats. In the case of officers, the effect is most pronounced among Republicans. (See Table 6.3.)

Party Identification Change Findings

Finding #11: Over *three-quarters* of active-duty enlisted personnel and veteran enlisted personnel report either *an intensification of or no change* in party identification since September 11, 2001.

Finding #12: Republican active-duty enlisted personnel and officers are *more likely* than veteran enlisted personnel to report either *an intensification of or no change* Republican PID than did Democratic active-duty enlisted personnel and officers.

Finding #13: Independent veteran enlisted personnel are *more likely* than officers or active-duty enlisted personnel to report either *an intensification of or no change* being Independent.

Table 6.3 Shift in Party Identification by PID
Active-duty Enlisted, Veteran Enlisted, and Officers

Active-duty										
	More Dem	Less Dem	More Rep	Less Rep	D to R	R to D	More Ind	Less Ind	No change	Total
Republican	0%	0%	22%	3%	2%	0%	2%	0%	16%	45%
Independent	0%	0%	2%	1%	0%	1%	15%	0%	14%	33%
Democrat	12%	1%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	0%	5%	22%
Total	13%	1%	24%	4%	3%	2%	19%	0%	35%	100%
N=878										
Veteran										
	More Dem	Less Dem	More Rep	Less Rep	D to R	R to D	More Ind	Less Ind	No Change	Total
Republican	0%	0%	28%	4%	1%	0%	5%	0%	11%	50%
Independent	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	18%	0%	6%	27%
Democrat	13%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	2%	0%	5%	23%
Total	14%	1%	31%	4%	1%	2%	25%	0%	22%	100%
N=844										
Officer										
	More Dem	Less Dem	More Rep	Less Rep	D to R	R to D	More Ind	Less Ind	No change	Total
Republican	0%	0%	32%	5%	0%	0%	3%	0%	14%	55%
Independent	0%	0%	2%	2%	0%	0%	8%	0%	3%	16%
Democrat	17%	0%	1%	0%	0%	2%	7%	0%	2%	29%
Total	17%	0%	35%	8%	0%	2%	18%	0%	19%	100%
N=173										

While the absolute shift in party identification is revealing, a comparison of gaps between various sample groups, or gap analysis, highlights differences between the three comparison groups. Active-duty enlisted personnel show a greater tendency to report no

change in PID than either veteran enlisted personnel or officers. Active-duty enlisted personnel are also less likely than either veteran enlisted personnel or officers to being more partisan, i.e., more Republican or more Democrat and were more likely to report being Independent.

The data also suggest that active-duty enlisted personnel may be slightly more likely than either veteran enlisted personnel or officers to have switched party identification. This tendency is about 2.5 times more likely among junior enlisted personnel (E-1 through E-5) than with senior enlisted personnel (E-6 through E-7), which would be consistent with older individuals having more stable PID. The total number of individuals reporting such a switch in PID from Democrat to Republican is small (22, or less than 3% of the sample), but a smaller number (16, or less than 2 percent of the sample) reported a switch in PID from Republican to Democrat. (See Table 6.4.)

Table 6.4 PID Change Gap Analysis

Gap Analysis AD-Vet

	More Dem	Less Dem	More Rep	Less Rep	D to R	R to D	More Ind	Less Ind	No change	Total
Republican	0%	0%	-7%	-1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	4%	-5%
Independent	-1	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%	7%
Democrat	-1	0%	-1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-1%
Total	-1%	0%	-7%	0%	2%	0%	0%	0%	13%	

Gap Analysis AD-Off

	More Dem	Less Dem	More Rep	Less Rep	D to R	R to D	More Ind	Less Ind	No change	Total
Republican	0%	0%	-11%	-2%	2%	0%	-1%	0%	2%	-10%
Independent	0%	0%	0%	-1%	0%	1%	7%	0%	11%	18%
Democrat	-5%	1%	-1%	0%	0%	-1%	-5%	0%	4%	-8%
Total	-5%	1%	-12%	-3%	3%	0%	1%	0%	16%	0%

Active-duty Enlisted minus Veteran Enlisted
 Active-duty Enlisted minus Officers

Party Identification Change Gap Analysis Findings

Finding #14: Active-duty enlisted personnel are *less likely* than veteran enlisted personnel or officers to report any change in PID.

Finding #15: Active-duty enlisted personnel are *less likely* than veteran enlisted personnel or officers to report an intensification of PID.

Finding #16: Active-duty enlisted personnel are slightly *more likely* than veteran enlisted personnel or officers to report having changed PID from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party.

Political Ideology. Respondents were asked to report their political ideology on a five-point scale: strongly conservative, somewhat conservative, middle-of-the-road,

somewhat liberal, and strongly liberal. Using methodology similar to that used above, the reported political ideology of each demographic subgroup was calculated and then summarized with the appropriate weighting. The proportions for the categories were determined for each of the same five sample groups: active-duty enlisted personnel, veteran enlisted personnel, officers (1998), officers (2008), and civilians. The results are summarized in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5 Political Ideology
Comparison of Active Enlisted, Veteran Enlisted, Officers (1998), Officers (2008), and Civilians

Political Ideology	Active Enlisted	Veteran Enlisted	Officers (1998)	Officers (2008)	Civilian (ANES)
Strongly Conservative	19	18	13	23	24
Somewhat Conservative	19	30	51	29	15
Total Conservative	38	48	64	51	38
Middle of the Road	34	29	28	19	32
Somewhat Liberal	18	18	7	15	12
Strongly Liberal	10	5	1	15	18
Total Liberal	28	23	8	30	30
Total	100	100	100	100	100
N=	1200	1085	1199	206	1626

Sources: Officers (1998) from TISS (1998) data, Civilians from ANES 2008 data.
All other data from the SOEP
Totals may not add due to rounding

Findings. The political ideology of active-duty enlisted personnel is roughly similar to that reported by the general American population in the 2008 ANES study, but the general population sample is more likely to report being either “strongly liberal” or “strongly conservative” while active-duty personnel are more likely to report

themselves as moderate or “middle of the road.” As with PID, ideological ratios reveal differences between the comparison groups. Active-duty enlisted personnel report about the same conservative to liberal ratio (1.4 to 1) as does the civilian population (1.3 to 1). Both of those ratios are not as high as those shown with veteran enlisted personnel (2.1 to 1), the 1998 officer sample (8 to 1), and the 2008 officer sample (1.7 to 1). Active-duty enlisted personnel also demonstrate a likelihood similar to that of the civilian population of reporting themselves as Independent. So, while active-duty enlisted personnel are more likely to be Republicans than Democrats, they are quite similar to the general population when it comes to ideology. See Table 6.6.

Table 6.6 Ideology Ratios

Ideology Ratios	Active-duty Enlisted	Veteran Enlisted	Officer (1998)	Officer (2008)	Civilian (ANES)
Conservative : Liberal Ratio	1.4:1	2.1:1	8:1	1.7:1	1.3:1
Moderate Ratio (M/C+L)	.52:1	.41:1	.39:1	.23:1	.47:1

Data for calculations drawn from Table 6.5

Political Ideology Findings – Active Duty Enlisted

Finding #17: The political ideology of active-duty enlisted personnel is *similar* to that reported by the general American population.

Finding #18: Active-duty enlisted personnel are *more moderate* than the general American population, being *less likely* to report themselves as “strongly conservative” or “strongly liberal.”

Officers. Reported ideology is markedly different between active-duty enlisted personnel and officers, although the limited data suggests a difference between the officers of 1998 and those of 2008. Officers are more likely than either active-duty enlisted personnel or the general American population to report being conservative. Indeed, while over half of the officer corps reports being conservative, only about a third of active-duty enlisted personnel report being conservative. However, the 2008 officer sample shows a higher likelihood than the officer sample of 1998 of officers reporting as liberal. This may result from some differences between the two samples, particularly the inclusion of a higher proportion of junior officers in the SOEP (2008) sample than was present in the TISS sample (1998).

Political Ideology Findings - Officers

Finding #19: Active-duty officers are *more likely* than enlisted personnel to report being conservative.

Finding #20: Active-duty officers are *less likely* than enlisted personnel to report being middle of the road.

Veteran Enlisted Personnel. Veteran enlisted personnel are about 10 percent more likely than active-duty enlisted personnel to report being conservative and are less likely than active-duty enlisted personnel to report being liberal or middle of the road. This may be a result of age cohort effects, as it is known from other studies that personnel who enlisted in the 1980s were more likely to report being Republican and conservative than was true for those who enlisted in the late 1990s or 2000s (Segal et al. 2001). The

majority of personnel who enlisted in the 1980s are no longer on active duty, while most of those currently on active-duty enlisted in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

Political Ideology Findings – Veteran Enlisted Personnel


Finding #21: Veteran enlisted personnel are *more likely* than active-duty enlisted personnel to report being conservative.

Finding #22: Veteran enlisted personnel are *less likely* than active-duty enlisted personnel to report being middle of the road.

Finding #23: Veteran enlisted personnel are *less likely* than active-duty enlisted personnel to report being liberal.

The gap analysis of differences between active-duty enlisted personnel and the other comparison samples is presented in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2 Political Ideology Gap Analysis
 Comparison of Veteran Enlisted, Officers (1998), Officers (2008), and Civilians
 to Active-Duty Enlisted Personnel



Cross-Tabulation of Party Identification and Political Ideology. In order to compare the groups in more detail, party identification and political ideology are cross-tabulated. (See Table 6.7.) This highlights the distribution of conservative, middle of the road, and liberal respondents within the Republican and Democratic Parties as well as among independents. Readily apparent is the expected distribution of conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats, but the distribution varies by sample group. For example, while only about one-fourth of active-duty enlisted personnel report being conservative Republicans, over half of officers report the same. Among the civilian sample, about 21

percent report being liberal Democrats as compared to only about 11 percent of active-duty enlisted personnel.

Political Ideology Gap Analysis Findings

Finding # 24: Active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with the Republican Party demonstrate about the *same* distribution of ideology as the general American population.

Finding #25: Active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with the Democratic Party are *less likely* than the general American population to report being liberal.

Finding #26: Active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with the Republican Party are *less likely* than veteran enlisted personnel to report being conservative.

Finding #27: Active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with the Democratic Party are *less likely* than officers to report being liberal.

Finding #28: Active-duty enlisted personnel who identify with the Republican Party are *less likely* than officers to report being conservative.

Table 6.7 Cross-Tabulation: Party ID and Political Ideology

6.7a Active-duty Enlisted Sample *

	Democrat	Other	Republican	Total
Conservative	0%	6%	28%	34%
Other	14%	16%	8%	38%
Liberal	11%	14%	2%	28%
Total	26%	37%	38%	N=1256

6.7b Veteran Enlisted Sample *

	Democrat	Other	Republican	Total
Conservative	1%	10%	38%	49%
Other	10%	15%	6%	31%
Liberal	14%	4%	2%	20%
Total	25%	30%	46%	N=1039

6.7c Officer Sample (TISS 1998) *

	Democrat	Other	Republican	Total
Conservative	2%	9%	55%	66%
Other	6%	9%	11%	27%
Liberal	4%	2%	1%	8%
Total	12%	20%	67%	N=1086

6.7d Officer Sample (2008) *

	Democrat	Other	Republican	Total
Conservative	0.00%	3%	48%	51%
Other	3%	13%	4%	20%
Liberal	29%	0%	0.00%	29%
Total	32%	16%	52%	N=207

6.7e Civilian Sample (ANES 2008) *

	Democrat	Other	Republican	Total
Conservative	11%	3%	25%	38%
Other	19%	5%	7%	32%
Liberal	26%	2%	3%	30%
Total	56%	10%	34%	N=1617

* Sum of all nine cells is 100%
 Totals may not add due to rounding

Gap analysis better highlights the differences. The active-duty enlisted sample was compared with each of the other four sample groups. Each of the nine cells was calculated by subtracting the comparison group proportion from that of the active-duty enlisted sample. A positive result indicates that the active-duty enlisted group had a higher proportion of representation in the particular characteristic than was shown in the comparison group. A negative result indicates a lower proportion of representation than seen in the comparison group. The results are presented in Table 6.8.

Table 6.8 Gap Analysis of Party ID and Political Ideology Cross-Tabulations

6.8a Active-duty Enlisted - Veteran Enlisted Gap

	Democrat	Other	Republican	Total
Conservative	0%	-4%	-10%	-15%
Other	4%	1%	2%	7%
Liberal	-3%	10%	0%	8%
Total	1%	7%	-8%	

Calculated by subtracting results of Table 6.7b from Table 6.7a.

6.8b Active-duty Enlisted - Officer (1998) Gap

	Democrat	Other	Republican	Total
Conservative	-1%	-3%	-27%	-31%
Other	8%	6%	-4%	11%
Liberal	7%	12%	1%	20%
Total	14%	16%	-30%	

Calculated by subtracting results of Table 6.7c from Table 6.7a.

6.8c Active-duty Enlisted - Officer (2008) Gap

	Democrat	Other	Republican	Total
Conservative	0%	6%	-20%	-13%
Other	12%	4%	3%	18%
Liberal	-18%	14%	-2%	-5%
Total	-6%	25%	-19%	

Calculated by subtracting results of Table 6.7d from Table 6.7a.

6.8d Active-duty Enlisted - Civilian Gap

	Democrat	Other	Republican	Total
Conservative	-10%	4%	3%	-4%
Other	-4%	10%	0%	6%
Liberal	-15%	13%	0%	-2%
Total	-30%	27%	3%	

Calculated by subtracting results of Table 6.7e from Table 6.7a.

Result of each cell calculated by subtracting the respective comparison group from the active-duty enlisted sample
Totals may not add due to rounding

RESEARCH QUESTION #2

Whether the second research question required a response was dependent upon the answer to the first. Had it been determined that enlisted personnel demonstrated political attitudes and behavior substantially different from what was predicted by demographics, further analysis would have been required. While the enlisted population is substantially less likely than civilians to identify with the Democratic Party, it is more likely to report being Independent. The enlisted population is no more likely to identify with the Republican Party, proportionally, than does the civilian population. As a result, the need to provide an answer to the second research question is obviated. As demographics have reasonably predicted the party identification and political ideology of the enlisted population, there is subsequently no need to determine causes for differences. Demographics remain, as previous research has suggested, the most reliable predictor of political behavior. The enlisted military population apparently is not the exception to the rule about political correlates of demographic characteristics.

POLITICAL EFFICACY

As much of the discussion about the culture gap revolved around the voting behavior of military enlisted personnel, it is reasonable to explore the political efficacy of this population. Previous research has demonstrated that a strong positive correlation exists between high political efficacy and the likelihood that an individual will vote (Pinkleton & Austin 1998; Pinkleton & Austin 2001; Pinkleton, Austin, & Fortman 1998; Pinkleton, Um, & Austin, 2002). Even though the demographics of the military

population translate into standard electoral patterns, it would be helpful to know if the usual predictor of high political efficacy is present in this high voter turnout population. In order to test this, the SOEP asked the respondents to reply to the following two standard internal political efficacy questions:

Q.2. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

Q.3. So many other people vote in the national election that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not.

Each respondent was then asked to agree or disagree with the statement across a standard five-point scale. The distribution of responses was calculated for each of seven different comparison groups: whites, blacks, other races, males, females, junior enlisted personnel, and senior enlisted personnel. These particular comparison groups were chosen to provide a cross-sectional view of differences along racial and gender lines. The last two groups, junior and senior enlisted personnel, were chosen to determine the existence of any age-related differences. (See Table 6.9.)

For the purposes of the analysis below, junior enlisted personnel are defined as pay-grades E-1 through E-5 while senior enlisted personnel are pay-grades E-6 through E-9. Such a categorization is consistent with the practice of the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, defining E-6 and higher as Senior Non-commissioned officers. The Navy makes the divide between E-6 and E-7, but for the sake of consistency, all four services will be categorized similarly.

Table 6.9 Active-Duty Enlisted Political Efficacy by Race, Gender, Pay-grade

Vote Doesn't Matter	White	Black	Other	Male	Female	Jr.	Sr.
						Enlisted	Enlisted
Agree Strongly	4%	3%	5%	4%	1%	5%	3%
Agree Somewhat	11%	4%	8%	8%	9%	12%	6%
Neither	4%	0%	6%	4%	0%	7%	2%
Disagree Somewhat	12%	14%	27%	19%	3%	23%	12%
Disagree Strongly	70%	80%	53%	64%	87%	54%	77%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N =	652	292	295	1031	208	489	750

Too Complicated	White	Black	Other	Male	Female	Jr.	Sr.
						Enlisted	Enlisted
Agree Strongly	6%	10%	0%	5%	8%	9%	4%
Agree Somewhat	20%	19%	17%	18%	26%	16%	21%
Neither	8%	0%	2%	5%	1%	4%	5%
Disagree Somewhat	19%	33%	34%	21%	47%	23%	27%
Disagree Strongly	47%	38%	47%	50%	19%	48%	43%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	656	292	295	1035	208	493	750

Jr. Enlisted = E1 – E-5; Sr. Enlisted = E6 – E9
 Totals may not add due to rounding

While variation exists between the groups, overall there appears to be a high level of political efficacy in all demographic groups. Contrary to what has been usually found in the national population, blacks demonstrated a higher level of efficacy than did whites. While it is reasonable to assume that the candidacy of Barack Obama in 2008 was likely a significant factor in a heightened sense of political efficacy among blacks, that explanation for the correlation cannot be substantiated because we have no efficacy data among military personnel prior to the present survey.

Senior enlisted personnel demonstrated a higher level of efficacy than did junior enlisted personnel. This finding supports earlier research showing that older voters

generally report a higher political efficacy than younger voters (Campbell et al. 1960; Verba & Nie 1987; Forrest & Weseley 2007).

In the 2008 ANES survey, nearly 70 percent of respondents replied that they agreed strongly or agreed somewhat that “politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.” In comparison, only 28 percent of active-duty enlisted personnel agreed strongly or agreed somewhat with this statement, while over 68 percent disagreed strongly or disagreed somewhat with the same statement. Such a marked difference between military and civilian political efficacy, combined with documented high voting turnout rates on the part of military personnel, may be connected to the efforts on the part of the military to encourage voting. It may also be related to the higher level of education on the part of military personnel as compared to the general American population.

Political Efficacy Findings

Finding #29: American enlisted personnel demonstrated a substantially *high level* of political efficacy when compared to the general American population.

Finding #30: Junior enlisted personnel demonstrated a *lower level* of political efficacy than did senior enlisted personnel.

Finding #31: Black active-duty enlisted personnel demonstrated a *higher level* of political efficacy than did white active-duty enlisted personnel.

SUMMARY

In order to answer the primary research question, this study delved into party identification, political ideology, and political efficacy of American military enlisted personnel. Specifically, ten findings were developed on PID along with an additional 6 findings about apparent shifts in PID since September 11, 2001. The exploration into political ideology resulted in seven findings, and the cross-tabulation of PID and ideology resulted in another five findings. The final investigation into the political efficacy of enlisted personnel resulted in three more findings for thirty-one total findings from this project.

American military enlisted personnel are proportionally no more likely than civilians to identify with the Republican Party, but are substantially less likely to identify with the Democratic Party. Additionally, enlisted personnel are not as strongly partisan, being less likely than other sample groups to report being either “strong Democrats” or “strong Republicans.” Not surprisingly then, enlisted personnel are about four times as likely to report being Independent when compared to the civilian population.

Similarly, enlisted personnel are less strongly ideological than the other sample groups. Of those who reported being either liberal or conservative, a higher proportion of enlisted personnel reported a more moderate position than the other sample groups.

Of particular note is the high level of political efficacy suggested by the survey results. While not surprising given the high reported level of voter turnout among

military personnel, that such a high efficacy would come from this relatively young age group is of interest.

While the need to provide an answer to the second research question was obviated by the results of answering the first question, some issues opened by the findings above remain to be explored. The implications of those findings and conclusions drawn from them along with recommendations for further study will be discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

The data presented in this study show a difference between the party identification of American enlisted personnel and those of civilian Americans. That difference is quite noticeable. Yet, should this difference be a concern? The short answer is “No”, at least not in terms of any threat, real or perceived, to civilian control of the military. This study discovered that while there are certainly more military personnel who identify themselves as Republicans than as Democrats, of particular significance are the number of individuals who are politically independent. That those in the military are proportionally three times more likely to be Independents than is true for the general population and are also less strongly ideological should be an encouraging finding as it supports – although it does not guarantee – the ideal of an apolitical, professional military that will respond willingly, if not unquestioningly, to civilian control.

The American military is a distinct population with distinct characteristics. In marked contrast to past conventional wisdom, it is not comprised of the undereducated and poor and it is not made up of individuals who are ideologically extreme or exceptionally partisan. And the enlisted personnel who are the overwhelming majority and the backbone of the military certainly are not a mirror image of the officer corps in terms of demographics, partisanship, and political ideology.

Why, then, in the face of the information presented here about the political attitudes of the military, would an impression of a strongly Republican and intensely conservative military remain so firmly impressed in the public consciousness? If we

look first at officers, we see a picture that indeed does track the conventional wisdom of Republican dominance in the military. The TISS surveys demonstrated a strongly Republican bias among senior officers in the late 1990s. The SOEP demonstrated a similar, although not as strong, tendency among officers ten years later. Despite a clear leaning toward the Republican Party, the data suggest that junior officers are less likely to hold the same conservative ideology and are not as likely to identify with the Republican Party as do their seniors. These findings, while preliminary, do suggest that the officer corps is similar to enlisted personnel in both the party identification ratio and conservative to liberal ratio, although officers are less likely to report being Independent in their party identification.

However, the real test of whether members of the military are predominantly Republican comes from our examination of the enlisted population, who, of course, are the overwhelming majority of military personnel. Without this specialized and unique group of people, none of the tasks assigned to the military could be accomplished. And here we find a different picture from the one we have of officers.

While some of the reporting about the political complexion of the military, and particularly of enlisted personnel, may be the result of misinformation being repeated unquestioningly, it can also readily be explained by the ratio of those enlisted personnel identifying themselves as Republican to those identifying as Democrats. Although there are proportionally no more Republicans among the enlisted military than in the general population, the proportion of Democrats is substantially smaller proportion of Democrats. With nearly two members of the enlisted armed services identifying as

Republican for every one identifying as Democratic, it is not difficult to gain an impression of a Republican dominance within the services. If one combines such a skewed perception of the partisan ratio with a senior officer corps that is largely Republican, the actual state of partisan identification becomes less easy to discern.

While it is inaccurate to characterize American military personnel as apolitical, it is equally inaccurate to report them as excessively partisan or ideological. The evidence presented here indicates that most enlisted military personnel exhibit a moderate ideology and a strong sense of partisan independence, findings that ease concerns about any widening of the civil-military gap. The majority of the American military, and certainly active-duty enlisted personnel, do not have partisan or ideological identifications fitting only with a narrow partisan section of the population.

In many ways, American enlisted personnel are reasonably representative of the general population. They are not widely different from civilians in their partisan and ideological views and they participate actively in the electoral process. However, this population is substantially less strongly partisan and less strongly ideological, and it demonstrates a much higher political efficacy, and, perhaps most significantly, votes at a substantially higher rate than do civilians. (See below for further discussion on this issue.)

The self-selective nature of enlisting in an all-volunteer force likely has a strong influence on the lack of presence of Democrats in the military population. As revealed in the review of demographics (see Chapter 3), those regions of the United States that have recently been voting more predominantly Democratic have been producing fewer

recruits per capita. This is most noticeable for the Northeast, particularly New England. At the same time, those regions that in recent elections have been regular Republican strongholds produce more than their expected proportion of recruits. In this case, the South, (and within it, particularly Texas), a traditionally conservative region of the country, has over-produced recruits.

Not only do those who identify as Democrats appear to participate in the military at a substantially lower rate than do Independents or those who identify as Republicans, regions of the country that traditionally produce Democratic majorities are more likely to produce recruits who identify politically as Independents. In contrast, regions that regularly produce Republican majorities are more likely to produce recruits with a Republican identification. Over time, this regional effect can account for much of the partisan difference observed between the military and civilian populations. Answering why such a phenomenon exists, however, requires future research.

In addition, younger enlisted personnel are more likely to identify with the Democratic Party and to report a liberal political ideology than do older personnel. The first possible explanation is self-selection: members of the military who are more liberal and who identify as Democrats decline to re-enlist at higher rates, thus leaving in the more senior pay-grades those who are more conservative and more likely to identify as Republican. However, there also may be an age cohort effect in which junior personnel are the leading edge of a more liberal and more Democratic enlisted population, with the more conservative and Republican senior enlisted personnel being an older age cohort in decline. Only further research will accurately resolve this question.

While enlisted personnel may not be as strongly partisan or ideological as are civilians, they appear to have voted at a higher rate than does the general American population and at a markedly higher rate than civilians under the age of thirty. The exceptionally high stated political efficacy of enlisted personnel suggested by the survey findings along with post-election studies reporting voter turnout rates routinely exceeding 70 percent, indicate a military population that is politically engaged and actively participating in electoral politics. Such a high participation rate is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that about 70 percent of the active duty enlisted population is under thirty years of age, a group with a traditionally low voting turnout rate. The 2008 voter turnout rate by individuals 18 to 29 years old in the general population was 51.1 percent (McDonald 2009). The military voter turnout rates for the 2008 election have not been released, but past behavior indicates that military personnel turned out to vote at a substantially higher rate than did civilians of the same age and that their voting rate will likely approach 80 percent. While a higher voting participation rate among military personnel might indicate a higher likelihood of intervention in politics - a potential danger to civilian control of the military – the military appears to be less strongly partisan than the general population and, importantly, voting alone does not necessarily imply political activities.

IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The finding that individuals participating in the military service identify less with the Democratic Party than with the Republican Party implies that at least one currently

unidentified variable may be at work. Candidates for that variable include (1) self-selection, (2) socialization, and (3) utilitarian attitudes.

With self-selection, those who identify with the Democratic Party either do not enlist at the same rate as Republicans or Independents or have a lower re-enlistment rate. In the case of socialization, the proximity of strongly influential senior non-commissioned officers may influence the political attitudes of enlisted personnel. While some may suggest that commissioned officers may also be a source of political influence on junior enlisted personnel, extensive active-duty experience indicates that a non-commissioned officer has far more effect on the day-to-day life of a junior enlisted person and therefore would have more impact on the development of attitudes. Utilitarian attitudes may cause an individual to choose an attitude based on the perception of which political party will best support the military. Such attitudes may also cause an adaption of one's political identification as a method to "stay safe" within an environment perceived as hostile to one's own particular political views or just to please their seniors.

The self-perpetuating nature of the military also helps explain the unique nature of the enlisted population. Not only is it likely that non-commissioned officers have a strong influence on the attitudes of newly enlisted personnel, but the impact of parents with military experience may also be significant (Shields 1996). Previous research indicates that parental influence is a reliable predictor of party identification and political ideology of children. The combination of non-commissioned officers and parents may be major influences on the unique nature of enlisted personnel. Over 75

percent of SOEM respondents reported that they would *not* be disappointed if their child joined the military. This overwhelmingly supportive attitude crossed party identification and political ideology lines. Such a finding supports the idea of a military that is significantly self-perpetuating in a manner that crosses partisan and ideological boundaries.

Research into the magnitude of the impact of children of veterans who make up a notable part of the present active-duty force may also reveal the affects of generational party identification and political efficacy. While no evidence of such a military “caste” within the American population has been presented to date, findings of an increasingly “in-bred” military may be predictive of growing cultural isolation from the civilian population like the old small professional army stationed at isolated outposts or deployed away from home for extended periods. Further study of any such isolating trends within “military communities” surrounding bases could result in interesting findings.

The high sense of political efficacy on the part of enlisted personnel as compared to the general population especially within the same age group prompts one to question as to why that would be. Possible answers again lie in self-selection, with those who would already demonstrate high political efficacy being more likely to enlist in the first place, or socialization, with those who enlist becoming more aware because those around them are already politically aware and becoming acutely conscious that political decisions decide how the military is used, thus directly affecting their lives. Again,

parents who had served in the military may also have significant influence. More work is required along these lines.

To determine the relative impact of potential causal factors on the characteristics of enlisted personnel requires additional research. One avenue of research that promises to resolve many of these open questions is a panel study. Such a study in which some of the individuals who responded to the SOEP are followed, along with a group of newly enlisted members, may reveal the presence and impact of age cohort, self-selection, socialization, and utilitarian attitudinal affects on those on active duty as well as parental influence on those entering the military.

* * * * *

This report limited the analysis primarily to determining the party identification and political ideology of active duty enlisted personnel in an attempt better to understand the relationship of the military to the civilian population. A limited look at political efficacy supported observations of a politically active military population. Remaining unanswered is why those who identify with the Democratic Party participate in the military in a substantially lower proportion than do Republicans or Independents. Also unanswered is why Independents are found in the military in such a substantially higher proportion than is found among civilians.

Along with the additional research suggested above, this study has enabled a more complete and accurate understanding of the American military. Because of this

project, the unique characteristics of American military enlisted personnel have been highlighted. Several items of “conventional wisdom” have been challenged with new data that leads to a more detailed analysis of American armed forces and the relationship of those forces with civilian leaders and democratic society. With the prospect of another decade of fighting ahead in Afghanistan, the American military will remain in the forefront of public attention and will remain the subject of continued public policy debate. A full understanding of the American military, and in particular the enlisted men or women who actually do the fighting, will become more, not less, important in how political decisions will impact American civil-military relations and to enable an informed debate.

Appendix A: Text of the Survey Instrument

SURVEY ON ENLISTED PERSONNEL (SOEP) Political Attitudes and Behavior

August 6, 2008

I am conducting research into the attitudes and thinking of American military personnel. I would very much like to know your opinions. Your and all other survey responses are anonymous, and anything you say will be completely confidential.

Let us begin with a few general questions...

1. Do you feel things in the United States are generally going in the RIGHT DIRECTION, or do you feel things have pretty seriously gotten off on the WRONG TRACK?

1. Right direction
2. Wrong track
3. Don't know

For the next two items, please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the statements:

2. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
6. Don't know

3. So many other people vote in the national election that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not.

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
6. Don't know

The next set of questions asks you to make some judgments about civilian and military culture in this country. First, think of the military culture. Please indicate whether the term applies or does not apply.

	Applies	Does Not Apply
4A. Honest		
5A. Intolerant		
6A. Materialistic		
7A. Corrupt		
8A. Generous		
9A. Self-Indulgent		
10A. Hard-Working		
11A. Rigid		
12A. Disciplined		
13A. Creative		
14A. Loyal		
15A. Overly-Cautious		

Now, think of the civilian culture. Please indicate whether the same terms as above apply or do not apply.

	Applies	Does Not Apply
4B. Honest		
5B. Intolerant		
6B. Materialistic		
7B. Corrupt		
8B. Generous		
9B. Self-Indulgent		
10B. Hard-Working		
11B. Rigid		
12B. Disciplined		
13B. Creative		
14B. Loyal		
15B. Overly-Cautious		

There are different things that people say might keep the military from being effective during times of war. For each of the following, please indicate if it might greatly hurt military effectiveness, somewhat hurt military effectiveness, has no effect on military effectiveness, or it is not happening at all in the U.S. military.

	Isn't Happening	No Effect	Somewhat Hurts	Greatly Hurts	Don't know
16. Americans' lack of trust in the uniformed leaders of the military					
17. The tensions created when women enter a new workplace					
18. The military becoming less male-dominated					
19. The military getting too involved in non-military affairs					
20. A ban on language and behavior that encourage camaraderie among soldiers					
21. A system for promotions and advancement in the military that does not work well					
22. Non-military people getting too involved in military affairs					
23. Sexual harassment in the military					
24. The military trying to hold on to old-fashioned views of morality					
25. A military culture and way of life that is very different from that for non-military					
26. The military's lack of confidence in our political leadership					
27. Inaccurate reporting about the military and military affairs by the news media					

Here are some statements people have made about the American military. For each, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree, somewhat, are neutral, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly.

	Strongly Agree	Some what Agree	Neutral	Somewh at Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
28. An effective military depends on a very structured organization with a clear chain of command						
29. Military symbols (uniforms, medals) and military traditions (ceremonies and parades) are necessary to build morale, loyalty, and camaraderie in the military						
30. Even though women can serve in the military, the military should remain dominated by male values and characteristics						
31. The U.S. military has done a much better job of eliminating racial discrimination within the military than American society in general						
32. Even in a high tech era, people in the military have to have characteristics like strength, toughness, physical courage, and the willingness to make sacrifices						
33. The bonds and sense of loyalty that keep a military unit together under the stress of combat are fundamentally different from the bonds and loyalty that organizations try to develop in the business world						
34. The chance to retire with a good pension at a young age is very important in the military						

35. It is very important to keep company stores, childcare centers, and recreational facilities on military bases in order to keep a sense of community						
36. Military leaders care more about the people under their command than leaders in the non-military world care about citizens						
37. The new emphasis on joint education, training, and doctrine across branches of the military has improved the effectiveness of the armed forces						

These questions ask for your opinion on a number of statements concerning the military's role in civilian society. For each, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, are neutral, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly

	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neutral	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
38. Members of the military should not publicly criticize senior members of the civilian branch of the government						
39. Members of the military should not publicly criticize American society						
40. Members of the military should be allowed to publicly express their political views just like any other citizen						
41. It is proper for the military to explain and defend in public the policies of the government						
42. It is proper for the military to advocate publicly the military policies it believes are in the best interests of the United States						

Here are some statements people have made about the U.S. military. For each, please indicate whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, are neutral, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly.

	Strongly Agree	Somewhat Agree	Neutral	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Don't Know
43. Most members of the military have a great deal of respect for civilian society.						
44. Most members of civilian society have a great deal of respect for the military.						
45. All male citizens should be required to do some national service.						
46. All female citizens should be required to do some national service						
47. I am proud of the men and women who serve in the military.						
48. I have confidence in the ability of our military to perform well in wartime.						
49. The U.S. Armed Forces are attracting high-quality, motivated recruits.						
50. Even if civilian society did not always appreciate the essential military values of commitment and unselfishness, our armed forces could still maintain required traditional standards.						
51. The American people understand the sacrifices made by the people who serve in the U.S. military.						

52. I expect that ten years from now America will still have the best military in the world.						
--	--	--	--	--	--	--

53. I would be disappointed if a child of mine joined the military.

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neutral
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
6. Don't know

54. How would you generally characterize your experience in the military?

1. Very positive
2. Somewhat positive
3. Mixed
4. Somewhat negative
5. Very negative
6. Don't know

55. How would you characterize your primary motivation to join the military? Please check the one closest to your primary motive.

1. To gain skills valued in the civilian job market
2. To have a career in the military
3. To earn veteran's benefits
4. To serve my country
5. To get an education
6. There were no other options
7. Other (please specify)
8. Don't know

56. I would leave military service if: (Please circle all that apply)

1. The senior uniformed leadership does not stand up for what is right in military policy
2. The country does not provide adequate facilities and weapons for the military to succeed
3. The pay and benefits further lagged behind compensation in civilian economy
4. There are reduced opportunities to train in my military specialty
5. Deployment schedules keep me away from my family too much
6. Chances for promotion were less than they are now in my service
7. The challenge and sense of fulfillment I derive from my service were less
8. Other (please specify)
9. Don't know

57. Morale in my service is

1. Very low
2. Low
3. Moderate
4. High
5. Very high
6. No opinion

Now, I'd like to ask a few questions to gather some background information.

In what year were you born?

What is the highest level of education that you have obtained?

1. Some High School
2. High school
3. Some college
4. College graduate
5. Some graduate work
6. Graduate degree

Are you currently on active-duty?

1. Yes
2. No

During what years have you been/were you on active military service?

Start _____ End _____

In which service are you presently serving or were serving upon leaving active military service?

1. Army
2. Navy
3. Air Force
4. Marines
5. Coast Guard
6. Army National Guard
7. Air National Guard
8. Army Reserve
9. Navy Reserve
10. Air Force Reserve
11. Marine Corps Reserve
12. Coast Guard Reserve

What is your present pay-grade (or pay-grade upon discharge from the service)?

- E-1
- E-2
- E-3
- E-4
- E-5
- E-6
- E-7
- E-8
- E-9
- W-1
- W-2
- W-3
- W-4
- W-5
- O-1
- O-2
- O-3
- O-4
- O-5
- O-6
- O-7
- O-8
- O-9
- O-10

What is/was your primary arm or specialty?

1. Law enforcement (USA 31) (USN MA) (USMC 58)
2. Logistics/supply/transport (USA 88, 89, 92) (USN CS, SH, SK) (USMC 04, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 65, 66, 70,
3. Technical/equipment maintenance (USA 45, 52, 63, 94) (USN FC, ST, ET) (USMC 11, 21, 28, 60/61/62)
4. Administrative/Combat service support (legal, admin, finance, public affairs, medical, recruiting, religious) (USA 27, 41, 42, 44, 46, 68, 79, 56) (USN YN, PS) (USMC 01, 43, 44, 46, 55, 68, 80)
5. Chem/PsyOp/Civil Affairs (USMC 05, 57)
6. Combat arms or platform (including aircraft, vehicles, ships/craft) (USA 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, 72, 73) (USN Aviation ratings, Engineering ratings, hull/deck ratings, construction ratings) (USMC 03, 08, 13, 18, 23, 73)
7. Intelligence/cryptology (USA 96, 97, 98) (USN IS, CT) (USMC 02, 26, 27)
8. Shipboard operations/deck operations (USN OS, BM)
9. Communications/IT/Signal (USA 25, 33) (USN IT) (USMC 06, 28)
10. Other (Please specify) _____

Have you deployed abroad for a military operation with the U.S. armed forces since September 11, 2001?

1. Yes
2. No

Have you been deployed in-country to Afghanistan or Iraq since September 11, 2001?

1. Yes
2. No

How would you describe your political views?

1. Very liberal
2. Somewhat liberal
3. Middle of the road
4. Somewhat conservative
5. Very conservative
6. Don't know

Generally speaking, how do you think of yourself politically?

1. Strong Republican
2. Moderate Republican
3. Lean slightly more to the Republicans
4. Independent
5. Lean slightly more to the Democrats
6. Moderate Democrat
7. Strong Democrat
8. Don't know
9. Other (please specify) _____

Has your party identification changed over the past seven years?

1. No
2. Yes
3. Don't know

Since the events of 9/11 and the U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, would you say that you:

1. Are more strongly Democrat than before
2. Are less strongly Democrat than before
3. Are more strongly Republican than before
4. Are less strongly Republican than before
5. Switched from Democrat to Republican
6. Switched from Republican to Democrat
7. Are more strongly Independent than before
8. Are less strongly Independent than before
9. Haven't moved/Don't know

What is the highest level of education that your father obtained?

1. Less than high school
2. High school
3. Some college
4. College graduate
5. Some graduate work
6. Graduate degree
7. Don't know

What is the highest level of education that your mother obtained?

1. Less than high school
2. High school
3. Some college
4. College graduate
5. Some graduate work
6. Graduate degree
7. Don't know

Where did you live most of the time when you were growing up?

- _____ (list state or territory)
- I moved around a lot
Lived outside the U.S.
Don't know

What is your racial/ethnic identity?

1. White or Caucasian (not Hispanic)
2. Hispanic
3. Asian-American
4. Black or African American (not Hispanic)
5. American Indian, Eskimo or Aleut
6. Prefer not to answer
7. Other (specify) _____

What is your gender?

- 1 male
- 2 female

Thank you very much for your time! Your cooperation is greatly appreciated!

Appendix B: Survey Codebook

VAR	VAR LABEL	
Q00a	RESPONDANT SERIAL NR	Sequential serial number in order of receipt
Q00b	HOW COMPLETED	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hand 2. Electronic
Q00c	DATE COMPLETED	MM/DD/YYYY
Q01	US RIGHT OR WRONG DIRECTION	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Right direction 2. Wrong direction 3. Don't know
Q02	GOVT COMPLICATED	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agree strongly 2. Agree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly 6. Don't Know
Q03	VOTE MATTERS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Agree strongly 2. Agree somewhat 3. Neither agree nor disagree 4. Disagree somewhat 5. Disagree strongly 6. Don't Know
Q04a	MIL HONEST	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q04b	CIV HONEST	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q05a	MIL INTOLERANT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q05b	CIV INTOLERANT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q06a	MIL MATERIALISTIC	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q06b	CIV MATERIALISTIC	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q07a	MIL CORRUPT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q07b	CIV CORRUPT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q08a	MIL GENEROUS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply

Q08b	CIV GENEROUS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q09a	MIL SELFINDULGENT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q09b	CIV SELFINDULGENT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q10a	MIL HARDWORK	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q10b	CIV HARDWORK	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q11a	MIL RIGID	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q11b	CIV RIGID	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q12a	MIL DISCIPLINE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q12b	CIV DISCIPLINE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q13a	MIL CREATIVE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q13b	CIV CREATIVE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q14a	MIL LOYAL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q14b	CIV LOYAL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q15a	MIL OVERCAUTIOUS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q15b	CIV OVERCAUTIOUS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Applies 2. Does Not Apply
Q16	DISTRUST OF MIL LEADERS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know

Q17	WOMEN ENTERING WORKPLACE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know
Q18	MIL LESS MALE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know
Q19	MIL IN NONMIL AFFAIRS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know
Q20	BAN ON BHAHAVIOR	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know
Q21	BAD PROMOTIONS SYSTEM	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know
Q22	NONMIL IN MIL AFFAIRS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know
Q23	SEXUAL HARASSMENT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know
Q24	OLD FASHIONED MORALS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know

Q25	DIFF MIL CULTURE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know
Q26	NO CONFID IN POL LDRS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know
Q27	INACCURATE REPORTING	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Isn't happening 2. No effect 3. Somewhat hurts 4. Greatly hurts 5. Don't know
Q28	CHAIN OF COMMAND	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q29	MIL SYMBOLS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q30	REMAIN MASCULINE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q31	ELIMINATE RACIAL DISCRIM	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know

Q32	STRENGTH AND SACRIFICES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q33	BOND AND LOYALTY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q34	PENSION AT YOUNG AGE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q35	ON BASE FACILITIES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q36	LDRS CARE ABOUT PEOPLE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q37	JOINT EDUC AND TRAINING	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know

Q38	NOT CRITICIZE CIVIL GOVT	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q39	NOT CRITICIZE AMER SOCIETY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q40	EXPRESS POLITICAL VIEWS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q41	DEFEND GOVT POLICIES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q42	ADVOCATE MIL POLICIES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q43	MIL RESPECTS CIV	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know

Q44	CIV RESPECTS MIL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q45	MALES REQRD NATL SERVICE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q46	FEMALES REQRD NATL SERVICE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q47	PROUD OF THOSE WHO SERVE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q48	CONFIDENCE IN WARTIME	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q49	HIGH QUALITY RECRUITS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know

Q50	MIL SHOULD MAINTAIN STDS	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q51	PEOPLE UNDERSTAND SACRIFICES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q52	10 YRS US STILL HAVE BEST MILITARY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q53	DISAPPOINTED IF CHILD JOINED	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Neutral 4. Somewhat disagree 5. Strongly disagree 6. Don't know
Q54	EXPERIENCE IN MILITARY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very positive 2. Somewhat positive 3. Mixed 4. Somewhat negative 5. Very negative 6. Don't know
Q55	PRIMARY MOTIVATION JOINING MIL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To gain skills in the civilian job market 2. To have a career in the military 3. To earn veteran's benefits 4. To serve my country 5. To get an education 6. There were no other options 7. Other (specified) 8. Don't know

Q56	LEAVE MIL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The senior uniformed leadership does not stand up for what is right in military policy 2. The country does not provide adequate facilities and weapons for the military to succeed 3. The pay and benefits further lagged behind compensation in civilian economy 4. There are reduced opportunities to train in my military specialty 5. Deployment schedules keep me away from my family too much 6. Chances for promotion were less than they are now in my service 7. The challenge and sense of fulfillment I derive from my service were less 8. Other (specified) 9. Don't know
Q57	MORALE IN SERVICE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very low 2. Low 3. Moderate 4. High 5. Very high 6. No opinion
Q58	YEAR OF BIRTH	YYYY
Q59	ACTIVE SERVICE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Yes 2. No
Q60	YEARS OF ACTIVE SERVICE	<p>Start Year (YYYY), End Year (YYYY)</p> <p>Still on active service</p>
Q61	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Some High School 2. GED 3. High School graduate 4. Some college 5. College graduate 6. Some graduate work 7. Graduate degree

Q62	SERVICE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Army 2. Navy 3. Air Force 4. Marines 5. Coast Guard 6. Army National Guard 7. Air National Guard 8. Army Reserve 9. Navy Reserve 10. Air Force Reserve 11. Marine Corps Reserve 12. Coast Guard Reserve
Q63	PAY-GRADE	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. E-1 2. E-2 3. E-3 4. E-4 5. E-5 6. E-6 7. E-7 8. E-8 9. E-9 10. W-1 11. W-2 12. W-3 13. W-4 14. W-5 15. O-1 16. O-2 17. O-3 18. O-4 19. O-5 20. O-6 21. O-7 22. O-8 23. O-9 24. O-10
Q64	PRIMARY ARM	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Law enforcement (USA 31) (USN MA) (USMC 58) 2. Logistics/supply/transport (USA 88, 89, 92) (USN CS, SH, SK) (USMC 04, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 65, 66, 70, 3. Technical/equipment maintenance (USA 45, 52, 63, 94) (USN FC, ST, ET) (USMC 11, 21, 28, 60/61/62) 4. Administrative/Combat service support (legal, admin, finance, public affairs, medical, recruiting, religious) (USA

		<p>27, 41, 42, 44, 46, 68, 79, 56) (USN YN, PS) (USMC 01, 43, 44, 46, 55, 68, 80)</p> <p>5. Chem/PsyOp/Civil Affairs (USMC 05, 57)</p> <p>6. Combat arms or platform (including aircraft, vehicles, ships/ 72, 73) (USN Aviation ratings, Engineering ratings, hull/deck (USMC 03, 08, 13, 18, 23, 73)</p> <p>7. Intelligence/cryptology (USA 96, 97, 98) (USN IS, CT) (USMC 02, 26, 27)</p> <p>8. Shipboard operations/deck operations (USN OS, BM)</p> <p>9. Communications/IT/Signal (USA 25, 33) (USN IT) (USMC 06, 28)</p> <p>10. Other (specify)</p>
Q65	DEPLOYED ABROAD FOR OPERATION	<p>1. Yes</p> <p>2. No</p>
Q66	DEPLOYED IRAQ OR AFGHANISTAN	<p>1. Yes</p> <p>2. No</p>
Q67	POLITICAL VIEWS	<p>1. Very liberal</p> <p>2. Somewhat liberal</p> <p>3. Middle of the road</p> <p>4. Somewhat conservative</p> <p>5. Very conservative</p> <p>6. Don't know</p>
Q68	PARTY IDENTIFICATION	<p>1. Strong Republican</p> <p>2. Moderate Republican</p> <p>3. Lean slightly more to the Republicans</p> <p>4. Independent</p> <p>5. Lean slightly more to the Democrats</p> <p>6. Moderate Democrat</p> <p>7. Strong Democrat</p> <p>8. Other</p> <p>9. Don't know</p>
Q69	PARTY IDENTIFICATION CHANGE	<p>1. No</p> <p>2. Yes</p> <p>3. Don't know</p>

Q70	NEW PARTY IDENTIFICATION	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Are more strongly Democrat than before 2. Are less strongly Democrat than before 3. Are more strongly Republican than before 4. Are less strongly Republican than before 5. Switched from Democrat to Republican 6. Switched from Republican to Democrat 7. Are more strongly Independent than before 8. Are less strongly Independent than before 9. Haven't moved/Don't know
Q71	FATHERS LEVEL OF EDUCATION	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Less than High School 2. High School 3. Some college 4. College graduate 5. Some graduate work 6. Graduate degree 7. Don't know
Q72	MOTHERS LEVEL OF EDUCATION	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Less than High School 2. High School 3. Some college 4. College graduate 5. Some graduate work 6. Graduate degree 7. Don't know
Q73	STATE/LOC GROWING UP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alabama 2. Alaska 3. American Samoa 4. Arizona 5. Arkansas 6. California 7. Colorado 8. Connecticut 9. Delaware 10. District of Columbia 11. Florida 12. Georgia 13. Guam 14. Hawaii 15. Idaho 16. Illinois 17. Indiana 18. Iowa 19. Kansas 20. Kentucky 21. Louisiana 22. Maine 23. Maryland

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 24. Massachusetts 25. Michigan 26. Minnesota 27. Mississippi 28. Missouri 29. Montana 30. Nebraska 31. Nevada 32. New Hampshire 33. New Jersey 34. New Mexico 35. New York 36. North Carolina 37. North Dakota 38. Northern Marianas Islands 39. Ohio 40. Oklahoma 41. Oregon 42. Pennsylvania 43. Puerto Rico 44. Rhode Island 45. South Carolina 46. South Dakota 47. Tennessee 48. Texas 49. Utah 50. Vermont 51. Virginia 52. Virgin Islands 53. Washington 54. West Virginia 55. Wisconsin 56. Wyoming 57. Move around a lot within the U.S. 58. Lived overseas (non-US country) 99. Don't know
Q74	RACE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. White or Caucasian (not Hispanic) 2. Hispanic 3. Asian American 4. Black or African-American (not Hispanic) 5. American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut 6. Pacific Islander 7. Other (specified) 8. Prefer not to answer
Q75	GENDER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Male 2. Female

Appendix C: Active-duty Military Home of Record (HOR) Population by State as a Percentage of the Voting Eligible Population (VEP)

State	HOR Total	VEP	DOD Pct
Unknown ²⁸	390,253		
Alabama	21,502	3,298,398	0.65%
Alaska	2,965	444,473	0.67%
Arizona	19,174	3,508,505	0.55%
Arkansas	9,837	1,958,922	0.50%
California	103,472	20,979,660	0.49%
Colorado	15,415	3,139,806	0.49%
Connecticut	7,079	2,465,669	0.29%
Delaward	2,251	579,294	0.39%
District of Columbia	1,458	438,201	0.33%
Florida	66,050	11,546,914	0.57%
Georgia	34,030	5,781,729	0.59%
Hawaii	5,125	887,931	0.58%
Idaho	5,764	947,302	0.61%
Illinois	35,053	8,810,724	0.40%
Indiana	17,914	4,510,774	0.40%
Iowa	8,466	2,174,806	0.39%
Kansas	9,452	1,890,455	0.50%
Kentucky	11,847	3,042,613	0.39%
Louisiana	19,341	3,219,060	0.60%
Maine	5,229	1,023,903	0.51%
Maryland	19,028	3,759,694	0.51%
Massachusetts	12,084	4,603,023	0.26%
Michigan	28,417	7,292,820	0.39%
Minnesota	10,797	3,682,001	0.29%
Mississippi	11,747	2,074,244	0.57%
Missouri	19,626	4,133,315	0.47%
Montana	5,225	708,691	0.74%
Nebraska	6,066	1,223,642	0.50%
Nevada	6,945	1,495,627	0.46%
New Hampshire	4,257	963,569	0.44%
New Jersey	19,666	5,637,378	0.35%
New Mexico	7,649	1,310,252	0.58%
New York	53,492	12,958,958	0.41%
North Carolina	31,456	5,995,045	0.52%
North Dakota	2,056	484,526	0.42%

²⁸ The Unknowns in this table are all United States Air Force personnel. During the time period from which this table's data was drawn, the Air Force did not report home of record data.

Ohio	35,741	8,471,152	0.42%
Oklahoma	14,399	2,495,323	0.58%
Oregon	13,184	2,626,437	0.50%
Pennsylvania	36,725	9,273,421	0.40%
Rhode Island	2,547	744,909	0.34%
South Carolina	20,314	3,069,791	0.66%
South Dakota	3,082	563,178	0.55%
Tennessee	17,908	4,306,650	0.42%
Texas	94,385	13,890,814	0.68%
Utah	5,709	1,518,074	0.38%
Vermont	1,766	474,713	0.37%
Virginia	33,160	5,240,509	0.63%
Washington	23,365	4,276,814	0.55%
West Virginia	6,715	1,419,464	0.47%
Wisconsin	14,225	3,930,978	0.36%
Wyoming	2,793	378,135	0.74%
TOTAL	1,387,600	204,418,082	0.68%

Appendix D: U.S. Military Enlisted Rank/Pay-grade Structure

Pay- grade	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
E-1	Private	Seaman Recruit	Private	Airman Basic
E-2	Private	Seaman Apprentice	Private First Class	Airman
E-3	Private First Class	Seaman	Lance Corporal	Airman First Class
E-4	Corporal Specialist	Petty Officer Third Class	Corporal	Senior Airman
E-5	Sergeant	Petty Officer Second Class	Sergeant	Staff Sergeant
E-6	Staff Sergeant	Petty Officer First Class	Staff Sergeant	Technical Sergeant
E-7	Sergeant First Class	Chief Petty Officer	Gunnery Sergeant	Master Sergeant
E-8	Master Sergeant First Sergeant	Senior Chief Petty Officer	First Sergeant Master Sergeant	Senior Master Sergeant
E-9	Sergeant Major	Master Chief Petty Officer	Sergeant Major Master Gunnery Sergeant	Chief Master Sergeant

Appendix E: Communication in Support of Research

October 13, 2008

Dr. Chu,

In conjunction with the University of Texas, I am conducting research into the political attitudes and behavior of American military enlisted personnel. As you know, Dr. Peter Feaver has done extensive research into officers, but little valid data has been collected with respect to enlisted personnel

I have developed an online survey and would like to reach at least 4,000 respondents. If this is possible, I would be happy to talk with your point of contact, show and discuss the proposed survey, and make any modifications you deem necessary to ensure it is compliant with the law and regulation.

Don Inbody

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Vita

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