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Classical Pragmatism does NOT need an Upgrade:
Lessons for Public Administration

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Rorty’s “importance to public administration seems limited simply to his pointing the field back to – and thereby contributing to a revival of – John Dewey” (Snider, 2005, p. 246).

Administration and Society is to be applauded for promoting scholarly dialogue in Disputatio Sine Fine. The recent debate initiated by my article “The Community of Inquiry: Classical Pragmatism and Public Administration” and propelled by Hugh Miller’s “Why Old Pragmatism needs an Upgrade,” is an example.

Classical pragmatism is a comprehensive, sophisticated, philosophy that offers public administration a way to unite and focus the field. When Hugh Miller attempted to show how an “upgraded” pragmatism was better for public administration he sparked a debate many classical pragmatist were eager to enter. Rorty and French variety postmodern philosophers are well represented in public administration discourse. Aside from Hugh Miller there are many influential promoters such as David Farmer, Richard Box, Camilla Stivers, Ralph Hummel, Cheryl King, O.C. McSwite and the late Charles Fox.

Hugh Miller’s (2004) “Upgrade” article provided an opportunity for debate that many classical pragmatists have been waiting for. (1)  Hickman (2004, p. 469) noted that promoters of neopragmatism such as Miller “have contributed to misreadings of classical
 pragmatism of Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey.” This debate gave us an
opportunity to address the misreading and to point out the advantages of classical
pragmatism. (2) We want PA to consider flying “Air Pragmatism” (Snider, 2005, p. 244).

I enjoyed the interchange and was pleased with the diversity of the participants.
Two philosophers, Larry Hickman and David Hildebrand, an institutional economist,
James Webb and a practitioner, Greg Stolcis, joined the discussion. Keith Snider, Karen
Evans and I represent PA /Dewey scholars while Hugh Miller argued for Rorty’s
position. My goal in this last segment is to make sense out of the discourse. What are the
key points of all the participants and how do they fit together? What roads did they travel
and where do we stand?

To do this I will first, address some of the issues raised by Miller (2004 and 2005)
and others. Second, I will examine Miller’s (2004, p. 243) initial working hypothesis “If
we upgraded pragmatism from the old ‘classic’ version, public administration would
work better.” Miller (2005), Hickman (2004) and Hildebrand (2005) all point out that
there are substantial similarities between neopragmatism and classical pragmatism. Each
has a postmodern origin in the sense that they “reject certain epistemological claims
advanced by thinkers from Descartes through Kant and beyond” (Hickman, 2004:497).
Nevertheless, the Disputatio discussion focused on the considerable differences between
classical and neopragmatism as well as their implications for public administration theory
and practice.

Dogmatism

Hugh Miller (2005) was dismayed that Shields, Webb, Stolcis and Hickman
found his interpretation of classical pragmatism “wrong.” He took this as a sign of
dogmatism within a group of supposedly open-minded pragmatists. Perhaps, we reacted to the title of Miller’s (2004, p.243) article “Why Old Pragmatism Needs an Upgrade.” Or, disagreed with assertions like an upgraded pragmatism would lead to a public administration that “worked better,” or “old” pragmatism is a “vulgar instrument” a “decoy for certain deontological foundations” (p. 245). Not surprisingly, these assertions led us to believe that Miller found things in classical pragmatism that were not quite right (or maybe wrong?). Using Miller’s contrived criteria, both sides could be accused of dogmatism. My sense is that each author used strong words to make a point and none can be classified as dogmatists. If one were to read the complete works of any of the contributors to this debate, it would be hard to find a hint of dogmatism. We were all attracted to pragmatism for its lack of dogmatism.

What is Neopragmatism?

James Webb (2004) and Greg Stolcis (2004) noted Miller’s (2004) claim that Rorty’s version of pragmatism would make Public Administration better. Both argued that his claim lacked substance because he failed to define or compare pragmatism and neopragmatism. I agree with Snider (2005, p.243), Miller did not intend a “detailed analysis of either Deweyan or Rortyan pragmatism.” Nevertheless, by avoiding this issue in both responses, Miller left the definitions to the other participants. Webb (2004) and Hildebrandt (2005) did a particularly effective job of drawing out the distinctions. (3) Webb linked Rortyan pragmatism to larger concerns he had with contemporary postmodern philosophies. Although his language was a bit strong for Miller, Webb’s points were on target. I was disappointed that Miller chose to ignore Webb’s well-documented and reasoned arguments, that I believe spoke to the heart of the debate. (4) In contrast, Miller took issue with Stolcis’ use of the term *ad hominem.* (5)
Karen Evans (2005) and Keith Snider (2005) reframed the debate. Both noted that PA has never fully embraced classical pragmatism. Thus it would be difficult to dismiss something that has not truly been tried or acknowledged. (6) Both clearly articulated the value of classical pragmatism for public administration. Evans (2005, p254-255) makes the most sweeping claim - Dewey’s ideas about community, democracy and certainty can help PA address the many problematic situations engender by the fragmented state of our current society (Evans, 2005, p. 254-255).

The Elephant Revisited (again)

In the original “community of inquiry” article I used the Zen Buddha “blind men and the elephant” tale as a metaphor to illustrate the community of inquiry concept. As a “community of inquiry,” the blind men would no longer view the elephant from the limited perspective of (it’s a rope – tail; it’s a fan – ear). They would face the problematic situation (given to them by the king – “tell him what an elephant was like.”) by engaging the world (smelling, touching, feeling) and forming working hypotheses about the nature of the elephant (scientific attitude) (Kyoki, 1993, p. 148). They would then discuss their reasoning and findings with an open mind (participatory democracy). The pragmatic insight is that in the long run they would have a better sense of “what an elephant was like,” than if they stayed in their little world using neither the scientific attitude nor participatory democracy. (7)

Since Miller’s original problem with this conceptualization was the scientific attitude, and its inherent empirical nature (touching, smelling, feeling the elephant), I assumed that the part of the story Miller believed needed upgrading was the touching, feeling, smelling part. Indeed, he had trouble with my example because the classical
pragmatists blind men had objectified the magnificent creature. (Miller, 2005, p. ?) When I suggested that the scene would look very different in a Rortyan world because his philosophy was non empirical, I was simply trying to illustrate in a stark way the differences between the approaches. If indeed, the presumption that the Rortyan blind men would feel, touch, smell and measure the elephant is an “absurd dismissal of Rorty’s linguistic turn” (Miller 2005 p?): What is the difference between the two approaches?

Miller (2005, p?) also notes that these “blind fellows would talk it over amongst themselves and finally depart, secure in the illusion that they experienced her when all they have done is reduce the elephant to an object of their instrumental purposes. Indeed they have reduced her to a moment in their experience.” This sentence illustrates the problem with Miller’s “simplistic and mistaken” conceptualization of Dewey’s notion of experience (Hildebrandt, 2005,p.? ) Dewey does not reduce experience to an objectified “moment” as Miller and Rorty charge. “For Dewey, experience – or better ‘experiencing’ – is what might just be called ‘life’ or ‘living’…Experience is where we start when we encounter a problem, what we do when we reason out possible solutions and what we go through to test those solutions to our intellectual and emotional satisfaction” (Hildebrand, 2005, p.?).

The complexity of Dewey’s (1934, pp.22&23) rich, vibrant notion of experience is captured in these quotes from Art as Experience.

“The senses are the organs through which the live creature participates directly in the ongoings of the world about him. In this participation the varied wonders and splendor of this world are made actual for him in the quality he experiences…Experience is the result, the sign, and the reward of the interaction of organism and environment which,
when it is carried to the full, is transformation of interaction into participation and communication.” (Dewey, 1934, p.22)

Using the Deweyan notion of experience, sensing the elephant is an opportunity to participate in the “wonders and splendor of this world” and a “transformation into participation and communication” not objectification as Miller maintains. Further, Dewey’s conceptualization of experience could lead the blind men to discover that they were dealing with a “magnificent creature” and to a radical change in their end-in-view.(8) There is no reason to believe that the “transformation of interaction into participation and communication” would not have included the elephant.

And surely, Miller’s suggestion that the magnificent elephant had been reduced to a moment in their space/time misrepresents Dewey.

“Space thus becomes something more than a void in which to roam about, dotted here and there with dangerous things and things that satisfy the appetite. It becomes a comprehensive and enclosed scene within which are ordered the multiplicity of doings and undergoings in which man engages. Time ceases to be either the endless and uniform flow or the succession of instantaneous points which some philosophers have asserted it to be. It, too, is the organized and organizing medium of the rhythmic ebb and flow of expectant impulse, forward and retracted movement, resistant and suspense, with fulfillment and consummation…..Time as organization in change is growth and growth signifies that a varied series of change enters upon intervals of pause and rest.” (Dewey, 1934, p.23)
These citations from Dewey reaffirm David Hildebrand’s (2005, p.) key points about Dewey’s notion of experience. Experience “is not just an intellectual or linguistic affair. We both ‘have’ and ‘undergo’ experience and later we may come to know it.”

Thankfully, Greg Stolcis takes us out of the world of ideas and elephants and provides a conceptualization of public administration practitioner experience. The links between Dewey’s discussion and Stolcis are obvious. Practitioner experience is far from Miller’s (2005) “objectified” moment or a “concept about reality” (Miller, 2004 p. 244). Stolcis’ (2004) discussion of practitioner experience captures for PA Dewey’s “transformation of interaction into participation and communication” as well as the “multiplicity of doings and undergoings.”

According to Greg Stolcis (2004, p. 364) practitioner experience is “anything but a vague concept.” These experiences

“are an accumulation of jobs we have performed, tasks we have accomplished, roles we have assumed, skills we have acquired, and decisions (and the resulting consequences!) we have made. These forces combine to shape our understanding of relevant and applicable public administration theory and guide our actions in trying to assist the citizenry who pay our salaries. In this context, experience is active and engaged participation in events or activities that lead to the accumulation of applicable knowledge and skills.”

Why take something as valuable and integral to public administration as practitioner experience and toss it, as Miller’s neopragmatism would have us do?
Epistemic Community

Hugh Miller was first drawn to my 2003 “Community of Inquiry” article because he saw a kinship with “The Epistemic Community” - a 2001 article he wrote with the late Charles Fox. I went to the “Epistemic Community” looking for the connection between it and this discourse. The style, substance and orientation of the two articles are very different. They are, however, analogous in the sense that ‘the epistemic community is to neopragmatism as the community of inquiry is to classical pragmatism.’

Although it is impossible to do justice to Miller and Fox’s insightful article a brief summary follows. According to Miller and Fox (2001) knowledge problems are addressed through epistemic communities. The processes used by epistemic communities to address knowledge problems are an alternative to the “protocols of logical positivism” (p. 668) that permeate academic thought and so-called knowledge accumulation processes. The epistemic community is a “a group of inquirers who have knowledge problems to solve. An epistemic community produces small-t local truth and not big-T universal Truth” (p. 668).

As far as I could tell, the epistemic community is composed of scholars and is not particularly concerned with the world of practice. (9) Knowledge problems are found within these communities of inquiry, where members of the community share a unique linguistic system and norms of inquiry. They also investigate their “own traditions, practices and projects” (p. 669). Accordingly, knowledge is a sociological endeavor, which is tempered by perspectival truth, intentionality, cultural practices and critically, for purposes of this discussion, - language.
“Words… are tethered to the rules of situated language games and to the human participants. Hence, words were not moored to objects of some external reality. Words do not exist outside of participants’ meaning making in a community” (Miller and Fox 2001, p.680). Thus the language of the epistemic community is not linked to an external reality. The epistemic community, conveniently, does not suffer from the “correspondence theory” problem that Miller associates with classical pragmatism.

Upon finishing Miller and Fox’s “Epistemic Community” I immediately thought of an article I wrote in 1989 that contrasted the views of the economist, social worker and public administrator as they conceptualized fees in human services. The point of the article was to demonstrate how vastly different policy communities could be. To the economist, the fee was a price – the market’s centerpiece of allocative efficiency. (10) Social work conceptualized the fee as a treatment modality using Freud’s psychoanalytic theories of development. (11) The language of consumers and prices contrasted sharply with patients and treatment. Indeed, I concluded, “At times economics and social work seemed like ships in the night silently passing one another, their captains and crews speaking alien languages pursuing conflicting objectives” (Shields, 1989, p.71). Upon reflection, it seemed I had inadvertently illustrated Miller and Fox’s epistemic communities. The social worker and economist are part of epistemic communities who frame the knowledge problem of fees in human services.

**Where does Public Administration fit?**

What if we revisited the world of human service fees through the lenses of classical pragmatism and neopragmatism? How would knowledge of the epistemic community or the community of inquiry help a public administrator facing a problematic
situation? I believe the classical pragmatist’s community of inquiry better suits the public administrator, even if the economist and social worker belong to epistemic communities. Public administration problematic situations cross disciplinary and professional boundaries. It is the world of practice and experience. The administrator should think and act outside the parameters of an epistemic community. The truth claims of academic epistemic communities like economics are perhaps useful and can play a limited role in defining or resolving the problematic situation. But when the problem is in the real world of public administration, the administrator/problem re-solver needs to work across epistemic communities and the tools of classical pragmatism (the community of inquiry) have immediate relevance. Further, because practitioner experience is valued and an integral part of knowledge creation, classical pragmatism, unlike neopragmatism, has an immediate, compelling role for the practitioner. The following example is illustrative.

Consider two problematic situations dealing with fees that a public administrator in a human service agency might face. In one she is charged with leading a task force to review the clinic’s fee structure to make recommendations for change. In the second scenario she must address an expected shortfall in the budget. In both cases, I believe classical pragmatism’s community of inquiry would better serve the public administrator.

In each situation one would expect that a diverse group of people would coalesced around the problematic situation (the community). Knowledge that economists and social workers are part of epistemic communities with unique languages would be a useful insight. But where would the savvy practitioner go from there? The public administrator would need the listening and mediating skills of the community of inquiry as people from
different backgrounds and experiences (client representative, board member from the business community, economist, social worker, accountant) contributed to defining/refining the problematic situation, articulating an end-in-view, developing the hypotheses of inquiry, collecting and analyzing evidence and making recommendations. (12)

The administrator schooled in classical pragmatism, would treat the theories of the participants as tools that can be used to resolve the problematic situation. No one in the group carries a big T–Truth as a trump card. Unfortunately, Miller and Fox’s epistemic communities or scholarly guilds with their own “norms, practices and curiosities” (Miller, 2005 fn 2) are not interested in the world of public administration practice – a world where people with diverse backgrounds, and professional languages come together to address problematic situations. It is ironic that Miller (2004, p.248 ) concludes in his first article in this series that the art of governance “is about problems that arise from the situation and developing the capacity and competence to deal with them.” Problematic situations in public administration occur outside the narrow, elitist, privileged confines of an epistemic community (Evans, 2005, p. 253). The community of inquiry, on the other hand, includes all those interested in resolving the problematic situation. It could include people from different epistemic communities as well as citizens, patients, students, neighbors, engineers, accountants, politicians, social workers, environmentalists, the business community etc. (13)

In this world where language systems can collide the capacity to creatively define the problematic situation, develop hypothetical approaches to problem resolution (big and small steps), listen, and collect evidence are needed. These are all skills/practices
emphasized in the community of inquiry. Classical pragmatism has daily and immediate resonance in the world of practice (Evans, 2005).

And unlike the neo-pragmatism, a mind independent existence is taken as given. Hugh Miller (2005, ) chided me because I subscribe “to the myth of the given, borrowed from the dogma of empiricism.” I do not have a problem being accused of taking some form of existence as given. This may be the essential difference between the two positions that makes classical pragmatism attractive for public administration. Dewey describes Miller’s concern as the “external world problem.”

I call it [the external world problem] a curiosity, for if anything seems adequately grounded empirically it is the existence of a world which resists the characteristic functions of experience; which goes it way, in some respects independently of the functions, and which frustrates our hopes and intentions. Ignorance which is fatal; disappointment; the need of adjusting means and ends to the course of nature, would seem to be facts sufficiently characterized empirical situations as to render the existence of an external world indubitable. (Dewey, 1985, p. 18)

Maps and the External world

Raymond Boisvert (1998) argues that mapping is a good metaphor for Dewey’s view of the external world and his metaphysics. Maps are a piece of paper or an image in cyberspace and of course not reality. Yet maps represent a reality and importantly, allow us to navigate in the external world. Boisbert (1998, p. 150) contrasts Dewey’s mapping metaphor with traditional metaphysics “that have sought to discover a central, unassailable starting point (sense data, atoms, protocol sentences, innate ideas) upon
which can be erected a logically consistent, rigorously developed system. The guiding images has been that of an edifice meticulously constructed upon a single foundation.” Miller (2004, 2005) associates this traditional image with classical pragmatism.

The mapping metaphor takes into account the anti-foundational nature of classical pragmatism and illustrates how classical pragmatism deals with the “external reality problem.” First, maps are constructed taking into account certain interests (navigation vs. political). There is no claim of detached disinterest. Second, mapping involves selectivity and choice. Mapmakers take a three dimensional world and translate it to a two dimensional map. In the process they distort and make choices that account for the interests of the user. As a result, “there is no foundational data. They are, in that sense, ‘given’: we do not invent them. However, as multifarious ‘given’ they represent a limitless concatenation that is unhelpful for intellectual advance. Different interests, different problems, will involve ‘takens,’ those data and perspectives selected as best able to satisfy the interest or resolve the problematic situation”(Boisvert, 1998, p. 150).

Third, maps are provisional. They are “always open to revision, improvement and emendation. The dialogical interplay between data and interests means that no single charting of territory, whether physical or intellectual, should be considered fixed and final” (Boisvert, 1998, p. 151). All maps have distortions. And, maps have practical utility in resolving how to travel from one point to another. The tools of classical pragmatism provide the public administrator with insights of the mapmaker and can help him navigate challenging problematic situations.

Mapmakers combine elements that Rorty and Miller believe to be incompatible. “Their methodology must be empirical, and they are guided by interests. The worst sorts
of one-sided biases can be avoided by keeping in mind the twin ideals of fairness to the data and self-conscious awareness of one’s interests” (Boisvert, 1998, p.151). This is a consciousness that should be adopted by practicing public administrators during inquiry.

The Working Hypothesis Revisited

Hugh Miller (2004, p. 243) began “Why Old Pragmatism Needs an Upgrade” with the working hypothesis “If we upgraded pragmatism from the ‘old’ classic’ version public administration would work better.” Stolcis, Webb, myself and later Hildebrand, Evans and Snider challenged his position with evidence and well reasoned arguments. Why did Miller’s subsequent response fail to mention much less defend his assertion? Instead Miller’s “Residues of Foundationalism in Classical Pragmatism,” made no mention of Public Administration at all. Rather he dealt with a minor (residue?) point raised by Hickman (2004).

Miller missed the big criticisms. Why would PA be better with a philosophy that discredits the possibility of an external reality? (15) Why would PA be better with a philosophy that trivializes practitioner experience? (16) Why would PA be better with a philosophy that speaks to the discipline and not the practice? Why would PA be better with a philosophy that “separates discourse from experience” and thus eliminates its practical usefulness in “examining the quality of assertions about the world” (Webb, 2004. p. 485)? Why would PA be better if it abandoned “public problems to the private sphere” (Evans, 2005, p. 254)? Why would PA be better with a philosophy that discarded the notion of inquiry? Given all these questions, there is yet another, “‘Where’s the Beef’ for Public Administration”(Snider, 2005, p. 243)? (17)
Endnotes

(1) Indeed, Miller’s comment resonates with similar debates that extends beyond public administration and are occurring simultaneously in other fields such as philosophy itself. For example, feminist pragmatists such as Seigfried (1996), Bacchi (1992), Kaufman-Osborn (1993), and Duran (1993) argue against Rorty’s linguistic pragmatism for reasons similar to those of PA scholars such as Stolcis (2004), Snider (2005), Evans (2005) and Shields (2004). Experience matters. Carol Bacchi’s (1992) “‘Pragmatism’ be Damned: Richard Rorty’s Death wish for Feminism” suggests the debate is very hot.

(2) My first reaction to reading Miller’s upgrade article was that he was unfamiliar with the Dewey I knew. This view was reinforced when I examined Miller’s bibliography. There was no reference to Dewey or prominent contemporary Dewey scholars. His other works such as Miller (1994), Fox and Miller (1996), Miller (2004), Miller and Fox (2001), Miller (2002a&b), Bogason, Miller and Kensen,(2002), Miller (2000) also do not include references to Dewey (or Peirce & James). Clearly Miller’s agenda in those works was not to define or even question classical pragmatism. His lack of Dewey sources is not problematic just further evidence that he is not familiar with Dewey. In the “Up-grade” article, however, the lack of Dewey sources is problematic. How can he assert something needs an upgrade without a reference to the original ideas? I agree with Webb (2004, p. 480) “there is no indication that Miller has direct knowledge of classical pragmatism either through the writings of Dewey or Peirce or through the numerous contemporary classical pragmatists.”
(3) Webb (2004, p. 481-484) effectively challenged Miller’s assumptions. He did a thorough job of demonstrating how Miller’s assumptions about Kuhn were incomplete.

(4) Miller (2005 fn2) claimed that James Webb’s paper was an “unoriginal rehearsal of well-known (and well-refuted) attacks on Rorty.” Unfortunately, Miller provided no evidence that the attacks were well-known, unoriginal or well-refuted. I would have appreciated several references that backed such a statement. I advise a careful reading of David Hildebrand’s (2003) insightful book Beyond Realism and Anti-realism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatist to see that Webb’s “assertion of a realism-that-rejects foundationalism” is far from “dubious” (Miller, 2005, fn2).

(5) Miller (2005, p.?) claimed that ad hominen means “to the person” and that Stolcis was making a personal attack. I checked a handy 1967 version of Webster’s dictionary and found the following definition of ad hominen, “appealing to a person’s feelings or prejudices rather than his intellect” (p.11). Stolcis was using this definition when he asserted that Miller’s (2004, p. 247) statement “new pragmatism sees liberty not as an abstract political belief but as a practice that enables the discourse to be democratic” was “pure ad hominem” (or appealing to emotion rather than intellect or evidence) because Miller’s statement implied that “our political discourse has been, to this point nondemocratic” (Stolcis, 2004,p. 365). The use of ad hominen in the Webster (1967) sense is certainly reinforced by Stolcis’ next questions, “How can Miller objectively make this claim? Moreover, how can he prove it?”
While checking a 2000 version of the *American Heritage Dictionary*, I learned that the term *ad hominen* is undergoing a usage change. “The phrase now chiefly describes an argument based on failings of an adversary rather than the merits of the case” (*American Heritage*, 2000, p. 21). Miller reacted to Stolicis’ statement assuming the more current usage. He was understandably upset. A careful review of the sentence surrounding Stolcis’ use of *ad hominen* makes it clear; he was employing the earlier usage. It is unfortunate that our scholarly debate got caught in the midst of a change in usage of an emotionally laden term.

(6) See Snider (2000a and 200b) for an extensive discussion on the topic.

(7) I used the blind men and the elephant example to illustrate the community of inquiry concept. I didn’t “want the blind men to confront their problematic situation” adopting classical pragmatism as Miller (2005, p.) suggests. Further, the use of the blind men is critical. The blind men will never figure out what an elephant is like. They are blind and will “never see the elephant (know truth)”. As a community of inquiry, however, they are “not trapped inside their limited selves with no chance of getting closer to the nature of the elephant” (Shields, 2004, p.352).

(8) Miller takes exception to treating the elephant as an object of inquiry that is poked and smelled, rather than taken as the “grand and dignified elephant she is” (Miller, 2005). Where would knowledge that the fan or rope was a “grand and dignified” animal come from in the first place? Perhaps it’s from Miller’s God’s-eye-view.
(9) Perhaps this is why Hugh Miller (2005) chided our practitioner, Greg Stolcis (2004, p.363) for admitting confusion about just exactly what Miller meant by neopragmatism and asking for a matrix or table that summarized the differences between the two. I for one was also confused by just exactly what Miller meant and would, like Stolcis, have appreciated a table. Thankfully, the philosopher, David Hildebrand (2005, p?) responded to Stolcis’ request and provided a useful table.

(10) The example of an economist is particularly relevant here because economists are probably the prototype example of logical positivism in social science. If economists are part of an epistemic community, their place of privilege in policy analysis would be diminished.

(11) During the 1930s, Freud’s psychoanalytic theories were adopted by social work in order to provide a much needed “scientific” base (Austin 1986). Freud believed that fees had a therapeutic value. Successful treatment, in part, was dependent upon patients paying what they could reasonably afford (Shields, 1989 p. 68). Ironically, social work practitioners have found Jane Addams’ pragmatism as a relevant framing device (Glaser, 2001).

(12) It should be noted that this list of activities would not necessarily occur in a neat orderly sequence. For example, the problematic situation may be redefined as data is collected. This in turn could lead to different working hypotheses and different approaches to data collection. David Hildebrand (2005, p.?) makes this point when he outlined the five phases of inquiry described in Dewey’s (1910) *How We Think*. 
(13) John Bartle’s (Forthcoming) chapter “Transportation Infrastructure,” in *Handbook of Public Sector Economics*, points out all the different groups that influence transportation policy and concludes that classical pragmatism is an approach worth exploring.

(14) In the 16th century a tool that would accurately guide navigation of the Atlantic was a chief aim of mapmakers. As a result, the landmass of North and South America were distorted.

(15) This question appeals to common sense. If one were to ask a set of practitioners whether there is an external reality they would look at you as if you were crazy. Yes we live in a world where jails can be cold, poor people can be hungry, bullets kill soldiers, car accidents and gridlock are possible, budget cycles influence agency activities. It makes sense to have a philosophy that takes into account practitioner external reality.

(16) Both Stolcis (2004) and Shields (2004) emphasized the practitioner-centered nature of classical pragmatism as one of its chief attractions. While journal articles are clearly targeted at an audience of scholars, in this case discussion of the role of practitioners was a central theme of two of the contributors. Miller ignored the practitioner and trivialized her experience by dismissing it as foundational. In both Miller’s replies and the “Epistemic Community” the practitioner is never mentioned. His emphasis is on the scholarly guild.

(17) In the last footnote of Miller’s (2005) “Residues” article he took me to task for incorrectly and inappropriately assigning him views on justice. I could not finish this paper without addressing his comment.
In his 2004 “Upgrade” article, Miller noted that classical pragmatism “was opposed to unwarranted attempts to infuse discourse with a priori moral foundations” (p.244). He claimed that in the 2003 “Community of Inquiry” article, I had violated this by smuggling in my “own normative favorites” efficiency and equity (p. 245). First of all, how could he know my favorite norms? Second, I was not illustrating moral foundations, rather norms that many people bring with them to a problematic situation in public administration. A norm could also be an inherent part of the problematic situation. Problematic situations are not value free, neither are they grounded in foundational values. I used justice to illustrate this because it fit in the context of the detectives’ example. Given, Miller’s concern over my use of justice, perhaps he gives justice more normative value than equity.

REFERENCES


