Three Philosophies Behind Public Administration's Research
Tradition

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Public Administration has had a history of difficulty and confusion defining itself. Evidence of this confusion can be found in the theory/practice debate. Part of the confusion stems from the way the research/theory/practice problem is conceptualized. For example, some academics argue that the discipline of Public Administration[1] needs more rigor and stature. Using the norms of science, they seek explanatory theories with empirical import.[2] Another group of academics is concerned about the norms of science being inappropriately applied to Public Administration. [3]They are critical of the logical positivist philosophic tradition introduced by Herbert Simon (1945) in *Administrative Behavior*. Finally, the practitioner asks a wholly different question: What is the use of theory? How can it help me do my job?

The differences in these perspectives led me to ask; Just what were the philosophic traditions that underlie the debate and approaches to public administration as either a field of study or a world of practice? Could confusion over unstated philosophic assumptions be hampering productive dialogue? Could these seemingly conflicting positions live under one larger umbrella?

This paper is a preliminary attempt to explore three modern philosophical traditions and link them to Public Administration theory and practice. Logical positivism, logical empiricism and pragmatism will be examined. In many ways these three philosophical traditions are similar. Elements of the scientific method such as the importance of empirical evidence and hypotheses are central to each. In other ways they are diverse; for example, the role of ethics, logic and aesthetics are treated differently.

To begin addressing this puzzle, I went to a group of philosophers. They suggested Alfred Ayer as an archetypal logical positivist. After studying Ayer and corroborating his position through the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, I could see that economics (my home discipline) followed very closely the formula outlined by Ayer. However, the logical positivism described by Ayer did not really fit the type of reasoning that Simon advocated. I had a sense that PA critics of logical positivism and Simon were not really criticizing this formal ideal type logical positivism. It seemed

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[1]   Barry Bozeman and Jeffrey Straussman (1984:1) distinguish between public administration and Public Administration. The lower case version refers to the practice of public administration and the upper case version refers to the discipline or field of study. This is a useful distinction and will be used through the paper.

[2]   In many ways the *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* came into being in response to this concern. Ideally this journal promotes sound explanatory theory which is tested empirically.

[3]   See for example, Denhardt, 1984; Stillman, 1990; Waldo, 1965.

more accurate to say critics were unhappy because Simon was interested in developing a "science of administration." His position was less rigid and less sterile than Ayer's logical positivism. The direction he led PA toward seemed closer to Hemple and Carnap who focused on the philosophy of science as a field of study. Brauch Brody and Richard Grandy (1989:xii) in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science* describe Hemple and Carnap's position as logical empiricism. It is also considered the classical view of the philosophy of science. This group of philosophers "produced a powerful persuasive conception of scientific enterprise that do not agree with the basic presuppositions of logical positivism."

Whether it is called logical positivism or logical empiricism there is still dissatisfaction over its influence within PA. Both of these techniques are far removed from the world of practicing public administrators. Critics maintain that neither apply to the real world of administration. On the other hand, the philosophy of pragmatism is firmly planted in the tangled muddy world of experience and addresses many of the issues from the practitioners perspective (Shields, forthcoming). In addition, philosophers of science such as Abraham Kaplan (1965) advocate the pragmatic approach as an underlying philosophic tradition for the social and behavioral sciences. Hence, pragmatism is an approach compatible with social scientific inquiry and with the "common sense," "what works?" world of the practitioner.

Three Philosophic Traditions

In the next section the three traditions are briefly described. The five major branches of philosophy (epistemology, metaphysics, logic, ethics, aesthetics) and the philosophy of science are used as a descriptive, organizing device. These criteria were chosen because the traditional branches of philosophy provide a comprehensive comparative framework. The philosophy of science was chosen because it is a specific subject matter of philosophy which defines many of the conflicts in PA research and theory. The comparison is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1

Comparison of Logical Positivism, Logical Empiricists and Pragmatism

Subjects of philosophy	Philosophical School		
	Logical Positivism	**Logical Empiricism**	**Pragmatism**
Epistemology *(nature of knowledge)*	-The principal of verification is used for the criteria of truth. -Uses a narrowly defined (sense content) experimental model -Analytic and empirical verification are distinguished. -Truth is not fixed or absolute.	-The principal of falsification is used as a criteria of truth -Truth is not fixed or absolute	-What works. -The truth of a notion is traced by its "respective practical consequences. ... What difference would it practically make if this notion rather than that notion were true" (James, 1907: 45). - *"True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. ...* (James, 1907: 201). -Truth is not fixed or absolute
	Logical Positivism	**Logical Empiricism**	**Pragmatism**
Metaphysics *(nature of reality)*	-Rejects metaphysics as a legitimate branch of philosophy. -Metaphysics cannot be verified with sense content and is therefore nonsense. -"Real" is what is empirically verifiable. -Fact and value are separate -reality is not fixed or absolute	- Not really concerned with metaphysics as a field of study -reality is not fixed or absolute	-Ultimate causes are not fixed. -A wide variety of experiences are considered real e.g., emotional, religious, aesthetic. Hence, practical consequences can be ascertained and the pragmatic criterion of truth can be applied to metaphysical questions. -Reality is a function of ones conceptual schemes. -The world is as many ways as it can cogently be conceived.
Logic	-Logic is concerned with formal consequences of definitions and not with empirical fact. -Truths of logic are tautologies.	-Concerned with the logical structure of explanatory arguments -concerned with causal relationships and causal laws	-Uses a logic of inquiry. -Naturalistic logic for assessing human experience. -It focuses on pragmatism as a method of learning.

	Logical Positivism	Logical Empiricism	Pragmatism
Ethics	-Rejects transcendent ethics as a legitimate branch of philosophy. -Ethics cannot be verified with sense content and is therefore nonsense.	- ethics is not part of its frame of reference.	-Uses a developmental approach to deal with ethical problems. - Ends-in-view help to anchor moral choices. -Ethical problems may be addressed by forming principles and generalizations that work. These principles should be taken seriously and developed with care. Nevertheless, if conditions change or if new facts appear principles, may be revised. -Moral choices are taken seriously. The conflict between good and evil is real.
Aesthetics	-Rejects aesthetics as a legitimate branch of philosophy. -aesthetics cannot be verified with sense content and is therefore nonsense. -Considers emotions outside the realm of sense experience and therefore cannot be used to verify hypotheses.	- Not concerned with aesthetics as a field of study	-Incorporates and ties aesthetics into the practical consequences associated with experience. -Incorporated emotions as legitimate experience in assessing working hypotheses or consequences. -includes a philosophy of art
	Logical Positivism	**Logical Empiricism**	**Pragmatism**
Philosophy of Science	-Verification was employed as a criteria of demarcation to draw distinctions between scientific and unscientific statements. - major focus of logical positivism -the philosophers "function is to clarify the propositions of science by exhibiting their logical relationships, and by defining the symbols which occur in them"(Ayer, 1952:32).	Seeks an answer to the "Why" question - Truth rest on explanatory relevance (theory) and testability -Statistical explanation is legitimate -major focus of logical empiricists	Instrumentalism "It identifies the procedures of analyzing concepts by an attempt to get at the use that is made of them. ... The meaning is scientifically valid only if what they intend by it becomes actual: problems are solved and intentions are fulfilled as inquiry continues" (Kaplan, 1964: 46). One of many concerns of the pragmatists

The sources for this table are : Ayer, 1952; The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Vols. 5&6 ; Brody and Grandy, 1989; James, 1907; Kaplan, 1964; Hempel, 1965 and various Dewey references.

Logical Positivism

Logical positivism is an approach which maintains that philosophy should deal with what is and not what ought to be. Logical positivism emphasizes, empiricism, analysis, and logic. It

focuses on epistemology and logic as the only legitimate branches of philosophy. Verification is used as a criteria for truth.[4] It is a philosophic approach that applies the methods of the hard sciences to the larger philosophical discourse. It uses hypotheses and focuses on 'facts' that can be empirically measured or verified through sense content. Ironically, logical positivism as defined by Ayer has been rejected by modern philosophers because the verification principle cannot be verified. Nevertheless logical positivism has had enduring influence on social science[5].

Earlier I suggested that Ayer's logical positivism really described Economics better than Public Administration. This parallel came through most clearly in Ayer's discussion of propositions. Ayer divides the world into propositions that can be verified by sense content and those that

> comprise the a priori propositions of logic and pure mathematics and these ...[are]...necessary and certain only because they are analytic... these propositions cannot be confuted in experience... that is they do not make assertions about the empirical world (Ayer, 1952: 31).

Economics like physics uses much of what Ayer would classify as analytic propositions.

> The truths of logic and mathematics are analytic propositions or tautologies... [a] proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definition of the symbols it contains, and synthetic when its validity is determined by the facts of experience" (Ayer, 1952: 77-78).

Ayer was using physics as exemplary here. Logical Positivism accepted, for example, the application of calculus to analytic propositions that had been reduced to mathematical symbols. By using the algebra of change (calculus) it was possible to "reveal unsuspected implications" within the propositions.

> [T]here is a sense in which analytic propositions do give us new knowledge. They call attention to linguistic usages, of which we might otherwise not be conscious, and they *reveal unsuspected implications* in our assertions and beliefs. But we can see also that there is a sense in which they may be said to add nothing to our knowledge. For they tell us what we may be said to know already.(Ayer, 1952: 79) (italics added).

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[4] "[T]he principle of verification is supposed to furnish a criterion by which it can be determined whether or not a sentence is literally meaningful" (Ayer, 1952:.5).

[5] It should be noted that many social sciences such as economics, political science, operations research, etc., have embraced logical positivism and the rational model. Further, over the last 30 years, policy and management prescriptions based on the logic of positivism and the rational model have been widely adopted. Not surprisingly, both theory and policy have been criticized. Academics such as Amitai Etzioni (1988), focus on the absence of ethics and the inaccurate assumptions about human motivation in their criticism. Hence, critics of logical positivism within Public Administration are part of a larger trend.

Science could thus be advanced without empirical verification. Social sciences like Economics drew from the logical positivist model as they became more mathematical.[6]   Ironically, Simon is concerned about the application of math to social science. Mathematical social science is first and foremost, social science. If it is bad social science (i.e., empirically false), the fact that it is good mathematics (i.e., logically consistent) should provide little comfort" (Simon, 1957: 388).

One of the most obvious features of Ayer's logical positivism is that he has an agenda. He wants to transform philosophy as a field of study. His first chapter is entitled "The Elimination of Metaphysics." Ayer (1952: 34) asserts

> [W]e maintain that no statement that refers to a 'reality' transcending the limits of all sense-experience can possibly have any literal significance; from which it must follow that the labors of those who have striven to describe such reality have all been devoted to the *production of nonsense*. [italics added]

Aside from metaphysics, Ayer asserts that the domains of ethics and aesthetics are beyond the empirical (cannot be verified with sense content) and thus are not legitimate branches of philosophy (Ayer, 1952). It is from this rejection of ethics, metaphysics and aesthetics that the fact/value dichotomy in PA was born.

It is statements such as this which link Simon (1945: 46) to Logical Positivism.[7]

> To determine whether a proposition is correct, it must be compared directly with experience-with the facts-or it must lead by logical reasoning to other

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[6]   Between 1938 and 1958 most of its early economic theory had been translated to mathematics. The problem was no longer teaching math to economists but of teaching "economics in mathematical terms." Henderson and Quandt, *Microeconomic Theory*, viii. For example, in 1948, Paul Samuelson published his landmark *Foundations of Economics Analysis* and in 1965, R.G.D. Allen published *Mathematical Economics*.

 Economics is conceptual in much the same way as physics. Engineers use properties of physics to build bridges and design airplanes. Similarly, systems analysts use principles of economics to design analytical studies which focus on efficiency and choice among alternatives. The science of physics does not include the details of design and operation. Furthermore, physicists who delve deeply into the details of design and operation are seldom rewarded or recognized by members of their profession. Likewise, economists are seldom rewarded or recognized by members of their discipline when they focus of the problems of implementing a budget or the specifics of a cost effectiveness study. Often, when critics find fault with policy they may look to those closest to the policy and be unaware of the role of the ideas behind the policy.

[7]   In this section of *Administrative Behavior*, Simon cites Ayer and other logical positivists such as Rudolf Carnap as the source for his arguments. Simon proposes a fact value dichotomy, which, he argues provides a better basis for a science of administration and a more appropriate standard for administrative conduct. Simon divides decision premises into two categories: value premises and factual premises. Value premises are ethical statements about what should be done. As such, they may be good or bad, but cannot be true or false (Simon,1945: 47). Factual premises, in contrast, are statements about the observable world. Consequently, it can be determined whether factual premises are true or false (Simon, 1945: 45-46). The factual premises of decisions are the perceived relationships between alternatives and their consequences. Factual premises are true if the alternative selected leads to the predicted set of consequences. (Simon, 1945: 46& 48). They are false if they are not (Fry, 1989: 186)

proposition that can be compared with experience. But factual propositions cannot be derived from ethical ones by any process of reasoning, nor ethical propositions be compared directly with the facts-since they assert 'oughts' rather than facts. Hence, there is no way in which the correctness of ethical propositions can be empirically or rationally tested (Simon, 1945: 46).

Through logical positivism, Simon redefined efficiency and brought rationality in decision making to Public Administration. He also brought a fact-value and (by implication) a cognitive-affective dichotomy (Fry, 1989: 210-212).

My sense is that the modern Public Administration theorists that want to enhance the scholarly rigor of Public Administration research reject the strict fact/value dichotomy as introduced by Simon. In addition, no one is calling for a theory of PA similar to neo-classical economics which is found in micro-economics text books and scholarly Economics journals. Public Administration scholars interested in more rigor , for example, would have no problem with efforts to apply Etzioni's (1988) Socioeconomics theory (which implicitly incorporates a moral dimension and thus integrates fact and value) to Public Administration. It seems safe to assume that Ayer's logical positivism is a historical artifact which, like in philosophy as a whole, is not really a living part of the Public Administration theory debate within academic circles.

Logical Empiricism

Whereas logical positivism clearly seeks to be a general philosophy that is widely applied, logical empiricism is more narrowly applied and its advocates don't have an agenda (elimination of metaphysic, aesthetics and ethics) with the same scope or intensity of Ayer's. Philosophers such as Carl Hemple, Paul Oppenheim, Rudolf Carnap and Nelson Goodman examine the philosophy which underlie science (both social science and physical science). To the extent that "administration is science" elements of the philosophy of science would apply. Using a "hypothetico-deductive" method (Kaplan, 1964:9) these philosophers seek to answer the "why" question. Truth rests on explanatory relevance (theory) and testability. Its logic is concerned with the structure of explanatory arguments, with causal relationships and laws. It does not *reject* metaphysics, ethics and aesthetics as legitimate branches of philosophy, rather, logical empiricism ignores them. These branches of philosophy are not attended to because they are not within the sphere of concerns relevant to science.

The epistemology of the logical empiricism uses the criteria of falsifiability. A hypothesis is falsifiable if it is constructed such that it is possible to obtain information which will refute the hypothesis. Thus science rests on empirical investigation which may reveal the unsuspected and refute the expected. This is an important criteria for certain kinds of public administration research such as program evaluation. Program evaluation research often asks whether a program is

effective.[8] The empirical evidence may suggest that the program is not effective. Thus practitioners of public administration should understand that social science applications to public administration are legitimate because (if designed correctly) they do not automatically confirm expectations (the hypothesis).

When Simon called for a scientific study of administration in *Administrative Behavior* fits. He was applying norms of the philosophy of science to administration. His vision was closer to Hemple than Ayer. It should be noted that logical empiricism also has an implied fact value dichotomy. Aside from program evaluation, many other analytic techniques used in applied Public Administration research such as cost benefit and cost effectiveness analysis fall under the philosophic umbrella of logical empiricism.[9] This umbrella is also inclusive of the PA scholars who seek testable explanatory theories. The fact-value dichotomy remains as a troubling thorn.

Pragmatism

Pragmatism is one of the major philosophies of the 20th century. In addition, it is the United States most noted contribution to the *world* of philosophy. It is broader and more comprehensive than either logical positivism or logical empiricism. In addition, it is also misunderstood.

The pragmatic philosophy posits a unique epistemology. The truth of a notion is traced by its "respective practical consequences. ... What difference would it practically make if this notion rather than that notion were true" (James, 1907: 45).[10] "*True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify*. ...The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth *happens* to an idea. It *becomes* true, is *made* true by events. Its verity *is* in fact

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[8]   An experienced administrator/MPA student restated this criteria. speaking to other students he advised "If you use the scientific method (in his case quasi-experimental design) you have to be prepared to tell your boss what he doesn't want to hear," I would like to thank Frankie Waller, Chief of Administration, Texas Department of Safety, for this example.

[9]   *The Academy of Management Journal* is a manifestation of logical empiricism applied to administration research, the majority of its articles contain carefully constructed hypotheses which are tested empirically. In addition, the statistical techniques used to test hypotheses tend to be highly sophisticated. Academics unsatisfied with the state of research in PA probably wish that PA had a journal which more closely resembled *The Academy of Management Journal*.

[10]   William James (1842-1910) has the distinction of being called both "the country's greatest psychologist" (Schultz, 1975: 129) and the "most influential American philosopher" (Soccio, 1992: 476). William James, brother of the novelist Henry James, originally was trained as a medical doctor. He was drawn to psychology while teaching at Harvard. *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), his greatest contribution to the field of psychology, was acclaimed internationally and dominated the teaching of psychology for decades.

James' pragmatic philosophy was an outgrowth of his psychology. An early and basic elaboration of the philosophy is James's *Pragmatism* (1907). To James, pragmatism was a way to mediate between the tough-minded empiricist and the tender-minded rationalist. James maintains that the world of experience (empiricists) and abstraction (rationalist) need each other. Pragmatism plunges one into the "river of experience."

an event, a process" (James, 1907: 201). For example, what is 90 degrees? Is it hot or cold? The pragmatist would ask, are you boiling water or are you playing basketball? The truth is in the experience, the problem and the context.

Truth helps us sort between working hypotheses carrying us from one experience to another (Flower and Murphy, 1977: 676). Effective truth is associated with a plan of action. It mediates between experiences. It connects the old to the new, it welds theory and fact. In addition, it is provisional, just the starting point used to address the next day's problem (Flower and Murphy, 1977: 681). Returning to the temperature example, if it is 90 degrees and you are playing basketball, the plan of action might consist of stopping and getting some water. Last weeks (old), experience with dehydration and its experience/effects helps provide the plan of action for today's decision-- to stop. The truth of 90 degrees being hot (in this context) mediated between yesterday and today. Theory would also be helpful. Dehydration is a concept with theoretical significance. Knowing some theory and the stages of dehydration would be useful.

The pragmatist asks about practical differences when settling disputes. "If no practical difference whatever can be traced then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle." (James, 1907: 45). Hence, pragmatists look for *what works* when settling disputes or solving problems.
Theories, also must work or have practical application (James, 1907: 216). Since practical consequences generally depend on context, pragmatism also allows for multiple realities.

> Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest. ....Pragmatism unstiffins our theories, limbers them up and sets each one to work. (James, 1907: 53).

Pragmatism is also, holistic, the whole puzzle, the entire experience, including novelty, is faced. None of the concrete facts are denied. Like all major philosophies, pragmatism helps one to exercise powers of intellectual abstraction. In addition, it focuses on making a "positive connection with the actual world of finite human lives" (James, 1907: 20). It dwells in the world of tangled, muddy, painful, and perplexing, concrete *experience* (James, 1907: 21). "It turns toward concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards power" (James, 1907: 51). The epistemology and metaphysics of pragmatism seems well suited to the day to day world of the practitioner. It is also suitable to the behavioral sciences. Unfortunately, this connection has often been obscured.

Abraham Kaplan (1964: 43) maintains that the "action" criteria described by James has been "widely misunderstood" because it was applied too narrowly. The more accurate broader interpretation clearly gives pragmatism unique import for PA theory.

> There is a vulgar pragmatism in which 'action' is opposed to 'contemplation,' 'practice' to 'theory,' and 'expediency' to 'principle,' ... this vulgar doctrine is almost the antithesis of pragmatism ... The 'action' that is relevant to the pragmatic analysis of meaning must be constructed in the broadest possible sense, so as to comprise not only the deeds that make up the great world of affairs, but also those that constitute the scientific enterprise, whether it be as

'practical' as performing an experiment or as 'contemplative' as formulating a theory. The 'usefulness' that pragmatism associates with truth is as much at home in the laboratory and study as in the shop and factory (Kaplan, 1964: 43-44).

Hence, pragmatic action incorporates scientific enterprise. William James (1907:54) uses a hotel corridor metaphor to describe the relationship between theory and practice. Theories are foune in the rooms. The pragmatist owns the corridor, walking from room to room using the theories, testing them in practice/context. Thus, pragmatism incorporates much of logical empiricism. The use of program evaluation, cost benefit analysis etc., fit here.

The logic of pragmatism is very different from the formal logic of logical positivism or logical empiricism. Pragmatism's logic is a method of inquiry/learning that focuses on process. It posits that people learn by experience. Particularly, they learn by using experience in combination with a loosely defined experimental model. It uses a naturalistic logic to develop and test ongoing hypotheses. Problems are important because they help to generate experiences, contexts and hypotheses.[11] The evidence used to verify the hypotheses can be drawn from a variety of experiences. Aside from measurable, scientific facts, pragmatism embraces the affective. It is, for example, inclusive of religious experiences, art as experience[12] and nature as experience. The key which ties them together is the practical consequences associated with the experiences. Without an awareness of consequences, that which is distinctive about human learning could not take place.

This method-of-learning philosophy draws from the scientific method but not in a reductionist manner. It allows for a richer set of experiences (or data) to test naturalistic, working hypotheses. Learning and knowing are connected. Knowing becomes a part of the natural process of adjustment. The working hypotheses are tested through action. Experiences and consequences that flow from the action become part of knowing. In this natural process environment, knowledge and action cannot be divided. (Flower and Murphy, 1977; 813) Hence, learning and action are connected.

The "method of learning," "logic of inquiry" model was most fully developed by John Dewey and is known as *instrumentalism* (Kaplan, 1964: 46). Analysis of a concept is imbedded in the 'problem' and in its use and in the way it contributes to a solution. The 90 degree as "hot" makes sense in the basketball context . If the problem is making spaghetti, 90 degrees means something else.

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[11]   Problems generate experience. We learn by experience when we act and try out solutions to the problem. Dewey uses cooking as an example, To deal with the problem of hunger one might fry an egg. How best to fry the egg (how hot the skillet, how much grease, how long to cook, etc.) can be viewed as working hypotheses. Try and teach a child to fry an egg. What seems natural to an adult is an unknown to a child. Experience is a critical component. Dewey's *How we Think* (1910) is one of the clearest presentations of these points

[12]   See James (1902) *The Varieties of Religious Experience.*   See Dewey, (1958) *Art as Experience,*

> A scientific concept has meaning only because scientists mean something by it. The meaning is scientifically balid only if what they intend by its actual problems are solved and intentions are fulfilled as inquiry continues (Kaplan, 1964: 46).

Pragmatist view and judge theories as instruments in problem solving. They are particularly concerned with *consequences* associated with problem solving. The problem helps to define the experience/reality boundary. "Reality begins with a problematic situation which stimulates" action. (Patterson, 1953: 467) [13] The action is then judged considering consequences. This is exactly the kind of logic useful in the ever changing problem filled environment of PA practice. In addition, the naturalistic logic of pragmatism underlie much of the growth in qualitative-naturalistic research methods (Erlandson et al. 1993; Guba and Lincoln, 1981).[14] This is an aspect of pragmatism that begins to address the issues raised by PA scholars such as Denhart that are concerned with the influence of logical positivism and who advocate the use of more qualitatitative research techniques.

Unlike logical positivism and logical empiricism, pragmatism incorporates ethics.[15] "*There is no single touchstone of truth in ethics .... a pragmatic ethics seems to embrace a developmental approach about how to best deal with ethical problems*" (Luizzi. 1993: 28). Ethical problems may be addressed by forming principles and generalizations that work. These principles should be taken seriously and developed with care. Nevertheless, if conditions change or if new facts appear, principles may be revised. For example, for centuries, the rights of women did not include the right to vote or own property. Clearly, ethical principles dealing with political participation and property rights played some role in developing these rules. Today, these principles no longer work, conditions have changed and new ethical principles guide behavior.[16] Keep in mind, however, ends-in-view [17]are more stable. Regardless of whether women do or do not have the right to vote; democracy, equity and/or fairness are potential ends-in view.

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[13]   In his discussion of pragmatism, Patterson (1953: 467-469) discusses "problematicism" as a defining characteristic of the philosophy.

[14]   In personal correspondence, Erlandson attributed much of his logic to Dewey. Since his book is an applied methods text, he did not feel the need to incorporate historical material. Hence, Dewey was not cited or referenced in the text.

[15]James believed that the moral question of how to live the good life was the most basic practical issue facing human beings. His morality was not confined to abstract rules or questions of duty. Rather, it was a series, of never-ending live choices -- choices that made a practical difference. He wanted people to take the moral choices seriously. The conflict between good and evil was real. Consequently, we need a moral direction. (Soccio, 1992: 491) .

[16]   Vincent Luizzi (1993) links legal ethics and pragmatic conceptions of ethics. He argues that legal ethics are a source for a universal ethic.

[17]   Ends are never viewed as absolute, rather, they are seen as ends-in-view or an intermediate step in a larger, never complete quest. "[I]f you follow the pragmatic method," you cannot view any word as "closing your quest."

Dewey was deeply concerned with the "reality of moral problems and the value of reflective thought in dealing with them" (Dewey and Tufts, 1927: iii). In 1908, John Dewey and James Tufts wrote the widely used, *Ethics* , an undergraduate philosophy text (reprinted in 1927). In it they developed a theory of ethics congruent with pragmatism. The theoretical portion the book

> "affirms that there is a place in the moral life for reason and a place for happiness, --a place for duty and a place for valuation. Theories are treated not as incompatible rival systems which must be accepted or rejected *en bloc*, but as more or less adequate methods of surveying the problems of conduct. This mode of approach facilitates the scientific estimation and determination of the part played by various factors in the complexity of moral life. The student is put in a position to judge the problems of conduct for himself. This emancipation and enlightenment of individual judgement is the chief aim of the the theoretical portion (Dewey and Tufts, 1927, iv-v).

They also developed an ethics equipped to address unsettled societal questions. They believed that ethical theory without practice was "intolerably academic." Moreover, practice sharpens theory-- theories must be judged by their practical use (Dewey and Tufts, 1927: v). Thus, *Ethics* discussed practical concerns which might be of interest to public administrators such as distrust of government, administrative efficiency, and conflict between the public and private interest. It also addressed policy reform such as child labor laws. Ethics was a fundamental element of Dewey's pragmatism.

During the late 1930s, leading logical positivists tried to forge a connection with pragmatism through Dewey[18] (Lamont, 1959:11; Westbrook, 1991: 403-408). Although there were

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> You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your experience. It appears less as a solution, then, than as a program for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which existing realities may be *changed* (James, 1907: 53).

Ends-in-view can be perceived as ideals. Democracy, justice, freedom, community could all be the elusive, yet real, ends-in-view. If one asks, "What difference would it practically make if this notion rather that that notion were true? " The practical difference might be whether one notion of truth enhanced justice. Hence, values are an important part of pragmatism.

[18]   John Dewey, (1859-1952) the philosopher-psychologist-educator-social activist, refined pragmatism as a method of learning and inquiry. Dewey, who was born before the Lincoln Administration and died the year Eisenhower was elected, accomplished much. Summarizing Dewey's life, philosophy, or causes is difficult.

Dewey, like James, made early contributions to psychology. He is noted among the world's important psychologist's as a founder of the Chicago School of Functional Psychology and for challenging the duality of stimulus-response.[18] In addition, Dewey wrote two psychology texts. Thus, it should be noted, that American pragmatism was refined by men deeply involved in shaping psychology.

Before pursuing a Ph.D. in philosophy from Johns Hopkins, Dewey taught high school. He was, thus, trained as a philosopher, but experienced as a teacher. His "experienced" based, "context and consequences" oriented philosophy of inquiry was at odds with the rigid educational practices of the day. He also lived his action oriented philosophy. Thus, it is not surprising that he helped to lead major educational reform. Through the "progressive movement" in education, children were taken out of rigid seating arrangements, memorized less and "experienced" more. Science laboratories, vocational education programs, field trips and gymnasiums are all credited to the progressive movement. Edwin Patterson

similarities (both use of the scientific method and empiricism), Dewey distanced himself from the logical positivists. His major objection lie in the realm of ethics. The *Theory of Valuation* (1939) was his response to the logical positivists. Dewey's naturalistic method of scientific inquiry incorporated values and emotions. Many of Dewey's concerns about logical positivism are echoed by today's Public Administration theorists. Clearly, fact and value are not separated by pragmatism. Hence, using pragmatism as a guiding philosophy, the application of techniques such as cost benefit analysis and program evaluation would be applied taking into account larger ethical concerns.

Not suprisingly, the psychologists/philosophers (Dewey and James) also incorporate aesthetics in their approach (Dewey, 1958 & 1925; James, 1890 & 1902). Aesthetics is tied to the practical consequences associated with experience. Thus emotions are considered legitimate experience in assessing working hypotheses or consequences. Art and beauty are also incorporated into the pragmatic philosophy. Pragmatis would thus incorporate PA professionals who joined The Section on Humanistic, Artistic and Refelective Expression of the American Society for Public Administration. Both logical positivism and logical empiricism would disregard or ignore this subject area.

The Irony of Simon's *Administrative Behavior*

One noted source to find the influence of William James and John Dewey is Herbert Simon's pivotal *Administrative Behavior*. In the introduction of the second edition, Simon indicates that Chapters 4 (Rationality in Administrative Behavior) and 5 (The Psychology of Administrative

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(1953:486) maintains that Dewey's influence on American public school education and its teachers has probably done more than any other to make pragmatism the "typically American way of thinking."

For the public, Dewey is perhaps most well known for his social activism. Over several decades, the American people were exposed to Dewey through his extensive writing in the popular print media. Here he aired his views on many of the key policy debates of the time such as suffrage, child labor laws, unionization of labor, educational reform, individual rights, the New Deal, the League of Nations. He also actively supported causes helping to organize the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Association of University Professors, the New School of Social Research, and teachers unions (Dykhuizen, 1973: 169-173). In addition, while at the University of Chicago, Dewey worked closely with Jane Addams and was an active member of the first board of trustees of Hull House. Thus, Dewey, the activist-pragmatism, worked to solve current social problems and contributed to the debate of many more.

Dewey's liberal activism was steeped in a faith in democracy. His personal philosophy incorporated "democracy" as an ends-in-view. Throughout his life Dewey developed a theory of democracy. Although in a minority,Dewey was the most important liberal intellectual of the twentieth century to advocate participatory democracy.   He called for a pervasive democracy which would shape the democratic character and create a common democratic culture suffusing factories, schools, political parties, and other organizations (Westbrook, 1991: xv-xvi). He demonstrated a commitment to the principle or ideal of democracy. An ideal which he believed organizations and governments should strive.

Decisions) were the core of the book (1957: xi). The psychologists, Dewey and James are cited extensively in Chapter 5. [19]

In *Administrative Behavior* Simon's contributed to the understanding of administration by focusing on individual purposeful behavior and the decision/action.[20] The decision is a pivotal action used to anchor experience and consequences. Simon uses the decision premise as the focus for context. These ideas ties to James's psychology which showed how the *decision* determined our *actions* (Flower and Murphy, 1977, 644-645). In addition, James maintained that people "pursued ends preferentially and behave purposively" (Flower and Murphy, 1977, 640). Simon also uses the language of pragmatism. In the "Rationality" chapter he uses pragmatic concepts when replacing the means-ends notion with alternative-consequences. In addition, the psychology chapter uses concepts such as "practical decision-making", "consequences", "experience" and "practical problems" to make arguments. (Simon, 1945: 82-83).

Finally, Simon cites Dewey and James extensively when he discusses habit.

> An equally important mechanism that assists in the preservation of useful behavior patterns is habit.[21] Habit permits conservation of mental effort by withdrawing from the area of conscious thought those aspects of the situation that are repetitive (Simon, 1945: 88)

Simon extends the notion of habit several pages later when he introduces "standard practices" in organizations.

> The organization establishes standard practices. By deciding once for all (or at least for a period of time) that a particular task shall be done in a particular way, it relieves the individual who actually performs the task of the necessity of determining each time how it shall be done (Simon, 1945: 102).

Through *Administrative Behavior* and later work Simon changed the direction of Public Administration. He is credited with bringing the controversial, philosophic doctrine of logical positivism to Public Administration (Stillman, 1990: 118; Denhardt, 1984: 75). Although his critics stress the logical positivist connection, which is clearly evident in the fact-value dichotomy, the

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[19] Simon indicates in a footnote that "most of the references here(ch 5) are to William James, *The Principles of Psychology* ...and John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct* "(Simon, 1945:80). One surprising aspect of Simon's book is that it is poorly indexed. Even though he cites three of Dewey's books in nine footnotes, Dewey is not in the index.

[20] It should be noted that Simon's first psychology reference is to Toulman's *Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men* (1932). Toulmin is associated with the "Behavioral" school of psychology. Toulmin both drew from James and departed from him. Like James, he focused on choice, decision, and purposive behavior. Unlike James, he gave goal-objects and means-objects more concreteness and emphasized the cognitive (Toulmin, 1932: 470). To Toulmin there is an end-of-quest. Toulmin's psychology is consistent with logical positivism. James's is not.

[21] This was footnote 8 in the "Psychology" chapter of *Administrative Behavior*. Dewey (*Human Nature and Conduct*, pp.14-131, 172-181) early emphasized the important role of habit in social behavior. James, in his *Psychology*, contributed a classic chapter to the psychological literature on habit (chap.iv).

above discussion demonstrates the used all three phisophical approaches in *Administrative Behavior*. Further, from his perspective the most important chapters relied on James and Dewey.

Simon's use of Dewey and James is ironic. Of all key people in public administration, he built theory using their ideas most explicitly. By embracing logical positivism, however, he moved Public Administration away from the influence of pragmatism. The instrumental or contingency nature of pragmatism makes it compatible with both schools of thought within Public Administration academic circles. Although not always stated in these terms, the criticism of philosophy is also a criticism of methods-- quantitative and qualitatitive. Critics are concerned about an overly quantitative- value free Public Administration. They often advocate naturalistic methods of inquiry for PA, pragmatism is compatible with both- Ironically, the works of Dewey also form the basis for much of the explosion in naturalistic methods texts throughout education and the social sciences.

Conclusion

This paper is a preliminary attempt to explore three modern philosophic traditions and link them to the public administration theory practice debate. A close inspection suggests that aside from the fact-value dichotomy, logical positivism has little to do with PA theory or practice. Logical empiricism is the philosophic tradition associated with analytic techniques used in PA practice (program evaluation, cost benefit analysis). It is also the philosophic tradition compatible with the push to develop larger PA explanatory theories. It, however, incorporates a fact value dichotomy and excludes aesthetics. Only pragmatism appears to be wholistic enough to be compatible with the larger changing, conflict, value filled world of Public Administration.

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