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## *The Influence of Military Policy on Black Men*

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### INTRODUCTION

Today as never before, blacks are serving their nation in uniform. At the end of 1981 almost one out of every five black males born between 1957 and 1962 had entered military service.<sup>1</sup> The armed forces offers its soldiers an uncommon blend of benefits and burdens. First, as the nation's largest employer and trainer it supplies much-needed jobs. The military also prepares men to compete in the civilian labor market. Research has shown that black veterans score higher than black nonveterans on measures of labor market success.<sup>2</sup> Also, in the field of race relations the military is considered a progressive institution.<sup>3</sup> Yet service in the armed forces brings with it risks to life and limb. For this reason, special attention should be given to norms of fairness and equity when evaluating armed forces policy.

The military is unlike other governmental agencies in that it creates a microcosm of larger society. The armed forces has separate health, housing and criminal justice systems. In addition, both in the United States and abroad, members of the armed forces segregate themselves from the larger society by wearing uniforms and living in military installations.

Most policy research explores outputs. For example, when studying blacks and health policy one might compare a health output measure such as infant mortality. The armed forces is unique in that its output, "defense," is shared equally by all regardless of race. Hence, this chapter will focus on how military policy affects black men who serve. Specifically, the chapter will examine the military recruitment process and blacks and the effects of such internal policies as promotion and occupational assignment on black servicemen.<sup>4</sup>

## HISTORICAL SETTING

### Revolution to Korea

Blacks have served ably and with honor in each of America's conflicts.<sup>5</sup> During the American Revolution, however, a pattern of sanctioned institutional racism was established, and it remained until the Korean War.<sup>6</sup> Prior to and during World War II the military was strictly segregated and employed racial quotas to limit black participation.<sup>7</sup> In addition, blacks were usually excluded from such benefits of military service as officer status and skilled occupations. Instead, they were often relegated to kitchen/servant work, backbreaking labor or, when needed, combat. Further, their effectiveness, ability and patriotism were often questioned.

Shortly before World War II, segregationist policies began to change slowly. The growing political power of Northern blacks made President Franklin D. Roosevelt sensitive to the demands of their leadership. By pressuring chief executives and monitoring policy implementation, the black press also helped initiate change.<sup>8</sup>

During the transition process (1940–1955) the military bureaucracy fought integration through the twin dictates of tradition and efficiency. Those who favored the status quo argued that neither military mission nor efficiency was served by mixing the races. The military was not and never could be an institution of social reform. They maintained that military policies should mirror local tradition, usually Southern local tradition. Poor performance among the all-black divisions of World War II was used as evidence to support segregation. Reformers, on the other hand, maintained that segregation was inefficient. The dual facilities of segregation created logistic problems and increased expenses. They believed that the poor performance of black divisions was caused by segregation and that blacks generally entered the military with an inferior education. As a result, a large proportion of blacks were clustered at the bottom end of the achievement scale. Whites who scored poorly on aptitude tests were scattered evenly throughout the numerous white units. These men were absorbed and had little influence on military effectiveness. In black divisions, performance was affected because the relatively few black divisions were unable to absorb the large numbers of men who had low scores on military aptitude tests. At the same time the limited availability of challenging positions wasted superior black talent. The reformers also argued that segregation hurt black morale and thus hurt efficiency.<sup>9</sup>

Ironically, proof of the success of integration existed. Toward the close of World War II, (summer and fall of 1944) in Germany, blacks were given the opportunity to serve alongside whites. The army carefully reviewed this experiment (over 3,500 white officers and enlisted men received questionnaires).<sup>10</sup> The results of the survey showed that most whites got along "very well" with blacks. "Nearly all of the officers questioned admitted camaraderie between whites and blacks was far better than expected . . . . Not a single [enlisted

man] stated that [he] developed a less favorable attitude [toward blacks]."<sup>11</sup> As was often the case, the results did not reach key decision makers. Rather, they were channeled into bureaucratic limbo.

President Harry Truman is justly credited with eliminating segregation within the military (Executive Order 9981). This order declared "equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin."<sup>12</sup> But the military was slow to implement the order. For example, at the dawn of the Korean War the Twenty-fourth Infantry Division remained all black.<sup>13</sup> The military finally integrated for pragmatic reasons. Shortages of whites during the Korean War made black replacements a necessity. Blacks and whites fought well together, proving that those who pushed for integration were correct.<sup>14</sup> This has been referred to as the "unbunching" of black troops.<sup>15</sup>

Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, when the military was inching toward integration, blacks were confronted with inconsistent or illogical bureaucratic blindspots. For example, during World War II officers from the South were often assigned to black units because Southern officers were believed to be "generally more competent to exercise command over Negroes."<sup>16</sup> Not only was this policy bad for black morale, but the officers resented being placed in dead-end commands. The case of black officers is another example. Top officials believed that whites should not take orders from blacks,<sup>17</sup> so the number and responsibilities of black officers were severely limited. In another instance, after the Navy began full integration of the general services it continued to employ a fully black or brown "Steward's Branch." Somehow policymakers failed to understand that true integration moved both ways.<sup>18</sup>

After Korea, the military quickly desegregated and became a recognized leader in racial reform among institutions. It even stepped outside traditional boundaries and tried to alter local civilian customs. For example, the Department of Defense took steps to topple segregationist education, housing and entertainment policies of communities located near military bases.<sup>19</sup> Army posts at this time have been described as "islands of integration in a sea of Jim Crow."<sup>20</sup>

### **Vietnam to the All-Volunteer Force**

As the Vietnam conflict began to unfold, the military was recognized as one of the most progressive institutions in the United States. For example, after a 1966 visit to Vietnam, Whitney Young, Jr., declared, "In this war there is a degree of integration among black and white Americans far exceeding that of any other war in our history as well as any other time or place in our domestic life."<sup>21</sup> By the war's end, however, the picture had changed radically. Racial strife was surfacing.<sup>22</sup> Blacks were voluntarily resegregated during off-duty hours.<sup>23</sup> They also questioned the Communist threat,<sup>24</sup> showed a new "sense of racial pride and solidarity" and expressed anger with "fighting and dying for a racist America."<sup>25</sup>

This change occurred in part because the civil rights movement within the

United States helped create a new militant black soldier.<sup>26</sup> Further, Vietnam was a prolonged, unpopular war. Much of the unrest, however, occurred because blacks felt that military policy exposed them to greater risks.<sup>27</sup>

Subsequent research has confirmed that blacks bore a disproportionate burden. The baby boom provided the military planners of the Vietnam era with a manpower surplus.<sup>28</sup> To deal with this, the predominantly white Selective Service devised a system that excluded men at both ends of the socioeconomic scale.<sup>29</sup> College students were deferred, and significant numbers of low-income men failed to meet minimum mental requirements. Approximately 30 percent of both whites and blacks entered the military,<sup>30</sup> but whites tended to enlist, and this gave them some occupational choice as well as opportunities for technical training. Blacks were more likely to be drafted. The draft is unlike most policy tools. It eliminates choice and requires those selected to risk life and limb. Clearly, it is essential to formulate and implement draft policy in an equitable manner.

The draft failed to achieve equity. And healthy black high school graduates were among the most draft vulnerable.<sup>31</sup> In addition, draftees were more likely to enter the combat arms of military service. Paradoxically, past generations of black soldiers had fought for the right to bear arms. Years later, during Vietnam, their sons were disproportionately fighting and dying.<sup>32</sup> Finally, there is evidence that the draft was used as a "weapon to intimidate and imprison civil rights leaders."<sup>33</sup>

During the 1960s the United States also fought a "war on poverty." The military was criticized because large numbers of disadvantaged men were unable to meet minimum entrance requirements. The ineligibility rate was particularly high among blacks. In some Southern states, over 70 percent of all blacks were rejected.<sup>34</sup> Hence, these men were denied the benefits of military service, such as steady employment and technical training.<sup>35</sup>

In 1966 the armed forces joined the nation's "war on poverty" with Project 100,000.<sup>36</sup> Under this program, men who were formerly unacceptable entered the military. As often happens in the policy implementation process, however, there was a wide gap between policy intention and implementation. A disproportionate number received little transferable training. Instead, they entered the combat arms of the military. Approximately 40 percent of the "new standards" men were black.<sup>37</sup>

## THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

President Richard Nixon campaigned on a promise to end the draft and received broad-based support. Liberals, antiwar activists and many conservatives all held strong antidraft positions. However, critics of a volunteer system argued that the draft would be replaced by "economic conscription," which would draw heavily from the disadvantaged and minorities.<sup>38</sup> But, the President's Commission on the All-Volunteer Force dismissed this concern, arguing that "the composition of the military will not be fundamentally changed by the end

of conscription."<sup>39</sup> This prediction proved to be wrong. Throughout its brief history (1973 to the present), the All-Volunteer Force has drawn heavily from minorities, particularly blacks. The Army has attracted more blacks than any other branch; in 1981 one-third of all Army soldiers were black.<sup>40</sup> Overall, close to 20 percent of all active duty personnel are black.<sup>41</sup>

The large concentration of blacks in the military has been a continuing and controversial issue. A separate but related issue is the quality of recruits.<sup>42</sup> The representation debate is remarkably varied. Some scholars have argued that a nonrepresentative force is inconsistent with democracy.<sup>43</sup> There is also speculation about lasting institutional change. They express apprehension over a possible "tipping" or "threshold effect." The "tipping" hypothesis maintains that as black participation grows, whites will be reluctant to join a "black" organization. There exists a threshold, or point of no return, where the Army will become all black.<sup>44</sup> A "Black Army" might experience withdrawal of public support and present national security problems. Charles Moskos is concerned about the prospect of the military being labeled a minority institution. Traditionally, minorities have used the military as a bridge that facilitated successful transition to the civilian labor market,<sup>45</sup> but as a "black" organization, the armed forces would lose its ability to aid in the transition.<sup>46</sup>

Some military manpower scholars maintain that the representation issue is more aptly described as nonparticipation among middle-class whites. The military is attracting the best of the blacks. For example, both parental education and occupation of black soldiers is higher than that of employed black civilians.<sup>47</sup> This phenomenon is particularly evident in the Army. Moskos points out:

Today's Army enlisted ranks are the only major arena in American society where black educational levels surpass those of whites, and by a significant degree. Whereas the black soldier seems fairly representative of the black community in terms of education and social background, white entrants in the all-volunteer Army have been coming from the least educated sectors of the community. The Army has been attracting . . . an unrepresentative segment of white youth, who are more uncharacteristic of the broader social mix than are our minority soldiers.<sup>48</sup>

A. J. Schexnider and John Butler, two prominent black scholars, suggest that the representation issue is nothing more than the age-old quota question in new clothes. They note that this is the first time a volunteer system has not had quotas to moderate black participation.<sup>49</sup> They also discuss the unspoken fear that a "Black Army" would turn on white society or that the black soldier would put race over nation and be unreliable in a conflict with Africa.<sup>50</sup>

### **The Cause of Disproportionate Black Participation**

There are several reasons that the racial composition of the armed forces does not reflect that of society as a whole. First, white enlistment is more heavily draft-motivated, and a key white enlistment incentive was removed with the

end of the draft.<sup>51</sup> Second, market signals suggest greater black participation. Relatively high levels of unemployment and low civilian wages attract young blacks to the military.<sup>52</sup> The armed forces also offers job security. Further, John White and James Hosek estimate that black average military pay was 106 percent of civilian pay. In the critical eighteen-to-twenty-year-old age-group they found military pay to be 132 percent of civilian pay. For whites, on the other hand, military wages average 86 percent of civilian pay.<sup>53</sup>

Aside from the market forces, demographic trends suggest that black military participation would grow in the 1970s and 1980s. The proportion of blacks ages seventeen to twenty-one is greater than the percentage of blacks in the population. In addition, today's black youth scores higher on military achievement tests and is more likely to be a high school graduate than in years past.<sup>54</sup> Finally, blacks are attracted to the military because it has a reputation and tradition of being a progressive institution. It should be noted that black participation may have peaked. For example, in 1979 the proportion of new black Army entrants was at an all-time high (36.7 percent). By 1981 this proportion had dropped to 27.4 percent.<sup>55</sup> An increase in entry-level pay, increased benefits, intensified suburban recruiting and the recession are credited with the change.<sup>56</sup>

### **Inside the Institution**

The military has long recognized the importance of racial harmony. Educational programs on race relations are well developed. For example, a Defense Race Relations Institute was conducted to train instructors in race relations and to develop curricula, conduct research and perform program evaluations.<sup>57</sup> John Butler maintains that the race relations programs of the Army are "the greatest effort of any institution to deal with the race problem."<sup>58</sup> Despite this effort, it is difficult to assess race relations in the armed forces accurately. First, race relations are hard to measure and subject to quick change, and society at large can influence attitudes. Studies have found race relations in the military to be generally positive, but tension tends to be high in units that are predominantly black.<sup>59</sup> One source of racial tension stems from the previous lack of contact new enlistees have had with individuals of other races. James Fallows characterizes the situation as country whites meeting city blacks.<sup>60</sup> An increase in Ku Klux Klan types of activities is attributed to the background disparities.<sup>61</sup> All in all, however, military personnel of either race view themselves primarily as soldiers or members of a particular branch of the service, not as whites or blacks.<sup>62</sup>

Inside the institution blacks and whites differ in their ability to reap its benefits. First, blacks are less likely to meet the standards of the armed forces. Fewer than half the blacks who attempt to enlist qualify.<sup>63</sup> Once accepted, blacks are disproportionately clustered in combat arms and are thus more apt to be among the casualties of war. In addition, skills acquired in combat specialties are the hardest to translate to civilian skills.<sup>64</sup> This may be particularly disillusioning to black youths, most of whom enter to "better themselves in life" or

get training for civilian jobs.<sup>65</sup> Moskos criticizes early All-Volunteer Force policies, maintaining that these policies actually accentuate the tracking of poor and minority youths into the combat arms of the military.<sup>66</sup>

Blacks are also not evenly distributed across occupational categories. They are more likely to serve in nontechnical jobs, where advancement is slow and training limited.<sup>67</sup> Performance on entry exams is used as the basis for occupational assignment, and blacks are apt to do relatively poorly on these tests.

Another problem that plagues black soldiers is their slower promotion rate. Some scholars claim that whites are promoted more quickly than blacks because they do better on such universalistic criteria as education and testing.<sup>68</sup> Butler tested this hypothesis using the Army's entire 1973 enlisted force. He controlled for such criteria as achievement exam scores, occupation and education and found that black promotions lagged behind promotions of comparable whites (see Table 6.1). For example, blacks who score in the highest cate-

**Table 6.1**  
Mean Months in Army to Make Enlisted Grades E4, E5-E6, E7-E9, by Race and Selected Controls

Grade	TOTAL ARMY		SELECTED CONTROLS			
	Black		White		White	
E4	19 (18,673)		15 (107,949)			
E5-E6	68 (30,046)		59 (112,212)			
E7-E9	173 (11,152)		169 (47,179)			
			High AFQT <sup>a</sup>		High Education	
			Black		White	
			Black		White	
			Black		White	
E4	23 (1,657)	14 (44,368)	15 (2,199)	12 (18,695)	17 (5,388)	14 (36,047)
E5-E6	93 (7,096)	62 (52,164)	56 (2,742)	41 (15,069)	66 (9,735)	56 (45,946)
E7-E9	181 (5,311)	173 (30,448)	173 (1,477)	173 (6,120)	165 (4,033)	165 (18,756)

Source: Data derived from John S. Butler, "Inequality in the Military: An Examination of Promotion Time for Black and White Enlisted Men," *American Sociological Review* 41 (October 1976): 810-818.

<sup>a</sup> Armed Forces Qualification Test.

gory of the Army's standardized achievement test (AFQT) take over two and a half years longer to be promoted to the rank of E5 or E6. He also found that blacks in technical occupational specialties are, on average, promoted to E5 or E6 ten months later than similar whites. He concludes: "The black enlisted man in the U.S. Army is subject to inequality which is not the result of failure to meet universalistic criteria, i.e., indirect impersonal institutions, but rather a result of the direct racist actions of real-life people."<sup>69</sup>

There is a serious underrepresentation of black officers in all four branches. Only 4.9 percent of all male officers are black (see Table 6.2). Although the Army's enlisted personnel are almost one-third black, only 7 percent of its male officer corps is black. The most serious underrepresentation is in the Navy (2.6 percent black male). In addition, black officers are found most often in such non-mainstream jobs as supply, procurement and administration.<sup>70</sup> It should be noted that the proportion of officers is roughly equivalent to that of black college graduates in the relevant age category. Further, the percentage of blacks in the officer corps has risen steadily. And civilian competition has made recruitment of qualified blacks difficult.<sup>71</sup>

Blacks do not fare well within the armed forces criminal justice system. The most obvious place is the area of serious crimes. Between 1977 and 1979, over 51 percent of the military prison population was black.<sup>72</sup> Even though the proportion of blacks in the military prison system is less than that of civilian society, the high proportion of blacks in prison is surprising in light of the tighter screens that are applied to blacks as opposed to whites.<sup>73</sup> There could be many reasons for this disparity. Within the armed forces, officers have great discretion in initiating corrective action. Only 4.9 percent of male officers are black. Further, blacks are underrepresented within the entire criminal justice system. In the Army, for example, blacks made up only 4 percent of the lawyers, 13 percent of the police officers and 2 percent of the judges during 1978.<sup>74</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Perhaps more than any policy change of the 1970s, the move from a draft to an all-volunteer system has touched the lives of black men. Without the draft to stimulate white enlistment or quotas to moderate black enlistment, blacks have entered the armed forces in unparalleled numbers. The effect of these men on military institutions and the effect of the military on the black family, lifestyle and culture will take decades to assess. In addition, those who eventually enter military service are among the black community's best and brightest.<sup>75</sup>

Some fear that if this trend continues the military's enlisted force will be so black that whites will no longer enter. A closer look suggests that concerns over a "Black Army" are premature. The lifting of the draft did lead to an overall increase in black participation, but minority participation also depends on larger economic cycles. For example, during downswings (such as the recession of the early 1980s) whites find military life more attractive. Increased competition

**Table 6.2**  
**Black Males as a Percentage of Officers Assigned to Major Occupational Categories, by Service, September 1981**

Occupational Category <sup>a</sup>	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	All Services
General Officers and executives	5.0	1.1	0.2	1.9	1.5
Technical Operations Officers	5.2	2.4	2.6	2.6	3.4
Intelligence Officers	4.4	1.6	3.0	3.4	3.5
Engineering and Maintenance Officers	9.5	2.6	7.0	4.8	5.7
Scientists and Professionals	6.0	2.6	5.0	4.5	4.2
Medical Officers	5.5	2.4	<sup>b</sup>	3.4	4.0
Administrators	9.4	2.5	7.6	8.2	6.8
Supply Procurement and Allied Officers	11.8	3.6	8.7	7.9	7.7
Black Officers as Percentage of all Officers	7.2	2.6	4.0	4.2	4.9

Source: Based on data from Defense Manpower Center.

<sup>a</sup> Approximately 25 percent of all Army officers and 12 percent of all Navy officers could not be identified by major occupational category.

<sup>b</sup> The Navy provides the Marine Corps with medical support.

leads to fewer minority soldiers. On the other hand, upswings seem to provide more civilian jobs for whites and open military slots for blacks. The military is not designed to be an employer of last resort, but it does seem to take on that roll. In doing so, it masks the problem that the civilian labor market has absorbing young semi-skilled blacks. Policymakers should be aware of this process. Ironically, the shortage of black officers may be reduced by economic downturns. During the 1970s many potential black officers found attractive civilian positions. As the economy weakens, black college graduates view a career in the military more positively.

The military has been characterized as "an institution that has gone further than any other to attack racism."<sup>76</sup> Nevertheless, when evaluating its policies using equity norms, it falls short. Compared with whites, blacks are promoted more slowly and receive poor occupational and training assignments. Also, the proportion of blacks in the officer corps and criminal justice system is out of balance.

## NOTES

1. Martin Binkin and Mark Etelberg with Alvin Schexnider and Marvin Smith, *Blacks and the Military* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 65.

2. H. L. Browning, S. C. Lopreato and D. L. Poston, Jr., "Income and Veteran Status: Variations Among Mexican Americans, Blacks and Anglos." *American Sociological Review* 38 (February 1973): 73-85.

3. John S. Butler, *Inequality in the Military: The Black Experience* (Saratoga, Calif.: Century Twenty One, 1980), p. 35.

4. This chapter limits itself to an examination of black men and the military. For much of our history, women were ineligible to serve or made up less than 2 percent of the force. While women currently make up a larger component of our military, data on black women is limited.

5. See, e.g., Jack D. Foner, *Blacks and the Military in American History: A New Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1974); and Marvin Fletcher, *The Black Soldier and Officer in the United States Army, 1881-1917* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974).

6. Butler, *Inequality in the Military*, pp. 19-22.

7. Alvin J. Schexnider and John S. Butler, "Race and the All-Volunteer System: A Reply to Janowitz and Moskos," *Armed Forces and Society* 2 (May 1976): 421.

8. For a successful discussion on how the black leadership and press helped shape policy, see Morris J. MacGregor, Jr., *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981).

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 17-44.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Executive Order 9981, *Federal Register* 13 (July 28, 1948): 4313.

13. Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, p. 28.

14. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, pp. 428-459.

15. Butler, *Inequality in the Military*, p. 29.

16. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, p. 37.
17. Of course blacks could take orders from whites.
18. For an interesting discussion of Navy policy on this matter, see MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, chaps. 3, 9, 13 and 16.
19. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, pp. 581-608.
20. Charles C. Moskos, "Has the Army Killed Jim Crow?" *Negro History Bulletin*, November 1957, p. 29.
21. Whitney Young, Jr., "When the Negroes in Vietnam Come Home," *Harper's Magazine*, June 1967; reprinted in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, *Source Material on the Vietnam Era Veteran*, S. Committee Print No. 26, 93rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 173.
22. Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, p. 36.
23. Butler, *Inequality in the Military*, p. 29.
24. Wallace Terry II, "Bringing the War Home," *Black Scholar*, November 1970; reprinted in Committee on Veterans' Affairs, *Source Material on the Vietnam Era Veteran*, p. 204.
25. Butler, *Inequality in the Military*, p. 30.
26. Terry, "Bringing the War Home," p. 201.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 208.
28. Patricia M. Shields, "The Burden of the Draft: The Vietnam Years," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 9 (Fall 1981): 215.
29. James W. Davis and Kenneth Dolbare, *Little Groups of Neighbors: The Selective Service System* (Chicago: Markham, 1968), p. 57.
30. Patricia M. Shields, *The Determinants of Service in the Armed Forces During the Vietnam Era* (Columbus, Ohio: Center for Human Resource Research, 1977), p. 84.
31. Shields, *The Burden of the Draft*, p. 221.
32. Butler, *Inequality in the Military*, p. 30.
33. Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss, *Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War and the Vietnam Generation* (New York: Knopf, 1978), p. 99.
34. During the mid-1960s some 59.3 percent of all black men failed to meet the minimum score on the mental achievement portion of the entrance exam. States such as Louisiana (74%), Alabama (73%), Mississippi (84%), North Carolina (79%) and South Carolina (81%) are among states with particularly high ineligibility rates. See B. D. Karpinos, "The Mental Qualification of American Youth for Military Service and Its Relationship to Educational Attainment," *Proceedings of the American Statistical Association: Social Statistics Section* (1966), pp. 101-102.
35. Daniel P. Moynihan, "Who Gets in the Army?" *New Republic*, November 5, 1966, p. 22.
36. Before Project 100,000, young men were not eligible to serve in the military if (1) they scored below the 10th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) or (2) they scored between the 10th and 30th percentiles and failed the minimum requirements on the Army Classification Battery or the Army Qualification Battery. See Karpinos, "The Mental Qualification of American Youths for Military Service and Its Relationship to Educational Attainment," p. 97. Under Project 100,000, minimum mental test scores were lowered. Under the new minimum standard, a youth could score as low as the 10th percentile on the AFQT if he was a high school graduate or received a minimum score on one of seven aptitude tests. See Harold Wool and E. S. Flyer, "Project 100,000," in P. B. Doeringer (ed.), *Programs to Employ the Disadvantaged* (Engle-

wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969). It is important to note that while the minimum requirements were lowered, they were not abolished. These "new standards" men comprised 9 percent of the military's entrants between 1966 and 1968. See Shields, *Determinants of Service in the Armed Forces During the Vietnam Era*, pp. 9-10.

37. Approximately 37 percent of the new standards men received combat-type skills. Over half the Army and Marine recruits went to Vietnam. Some 47 percent were drafted. See Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, p. 34.

38. For an excellent discussion of the policy process surrounding the end of the draft, see Gus Lee and Geoffrey Parker, *Ending the Draft: The Story of the All-Volunteer Force* (Washington, D.C.: Human Resource Research Organization, 1977).

39. *The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. i.

40. Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, p. 43.

41. *Ibid.*

42. When quality is measured by performance on aptitude tests, 58 percent of the blacks in 1980 were classified as below average. See *ibid.*, p. 47.

43. Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos, "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force," *Armed Forces and Society* 1 (November 1974): 110.

44. For a discussion of the "tipping" effect, see Kenneth J. Coffey, *Strategic Implications of the All-Volunteer Force: The Conventional Defense of Central Europe* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 68; Janowitz and Moskos, "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force," p. 113; and Charles C. Moskos, J. S. Butler, A. N. Sabrosky and A. J. Schexnider, "Symposium: Race and the United States Military," *Armed Forces and Society* 6 (Summer 1980); see contributions by Moskos (p. 592) and Schexnider (p. 609).

45. Browning et al., "Income and Veteran Status."

46. Charles Moskos, "The Enlisted Ranks in the All-Volunteer Army," in John B. Keely (ed.), *The All-Volunteer Force and American Society* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), p. 73.

47. Choongsoo Kim et al., *The All-Volunteer Force: An Analysis of Youth Participation, Attraction and Reenlistment*, prepared for the Employment and Training Administration, Department of Labor (Columbus: Ohio State University, Center for Human Resource Research, 1980), p. 12. It should be noted, however, that overall socioeconomic status is higher among whites than blacks. See Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, p. 49.

48. Charles C. Moskos, "Social Considerations of the All-Volunteer Force," in Brent Scowcroft (ed.), *Military Service in the United States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1982), p. 132.

49. Schexnider and Butler, "Race and the All-Volunteer System," p. 421.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 425.

51. Patricia M. Shields, "Enlistment During the Vietnam Era and the 'Representation' Issue of the All-Volunteer Force," *Armed Forces and Society* 7 (Fall 1980): 221.

52. Richard V. L. Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 218.

53. John P. White and James R. Hosek, "The Analysis of Military Manpower Issues," in Scowcroft, *Military Service in the United States*, pp. 63-64.

54. Cooper, *Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force*, p. 213.

55. Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, p. 45.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
57. Guy R. Marbury et al., *Race Relations in the Army: Policies, Problems and Programs* (McLean, Va.: Champion, 1972), pp. 28-29.
58. Butler, *Inequality in the Military*, p. 35.
59. Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, pp. 104, 105.
60. James Fallows, *National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 127.
61. Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, p. 107.
62. Charles Moskos, "The Changing Composition of the AVF," in Kenneth J. Coffey (ed.), *Strategic Implications of the All-Volunteer Force: The Conventional Defense of Central Europe* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 68.
63. Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, p. 96.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
66. Moskos et al., "Symposium: Race and the United States Military," p. 594.
67. Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, p. 55.
68. For further discussion on this point, see Nijole Benokraitis and Joe Fagin, "Institutional Racism: A Critical Assessment of the Literature," in C. V. Willie (ed.), *Institutional Racism: In Search of a Perspective* (Chicago: Transaction, 1974); and James Jones, *Prejudice and Racism* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1972).
69. John Butler, "Inequality in the Military: An Examination of Promotion Time for Black and White Enlisted Men," *American Sociological Review* 41 (October 1976): 817.
70. Binkin et al., *Blacks and the Military*, pp. 59-60.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 96.
76. Moskos et al., "Symposium: Race and the United States Military," p. 588.