Military Privatization: The Normative/Affective Context

Patricia M. Shields

Department of Political Science

Southwest Texas State University

ps07@txstate.edu

Presented at the Second Annual Conference, Society for the Advancement of Socioeconomics, Washington D. C. March 1990
Military Privatization: The Normative/Affective Context

Patricia M. Shields

“If we desire to secure peace...it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.”

George Washington, Address to Congress, 1793

What does it mean to be ready for war? Readiness is more than superior weapons. It is also a cultural milieu that supports warrior values and norms. Privatization policies are implemented within the organizational culture of the warrior. This paper deals with the impact of privatization policies on the culture of an institution.

Trends in Military Privatization

Privatization rationalizes government by introducing market or market-like mechanisms to the delivery of public services. Advocates maintain that privatization contains costs by bringing the benefits of competition to the public sector. ¹ The method most commonly associated with privatization is contracting. The military has relied on contracting for decades to meet its hardware needs.

Trends in the privatization of the military, however, go well beyond the simple case of weapons systems contracting. Cost containment techniques such as cost effectiveness analysis and program budgeting introduced by economist Charles Hitch during Robert McNamara’s tenure at DOD represent initial attempts to use market-like mechanisms to contain costs (quasi-privatization). Interestingly, before the term privatization became popularized by conservative economists like E.S. Savas, David Segal and Joseph Lengerman used the term to refer to McNamara's reforms.

“The military was ... privatized under McNamara, when the ideologies and practices of systems analysis and operations research removed from the military calculus variables which could not easily be quantified, such as cohesion and morale. Since the benefit of unit solidarity could not be calculated, cost-benefit analysis removed affect from management consideration.” (Segal and Lengermann, 1980: 182) (emphasis added)

The elimination of the draft is a second phase of privatization. Here econometric labor supply models were used to estimate volunteer enlistment rates. Economic variables such as relative wages and unemployment became cornerstones of the model. The unfair draft tax and allocative inefficiencies associated with artificially low draft wages were additional economic arguments. Although its beginnings were often shaky, the success of the volunteer military reveals that manipulation of economic incentives influences enlistment and retention.

In the third phase of military privatization, private sector employees increasingly perform tasks traditionally assigned to uniformed personnel or career civil servants. These newly privatized functions are widespread and varied. For example, US firms have manned and operated distant early warning lines and carried out surveillance of cease fire lines (Siani). In addition, the everyday activities of running and operating a base such as mess attendant services, grounds maintainence, trash collection, mail service, utilities maintenance, automated data processing, aircraft maintainence and fuels management programs are routinely contracted out. The Army also contracts out functions such as dentistry and nursing. Training on high tech weapons systems is a new growth area in service contracting.

In addition, DOD makes widespread use of professional service contracting. These contracts involve such processes as program management and support services, foreign/national securities policy studies, intelligence studies and program evaluation. Professional service contracts are often awarded to consulting firms for the purpose of monitoring a larger (weapons system) contract. Hence, in some cases government's monitoring role is once removed from the actual weapons system.

Institutional Tensions

Clearly, privatization policies have been adopted and integrated into the fabric of the modern military. At first glance, there would appear to be a natural clash between the principles and assumptions that guide the warrior and the economist. The successful military leader is tested in battle. In this uncertain, violent, emotion-charged environment he orders soldiers to risk their lives and kill others for a greater good. ²

² I am purposely using the male gender because the warrior culture is a male culture.
Combat units are more successful if they are cohesive. (Kaufman, 1987) In socioeconomic terms, if the band of brothers are a tight knit “We” they will be better killers and more apt to survive. Combat effectiveness may be jeopardized if the soldiers are utility maximizing, rational employees.

Manifestations of institutional tension associated with the discordant values of the warrior and the economist exist. An obvious example is the ongoing debate over the erosion of leadership and the rise in management. The early economists advocated management. The Pentagon needed managers trained in the philosophy and techniques of efficiency. Business management techniques were adapted to the case of defense. Warriors argue that many of these management principles and techniques undermine leadership. The warrior/leader must call upon higher values to inspire combatants to risk their lives and kill an unknown enemy. Managers motivate employees to do their job.

Aside from the leadership management debate, institutional tension is also manifested through criticisms of particular privatization policies such as the volunteer military. Critics such as Charles Moskos contend that the military is becoming more like a civilian employer and less like an institution. In this new world, warriors become employees. Obviously, traditional values and norms clash with the soldier/employee vision.

Privatization policies were not designed to undermine the warrior spirit. Rather they stressed efficiency in allocation decisions. At one level, there is no tension between the warrior and the economist. The warrior wants the largest bang for the buck. The real problem occurs when the policy changes advocated by economists begin to erode the institutional culture and the professional ethic (the Normative/Affective (N/A) context). This is where the tension is manifested.

The warrior of the late twentieth century has had to adjust to more than privatization policies. The high-tech nuclear age brought with it deterrence. The warrior now possessed the most sophisticated and lethal weapons imaginable. Yet, to use them would assure world destruction. Warriors can lose their sense of mission and purpose while they wait for war. The high tech revolution also brought with it changes in the tasks warriors performed. In earlier eras, there was a sharp distinction between the activities of the soldier and the civilian. This distinction blurred as the overlap between civilian and military occupations grew.
Large cadres of technicians are needed to support sophisticated weapons. Military skills now have greater applicability to the civilian labor force.

One might speculate that privatization policies are a natural outgrowth of the larger societal trends. Any tension that the warrior is experiencing adapting to the new environment can be traced to these forces. However, I believe many of the concerns of the warrior can be traced to policies advocated by economists (privatization policies). James Fallows commented on the tension between the warrior norms and the economist’s policies in *National Defense*.

> “American defense has been greatly shaped by the economists pattern of thought and those of the manager... The warrior’s perspective has counted for little.”
> (Fallows, 1981:181-182)

Since the 1981 publication of *National Defense*, the economists pattern of thought and recommendations have made even greater inroads.

**The Normative/Affective Context**

The next section will outline the warrior’s Normative/Affective (N/A) context. Whenever professionals are motivated by factors other than self interest (Doctors--healing; social workers--helping; teachers--learning) they are defining and reinforcing the Normative/Affective context within which policy is implemented. The military’s N/A context is useful to explore because it is extreme and well defined. Rituals such as boot camp, parades, medal ceremonies, and the oath of office are ways the Normative/Affective context is built.

An exploration of the military’s Normative/Affective context also demonstrates some of the problems social scientists face when studying norms, values and affect. Military norms and values center around preparing and fighting war, a ghastly subject that is likely to tap into the scholar’s own fears and value system.

**Central Norms and Values**

---

3 For a complete discussion of the Normative/Affective context see Etzioni, (1988).
“Moral elements are among the most important in war. They constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole, and at an early stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves and leads the whole mass.” (Clausewitz, 1976: 184)

The norms and values of the warrior are in many ways universally understood. They are found in ancient poetry such as the *Iliad* and in modern best sellers such as *Red Storm Rising*. Virtually every major nation throughout history has had a military. Hence, moral elements transcend time and are international.

It should be noted that this depiction of the warrior norms and values is idealized. Clearly, norms and values are not stable and the activities of everyday life often depart dramatically from the ideal.

Nevertheless, I will focus on ideal ethical precepts because they represent a standard of reference. Also, they can have a meaningful impact on personal conduct. (Sorley, 1979:159)

There will always be a gap between the ideal and the reality. The ideal is important because it should motivate behavior. Problems arise when the gap between between aspiration and performance becomes too large, then the ideal is no longer useful because it fails to motivate achievement (Sorley, 1979:158). All systems contain elements which may corrupt the ethical foundations of its members. The warrior is concerned that privatization policies have a corrupting influence. That they provide opportunities to corrupt an individual’s ethics and in that way increase the gap between the ideal and reality.

Another factor central to understanding the warrior is his view of human nature. He emphasizes the dark side. In his classic, Samuel Huntington addresses this issue. The professional soldier’s business is war.

> “the military ethic views conflict as a universal pattern throughout nature and sees violence rooted in the permanent biological and psychological nature of men. As between good and evil in man, the military ethic emphasizes the evil. Man is selfish. He is motivated by drives for power, wealth, and security….As between the strength and the weakness in man, the military ethic emphasizes the weakness. Man’s selfishness leads to struggle but man’s weakness makes successful conflict dependent upon organization, discipline, and leadership….the military man emphasizes the importance of the group as against the individual. Success in any activity requires the subordination of the will of the individual to the will of the group.” (Huntington, 1964: 63)

Interestingly, the economist and the military man both view individuals as selfish. For the economist, selfishness fosters competition which promotes abundance and the greater good. They, thus, conclude the individual should have primacy over the group. The warrior, on the other hand, believes this selfish nature leads to conflict and eventually to violent conflict. The warrior prepares for violent conflict by subordinating individual preferences to those of the organization.
Economists stress the value-free nature of efficiency. Concepts such as good and evil are alien to their discourse. The warrior, on the other hand, emphasizes the dark side of man. Warriors confront evil and are expected to deal with many of the consequences of this evil such as war, and violence. Nevertheless, the ideal warrior strives to maintain a virtuous way of life. Military virtues are “none the less virtues for being jewels set in blood and iron” (Toynbee, 1939: 644).

**Duty, Honor, Country**

This West Point motto summarizes many important warrior virtues. The term duty refers to obedience, obligation, and willingness to make sacrifices. According to Huntington the “supreme military virtue is obedience” (Huntington, 1964:74). Military organizations are hierarchical in nature. For the system to work those in charge at each level need instantaneous and loyal obedience from subordinates. The inherent uncertainty of war dictates the need for quick and immediate obedience. Duty also embraces the notion of obligation. Warriors have an obligation to serve and sacrifice for the nation.

A soldier with honor knows how to distinguish between right and wrong and has “the courage to adhere unswervingly to the right.” (The Officers Guide,1956:254 quoted in Sorley, 1979:145). Honor is also an umbrella term that embraces concepts such as integrity and trust. These are the wellspring of military ethics (Sarkesian and Gannon, 1979: 135). Without integrity and trust a leader cannot be confident that orders are being carried out or that they are based on accurate intelligence. (Ryan, 1979: 189).

Honor also embraces competence. Incompetence may involve assigning an illqualified soldier to repair a tank. Later, soldiers, either during combat or training exercises, may die as a consequence. The stakes of incompetence are so high that some have declared incompetence in a military context immoral (Wakin,1984:59-62). General Sir John W. Hackett blames the needless death of British and French troops during World War I on incompetent leadership (Hackett, 1979: 88).

**Affective Considerations**

In addition to normative components, the warrior’s culture is finely tuned affectively. The affective context can be seen in the rituals that define military life such as the tough initiation of boot camp, neatly
pressed uniforms, the raunchy jody calls during marches, monuments to past glory, and the draping of a flag over the casket of a dead warrior. Clearly, the funeral of a heroic soldier combines high moral principles and deep emotions as few events can. There is also the importance of courage and the stark terror of combat.

**Esprit-de-Corps**

The warrior places a high value on morale or the “feeling of unity that gives the soldier the courage to fight.” (Segal & Segal, 1983:156) While a soldier may join the military for a variety of reasons (getting a job, patriotism, the draft) the actual willingness to fight is based in large part on the cohesion of the fighting unit. Hence, feelings such as esprit-de-corps, and brotherhood play an integral part in military success.

During World War II “no more that one in four American infantrymen ...fired their weapons at the enemy, even under the most desperate conditions.” (Kaufman, 1987:48) Scholars trace this fact to problems with unit cohesion. Hence, even in a war where patriotism ran high, poor unit cohesion produced severe problems with performance. The problems of World War II can be traced to a cohesion-destroying rotation and replacement system (Kaufman, 1987: 53). Cohesion requires trust.

“Trust between leaders and subordinates and between a soldier and his peers... Trust is built through daily interaction and working together over an extended period of time--small unit cohesion. Cohesion is the glue that holds units together, keeps them fighting and prevents psychiatric casualties.” (Kaufman, 1987: 53)

Cohesiveness, brings other benefits. It helps control the behavior of unruly individuals. For example, peer pressure stops angry outbursts from escalating into fights. (Miller, 1985: 92) This is particularly helpful when men are sleep-deprived, living in cramped, hot, damp quarters; conditions where tempers are likely to be short.

Aside from small unit cohesion, the warrior also values a feeling of unity among uniform members on a larger scale. The military is a community within a larger society. Moreover, it is a community which takes pride in “taking care of its own.” The military base provides this sense of community. The military base is a geographic community where almost all the necessities of life can be found. It is also a community in a psycho-social sense. Members of a base “share a common culture or practice a common way of life. There
exists a kind of community of fate.” (Coates and Pellegrin, 1965: 373) The base provides the community which supports the warrior.

**Macho-culture**

Perhaps the military has traditionally stressed discipline because it had to rely on late and post-adolescent boys/men. This is a time in life characterized by relatively greater risk taking and daring; qualities that may be useful in combat. Young men seek adventure, and have fewer family responsibilities. They also bring with them a unique post-adolescence macho culture. This culture in some respects emphasizes possession of the “manly virtues”. “The ability to consume alcohol in quantity and the ability to meet one’s work obligations in spite of doing so is highly valued. To be successful with women, to defend one’s person in physical combat, to laugh in the face of hardship and disaster” (Coates and Pellegrin, 1965: 398). This is the culture of the military peer group and an integral component of the affective context.

**Will**

Will is an intangible identified by Clausewitz (1976:77). Will is the determination of the fighting force to press on. It is a factor which explains how armies overcome seemingly impossible obstacles and prevail. In Vietnam and Afghanistan one might speculate that the United States and the Soviet Union lacked necessary will and the natives had tenacious will. This may be the critical factor that explains why neither world power was victorious against a small third world country.

**Nurturing and Responding to Affective Elements**

The affective context is nurtured and exploited by the military. For example, when a Task Force of the 101st Army Air Borne Division was preparing to deploy to the Sinai as part of a multinational observer force, the Army paid careful attention to the affective milieu. These men were issued special uniforms (including shoes, hats and canteens) well in advance of departure. This gave them status while still at Ft Campbell. They were given a big sendoff, with a band and a rousing speech. Capt. John Miller described the event,
“When you look at some of these eighteen and nineteen year old kids right out of AIT (advanced individual training), they were awed by it...they couldn’t wait to get over there...We started off on the right foot. We started off with a lot of heightened morale, heightened cohesion, esprit de corps, and everybody was geared up to go.” (Miller, 1985:91)

Aside from creating an affective context which supports warrior actions, the military has to deal with the consequences of affect. Psychiatric casualties or battle shock associated with emotional dysfunction is part of combat. Clearly, the institution is more effective when psychiatric casualties are minimized. Research suggests that men with personal problems are more likely to experience battle shock. For example, in the 1973 Israeli war 80 percent of the battle shock cases had problems or stress (drug, alcohol, family) prior to combat (Gal, 1985:115).

Men at highest risk for combat stress were married. Problems or stresses at home were brought to the battlefield. Men with marriages in crisis (pending separation) are obvious examples. In addition, stresses common to any marriage such as pregnancy or an infant were related to psychiatric casualties. Hence, there was a direct link between the combat soldier's effectiveness and the welfare and stability of his family life. This points to the importance of the “community that takes care of its own” element of military life. Johnson found that the Army was doing a poor job of supporting the families of men in the Sinai. The wives felt isolated, and overwhelmed with single parent responsibilities. Johnson reported that the families enthusiastically greeted and participated in the support networks that were subsequently developed (Johnson, 1985:100).

**Warrior Philosophy (what warriors believe about war)**

Soldiers attend to the business of war. Hence, an understanding of their views of war is central to understanding the N/A context. Clausewitz' discussion has endured as a way of understanding war.

Clausewitz links war with political objectives and views it as a policy instrument.

“When whole communities go to war...the reason always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.” (Clausewitz, 1976: 86-87.)

What separates war from other policy is the nature of its means---violence. Hence, violence and politics are two enduring characteristics of war.
While the characteristics of war can hardly be summarized in a small section of this paper, there are several characteristics that are interesting because they are related to the assumptions associated with privatization. For example, the nature of war is extreme. In a combat situation there is no room for moderation. “To introduce the principle of moderation into the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity.” (Clausewitz, 1976:77) War involves the impulse to destroy the enemy. Destruction is not something entered into with moderation. War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application to that force.” (Clausewitz, 1976:77) The extreme nature of the venture puts it at odds with marginal analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. When you go for broke there is little point in examining tradeoffs.

Another enduring concept developed by Clausewitz is friction. Friction applies to factors that “distinguishes real war from war on paper” (1979:119). Friction is the countless unforeseen problems that occur when engaged in combat. It makes simple things in war difficult. It lowers the overall level of performance and makes it almost impossible to achieve a goal. The helicopter crash of the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt is a modern example of friction. Friction mucks up rational economic analysis. The “relationship between effort and result (inputs and outputs) is disturbed by friction” (Clausewitz, 1976:120). One of James Fallows most disturbing criticism of the modern managed military is its disregard for friction. (Fallows, 1981:17-18)

Warfare is complex and composed of many parts.

“Warfare comprises everything related to the fighting forces--everything to do with their creation, maintainence and use...It is made up of many parts...The whole of military activity must therefore relate directly or indirectly to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed and trains, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking, and marching is simply that he should be in the right place at the right time.” (Clausewitz, 1976:100)

Friction can complicate any part of the warfare process. The more complex the process the more sources of friction are possible. Readiness, in part, deals with ways to control or minimize friction. This is why the warrior stresses the importance of drills, practice, and discipline.

Friction also increases the slack and uncertainty of the system. It increases the number of tasks that cannot be specified in a contract’s statement of work. A military organization which is self contained or a community that “takes care of its own” is prepared for friction and designed to pick up the slack. Warriors
fear the consequences of friction as contractors take over functions previously held by uniform personnel. In an emergency, contractors may have to be evacuated causing friction. In addition, they may be unwilling or unable to deal with the consequences of friction because it was “not in the contract”.

The protracted peace of the high-tech nuclear age has provided the warrior with new dilemmas.

“Protracted peace generates chronic debate over military goals, formats, structures and cultural styles” (Cotton, 1988:40) Do the traditional values and insights of past warriors still apply? Since objectives are blurred the already hard to define and defend concept of readiness becomes more ambiguous.

**The Warrior in a Modern Democracy**

The warrior is an ideal which transcends time and place. Many of the values discussed above would be valid for the soldiers of ancient Greece, of Caesar or Napoleon. The warrior in a modern democratic state must consider other issues or parameters that define the limits of behavior.

In a democracy the “military is legitimate only in so far as its existence and its use of power have been agreed to by society as a whole...Consent is the core trait, individuals confer the right of coercion on the state” (Harries-Jenkins, 1976:43).

Since legitimacy derives from the consent of the population the military institution is more likely to maintain consent if the population can identify with the institution. Consent will weaken if the military is isolated from the larger society. This legitimacy is strengthened to the extent that the warrior ranks are filled with citizen soldiers. (Harries-Jenkins 1976: 55)

In addition, the behavior of military professionals can affect legitimacy. Unethical behavior can erode civilian control and denigrate professionalism (Sarkesian and Gannon, 1979, 128). Hence, ethical behavior (military virtues) is fundamental to institutional legitimacy as well as professional status.

Conscription which draws from a representative cross section may increase an institution’s legitimacy because a cross section of society is directly tied to the institution. A volunteer force, on the other hand, may tend to isolate the institution and erode consensus and eventually legitimacy. (Harries-Jenkins,1976:55)

Sarkesian and Gannon maintain that conscription (a form of privatization) present challenges to professional ethics.
“The fundamental ethical problem facing the military profession is how to accommodate itself to its growing volunteer (privatized) character and reinforce its links with society while maintaining its uniqueness as a profession” (Sarkesian and Gannon, 1979: 129).

Hence, maintaining the delicate balance between autonomy and fusion is a fundamental problem for a military in a democracy (Thayer, 1973: 568). The institution needs to maintain its separateness as the “managers of violence in the service of the state” (Sarkesian and Gannon, 1979:133). Ideally, it would be filled with warriors willing to attack the enemy, risking life and limb on a moments notice. The warriors would be cohesive and proud of their separateness in the service of the state. On the other hand, legitimacy in a democracy dictates that warriors are not too isolated from society. The larger citizenry must be able to identify with the warrior and his institution. Cotton believes that a military premised on marketplace principles can lead to the worst of two worlds: a military which lacks cohesion and which is isolated from the larger civilian society. (Cotton, 1988)

While the warrior values and traditions are found in antiquity, the modern, high tech, nuclear environment challenges many ingrained assumptions about the nature of war and military mission. The warrior has always wanted the best weapons. Technological superiority has proven decisive in battle (arrows v. guns). Now, however, technological superiority has taken on a life of its own. Technological change is fast paced and the ability to continually develop superior weapons has itself become a weapon in the arsenal of deterrence.

Technological change has also eroded the distinction between “military” and “civilian”. (Janowitz, 1979: 57) As a warrior becomes proficient in the high-tech equipment of destruction and deterrence he spends more time working on tasks with civilian equivalents. He has more in common with similar civilians and less in common with fellow warriors. As early as 1965, well before there was a serious call for the elimination of the draft, Coats and Pellegrin (1965: 379-380) discussed the eroding influence of technological change on the psychosocial nature of the military community. They noted that the “Gemeinschaft” quality of the military was deteriorating.

According to Janowitz, nuclear weapons, the cold war and deterrence have led to an elimination of the distinction between a peacetime and wartime posture (Janowitz, 1979:53). The profession has had to radically adapt to the new conditions. Janowitz defined the concept of a “constabulary force”.
The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to a minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective posture. (Janowitz, 1979: 53)

Although the thaw in the cold war may move the United States toward peace, problems such as terrorism, and the drug war suggests that the “constabulary” concept remains useful.

Janowitz maintains that, in the short run, a constabulary force is compatible with the concept of a volunteer military—effectiveness tends to rise when salaries are raised. In the long run, however, effectiveness may be compromised by relying on monetary rewards. (Janowitz, 1979: 56)

Men can be motivated by money to undertake dangerous and irksome tasks, but the result would be to weaken essential heroic traditions. In a private enterprise society, the military establishment could not hold its most creative talents without the binding force of service traditions, professional identifications, and honor. (Janowitz, 1979: 57)

Many of the most important decisions of our time are related to military policy. These decisions are affected by a host of factors. Public debate often focuses on the issues associated with defense policy (i.e., size of the defense budget, force composition, choice of weapons, deployment of troops). In the long run, however, “the nature of the decisions on these issues is determined by the institutional pattern through which decisions are made” (Huntington, 1964: 2). Privatization policies have had a profound impact on this institutional pattern.

**Institutional Tensions**

The underlying philosophy of the warrior and the economist are clearly different. These differences have created some institutional tensions because privatization policies often clash with the Normative/Affective context of the warrior. The warrior is responsible for building a culture of the firing line. The importance of the “I” and the lack of recognition of the “We” in neoclassical policy prescriptions have resulted in institutional tensions.

This section will deal with manifestations of tension which are systemic rather than policy-specific. One obvious area of tension is the debate over leadership and management. Another, is the controversy over careerism and professionalism. The warrior is concerned that the emphasis on management, a concept
consistent with the neoclassical focus on the individual, is eroding the role of leadership. As warriors become managers they may lose their ability to lead. Careerism is the individual’s focus on getting ahead—at any price. Ideally, the military professional’s first allegiance is to the institution and its goals. The professional is guided by an ethical code of conduct.

Privatization policies are designed to be neutral with respect to the Normative/Affective context. Clearly, policy prescriptions based on economic theory were not designed to erode leadership. Rather, management was emphasized to enhance efficiency in resource allocation. Unfortunately, policies rooted in the neoclassical tradition ignore and often weaken the culture of the firing line.

**Leadership vs. Management**

Leadership is a concept central to military success. It is a topic prominent in military education. Clauswitz's discussion of military genius is illustrative. Here, he stresses courage, passion, strength of character and a mind powerful enough to drive an army to the limit (Clauswitz, 1976: 100-115). Intangible elements such as discipline, sacrifice, courage, and calling are characteristics that distinguish past military leaders. Because war is violent business, military leadership represents an extreme case. In a democracy, effective military leaders use ideals and values to motivate citizen soldiers to survive and kill the enemy. War and preparing for war is a tough testing ground for leadership.

The leadership/management debate does not challenge the military’s need for management skills. In a sense, the warrior sees the management function as akin to logistics, a function central to success on the battlefield. A military leader will be better able to push his army to the limit if it is well fed and equipped. Clearly, the military needs both leadership and management. Institutional tensions concern relative emphasis. Is the intrinsic nature of leadership being displaced by a management philosophy? There is concern that a “military managerial mind is emerging, which is harmful to the image of the heroic leader and the successful warrior”(Turcotte, 1984: 105).

The literature is filled with a discussion of the leadership management debate. Many, like Sorley, trace the beginning of the conflict to the “management revolution” ushered in by economists. He cites Hitch and

---

4 See for example, (Stokesbury, 1984); (Ridgeway, 1984); (Andrews, 1984); (Marshall, 1984).
5 See for example, (Turcotte, 1984); (Segal and Segal, 1983); (Wood, 1988), (Sorley, 1979), (Wakin, 1984).
McKean’s introduction of management techniques such as systems analysis and operations research as examples (Sorley, 1979: 149).

Sorley maintains that the manager inappropriately brought his bag of quantitative tricks to the game of war. Quantitative measures were used to evaluate success or setback during the Vietnam conflict. Performance evaluations focused on a quantitative output measures and disregard intangibles such as morale. For example, body count was used as a “management tool” to estimate progress and performance. (Sorley, 1979:152) This summary statistic was problematic because it was used to compare commander battlefield performance. In addition, the men in the field had an incentive to overstate body counts because they knew the commander was pleased with higher numbers. “Vietnam lore is conspicuously short on reports of commanders who came down to verify subordinates’ estimates” (Sorley, 1979: 152). Exaggerated body counts were handed in up the line. Decisions in war should be based on sound intelligence. Leaders need to trust the reports from the field.

Under this system of data collection, vital information was collected by the people being evaluated and compared, the very people who had an incentive to manipulate the data. In addition, statistical comparison of this type brings depersonalization of the command structure and places “pressure on lower echelons to be guided by how it will look on the charts rather than what is right in a particular situation” (Sorley, 1979:155). Hence, the “management revolution” ushered in new ways to corrupt the system.

The management philosophy advocated by economists introduced a contractual focus to military decision making. Economists conceptualize the relationship between citizen and government in contractual terms. Under the contractual approach, citizens purchase government services such as defense with tax dollars. (The economist, of course, would want this to be the efficient amount.) The contractual notion is then extended to the relationship between the warrior and the state. (Wood, 1988:35) To the neoclassical manager, the warrior is the human resource (labor) that along with raw materials and weapons (land, capital), provides the service to the consumer/citizen. When these relationships are stated in contractual terms the role of ethics and ethical considerations is diluted.

“if one adopts the contractual view it is relatively easy to attempt to divorce the military function from moral considerations. War is a dirty business, and the tasks facing this
military leader is to develop armies and weapons systems which can efficiently destroy potential enemies; the body count is the bottom line.” (Wakin, 1984: 55)

The contractual relationship is reinforced in a volunteer force. Enlistees become employees who have contracts with their employer. The term “contract” is commonly used by economists. For example, Gary Nelson, an economist, discusses “contracts” rather than men when describing enlistment trends over the life of the All Volunteer Force (Nelson, 1986: 38).

Professionalism vs. Careerism

A controversy similar to the management/leadership dichotomy is the careerism vs. professionalism debate. Military officers and scholars have long been preoccupied with the nature of military professionalism. Samuel Huntington, in his classic definition, cites three elements that characterize professionalism; expertise, corporateness, and responsibility (Huntington, 1964: 8-10). Expertise is specialized skill, education and training. Corporateness stems from a shared use of the specialized skill and an interest in maintaining high standards in the applications of the skill. The military professional has a “responsibility” to provide his service to society. Compared to a person who views his work as just-a-job, a professional is unlikely to place emphasis on working conditions and pay. Rather he is one who “pursues a higher calling in the service of society” (Huntington, 1964: 8). Responsibility also implies a set of values and an ethical code of conduct. Ideally, the military professional believes in and adheres to the values and norms discussed earlier. In other words, the professional cares about, pays attention to and is motivated by the Normative/Affective context.

Careerism is a corruption of military professionalism.

“The change from ‘professionalism’ to ‘careerism’ ... automatically signals a change in emphasis from service to others to self-interest, from the responsibilities of trust to self-defined rights of position. It is a subtle and often unnoticed transition, but the true professional and the genuine careerist are poles apart when it comes to the viability of the military ethic” (Flammer, 1979: 167-168).

---

6 See for example, (Huntington, 1964); (Janowitz, 1979); (Flammer, 1979); (Sarkesian, 1981); (Sarkesian and Gannon; 1979); (Wood, 1988).
Careerism is the opposite of professionalism. It is individualistic in nature and is characterized in a worst case scenario by blind, ruthless, ambition. “It is not difficult. to make the subtle but terrible transition from professional to ‘careerist’. ‘Careerism’ inherently involves conflicting loyalties in relation to any idealistic ethic, and particularly the military ethic” (Flammer, 1979:167). Clearly the utility maximizing man of neoclassical economics fits the image of the careerist more closely than the professional.

Policy Criticisms

Aside from systemic issues such as management and careerism, specific privatization policies have been sharply criticized. Criticism associated with the transition from a draft to a volunteer force are among the most developed.

Warriors implement policy when they obey orders. Sanctions and the norm of obedience prevents warriors from publicly criticizing policy. Although aspects of service contracting make him uncomfortable he is reluctant to criticize.

The Military Employer

The military draft requisitions men. It is clearly a non market mechanism that displaces individual self interest in favor of the needs of country and institution. The all volunteer force (AVF) represents a form of privatization because a non market mechanism was replaced by competition in the labor market. Although political pressure played a dominate role in the draft's demise, economic theoretical underpinning formed the foundation on which the new military was built. For example, labor economists and econometricians estimated supply elasticities of approximately 1.25. This crucial number indicated that the military could rely on pay alone to fill its ranks (a one percent increase in relative wages would increase enlistments by 1.25 percent).

Hence, managers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, of necessity, treated the armed forces as an employer competing in the labor market. The military employer has adapted to the situation by

---

7 See for example, (Altman, 1969); (Altman and Fechter, 1967); (Fisher, 1969); (Hansen and Weisbrod, 1967); (Oi, 1967).
modifying policies. Today's institution more closely resembles a civilian firm. For example, military pay has increased dramatically. In 1964 the last year of peace before the AVF, average military compensation (in 1986 dollars) was $15,000; in 1986, the average compensation was $25,000. In-kind benefits have been delayed or substituted for cash. Previously, pay had been tightly linked to rank, now the role of rank is diluted by occupational speciality. In addition, there has been increased reliance on advertising that emphasizes individual benefits. Under conscription, enlistee and draftee alike were obligated for a specified tour of duty. Premature discharge was rare. Today's military has adopted an easy-out policy. For example, of the Marine enlistee cohort entering in 1982, thirty two percent failed to complete their initial tour.

Life within the rank and file is also different. Today's enlistee is more likely to live off base, be moonlighting, married and a father than his conscript counterpart. In addition, there has been growth in union-like activities; for example, the Air Force Sergeants Association actively lobbies Congress for pay and benefits. Indeed, soldiers no longer betray their country for ideological reasons. The new breed of traitor sells secrets for cash.

**Occupation or Institution**

Over the past ten years, sociologist Charles Moskos has called attention to these trends, many of which are unintended consequences of privatization. He developed a model which addresses concerns on the warrior because it incorporates normative factors. His Institutional/Occupational (I/O) model of military organizations has received significant attention. The I/O model uses an ideal continuum, to show how America's traditional military is being transformed. According to Moskos, an Institutional military is grounded in traditional, intrinsic values (duty, obligation, esprit de corps). Here leaders motivate soldiers to sacrifice for the greater good. On the other hand, in an Occupational military managers use extrinsic rewards (pay, bonus) to motivate workers to do their job. Changes noted above are manifestations of occupational trends which Moskos and others find alarming.⁸

---

⁸ See for example, (Moskos, 1988); (Cotton, 1988); (Faris, 1988).
Moskos has identified a change in values, organizational mind set and culture that accompanies privatization. He maintains that the privatized, occupational orientation ignores intangibles such as morale, cohesion and leadership. Hence, it undermines organizational commitment and effectiveness.

These occupational trends are not unique to the United States. A recent study of 8 allied militaries revealed occupational trends in all but one (Israel). The United States, however, is closer to the occupational end of the spectrum than the other militaries.

**Service Contracting**

Charles Moskos cites an increase in service contracting as characteristic of an occupational military. The growth in service contracting has been gradual. It is impossible to point to a specific time or policy such as the elimination of the draft. I believe that service contracting is changing the military organization at the boundary. By influencing its boundary it is incrementally transforming the texture of military organizations. There are several aspects of this change that disturb the warrior. First, will contracting compromise readiness? Second, will contracting further deteriorate the psycho-social community or “we take care of our own”? Third, will contracting further entrench patterns of thought which undermine ethics and promote or reward management/careerism versus leadership/professionalism?

The high-tech nature of defense makes contracting more attractive to the warrior. Deterrence calls for a different set of skills. The engineer, the communications technician, and the radar specialist are all modern warriors. Competence in these skills requires extensive training both in the classroom and on the job. Why should someone in uniform cook meals, collect garbage, do routine building maintenance, stock commissary shelves? Contracting frees airmen, soldiers, and sailors for essential functions. Readiness becomes an issue when contractors fix helicopters and tanks or fuel airplanes. Training on equipment is another example. When the service owns and operates training equipment the expertise is held within the system. It is a back-up in case of crisis. In the case of some high tech equipment the private sector has begun to cross the line and is teaching strategy and tactics (Grossman, 1989). This would be particularly troubling to the warrior.
Contract failure is another way service contracting can influence readiness. Shortages and service disruption is an inevitable consequence of contract failure. In a worst case scenario, these disruptions could threaten national security.

It is difficult to determine the exact level of service contracting at the Defense Department. Scattered statistics are suggestive of its size and import. In 1988, the federal government spent almost $200 billion on contracts. Of this, DOD made up over 76% (GSA, 1989:2 &7). Twenty six percent of all federal contracts are service contracts. The exact size of service contracting at DOD is ambiguous because neither The Federal Procurement Data Center nor any other agency publish this number.

If exact size is ambiguous, clearly, corporate America finds service contracting attractive. In 1988, the top three service contractors were General Electric ($686.3 million), Boeing ($645.7 million), and Lockheed ($641 million) These companies are among the top ten military contractors for 1988. The top 40 service contractors earned approximately 11.8 billion dollars in 1988. (Military Forum, 1989:136)

Service contracting as official policy began in the Eisenhower administration with the 1955 Bureau of the Budget (BOB) Bulletin 55-4. This regulation applied to all agencies and stated that it was the “policy of the federal government to rely on the private sector for goods and services, rather than to compete with private enterprise” (Russell, 1985: 18) The Army’s in-house coffee grinding activity was often cited as an inefficient and inappropriate government (military) function. Although official policy, BOB's Bulletin 55-4 was never taken seriously within the bureaucracy. Its impact was negligible.

The policy was reborn as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 in 1967. Here the notions of competition and efficiency were introduced. Under A-76, the private sector involvement must save money. A formal internal review process was introduced. Agencies were required to carefully review work and estimate costs. These review processes alone, generally produce savings of 30 percent. After the in-house cost estimates are complete the job is put up for private bid. If the private bid comes in 10% below the in-house estimate the work would be contracted out.

Between 1979 and the first quarter of 1987 DOD completed 1,661 cost comparison studies. The estimated savings from this program over the period were 612.5 million dollars. It should be noted that savings accrue to this program whether or not they go contract since agency review of work usually results
in cost savings. Approximately 52% of the cost comparisons resulted in contracting out. Typical cost comparison studies included functions such as Facilities/ground maintenance, custodial, commissary, motorpool/vehicle maintenance, supply, equipment maintenance, fire protection (GAO/GGD-89-6, 88:14-15). It should be noted that the A-76 process targets civil service employees and is not designed to examine the activities of uniformed personnel. Nevertheless, uniformed positions are affected by A-76 through the reclassification process. For example, a uniformed position may be reclassified civilian and then reviewed under A-76.

Clearly, the A-76 program is targeted toward civilians. The warrior has always had some ambivalence toward civilian DOD employees. One would anticipate that civilian employees are less committed than the warrior. He may see little difference between civilianization and privatization. The civil servant, however, strengthens the operation of military bases by providing stability and institutional memory. Career civil servants typically live in the community and are employed at the base for 10 to 20 years. Uniformed personnel, on the other hand, rotate in and out on significantly shorter tours--usually two years. Their longevity might be a safeguard against the problems of friction. Institutional memory should decrease the number of unexpected events (even if it is a cracked runway due to unexpected sub zero temperatures or labor problems due to striking plumbers on a construction job).

Theoretically, if career civil servants are replaced by contract employees one would expect shorter tenure and greater turnover. On average, if a competitive environment is maintained, one would expect turnover in firms operating base services. While it is possible for one firm to maintain a competitive advantage and receive extended contract renewals, one would expect turnover system wide. Absence of turnover would suggest the lack of competition. Without competition, the contractor becomes a de-facto part of the bureaucracy. If competition is maintained, contract employees will rotate in and out of base functions much like their uniformed counterparts. Institutional memory may be seriously eroded.

A-76 is not the only way service contracting is changing the boundaries of military organizations. Budget pressures, as well as, personnel and equipment constraints are factors which contribute to the substitution of uniformed for nonuniformed personnel. For example, the Army contracts with nurses,
doctors and dentists. In some instances, contract and uniformed doctors and nurses work side by side.

Training in high-tech equipment is also illustrative.

Pressure to increase contracting comes from several sources. First, contracting, like all privatization techniques, is considered a cost containment measure. The peace dividend and budget deficits are putting political pressure to reduce the size and scope of military operations. In addition, ceilings on personnel and equipment increase opportunities for contracting. Congress may cut end-strength yet keep the budget fairly stable. Contracting is a viable alternative. Equipment caps have spurred growth in contract training.

Congress counts weapons used for training purposes as part of a service’s inventory. Equipment used for training purposes does not count against the quota if it is owned by a contractor operating a training program.

Conclusion

The military understands the importance of norms and values in institutional effectiveness. It has been sensitive to Moskos’ criticisms and has to a limited sense reinstitutionalized. For example, the Navy introduced “Operation Pride” which stresses Navy traditions. The Army has developed the COHORT system of unit replacement. This system promotes unit cohesion. The military devotes considerable resources to understanding the psychological nature of man in war.

Clearly, the warrior is part of his institution. His timeless norms and values will probably, in the long run, be more important in shaping military institutions than those of the economist. Socioeconomics is a useful tool to study the warrior’s dilemmas with privatization. By making the Normative/Affective context an integral part of analysis, socioeconomics provides conceptual tools for integration of the warrior ideals. Further, neoclassical economic theory leaves out the “We” aspect of human motivation. This is the very element the warrior depends on in war. Socioeconomics embraces the “We” and addresses the need to integrate the two perspectives.


