Vermont-Québec Police Agency Cooperation:  
A Case Study

by

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Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this applied research project is to develop a practical ideal type model of cross-border police agency cooperation and to gauge Vermont-Québec police agency cooperation against this practical ideal type standard. Cross-border police agencies are faced with two main problems: 1) the existence of barriers to effective cross-border police agency cooperation and 2) how to mitigate or remove these barriers to cooperation. A review of the literature identified three main concepts that were used to develop the practical ideal type against which Vermont-Québec police agency cooperation was gauged. The three main concepts are effective command, collaboration, and communication.

Methodology: The three main concepts of practical ideal type cross-border police agency cooperation serve as the building blocks for a conceptual framework. The conceptual framework both describes the practical ideal type and provides a tool for gauging the effectiveness of Vermont-Québec police agency cooperation. The conceptual framework helped develop the three methods used in this study: the interview, field research, and document analysis.

Findings: The cross-border practices of Vermont and Québec were rated as strongly supportive, generally supportive, minimally supportive, or not supportive of practical ideal type cross-border police agency cooperation. For the concept of command, the agency practices were strongly supportive. For the concept of collaboration, the agency practices were generally supportive. For the concept of communication, the agency practices were generally supportive.
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Chapter I

Introduction

Major Issues in Cross-border Police Agency Cooperation

The major issues addressed in this ARP are 1) the barriers to effective cross-border police agency cooperation and 2) how cross-border police agencies can mitigate or remove these barriers to cooperation. Desai (2005, 58) identified four impediments to law enforcement agency cooperation that must be addressed: 1) Lack of a formal overarching concept of operations or “doctrine” for coordination; 2) Lack of an independent authority responsible for the development and training of personnel in such a doctrine; 3) Individual agencies use different regional structures to organize; and 4) Personnel policies within most agencies develop personnel who are primarily dedicated to their own agency rather than the interagency community. Barriers to cross-border police agency cooperation are discussed in more detail in Chapter II.

This ARP will describe best practices that cross-border police agencies should adopt in order to most effectively cooperate. These best practices include not only the practices themselves, but the extent to which they should be adopted and applied. The cooperation between police agencies of the US state of Vermont and the Canadian province of Québec provides a unique arrangement to which these best practices of cross-border police agency cooperation can be applied in order to “gauge” the state of this cross-border cooperation. The concept of gauging is discussed later in Chapter I.
Specific Concerns at the Vermont-Québec Border

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks affected cross-border cooperation by pushing security concerns above trade concerns between the US and its North American neighbors. On the subject of trade, in order for North America to be a true free trade region there must be significant security cooperation that includes the harmonization of policies and procedures and cooperation between Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. law enforcement agencies. The harmonization of policing policy between bordering nations is discussed in Chapter II.

A discussion of the situation at the Mexico-US border helps to understand the nature of the international border between Canada and the US. The Mexico-U.S. (M-US) border presents specific difficulties for law enforcement cooperation and distinct security concerns that are different than the security concerns at the Canada-U.S. (C-US) border. The M-US border “is an ecosystem for violence as a consequence of being removed from direct governmental supervision and a lack of law enforcement by the centers of power” (Schmidt 1997, 300). Cottam and Marenin describe the M-US border: “The border stretches for about 2,000 miles, has 50 official border crossing sites separated in some cases by miles of desolate terrain, many large 'twin' cities on both sides, and a unique culture which blends Anglo-American, Hispanic and Native American values” (2005, 7).

There are also difficulties with managing the Canada-U.S. (C-US) border, even though cooperation between Canadian and U.S. law enforcement is much better off than cooperation between Mexican and U.S. law enforcement. The C-US border is even longer than the M-US border. Cottam and Marenin (2005, 9) describe the C-US border:

It is 5,500 miles long (if the Alaska-Canada border is included), and it has 130 official crossing points. Over 200 million border crossings occur each year.
Ninety percent of Canada’s population lives within 100 miles of the border with the U.S. As in the case of Mexico, the border tends to have matching cities. The Great Lakes region contains heavy industry on both sides, yet elsewhere there are many miles of rugged terrain where crossings can occur undetected.

This brief description of the C-US border is a good introduction to a description of the Vermont-Québec border. Heavy industry is present on both sides of the border in the Great Lakes region; that is not the case at the Vermont-Québec border. There is no heavy industry at the border, on either side. The border on both sides is dotted with small towns. While the C-US border is immense, the Vermont-Québec border is small, only about 117 miles long (188 km) due to Vermont’s small size. There are no matching cities. Vermont’s largest city, Burlington, has a population of 42,282 (US Census Bureau). The Burlington MSA has a population of 213,701 (Real Estate Center at Texas A&M University). Québec’s largest city is Montréal with a population of 3,824,221 (Statistics Canada). Montréal is a major North American city and is the second largest city in Canada. Montréal is 50 miles (80 km) from the closest Vermont town, Alburgh, VT. The border is comprised of land as well as three bodies of water. The terrain is varied. Lakes freeze in the winter, providing highways for foot and snowmobile traffic (Vermont State Police). There is an important linguistic difference between Vermont and Québec. The official language in Québec is French. This presents a unique cross-border communication and perhaps cultural barrier that does not exist along the rest of the immense C-US border.

Specific concerns at the Vermont-Québec border include the “large zones of virtually non-existent border demarcation” (Vermont State Police). The Vermont State Police also cite the porosity of the border and the proximity of most of the Québec population to the US border. Terrorist groups also present a threat. According to
Canadian authorities Canada has identified over 50 terrorist factions with members residing in Canada, including Al Qaeda (Vermont State Police). Other criminal activity concerns are smuggling of drugs, people, firearms, and currency. Vermont has lenient firearm laws; Canada, including Québec has much more restrictive firearms laws.

Any time there is an international border there is at least some impediment to cross-border cooperation that must be overcome. If asymmetry exists between bordering nations, cooperation is made that much more difficult. In the case of the US and Canada, the relationship is much less asymmetrical than the relationship between the US and Mexico. This may have an unintended consequence: the border shared by two asymmetrical countries get more attention, resources, and study than the border shared by two symmetrical countries. In other words, the border activities between more developed countries and less developed countries get the attention at the expense of the border activities between two developed countries. Related to this phenomenon, elected officials, public administrators, and researchers may concentrate on certain cross-border relationships over others. The chart below illustrates this tendency.

**Cross-Border Study Focus Chart**

Table 1.1 presents the major combinations of cross-border study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **More Developed/More Developed**  
Example: Detroit, MI/Windsor, ON | **More Developed/More Developed**  
Example: VT/QC |
| **More Developed/Less Developed**  
Example: El Paso, TX/Ciudad Juárez, Chih. | **More Developed/Less Developed**  
Example: Sasabe, AZ/El Sásabe, Sonora |
Based on the combinations possible in the chart above, it is likely that Rural – More Developed/More Developed (the Vermont-Québec example) receives the least attention of the four possible combinations.

Research Importance

This research is important because the cross-border police agency cooperation that is being gauged is a part of border security and crime control. “The hardened border still provides substantial returns to criminal organizations that are both creative and persistent in their activities” (Hale 2009, 22). McBryan (2011, 66) asserts that borders are often enablers of criminal enterprise. Border security cooperation is necessary to curb crime and criminal organizations. The shared borders that enable commerce also present security challenges. Canada has emerged as a greater concern regarding terrorist threats, despite Mexico’s relative instability compared to Canada. After 9-11, and the preoccupation of the US government with the war on terror, Canada has emerged as a more likely source of threats in the eyes of US decision makers, while there has been very little public discussion of a terrorist threat coming through Mexico (Hristoulas and Serrano, 2003). In a 2005 independent task force report from the Council on Foreign Relations with the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales task force member Richard A. Falkenrath wrote that North American countries “should intensify their cooperation across an even broader range of national and homeland security issues, including: law enforcement; intelligence; transportation security; critical infrastructure protection; defense against biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, and ballistic missile threats; and incident management.”
Bow (2010, 13) discusses the “easy and extensive defense collaboration between the U.S. and Canada.” This “bilateral defense relationship” is distinct from law enforcement cooperation. This may represent an area that needs to be improved, if the defense relationship is robust, but other relationships such as law enforcement cooperation are less robust.

Law enforcement cooperation bears on trade policy, international cooperation, and public safety. This cooperation is “the product of bilateral negotiations and arrangements in the pursuit of common goals” (von Hlatky and Trisko 2012, 64). Cooperation also enhances the efficiency of police agency operations. Cropp writes “it is critical, especially within the paramilitary command and control structures of law enforcement, that management buy in to and support collaborations” (2012, 218). Despite the importance of cross-border police agency cooperation, Walker and Katz (2001) write “law enforcement and intelligence agencies are significantly lacking in their ability to cooperate through a multi-jurisdictional or interagency model.” For effective cross-border law enforcement, both the sharing of intelligence and police cooperation are necessary (Hale 2009, 22). According to Jackson and Brown “information sharing and interagency cooperation are well recognized by the law enforcement community as important components to effective crime prevention” (2007, 118). The delivery of police services has now assumed an international dimension. “Twenty-first century police agencies are expected to provide safety and security to increasingly complex communities with international ties” (Law Enforcement Symposium 2009, 6). Two case studies follow that illustrate the importance of effective cross-border police agency cooperation. These case studies will include three important concepts. They are: 1) Command; 2) Collaboration;
and 3) Communication. These concepts will be described in detail in Chapter II. At this point, it is enough to say that these concepts are all part of cross-border police agency cooperation and that these three concepts serve to enable cross-border police agency cooperation.

Case Study No. 1 – The Washington, D.C. Sniper Investigation

This case is not a cross-border example, but its multijurisdictional nature allows it to be applied to cross-border police agency circumstances in terms of the challenges faced. Murphy et al. (2004) prepared a report for the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) titled “Managing a Multijurisdictional Case: Identifying the Lessons Learned from the Sniper Investigation.” That report serves as the basis for this case study.

In October 2002 a sniper team using a high-powered rifle targeted victims indiscriminately throughout the Washington, D.C. and central Virginia area. The shootings spanned eight local jurisdictions and involved more than a thousand investigators from federal, state, and local agencies. “The sniper case was one of the most infamous crimes in the recent history of American law enforcement, instilling fear in thousands of people” (Murphy et al. 2004, 18). The scope of this manhunt and investigation was unparalleled in US law enforcement history. “Very little exists in the way of ‘best practices’ to help agencies initiate, manage and conduct a multi-agency agency investigation” (Murphy et al. 2004, 1). This is part of the reason that Walker and Katz (2001) assert “law enforcement and intelligence agencies are significantly lacking in their ability to cooperate through a multi-jurisdictional or interagency model.” Murphy et al. describe the “numerous agencies with overlapping jurisdiction” each of which had
their own capabilities and resources. The PERF project staff for the report identified four cornerstones of an effective law enforcement response. These cornerstones are: 1) careful planning and preparation; 2) defining roles and responsibilities; 3) managing information efficiently; and 4) maintaining effective communication. These four cornerstones are related to the three concepts of police command, collaboration, and communication. These concepts will be discussed in Chapter II. The assertion by Jackson and Brown that “information sharing and interagency cooperation are well recognized by the law enforcement community as important components to effective crime prevention” (2007, 118) is in harmony with the four cornerstones of an effective law enforcement response described in the PERF report.

One of the lessons learned in the D.C. sniper investigation was the need for agreements such as Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and “other mechanisms for building relationships” (Murphy et al. 2004, 15). This is related to Cropp’s call for police agencies to buy into and support collaborations. It is also related to the reference by von Hlatky and Trisko (2012, 64) to “bilateral negotiations and arrangements in the pursuit of common goals.” MOUs are just one example of these arrangements. Related to the concept of command, a second lesson learned is that a balance must be found between leadership to a police commander’s own community and agency and the leadership provided to a task force. In the cross-border context, the task force example would be the cross-border relationship with a partner police agency. Cropp’s assertion that “it is critical, especially within the paramilitary command and control structures of law enforcement, that management buy in to and support collaborations” fits here. Without collaborations, police agency commanders may be too beholden to their own agency’s
concerns at the expense of the cross-border relationship. A third lesson learned concerned communication, which is one of the concepts of cross-border police agency cooperation. Murphy et al. (2004, 62) found that “telephone and radio communications presented significant challenges for officials involved in the sniper investigation.” Lack of communication interoperability among police agencies in the Washington, D.C. area was identified as an obstacle.

The PERF report identified the difficulties in sharing information. “The sharing of information can be a delicate issue, but the eventual success of any multi-agency investigation may hinge on whether information is shared” (Murphy et al. 2004, 57). This is related to the statement by Jackson and Brown: “information sharing and interagency cooperation are well recognized by the law enforcement community as important components to effective crime prevention” (2007, 118). The multijurisdictional nature of the D.C. sniper case definitely made the investigation more complex and challenging for police, and may have benefitted the sniper team. As Hale (2009, 22) stated “the hardened border still provides substantial returns to criminal organizations that are both creative and persistent in their activities.” The multiple municipal, county, and state borders and overlapping jurisdictions may have conferred a similar “substantial return” to the D.C. area sniper team.

Case Study No. 2 – International Law Enforcement Cooperation against Organized Crime

This second case study is a distillation of cases involving transnational organized crime prepared by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). These cases have in common a response to this threat through the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Crime, known more simply as the Palermo Convention. The Palermo Convention provides a “unique set of legal tools and a framework for concerted criminal policy” (UNODC 2012). Article 1 of the Palermo Convention states “The purpose of the Convention is to promote cooperation to prevent and combat transnational organized crime more effectively.” This is related to McBryan’s assertion that borders are often enablers of criminal enterprise (2011, 66). The UNODC report cites an expert who stated that international policing needs “a modern professional culture of international cooperation” (2012, 54). This is related to Hale’s assertion that effective cross-border law enforcement requires both the sharing of intelligence and police cooperation (2009, 22). Also mentioned in the UNODC report is the difficulty caused by a lack of willingness to get involved in a crime that occurred in another country (“your crime is not my crime”).

Regarding law enforcement cooperation specifically, the UNODC report stresses 1) the exchange of intelligence on organized crime and bilateral agreements; 2) the role of early cooperation and spontaneous information sharing; 3) the necessity of continuous coordination of investigations carried on by multiple countries; and 4) direct, informal cooperation (2012, 57). In Article 27 of the Palermo Convention, nations are obliged to “consider entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements on direct cooperation between their law enforcement agencies.” Von Hlatky and Trisko (2012, 64) state that cooperation is “the product of bilateral negotiations and arrangements in the pursuit of common goals.” The UNODC report describes an Italian model agreement that creates a “permanent Working Group for both intelligence exchange and operational cooperation” (2012, 60). The report stresses the importance of early cooperation. “In dealing with transnational organized crime, law enforcement cooperation should start at an early
stage” (2012, 61). The report also notes that cooperation in organized crime cases is not limited to single acts. Rather, it is based on a “series of continuous and interlinked activities conducted in complex combinations by two or more countries” (2012, 62).

The UNODC report describes a case involving complex coordination in the investigation of a transnational crime:

A powerful network of Serbian, Croatian, Albanian, and Montenegrin citizens resident in various European and Latin American countries was trafficking cocaine and heroin to European destinations. The main organizers were based in Northern and Central Europe, Albania and South America, while other members operated in Europe, moving around frequently and supported by local cells. Local operations and communications among local cells were always “filtered” by the main organizers. The Italian criminal proceedings ultimately resulted in the conviction of 22 persons, who were sentenced to imprisonment from one to 20 years, and the confiscation of assets worth more than 8 million euros.

Full cooperation was necessary for investigative success. “Soft law” arrangements were used with non-EU countries. For example, the Italian Anti-Mafia National Directorate and the Croatian Ministry of Interior adopted a special arrangement for cooperation in the area of confiscation because Croatia was not a party to the Palermo Convention at that time (2012, 63). The UNODC discusses Joint Law Enforcement Centers. These centers are for “information exchange and support of police authorities of both contracting States” (2012, 65). The UNODC report heavily emphasizes the concept of collaboration, which will be discussed in Chapter II.

**Research Purpose Statement**

The purpose of this ARP is to develop a practical ideal type model of cross-border police agency cooperation and to gauge Vermont-Québec police agency cooperation against this practical ideal type standard. The term “practical” in the practical ideal type
indicates that the criteria or model components are not perfect but are subject to revision (Shields and Tajalli 2006, 324). The practical ideal type is used to gauge the effectiveness of the cross-border police cooperation under study. A review of the literature concerning cross-border police agency cooperation and cross-border local cooperation in general provides a method for the construction of a practical ideal type. A practical ideal type framework identifies key components from the literature of the matter being researched (Shields and Tajalli 2006, 319). The practical ideal type provides a realistic standard against which Vermont-Québec police agency cooperation can be gauged.
Chapter II

Literature Review

Chapter Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the components of a practical ideal type for cross-border police agency cooperation. Cross-border police agency cooperation is made difficult by the existence of a “political barrier.” Political barriers “inevitably reduce administrative cooperation” (Slowe 1991, 192). Barriers of many types will be discussed in this chapter. The practices used to minimize the effect of these barriers form a large part of the practical ideal type. The components of this practical ideal type are derived from and are supported by a careful review of the literature. The supporting literature mainly concerns security or police agency cooperation. Other sources are scholarly journal articles and books that describe cross-border cooperation not necessarily in the security or police agency realm, or even between the U.S. and Canada. For example, the undertaking of joint local public sector projects between the U.S. and Mexico (Saint-Germain 1995, 507) provides support for the practical ideal type of cross-border police cooperation. Regarding cross-border cooperation generally, Saint-Germain writes “a development of such importance cannot be left to chance. It must be planned, funded, and managed” (1995, 113).

This chapter also includes the Conceptual Framework for Cross-Border Police Agency Cooperation. See Table 2.1 at the end of this chapter. As stated in the Introduction (Chapter I), the conceptual framework is based on three main concepts that enable cross-border police agency cooperation. These three main concepts again are: 1)
Command; 2) Collaboration; and 3) Communication. These three concepts and their descriptive components were developed from the fields of cross-border police agency cooperation; multijurisdictional/multiagency cooperation on specific cases; law enforcement cooperation against transnational organized crime; international defense cooperation; international cooperation generally; differences of occupational subculture; and policing policy.

Command

Cross-border police agency cooperation must be supported by command structures and authorizing agreements at three levels. The three levels of command are: 1) The Strategic Level; 2) The Operational Level; and 3) The Tactical Level. In the case of police agencies, these three different levels of command represent different structural levels of police command with different but ideally related and nested scopes of responsibility.

Command is a definite challenge for cross-border police agency cooperation. As Glunz (2007, 51) points out “a national-level structure for orchestrating the US-Canada security relationship is not as robust as seen in the defense relationship.” This lack of robustness refers to the strategic level of police command rather than the more robust strategic-level military defense relationship. Later in this chapter the importance of programs and innovation at the operational level and especially at the tactical level becomes apparent, and helps to build the practical ideal type for cross-border police agency cooperation. In support of the need for command structures at all three levels is this characterization of agreements between Québec and neighboring US states: “such
arrangements may be consummated within bilateral or multilateral frameworks and result from habits of association which range from the unstructured, highly informal and ad hoc to the formal, institutionalized, and regular” (Lubin 2003, 31).

Ratcliffe (2008, 102) makes it clear that command is a key component of police agency cooperation, and he describes the danger of lack of clear hierarchy of command in cross-jurisdictional situations. “The very nature of cross-jurisdictional operations and intelligence work in a collaborative environment without a clear hierarchy entails a potential weakness in the structure of law enforcement that criminals may seek to exploit.” Thus, a clear hierarchy in cross-jurisdictional police operations is required for the practical ideal type of cross-border police agency cooperation. The definitions of the three levels of police command (strategic, operational, and tactical) are adapted from Ratcliffe’s definitions of the levels of crime intelligence. Some experts call for unified command and control for cross-border police operations. This may include co-located headquarters. As one police official remarked after an interagency operation “If anything was learned in this process it was the need for as much integration as possible… It would have been advantageous to have all managers located in the same facility” (RCMP 2002, 101).

The concept of command is very important to overcoming barriers to cross-border cooperation. According to Desai (2005, 58) in order to develop successful interagency cooperation, four strategic factors that impede law enforcement agency cooperation must be addressed: 1) Lack of a formal overarching concept of operations or “doctrine” for coordination; 2) Lack of an independent authority responsible for the development and training of personnel in such a doctrine; 3) Individual agencies use different regional
structures to organize; and 4) Personnel policies within most agencies develop personnel who are primarily dedicated to their own agency rather than the interagency community. For the practical ideal type of cross-border police cooperation the four impediments to successful interagency cooperation described by Desai must be overcome.

Finally, a solid governance model that “establishes roles and responsibilities for participants and allows for the contribution of local agencies to enhance border security” must be present for the practical ideal type of cross-border police cooperation (McBryan 2011, 67). The establishment of roles and responsibilities must be made clear at each of the three levels of police command.

Strategic Level

The strategic level of command is the level of command concerned with broad strategies, policies, and resources at the national level. For the purposes of this ARP, this includes high-level asymmetric cooperation, for example cooperation between the Province of Québec and the United States, or at a minimum, cooperation between the Province of Québec and multiple US states. At the strategic level, the establishment of bilateral agreements that authorize and enable cross-border police agency cooperation in the first place must exist. “The ‘formal’ approach of creating model laws and legal frameworks can be a facilitator of cooperation” (Hufnagel 2011, 338). As an example, “A key Québec initiative has been the conclusion of bilateral agreements with bordering states including Vermont” (von Hlatky and Trisko 2012, 76). Note that these bilateral agreements are between a Canadian province and multiple US states. The example can therefore be considered a strategic level example. These bilateral agreements are
important in international police agency cooperation situations and must exist in the practical ideal type. Von Hlatky and Trisko write “Québec is a major player in Canadian strategies of asymmetric security cooperation with the United States” (2012, 64). Engagement at the strategic level by the government is essential for the practical ideal type.

Finnane and Myrtle (2011, 1) acknowledge that “police cooperation and the harmonization of laws are perennial issues in regional and international domains.” Bilateral agreements address conflicts that can arise from national interests in the policing domain. “Any sociological model of internationalization of police work must recognize that national interests remain paramount in shaping the possibility of police cooperation across borders” (Deflem 2002). Therefore, the more harmonization of national interests there is between two nations, the possibility of successful cross-border police agency cooperation increases. Police cooperation, the harmonization of laws, and national interests are all key areas that successful working bilateral agreements address. National-level structures for security cooperation of the type mentioned by Glunz exist at the strategic level of police command. Without these national-level structures at the strategic level, the operational and tactical levels will probably operate in a less-coordinated and fragmented way.

The strategic level of police command as it relates to cross-border police cooperation can be observed by 1) interviewing cross-border police agency personnel in order to capture their views of the strategic level of cross-border police cooperation; and 2) document analysis that studies both bilateral agreements and national (strategic level) structures for cross-border police cooperation. The assignment of roles and
responsibilities at the strategic level will be observed through interviews and document analysis.

Operational Level

The operational level of command is defined as the responsibility of area and regional operational police commanders in deploying resources to achieve operational objectives. The operational level is a sub-national level, operating at the state/provincial level. The operational level of command also serves as a bridge between the strategic level of command and the tactical level of command. At this level, decentralization, if it exists, first becomes evident. “US-Canada relations overall are so dense and diverse that a unique model of cooperation has evolved characterized by unparalleled decentralization and informality” (Glunz 2007, 1). This decentralization begins at the operational level and may extend to the tactical level of police command.

For the purposes of this ARP, the clearest examples of the operational level of police command are the major state police and provincial police agencies. These agencies serve as a link or bridge between the strategic (national) level and the tactical (local) levels of police command. In the case of Vermont-Québec police agency cooperation, two of these major agencies are the Vermont State Police and the Sûreté du Québec (Quebec Provincial Police). While these state/province level police agencies do not have a specific command and control relationship over local police agencies, they do represent a higher political subdivision of their respective nations than do counties, cities, and towns or their Québec equivalent.
The concept of command doesn’t change when it is applied to the operational level; rather, the scope of responsibility changes. For the practical ideal type of police agency cooperation, state/provincial or regional police agencies must interact and cooperate. Also needed is an area or regional structure (state/provincial) that supports cross-border police agency cooperation. In New South Wales, Australia, legislation known as the NSW Act provided “clarity and certainty in relation to cross-border policing” (Hufnagel 2011, 339). The areas highlighted were “joint patrols in border areas and the joint work on specific investigations.”

The operational level of police command as it relates to cross-border police cooperation can be observed by 1) interviewing cross-border police agency personnel at the operational level to capture their views on the state of cross-border police agency cooperation; and 2) document analysis of state and provincial agreements and state and provincial police agency policies at the operational level to determine if they enable cross-border police agency cooperation. The assignment of roles and responsibilities at the operational level will be observed through interviews and document analysis.

Tactical level

The tactical level of police command is defined as front-line areas, activities, and investigations that involve case-specific action to achieve law enforcement objectives. It is important to note that this level of police command focuses on case-specific actions, typically handled by either local agencies or field offices of state and national agencies. Ideally, these case specific actions are taken in accordance with the directions that come from both the operational and the strategic level of command. The involvement of local
police agencies in cross-border police cooperation is part of the practical ideal type. “Local law enforcement, since it is one of the primary first responders to any incident of crime and terror, now has the mandate of developing stronger intra- and interagency ties with federal agencies in an attempt to share information” (Jackson and Brown 2007, 12). Cooperation between cross-border local governments is related to the tactical level of police command. This type of cross-border local government cooperation enhances cross-border police agency cooperation. For example, Geoffrey Hale writes “border communities in Québec have a long history of crossborder collaboration with their neighbours in upper New England” (Hale 2009, 20). Saint-Germain (1995, 95) asserts that the local level is “the most important for the success or failure of cross-border initiatives.” This is due in part to a tendency to “devolve” responsibilities and duties from the highest level of government to a lower level of government (Saint-Germain 1995, 514).

The “unparalleled decentralization” of US-Canada relations discussed by Glunz appears prominently at the tactical level of police command. Note that according to McBryan (2011) local agencies should have the opportunity to contribute to border security. All of this supports the inclusion of local police agencies in cross-border police cooperation as part of the practical ideal type. Linked to the inclusion of local police agencies in the practical ideal type, cooperation between cross-border local governments is also part of the practical ideal type.

The tactical level of police command as it relates to cross-border police cooperation can be observed by 1) interviewing cross-border police agency personnel at the tactical level to learn their views on how involved they are in cross-border police
cooperation and their views on how much their local governments are involved; 2) document analysis to determine whether or not local agreements (even informal ones) exist to enable cross-border police agency cooperation; and 3) field research can be undertaken to look at a purposive sample of local police agencies to get a sense of the level of cross-border police agency cooperation there is at the tactical level. The assignment of roles and responsibilities at the tactical level will be observed through interviews, field research, and document analysis.

**Collaboration**

The collaboration between police agencies must be examined in order to assess the state of their cross-border cooperation. For the purpose of this research, collaboration is both distinct from cooperation and is a component of cooperation. Collaboration is an extremely important part of the practical ideal type. Cropp writes “it is critical, especially within the paramilitary command and control structures of law enforcement, that management buy in to and support collaborations” (2012, 218). The concept of collaboration can be broken down into three descriptive components: 1) **Joint Planning**; 2) **Joint Training**; and 3) **Operational integration**.

**Joint Planning**

The practical ideal type of cross-border police agency cooperation requires that the agencies plan together. Saint-Germain (1995) emphasized the importance of planning regarding cross-border cooperation, along with funding and management. Planning in this case is a tool that enables and enhances cooperation. Even if bilateral agreements and
structures exist that allow for cross-border police agency cooperation, without planning there will be little or no success. “Deliberate bilateral planning is a critical element of interoperability” (Glunz 2007, 23). Planning supports operations between agencies. “The informal and early practice of agency-to-agency discussion, planning and refinement allows for longer timelines to prepare for an operation” (Fenton 2002, 1). For the achievement of the overall mission, liaison officers can facilitate coordination for support. However, it is through joint planning done well before formal requests are made that will best achieve coordination for support (Barr 2003). A joint planning team should be “fully integrated from its inception” otherwise there will be a planning lag (Senft 2002, 3). Joint planning is typically done in fusion centers. A fusion center is “a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal activity” (Lambert 2010, 2). Mechanisms for bilateral (joint) planning and the existence of fusion centers are part of the practical ideal type.

Less formal arrangements may also exist that complement the work of fusion centers:

On the Vermont-Québec border, for instance, Canadian and U.S. law enforcement officers at the federal, state, provincial, and local levels have been meeting for 18 years to discuss their criminal cases without any formal charter. The relationships are such that participants sit together and share information in much the same way they might at a roll call if they all belonged to the same police precinct (Flynn 2003, 4).

Saint-Germain (1995, 101) found “innovative, informal local arrangements” to exist between El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua in the areas of infrastructure, social services, and planning. As long as these informal arrangements do not violate laws
or bilateral agreements their existence serves to complement more formal arrangements. As discussed above under the subsection for the tactical level of police command, these “innovative, informal local arrangements” that Saint-Germain found have a place in the practical ideal type of cross-border police agency cooperation. Again, they must be complementary to more formal, higher-level agreements and they must support cross-border cooperation in order to be included in the practical ideal type.

Joint planning can be observed by 1) conducting field research; and 2) document analysis to study the degree to which agency policies enable cross-border police agency joint planning.

Joint Training

Training together is a necessary part of cross-border police agency cooperation. Cropp (2012, 214) identifies “horizontal learning and the transfer of knowledge” as one of the benefits of collaborative learning. Training together will result in safer and more effective operational integration actions. Along with joint planning, joint training is a prerequisite for successful integrated operations. Training should be integrated and exercises should focus on integrated operations (McBryan 2011, 68). This means that training exercises should 1) integrate personnel from cross-border police agencies and 2) reflect what would be encountered in the operational environment. In other words, the joint training should reflect “real-world” conditions. Joint training that includes both personnel integration and that is reflective of the operational environment is part of the practical ideal type.
Joint training will also encourage technological interoperability. Technological interoperability will be discussed later in this chapter. Success in fielding new systems and equipment requires that 1) the cross-border police agency personnel who install, purchase, or repair these items know how to do so; and 2) the end users on both sides of the border know how to use these items.

Joint training can be observed by field research as a passive observer accompanying cross-border police agencies during joint training and exercises. This field research should look for the integration of police personnel and the degree to which the joint training is reflective of the operational environment. This requires that the researcher 1) makes the first step of understanding the operational environment; and 2) if it is developed, be familiar with the cross-border police agencies’ common operating picture (COP). The COP concept will be discussed later in this chapter under the sub-heading “Shared Language and Terminology.”

Operational Integration

For the purposes of developing the practical ideal type of cross-border police agency cooperation, operational integration in this context refers to conducting joint police operations. Operational activities include the actual conduct of patrols, missions, investigations, searches, and disaster response. These operational activities are typically performed at the operational and tactical levels of police command. Operational integration is a part of collaboration, and is separate from joint planning and joint training. Successful operational integration may depend on joint planning and joint training (such as mission rehearsals). Joint planning and joint training do not necessarily
guarantee successful operational integration, but without them successful operational integration will be extremely difficult if not impossible to achieve. Alpert and Dames (2011) consider partnerships as part of the process to implement “complex, comprehensive community programs and problem-oriented interventions.” This statement can be extended to apply to the operational integration aspect of cross-border cooperation between police agencies due to 1) the complexity of cross-border operations; 2) the need to be complete in terms of community programs on both sides of the border; and 3) successfully addressing crime problems successfully usually involves a team approach.

If criminal activity has a cross-border aspect to it, successful operational integration will result in more effective and complete intervention. Operational integration arrangements such as Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) represent “a joint effort to increase the responsiveness of enforcement agencies on both sides of the border” (von Hlatky and Trisko 2012, 72). IBETs are “intelligence-led law enforcement teams that are designed to enhance border security” (McBryan 2011, 66). These operational integration arrangements, and arrangements like them, are part of the practical ideal type. In addition to increased responsiveness, the IBETs operational integration arrangement offers several benefits to cross-border police agency cooperation:

Police and border services officials from the US and Canada work closely together, sharing intelligence, setting priorities, coordinating operations with state and local police forces and identifying barriers to cooperative police work that allow them to overcome, or work around, institutional barriers within and between countries, while respecting national and local laws (Hale 2009, 13).

The IBET is an example of a partnership that enhances operational integration. These integrated projects are effective mechanisms for enforcing both countries’ laws as they
pertain to illegal border crossings and smuggling (McBryan 2011, 66). Hale describes IBETs as a “practical and reasonably effective response to cross-border criminal activity” (2009, 13). Another effective mechanism is the memorandum of understanding (MOU). “Much police co-operation is brokered through the use of agency-to-agency memoranda of understanding” (Hufnagel 2011, 342). Hufnagel gives the example of the authorization of joint investigation teams between state and federal policing agencies as a circumstance appropriate for an MOU (2011, 342).

Operational integration can be observed by field research as a passive observer accompanying cross-border police agencies on joint operations such as IBET missions. Operational after action reports (AARs) and debriefings should be attended by the researcher if possible.

**Communication**

In order for police agencies to cooperate effectively, they must be able to communicate. LeBeuf (2005, 1) writes “information and the sharing of information are essential for law enforcement.” According to McBryan (2011) the need to communicate and share information is a driver for the development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and related tools. McBryan cites the information sharing matrix as “one of the most valuable tools developed by IBET” (McBryan 2011, 68). The information sharing matrix “identifies common examples of circumstances and conditions under which one agency will be asked to share information or intelligence” with another agency (McBryan 2011, 68). The presence of communication-enhancing tools such as the information
sharing matrix is part of the practical ideal type for cross-border police agency cooperation.

While tools such as the information sharing matrix encourage communication and SOPs serve to authorize (or limit) communication, the concept of communication in the context of cross-border police agency cooperation must still be described. The concept of communication can be broken down into three descriptive components: 1) Shared Values; 2) Shared Language and Terminology; and 3) Technological Interoperability.

Shared Values

Shared values between the police agencies encourage cooperation. In the event of value differences between organizations, shared key performance indicators are a tool to minimize the differences. “Differences of occupational subculture may be minimized through shared key performance indicators” (Sheptycki 2004, 327). The meaningful use of shared key performance indicators are part of the practical ideal type.

Shared values can also be evaluated by examining the harmonization of policing policy. The harmonization of policing policy can come about through policy transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 344) define policy transfer as “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions, etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions in another time and place.” DeKeseredy asserts that there is criminal justice policy transfer from the USA to Canada. This is useful for a practical ideal type of cooperation. “Crime control laws and policies transferred from the USA heavily influence some of Canada’s
methods of governance” (2009, 306). Policy transfer is just one way in which harmonization of policy may come about. Regardless of how it is achieved, the harmonization of law enforcement policy is part of the practical ideal type.

Shared values are also reflected by common goals. Common goals aid cross-border police agency cooperation. The existence of common goals is summed up in the following statement: “Security cooperation at the border is the product of bilateral negotiations and agreements in the pursuit of common goals” (von Hlatky and Trisko 2012, 64). The existence of common goals between cooperating police agencies is part of the practical ideal type. Without common goals, values may not be shared, and a part of the practical ideal type will be lost. According to McBryan, shared values also engender a common vision and mission for partners who are governed by joint management teams. In the case of the IBET, “this approach permits the joint delivery of the program and joint prioritization of operational priorities in the (IBET) regions” (McBryan 2011, 67). This suggests that shared values impact the quality of operational integration. Shared values enhance cross-border police agency cooperation by going beyond the establishment of “harmonised legislation.” The cultivation of shared values are part of the “uniform implementation of strategies to enhance police co-operation” (Hufnagel 2011, 339).

For the practical ideal type, a police agency’s values must be in keeping with an acceptance of both transparency and openness. Jackson and Brown (2007, 120) describe this requirement:

Outside of the culture of the agency, interagency cooperation may also be impacted by the requirements of cooperation. Cooperation among law enforcement agencies often requires that the cooperating agencies open themselves up for examination… law enforcement agencies, along with sharing concepts, must also share data on suspects and progress reports, thus allowing the
cooperating law enforcement agencies to be scrutinized internally and possibly criticized publicly about their internal shortcomings and mismanagement.

The existence and strength of shared values can be observed by 1) interviews of cross-border police agency personnel to learn their views regarding the existence of shared values; and 2) document analysis can also be undertaken to examine and compare cross-border police agencies’ written mission statements or core values to determine if either shared values are emphasized, if they exist, or whether or not there is harmonization of values regardless of intent to have shared values with another agency.

Shared Language and Terminology

A common or agreed-upon language and terminology enables cross-border police agency cooperation and is part of the practical ideal type. “Cross sectoral intelligence-sharing is easier if policing agents share a common argot and a common subculture” (Sheptycki 2004, 327). Specifically regarding language, Lubin states “connecting linkages between Québec and those neighboring US states continue to be conducted almost exclusively in English.” He goes on to say “whereas the key Québec players are almost always bilingual, language versatility on the US side continues to be rare” (2003, 29). For the purposes of communication in a cross-border environment, being one-sided regarding language versatility is not a bad thing; it is a good thing. The goal is a shared language and terminology.

Without a shared language, cross-border cooperation will suffer. Saint-Germain (1995, 103) found that language differences (between English speakers and Spanish speakers) were a barrier to increased public manager cooperation in El Paso and Ciudad Juárez. Saint-Germain’s finding points to the need for a common agreed-upon language;
otherwise police agency personnel at all three levels of command will have great difficulty accomplishing the three components of collaboration: joint planning, joint training, and operational integration. Cooperation will be significantly reduced.

According to Jackson and Brown (2007, 119) the lack of conceptualization of terms such as intelligence as well as an absence of a common doctrine “both place serious limits on interagency cooperation.” Terms such as “intelligence” must be clearly defined and mean the same thing to different police agencies. The presence of crime analysis structures also serves the best interests of cross-border police agency cooperation. “Essentially analysts are information translators, whose role is to review information and provide reliable intelligence in a practical and operational format” (Cope 2004, 188). Crime analysis “incorporates the collection and review of information into manageable summaries” (Cope 2004, 191). Cope describes crime maps and network charts as examples of these manageable summaries. The practical ideal type of cross-border police agency cooperation includes crime analysts to make sense of information and transform it into a usable format. Further, the practical ideal type requires that this usable format for cross-border police agency personnel be in the shared language and use agreed-upon terminology; this includes products such as Copes’ crime maps and network charts. As discussed earlier in this section, Lubin found that “connecting linkages between Québec and those neighboring US states continue to be conducted almost exclusively in English.” If a Québec police agency’s crime analysis section were to send out a bulletin intended for cross-border police agencies solely in the French language, its usability would be limited.
An example of the benefit of common language and terminology between different law enforcement agencies with different jurisdictions that shared a COP was the marine operations COP deployed by the IBET operating in and around Lake Ontario during the 2010 Toronto G20 Conference. McBryan (2011, 67) quotes a sergeant from the Toronto Police Service Marine Unit: “For the first time, all agencies concerned with the marine environment had a common language that we could speak.” This demonstrates the importance of cross-border police agencies sharing a common language and terminology. Sharing a common language and terminology is an enabler of police cooperation in general, and more specifically it is an enabler of successful collaboration and its three descriptive components: joint planning, joint training, and operational integration. Jackson and Brown (2007, 124) recommend a “national doctrine and vernacular be established in order to ensure that all participants are able to communicate and cooperate with each other.” This also applies to cross-border police activities.

Shared language and terminology can be observed by field research. During all field research undertaken for this ARP, especially as it relates to joint planning, joint training, and operational integration, the use of shared language and terminology can be assessed as a secondary attribute; it is an attribute of the variable “Type of communication.” Additionally, document analysis can be performed on cross-border police agency bulletins to observe their use or non-use of shared language and technology.
Technological Interoperability

Technology can serve as either a barrier to or an enabler of cross-border police agency cooperation. For example, “any model must be technologically advanced, compatible with current policing techniques and provide a platform for interagency cooperation” (Jackson and Brown 2007, 113). Information technology can enhance police efforts in coping with new developments such as “the advent of high-performance working tools that require new national infrastructures and specialized training for their use” (LeBeuf 2005, 1). On the other hand, if interagency cooperation is not enabled by the technology, then the technology itself can become a barrier. Sheptycki (2004, 314) calls this barrier “the digital divide.” He notes that “there are many different information storage systems in use across the police sector.” According to Sheptycki the digital divide “is also manifest in communications systems.” Finally, Sheptycki warns that “the digital divide can cause particular problems where there is a need to coordinate cross-border or inter-institutional flow.” It is important to note that Sheptycki specifically mentions cross-border coordination as sensitive to the digital divide. LeBeuf (2005, 5) notes that “technology can provide its own barriers to sharing such as incompatible software.” This is in line with the concept of the digital divide. These examples show that technological compatibility is necessary for the practical ideal type of cross-border police agency cooperation.

One goal of technology is the development of a Common Operating Picture (COP) between cross-border police agencies. “COPs succinctly characterize the environment for decision makers and users alike” (McBryan 2011, 67). The development of a COP is hindered by technological incompatibility, especially in the area of
interoperability and integration of radio communications (McBryan 2011, 67). Therefore, radio communication interoperability and integration is part of the practical ideal type of cross-border police agency cooperation. While a COP allows police agencies on either side of an international border to “speak the same language”, radio communications incompatibility will not allow the cross-border police agencies to speak to one another (McBryan 2011, 68). Both the absence of a COP and radio communications incompatibility significantly harms cross-border police agency cooperation.

Technological interoperability can be observed by interviews of 1) technical personnel who install, purchase, or repair items of technology for their respective cross-border police agencies; and 2) end users of items of technology to learn their views on the degree of cross-border police agency technological interoperability.
Conceptual Framework for Cross-Border Police Agency Cooperation

Table 2.1 presents components of the practical ideal type for police agency cooperation. The table also includes scholarly literature supporting each of the components.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practical Ideal Type</th>
<th>Literature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>(Desai 2005); (Glunz 2007); (Lubin 2003); (McBryan 2011); (Ratcliffe 2008); (RCMP 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Level</td>
<td>(Deflem 2002); (Finnane and Myrtle 2011); (von Hlatky and Trisko 2012); (Hufnagel 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Level</td>
<td>(Glunz 2007); (Hufnagel 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Level</td>
<td>(Hale 2009); (Jackson and Brown 2007); (McBryan 2011); (Saint-Germain 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>(Cropp 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Planning</td>
<td>(Barr 2003); (Fenton 2002); (Flynn 2003); (Glunz 2007); (Lambert 2010); (Saint-Germain 1995); (Senft 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Training</td>
<td>(Cropp 2012); (McBryan 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational integration</td>
<td>(Alpert and Dames 2011); (Hale 2009); (von Hlatky and Trisko 2012); (Hufnagel 2011); (McBryan 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>(LeBeuf 2005); (McBryan 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Values</td>
<td>(DeKeseredy 2009); (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996); (von Hlatky and Trisko 2012); (Hufnagel 2011); (Jackson and Brown 2007); (McBryan 2011); (Sheptycki 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Language and Terminology</td>
<td>(Cope 2004); (Jackson and Brown 2007); (Lubin 2003); (McBryan 2011); (Saint-Germain 1995); (Sheptycki 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological Interoperability</td>
<td>(Jackson and Brown 2007); (LeBeuf 2005); (McBryan 2011); (Sheptycki 2004)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Summary

This chapter provided a review of the literature that supports the practical ideal type of cross-border police agency cooperation. This chapter also introduced the Conceptual Framework for Cross-Border Police Agency Cooperation. The conceptual framework is based on three main concepts that enable cross-border police agency cooperation. These three main concepts again are: 1) Command; 2) Collaboration; and 3) Communication.
Chapter III
Methodology

Chapter Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methods used to gauge Vermont-Québec Police Agency Cooperation against the Practical Ideal Type. The methods used in this ARP reflect a mainly qualitative approach. According to Babbie (2010, 394) qualitative analysis is the “nonnumerical examination and interpretation of observations, for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships.” Babbie adds that qualitative analysis is most typical of field research and historical research. The mainly qualitative approach is more appropriate for this ARP than a mainly quantitative approach.

The unit of analysis must be made clear early on. For this ARP, the unit of analysis is the Vermont or Québec police agency that has jurisdiction in a border area shared between Vermont and Québec. Two examples of these police agencies are the Vermont State Police and the Sûreté du Québec (Quebec Provincial Police). Babbie describes the term unit of analysis as simply “that what or whom being studied.” Babbie goes on to say that “a possible unit of analysis in addition to examples such as individuals or groups is the social artifact or any product of social beings and their behavior.” In the context of this ARP, the unit of analysis could also be the agreements developed in support of cross-border police agency cooperation. Researchers must be clear on the unit of analysis in order to ensure that the right thing is being studied and reported on. If the unit of analysis changes in this ARP, it will be explained.
The research methods chapter discusses the processes of conceptualization and measurement. Conceptualizing means coming to an agreement about what terms mean. In order to conceptualize variables, the first step is to identify the concepts. There are three concepts: 1) Command; 2) Collaboration; and 3) Communication. There are three variables based on each of the concepts which describe and give an understanding to what the concepts represent. The three variables are 1) Level of Command; 2) Types of collaboration; and 3) Types of communication. Identification of the variables corresponds to the nominal definition step of the conceptualization process. The next step is to operationally define the variables, which specifies how they will be measured. The three variables will be measured according to their attributes. The operationalization of the conceptual framework appears at the end of this chapter (see Table 3.2). The final step is to take measurements in the real world. The level of measurement is nominal. Three methods will be used to measure the cross-border police agency cooperation. These methods are 1) the interview; 2) field research; and 3) document analysis.

**Interview**

This study will take a nonprobability sample of cross-border police agency personnel from all three levels of command (Strategic, operational, and tactical). This sample will be a purposive sample. Babbie (2010) defines a purposive sample as a sample in which “the units to be observed are selected on the basis of the researcher’s judgment about which ones will be the most useful or representative.” The study will use snowball sampling to have key personnel referred to me for interviews.
The criteria for selecting individual informants are that they work in one of the cross-border police agencies between Vermont and Québec (I will be sure to select informants from each level of command: strategic, operational, and tactical) and that they are the most useful or representative. In other words, a police sergeant in charge of strictly local parochial interests such as special event parking and parade permits would not be the best to include in the sample; an organized crime investigator probably would be a good person to be part of a purposive sample.

By using nonprobability sampling rather than probability sampling I have gained speed and straightforwardness in identifying informants. I have lost the ability to conduct a random sample, but for this ARP probability sampling techniques are unnecessary.

An index that is useful appears below. It is based on the variable “Types of collaboration.”

1. My agency has mechanisms for joint planning
2. My agency participates in cross-border fusion centers
3. My agency is a party to innovative and informal local planning arrangements
4. My agency integrates personnel from cross-border police agencies into training
5. My agency’s joint training reflects the operational environment
6. My agency participates in integration agreements such as IBET
7. My agency uses MOU to authorize joint operations and/or investigations

The seven index items above are the things that are related to cross-border police cooperation, specifically the collaboration concept/variable. They are all like (similar)
things that help to describe the type of collaboration in existence. The index items can be used as the basis for interview questions to ask informants. An example appears below.

My agency has mechanisms for joint planning
☐ Yes ☐ No

My agency participates in cross-border fusion centers
☐ Yes ☐ No

My agency is a party to innovative and informal local planning arrangements
☐ Yes ☐ No

My agency integrates personnel from cross-border police agencies into training
☐ Yes ☐ No

My agency’s joint training reflects the operational environment
☐ Yes ☐ No

My agency participates in integration agreements such as IBET
☐ Yes ☐ No

My agency uses MOU to authorize joint operations and/or investigations
☐ Yes ☐ No

For this example, each “Yes” Response equals one point. The maximum points would be seven. The lowest possible points would be zero. Since it is an index and does not measure intensity, there is no weighting. Each interview question item is supported by the literature. Each of the three variables (Level of Command; 2) Types of collaboration; and 3) Types of communication) will have an index created specifically for it that will be used to develop interview questions.

Field Research

A second method to be used in this ARP is field research. As the cross-border police agencies conduct (or fail to conduct) intelligence-sharing meetings or joint
missions and training with each other, there is the opportunity to capture the details of the events through field research techniques. Babbie (2010, 297) writes “field research is best for attitudes and behaviors best understood within their natural setting rather than experiments.” There are two problems to guard against with field research. The first is the risk to objectivity by the researcher. I will guard against this by being a passive observer rather than a participant-observer. The second risk is reactivity. Reactivity is when “the research subjects react to the fact of being studied, thus altering their behavior from what it would be normally” (Babbie 2010, 300). I will guard against the risk of reactivity by 1) asking the event participants to conduct their business as normal and 2) remaining a passive observer rather than a participant-observer.

The qualitative research paradigm closest to this methodology is the case study paradigm. A case study is an “in-depth examination of a single instance of some phenomenon” (Babbie 2010, 309). The phenomenon in this case is the cross-border police agency cooperation between Vermont and Québec.

According to Babbie, “the greatest advantage of the field research method is the presence of an observing, thinking researcher on the scene of the action” (2010, 324). Flexibility and low cost are other advantages. A weakness of field research is that it is not appropriate for arriving at statistical descriptions of a large population. Since that is not an aim of this ARP, this weakness of field research poses no problem. In terms of validity, the result is usually greater validity than that of experimental measurements. In terms of reliability, field research usually has much less reliability than experimental measurements. This tradeoff is acceptable due to the chance for gaining truly meaningful insight into the phenomenon being studied.
Document Analysis

The third method used in this ARP to measure cross-border police agency cooperation is document analysis. Here the unit of analysis remains the same: the cross-border Vermont and Québec police agencies. However the unit of observation has changed to documents such as interagency agreements, enabling statutes, and policies and procedures that support cross-border police agency cooperation. These documents as the unit of observation will be used to characterize the unit of analysis. The goal of the document analysis is to identify patterns that help understanding. Document analysis is a form of unobtrusive research. Document analysis is also a type of content analysis.

According to Babbie (2010, 338) “Content analysis is essentially a coding operation.” Babbie describes coding as the process “whereby raw data are transformed into standardized form.” For the type of document analysis in this ARP, the manifest content will be coded. Manifest content is described as “the visible, surface content” (Babbie 2010, 338). This document analysis will be evaluated quantitatively, in contrast to the other two research techniques described in this chapter. An example of the tally sheet which can be used to count and keep records appears below.

Sample Tally Sheet for Police Agency Cooperation
Table 3.1 presents a sample of the sheet which will be used for counting and record keeping of the document analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1 Sample Tally Sheet for Police Agency Cooperation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Document ID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Operationalization of the Conceptual Framework**

Table 3.2 presents the variables and their operationalization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practical Ideal Type</th>
<th>Operationalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Command</strong></td>
<td>Variable: Level of command. Measured by whether we are examining police structures at the strategic, operational, or tactical level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is there a clear hierarchy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is there a doctrine for coordination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are roles &amp; responsibility established?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are there bilateral agreements in place?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is there harmonization of laws?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Level</td>
<td>• Strategic: Is there a national-level structure that supports cross-border police agency cooperation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Level</td>
<td>• Operational: Is there an area or regional structure that supports cross-border police agency cooperation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Level</td>
<td>• Tactical: Is there a case-specific or local structure that supports cross-border police agency cooperation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is there cooperation between cross-border local governments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Collaboration</strong></td>
<td>Variable: Type of collaboration. Measured by whether the cross-border police collaboration is planning, training, or operational integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Planning</td>
<td>• Are there mechanisms for joint planning?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are fusion centers in use?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are there innovative/informal local plans?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Training</td>
<td>• Is there integration of personnel from cross-border police agencies?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Does training reflect the operational environment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Integration</td>
<td>• Are operational integration arrangements such as IBETs in place?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are there MOUs that authorize joint Ops/Investigations?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communication</strong></td>
<td>Variable: Type of communication. Measured by whether the cross-border police communication is supported by shared values, technological interoperability, and language and terminology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Values</td>
<td>• Are there shared performance indicators?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is there a harmonization of policy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are their common goals?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Is their shared transparency?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared Language and Terminology</td>
<td>• Is there an agreed-upon language?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Are terms conceptualized &amp; agreed upon?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Technological Interoperability</td>
<td>• Are there crime analysis structures?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Is there compatibility of technological platforms and systems?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Is there a shared COP?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Chapter Summary

This chapter introduced and explained the three research methods that will be used for this ARP. The first two (interviews and field research) will be qualitative measures while the third (document analysis) will be a quantitative measure. I believe that the reliability of my measures is acceptable at this time, especially since I am using research methods that have already been proven and accepted. Regarding the validity of the measures for this ARP, the measures have face validity. This is due to two reasons: 1) The review of the literature supports the measures and 2) my years of experience as a large-city police officer allows me to say “yes, these measures make sense.” There is also construct validity, based on the “logical relationship between variables” (Babbie 2010).
Chapter IV

Findings

Chapter Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to report the findings on the state of cross-border police agency cooperation between Vermont and Québec. These findings are based on comparing the cross-border practices of Vermont and Québec against the practical ideal type standard. The practices were identified using the research methods described in Chapter III: interviews, field research, and document analysis.

The observed cross-border police agency practices of Vermont and Québec were compared against the corresponding practical ideal type categories (see Table 3.2, Operationalization of the Conceptual Framework) and were described as either:

- Strongly supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation
- Generally supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation
- Minimally supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation
- Not supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation

A chart based on the conceptual framework that provides a summary of findings appears on the next page.
Summary of Findings

Table 4.1 summarizes the level of support VT-QC police agency practices provide for cross-border police agency cooperation practical ideal type concepts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practical Ideal Type</th>
<th>Findings</th>
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<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>Overall Finding for Command: Strongly Supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strongly Supportive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Level</td>
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<td>Operational Level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical Level</td>
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<td>Collaboration</td>
<td>Overall Finding for Collaboration: Generally Supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Planning</td>
<td>Strongly Supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Training</td>
<td>Generally Supportive</td>
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<td>Operational Integration</td>
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<td>Overall Finding for Communication: Generally Supportive</td>
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<td>Shared Language and Terminology</td>
<td>Minimally Supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological Interoperability</td>
<td>Minimally Supportive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Command

Vermont-Québec police agency practices are strongly supportive of the cross-border cooperation practical ideal type concept of Command. The concept of police command is described by its three components: the strategic level, the operational level, and the tactical level. The agencies most involved in cross-border police agency cooperation between Vermont and Québec are the Vermont State Police and the Sûreté du Québec. Both are paramilitary organizations. Both agencies have command structures that strongly support cross-border police cooperation at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels. In addition to the three levels of police command, there are the following components of command that were introduced in Chapter II:

- Hierarchy
- Doctrine for Coordination
- Roles and Responsibilities
- Bilateral Agreements
- Harmonization of Laws and Policy

Hierarchy

Both agencies have a paramilitary structure and hierarchy, which is the norm for state/provincial level law enforcement agencies. For example, cross-border initiatives generally require approval from the respective agency’s higher headquarters prior to implementation. In terms of a specific hierarchy for cross-border police activities, cooperation is facilitated by cross-border structures located at all three levels of police command.

Doctrine for Coordination

Both Vermont and Québec have doctrines for coordination. These doctrines for coordination are based on broad policies and are a first step to enabling cooperation. A doctrine for coordination for Vermont police agencies comes from Title 20 of Vermont Statutes Annotated, Chapter 8. This chapter describes the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact. Party jurisdictions to this Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) include Vermont and Québec. The purpose of the compact is “to
provide for the possibility of mutual assistance among the jurisdictions entering into this compact in managing any emergency or disaster when the affected jurisdiction…ask for assistance, whether arising from natural disaster, technological hazard, manmade disaster, or civil emergency aspects of resource shortages.” The compact recognizes that “many emergencies may exceed the capabilities of a party jurisdiction, and that intergovernmental cooperation is essential in such circumstances.”

For Québec police agencies a Policy and Strategies document in the English and French languages from the Québec Ministère des Relations Internationales, Francophonie et Commerce Extérieur provides a doctrine for coordination, in addition to the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact MOU. The Policy and Strategies document describes several areas that support cross-border police agency cooperation such as: 1) The establishment of a unit in the Ministry of Public Security in charge of integrated management of security related information; 2) The intensification of collaboration with Northeastern American states in security matters; and 3) The strengthening of ties between administrative and police organizations in Québec and in New York State.

Interestingly, New York is the only state explicitly mentioned. It could be that that the relationship with New York is either lagging behind the other northeastern states or is considered to be more important than the other northeastern states. This is an area for further study.
Roles and Responsibilities

A Vermont State Police official described roles and responsibilities. The assignment of the lead agency during an event or incident is based on two factors: 1) the incident’s characteristics and 2) which agency is the responding agency. The responding agency is based on jurisdiction. This is a sensible approach. For example, an incident in Vermont would be under the jurisdiction of a law enforcement agency from the U.S. Additionally, the official stated that “A fast-moving incident will be under local command”, whereas an incident such as the 2002 Summit of the Americas called for more deliberate command and planning.

Bilateral Agreements

The clearest example of a bilateral agreement is the MOU referenced under Vermont’s Title 20 for International Emergency Management Assistance. This MOU is purposely broad as it sets the stage for other agreements: “nothing in this compact precludes any jurisdiction from entering into supplementary agreements with another jurisdiction or affects any other agreements already in force among jurisdictions.” This MOU both 1) authorizes cross-border cooperation and 2) encourages the development of supplementary agreements. The MOU specifically refers to only one specific police agency function: search and rescue. Other policing tasks are not explicitly mentioned.

Harmonization of Laws and Policy

The subject of policy transfer from the US to Canada is a phenomenon under study. DeKeseredy asserts that there is criminal justice policy transfer from the USA to
Canada (see Chapter II). Harmonization of laws and policy does exist between Vermont and Québec, but not in all areas. The official pointed out that the mission of police agencies on both sides of the border is public safety. The official stated “The benefits of public safety are not limited by state or international borders.”

An example where there is not harmonization of law and policy is the question of police officers from Vermont and Québec being armed and able to operate in each other’s jurisdictions. Vermont police officers cannot be armed in Québec, nor do they have the same authority as they do in Vermont. Québec police officers can be armed in Vermont, but they have no more police authority than an average Vermont citizen. The official described the current situation: “As far as US law enforcement operating in Québec goes, US law enforcement would have to seek some kind of exemption to Canadian law. Next, there would have to be an exemption to Québec provincial law.” The official stated that cooperation of this type is moving forward in “baby steps.” He explained that Québec police officials were very surprised that they were allowed to enter the US Port of Entry (POE) into Vermont while carrying their weapons.

Strategic Level

Vermont-Québec police agency practices at the strategic level are strongly supportive of the cross-border cooperation practical ideal type concept of Command. The International Emergency Management Assistance Compact introduced at the beginning of this section enables cross-border police agency cooperation. This MOU is applicable to both Vermont and Québec. The Québec Policy and Strategies document also enables
cooperation and complements the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact MOU.

The International Emergency Management Assistance Compact authorizes a structure called the International Emergency Management Group. It is a national-level structure that supports cross-border cooperation. It is strongly supportive of cross-border cooperation because this group allows for consultation beyond what is contained in the compact: “there shall be frequent consultation among the party jurisdiction officials.” The International Emergency Management Group is charged with allowing the “free exchange of information, plans, and resource records relating to emergency capabilities.”

Operational Level

Vermont-Québec police agency practices at the operational level are strongly supportive of the cross-border cooperation practical ideal type concept of Command. At the operational level of police command, the Québec-Vermont Cross-Border Workshop is the area or regional structure that supports cross-border cooperation. Note that the participants of the workshop are Québec and Vermont police agencies, rather than police agencies from several US states and Canadian provinces. The Québec-Vermont Cross-Border Workshop strongly supports cross-border police agency cooperation because its purpose is to further cooperation. The workshop’s agenda items have included 1) an overview of policing on both sides of the border, including agency capabilities; 2) introductions of counterparts from different agencies on both sides of the border; and 3) communication planning. These workshops should continue to develop in complexity and scope as they mature. Other practices exist as well. A Burlington, Vermont police
detective reports that he attended a Vermont-Québec conference on combatting the cross-border drug trade.

Tactical Level

Vermont-Québec police agency practices at the tactical level are strongly supportive of the cross-border cooperation practical ideal type concept of Command. At the tactical level of police command, the Cross-Border Coordinator system is the case specific or local structure that supports cross-border cooperation. The Cross-Border Coordinator system is strongly supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation because the system allows police officials from both sides of the border to be referred to the correct point of contact through the cross-border coordinator. Vermont has one cross-border coordinator; Québec has several (note that Québec borders four different US states). The lieutenant serving as Chief of Homeland Security for the Vermont State Police is Vermont’s cross-border coordinator. The routing for requests is Requestor – Cross-Border Coordinator – VT/QC official who can assist.

Further supporting cross-border cooperation between police agencies, cooperation between cross-border local governments exists. Localized MOUs are less formal. An example is the category of local government mutual aid agreements between fire departments. Plans and protocols exist to allow easier access through the POE. Personnel are vetted in advance. An official gave the example of the Beecher Falls, VT Fire Department which is dispatched from Québec. However, a Vermont State Police official stated that informal local agreements don’t exist in law enforcement. The more formal
agreements such as the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact MOU are more appropriate for police agencies.

**Collaboration**

Vermont-Québec police agency practices are generally supportive of the cross-border cooperation practical ideal type concept of Collaboration. The concept of police collaboration is described by its components of joint planning, joint training, and operational integration.

**Joint Planning**

Mechanisms for joint planning are strongly supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation. These mechanisms are the monthly cross-border meetings, the Québec-Vermont Cross-Border Workshops, fusion centers, and the existence of innovative, informal plans.

The monthly cross-border meetings and the Québec-Vermont Cross-Border Workshops support cross-border police agency cooperation because their main purpose is to share information, and many different cross-border police agencies are invited. The locations of these events rotate. The meetings are conducted in either English or French with attendees helping to clarify or translate.

Fusion centers support cross-border police agency cooperation because according to a criminal analyst supervisor at the Vermont Intelligence Center (VIC), the fusion center “is an information conduit.” The mission statement of the VIC reads:

The Vermont Intelligence Center (VIC) gathers and analyzes criminal and terrorism information from all sources and multi-agency partners to produce and
disseminate relevant and actionable intelligence to the Federal, State, County and Local law enforcement and public and private sectors. The VIC provides multidisciplinary expertise and situational awareness to inform decision making at all levels of government in order to protect Vermont residents and critical infrastructure from all crimes and terrorism.

On the Vermont State Police web page, the VIC is described as working in “close partnership” with several agencies including the Sûreté du Québec. Both Vermont and Québec have fusion centers. Vermont’s has been in operation since August 2005, and Québec’s has been in operation since November 2013. A Burlington, Vermont police detective reported that he has used the VIC to facilitate the flow of information with partner police agencies in Québec. The detective described the VIC as a “great resource.”

The existence of innovative, informal plans is in evidence regarding cross-border police agency cooperation, but with restrictions based on legal requirements. This is related to the similar condition of informal local agreements in law enforcement: innovative, informal plans may be more evident in other forms of cross-border governmental cooperation with less legal stipulations. An example of an innovative, informal plan is the parking of two police cruisers from two different cross-border police agencies together in order to relay important radio information during a joint operation, crisis, or event. This is necessary to overcome barriers of technological interoperability that will be discussed later in this chapter. Innovation is also found in the approach to joint operations such as traffic safety and enforcement that also will be discussed later in this chapter. Innovative, informal plans for cross-border police agency cooperation between Vermont and Québec are perhaps curtailed by legal requirements, but nevertheless police officials on both sides of the border are planning in innovative and informal ways.
Joint Training

The level of joint training is overall generally supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation; this is because the integration of personnel in training from different cross-border agencies has occurred on a small scale. This is a sensible approach, as it allows joint training efforts to build on successes and to correct weaknesses before larger scale and more ambitious joint training is conducted. Joint training occurred in 2013 for special teams such as tactical units, EOD (bomb squad), and police divers. Joint training also occurred in 2005 with the Double Impact exercise, which simulated terrorist acts in Vermont and Québec. A distinction should be made regarding the degree to which this joint training supports cross-border police agency cooperation. The cross-border police agency joint training is most beneficial for police units which have conducted joint training. The joint training does not provide the same benefit for those police units that have not conducted joint training. It cannot be said that there is no benefit, because there is a likelihood that 1) larger and more inclusive joint training events will be held and 2) smaller training events encourage a culture of joint training.

Joint training is supported by the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact. The compact provides for the process of planning mechanisms for training among agencies responsible. This training includes emergency related exercises, testing, and other training activities “using equipment and personnel simulating performance of any aspect of the giving and receiving aid by party jurisdictions.”
Operational Integration

The level of operational integration is generally supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation. Operational integration includes arrangements such as Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs). According to the RCMP, there are two IBETs that cover the area near the Québec border with Vermont. A Vermont State Police official stated that actual operational cooperation is at the discussion level or even coordination level. The official identified concerns that have to be addressed in order for more complete operational integration to occur. For example, police officers in Vermont understand the level of probable cause needed in Vermont to arrest. What is the Québec standard? Also, fourth amendment protections are a U.S. standard. What standards does Canada have? The Vermont State Police are developing a “Border Operability Guide” for Vermont law enforcement in order to reduce the impact of the border on police operations.

Police agencies in Vermont and Québec have found an innovative way to reduce the barrier caused by the shared border yet work together on the same operation. An example is the Operation Traffic Safety without Borders (l’opération Sécurité sans frontiers). This is an operation between several police agencies including the Vermont State Police and the Sûreté du Québec. The emphasis is traffic enforcement conducted simultaneously with partner agencies on the major international corridors. A 2012 Vermont State Police press release states “There will be 14 officers supporting this event and working closely with the Sûreté du Québec.” A Sûreté du Québec press release for this same operation stated that traffic safety enforcement would be conducted in districts that share a border with an American state, including Vermont. This operation is an
example of acknowledging the limitation posed by an international border, and still having the capacity to approach operational integration.

MOUs such as the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact authorize this type of cooperation at a strategic level. It would be impossible or illegal for cross-border police agencies to cooperate without an overarching doctrine and authorizing document. The International Emergency Management Assistance Compact authorizes supplementary agreements (MOUs) that may be necessary from time to time between Vermont and Québec police agencies.

**Communication**

Vermont-Québec police agency practices are overall generally supportive of the cross-border cooperation practical ideal type concept of Communication. The concept of police communication is described by its components of shared values, shared language and terminology, and technological interoperability.

**Shared Values**

The state of shared values between Vermont and Québec police agencies strongly supports cross-border police agency cooperation. The existence of shared performance indicators between Vermont and Québec police agencies are in the discussion phase. This becomes important for evaluating performance in a training exercise as well as operational performance in the field. Harmonization of policy was introduced earlier in this chapter. The harmonization of policy is described in this excerpt from the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact:
Each party jurisdiction shall afford to the personnel of the emergency forces of any party jurisdiction, while operating within its jurisdictional limits under the terms and conditions of this compact and under the operational control of an officer of the requesting party, the same powers, duties, rights, privileges, and immunities as are afforded similar or like forces of the jurisdiction in which they are performing emergency services.

This excerpt from the compact paves the way for harmonization during an emergency event.

Common goals do exist between Vermont and Québec police agencies. As the Vermont State Police official stated “The benefits of public safety are not limited by state or international borders.” Both Vermont and Québec police agencies recognize the need to cooperate, and recognize that crime control on both sides of the border is beneficial to the public.

Little information was found regarding shared transparency. However, all officials interviewed were candid in their thoughts and assessments of the state of cross-border police agency cooperation.

Shared Language and Terminology

The lack of shared language and terminology between Vermont and Québec police agencies is minimally supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation. An agreed upon language has not been codified. English is used more often than French because there is more bilingualism in Québec than Vermont. A Vermont State Police official identified language as a barrier. He stated that the assured availability of bilingual personnel requires pre-planning; a sudden, unplanned event may not have bilingual personnel available. Policing terms are not yet conceptualized and agreed upon. Police radio codes are being phased out in some areas of the US in favor of plain English. If this
trend occurs in Vermont, French-speaking Québec police may be at a further
disadvantage as more easily remembered codes are abandoned.

The International Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been “duly
authenticated” in both French and English.

Both Vermont and Québec have crime analysis structures at the state and
provincial level. The existence of crime analysis structures is part of the practical ideal
type of cross-border police agency cooperation. The quality of the products and level of
responsiveness of the crime analysis structures was not studied.

Technological Interoperability

The level of technological interoperability between Vermont and Québec police
agencies is minimally supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation. At the
present time there is either no or low compatibility of communication and technology
platforms between Vermont and Québec cross-border police agencies. This is a problem
even nationally within the US.

The Sûreté du Québec does not have Vermont police frequencies on their radios,
and Vermont police agencies do not have Québec police frequencies on their radios. The
practical ideal type calls for common frequencies for seamless communication. A
Vermont State Police official stated that communication planning is an agenda item for
cross-border workshops. The official discussed the possible use of technology to
“gateway” different communications platforms. He identified three steps to this process:
1) determine the communication platforms; 2) solve the gap through re-programming or
gateway technology; and 3) resolving the regulatory piece.
A workaround of two police cruisers from two different cross-border police agencies co-located at a command post in order to relay important radio information during a joint operation is an inelegant but effective method to mitigate the barrier of technological incompatibility. Today, police cruisers usually also contain in-car computers that can also provide information during a cross-border event if the two police cruisers are co-located.
Chapter V

Conclusion and Recommendations

Areas of Strength

The greatest strength in the current state of cross-border police agency cooperation between Vermont and Québec is the existence of structures that support cross-border cooperation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of police command. These structures include the International Emergency Management Group, enabled by the International Emergency Management Assistance Compact; the Québec-Vermont Cross-Border Workshop; and the Cross-Border Coordinator system. Also, the adoption of inventive workarounds and flexibility by police officials on both sides of the border at all levels of police command increase the quality of cross-border cooperation. This is a police agency equivalent to the “innovative, informal local arrangements” that Saint-Germain found between El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua in the areas of infrastructure, social services, and planning.

It is clear that police agencies in Vermont and Québec are dedicated to cross-border police agency cooperation. A Vermont State Police official stated that Vermont has a tradition of cooperation with other agencies, and that the Vermont State Police supports working collaboratively. The officials I interviewed were enthusiastic about continuing to develop the level of cross-border cooperation, and were candid regarding areas that require the most attention to improve. Vermont and Québec police agencies do share common goals. Common goals are necessary for cross-border police agency cooperation. As von Hlatky and Trisko (2012) write, “security cooperation at the border is the product of bilateral negotiations and agreements in the pursuit of common goals.”
The existence of an international boundary is a definite challenge to cooperation. Political barriers “inevitably reduce administrative cooperation” (Slowe 1991, 192). Crime control and emergency management are still responsibilities of the police despite the international boundary. While the border is a barrier, its impact on police operations can be mitigated by the adoption of practical ideal type practices for cross-border cooperation.

Areas to Improve

There are two main areas of concern that fall short of the practical ideal type: 1) the absence of a shared language and terminology is overall minimally supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation; and 2) The current state of technological interoperability is minimally supportive of cross-border police agency cooperation. Both of these components of Communication are difficult to solve.

A shared language and terminology serves the best interests of the practical type of cross-border police agency, but Québec is a Francophone society, and Vermonters speak English almost exclusively. It will be difficult to make one language the language of cross-border cooperation over the other, even though the practical ideal type calls for it. There are cultural considerations to consider that may prevent the adoption of a single language for cross-border police agency cooperation. Saint-Germain (1995, 103) found that language differences were a barrier to increased public manager cooperation in El Paso and Ciudad Juárez. Jackson and Brown (2007, 119) found that the lack of conceptualization of terms such as “intelligence” place “serious limits on interagency cooperation.”
The technological interoperability problem has been acknowledged by cross-border police officials, and is an agenda item for cross-border workshops. Sheptycki (2004) described the “digital divide” and noted that the digital divide affects communications systems. Sheptycki singles out cross-border cooperation as particularly susceptible to the digital divide. “The digital divide can cause particular problems where there is a need to coordinate cross-border or inter-institutional flow.” The lack of technological compatibility has hindered the development of a Common Operating Picture (COP). McBryan (2011) cites the lack of “interoperability and integration of radio communications” as most detrimental to development of a COP.

Recommendations

Vermont and Québec police agencies should continue using and developing their effective cross-border cooperation structures that exist at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command. These structures are 1) the International Emergency Management Group; 2) the Québec-Vermont Cross-Border Workshop; and 3) the Cross-Border Coordinator system.

While both Vermont and Québec employ fusion centers, there are no liaison officers stationed in either the Vermont or Québec fusion centers. It might be useful for faster coordination and approvals during incidents if liaison officers were present at fusion centers at the start of an incident. A Vermont State Police official stated that “face to face communication works best.” Fusion centers can follow the recommendation of Senft (2002) for joint planning teams: a joint planning team should be “fully integrated from its inception” otherwise there will be a planning lag (Senft 2002, 3).
Both Vermont and Québec must continue to work toward technological compatibility especially in the area of radio communications. Police officials in both Vermont and Québec have acknowledged this shortcoming, and have added it as an agenda item for cross-border workshops. Vermont and Québec should address language issues directly. If it is not possible to adopt a single language for cross-border police agency cooperation, mitigation measures include: 1) French language instruction for Vermont police officers, especially for Vermont state troopers state-wide and police officers and sheriff’s deputies working near the border; 2) English language instruction for even more Québec police officials, especially in the Sûreté du Québec and local police officials in border communities; and 3) the adoption of certain brevity codes or terms, similar to the brevity codes and terms that allow NATO forces to communicate on the battlefield.

As Vermont and Québec police agencies move toward greater operational integration, an important consideration for both the state and the province is that their respective police agencies are key force protection assets. If emergency services deploy across the international border without police protection, the burden for providing force protection will fall to the host country, stretching police resources. Perhaps police agencies could deploy across the international border with the caveat that their mission is restricted to force protection for their own jurisdiction’s assets and personnel.

Future Vermont and Québec joint training should include legal issues such as police use of force, search and seizure laws, rules of evidence, and protections for citizens against illegal police practices. Such joint training is reflective of the operational environment in an important legal sense. Joint training in this area will 1) increase the
confidence of police and other governmental officials in allowing greater operational integration and 2) increase the confidence of the public in accepting greater operational integration of their police agencies.
REFERENCES


Appendix
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<th>Document ID</th>
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<td>QC Government statement on security cooperation</td>
<td>S</td>
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