BELOW THE SURFACE: UNITED STATES SUBMARINERS’ IDENTITY DURING WORLD WAR TWO

by

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I acknowledge that the Graduate College says that I have to have this page; therefore, #RequirementMet. Frankly, I am tired of typing at this point and there are too many people to acknowledge, so I will keep this short, but semi-sweet. First, I would like to thank my beautiful baby girl, Princess Fiona. I wish I had more time to give you attention while I was working on this project, but it cheered me up every time you crawled on my lap while I was up late reading or writing. No matter what I write, I cannot thank Dr. Tillman enough. Without her guidance through the last few years, I don’t know where I would be today. I doubt that I would have even started graduate school. She offered assistance at every turn. Broad shout outs to my family, submariners past and present, and the entire History Department at Texas State.
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INTRODUCTION

World War Two (WWII) is a popular subject among historians and casual readers, and the subject’s historiography could easily fill a large library. Most of the literature that examines the individuals who were involved in the conflict are biographies about the war’s heroes and villains and portray other members of the military as footnotes or nameless pawns who blindly followed the orders of their superiors. Recent studies, however, analyze the ways in which individuals’ experiences and groups’ involvement in WWII affected the United States after the war. For example, historian Neil A. Wynn argues that the African American soldiers’ fight for democracy abroad during WWII was linked to the struggle for democracy at home in the following decades. He also claims that the Black self-consciousness at the national level expressed in the African-American Civil Rights Movement developed during the war.¹ Historian Dorothy Sue Cobble traces the ways in which female factory workers during WWII impacted present feminist movement.²

The men who served in the United States Navy’s Submarine Force during WWII did not spend their entire lives sealed inside the watertight hulls of their submarines. The members of the Submarine Force were not isolated from the social, political, and cultural climate in the United States during the 1930s and 1940s. The racial prejudices and social inequalities prevalent in the U.S. during the time also existed onboard submarines. Unlike most of the enlisted submariners who were members of the working or agricultural class

and lacked formal education beyond high school, submarine officers were generally wealthier and more educated. According to 1935 Naval Academy graduate and captain (CO) of the *USS Skate* (SS-184) during WWII, William P. Gruner Jr., “[t]he Naval Academy provided all the CO's of U.S. submarines except for a very few Naval Reserve officers who worked their way up during the war. The Naval Academy class of 1935 provided 50 WWII submarine CO's.”³ During WWII, the navy only allowed African-Americans to assist cooks and serve officers as stewards on naval vessels. Although the Submarine Force was generally more accepting of racial minorities, and many submarine COs expected stewards to perform additional tasks onboard, racial prejudices still existed onboard submarines.⁴ Although members of the Submarine Force considered themselves a ‘brotherhood,’ individuals within the social group struggled for power with one another.

Submariners joined the Navy and volunteered for the Submarine Force for a variety of reasons, which reveals that although many members shared common bonds, such as a sense of patriotism, they were each individuals who joined independently. Before the war, most men entered the navy to make money during the Great Depression, but after December 7, 1941, some men became “Instant Avengers” in order to “make the Japanese sorry they ever thought about bombing Pearl Harbor.”⁵ As the war progressed, a

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³ Many enlisted submariners did not complete high school, but most officers attended the Naval Academy. Although the Naval Academy’s student population was more diverse before WWII than WWI, every student was white and the vast majority had well-connected family, because an appointment in the school required a nomination from a U.S. congressman. William P. Gruner Jr. “U.S. Pacific Submarines in World War II,” San Francisco Maritime National Park Association, 11, accessed May 5, 2016. [http://www.maritime.org/doc/subsinpacific.htm](http://www.maritime.org/doc/subsinpacific.htm).


major motivation to join the navy was avoiding the army’s draft. During WWII, the Submarine Force was voluntary, and most submariners volunteered for the duty because they sought an active role in the war and recognized the Submarine Force’s success in the Pacific. The submariners’ decision was also influenced by their personal experiences with World War I (WWI) veterans. WWII submarine officer Ernest Zellmer claims that he saw many “[WWI] survivors who had been badly wounded or poisoned by mustard gas, and had to live limited and painful lives.” Zellmer, like many submariners, suggests that one reason he joined the Submarine Force because he expected to “come back whole or to die at sea.”

During WWII, the Submarine Force had the highest fatality rate of any group in the U.S. military, but was considered successful by almost any standards. Although technology and tactics are responsible for much of the service’s success, other variables also affected the service’s performance. According to Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, who served as Commander, Submarines, Pacific Fleet during WWII, submariners “were no supermen, nor were they endowed with any supernatural qualities of heroism. They were merely top-notch American lads, well trained, well treated, well armed [sic] and provided with superb ships.” In *War and Peace*, Leo Tolstoy defines “the spirit of the army, the greater or less desire to fight and face dangers on the part of all the men

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composing the army” as “an unknown quantity, x.” Military Psychologist Frederick Manning similarly identifies the “X-factors” responsible for determining wars when military might cannot as: unit cohesion, esprit de corps, and morale. Many scholars recognize the Submarine Force’s success, but the studies credit the service’s technology and tactics. Although ignored in the submarine historiography, the evidence reveals that the force maintained a high level of unit-cohesion and esprit de corps, as well as the morale on individual submarines.

This thesis uses the members of the Submarine Force’s cohesiveness to the in-group and their rejection of the out-group to argue that submariners shared a separate collective identity than the rest of the navy during WWII. This project also examines intragroup conflicts between submariners while submarines were on patrol to claim that the collective submarine identity’s cohesiveness was dependent upon the membership’s distinction to outsiders. The members of the Submarine Force portrayed themselves as a homogenous social group in order to collectively challenge the out-group for power while in port, but while at sea and unchallenged by outsiders, submariners used various methods to negotiate for with one another on the submarine. Therefore, this thesis argues that, at least in the case of the collective submarine identity during WWII, although members of an in-group sharespecific a specific characteristic, individuals’ sense of belonging to an in-group is dependent on their shared distinction from others.

During WWII, the Submarine Force was a cohesive group. George W. Grider, a

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submarine officer who served on three submarines during WWII before commanding the USS Pollack (SS-1180) and the USS Hawkbill (SS-366), described the interconnectedness between submariners. Grider claimed, “[w]e were small, so small in the basic unit that every man aboard a submarine knew every other man by his first name, so small as a service that transfers, joint shore leaves, and overlapping friendships tied us all together.”

The Submarine Force also had a strong esprit de corps. In a 1947 naval study examining health on submarines during WWII, the researchers, Charles Wesley Shilling and Jessie W. Kohl, claim that the Submarine Force had a low psychiatric casualty rate, because “from start to finish the submarine engenders in the men a special spirit which undoubtedly served to carry them over many a tough spot.” Morale was boat-specific, but Carl Dwyer, the CO of the USS Puffer (SS-268), claims “any good submarine captain fully understood that his success was dependent on the enlisted men that served under him.” Therefore, the evidence suggests the Submarine Force’s successes during WWII may have also been attributable to ‘X-factors’ and the submariners’ identity that academics, such as Gary E. Weir, overlook.

An individual’s identity, or perception of ‘self,’ is the complex product of any number of influences and experiences, which can overlap or vary in importance depending on the situation. For example, a person may identify his or herself as a Texan, student at Texas State University, member of the history club, graduate student, amazing

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15 For more information about Gary E. Weir and submarine historiography see Chapter I.
dancer, parent, or all of the above. A collective identity occurs when a group’s membership shares a sense of belonging, and each individual’s sense of ‘self’ merges with his or her perception of the group. During WWII, individuals in the Submarine Force shared a collective identity that was based on the membership’s distrust of outsiders and rejection of the rest of the navy. Although the Submarine Force followed a traditional naval hierarchal structure and an analysis of the submariners’ personal experience reveals that intragroup friction existed while in port, submariners presented themselves and scholars portray the Submarine Force as a united social group with shared values. The struggles between members were magnified while a submarine was on patrol. Underway, the collective fractured into smaller groups within the boat, because the submarine identity lacked an out-group to unify the individual submariners by distinguishing members of the ‘in-group’ from outsiders.\(^\text{16}\) Although the submariners’ had a common enemy, they shared the foe with the rest of the U.S. military, which did not reinforce the members of submarine collective’s perception of themselves as distinct from the rest of the navy. The individual submariners were also unable to negotiate power with individuals outside the submarine’s hull or the boundaries of the submarine collective while on patrol.

At times, historians must classify and categorize individuals into groups in order to fit the scope of his or her work, but it is also important to understand the how the individuals identified themselves. Tribalism and intra-service rivalries may be common

throughout the military, and other military groups share similar collective identities. The scope of this project, however, is the Submarine Force during WWII, and subjects believed their social group was unique. Given the complexity of identities, it is worth noting that not every member of the Submarine Force shared the collective submarine identity, but based on personal accounts from WWII submariners, it is evident that the vast majority primarily identified as ‘submariners.’ The project’s first chapter explains Submarine Force’s history and historiography, and the chapter reveals that many of the submariners, in some places and times, shared a unique collective identity. The second chapter discusses the submariners’ indoctrination into the collective and contrasts the membership’s perception of themselves and outsiders. The final chapter analyzes interactions and negotiations between members of the ‘in-group’ while submarines were on patrol. Overall, the evidence leads to the conclusion that members of the Submarine Force shared an identity was based on the submariners’ distrust of outsiders and perception of themselves as superior to the rest of the navy. While underway, however, the submariners’ sense of belonging to the collective submarine identity eroded, because the in-group’s value was dependent on its distinction from the out-group.

The historical context is another important reason that the collective submarine identity was stronger during WWII. During WWII, which had over twenty million total military casualties, individuals around the world established social groups and identified with the collective identities of their military units. In his book, *The Red Badge of Courage*, American author Stephen Crane described the comradery shared by a unit’s membership after combat experience as a “mysterious fraternity born out of smoke and

17 The author recognizes that individuals who share a collective identity may be more likely to speak about it than individuals who do not feel it as an important part of their identity or share the same sense of belonging.
the danger of death.”

According to political scientist Patrick G. Coy and sociologist Lynne M. Woehrle, in addition to the obvious threat from an out-group, an individual’s emotions are heightened when they are fighting in a war, which makes him or her more likely to identify with an in-group during war.

Although the Submarine Force has been part of the U.S. Navy since 1900, submariners did not primarily identify as separate social group from the rest of the navy until after WWI. Propaganda aimed at Germany’s use of unrestricted submarine warfare during WWI led the U.S. naval planners to distance themselves from submarines, which granted the Submarine Force a considerable amount of autonomy from its umbrella command during WWII. The service consisted of only a few submarines, which were manned by sailors and officers who served on other naval vessels before volunteering for submarine duty during the first few decades. The invention of nuclear power divided the Submarine Force over the definition of a ‘real submariner’ after WWII. While some individuals on diesel-boats used the service’s history to claim that they were ‘real submariners,’ others argued officers and men on nuclear-powered submarines were true submariners because the new technology allowed the submarines to remain submerged for months.

After discussing the service’s history, the first chapter introduces the historiography of Submarine Force during WWII as evidence that the submariners shared a collective identity, because WWII submariners dominate the subject’s literature. The

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20 The collective submarine identity developed over time. The earliest evidence that members of the Submarine Force were beginning to establish a separate identity was in 1923 when the navy allowed submariners to wear the submarine warfare insignia, but the collective submarine identity gained strength as a primary identity during WWII.
Submarine Force’s secrecy allowed WWII submariners to control the public’s memory. It is also important to note that submarine officers authored the most of the literature, which is representative of the power granted to specific social classes within the collective. Controlling the Submarine Force’s collective memory granted the submarine officers authority over the submarine identity’s future, because the authors were able to legitimize certain values while silencing others. The submariners’ use of the inclusive pronoun “we” when discussing members of Submarine Force serves as further proof that they shared a separate collective identity than the rest of the navy. The narratives and themes in the enlisted submariners’ narratives also highlight the relationships between submariners and reveal the values and beliefs of the individuals who shared the collective submarine identity.

The chapter also explores rituals, traditions, and common practices, and it also reveals the reasons that a submariner’s identity was attached to the service as a whole rather than the individual’s submarine. For example, the navy’s policy of rotating submarine crewmembers ensured a submariner’s kinship and sense of belonging was primarily attached to members throughout the force rather than a specific submarine. After establishing the boundaries of the social group, the chapter concludes with an argument that unit-cohesion shaped the submariners’ perception of their collective success during WWII in ways that perpetuated their belief that they were superior to the general service.

The second chapter argues that during WWII members of the Submarine Force distrusted outsiders and viewed the submarine service as self-reliant by contrasting the submariners’ reflections of the in-group with their perceptions of the out-group. Members
of the Submarine Force distinguished themselves further from ‘others’ by exaggerating the differences between submariners and other naval personnel. Submariners were introduced to the collective submarine identity at submarine training, where submarine volunteers lived and trained separate from the rest of the navy and learned the values of the submarine collective. The training portrayed submariners as superior to other sailors by highlighting the differences between Submarine Force and the ‘general service.’

For example, in an article about submariners training for combat in 1942, Allen Raymond, a journalist from The Washington Post, wrote that the men “have a morale today that can only be described as cocky, belligerent and anxious for action.” A submariner’s indoctrination into the collective ended when he finished the qualification process and earned his submarine warfare pin, which not only symbolized his belonging to the ‘in-group,’ but also distinguished the submariner from members of the ‘out-group.’ The submarine warfare pin had so much symbolic value, because, after their completion of the training and qualification processes that highlighted the Submarine Force’s distinction from the general service, the submariners believed that they were superior to other members of the navy.

After examining the early influences that led submariners to believe that they were superior to outsiders, the chapter analyzes multiple episodes that reinforced the submariners’ distrust of ‘others,’ such as friendly fire accidents, torpedo issues, and a notorious leak of classified submarine capabilities known as the ‘May Incident.’

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21 The generalizations about the U.S. Navy and the use of the term ‘general service’ do not reflect the author’s attitude, but are representative of the submariners’ perspective of the ‘out-group,’ which was based on a binary between submariners and sailors in the ‘general service.’ Submarine Information and Instruction Manual, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942), 65, accessed March 4, 2015, http://www.maritime.org/doc/s-boat/index.htm

Submariners ignored naval procedures and turned to leaders within the Submarine Force to resolve issues involving submarines rather than naval admirals or government officials, because the individuals who shared the collective submarine identity believed outsiders were inferior, incompetent, and untrustworthy. The chapter closes with a discussion about the privileges that the U.S. Navy granted submarine volunteers, which served as proof to the submariners that the U.S. Navy recognized the Submarine Force’s superiority. For example, Joseph Ekberg, Chief Radioman on the USS Seawolf (SS-197), claimed, “[w]ith all due modesty we [submariners] know we’re picked men, paid 50 per cent [sic] more in our jobs than men in any other branch of service.”

The collective submarine identity relied on the submariners’ perception of themselves as superior to outsiders, who the submariners perceived as weaker, less intelligent, and untrustworthy.

Unlike the second chapter that focuses on the submariners’ perceptions of a binary between the members of the Submarine Force as superior and outsiders as untrustworthy, the third chapter examines members of the in-group at the micro-level and reveals that the submarine collective was not as united as most submariners believed. During WWII, while a submarine was on patrol, the collective’s unity temporarily dissolved. Although the collective met its membership’s need for belonging, the lack of influence from outsiders while underway did not provide the individuals who shared the collective submarine identity an opportunity to distinguish themselves from others. On patrol, submariners classified themselves and each other based on new criterion, because membership in the submarine collective lacked value without an out-group with which to distinguish its membership. Although submariners used multiple

variables to classify individuals onboard, such as rating or department, the most obvious chasm onboard occurred between the officers who controlled the formal power onboard and the crew of a submarine.

The chapter begins by discussing the social hierarchy and culture onboard WWII submarines. Although the navy granted formal power to the COs and officers of the submarines, enlisted crewmembers gained specific privileges by negotiating for power onboard. For example, the enlisted men’s right to request a transfer or ‘unvolunteer’ for submarine duty motivated a CO to compromise with his crew in order to retain experienced crewmembers. The chapter also includes multiple examples of the creative methods in which enlisted submariners individually attempted to negotiate power with their officers. Cultural sharing between the members of different submarine crews, such as sharing sea stories or passing scuttlebutt, allowed enlisted submariners established an informal set of expectations throughout the Submarine Force that was compatible with their definition of an acceptable working environment.

Although the submariners established new groups to identify themselves and each other while on patrol, members of the Submarine Force continued to share the collective submarine identity when their submarine returned to port. The submarine collective was not irrelevant to submariners while they were on patrol, nor was the collective submarine identity independent from the members’ experiences while on the submarine. The submariners’ common experiences on patrol helped shape the collective submarine identity, and enlisted submariners simultaneously attempted to use their perceptions of the collective’s core values to justify their positions when engaging in asymmetrical negotiations on patrol.
The chapters reveal that the submarine collective acted as a tool which served to legitimize the leadership of Submarine Force’s control and the enlisted submariners’ ability to use the collective’s values to justify their grievances, granted the men the power to negotiate with their officers onboard. The submariners’ perception that they belonged to a unique social group strengthened the Submarine Force’s command over the enlisted men, because it was simpler for the leadership to monopolize formal power over a single collective rather than many individuals. The men’s trust in the submarine command granted members of the force’s leadership substantial power to influence the values of the collective’s identity. For example, on multiple occasions, Admiral Charles Lockwood suggested that submariners were superior to other sailors and that outsiders were untrustworthy.\textsuperscript{24} The submariners’ sense of pride in the perception their collective superiority homogenized the group, which legitimized the command’s authority. At the same time, enlisted submariners used the collective’s values to justify their positions when negotiating with submarine officers. For example, an enlisted submariner’s belief in his superiority to other sailors in the navy allowed him to make demands, such as greater respect from his officers, which then became intertwined in the collective submarine identity.

The submarine collective during WWII should be viewed as an individual case, but the findings add to the growing understanding of collective identities. In the case of the collective submarine identity, the evidence suggests that in order for a collective to be salient, a common out-group must also be present, because belonging to the in-group was no longer relevant when the submarine was on patrol and away from outsiders. The submariners’ establishment of new criterion to distinguish themselves and each other

\textsuperscript{24} For more details, see Chapter 2.
while on patrol suggests that an in-group’s cohesion is dependent upon the membership’s perception of a threat from the out-group. By shifting primary identities between the submarine collective and various groups underway, WWII submariners demonstrated that the individual’s need to belong was in a constant struggle with his or her need to distinguish him or herself from others.

The Submarine Force during WWII is an individual case, but the submariners’ narratives reveal that members of the military identities are more complicated than many scholars’ portrayal. The WWII submariners also show that although the social structure within the military forces is traditionally disciplined based on rank, the leadership’s need to maintain authority, order, and a high morale creates space for individuals with lower military ranks to creatively negotiate with their superiors. WWII submarines shared many similar cultures and social structures, but the distinctions between each submarine suggests that command environments in the military, at least at the micro-level, are based on the leadership’s personal preferences and are often products of the compromises between enlisted members and officers.
I. DEEP CONNECTION: THE COLLECTIVE SUBMARINE IDENTITY

Located at the end of a narrow, three-mile road known as Seawolf Parkway on Pelican Island in Galveston, Texas, Seawolf Park is a memorial to the lost World War Two (WWII) submarine, USS Seawolf (SS-197). The park hosts two WWII-era naval vessels: the Edsall-class Destroyer Escort, USS Stewart (DE-238) and the Gato-class submarine, USS Cavalla (SS-224). The Cavalla arrived at Seawolf Park in 1971 after the United States Navy transferred ownership of her to the Texas Submarine Veterans of WWII and the navy donated the Stewart to Seawolf Park three years later. Today, the sidewalks at Seawolf Park are lined with plaques dedicated to submarine crews and submariners and the space between the two vessels serves as a large memorial to the fifty-two U.S. submarines lost during WWII. Upon arrival, guests are handed a pamphlet with brief descriptions of the vessels. The pamphlet also advertises sleepovers at the AUWC, claiming to offer “a unique experience” and “something only sailors and submariners can speak about.”

By definition, all enlisted naval personnel, including submariners, were sailors. Although the distinction between sailors and submariners appears unnecessary, members of the U.S. Submarine Force during WWII did not identify with the U.S. Navy. Based on the boundaries of the Submarine Force’s

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1 The USS Cavalla was designated as (SSK-244), (SS-224), and (AGSS-224) depending on its equipment and tasking during the Cold War. The designation is necessary to understand the vessels class as the navy often reuses names. For example the navy has named four submarines USS Seawolf: (SS-28); (SS-197); (SS-575); (SSN-21). American Undersea Warfare Center, pamphlet, (Galveston, TX). The information is also available online: American Undersea Warfare Center, Cavalla Historical Foundation, accessed February 8, 2016, http://www.americanunderseawarfarecenter.com/sleepovers/

membership, submariners shared a collective identity during WWII and perceived themselves as a separate social group than individuals in the rest of the navy.

During WWII, U.S. submariners came to think of themselves as members of a distinct social group who shared a collective identity that viewed its membership separate from other officers and sailors in the United States Navy. The intra-service rivalry between the Submarine Force and the ‘general service’ began in WWI and grew during the intra-war years. As a result of the propaganda’s negative portrayal of U-Boats during WWI, the naval leadership distanced themselves from the Submarine Force. At the same time, a submarine’s inability to maintain the speed or communication necessary to collaborate with battleships, granted the Submarine Force enough autonomy to develop its own identity. The Submarine Force’s relatively small size and navy’s personnel policies during WWII, such as rotating members of submarine crews, ensured submariners did not primarily identify as members of a specific submarine crew. The rotation policy also allowed submariners to share information and ideas throughout the submarine fleet.  

During WWII, submariners perceived the submarine collective as a homogenous group whose membership shared the same goals and a closer connection than other members of the navy. Members of submarine collective also established unique traditions, rituals, and vocabulary that submariners understood, but that seemed foreign to individuals outside the U.S. Submarine Force. Submariners also defined specific values that they believed best represented the collective submarine identity and used the inclusive pronoun ‘we’ when referring to the in-group’s membership.

Sociologists Verta Taylor’s and Nancy Whittier offer a theoretical framework in which to understand submariners shared a collective identity during WWII. The members

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3 The chapter examines the policy in more detail on page 27.
of the Submarine Force had a “shared definition of a group that derives from members’
common interests, experiences and solidarity.”4 William B. Swann, a professor of social
and personality psychology at the University of Texas at Austin, argues that most people
have a “psychological divide (the self-other barrier) [that] separates their personal
identities from the identities of others.”5 According to Swann, “identity fusion” occurs
when “the self-other barrier is blurred” and the group becomes regarded as “functionally
equivalent with the personal self.”6 During WWII, submariners primarily identified
themselves and each other as members of a unique social group, because their individual
reflections of ‘self’ merged with their perceptions of the submarine collective. The
collective submarine identity was based on the membership’s belief that submariners
shared common values, norms, and goals that were separate from, and in contrast to, the
rest of the U.S. Navy.

As with most social groups, however, the collective submarine identity lacked
homogeneity. While on patrol, submariners used different criterion to classify their
shipmates and negotiated power inside their submarines, because the collective’s
solidarity was dependent on the membership’s ability to distinguish themselves from
outsiders. Although the collective submarine identity opposed the navy at times,
submariners identified themselves as members of the U.S. Navy, which is speaks to Eric

4Verta Taylor and Nancy Whittier, “Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities:
Lesbian Feminist Mobilization,” in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, ed. Aldon D. Morris and Carol
McClurg Mueller (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 110. Taylor and Whittier’s definition is
consistent with most sociologists, but Cristina Flesher Fominaya accurately argues, the “concept of
collective identity…is notoriously ‘slippery.’” Cristina Flesher Fominaya, “Collective Identity in Social
5William B. Swann et al., “Identity Fusion: The Interplay of Personal and Social Identities in
6Swann suggests identity fusion is more likely to occur in groups in which individuals have close
personal relationships with one another, such as family members; he also notes that it is possible for people
to fuse with collectives, “even though they are unacquainted with many, if not most, of the other group
Hobsbawm’s theory that people are complex and do not identify with a single collective exclusively. Hobsbawm creatively states, “[h]uman mental identities are not like shoes, of which we can only wear one pair at a time. We are all multi-dimensional beings.”

The Submarine Force’s history dates back to U.S. Navy’s purchase of its first submarine, *USS Holland* (SS-1), in 1900, but the service was not involved in combat until WWII. U.S. submarines did not see combat during WWI, the technology and public perception of Germany’s U-Boats shaped perceptions of the U.S. submarine. The U-Boats’ targeting of civilians and commerce raiding posed a considerable threat to British war efforts as well as British ideas surrounding honorable naval warfare and free trade. Therefore, according to sociologist Nachman Ben-Yehuda, the British stigmatized the submarines and associated them with terms such as “piracy and barbarity.” Ben-Yehuda claims the negative portrayal of submarines by the British during WWI haunted the Royal Navy during WWII as many people continued to associatesubmarines with commerce raiding. Similarly, German U-Boats’ sinking of the *Lusitania* and *Sussex*, in 1915 and 1916 respectively, brought negative attention from the press and public in the United States. Historian Chris Dubbs argues that the portrayal of German U-Boats as “Sea Monsters, Hun Devil Boats, Sea Thugs, Undersea Dastards, and Slayer of Innocents,” during WWI provided the U.S. general public with a “thorough education in submarine warfare, an education based on sensationalism, propaganda, technology, and the ruthless parade of reported attacks.”

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war on the Imperial German Government on April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson emphasized the German practice of unrestricted submarine warfare, regarding to it as, “warfare against mankind” and claiming, “submarines are in effect outlaws when… used against merchant shipping.” The general public’s association of submarines with commerce raiding after WWI granted members of the Submarine Force space to establish their own identity during WWII.

After WWI, the navy distanced itself from the submarine service because so many Americans believed submarines were deviant. During the interwar period, multiple international conventions discussed whether submarines should be permitted in future naval conflicts. The majority of the naval powers during the interwar conventions agreed to set limitations on submarine capabilities and outlawed the practice of unrestricted submarine warfare because it was perceived as inhumane. The U.S. Navy struggled between the wars to develop a strategy to use submarines in ways that would meet

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international law and civil expectations between the wars. Most naval strategists recognized unrestricted submarine warfare’s potential success. However, they also believed in the Mahanian strategy, which stated decisive fights between battleship fleets decided wars. Influenced by international treaties and public opinion after WWI, naval strategists, scientists, and submarine officers held multiple discussions about the role of submarines in the future, but historian Gary Weir claims, “American submarine strategy could not include unrestricted submarine warfare, which might turn neutral commercial vessels and innocent civilians into victims.”

Joel Ira Holwitt, who is also a submarine officer today, argues that “the submariners recognized that the submarine was a natural commerce raider,” at the 1930 Submarine Officers Conference, but recommended armaments for the new submarine class that fit the role of naval combatants.

Therefore, the newest U.S. submarines, which were developed and built during the 1930s, were referred to as ‘fleet-submarines,’ because they were designed to scout and provide support for battleships in the fleet. The navy’s distrust for submarines after WWI and the naval leadership’s limited knowledge regarding submarine operations and capabilities granted the Submarine Force a considerable amount of independence from the rest of the

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14 At the beginning of the war, U.S. Navy submarines could be divided into two broad classifications: the older S-boats boats had a shorter range and designated numerically, such as the S-44 (SS-145). The second class was the longer-ranging, fleet-type submarines, which were made up of multiple classes and named after a species of fish, such as the USS Flasher (SS-249) of the Gato-class. Although the fleet-type submarine were not generally tasked scouting for the surface fleet as they were originally designed, the U.S. Navy continued to build the fleet-type boats in order to meet the demands of the Pacific war. Over the course of the war, these submarines would undergo a series of refits including lowering the submarines’ silhouette, remedy various problems, and add equipment with technological improvements, including radar and radio. For more information about submarine class: David L. Johnston, “A Visual Guide to the U.S. Fleet Submarines Part One: Gato Class (with Tambor/Gar Class Postscript) 1941-1945” (2010), accessed March 17, 2015, http://navsource.org/archives/08/pdf/0829294.pdf
navy’s chain-of-command and created space for submariners to establish their own identity during WWII.

During WWII, the navy tasked the Submarine Force with a role that required the submarines to operate independently. About four and one-half hours after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, ordered that the Submarine Force should “Execute against Japan unrestricted air and submarine warfare.” Until recently, historians agreed with the widely held belief amongst WWII submariners that the damage to the battleships sustained during the attack on Pearl Harbor precipitated the navy’s strategic change to unrestricted submarine warfare. However, recent scholarship suggests that while the U.S. Navy outwardly rejected unrestricted warfare as barbaric, naval leadership negotiated international arms treaties to allow the shift in policy, which was planned before the attack. According to Holwitt, although naval planners proposed “conducting unrestricted submarine warfare in the event of a war, and doing so from the start of hostilities,” Admiral Stark and the senior naval leadership also chose to “keep this decision out of the hands of civilian policy makers.”

Holwitt also notes that the Submarine Force was unprepared to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare, and some submariners “believed that they could be

15 The Department of the Navy’s order to execute unrestricted submarine warfare before the declaration of war may be evidence that naval planners secretly shifted the naval strategy to include the strategy before December 7, 1941; however, some historians argue that the loss of battleships in the attack caused the strategic shift. Ben-Yehuda, Atrocity, Deviance, and Submarine Warfare, 151; Theodore Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II (New York: Bantam Books, 1958), 493.
16 It is also worth noting that some of the recent scholars who disagree are post-war submariners, such as Joel Ira Holwitt. For more information about the order to execute unrestricted warfare: Holwitt, Execute Against Japan, 68; Ben-Yehuda, Atrocity, Deviance, and Submarine Warfare, 99; Janet Manson, Diplomatic Ramifications of Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990); Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II; Weir, “Silent Defense: One Hundred Years of the American Submarine Force.”

17Holwitt, Execute Against Japan, 127.
hanged as pirates” for following Admiral Stark’s order.\textsuperscript{18} Due to the lack of training, U.S. submariners established their own procedures for commerce raiding and learned from each other’s successes and failures.\textsuperscript{19} Unrestricted submarine warfare usually required boats to operate independently on patrol, and on the rare occasion that a submarine coordinated with another naval vessel, the communication and teamwork was generally limited to submarines in the boat’s ‘wolfpack.’\textsuperscript{20}

The collective submarine identity is apparent in the historiography of Submarine Force during WWII, because submariners author the majority of the sources. After the war, submarine officers published memoirs and books about their exploits during the war, and although these books may be self-serving and involve exaggeration by the authors, many serve as the ‘official memory’ and ‘sacred texts’ for men of the submarine service.\textsuperscript{21} Submarine officers’ personal accounts, oral histories, official naval studies, and recent books about WWII submarines also provide a glimpse into the social structure of the Submarine Force.

WWII submariners had two primary goals for publishing books after the war: pay tribute to the submariners lost during WWII and grant the Submarine Force the attention in which the submariners believed it deserved. Edward L. Beach was the first person to have served on submarines during WWII to publish a book about his experiences. In his

\textsuperscript{18}Holwitt, \textit{Execute Against Japan}, 160-161.

\textsuperscript{19} During the first months of the war, the Submarine Force had to deal with what is referred to as “The Captain Problem.” Many submarine captains were not considered ruthless enough for unrestricted submarine warfare, so they lost command of their boats to younger submariner officers. The younger officers, often through trial and error, shared their experiences after patrols and established tactics and procedures for U.S. submarine operations during WWII. James F. DeRose, \textit{Unrestricted Warfare: How a New Breed of Officers Led the Submarine Force to Victory in World War II} (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2000). Clay Blair Jr., \textit{Silent Victory: The US Submarine War Against Japan} (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1975), xvi-xvii.

\textsuperscript{20} As the war and radio technology progressed, some submarines hunted in ‘wolfpacks,’ which consisted of three of four submarines.

\textsuperscript{21} The Submarine Force’s combat history began in WWII. By dominating the submarine literature, submariners were able to have the most influence on service’s history.
1946 book, *Submarine!,* Beach states that he is indebted to the “thousands of officers and men of the United States Navy and United States Submarine Forces,” which implies that he respected the navy, but viewed the Submarine Force as a separate force. Charles A. Lockwood, a submarine admiral during WWII, also dedicated his 1951 book, *Sink ‘Em All,* to his “comrades of the Silent Service and in the memory of those who did not return.”

The second goal of the submariners’ publications was to gain the recognition they believed they deserved for the Submarine Force’s achievements during WWII. Lockwood believes that after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Submarine Force “carried the war to the enemy” and “held the line while the Fleet licked its wounds.” He also argues that submariners “proved there is practically nothing they cannot do. They had measured up to their own high standards of performance and certainly no Force Commander ever had a finer, smarter, braver or more loyal Force.”

Another one of the strongest voices in the early WWII submarine historiography was the admiral in charge of the entire U.S. Navy in the Pacific. Chester W. Nimitz may not have been a member of the submarine social group or shared the collective submarine identity during the war, but he served aboard submarines before serving as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet during WWII. Nimitz’s positive portrayal of the Submarine Force also contributed to the public memory of the Submarine Force:

> Our gallant submarine personnel filled the breach after Pearl Harbor and can claim credit, not only for holding the line, but also for carrying the war to the enemy while our shattered forces repaired damages following the treacherous initial attack by the Japanese, and gathered strength for the long march to Tokyo.

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22 Lockwood, *Sink ‘Em All.*
23 Charles A. Lockwood, foreword to *Submarine!,* by Edward L. Beach (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1949), iii.
24 Lockwood, *Sink ‘Em All,* 371.
25 Chester W. Nimitz, foreword to Lockwood, *Sink ‘Em All,* 7.
In the foreword to *Sink ‘Em All*, Nimitz wrote that he hoped Lockwood’s narrative would be “widely read, and that the exploits of our ‘Silent Service’ will take proper place in the minds of our citizens.” According to Nimitz, “[t]he American public is largely unaware of their great debt to the relatively small but close knit force.” Not only does Nimitz describe the sense of camaraderie shared by members of the submarine community, but he also claims the Submarine Force did not gain the credit it deserved for its membership’s contribution to the war effort. He reiterates his position in the foreword of Lockwood’s *Hellcats of the Sea*; Nimitz not only argues the Submarine Force does not get enough credit, but also that ‘outsiders’ did not understand what the war was like for submariners.

Although the public and that part of the Navy that does its fighting above the surface- has an idea of the great contribution made by our submarines toward defeating Japan in World War II, few outside the Submarine Service have the slightest knowledge of the men- and their problems- who served so gallantly in that dangerous service.

It is possible that so few ‘outsiders’ wrote about submarines following the war because they lacked information. The service used arcane language and acronyms. The activities of the ‘Silent Service’ were classified. And, like many collective groups, the submariners distrusted outsiders. In 1949, Theodore Roscoe was the first non-submariner to write a major work about submarines after WWII. His book, *United States Submarine Operations in World War II*, is an important resource for any historian.

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26Nimitz, foreword to *Sink ‘Em All*, 7.
27Nimitz, foreword to *Sink ‘Em All*, 7.
examining submarines during the war, but Roscoe’s work was also aimed at boasting about the Submarine Force’s achievements during WWII. To his credit, Roscoe clearly states that his objective in writing the book is “to serve as an informative, instructive, and inspirational text for those in Naval Service who are interested directly or indirectly in submarines.”

Although he also admits the book “is not the official operational history. Strictly speaking, it is not a history, nor is it to be studied as such” in the introduction, nearly every subsequent study of WWII cites Roscoe’s five hundred seventy-seven page work. The book primarily focuses on submarine operations, but provides strong historical context for understanding the Submarine Force during WWII.

Roscoe’s book, although admittedly complimentary toward the Submarine Force, provides valuable, detailed information about submarines from an operational perspective during WWII. For example, Roscoe explains that the average complement of U.S. submarines was six officers and a crew of fifty-four enlisted men at the beginning of the war, but the size of the crew increased as the submarines required more men to operate the new radio and radar equipment. By the end of the conflict, submarines averaged about eighty men. Roscoe’s work served as the most comprehensive study of submarine operations during WWII until Clay Blair published *Silent Victory* in 1975. Blair was a historian, journalist, and served on the submarine *USS Guardfish* (SS-217) during WWII. The Clay’s work is a continuation of WWII submariners’ authority of their own

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historiography and is widely considered “the definitive history of submarines” since its publication.\textsuperscript{33}

It appears that interest in WWII submarines grew in the 1980s and 1990s, because the decades saw an explosion of submariners publishing their accounts of the war, which were generally marketed toward the general public as daring war stories.\textsuperscript{34} The few scholarly sources are limited to the examination of submarine technology and tactics. For example, Gary E. Weir, a historian at the U.S. Naval Historical Center, details the construction of U.S. submarines from 1914 to 1961 in two monographs and he also discusses historic technological advances on submarines in multiple online articles for the U.S. Navy.\textsuperscript{35} Since the year 2000, there has been a bit of a rebirth in the WWII submarine historiography. The majority of academics still focus on submarine design and unrestricted submarine warfare, but scholars such as Nachman Ben-Yehuda examine the subjects from a different perspective. Ben-Yehuda analyzes morality and the cultural acceptance of unrestricted submarine warfare during both world wars.\textsuperscript{36}

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\textsuperscript{36} Ben-Yehuda, \textit{Atrocity, Deviance, and Submarine Warfare}. 

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Rather than the WWII veterans giving their first-hand accounts, a new generation of submariners, such as Joel Ira Holwitt, currently authors the majority of the subject’s recent literature. Unlike WWII submariners, who argue that the order to conduct unrestricted submarine warfare was an unplanned consequence of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Holwitt uses primary sources to suggest the naval planners secretly agreed to the strategy several years before the attack.\(^{37}\) WWII submariners’ ability to maintain a large influence over their own history and portray the Submarine Force as the U.S. Navy’s savior in the Pacific remains prevalent in submarine historiography. As with members of most military units, the majority of submariners who served after WWII glorify the Submarine Force’s contribution to the war effort. Most post-WWII submariners who wrote about the Submarine Force during the war echoed Nimitz’s and Lockwood’s claims. For example, Richard Gimber argued, “[s]ince U.S. surface forces, save its aircraft carriers, had been so severely crippled at Pearl Harbor, it was necessary for the remaining forces—namely, submarines—to initiate a forceful response.”\(^{38}\)

In his 2010 book, *The Men*, post-WWII submariner Stephen Leal Jackson claims, “there was reluctance among some [submarine] veterans about discussing their experience.”\(^{39}\) Jackson argues, in contrast, that as a submariner himself, he “was able to establish an instant rapport with the interviewees and forego the need for time-consuming

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\(^{37}\) Holwitt, *Execute Against Japan*.

\(^{38}\) Gribble, *Navy Priest*, 70. Post-WWII submariners believed that they shared an esprit and collective memory with members of the Submarine Force during WWII, because submariners after the war learned about the Submarine Force’s history and effectiveness at submarine training. According to a 2003 U.S. Army manual: “Military history inspires soldiers and adds to their pride in the military profession. An understanding of the qualities and successful actions of their unit and of individuals can help the members of the organization understand what can be achieved. Military history provides useful examples of outstanding leadership and its effects upon the organizational esprit. This knowledge helps to build great soldiers.” “Military History Operations,” FM-1, Department of the Army, February 2003, accessed June 4, 2016, [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/1-20/fm1-20.pdf](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/1-20/fm1-20.pdf).

explanations about topics every submariner naturally understands.”

According to Jackson, although his eight years of experience as a submariner were several decades after WWII, all submariners, no matter when they served, share mutual respect for one another and understand certain procedures, hazards, and situations. Jackson’s claims suggest the collective submarine identity still exists, in some form, and the author believes that “[a]s a former submarine sailor,” he feels that he is “the beneficiary of the high level of pride and professionalism” of WWII submariners.

In his book, The Men, Jackson’s goal is to recognize to the Submarine Force during WWII, but specifically the enlisted submariners, because he recognizes “[t]he majority of books written about submarine activities during World War II focus on the actions of the officers.” In the book’s foreword, WWII submarine radioman Jeweldeen Brown recognizes Jackson’s contribution to the historiography and argues that enlisted submariners are “largely neglected by authors, and especially the entertainment media, the latter often falsely portraying enlisted crewman in movies in an uncomplimentary role; almost as pawns, acting only by officer direction.” The author’s motivation and book’s title are evidence that members of the submarine collective had varying amounts of power. Jackson’s analysis, however, primarily focuses on enlisted submariners while they were on patrol, which suggests the gap between officers and enlisted men was widened while submarines were underway. Six of Jackson’s ten chapters are biographies.

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40 Jackson, The Men, 3.
41 The reluctance of WWII combat submarine veterans to speak about their experiences is not necessarily unique to submarines, but the secretive nature of the force may have also deterred some from speaking to people that they perceived outsiders. Jackson, The Men, 3.
42 Jackson, The Men, 3.
43 Jackson, The Men, xvii.
of WWII submarine veterans. Jackson’s depiction of the Submarine Force, and particularly of the enlisted men as unsung heroes, is consistent with the WWII submariners’ perception that they were distinct from the rest of the U.S. Navy.\textsuperscript{45}

Historian Glenn A. Knoblock’s monograph, \textit{Black Submariners in the United States Navy, 1940-1975}, examines the lives of African-Americans on submarines, which are often ignored in the submarine literature. According to Knoblock, although the black submariners were only allowed to serve in the Steward’s Branch, the men played important roles in the Submarine Force. Knoblock does not go into detail about the social hierarchy on submarines, but he does state that most individuals of color were not considered equals with submariners of the same rank. According to Knoblock, “[t]hough men of the steward’s branch were enlisted men, their position in the naval rating hierarchy was distinctly separate and considered inferior in all regards.” Although they were separate and subordinate in the social structure, evidence suggests that other submariners considered the stewards part of the collective and that they shared many of the values and traditions associated with the Submarine Service’s identity. Although Knoblock also argues “no steward, even a chief steward, had any formal authority over even the lowest rated white sailor,” many were able to use their value to the submarine and their relationships with officers to negotiate informal power onboard.\textsuperscript{46}

Another recent study of submarines is Zachary Mason’s 2014 master’s thesis for East Carolina University. Mason argues that WWII submariners’ “emotional attachment to submarines,” combat experiences, and rituals created a unique folk group. Mason

\textsuperscript{45} Although enlisted men in other areas of the military may not get the same attention as officers and may also be considered heroes, Jackson portrays the men in the Submarine Force as unique.

\textsuperscript{46} For more details about stewards and their ability to negotiate power onboard see Chapter III. Knoblock, \textit{Black Submariners}, 20.
argues that submariners created a distinct “culture” built upon a “rejection of the surface world.” Through interviews with several submarine veterans he shows that close quarters forged close bonds between men on the submarine. According to Mason, the “high level and unique nature of constant danger… brought submariners on other submarines closer together.” His argument, that submariners “grew extremely attached” to their submarine, is accurate and provides further evidence towards Hobsbawm’s claim that identities are complicated. Submariners established kinships with their shipmates and, at times, specifically when speaking to submariners from other vessels, took special pride in their specific submarine’s success. However, submariners primarily identified with the submarine collective and viewed the rest of the navy as the out-group.

One reason that submariners established a close comradery with one another was the limited space available for the men to live and work. The tight quarters and small crews limited space for individual privacy or mere acquaintances, while also helping to form a family structure between individuals on the same boat. Knoblock argues that camaraderie was necessary because in “the tightest imaginable quarters, a spirit of teamwork was essential to its successful operation.” In a 1942 article about U.S. submarines, Allen Raymond, a journalist for the Washington Post, stated: “I could see that submarining is teamwork to the nth degree.”

The collective submarine identity’s separation from outsiders and a submarine’s isolation while on patrol made it difficult for a submariner to communicate with people

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47 Mason, “Corsairs in the Drain Pipes.”
50 Mason, “Corsairs in the Drain Pipes,” 70.
51 Knoblock, Black Submariners, 45.
who were not attached to his submarine. In port, however, submariners were granted two
weeks to a month of shore liberty between patrols, while a ‘relief crew’ overhauled and
conducted maintenance on the submarine.53

Joseph Benedict Coulter Jr., a motor machinist on the S-43 (SS-153), discussed
the close quarters of the submarine. “Where we ate, we slept, and the meals were cooked
there, the head was there, it was all in this, compressed in this area.”54 On patrol, a
submariner’s communication was limited to the other individuals confined to the same
small space for up to seventy-five days. Most submariners, such as Joseph Eckberg, Chief
Radioman on the USS Seawolf, argue that their relationship with shipmates was deeper
than co-workers or teammates. Eckberg described his bond with the men of the Seawolf
as “all one family, all wrapped together in extraordinary intimacy of men who go down to
the sea in the sealed steel chambers of silence.”55 Submariners established a kinship with
the men on their boat, but when they returned from patrol the collective submarine
identity became more salient.

According to Knoblock, after each patrol, about seventy-five percent of a
submarine’s personnel were considered members of the ‘core-crew,’ and remained on the
submarine. The remaining twenty-five percent were transferred to other submarines or
stations. According to Knoblock, the rotation of submariners was necessary to ensure that
all “submarine crews would always be comprised of a mixture of veteran patrollers and

53 After each patrol, the crew turned over the submarine to a ‘relief crew’ comprised submariners
who were attached to the squadron. The relief crews performed maintenance and guarded the submarine
while the boat’s regular crew enjoyed a few weeks of liberty. The navy also regularly sent submarines to a
U.S. naval yard for large overhauls and allowed the crews to take leave after five patrols. Knoblock, Black
Submariners, 42-43.
54Coulter, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
newcomers who could learn from them.” Ernest Zellmer, an officer on the *USS Cavalla* (SS-224), claimed the policy was frustrating at times. Describing his experience after returning to Australia from the boat’s third patrol Zellmer stated, “we had lost a number of our experienced crew members as was routine after each patrol. While we received a couple of experienced hands, fifteen of the new men had never been on a submarine patrol. Therefore, we needed to train the *Cavalla*’s crew for the fourth patrol.”

This naval policy allowed one submariner, even if he consistently remained as a member of his submarine’s core-crew, to serve with at least one dozen new submariners each patrol; therefore, in addition to knowing his fellow submarine school graduates, the submariner was able to establish relationships with men serving on multiple submarines.

The relationships between submariners attached to different boats fostered the individual’s attachment to a collective submarine identity between members, rather than a more localized, boat-specific identity for multiple reasons, the most obvious of which is that many members served on more than one submarine. Submariners from different crews may have also met one another at a bar in port or after being introduced by a former shipmate. Relationships with submariners from other boats was apparently beneficial for Zellmer, because his former classmate at the Naval Academy, ‘Hap,’ who was about to leave on patrol, greeted him onboard when the *USS Cavalla* pulled into

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56 Submariners were required to re-qualify each time they were transferred to another boat; however, it is likely the process was simpler than his original qualification and the submariner did not have to re-earn his dolphins during the process because he was already a member of the ‘in-group.’ Knoblock, *Black Submariners*, 137.

57 Zellmer, “A Submariner in Western Australia,” 91.

58 Each submarine fleet was divided into squadrons that generally consisted of two divisions, which contained about six submarines each. Squadrons were assigned a homeport or a submarine tender that not only contained offices and quarters for the administrative staff assigned to the squadron and divisions, but also personnel and equipment to resupply and repair the attached submarines. For more information about submarine manning, see: Roscoe, *United States Submarine Operations in World War II*, 17.
Australia after its third patrol. According to Zellmer, “Hap wanted to tell me about a girl he had met and thought I would like to know. He had told her that I was coming in from patrol and would give her a call. What a friend! His intuition changed my life, though of course we didn't know it then.” Zellmer called and eventually married the girl, but he spent his first day in port after the third patrol similar to the way he spent the first few days of his second patrol, by “meeting with officers from the other boats that were being refitted and telling sea stories of the last and other patrols and of other visits to Australia.” Not only does Zellmer’s story reveal that his relationship with members of other boats was so close that it allowed Zellmer met his future wife, but it is also an example of sea stories’ importance to members of the submarine collective.

The Submarine Force’s relatively small size, and the U.S. Navy’s policy of rotating submariners after every patrol, created a web of kinships that spread throughout the Submarine Force. The relationships with submariners throughout the fleet did not always produce positive outcomes similar Zellmer’s experience of meeting his wife. For example, Herbert L. Starmer described a negative aspect of maintaining kinships with submariners on other boats by explaining the personal loss submariners felt when they learned a boat was ‘on eternal patrol.’ Starmer stated, “the submarine force was small and discussion always followed about someone they knew on the lost boat.” The individual contacts that weaved throughout the submarine fleet established a social network that facilitated cultural exchanges. The Submarine Force was too large for each submariner to know every member of the in-group, but sociologists Marilyn B. Brewer and Wendi

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59 Zellmer, “A Submariner in Western Australia,” 85.
60 Zellmer, “A Submariner in Western Australia,” 86.
61 Zellmer, “A Submariner in Western Australia,” 83, 86.
Gardner also claim that “personal relationships among group members” are not required for collective identities.\textsuperscript{63} The common practices of telling sea-stories and spreading scuttlebutt allowed submariners to exchange information, rumors, and ideas with other submarine crews and bases. Sharing of sea stories, possibly due to the limited activities available for submariners to engage in underway, is one example of the many nautical traditions that became engrained in the collective submarine identity. Sea stories allowed submariners to pass the time by sharing information and ideas. The common saying in the submarine community was, “Writers of fairy tales begin their fantasies with ‘Once upon a time…’ Tellers of sea stories begin, ‘This is no bullshit.’”\textsuperscript{64} Although the sea stories are based on true events, rather than being shared for accuracy, the stories are carefully crafted in order to shock or humor the audience; therefore, the researcher should analyze the stories cautiously. At a minimum, the person sharing the story must remain close enough to the truth that his audience finds the narrative believable. Even if a story is factually inaccurate, the stories are proof that the submariners borrowed from nautical tradition and they also reveal a shared language. The narratives highlight the relationships between submariners and potentially reveal collective submarine identity’s values and the membership’s perception of humor, hopes, and fears.\textsuperscript{65}

Passing scuttlebutt, or telling rumors, was another common way for submariners to pass information between submarine crews and for submariners to learn the latest gossip from relief crews or other submariners on other boats. For example, Ron Smith, an

\textsuperscript{63} Brewer and Gardner, “Who is This ‘We’?,” 83.


enlisted submariner on the *USS Seal* (SS-183), claimed that he learned of the loss of the *USS Pickerel* (SS-177) and *USS Grenadier* (SS-210) from scuttlebutt, and, according to Smith, “scuttlebutt, as usual, turned out to be accurate.” Scuttlebutt, similar to sea stories, provides a window into the interests and values and also to analyze the information that the submariners collectively believed was important enough to share. However, unlike sea stories that could potentially be shared for years, scuttlebutt stopped spreading once the information was confirmed, proved incorrect, or became widely known because it was no longer relevant to share.

Sea stories were one of many ways in which submariners announced their collective sense of belonging to the submarine collective. Sociologists Francesca Polletta and James M. Jasper argue, “collective identities are expressed in cultural materials,” such as “narratives, symbols, verbal styles, rituals, [and] clothing.” And Christina Flesher Fominaya similarly suggests “shared leadership, organization, ideologies and rituals” act to maintain a membership’s commitment to one another and forge solidarity within the group. Members of the Submarine Force shared multiple rituals. For example, submariners told sea stories, lashed a broom to the periscope after a successful patrol, and flew a battle flag that recorded the boat’s success when returning to port. Members of the Submarine Force also shared common leaders, such as Admiral Charles Lockwood.

WWII submarine veteran Ervin J. Gaines argues that submariners also shared a common

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68 Upon returning from a successful patrol, it was common practice for WWII submariners to lash a broom to the periscope to signify a “clean sweep.” William Tuohy, *The Bravest Man: Richard O’Kane and the Amazing Submarine Adventures of the USS Tang* (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2009), 40. In his Master’s Thesis, Mason recognizes submariners’ ritual of keeping a battle flag. He also notes that pilots recorded their kills in a similar manner, but views aviation as a separate folk group than submariners. Mason, “Corsairs in the Drain Pipes,” 65-68.
language with a “vocabulary whose size alone may well amaze the uninitiated.”\textsuperscript{69} It is possible that Gaines, who earned a doctorate in English Literature at Columbia University after the war, exaggerates the difference between submariners’ speech from outsiders, but his article is an example of the submariners’ collective perception that they were a distinct in-group. Gaines includes a two-page glossary of terms unique to the Submarine Force and states, “the jargon of the submariner is not only vigorous and expressive, but ... it is almost unknown outside the submarine service...[though] acquaintance with most of the expressions that are not only useful but often indispensable to the submarine sailor.”\textsuperscript{70} If the jargon contained a large vocabulary and was essential for submariners as Gaines claims, then it is reasonable to assume information and ideas could spread throughout the Submarine Force as well.

Not only did submariners have their own jargon, they also had their own perception of values and traits that designated an individual as a ‘good submariner.’ According to Brewer and Gardner, as “the boundaries of the self are redrawn,” the content of an individual’s self-conception “is focused on those characteristics that make one a ‘good’ representative of the group.”\textsuperscript{71} WWII submarine mechanic Garfield Kvalheim’s claims, “to be a good submariner one must possess the quality of being able to get along with other people, be of sound mind and top physical condition,” which suggests he believed certain values defined members of the Submarine Force.\textsuperscript{72} Kvalheim was not the only member of the Submarine Force who believed certain qualities defined

\textsuperscript{69}Gaines, “Talking Under Water,” 36.
\textsuperscript{70} Gaines wrote the article as a graduate student because he earned his PHD in 1952. Gaines, “Talking Under Water,” 36.
\textsuperscript{71} Brewer and Gardner, “Who is This ‘We’?,” 84.
\textsuperscript{72} Kvalheim’s definition of a ‘good submariner’ also suggests he associated with the submarine identity, rather than a broader naval identity. Garfield Kvalheim, Interview by author, quoted in Tony Banham, The Sinking of the Lisbon Maru: Britain's Forgotten Wartime Tragedy (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 60.
an individual as a ‘good submariner.’ The commanding officer of the USS Peto (SS-265) described one of his officers, Jake Laboon, “as a ‘splendid submariner’” in his official evaluation.\textsuperscript{73} Most submariners recognized that specific traits defined a group member as ‘good,’ because the concept was clearly stated in the 1942 submarine training manual: “You must be able to assume the trust that is given you when you take over the anchor watch-otherwise you will never be a good submarine man and if you are not a GOOD submarine man you will not be retained in the submarine service.”\textsuperscript{74}

Bob Hunt’s story about his arrival at his first boat suggests equality was also an important value of the collective submarine identity. According to Hunt, a chief told him a common saying throughout the Submarine Force when he reported to his first submarine: “I don’t know what your rate is, but you can leave it on the gangplank! You are a now a member of the crew and we all work together, no matter what we are.”\textsuperscript{75} According to Knoblock, “true submariners held true to this ideal and practiced what was preached for the most part, according to most stewards.” Knoblock, or more likely the stewards that he researched, believed certain values, such as mutual respect, made an individual a ‘true submariner.’\textsuperscript{76} The chief’s claim that rank did not matter on a submarine does not accurately represent the true nature of a submarine’s social structure, but it reflects the collective submarine identity’s valorization of equality. The chief was certainly aware that traditional military rank gave him power, but the values of the collective submarine identity believed every member deserved respect from other

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{73} LTJG John Laboon, fitness report, August 7, 1945, cited in Gribble, Navy Priest, 95.
  \item \textsuperscript{74} Submarine Information and Instruction Manual, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942).
  \item \textsuperscript{75} Robert Schultz and James Shell, We Were Pirates: A Torpedoman’s Pacific War (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{76} Knoblock, Black Submariners, 96.
\end{itemize}
submariners. WWII submarine officer Henry C. Lauerman explains, “There was a feeling of mutual respect and a feeling that the officers could not get along without the men. I am sure the men could have got along without the officers; but at any rate, there was a great feeling of oneness and unity.” Roscoe accurately recognizes submariners were also permitted and expected to correct superiors in situations when failing to do so may prove fatal. According to sociologists Shmeul Noah Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, “members of the collectivity have to view each other as equals in a certain respect—otherwise trust and solidarity will not develop in the collectivity.”

Sociologists Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke state, “having a particular social identity means being at one with a certain group, being like others in the group, and seeing things from the group's perspective.” Brewer and Gardner argue that individuals who share a collective identity have a “connectedness and belonging are not merely affiliations or alliances between the self and others but entail fundamental differences in the way the self is construed,” which Taylor and Whittier describe as a “sense of ‘we.’”

According to Brewer and Gardner, the “the shift from ‘I’ to ‘we’” corresponds with the transformation of the individual’s self-definition. In autobiographies and oral histories, WWII submariners often use ‘we’ when referring to members of the Submarine Force. This suggests the submariners identify themselves as members of the in-group, because individuals identify themselves based on their perception of inclusiveness in a social

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78 Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II, 18.
81 Brewer and Gardner, “Who is This ‘We’?,” 83; Taylor and Whittier, “Collective Identity in Social Movement Communities,” 110.
82 Brewer and Gardner, “Who is This ‘We’?,” 84.
group. For example, in his book about serving as the pharmacist’s mate on the USS Cobia (SS-245), Herbert L. Starmer stated, “we were the silent service.” By using ‘we,’ Starmer also reveals that he, like many submariners, perceived a connectedness with other members of the Submarine Force. USS Seawolf (SS-197) veteran Joseph Eckberg’s description of submariners reveals his perception of inclusiveness and sense of ‘we’ with other members of the Submarine Force:

We know we’re different from other services of the armed forces. We differ from the crew of a Flying Fortress, for example, or a company of Marines, because we have no identity outside our submarines. We are not salesmen, clerks, factory employees, white-collar workers, transformed overnight into fighting men. Most of us have no private life.

Eckberg not only portrayed himself as a member of a collective submarine identity, he also identified what he was not. Fominaya claims, “the process of defining what ‘we are’ inevitably involves establishing what ‘we are not,’” which requires group members establish a reciprocal identification that express a common “difference with reference groups.” Eisenstadt and Giesen argue that collective identities are “produced by the social construction of boundaries,” which represents a “demarcation between inside and outside.” Individuals within the boundaries classify themselves and each other as members of the ‘in-group,’ whereas other people are considered the ‘out-group.’ All individuals who were not in the U.S. Submarine Force were considered members of one out-group or another, while submariners highlighted their differences with other military personnel, particularly sailors and officers in the U.S. Navy. Lauerman, for example, claimed that serving on submarines “was not like being a combat pilot. There it is sort of a one-for-one proposition. Nor was it quite like the infantry, I don't think; and it

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83 Starmer, WWII Submarine Doc, 8.
84 Frank, Horan, and Eckberg: U.S.S. Seawolf, 7.
wasn't quite like, shall we say, a ship in convoy. It was something, I think, that was extraordinarily unique."87

Knoblock notices that submarines were different from other naval units and argues, “traditional naval protocol was often less adhered to in the Submarine Force.”88 Sociologists Joseph C. Hermanowicz’s and Harriet P. Morgan’s theory offers a potential explanation as to why the submariners exaggerated the difference between themselves and the rest of the navy. Hermanowicz and Morgan believe social groups engage in “social practices” in order to distinguish themselves from a similar group, because the distinction with other groups was “self-exemplifying.”89 One social practice common in the military is enlisted men saluting officers, but Eckberg claims this was not strictly adhered to in the Submarine Force. According to Eckberg, he and his shipmates passed a naval officer, who “called out ‘Just a minute sailors!… You failed to salute,’” while the men were returning to their submarine, USS Seawolf, in Hawaii.90 Eckberg claimed, “[w]e hadn’t saluted an officer for a long, long time. Someone mumbled, ‘sorry sir,’ and we saluted and hurried on.”91 He and his shipmates recognized the different social practices between the navy and Submarine Force, and that “[f]or the first time in months we realized we were back in the Navy.”92

As with all enlisted submariners, Eckberg went through navy boot camp and knew the Submarine Force was part of the navy, but he perceived the two as separate institutions because they did not share the same social practices. Eckberg was officially a

88 Knoblock, Black Submariners, 105.
90 Frank, Horan, and Ekberg: U.S.S. Seawolf, 189.
91 Frank, Horan, and Ekberg: U.S.S. Seawolf, 189.
92 Frank, Horan, and Ekberg: U.S.S. Seawolf, 189.
sailor, which meant that he shared many of the same traditions, rituals, and goals with sailors serving elsewhere in the navy; however, he highlighted the distinction, because he identified with the submarine collective. Starmer similarly portrayed the two groups as different when he described the reason he requested to join the submarine service after becoming acquainted with submariners while he worked as a pharmacist mate at Midway. Starmer claims he volunteered for submarine duty because he realized “[t]hey [submariners] were different than sailors in the other navy…. This was the navy I wanted to be part of. I wanted submarine duty.”

Unlike many other military duties during the WWII, submarine service was voluntary, which means that the submariners chose to become members of the in-group, rather than being drafted into a unit against their will. Submariners presumably viewed the service as prestigious before they even attended submarine training, because if a sailor did not perceive a difference between the Submarine Force and the rest of the navy, he would have no incentive to volunteer for the duty. According to a 1947 naval study about submarine medicine, a submariner “may have been drafted into the Navy, but he goes into the submarine branch of his own free will. This not only is a selective process in itself, but also a motivating force for a man to continue in this activity.”

In other words, submariners wanted to be members of the Submarine Force and distinguish themselves from other sailors.

Even decades after the war was over, WWII submariners attempted to distinguish themselves from outsiders. For example, at a United States Submarine Veterans of World War II meeting in 1982, Rudy Jacks, who served on the USS Seahorse (SS-304) and

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Sunfish (SS-281), claimed that one difference between the navy and the Submarine Force was, “[m]ost sailors when they hit port, went their own way. But submariners stuck together.”

The formation of the Submarine Veterans of World War II is further evidence that the submariners felt that they belonged to a different group, and needed a separate organization from other veteran groups to express themselves. According to Maria Hileman, a reporter at the meeting, the submarine veterans described “the close bond that is formed by the submarine service,” and “[i]n describing the war years, they talk mostly of the camaraderie that makes submariners different.” Hileman’s article reveals that the submariners not only perceived themselves as unique, but that they also stressed their distinction from similar groups to others. The submarine veterans’ claim that they shared a closer bond to one another than other military units is further evidence that WWII submariners were members of their own collective.

Another difference submariners emphasize is that submarines were ‘boats.’ Gaines defined ‘boat’ as a “[s]ynonym for submarine,” and claims: “Although a boat is properly a small vessel that may be carried by a ship, the special use of this word dates from the years when submarines were very little larger than boats. A common question in the submarine navy is, ‘What boat are you on?’” Starmer is more adamant and insists, “[t]he boats, and they are boats not ships, were the most successful branch of the U.S.

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95 Jacks’s distinction is probably inaccurate, because sailors on other ships presumably forged close bonds with their shipmates, too. Like submariners, other sailors probably did not have many contacts outside the ship; therefore, they probably went out together as well. Jack may have meant that the officers and men did not all go out together. Whatever his reasoning, Jack either perceived this difference or wanted others to recognize the difference between the groups. Maria Hileman, “Memories: Submariners Share a Special Bond,” The Day (New London, CT), August 17, 1982, 11.

96 Hileman, “Memories: Submariners Share a Special Bond,” 11.

Starmer’s argument is in keeping with the collective submarine identity, because it stresses the difference between the Submarine Force and rest of the navy and it also credits the service’s success.

WWII Submariners prided themselves on their group cohesion, or strength of the bonds that connected the collective’s membership. Former director of the Division of Neuropsychology at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research and lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Frederick J. Manning claims that group cohesion is more important for members of the military, and “nowhere in civilian life is the social group of such major and crucial importance in the life of the individual as it is for the soldier in combat.”

After collecting information from German and American troops in the years following WWII, scholars found that “unit cohesion is essential to military effectiveness,” and present researchers from the RAND Corporation, a nonprofit think tank for the United States Armed Forces, agree.

In a 2010 RAND study, researchers argue, “cohesion was reliably associated with performance,” because units that perform well are generally more cohesive than units that experience more failures. Therefore, the Submarine Force’s success during WWII may also be evidence of the submariners’ cohesiveness. According to post-WWII submariner Joel Ira Holwitt, by the close of the war, the U.S. Submarine Force, which consisted of less than two percent of naval personnel, “sank 55 percent of all Japanese

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99 Although submariners were not ‘soldiers,’ they were in combat. Manning, “Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry,” 2.
ships in the Second World War.”\(^{102}\) Although the U.S. Submarine Force was successful and U.S. submariners had a greater survival rate than the other great powers’ submarine fleets during the war, the twenty-two percent of submariners lost meant that the Submarine Force “suffered the highest loss rate in the U.S. Armed Forces.”\(^{103}\)

WII submariners Herbert Starmer, Jack Blank, and Wilber Meyer may disagree on the specifics, but the themes remain consistent. Starmer, for example, claims the Submarine Force only accounted for one percent of the U.S. Navy, but was responsible for sinking about sixty percent of Japanese shipping during the war, but also suffered the “[h]ighest casualty rate of all of the US armed forces in WWII. That would also be the group that would bring Japan to surrender.”\(^{104}\) Blank claims that U.S. “submarines were less than [sic] one percent of the Navy. And they sank 52 percent of the Japanese fleet. And we lost one in five men in the submarines so we lost 52 submariners all together.”\(^{105}\) Meyer similarly argues, “[t]he submarine service was less than two percent of the navy, total navy. The submarine service sunk over sixty percent of all enemy tonnage of the Japanese. We lost fifty-two submarines in World War II, and we lost approximately 3,600 personnel-officers and enlisting men.”\(^{106}\) The WWII submariners’ boasts about the Submarine Force’s accomplishments during the war and their focus on the service’s

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\(^{102}\) Holwitt, *Execute Against Japan*, 168. Submariners also felt a connection to the members of their crew and kept banners showing their individual submarine’s accomplishments, but most of the individuals took pride in the force’s collective success. Future studies may examine each submarine’s success and cohesiveness as a separate ‘unit’ in order to determine the effects of cohesiveness on a micro-level. Submariners’ pride may have also been tied to the success of the force as a whole, because it is likely the more aggressive boats were responsible for sinking the most enemy shipping and were also more likely to be lost, or are ‘still on patrol.’

\(^{103}\) Along with the 3,131 men and 374 officers, the U.S. Navy also lost 52 (48 in warzones, 41 from enemy action) of the 288 submarines deployed throughout the war. Roscoe, *United States Submarine Operations in World War II*, 493; Michael Thomas Poirerer, “Results of German and American Submarine Campaigns of World War II,” Chief of Naval Operations, Submarine Warfare Division (1999), accessed March 17, 2015, [http://www.navymil.navydata/cno/n87/history/wwii-campaigns.html](http://www.navymil.navydata/cno/n87/history/wwii-campaigns.html).

\(^{104}\) Starmer, *WWII Submarine Doc*, 41.

\(^{105}\) Blank, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.

\(^{106}\) Meyer, Park Tudor School of Words Oral History Collection.
relative size to the rest of the navy are further proof the submariners viewed themselves as a separate group from other sailors and a sense of cohesiveness existed between the members. Meyer’s and Blank’s use of the inclusive ‘we’ when discussing the Submarine Force’s losses during the war also suggests the two men felt they shared a certain degree of emotional investment amongst the collective’s membership, which sociologist Alberto Melucci claims is necessary for members to feel as though share a common identity.  

        WWII submariners were members of a common social group with a shared language, unique values, rituals, an emotional connection with one another, and a collective identity. Individuals who shared the collective submarine identity were proud of the collective’s success and distrusted outsiders. Submariners also believed they shared a unique bond and often used the inclusive ‘we’ when referring to the group as a whole or members of the collective. For example, Laureman stated, “I look back on my submarine days and think back on my experiences and how closely knit we were.” Members of the Submarine Force identified its membership as ‘submariners’ and exaggerated the differences between themselves and ‘sailors’ in order to highlight the distinction between the in-group and the most similar social group, the U.S. Navy as a whole.

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108 Lauerman, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, 4.
Individuals who shared collective submarine identity viewed the Submarine Force’s successes during WWII as proof of the group’s superiority to the rest of the navy. The submariners’ lack of communication with outsiders strengthened the bonds among members of the Submarine Force and drove a wedge between the submarine collective and the out-group. The collective submarine identity had a special *esprit de corps* or loyalty and pride to the Submarine Force, but perceived all outsiders as members of a homogenous, inferior out-group. The submariners first learned to distrust outsiders when they were indoctrinated into the submarine collective at the submarine school. Friendly-fire incidents and issues with submarine torpedoes during WWII justified the collective submarine identity’s perception of ‘others’ as incompetent while reinforcing the submariners’ sense of independence and self-reliance. The submariners exaggerated the boundaries that separated the submarine collective’s membership from the out-group and placed higher values on characteristics that they believed distinguished themselves from the inferior outsiders. For example, post-WWII submriner, Stephen Leal Jackson claims that a WWII submariner “could not be too fond of the formality of the ‘spit-and-polish’ navy… especially with regard to those navy traditions that are more form than substance.”1 Jackson’s claim suggests that not only were submariners inherently different than members of the general service, but also naval regulations contradicted the submarine identity because the traditional rules did not affect the submarine’s operation ability or safety.

At the submarine school, new submarine volunteers learned the values of the submarine collective and instructors groomed the students’ sense of superiority to other sailors by highlighting the differences between submarine service and the rest of the navy. A submariner’s indoctrination culminated with his completion of the submarine qualification process and was symbolized by the submarine warfare insignia. The navy’s rotation of submarine crews allowed submariners to develop friendships with members of other boats and spread ideas and information throughout the submarine fleet by sharing sea stories and scuttlebutt. During the war, issues such as defective torpedoes, friendly fire, and the “May Incident” legitimized members of the submarine collective’s distrust of outsiders.

The submariners’ negative portrayal of the rest of the navy was relative to the collective submarine identity’s sense of superiority, which may be explained by Brewer’s and Gardner’s theory that the derogation of an out-group is linked to collective self-esteem. The collective submarine identity’s perception of its own membership as superior to outsiders is an example of ‘in-group favoritism.’ Most sociologists accept that individuals show favoritism toward other members of their in-group at the expense of the out-group no matter how trivial the criterion. For example, in multiple experiments, in which researchers categorized subjects based on the outcome of a coin-flip, the sociologists found that “participants give significantly more resources to in-group members than to out-group members.”

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2 Brewer and Gardner, “Who is This ‘We’?,” 91
Young submarine volunteers were introduced to the submarine collective identity at Naval Submarine Base New London, where officer candidates conducted three months of submarine training and enlisted volunteers attended the six-week course, Basic Submarine School (BSS). Some volunteers had experience serving on other naval platforms, but the majority of the students’ naval experience was limited to boot camp and a specialty school. The new volunteers’ lack of naval experience in addition to the school’s location and curriculum established the perception that submariners were superior to other sailors and operated in a different sphere than the rest of the navy.

The location of BSS in New London played a significant role in the establishment of the Submarine Force’s identity for multiple reasons. The school was located on a submarine base separate from other military establishments, which limited the students’ access to outside influences. The town, New London, also held historic and economic ties to the Submarine Force. John Holland built the first submarine purchased by the U.S.


4 Most submariners attended submarine training, but some enlisted men were ordered to a submarine crew directly following the completion of their specialty school. The Steward Branch was the only submarine rating available to people of color at the time, and although it appears as though the rating was not undermanned at the time, stewards seem to have only attended BSS on a case-by-case basis. Traditionally, members of the Stewards Branch’s duties were assisting the ship’s cook and serving the ship’s officers; however, stewards on submarines were often tasked with additional responsibilities, such as loading torpedo tubes during battlestations. The inconsistency in stewards’ submarine training experiences may have been due to the perception that the rating did not serve a tactical-role onboard. It is also possible that racism played a direct role. Although Knoblock suggests many of the stewards who attended BSS succeeded, another reason stewards might have been less likely to attend BSS was a belief that the submarine training standards were too high for people of color to meet, because racial prejudice at the time considered African Americans as intellectually inferior. For a detailed examination of race in the Submarine Force during WWII see: Knoblock, *Black Submariners*. For a rare example of white enlisted submariner who was promoted officer during the war and did not attend BSS see: Joseph Bonds, interview, Arkansas Inland Maritime Museum, April 15, 2000, accessed March 1, 2015, [http://aimmuseum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Oral_History_Joseph_Bonds.pdf](http://aimmuseum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Oral_History_Joseph_Bonds.pdf). Pharmacist mates, or ‘docs,’ were enlisted sailors who served as a submarine’s medic. Pharmacist mates were not allowed to volunteer for submarine duty until they gained years of experience elsewhere in the fleet. After attending BSS with other enlisted volunteers, pharmacist mates went to an extra school in order to train for service as the only medially qualified individual on a submarine. For more information about specialized training for pharmacist mates see: Starmer, *WWII Submarine Doc*, 5.
Navy in New London, and Holland’s company that specialized in building submarines, Electric Boat, was the town’s largest business at the time. Therefore, students at BSS were not only geographically secluded from outsiders, but the economic and historic importance of submarines to the surrounding civilian community also probably further distanced the submariners ideologically from the other naval identities.

As with other enlisted sailors, submarine volunteers’ naval experience started in boot camp, during which submariner Neil Pike claimed that over the thirteen weeks, he learned “the basics of the Navy.” After boot camp, sailors who qualified for a specific rating attended a specialty school to learn how to perform a specific trade. In most cases, as for Pike at the electronics school, instructors at the specialty schools recommended that distinguished students volunteer for submarine duty. For example, Raymond Allen claimed that he was “honor man” of his class at the Cooks and Baker School in Jacksonville and stated, “I got my choice of duty and everybody was telling me you got to go to Sub School.” Although the percentage of applicants accepted to attend BSS cannot be confirmed, WWII submariners consistently argue that only 9 out of 107 applicants were accepted to undergo two weeks of preliminary psychological and physical testing. Even if the submariners’ claims are not factually accurate, the numbers

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5 David Bushnell also built his submarine, the Turtle, which was used in the American Revolutionary War, eighteen miles away from New London in Old Saybrook, CT. The submarine base and Electric Boat were physically located across the river from the town of New London, in the historically smaller town of Groton, CT, in New London County. Electric Boat built seventy-four submarines for the U.S. Navy in New London between 1941 and 1945. For more information about Electric Boat see: Weir, Forged in War; Weir, Building American Submarines.


8 All claims regarding the figures of the submarine school’s selectivity are from members of the submarine community and cannot be verified due to a lack of empirical evidence, but at a minimum they
reveal the submariners’ collective belief that the school was exclusive, because only the best candidates were selected to attend the submarine training.

A 1946 naval study that tested submariners’ intelligence highlighted the submarine school’s strict selection of volunteers and found the average enlisted submariner’s score was higher than the average navy sailor’s score. Perhaps more importantly, the study’s author noted, “aptitude and training requirements have been high for several years so it would be anticipated that the average submarine score would be above the general Navy average.” The WWII submariners’ perception of the school’s selectivity, in addition to the evidence provided by naval studies, suggests the students probably viewed themselves as individually superior to their peers before even attending their first class at the submarine school.

According to the training manual, the goal of BSS curriculum was “to equip enlisted men required for submarine service with an adequate foundation of theoretical and practical knowledge of submarines”; however, the training, taught by experienced submariners, also served to widen the gap between the students’ perceptions of the

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9 During WWII, the navy created the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory to develop and implement new technologies for the Submarine Force and ensure the health of submariners. In hopes of developing a higher standard of training at BSS, the researchers used by the Average Navy Battery Test to examine submariners during the summer of 1945. Bartlett found, the enlisted submariners scored an average scored a fifty-eight on the test, while the average score for enlisted sailors throughout the navy was fifty and the standard deviation was ten. It is also worth noting that the test did not examine submariners of the Stewards Branch for racial reasons. H. Bartlett, “Average Navy Battery Aptitude Test Scores for Enlisted Submariners: Second Progress Report,” Medical Research Report Number 87, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, New London, CT, January 1946, 3, accessed June 2, 2015, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/663517.pdf. The results of a 1947 study that examined the physical and psychological standards of the submarine school and how they related to submarines on patrol were similar. Shilling and Kohl, “The History of Submarine Medicine in WWII,” 12.

Submarine Force and the rest of the navy.\textsuperscript{11} For example, the BSS training manual claimed, “each man on a submarine will be given responsibility far exceeding that on any other type of naval vessel.”\textsuperscript{12} In his biographical chapter about torpedoman first class, Hanly Davis, historian Arthur Kelly argues the young torpedoman “proved that he had the personality to tolerate the cramped living conditions on a submarine” in training, but “[s]ome of his fellow trainees could not and were eliminated from the elite program.”\textsuperscript{13} Although the administration at BSS was very selective, the school also had a high attrition rate due to its “rigid…educational, psychometric, and psychiatric, as well as physical fitness standards.”\textsuperscript{14}

The manual also warned students that the sailors who failed to complete submarine training would be relegated to serve the navy in some other capacity, which the submarine school referred to as: the “general service.”\textsuperscript{15} The term ‘general service’ in the official submarine training manual suggests that, at least by 1942, submariners viewed themselves as separate from and superior to an otherwise monolithic and

\textsuperscript{11}At BSS, students completed classroom and practical work. The students also trained on the older \textit{S-class} boats rather than the newer and more-common fleet-type submarines. The school’s leadership justified training on older submarines, because they believed that the lack of uniformity throughout the submarine fleet made “it impossible to give the correct location of all gear on all boats,” but the “basic principles will not vary between types of boats.” \textit{Submarine Information and Instruction Manual}, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942), i-3.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Submarine Information and Instruction Manual}, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942), i.

\textsuperscript{13}Kelly, \textit{BattleFire!}, 160.

\textsuperscript{14}Shilling and Kohl, “The History of Submarine Medicine in WWII,” 126. Although there is no record of the total attrition rate at BSS, historian Glenn A. Knoblock echoes the WWII submariners’ claim that the tests conducted during the first two weeks of BSS led the rejection of between twenty-five and thirty percent of the sailors selected to attend BSS. Knoblock, \textit{Black Submariners}, 36; Starmer, \textit{WWII Submarine Doc}, 35-36; Skurat, “The WWII Diesel Boat Era,” 9; McKenzie Allen, “The ‘Volunteers’ of Spritz’s Navy.” In 1943, the Submarine Force attempted to lower the attrition rate in at BSS by establishing methods to examine volunteers for the submarine service before accepting the sailors and officers to submarine training. The screening process provided naval authorities an opportunity to reject volunteers who did not meet the specified standards of submarine service before the officers and sailors received orders to New London. For the specifics of the programs see: Shilling and Kohl, “The History of Submarine Medicine in WWII,” 12.

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Submarine Information and Instruction Manual}, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942), 65; Jackson, \textit{The Men}, 21.
‘general,’ or ordinary, collective U.S. naval identity. It also implies that, if the students believed that the submarine school consisted of the best young sailors, the general service was comprised of sailors who were inferior and incapable of service on submarines.\textsuperscript{16} According to Australian psychologist Trang Thomas, members of an in-group often “exaggerate the differences between their own and other social groups.”\textsuperscript{17} The submariners’ perception of outsiders is common, because collective identities commonly “characterise [sic] members of outgroups as more homogeneous.”\textsuperscript{18} According to sociologists Marilyn Brewer and Wendi Gardner, “when collective identities are salient, in-group-out-group categorizations become the most important basis for evaluating others.”\textsuperscript{19} In the case of the collective submarine identity, while in port, WWII submariners primarily characterized individuals as either members of the Submarine Force or outsiders.

Contrary to the ‘general service,’ students at BSS during WWII referred to the school as ‘Spritz’s Navy,’ after Charley Spritz, a chief torpedo man and BSS instructor feared by most of the students.\textsuperscript{20} The students’ claim that they were members of ‘Spritz’s Navy’ implied, albeit jokingly, to both insiders and outsiders, that they belonged to a different navy than the sailors in the U.S. Navy. The students’ affiliation with the Submarine Force and disassociation with the rest of the navy while at BSS was recognized in a 1947 naval examination of WWII submarine standards and training. The authors of the study commended the submarine school for making “every effort… to

\textsuperscript{16} McKenzie Allen, “The ‘Volunteers’ of Spritz’s Navy.”
\textsuperscript{19} Brewer and Gardner, “Who is This ‘We’?,” 91.
properly indoctrinate all personnel into the submarine service—a unit notable for its esprit de corps,—so that they would realize that they were in the very best possible specialty of any of the military services.”

After the successful completion of submarine training in New London, most prospective submariners received orders to join a submarine crew and were given six months to ‘qualify for submarine duty.’ Division officers were responsible for guiding new submarine sailors through the qualification process, which expected each sailor to create a notebook describing and illustrating the “entire installation in detail…as well as the duties of his department and the ship as a whole.” After a sailor completed his notebook, he was required to pass an oral examination from the executive officer (XO), which was “not a routine matter but a searching test to determine the individual's ability to meet the standards and responsibility required of submarine men.” If satisfied, the XO recommended the captain qualify the man in submarines. Ron Smith, an enlisted submariner on the USS Seal (SS-183), sarcastically wrote that the process was easy:

All you had to do was go through the boat with a qualifying officer and be able to identify every gauge and valve, tell where every hatch led to, describe whether there was water, fuel, or air in every line and pipe, and be able to explain in full detail the job of every man on the boat including the officers.

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22 After completing BSS, some sailors joined a submarine squadron’s relief crews, which do not fall within the specific focus of this particular study. It was common practice for individuals who were attached to relief crews to trade duty with members of submarine crews with permission from the submarine’s commanding officer; therefore, even if a sailor was originally assigned to a relief crew, he still had the possibility of joining a submarine crew in the future, in which case the same concept qualification would apply. An examination of the multiple submarines’ war patrol suggests that anywhere from five to twenty sailors attached to the submarine were not qualified when the submarine left for on patrol. Although there is no explanation as to why some submarines had less qualified personnel than others, the variety is probably due to a combination of navy’s rotation of men on submarines, the growing number of boats commissioned during the war, and the need for larger submarine crews to fill roles created by the addition of new technologies as the war progressed.
23 Submarine Information and Instruction Manual, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942), 65.
24 Submarine Information and Instruction Manual, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942), 65.
25 Whitlock and Smith, The Depths of Courage, 186.
The BSS training manual claims qualification was of the “gravest importance,” because “it often happens that the safety of the vessel and the entire crew is in the hands of a single man. His knowledge and training, his ability to act quickly and correctly is the sole protection standing between safety and disaster.” The manual also states that qualification was required of “every man aboard from the captain on down to know his boat from the top mast to the keel.” Similarly, historian Glenn A. Knoblock argues, “a new lieutenant junior grade, fresh out of the Naval Academy, had to qualify for submarine service going through the same process as would a ship’s cook, motor machinist, torpedo man, radioman, or any other man,” which suggests every submariner, regardless of rank, came to his first boat equally unqualified.

The difficulty of the qualification process provided additional proof to submariners that they were superior to sailors in the ‘general service.’ Similar to the students who failed submarine training in New London, failure to qualify within six months resulted in a “transfer to general service,” because, according to the training manual, “retention of men unable to meet this standard in submarines is a menace to the safety and efficiency of the vessel concerned.” The training manual also states that the goal of the qualification process was to “produce capable and competent submarine

26 *Submarine Information and Instruction Manual*, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942), 65.
27 *Submarine Information and Instruction Manual*, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942), 65.
men,” which not only suggests an individual who completed his qualification was ‘capable’ and ‘competent,’ but also defined sailor as a ‘submarine man.’

According to sociologists Shmeul Noah Eisenstadt and Bernhard Giesen, “membership of, and partaking in, a collective identity depends on special processes of induction, ranging from various rites of initiation to various collective rituals.” In the case of the Submarine Force during WWII, the training and qualification processes were rituals that submariners were required to complete in order to be inducted into the submarine collective. Eisenstadt and Geisen claim further that while it is necessary for the rites or rituals for members to share similarities, the practices must also be “against the strangeness, the differences, the distinction of the other, is symbolically constructed and defined.” In other words, the submariners’ similar training and qualification processes were relevant to the collective submarine identity because the routines were unique to the Submarine Force.

After a sailor qualified for submarine duty, he was awarded his submarine warfare insignia, which represented the submainer’s ability to contribute to a submarine crew. The insignia, commonly referred to as ‘dolphins’ or ‘fish,’ symbolized the submariner’s personal accomplishment, but more importantly to many WWII submariners, it also announced his belonging to the submarine collective. As with most WWII submariners, the insignia was more than a patch or pin to Herbert L. Starmer, the pharmacist’s mate on

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33 As previously noted, not every submariner attended submarine school, but the vast majority (with the exception of stewards) did. Although officers and enlisted men attended different training programs, both schools were located in Groton, CT. The common perception amongst submariners was that enlisted men and officers on submarines had the same qualification process, which they collectively believed differentiated them from other members of the U.S. Navy.
the *USS Cobia*, who admitted: “I wanted those dolphins.” Admiral Corwin Mendenhall, a submarine officer during WWII, believes, “it took a special kind of sailor to wear the dolphins insignia that signified ‘qualified in submarines’ – and those who did took particular pride in doing so.” Post-WWII submariner and historian, Stephen Leal Jackson argues the submarine insignia was important to WWII submariners because “that little embroidered patch [submarine insignia]... told the world, ‘This is a submarine sailor.’” The dolphins held such a high symbolic value to submariners because they were visual evidence of their individual achievement. Perhaps more importantly, however, the dolphins were also a form of ‘oppositional capital,’ because the insignia allowed submariners to distinguish themselves from sailors in the general service even when wearing official navy uniforms.

Along with symbolizing an individual’s sense of belonging to the submarine

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34 Starmer, *WWII Submarine Doc*, 44. In 1923, the navy designed the submarine warfare insignia for submariners to wear when actively attached on a submarine, but not while the submariner was rotated to a shore command. In 1941, the policy changed to allow any submariner who was ‘qualified’ to wear his dolphins in uniform. The insignia is the bow of a submarine flanked by two ‘dolphins,’ which are actually mahi-mahi, because they were attendants of Poseidon, god of the sea, in Greek mythology; therefore, although submariners referred to the dolphins in the plural form, even when discussing an individual insignia. During WWII, the navy regulations stated that enlisted submariners were to sew a cloth insignia on their right sleeve, while officers wore a bronze, gold plated metal pin above their right breast pocket. For more information on the submarine warfare insignia see: “History of The Submariner's Dolphins,” Commander Submarine Forces, U.S. Navy, accessed April 12, 2015, [http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/hq/Pages/Dolphins.aspx](http://www.public.navy.mil/subfor/hq/Pages/Dolphins.aspx). After WWII, the fraternity informally referred to itself as the “Brotherhood of the ‘Phin.” The submariners calling the group a ‘brotherhood’ suggests they feel a kinship with other members of the in-group. ‘Phin is short for dolphins, referring to the submarine warfare insignia, which reveals the symbolic importance of the insignia. Although it is unknown when the term became popular amongst submariners, but it probably did not exist during WWII. It is, however, likely the in-group’s membership shared a similar familial relationship with one another and the dolphins’ symbolic value was probably equally significant. The dolphins should not be confused with the Submarine Combat Patrol Pin, which the navy awarded submariners after the completion of their first war patrol, because the Submarine Combat Patrol Pin was considered a ‘secondary insignia.’ Skurat, “The WWII Diesel Boat Era,” 9.

35 Mendenhall, *Submarine Diary*, xv.


collective, the submarine warfare insignia also represented that the member earned the trust of his fellow submariners. Shipmates on a submarine had to trust each other with their lives, but the trust extended beyond the hull of his submarine, because the Submarine Force had a high esprit de corps, or loyalty to and pride in the reputation of a group beyond the membership the individual sees every day. According to WWII submariner George Grider, “the very nature of the Submarine Service produced an intimacy, an esprit de corps, and a spirit of romantic adventure unmatched by the other branches.” Similarly, the captain of the USS Halibut (SS-232), Ignatius J. Galantin, argued, “the smaller individual ships, the smaller total force, and the interdependence of every man in the crew, officer and enlisted man alike, have, since the navy’s acceptance of its first submarine in 1900, led to a force with a special esprit de corps.” Although submariners took pride in the Submarine Force’s accomplishments and trusted one another, their loyalty and trust rarely extended beyond the boundaries of the in-group membership.

The Submarine Force’s separation from the rest of the fleet further limited the cultural sharing between individuals who shared the collective submarine identity and outsiders. Discussing his father’s service on submarines during WWII, Senator John McCain III recognizes the Submarine Force’s distance from outsiders and states, “the submarine service was a small component of the Navy and even more insular than the

38Manning, “Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry,” 5-11.
39Grider served on three submarines during WWII, including two patrols as the captain of the USS Flasher (SS-249). After the war, he served as captain of the USS Cubera (SS-347), and later became a U.S. Representative from Tennessee. Grider and Sims, War Fish, 9-10.
40Galantin, Take Her Deep, 7.
41 According to sociologists Miles Hewstone, Mark Rubin, and Hazel Willis, “[t]rust is extended to fellow in-group, but not out-group, members… based on group living as a fundamental survival strategy.” Miles Hewstone, Mark Rubin, and Hazel Willis, “Intergroup Bias,” Annual Review Psychology 53 (2002): 578.
Navy at large.” Submariners on patrol obviously had little to no communication with individuals outside the boat, but submarine sailors were also isolated from the general service while in port because surface and aviation naval units generally operated from bases separate from those of submarines. Submariners viewed their service as superior to others and, as members of the Silent Service, were consistently reminded of the potentially fatal consequences of sharing with outsiders. The members of the Submarine Force’s collective involvement in multiple disputes throughout the war amplified the submariners’ senses of unity, exclusivity, and self-reliance.

One reason members of the Submarine Force perceived themselves as a separate group and did not trust the rest of the navy was the submariners’ fear that U.S. and Allied ships and aircrafts may try to sink their submarines. During WWII, U.S. submarines often operated individually and only maintained limited contact with other naval units. The evidence suggests U.S. pilots struggled to identify and distinguish friendly submarines from Japanese submarines, which led to numerous ‘friendly fire’ incidents. As the war progressed and technology advanced, submarines gained radio equipment, but throughout the war, the radios only worked when the boat was on the surface where the submarine was most vulnerable to attacks from the air; therefore, U.S. submariners were unable to identify themselves as friendly when depth charged by U.S. surface vessels. In his article about submariners preparing to fight in the Pacific, Allen Raymond, a Washington Post journalist during WWII, claims submariners shared a story about a land-based patrol plane that accidently bombed a U.S. submarine. Raymond claims the submariners laughed and

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42 Senator McCain’s father, John S. “Jack” McCain Jr. was a submarine captain during WWII and became an admiral during the Cold War. John McCain and Mark Salter, Faith of my Fathers (New York: Random House, 1999), 66.
joked when they told him that the submarine captain supposedly “radioed the incident back to the base with the comment, ‘Close but no cigars.’”

The records indicate forty-eight separate incidents of friendly fire against U.S. submarines, including one confirmed submarine destroyed, USS Seawolf, which resulted in the death of all eighty-three men onboard. Due to their independent patrols and the majority of submarines being ‘lost with all hands,’ it is possible that other U.S. submarines were also lost in friendly fire incidents. For example, a pilot with incorrect instructions, “delivered a surprise attack of three depth charges on an unidentified submarine,” which is widely believed to have been the USS Dorado (SS-248); however, the Court of Inquiry was “unable to reach definite conclusions as to the cause of the loss of Dorado,” due to a lack of evidence. Whether or not the loss of the Dorado was the result of friendly fire, submariners understood that ‘friendly’ surface ships and aircraft posed real threats.

Friendly surface vessels also bombed U.S. submarines while the submarines were performing lifeguarding duties. In an interview with the Veterans History Project, Jack Blank of the USS Gabilan (SS-252) shared his memory of saving a pilot who “ditched” in Tokyo Bay after the navy ordered his submarine to leave the area. According to Blank, the submarine’s captain spotted the downed pilot and refused to leave the airman to die.

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44 The majority of submarines lost during WWII were “lost with all hands,” meaning everyone onboard died. Presumably, the submariners understood that any individual’s mistake could lead to the entire crew’s death; therefore, it is likely, trust onboard was paramount and submariners shared a sense of kinship, because they recognized they could potentially die together.
45 Of the forty-eight friendly fire incidents, the only record of a U.S. submarine firing at another U.S. submarine was the USS Lapon (SS-260) shooting at the USS Raton (SS-270). At the time, both of the submarines’ commanding officers assumed the other was a Japanese submarine. “United States Submarine Losses: World War II,” Naval History Division, NAV PERS 15,784, Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963, accessed November 4, 2015, http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/SubLosses/SS_losses-dorado.html.
Blank claims the *Gabilan* was unable to exit the area by the time the navy instructed, because his submarine was concerned with rescuing the pilot. Blank discussed the consequences of his submarine remaining in the area when the U.S. surface fleet arrived and stated: “so then they started shelling us. And they depth charged us for eight hours--they--they thought we were Japanese submarines.”

Friendly fire from aircrafts became such a major concern for the Submarine Force that Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, as Commander, Submarines, Southwest Pacific, ordered that planes were forbidden to bomb “any submarine in West Australian waters not positively identified as enemy.” Later in the war, the restriction applied to most of the Pacific, but the evidence suggests army and navy airmen did not always follow the order. For example, an Army B-24 Liberator attacked the *USS Spearfish* (SS-190) while the submarine transited through a zone with bombing restrictions. In his patrol log, the CO of the *Spearfish*, Cyrus C. Cole, wrote that his radio picked up a conversation from the Army pilot:

“Look, a ship down there about four miles.”
“No, I think it's a submarine at two miles.”
“Well, let's bomb the bastard anyway. Here we go, and use your rockets.”

In his log, Cole also wrote that the pilot who missed *Spearfish* by seven hundred yards needed “practice as well as briefing.”

Many of the friendly fire incidents occurred during the final years of the war, when the Submarine Force coordinated with other military units and assigned submarines to rescue pilots who ejected over the ocean, or ‘lifeguard college.’ For example, according

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46 Blank, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
47 Lockwood, *Sink 'Em All*, 47-48.
to the CO of the *USS Mingo* (SS-261), John R. Madison, after attempting to contact the “high flying Liberator bomber,” the U.S. Army aircraft “dropped 100 lb. bomb that landed 100 yards” from the submarine.\(^{50}\) According to Madison, the Liberator pilot only attempted to establish contact with the *Mingo* after the attack. In the war patrol log, Madison wrote: “Informed plane of success in picking up sixteen *zoomies*. Our last message to him: ‘Please go home and take your bombs with you.’”\(^{51}\) The only information the submarine CO needed to relay to the pilot was that his submarine was friendly; however, it appears Madison, presumably angry about the close call, felt that the army pilot ought to show the *Mingo* gratitude for assisting his fellow airmen, rather attacking the submarine. Similar to Cole of the *USS Spearfish*, Madison’s inclusion of the unrequired details in the patrol log suggest the he wanted his superiors to know that the pilots did not understand or respect the safety of submariners.

Admiral Charles A. Lockwood understood the submariners’ concerns regarding friendly fire and claimed the U.S. military should not attack unidentified submarines because the risk of bombing a U.S. submarine was not worth the potential reward of potentially sinking a Japanese boat. Lockwood stated that he “preferred the fly-fly boys… pass up a hundred chances to attack what, perhaps might be enemy submarines,

\(^{50}\) During the final years of the Pacific war, when Japanese shipping targets became scarce, Admiral Lockwood agreed to send submarines assist the commander of the carrier task force. Admiral Charles A. Pownall, to take part in ‘lifeguarding’ duties. In order to rescue the pilots and protect submarines, a series of secret reference points and areas with bombing restrictions was established between the carrier group and local submarines. The lack of communication and planning between the shore commands of the bomber units and the submarines was more problematic, until Lockwood suggested Standard Operating Procedure Number Two, which “laid down all the rules for lifeguarding” and “specified universal radio frequencies for all air-sea rescue communications” on October 28, 1944. For more information about lifeguarding duties: Roscoe, *United States Submarine Operations in World War II*, 470-496.

rather than dash in precipitately and sink one of our own.” Submariners had to constantly be on alert for air contacts, especially while surfaced, because ‘enemy’ planes were not the only threat to submarines. Paul R. Schratz’s description of a ‘friendly’ merchantman that shot at his submarine, *USS Scorpion* (SS-278), summarizes the collective submarine identity’s recognition of the friendly fire threat. According to Schratz, the incident was “one more warning that once a submarine leaves the pier, it has no friends and many enemies.” While on patrol, submariners usually operated as lone hunter-killers or with other submarines in a wolfpack. Members of the Submarine Force’s distrust and fear of outsiders was quite literally a matter of life or death to the submariners, because they perceived all other vessels and military aircraft, whether ‘friend’ or foe, as potentially life-threatening.

The most well known scandal that served to cement submariners’ sense of self-reliance and distrust of outsiders was a series of problems and resolutions associated with torpedoes during WWII. Bureau of Ordnance (BuOrd) was the organizational authority in charge of developing, acquiring, and storing naval weapons for the Department of the Navy and bureau was also responsible for fitting the Submarine Force with torpedoes. During the first years of the war, submarine captains complained to their superiors, such as Admiral Lockwood, that the torpedoes were not functioning properly. Lockwood informed BuOrd of the submariners’ concerns, but the scientists and officers in the bureau denied any faults in the torpedoes.

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52 Lockwood, *Sink ‘Em All*, 48.
53 Schratz, *Submarine Commander*, 51.
54 At the beginning of the war, BuOrd fit the older S-boats submarines with Mark VIII and Mark X torpedoes, which used contact exploders and loaded newer fleet-boats with Mark XIV torpedoes that contained secret magnetic exploder. Rather than hit the ship, the proximity detonator on the Mark-XIV was designed to explode beneath the target’s hull, because new ships had greater armor to protect from direct hits. For more information about submarine torpedoes during WWII see: Robert Gannon, *Hellions of the*
While in command of Southwest Pacific submarines, Lockwood met with every submarine CO as soon as the boat returned from patrol and found that many of the commanders were frustrated with the performance of their torpedoes. For example, when Lockwood met with Dudley W. “Mush” Morton of the *USS Wahoo* (SS-238), the Admiral noted that the officers onboard looked tired and “mighty glum.” According to Lockwood, Morton shouted: “Damn them Admiral…damn the torpedoes sir!” and explained that the faulty torpedoes affected morale, arguing that *Wahoo*’s crew felt “naked” without its “clean sweep broom.” Morton also voiced his concerns about the safety of the submarine and begged the Admiral, “please, please load me up with torpedoes that will explode when they should.” Mush Morton’s was not the only submarine captain who complained to Lockwood about issues with the torpedoes. In the early stages of the war, *S-boat* COs claimed the torpedoes ran too deep to strike target’s hull and the *fleet-type* submarines’ COs argued the torpedoes ran so far beneath the target that the exploder was unable to recognize the magnetic field of the target.

BuOrd’s disbelief and lack of solutions reminded submariners that they should turn inside to members of the Submarine Force for help, rather than trusting outsiders to resolve issues pertaining to submarines. Lockwood claimed that he relayed the submariners’ concerns to the Bureau of Ordnance, but the BuOrd leadership blamed the

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56 The *USS Wahoo*, captained by Mush Morton, was a famously aggressive and successful submarine. During WWII, submarines often returned from a successful patrol with a broom on attached to the periscope in order to symbolize ‘sweeping the Pacific of Japanese shipping.’ Lockwood and Adamson, *Hellcats of the Sea*, 11-12.

57 Lockwood and Adamson, *Hellcats of the Sea*, 12.

submarine captains for making alibies for missing the targets. Lockwood and his staff were frustrated with the bureaucracy and concerned with the morale and safety of the submarine crews; therefore, according to Lockwood, the Submarine Force decided to “do a little torpedo testing of our own.”

To test the torpedoes’ depth, Lockwood purchased about five hundred feet of netting from a local fisherman, stretched it across a bay in Southwest Australia, and ordered James W. Coe, the CO of the USS Skipjack (SS-184), to fire a series torpedoes loaded with exercise heads into the net. Then, Lockwood raised the net and logged the results. The first two torpedoes were set to a depth of ten feet, but broke through the net at twenty-five and eighteen feet respectively. The third torpedo was set at zero feet, but also cut through the net at eighteen feet. According to historian Robert Gannon, the admiral and his staff took “various factors into account and calculated that the torpedo ran 11ft deep.”

<table>
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<th>TORPEDO DEPTH SETTING</th>
<th>ACTUAL TORPEDO DEPTH</th>
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<td>850yds</td>
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<td>25ft</td>
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<tr>
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<td>700yds</td>
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<tr>
<td>6/21/1942</td>
<td>700yds</td>
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The admiral submitted the results to BuOrd, but Lockwood claims the bureau “questioned our procedure in making these tests – also the accuracy of our data.” After Lockwood ran a second set of experiments that produced similar results, BuOrd conducted its own tests and found the torpedoes ran ten feet too deep. Once BuOrd

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59 Lockwood, *Sink ‘Em All*, 21.
60 Lockwood, *Sink ‘Em All*, 21.
62 Table created by author with information gathered from: Gannon, *Hellions of the Deep*.
63 Lockwood, *Sink ‘Em All*, 21.
addressed and resolved the problems with the torpedoes’ depths and submariners recalibrated their torpedoes, the submarine captains complained of an increase in premature explosions in the Mark XIV torpedoes. In an attempt to resolve the issues, Lockwood met with his superior, and a fellow submariner, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet, to recommend the deactivation of the magnetic feature in the torpedoes’ exploders. Nimitz agreed and the premature explosions decreased; however, submariners complained that many of the torpedoes were duds. After running tests in Pearl Harbor, Lockwood found that if the Mark XIV’s backup contact exploder struck the target at a nine degree angle or greater, the torpedo would not explode. Gannon argues that after submarines were finally loaded with “effective Mark-14 torpedoes” in the spring of 1944, “the kill rate soared.”

The struggles between the Submarine Force and BuOrd over torpedoes sank the morale of many submariners, because it made their service more dangerous and hindered their ability to sink Japanese shipping. Although the men on the submarines were obviously aware of the numerous issues with their torpedoes, they were probably not privy to the details; however, probably through scuttlebutt and hearsay, the members of the Submarine Force blamed BuOrd for placing the lives of submariners at an unnecessary risk by either not equipping them with the necessary equipment. The men believed they were suffering because the Bureau either ignored their complaints or attempted to cover up its own errors. The issues with torpedoes led many submariners to

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64The torpedoes also made ‘circular runs,’ which meant the Mark XIV stopped tracking its target and boomeranged back at the submarine that fired the torpedo. Although considered rare, the Submarine Force lost at least two boats, USS Tang (SS-306) and USS Tullibee (SS-284), due to circular runs during WWII. Gannon, Hellions of the Deep, 88-93; Lockwood, Sink ‘Em All, 20, 103-104; Stanley Sandler, World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia, (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001), 980.
believe they could only trust other members of the Submarine Force.\textsuperscript{65} The depiction of the torpedo tests by members of the Submarine Force reveals the submariners’ pride in their perception of the collective’s self-reliance, because, according to Lockwood, the test results “brought a wave of confidence because we believed the trouble had been located and we had the satisfaction that we found it all on our own.”\textsuperscript{66}

Bill Grieves, a torpedoman who served on the \textit{USS Thresher} (SS-200), describes his understanding of the torpedo issue: “the skippers were furious and complained vociferously but the armchair admirals” claimed the problem was that the submarine captains were too “trigger happy.”\textsuperscript{67} Rather than joining the other admirals, Grieves proudly argues, “our good old Admiral ‘Uncle Charlie’ Lockwood sided with the skippers.”\textsuperscript{68} Grieves claims the problems were caused by the “bureaucracy back here in the States,” but, according to Grieves, “it was our ‘Uncle Charlie’ Lockwood who found the solution.”\textsuperscript{69} The antagonists of Grieves’s story are ‘armchair admirals’ and bureaucrats, who ignored submarine captains, rather than solving the problems. Whether these outsiders were stubborn, arrogant, or incompetent, Grieves portrays them as high-ranking officials who put their own personal interests above the submariners’ safety and overall war effort. In contrast, the protagonist, Admiral Charles A. Lockwood, or ‘Uncle Charlie’ Lockwood, was the hero. In Grieves’s version of the story, Lockwood distinguished himself from the admirals by trusting the lower-ranked submarine captains over the BuOrd and defending the submariners from the antagonists by defeated the self-

\textsuperscript{65} Gannon, \textit{Hellions of the Deep}, 252.
\textsuperscript{66} Lockwood, \textit{Sink ‘Em All}, 20.
\textsuperscript{67} Grieves, The Digital Collections of the National WWII Museum.
\textsuperscript{68} “Uncle Charlie” was a popular nickname for Charles Lockwood amongst WWII submariners. Grieves, The Digital Collections of the National WWII Museum.

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serving bureaucrats and admirals in Washington. Grieves’s interpretation is an example of a way in which submariners legitimized their distrust of outsiders, including other members of the U.S. Navy. His story also serves as an example of the collective submarine identity’s perception that the Submarine Force was a misunderstood and disrespected service that was threatened by outsiders and relied on its own membership for protection.

One of the common themes in the submariners’ sea stories was that members of the Submarine Force had to fight for resources and respect. The sea stories usually involved a submariner, or hero, standing up to the general service, admiral, or politician who did not understand the experiences, concerns, and needs of submarining. Although most sea stories were a form of cultural sharing that highlighted boundaries between the in-group and out-group and contained a moral that was consistent with the submarine collective’s values, not every story was serious or about a life-threatening subject. For example, one famous sea story was about toilet paper.

According to Lockwood, Lieutenant Commander J.W. “Jim” Coe, the CO of the USS Skipjack(SS-184), “submitted a number of requisitions for supplies, among them one for a case of toilet paper, which was returned, stamped ‘Item cannot be identified.’”70 Lockwood suggests that Coe’s “two-page letter which he wrote to the Supply Officer more clearly identified the item is a classic which will live long in submarine in the annals.”71 In response to the Bureau of Ships’ inability to identify the toilet paper requested, Coe submitted an invoice stating: “cannot help but wonder what is being used in Mare Island in place of this unidentifiable material, once well known to this

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70 Lockwood, Sink ‘Em All, 24.
71 Lockwood, Sink ‘Em All, 24.
command.” 72 Coe included a “sample of the desired material provided for the information of the Supply Officer, Navy Yard, Mare Island” with the invoice. 73 Coe’s invoice also claims that due to the lack of toilet paper, the men on the USS Skipjack used “the vast amount of incoming non-essential paper work, and in so doing feel that the wish of the Bureau of Ships for the reduction of paper work is being complied with, thus effectively killing two birds with one stone.” 74

According to WWII Submariner, Ron Martini, Coe “wrote his famous ‘toilet paper’ letter to the Mare Island Supply Office.” Martini claims that he heard from a member of the Mare Island office “that all officers in the Supply Department” had to stand at attention for three days because of that letter. According to Martini, be the time he heard of the incident “the letter had been copied and was spreading throughout the fleet and even to the President’s son who was aboard the USS Wasp.” 75 Martini states that when “the boat came in from her next patrol, Jim and crew saw toilet-paper streamers blowing from the lights along the pier and pyramids of toilet paper stacked seven feet high on the dock.” 76 According to legend, a band greeted the Cisco when they returned to port and the “band members wore toilet paper neckties in place of their Navy neckerchiefs” and

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73 Coe, invoice to Supply Officer, Navy Yard, Mare Island, California. “SO NYMI Canceled invoice No. 272836.”

74 According to Martini, a copy of the original invoice is available on his website dedicated to submariners, but the document’s authenticity cannot be verified. The story was also referenced in the 1959 film Operation Petticoat. Coe, invoice to Supply Officer, Navy Yard, Mare Island, California. “SO NYMI Canceled invoice No. 272836”; Martini, “The Infamous Toilet Paper Letter.”

75 The USS Wasp (CV-7) was an aircraft carrier. Martini, “The Infamous Toilet Paper Letter.”

76 Martini, “The Infamous Toilet Paper Letter.”
“[t]he wind-section had toilet paper pushed up inside their instruments and when they blew, white streamers unfurled from trumpets and horns.”

Coe’s invoice became a legendary tale for multiple reasons. The submariners shared the story because it was funny, but it also reflected multiple values of the collective identity. For example, the invoice was humorous because it sarcastically implied the supply office rejected a submarine’s request for toilet paper, because the personnel who worked at the supply office had never heard of toilet paper. By sharing the story, submariners not only reminded each other that outsiders were not very intelligent, but also that submariners could not depend on members of the out-group for something as simple as a daily necessity. The invoice also confirmed the submariners’ belief that the Submarine Force was different from general service, because the perception of boring and monotonous military paperwork was starkly contrasted by Coe’s sarcastic tone. Coe’s unapologetic insubordination to the naval protocol climaxed when he suggested the supply office was too concerned with paperwork and that submariners should use the office’s documents as a substitute for the original material requested. The stories about the Skipjack receiving toilet paper after it returned to port and the supply office personnel’s punishment proved to the submariners that Coe’s guile defeated the out-group and his disregard for traditional naval protocol was justified because it produced a favorable result.

Submariners also distrusted and distanced themselves from outsiders because their vessels’ equipment and tasking were classified. Submarines were independent and secretive boats. The equipment onboard was secretive and submarine operations depended on stealth. The secret technology, if leaked, could have potentially allowed the

\[\text{Martini, “The Infamous Toilet Paper Letter.”}\]
enemy to advance their own submarine service or develop new antisubmarine weapons and tactics to detect and destroy U.S. submarines. Admiral Nimitz wrote that there was “almost complete blackout of information relating to submarines,” because “information, if publicized, could be valuable to the enemy and — what is more important — very dangerous to our submarines operating unsupported in enemy waters.” The success of submarine’s patrol and safety of its crew relied on the boat’s ability to remain undetected by their targets, enemy ships, and aircraft. During WWII, members of the ‘Silent Service’ were consistently reminded of the dangers associated with discussing submarine tactics, equipment, or capabilities with outsiders.

After the war, Admiral Lockwood argued that the press was a constant concern because he believed the enemy was able to benefit from any facts about submarines. According to Lockwood, during the war, he recommended “a press release to the effect that the Navy Department was deeply concerned about its submarine losses” in order to fool the enemy. Lockwood suggested that if the Japanese falsely believed that “every time he [Japanese] dropped a depth charge, another American submarine went to Davy Jones locker,” the enemy would have lacked the incentive to improve their antisubmarine measures. Admiral Lockwood understood that the Navy Department published details from the Pacific for morale, but suggested, “we of the submarines wanted no part of this,”

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78 While the U.S. Submarine Force struggled understanding why Mark-XIV torpedoes with the secret magnetic exploders consistently missed their targets, the scuttlebutt on the submarines, which proved inaccurate, was that the Japanese developed a new technology that disrupted the enemy ships’ magnetic field. According to Gannon, it was common practice for submarine torpedomen and commanding officers to discretely disobey naval orders and procedures by turning off the magnetic exploders before firing the torpedoes. Robert Gannon, *Hellions of the Deep: The Development of American Torpedoes in WWII* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 70-76.


80 Lockwood, *Sink ’Em All*, 43.

81 Lockwood, *Sink ’Em All*, 43.
and that submariners “would have preferred to publish nothing at all, not even the score of enemy ships sunk by each returning submarine.”

Although Lockwood’s statement was probably not consistent with most of the submariners at the time, his use of the inclusive pronoun “we” suggests that he perceived himself as belonging to the submarine collective with priorities and goals that were differed from the general service.

The Submarine Force’s leadership, from the admirals to the officers and chiefs serving on the boats, emphasized secrecy and consistently reminded submariners of the dangerous implications of disclosing information to outsiders. In 1943, Navy-accredited correspondents Gerold Frank and James Horan recognized submariners’ uneasiness with talking to the press when they met Joseph Eckberg, a chief radioman, in New London while working on a story about submarine training. The correspondents claimed Eckberg “wasn’t one to talk.” When they asked him about his submarine, Eckberg “hemmed and hawed and looked uncomfortable,” before agreeing to speak with the correspondents if the navy granted them proper security clearance. After obtaining clearance in Washington, Frank and Horan followed up with Eckberg and eventually published a book about his submarine, the USS Seawolf (SS-197), based on their interviews. Eckberg’s initial resistance and insistence that the pair gain permission, however, reveals his fear of discussing matters related to submarines with outsiders.

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82 Lockwood, Sink ‘Em All, 43.
83 The majority of submariners probably would have disagreed with Lockwood’s suggestion that the boat’s score should not be published, because the battle flags suggest the crews were proud of their ship’s accomplishments. Many submariners even painted the sail to boast the number of targets destroyed and damaged by the submarine on patrol; however, submariners understood that speaking to outsiders about the submarine operations, technology, and capabilities was unacceptable.
84 It is worth noting that the correspondents originally approached Eckberg at a train station because they recognized he was a submariner because he was wearing his dolphins. Gerold Frank, James Horan, and Joseph Eckberg, U.S.S. Seawolf: Submarine Raider of the Pacific (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1945), ix.
85 Frank, Horan, and Eckberg: U.S.S. Seawolf, ix.
Eckberg was uncomfortable speaking with the journalists because the officers on his submarine consistently reminded him to distrust outsiders. For example, when Eckberg arrived in Australia after a patrol on the *Seawolf*, his CO, Frederick B. Warder, cautioned the crew: “When you get ashore, don’t discuss any of our operations with anyone, even with your own shipmates. Leave the *Seawolf* tied down here. Don’t drag her down into the city.”

Months later, Eckberg’s XO, William Nolin Deragon, echoed a similar warning in Pearl Harbor: “what we have done on this last patrol and where we have been is no one’s business but our own.”

The infamous ‘May Incident’ was another episode that legitimized the collective submarine identity’s distrust of others and reminded submariners of the dangers associated with speaking to outsiders. According to journalist and historian Clay Blair, the May Incident proved the submariners were justifiably concerned that the enemy could take advantage of leaked information in order to improve antisubmarine tactics and destroy more submarines. In his 1975 book, which is widely referred to as “the definitive account of American submarine operations in the Pacific during World War II,” Blair argues the incident after occurred Congressmain Andrew Jackson May returned from a tour U.S. military facilities in the Pacific in June 1943.

During his tour, May was briefed about the strengths and weaknesses of the Submarine Force’s campaign, including that the U.S. submarines were able to launch torpedoes from a close range with little risk, because the Japanese depth charges were set to explode above the depth in which the

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submarines operated. At a press conference following his tour, Congressman May credited the Japanese depth charges’ shallow fusing for the Submarine Force’s success. Afterward, various sources printed the leak. According to Blair, Admiral Lockwood, upon learning of the leak, furiously wrote Admiral Edwards, “I hear… Congressman May…said the Jap depth charges…are not set deep enough…. He would be pleased to know the Japs set’em [sic] deeper now.” After the war, Blair claimed that Lockwood also wrote, “I consider that indiscretion cost us ten submarines and 800 officers and men.”

Although many submariners and historians cite Blair and the May Incident when discussing operations security, the evidence suggests there are reasons to be skeptical of Blair’s claims. For example, in 1951, Lockwood wrote that he heard about a public official who “boasted in a press release that American submarines did not fear Japanese destroyers because their depth charges were neither heavy enough to damage them nor set deep enough to reach them,” which suggest Lockwood was aware of the potential leak during the war. It appears that by at least 1951, twenty-four years before Clay Blair’s work, Lockwood questioned the validity of the hearsay, and stated, “whether or not this

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89 Blair, Silent Victory, 397.
90 Blair, Silent Victory, 397.
92 Lockwood, Sink ‘Em All, 38.
rumor was founded on fact, it is true that in the autumn of 1942 the Japanese radically increased the setting of their depth charges.”\(^{93}\) It is also worth noting that Admiral Lockwood’s claim that the Japanese adjusted their antisubmarine tactics in 1942 does not match the timeline of Blair’s argument that Congressman May leaked the information in 1943.

As a WWII submariner himself, on the *USS Guardfish*(SS-217), Blair’s 1975 version of the events was perhaps based on the same rumor that Lockwood heard, because the evidence suggests that submariners throughout the fleet were aware of this scuttlebutt during the war. Stephen. H. Gimber, the CO of the *USS Pompon* (SS-267), expressed his concern with the crew leaking information by referencing the May Incident in his 1944 Ship’s Orders:

> The most common mistake is to reveal information to a person who is unaware of its possible value to the enemy…. Joe on a cruiser is interested in what you did and where you went on your last patrol. But he doesn’t give a hoot who knows it and it’s a good story for him to pass along. Let it suffice that exact knowledge of the operating depth of our submarines carelessly disclosed resulted in bigger and better depth charges for the Japs.\(^{94}\)

Whether Blair’s claim is accurate, exaggerated, or completely fabricated, Gimber’s inclusion of similar details in his Ship’s Orders suggests submariners were aware of the rumor and believed the Japanese destroyed more submarines as a result of May’s leak. Throughout their service, submariners were continuously reminded not to trust outsiders, including government officials, because the sharing of information had already proven to have fatal consequences. According to Lockwood, “submariners, I feel sure, were fully

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\(^{93}\) Lockwood, *Sink ‘Em All*, 39.

convinced that they must become ‘the Silent Service,’ but we were never successful in stopping the leaks.”

Members of the Submarine Force shared a negative perception of the rest of the navy and claimed naval officials did not give submariners the resources they needed or deserved, but the submariners also recognized that naval leadership granted submarine volunteers unique privileges. Although the figures vary, the U.S. Submarine Force was considered by all accounts to have been exceptionally successful and extremely dangerous, but submarine duty remained voluntary throughout the war, and according to a 1942 article about the submarine school in LIFE Magazine, “[t]he students are all volunteers and there is always a waiting list. For submarine service is a coveted duty, given only to men who are suited to its hardships.” It appears the U.S. Navy believed recruiting and retaining submarine volunteers was a priority due to the Submarine Force’s success in the Pacific. The time-consuming training and qualification process also made experienced, qualified submariners difficult to replace without lowering the Submarine Force’s standards. The poor living conditions onboard submarines and the force’s high fatality-rate may have deterred some sailors from volunteering for submarine duty; however, Leal Jackson claims, although the navy did not institute conscription until the end of 1942, the “Submarine Service never had any difficulty in acquiring qualified volunteers.”

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95 Lockwood, Sink ’Em All, 39.
96 During WWII, U.S. navy contractors such as Electric Boat built over two hundred submarines. For more about submarine construction during WWII see: Weir, Forged in War.
98 Jackson, The Men, 1.
Although the navy attempted to incentivize submarine duty as early as 1905, the success of submarines during the war, the standards of the service, mortality-rate, and the poor living conditions onboard led to the navy granting submariners one and one-half times the wages of surface sailors of the same rank during WWII. It is likely the submariners perceived the higher wages as further evidence that they were better than other sailors in the navy. The increased pay for submariners was not unique to the United States. Edward Young, a British submariner during WWII, stated that he once heard a submarine captain snap at a young officer who referred to the extra pay as “danger pay.”

According to Young, the captain exclaimed, “Danger?... Danger! What you get paid for, my boy, is skill and responsibility. What the hell do you mean, danger?” Similarly, in the U.S., it is likely the navy increased pay to provide an incentive for individuals to volunteer for submarine duty, but it may have also served as evidence to the submariners that they had greater skills and responsibilities than members of the general service. WWII submariners Jack Blank and Joseph Benedict Coulter Jr. suggest the higher wages led to other privileges in Australia. According to Blank, Australian women looked for submariners because “the girls knew” submarine sailors “get extra money.”

Coulter claimed Australian taxi drivers would drive by American servicemen looking for dolphins on the military uniforms and “when he saw that patch, he would stop,” because the drivers knew submariners had more money than other sailors.

Earning higher wages and gaining greater privileges than the rest of the navy proved to the submariners that the naval leadership not only recognized the distinction

100 Young, *Undersea Patrol*, vii.
101 Blank, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
102 Coulter, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
between the Submarine Force and the general service, but also that ‘submariners’ were superior to ‘sailors.’ For example, the navy also leased “the nationally famous” Royal Hawaiian Hotel in Hawaii and converted into a rest camp for submariners during the war.103 Surface ships had enough bunks for the crew, but a submarine did not have enough space to berth the entire crew at the same time; therefore, sailors in the general service were required to report back on their ship by midnight, but submariners did not have curfews and were granted up to a month of shore liberty after each patrol.104

As the example above demonstrates, the perks of submarine duty were not always designed as incentives for members of the Submarine Force. Yet submariners such as Jack Blank still believed it was proof that the navy was trying to provide submariners greater privileges. According to political scientist Leonie Huddy, “ingroup members tend to elevate the importance of positive ingroup characteristics that confer superiority over an outgroup in defining their group.”105 In other words, members of the submarine collective justified their perception that they were superior to the general service by placing a greater positive value on traits and privileges that distinguished submariners from and other naval personnel. Blank claims, “when we were in Pearl Harbor why the submarine sailors got to stay out all night. We were privileged. I mean, they really looked after us…. They were really, really good to us. But the [sailors on] other ships had to be back in at midnight.”106 Blank not only uses the inclusive ‘we’ when discussing the

104 Some submariners claimed that they got longer liberty than sailors on surface ships because submariners’ work was more strenuous and difficult. Although this may be true, there is no evidence from naval planners that suggest their motive for granting submariners longer liberty than sailors on surface ship. It is, however, important to note the submariners’ portrayal of themselves as deserving of more time off and the surface sailors as less productive or lazy. Knoblock, Black Submariners, 42-43.
105 Huddy, “Contrasting Theoretical Approaches to Intergroup Relations,” 956.
106 Blank, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
submarine collective, but he also portrays the submariners as rich and the general service as poor by contrasting the privileges awarded to the in-group and out-group.

A submarine did not have the amenities of a surface ship in the navy, but submariners boasted about the few advantages they had over members the general service. During WWII, the navy recognized that a crew with good morale would be more willing to fight and less likely to surrender; therefore, the navy made “[e]very effort… to build into… submarines the maximum in comfort, for the sake of the men’s morale”\textsuperscript{107} As the war progressed, the navy equipped submarines with air-conditioning, a movie projector, and ice cream. According to the authors of a 1947 naval study that examined health onboard WWII submarines, the berthing space on the newer submarines was “much better than even some of our largest battleships.”\textsuperscript{108} The benefit that submariners notoriously boasted about most was having the “the best food in the navy.”\textsuperscript{109}

According to Alberto Melucci, a former professor of Sociology of Cultural Processes at the University of Milan, a collective’s membership needs to “distinguish itself from others,” but adds that, to some degree, the ‘others’ must also recognize the

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\textsuperscript{107} Raymond, “Submarine Crews Are Cocky and Confident,” 4. Morale and \textit{esprit de corps} are similar and their meanings overlap in some works because scholarship lacks concise definitions of both terms. For the purposes of this paper the primary difference is the number of people who share the morale and \textit{esprit}: each submarine has its own morale (face-to-face level), whereas the Submarine Force as a whole has an \textit{esprit de corps}. Manning refers to morale and \textit{esprit de corps} (as well as unit cohesion,) as unquantifiable “X-factors” when examining potential fighting power of military forces. Manning, “Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry”; Alexander H. Leighton, \textit{Human Relations in a Changing World: Observations on the Uses of Social Sciences} (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1949).


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The naval planners’ offering of incentives for submarine service is further proof that naval planners recognized the differences between members Submarine Force and other naval forces. It is also possible that the incentives granted to members of the Submarine Force may have also legitimized the members’ collective sense of superiority to the rest of the navy, to which submariners were introduced during their training. Members sharing the collective submarine identity showed in-group favoritism and trusted other members of the ‘in-group,’ which was symbolized by the submarine warfare insignia, but distrusted others, including other members of the navy, high-ranking naval officials, and politicians. Issues with torpedoes, friendly fire against submarines, and the May Incident -no matter how factually accurate- justified WWII submariners’ distrust of outsiders. Although communication with submariners attached to other boats was impossible underway, the navy’s rotation of submarine crews and time in port allowed submariners to spread scuttlebutt, information, ideas, and beliefs through stories. The submariners’ distrust of others led them to perceive the Submarine Force as united in-group that could not depend on members of the out-group to resolve problems related to submarines.

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111 Naval officials recognized the difference between the Submarine Force and the rest of the navy before WWII, because they offered submarine pay as an incentive for submarine service in 1905 and issued submarine warfare pins in 1923. Naval planners also distanced themselves from submarines prior to WWII.
III. SUB-DIVISION: INTRAGROUP NEGOTIATIONS

During WWII, the Submarine Force’s membership consisted of individuals who perceived themselves as collectively belonging to a unique social group and primarily identified themselves and each other as ‘submariners.’ The concept of belongingness, or the need to belong may explain individual WWII submariners’ urge to identify as members of the submarine collective. According to forensic psychologists Sayli Vichare and Bhagyashree Kulkarni, “the need to belong is an intrinsic motivation to affiliate with others and be socially accepted,” and social psychologists Roy F. Baumeister and Mark R. Leary similarly claim, the “need to belong is a fundamental human motivation” for people joining groups.\(^1\) As members of the collective, WWII submariners met their need to belong, but the boundaries of the submarine collective became irrelevant when the members of boundaries of the in-group did not have an out-group with which to contrast.

Brewer and Gardner also recognize “a fundamental ‘need to belong’ as an innate feature of human nature,” but argue further that, “collective identities are constrained by the necessity of satisfying simultaneously individual needs for inclusion and distinctiveness.”\(^2\) In other words, an individual may join a social group in order to meet his or her need for social belonging. However, in contrast to the collective’s promotion of intragroup unity, the individual must also be able to feel unique and different from others within the group. With the exception of the non-qualified personnel, who were a minority with the least amount of knowledge, experience, and power onboard, every individual

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\(^2\) Brewer and Gardner, “Who is This ‘We’?,” 83; Brewer, “The Social Self,” 475-482.
attached to a submarine on patrol was a member of the submarine collective.\(^3\) The collective submarine identity lost its value as the primary identifier, because the members of the in-group no longer had a common out-group with which to collectively distinguish themselves while underway. Therefore, submariners used other characteristics, primarily traditional naval ranks, to identify themselves and categorize each other while on patrol.

The greatest intragroup division within the submarine collective during WWII was between enlisted submariners and officers. Examining submarines while on patrol magnifies the divide along the lines of rank because the collective lacked a common out-group to contrast while at sea. The two factions had different priorities, responsibilities, and amounts of power on a submarine. Officers and enlisted men also often had different upbringings and experiences before arriving to their first submarine. Submarine officers were usually born into wealthier families than enlisted men and attended the Naval Academy for a few years or Officer Candidate School for ninety days. Prior to 1942, submarine officers were required to serve at least two years on a surface ship before volunteering for submarine duty, and all submarine officers completed three months of submarine training before receiving orders to a boat.\(^4\) According to the 1943 *Naval Officer Guide*, “officers were provided with ample power… so that they may execute their great responsibilities.”\(^5\) The majority of enlisted submariners, however, were less educated than the officers and born to parents who were working-class or farmers. Enlisted submariners, like Neil Pike, attended a thirteen-week boot camp where they

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\(^3\)Non-qualified enlisted personnel probably shared the same values as the submariners because they went through BSS and hoped to become submariners in the future. They were important in the social structure of submarines, but due to their limited value to the submarine crew and power onboard, the non-qualified personnel primarily negotiated power with qualified submariners.

\(^4\)Lockwood, *Sink 'Em All*, 392; Lauerman, East Carolina Manuscript Collection.

learned “how to stay out of trouble and salute officers,” before a few weeks at a specialty school and six weeks at BSS. Officers and enlisted submariners had different upbringings and took separate paths to the submarine service. While the 1943 Naval Officer Guide stated “all officers have certain rights and privileges,” enlisted sailors learned to show deference to their officers.

During WWII, enlisted submariners accepted officers’ formal power and many of the privileges associated with naval rank, but the men rejected other traditional naval formalities and practices. Enlisted submariners rejected traditional privileges they did not perceive as directly related to the submarine’s safety or operations, because the formalities contrasted the crewmembers’ perceptions of the submarine collective’s values, such as distinction from the general service. The negotiation of power between enlisted submariners allowed submarine officers to maintain certain benefits, such as better berthing spaces, but concede other naval traditions and privileges. Members of submarine crews had certain expectations from their officers and command, because, similar to spreading scuttlebutt and telling sea stories, the men shared their individual experiences onboard throughout the submarine fleet. For example, a submariner serving on the USS Pompon was probably aware of the power dynamics within other submarine commands, because even if he had not served on another submarine before, it is likely that he would have heard stories from some of his shipmates who had served on other boats prior to the Pompon.

Although enlisted submariners were able to negotiate power on submarines, the formal power structure on submarines was based on traditional naval rank and similar to

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6 Pike, Rutgers Oral History Archives.
7 Ageton, Naval Officer Guide, 424.
that of most military units. A submarine’s complement consisted of fewer personnel than most other naval vessels, but its official chain of command shared similarities with the rest of the navy.8 The two highest ranked officers were the captain and executive officer. The submarine also had about six additional officers. Unlike in rest of the navy, a submarine CO had the power to assign his officers to positions, such as chief engineer, gunnery officer, communications officer, and commissary officer, based on his perception of the officers’ “experience and capabilities,” rather than seniority.9 The assignment of officers by capabilities was unique to the Submarine Force and supports the argument that submarines were more self-sufficient than most of the navy, and also reveals the amount of power and influence a CO held on his boat.

Similar to the general service, the captain and his officers monopolized the formal power onboard the submarine due to their rank within the traditional naval hierarchal structure. According to Knoblock, the CO had the power to create and enforce regulations onboard his submarine and punish individuals who failed to follow the policies while his submarine was at sea.10 A submarine’s CO issued Ship’s Orders, which contained the procedures for rigging every room for dive, surface, silent running, and various casualties, including a table for each compartment that lists every valve in the space labeled as “OPEN” or “CLOSE,” to ensure all crewmembers rigged spaces properly and uniformly.11 The Ship’s Orders reveal the CO’s expectations for the officers

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8 Ageton, Naval Officer Guide, 135.
9 The complement of officers and crew on a submarine varied and depended on multiple factors such as the submarine’s class and the development of technology as the war progressed. For the purposes of this paper, the numbers of officers and men are based on the fleet-type boat averages. Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II, 17.
10 Glenn Knoblock, Black Submariners, 108.
11 The variations and refits that took place throughout the submarine fleet during the war may have made it necessary for each captain to control the specific rigging procedure on his submarine rather than a higher command issuing a standardized bill. Even if out of necessity, the captain’s power to control the
and men under his command, whether at sea or in port. In an informal hearing, or ‘Captain’s Mast,’ the CO had the power to assign guilt and punish submariners under his command who were accused of failing to follow orders. At Captain’s Mast, the submarine CO levied the punishment that he believed fit the infraction, such as cutting the guilty party’s rank for a month, disqualifying the individual from submarine duty, or ‘awarding’ the submariner with a lower rank. According to Joseph Benedict Coulter Jr., the CO of the S-42(SS-153) “left a guy standing on a buoy… because he went to sleep at the helm.”

Although the punishment in Coulter’s narrative was not common and the CO’s sentence may appear harsh, it may have served as a warning to the rest of the crew that the captain was in control and a reminder that not performing one’s duty was unacceptable. The crew probably did not trust or respect the helmsman, because it is unlikely that CO would punish a crewmember who the crew perceived as a family member in such a way, because the captain would not want to risk lowering the crew’s morale or his own authority by causing the crew to object.

The submarine’s captain also selected a chief of the boat (COB) to ensure the crew followed the orders and regulations and to act as a representative for the enlisted men. The COB had significant power because he was the primary negotiator between the ship’s command and crew. A strong COB needed to be trusted by the crew and respected by the officers, which tended to grant him special privileges not generally extended to enlisted men. According to Leal, “[a]t his best, the COB was a stern but operating and casualty procedures reveals the degree of responsibility granted to the submarine captains by the higher naval commands. Stephen. H. Gimber, *USS Pompon Ship’s Orders*, accessed March 10, 2015, http://maritime.org/doc/pdf/suborders.pdf.

12 Coulter stated that the CO “radioed the beach” asking them to send a ship to get the sailor from the buoy near Sabo Island. “At the helm” is a nautical-term for controlling the vessel’s heading or course, but on a submarine the helmsman was also responsible for specific aspects of the ship’s depth control. Coulter, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.

loving uncle; he was approachable and would encourage new men with their assimilation to the crew, but he was equally as able to enforce established standards and swiftly correct those who deviated from them.”

Although the COB was usually one of the most senior enlisted men on each submarine, this was not always the case. Joseph McGreivy claims he was selected as COB when he was only a Petty Officer, Second Class, due to his experience on multiple war patrols. McGreivy’s position granted him greater power than the remaining chiefs, who were considered experts at their specified jobs and often trusted with a considerable amount of power by the submarine’s chain of command. The COB was selected by the CO, represented the crew, and generally had more submarine experience than the officers onboard. Therefore, it is likely he had as much, if not more, influence within a submarine’s command than the majority of the junior officers.

The largest and most complex class on a submarine was the rated crew, which usually provided the most space for social movement within the group. Roscoe described crews as “many ‘sergeants’ but few ‘privates,’” because the majority of the people onboard were NCOs. Although the chiefs were also enlisted and often identified with and acted as representatives for the crew, they were viewed and treated as a separate class with greater tools to negotiate power with the command and more privileges onboard. The crew was comprised of about sixty enlisted men, many eighteen or nineteen years old, who operated the submarine. The submariners’ training and qualification process

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15 Petty officer second class (E-5) is two ranks below a chief (E-7) in the naval rank structure. McGreivy, *Sub: Oral Histories*, 20.
17 NCO is a military acronym for Non-Commissioned Officer. It usually refers to enlisted individuals holding ranks higher than E-3. Starmer, *WWII Submarine Doc*, 8. For the purposes of this paper, ‘enlisted’ or ‘crew’ refers to the men below chief, unless specified otherwise in the text. According to Lockwood, reservists made up about three quarters of sub force by the end of the war. Lockwood, *Sink ‘Em All*, 392.
emphasized intellect, trust, and value to the submarine crew. Therefore a man’s social status onboard was usually measured by experience, rather than traditional naval rank, as was the case in McGreivy’s selection as COB. Wilber Meyer, a machinist’s mate on the USS Catfish (SS-339), described the underway schedule for the submariners: “when we were at sea, we stood watches 4 on and 8 off.” In other words, Meyer claims the crew was divided into three sections of watch-standers, such as lookouts or helm, and rotated every four hours. In the eight hours between a section’s watch, Meyer argues that the crew “played cards and we ate and we slept,” because a submariner had the relative freedom to do “whatever you wanted to do.”

The space in which a submariner slept was often revealing of the place he held within the submarine’s social hierarchy. The captain had his own stateroom and the remaining officers shared three-bed staterooms in a space known as ‘officers’ country.’ Enlisted submariner Neal Pike described the officers’ quarters and recognized that specific privileges were associated with officers’ formal rank. According to Pike, the officers “had rather big bunks… and a lot more room than the crew,” but he laughed and suggested, “they [officers’ quarters] weren't luxurious,” because the submarines lacked space. The chiefs bunked in a separate stateroom, segregated from the officers and rest

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18 The bottom social class consisted of non-qualified sailors and the stewards, who were Black Americans, Chinese or natives of the Philippines islands or Guam. For more information about race and social structure on WWII submarines: Knoblock, Black Submariners, 392.

19 Underway, the submarine’s crew and officers, excluding the ship’s captain, were organized into three watch sections to man the ship in all normal surfaced or submerged operations. On most submarines, each watch section rotated every four hours. For example: if a lookout takes the watch at 2200, he would be relieved at 0200, and would stand watch again at 1000, but, since the boat generally ran submerged during the day, he may be on watch controlling the stern planes. Meyer, Park Tudor School of Words Oral History Collection.

20 By stating that ‘submariners’ had the freedom, Meyer’s remark suggests other sailors did not. This paper is not meant as a comparative study between members of the Submarine Force and the rest of the U.S. Navy, but Meyer’s comments are further proof that the submariners perceived a contrast. Meyer, Park Tudor School of Words Oral History Collection.

21 Pike, Rutgers Oral History Archives.
of the enlisted men, while the rest of the crewmembers shared the thirty-six bunks in
crew’s berthing, or ‘after battery,’ or slept in the torpedo rooms.\(^{22}\)

The majority of the men slept in crew’s berthing, which was an ‘L-shaped’ room
with the majority of the racks in a long line stacked three bunks high. At the furthest aft
part of the crew’s berthing, there was a small passageway on the portside with six
additional bunks, known as ‘Hogan’s Alley.’ According to some fleet-boat veterans, it
was considered “somewhat of a prestige” to be assigned berthing in Hogan’s Alley,
because “it removed the sleeper from fore-and-aft travel disturbances.”\(^{23}\) The remaining
chiefs and most respected submariners may have had their own bunks, but the majority of
the other men ‘hot-racked.’\(^{24}\) According to Pike, who slept in the after battery during
WWII, “each of us had a locker with about a couple of square feet of space to keep our
personal items.”\(^{25}\) On the lowest end of the social spectrum, the stewards slept in bunks

\(^{22}\) Although the submariners often portrayed and perceived themselves as belonging to a
homogenous collective that rejected naval formalities, the reality is far more complicated. Officers on
board had greater privileges, such as better sleeping conditions. However, as discussed later in the chapter,
through the process of negotiation, the enlisted crew accepted specific privileges and rejected others. The
berthing space has thirty-six bunks stacked three high and is called ‘after battery’ because the space is
located above the aft (back) half of the submarine’s battery. The forward half of the battery is below crew’s
mess and the galley. Usually the torpedomen slept in the torpedo room in which they worked. Submarines
had two torpedo rooms, one forward and one aft. The Stewards also slept in the forward torpedo room,
which had space for fourteen individuals to sleep. During attack, most captains primarily used the forward
torpedo room and, because the space was larger than most, it was a space in which enlisted submariners
were able to socialize after their watch. The torpedo rooms were not a quiet space to sleep because it was
also a space that submariners held church services and, later in the war, watched movies.

\(^{23}\) The article describes sleeping quarters on the fleet-boat, USS Cubera (SS-347) after WWII;
however, the design of the submarine sleeping quarters was the same as during the war and many of the
crewmembers were WWII veterans, so it is likely the benefits and prestige of sleeping in ‘Hogan’s Alley’
existed during the war. “WWII Attack Submarine Hull,” USS Cubera, accessed March 5, 2015,

\(^{24}\) ‘Hot-racking’ or ‘hot-bunking’ was a common form of rotating beds among submarine crews.
Three submariners from different watch-sections shared two bunks, and because one of the three men was
always on watch, the other two could use the beds. The term stems from the idea that the racks were always
‘hot’ from the previous person’s body heat.

\(^{25}\) Pike, Rutgers Oral History Archives.
suspended over torpedoes in the forward torpedo room, which the crew referred to as the “honeymoon bunks” or the “bridal suite.”

Other than the CO, submariners had no personal, private space. Even if a submariner was fortunate enough to have his own rack, he did not have privacy while he slept, because the bunk did not have curtains to act as a boundary between the shared living space and his private domain. The shower on the submarine was the only space a submariner could have privacy, but a submariner only took about two short showers per week at the end of a patrol because water was a precious resource. During the first half of the patrol, submariners usually had to use a small bucket of water and sponge, because the showers served as storage and were loaded with food when the submarine left port because space was so limited onboard.

The lack of privacy, space, and social options meant that submariners had to be relatively tolerant of their shipmates and according to journalist Allen Raymond, “[i]f a man can’t get along with the rest of the crew, he pretty soon gets transferred somewhere else.” Based on his observations of submarines training at sea, Raymond also claims, submariners lived and worked in such tight quarters that “officers and men have to

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26 The ‘bridal suite’ was a separate bunk in the center of forward torpedo room, above the space people walked and stood. Much like their segregation in berthing assignments, Knoblock claims, whether or not the individual was qualified in submarines, Stewards were not truly considered a member of the crew by their peers. According to Knoblock, as with the majority of the U.S. Navy, racism existed on submarines, but submariners were generally more liberal than their ‘general service’ counterparts. This may be in due to their education or due to the values of their collective identity, which classify individuals based on their ability to contribute to the boat. Knoblock argues that the experiences of African American submariners varied depending on their captain and crew. Harry Hall, “About The Diesel Boat Era,” USS Queenfish, accessed March 10, 2015, http://www.queenfish.org/noframes/diesel_boat_era.html; Knoblock, Black Submariners, 83.

27 U.S. submariners considered the shower a luxury because they had fresh water, whereas most submariners from other countries had to use salt water during WWII. Ostlund, Find 'Em, Chase 'Em, Sink 'Em, 19.

develop a capacity for living with one another with mutual consideration and respect.”

According to WWII submariner Neal Pike, the “close quarters and… rubbing elbows with the whole crew daily, [at] night, twenty-four hours a day,” caused “squabbles, but not too often.” Although frustration between individuals may have magnified disagreements between submariners, Knoblock argues that because a submarine only had small complement of individuals who lived and worked in “the tightest imaginable quarters, a spirit of teamwork was essential to its successful operation.”

Although the officers monopolized the formal power onboard, enlisted submariners were able to negotiate with their officers and establish a series of standards based on men’s definition of an acceptable work environment. According to Psychiatrists Rebecca J. Wolfe and Kathleen L. McGinn, in order to successfully negotiate, “each party needs to convince the other to make a concession that he or she would not have made absent the influence of the other.” Negotiations become more complicated in an asymmetric relationship, which Wolfe and McGinn define as: a relationship “in which the power balance between the parties is unequal,” because “the relatively high-power party is likely to have his or her interests addressed during a negotiation, while the interests of the lower-power party may be ignored.”

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29 Raymond, “Submarine Crews Are Cocky and Confident,” 4. Psychologists Eric Sundstrom and Irwin Altman suggest friends or people with favorable opinions of one another are more likely to stand at closer distances and require less personal space than with strangers. Given the bond between submariners who were unable to distance themselves from one another, perhaps it would be helpful for a future study to examine whether the lack of personal space helps to facilitate the feeling of comfort between individuals. Eric Sundstrom and Irwin Altman, “Interpersonal Relationships and Personal Space: Research Review and Theoretical Model,” *Human Ecology* 4 no. 1 (January 1976): 47-67.

30 Pike, Rutgers Oral History Archives.


As with most nautical vessels and military units, negotiations between enlisted submariners and officers were asymmetrical, because the officers’ military rank was associated with power and responsibility. Historian Cheryl A. Fury’s research in her book *Tides in the Affairs of Men: The Social History of Elizabethan Seamen 1580-1603* reveals asymmetric negotiations between a vessel’s leadership and laborers is not unique to the Submarine Force during WWII and exists throughout nautical history. Similar to Fury’s claim, “[t]he maintenance of order was a two-way street. Obedience was not given blindly” regarding Elizabethan seaman, “the crew’s opinions and expectations had to be taken into account” by officers on WWII submarines as well.\(^{34}\) According to Fury, the crews’ grievances on merchant vessels forced captains and shipmasters “to halt or alter their voyages” between the years 1580 and 1603.\(^{35}\) Although there is no evidence that enlisted submariners forced a CO to cancel an operation, individual submariners unvolunteered or requested a transfer if they did not agree with the command. Interestingly, a 1947 naval study claims that on multiple WWII submarines, “the crews lost confidence in their commanding officer or he lost faith in himself.”\(^{36}\) Although a formal, military hierarchy existed on a submarine, the evidence suggests that submarine officers were willing to negotiate with their crews in order to maintain order on the boat.


\(^{35}\) Fury, *Tides in the Affairs of Men*, 410.

\(^{36}\) No studies have examined whether a submarine crews’ concerns about the command climate or a CO being too aggressive ever influenced the captain’s tactics, but the crews’ power to unvolunteer or request a transfer imply that it is a possibility. Although contradictory, unclear, and vague, a 1947 naval study states: “is patrol report evidence of only 4 cases in which the crews lost confidence in their commanding officer or he lost faith in himself,” and “there is patrol report evidence of only three cases in which the men apparently lost confidence in the commanding officers, or the commanding officer lost confidence in himself, or his boat.” Although the researchers do not provide specific about the crews who lost faith in their CO or the reasons why, the nature of the study suggests it was based on the commanding officer’s performance. Although unable to obtain for this project, the declassification of WWII submarine records, including war patrol logs, suggests the evidence is available for researchers to examine. Shilling and Kohl, “The History of Submarine Medicine in WWII,” 117.
Multiple social psychologists recognize that it is common for an in-group’s low-status members to attempt to negotiate power by stressing the importance of specific attributes assigned to the group or comparing the group members with higher status to individuals in the out-group.\textsuperscript{37} The values emphasized during the submarine training and qualification processes, such as teamwork, the evaluation of an individual based on his ability to contribute to the boat, and the rejection of the general service, were essential to the collective submarine identity. Enlisted submariners used the values to negotiate power with their officers by defining a ‘true submariner’ as someone who often ignored traditional naval privileges and rating structure.

The submariners’ perception of the Submarine Force as superior to the general service granted enlisted submariners the power to negotiate and establish boundaries of what they viewed as appropriate submarine behavior. Using the collective submarine identity’s negative perception of the out-group to their advantage, the enlisted submariners justified their rejection of naval privileges by perceiving an officer who acted outside the limitations of a ‘submariner’ as a threat to the collective. The Submarine Force leadership’s negative portrayal of certain naval regulations at submarine training and the submariners’ distrust of the naval bureaucracy that the men blamed for the torpedo issues served to legitimize the enlisted submariners’ claim that the specific naval traditions contrasted the collective submarine identity. Many enlisted submariners believed traditional naval privileges based on rank had no place within the Submarine Force, because the men associated the officer privilege with the general service. The perception that the Submarine Force’s leadership and men shared the same values raised

the force’s _esprit de corps_ and allowed the leadership maintain authority, but it also allowed the men to use their perception of the collective’s values to negotiate with and set boundaries for the leadership. For example, submarine crews demanded a more informal and relaxed work environment onboard submarines than their perception of the rigid and strict climate within the general service. The evidence suggests submarine commands compromised many traditional formalities between officers and enlisted men within the navy because the officers did not want risk the crew’s moral, their authority, or other traditional privileges associated with naval rank.

Historians and WWII submarine veterans consistently note, and often exaggerate, the relaxed social atmosphere in submarines while on patrol. In his 1949 book, historian Theodore Roscoe argues, “there is no time for ‘yessing’ on a submarine… the only answer permitted is the right answer.”\(^38\) He recognizes that submariners were permitted to question and correct their superior’s orders within reason, because failure to do so could prove fatal. While Roscoe’s analysis appears accurate, perhaps another reason submariners were not expected to blindly follow orders was the example set by the command style of the Submarine Force’s leadership.\(^39\)

Six years after Roscoe’s book, Admiral Lockwood claimed that frankness and rejection of traditional formalities associated with naval rank was the “the real spirit of the submarine service in which I had been raised.”\(^40\) Lockwood recalled Dudley W.

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\(^{38}\) Roscoe, _United States Submarine Operations in World War II_, 18.

\(^{39}\) It would be unfair to claim that the culture or social-climate onboard a submarine was homogenous throughout the Submarine Force, but the evidence suggests that the majority of the variable were consistent on all submarines, due to the submariners’ common training, cultural sharing, and the Navy’s rotation of men to fill ‘core crews. The 1943 edition of the _Naval Officer’s Guide_ states “[t]he little ships are more comfortable than big ones, but they are also more informal,” which implies the U.S. Navy was aware of the informality on submarines and that the relaxed traditions on submarines were not as unique as the collective submarine identity’s perception. Ageton, _Naval Officer Guide_, 135.

\(^{40}\) Lockwood and Adamson, _Hellcats of the Sea_, 12.
“Mush” Morton’s disregard for formal naval privileges as “a man after my own heart. No yessing. No beating around the bush. No silted ‘By your leave sir!’”

Lockwood’s comments suggest he favored officers who did not follow traditional formalities when speaking with him. Therefore, it is also possible that he appointed officers who shared a similar leadership style and welcomed frankness in command positions. According to political scientist Leonie Huddy argues, “[g]roup leaders have a potentially influential role to play in the process of developing the collective meaning of an identity or conflict, especially in the formation of grievance.”

Admiral Lockwood’s extraordinary influence on the Submarine Force, as Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet, may have also assisted the development of the submarine identity that gave all members a voice and contributed to the relaxation of certain naval formalities while a submarine was on patrol.

Uniformity was a common theme in the military, but submariners did not expect naval regulations to be enforced while on patrol. Each submarine CO had the power prescribe the ‘uniform of the day’ on his boat in their Ship’s Orders, but the frequency with which captains ignored uniform regulations on submarines during WWII suggest that the captains did not risk challenging crew morale on naval traditions that were not directly related to safety of ship. In his Ship’s Orders on the USS Pompon, Lieutenant Commander S. H. Gimber stated that there was “no prescribed uniform” while at sea and he expected individuals “to be guided by their own common sense, pride in personal cleanliness, and a sense of decency in regard to their shipmates.”

Ron Smith’s experience was similar onboard the USS Seal (SS-183): “ragged cutoff dungaree shorts;

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41 Lockwood and Adamson, *Hellcats of the Sea*, 12.
42 Huddy, “Contrasting Theoretical Approaches to Intergroup Relations,” 958.
sandals, no socks; an assortment of dirty skivvy shirts with sleeves cut off or brightly colored Hawaiian shirts.”\textsuperscript{44} The training manual at the submarine school stated that, while underway, “each man is expected to maintain that high standard of his own accord,” which suggests all submariners believed the CO did not have the power to set strict uniform standards while underway.\textsuperscript{45} Although the U.S. Navy granted the captains of naval vessels the power to authorize underway uniforms, the submarine captains chose not to enforce naval uniform regulations while on patrol during WWII. The uniformity with which submarine captains ignored naval standards suggests the men did not believe the CO had the right to control how submariners dressed and that captains rarely risked their crews’ morale by challenging the men over the dress code because the issue was not directly related to the boats’ safety or operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{46}

According to Roscoe, “The stranger on board a submarine on war patrol might have difficulty distinguishing between the captain and seaman… shorts and leather sandals being standard costume.”\textsuperscript{47} Roscoe continues by stating that every “member of the crew, from cook to captain, stands on his own two feet as an individual,” because “submarines and submarining do not provide space for the protocol of rank.”\textsuperscript{48} Although Roscoe’s observation of the submariners’ lack of standard military uniforms and display of rank underway is accurate, his analysis that submariners did not respect the traditional naval rank structure is not consistent with the evidence. In addition to mode of dress,

\textsuperscript{44} Whitlock and Smith, The Depths of Courage, 177.
\textsuperscript{45} Submarine Information and Instruction Manual, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942), i.
\textsuperscript{46} Jackson claims the reason for the relaxed dress code was, the submarine was so hot and humid: “[c]lothing and footwear, when worn, would disintegrate under these conditions,” but he provides no evidence to back his claim. It is far more likely that the submariners attempted to stay comfortable by not wearing uniforms because of the heat and humidity onboard. Jackson, The Men, 11.
\textsuperscript{47} Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II, 17.
\textsuperscript{48} Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II, 17.
Roscoe also bases his argument on the captain and the enlisted men eating the same food.\textsuperscript{49} It is evident that a submarine followed a less formal rank structure than many military commands during WWII, but certain traditional naval protocols and privileges associated with rank were still granted to the captain and his officers. For example, although everyone onboard ate the same food, the enlisted men served their own food in crew’s mess, while the stewards served the officers on “China dishes reserved for the officer’s mess only.”\textsuperscript{50}

Officers onboard the submarines, such as Paul R. Schratz who claimed, “one never heard…the Hollywood cliché, ‘and that’s an order,’” appear to have shared Lockwood’s understanding of informality and privilege associated rank in the Submarine Force.\textsuperscript{51} Enlisted submariners often claimed not to treat officers any differently from other enlisted men. For example, Neal Pike, a radioman, described “the relationship between officers and enlisted men” as “very informal” and stated that he viewed his Communications Officer as, “just like another shipmate and I’d always go talk to him, every day and every night.”\textsuperscript{52} Although the social climate onboard submarines may not have been as strict as the general service, Schratz argued that “discipline was relaxed but inflexible when matters of safety were involved.”\textsuperscript{53} Onboard the boats, submariners followed a fairly traditional naval command structure and rank brought certain privileges for submarine officers, but enlisted submariners were able to negotiate power with the command in order to obtain what they perceived as mutual respect. The crew rotations, as

\textsuperscript{49} Roscoe, \textit{United States Submarine Operations in World War II}, 17.
\textsuperscript{50} Knoblock, \textit{Black Submariners}, 54.
\textsuperscript{51} Schratz, \textit{Submarine Commander}, 56.
\textsuperscript{52} Pike, Rutgers Oral History Archives; Ageton, \textit{Naval Officer Guide}, 135; Knoblock, \textit{Black Submariners}, 105.
\textsuperscript{53} Schratz, \textit{Submarine Commander}, 55.
well as the habit of spreading scuttlebutt and sea stories, allowed the enlisted submariners to set consistent standards throughout the fleet and form an informal understanding with submarine officers as to what the men considered appropriate behavior and an acceptable working environment.  

The relationship between the two social groups is correctly considered very relaxed by normal military standards, but the divide between submarine officers and enlisted men was stricter than many submariners claim. Although the U.S. Navy authorized submarine officers to control the formal power on the boat and the CO had “absolute power,” within the scope of naval regulations, the enlisted men were able to negotiate with officers. While naval rank strengthened the officers’ position in negotiations, enlisted submariners, possibly out of resentment or jealousy, were able to challenge specific privileges traditionally granted to naval officers in the general service. The enlisted submariners negotiated with their submarine officers and shaped the social environment onboard to resemble the their perception of the submarine identity and, with the help of crew rotations and cultural sharing, were able standardize expectations throughout the submarine fleet.

By conceding certain privileges traditionally granted to individuals who shared their naval rank, submarine officers raised crew morale by created a strong sense of unit cohesiveness on submarines. According to Manning, a submariner’s sense of unit cohesiveness was dependent upon his bond with his peers and officers on the submarine and also contributed to his morale. In his study of personnel in the U.S. Army, Manning argues, soldiers identify with the leaders that they see every day, and “in the process

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54 As discussed in the first chapter, the submariners used sea stories and scuttlebutt as methods in which to share ideas with individuals attached to other submarine crews.

come to accept these leaders’ aims and goals as their own.”

Manning suggests the identification process continues throughout the army’s chain of command. Therefore, strong unit cohesion benefited the submarine’s CO because it helped ensure the crew shared his values.

The crew’s sense of unit cohesion was important to submarine officers because it ensured the entire crew shared the same objectives. Organized groups also consistently perform at higher level because the membership shares a higher morale and completes tasks promptly and efficiently. Frederick Manning believes that groups with strong unit cohesion are successful because each member is willing to contribute and help others, because he or she believes in the objective and trusts his or her associates to equally to their part. Manning also argues that although cohesive units are usually more successful and have higher morale than a less cohesive unit, a unit’s success strengthens the membership’s cohesion and morale. In other words, it was beneficial for submarine officers to surrender some privileges because it strengthened the unit cohesion onboard and boosted the crew’s morale, which made submarine more successful.

Submarine captains understood the importance of their crew’s morale and apparently recognized that crew’s perception of themselves as successful translated to a higher crew morale, which resulted in future actual success. According to submarine

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56 Manning, “Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry,” 5.
57 Manning, “Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry.” Manning’s argument may accurately describe identity and unit cohesion in the U.S. Army and strengthen the argument that Lockwood’s preferences influenced collective submarine identity, but one must account for nuances of the Submarine Force during WWII in order to apply Manning’s ideas to cohesion onboard submarines. Unlike the army, in which Manning argues lower-ranked members speak with their squad or platoon leaders daily, due in part to the lack of space, submariners established a relationship and communicated with their CO every day. Therefore, it is likely a submariner’s morale was dependent upon the cohesion of the entire submarine, rather than at the squad-level. As discussed in the previous chapter, submarines were often unable to communicate with other commands; therefore, the CO did not have consistent communication with his leadership, which supports Mason’s argument that submariners had an attachment to their specific boat while on patrol. Mason, “Corsairs in the Drain Pipes.”
58 Manning, “Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry.”
officer Henry C. Lauerman, it was common practice for submarine captains to raise their crews’ morale by exaggerating the tonnage of ships that the submarine sank. Lauerman argues that during an attack, a CO’s “main concern was first to get a torpedo off and, secondly, to get the hell out of there and make certain that you didn't get it.” The CO could only assess the damage after he felt assured the surface was safe following an attack, “[a]nd if there were a choice between several ships, one of 10,000 tons, one of 20,000 tons, or one of 2,000 tons, which one do you think he would choose? The largest.” Although sonar did not have the capability to confirm a ship sinking after a strike, the sonarman would usually announce that he heard the torpedo hit and the ship “breaking up,” because according to Lauerman, the sonarman “was playing the game” too. Lauerman claims, at the time he felt it was wrong to overestimate the tonnage the submarine sank in the patrol logs, because a conservative approach would have been strategically smarter. However, he admits that he was “100 percent wrong” for disagreeing with the practice. Lauerman argues:

For purposes of morale and keeping things going, he had no choice. If he, in good faith, can say, “I sank a ship of twenty thousand tons,” it’s better that he say that from the point of view of the command than that he sunk a ship of three thousand tons. These men have gone out there, they have risked their lives, they’ve risked their all, and the least the commanding officer could do is to give his crew and himself in the process the benefit of the doubt.

Exaggerating the tonnage may have been self-serving, because it helped the CO earn personal acclaim and medals, but success strengthened unit cohesiveness and built morale. The evidence suggests that although most submariners were not individually recognized, they were proud of their captain’s medals, because a CO often credited the

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59 Lauerman, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, 11.  
60 Lauerman, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, 11.  
61 Lauerman, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, 11.  
62 Lauerman, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, 11.  
63 Lauerman, East Carolina Manuscript Collection, 11.
entire crew for his individual award and the successful submarines usually had a high level of unit cohesion. For example, according to Joseph Eckberg, when the Admiral Carpenter pinned a Navy Cross on Frederick B. Warder, Eckberg’s CO on the USS Seawolf, the men were standing in ranks for the ceremony and nudging each other, wanting to yell in pride, because “[t]he crew of the Wolf was as thrilled as their Skipper.”

Eckberg claims that after the formal naval celebrations were over, the CO turned to the crew: “[t]his cross is as much yours as it is mine, boys,’ he [the CO] said earnestly. ‘You have contributed as much as, if not more than I to the earning of it. I’m proud of you all, and I’m proud of the Wolf.”

The medal may have been to the individual but it represented the recognition of the unit’s collective success to the crew. Although the crewmembers were proud of their achievement, Eckberg claims the crew “had a bone to pick with the High Command though about crediting us with those few ships. We’d done better than that, but we knew how conservative the Skipper was.”

Therefore, although overestimating the tonnage sank may lead to greater recognition for the CO, it also affected the crew’s morale.

The crew’s morale was important to the submarine’s captain because COs were usually relieved of command if the submarine had low morale. A submarine CO was required to be successful in order to maintain his command and advance his naval career.

64 Frank, Horan, and Ekberg: U.S.S. Seawolf, 127-128. It was common for the crew to feel proud of the CO’s personal recognition as if it was the collective’s: After being awarded the Navy Cross as the CO of the USS Puffer (SS-268), Carl Dwyer had his picture taken individually with every enlisted crewmember. Dwyer also gave a commendation letter to each enlisted man aboard and with his name and a picture of the Navy Cross at the top. Many cherished the document and treated it as if he won the Navy Cross himself. Knoblock, Black Submariners, 104.


66 Frank, Horan, and Ekberg: U.S.S. Seawolf, 127. One of the common complaints among submariners about the U.S. Navy is that the higher command did not credit their boat correct amount of tonnage, but it is likely that the navy was aware of this practice. Knoblock, Black Submariners, 104; Pike, Rutgers Oral History Archives; Meyer, Park Tudor School of Words Oral History Collection.

67 Knoblock does not go into detail or state what command authorized the removal of the submarine captains. Knoblock, Black Submariners, 43.
and most of the captains recognized the positive correlation between their crew’s morale and the submarine’s success. Multiple disciplines and institutions examine ‘morale,’ and term’s definition varies throughout the literature. Most military studies, however, generally acceptable military psychologist Frederick J. Manning’s definition: an individual’s morale is determined by his or her “sense of well-being, happiness, job or life satisfaction.”  

Although numerical strength, technological advances, and military might are important, Manning identifies morale and unit cohesion as “X-factors” that can determine the success of a unit or the outcome of a war.

Another reason submarine CO’s cared about the morale of their crew was because submariners “obviously preferred to those boats where the crew was not treated as well and where… the submarine in question had less success while on patrol.” Unlike most military duties during WWII, submarine duty was voluntary and the men in the submarine service understood that they had a ‘right’ unvolunteer at any time and transfer to the general service. According to Knoblock “any man could ask off the boat at any time, and permission was usually granted.” At a minimum, submariners’ ability to unvolunteer and the officers’ reliance on the crew allowed the enlisted submariners to set limitations on their command by declining the service if they perceived the orders or environment unacceptable.

Although the enlisted men lacked formal power onboard, they were able to negotiate with officers because the men recognized that by being “not only very carefully selected but highly trained,” they would be difficult to replace if they requested to

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68 Manning, “Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry,” 2.  
69 Manning, “Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry,” 2.  
70 Knoblock, *Black Submariners*, 43.  
transfer off of their boat or out of the Submarine Force.\textsuperscript{72} The enlisted submariners recognized the time-consuming and difficult training and qualification process made them valuable commodities in the navy that could not simply be replaced by a general service sailor without lowering the standards for submarine duty and losing experience. The enlisted submariners, who were indoctrinated into the collective submarine identity that perceived the general service as inferior, were aware of their premium value. For example, Herbert L. Starmer argues, “we [submariners] were above the ordinary sailor.”\textsuperscript{73}

In order for the men to negotiate with the officers onboard, it was important for enlisted submariners to believe their value granted them space to challenge specific naval traditions. Perhaps, it was however more vital that the submarine officers also recognized the relatively short supply of experienced enlisted submariners relative to the growing demand, because the officers monopolized the formal power. The navy’s reason for rotating submarine crews—to ensure all submarines have enough experienced submariners—is evidence that the naval planners considered experience an important factor when evaluating an individual’s value to a command. The incentives that the navy granted members of the Submarine Force suggests naval planners believed it was necessary to negotiate with the submariners in order ensure the Submarine Force remained fully manned by volunteers without lowering the standards for submarine duty.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72}Shilling and Kohl, “The History of Submarine Medicine in WWII,” 127.
\textsuperscript{73} Starmer, \textit{WWII Submarine Doc}, 41.
\textsuperscript{74} See Chapter II for more information about incentives from the U.S. Navy. There is no evidence that the navy or any submarine command feared a mass exodus by enlisted submariners attempting to unvolunteer at the same time, and if they had, the navy probably would have forced the men to remain on submarine duty. Removing the Submarine Force’s volunteer status may have also negatively affected the service’s \textit{esprit de corps} and morale on each submarine. By all accounts, the navy had plenty of volunteers
Some commands may not have granted the request until an acceptable replacement arrived to take the unvolunteering submariner’s place, but there is no evidence of submarine commanders attempting to take power by punishing a crewmember for wanting to unvolunteer. While informal punishment may have taken place at times, the lack of evidence for such punishment suggests that most captains did not try to directly deter their men from unvolunteering with the fear of formal reprimand. Knoblock claims it was in the CO’s best interest to transfer submariners who wanted to transfer, because “submarines were small and cramped, and the last thing a commander wanted on a war patrol that might last two months was a disgruntled or disruptive crewman.”

Rather than attempting to steer men away from using this power through threat of punishment, most captains granted the request as quickly as possible so that the unhappy sailor could not challenge CO’s authority with the crew. For example, in the ship’s logs, one captain recommended that a chief who had recently requested “disqualification for submarine duty,” be removed from the crew, because “his presence aboard is a definite hazard to our morale.”

One example of the negotiation between a submarine command and the crew occurred on board the USS Seahorse (SS-304) after rumors spread that the submarine’s new captain, Slade Cutter, was a “mad man.” According to Joseph McGreivy, Seahorse’s COB at the time, Cutter asked him to make a list of the men who did not want to go on for submarine duty, and the Submarine Force had hundreds of sailors that went through BSS attached to relief crews who were able to serve on submarine crews, but lacked experience. Knoblock, *Black Submariners*, 117.

The chief was a submariner who had been on multiple patrols on other submarines, but began to show “extreme nervousness and mental depression.” The CO reported that the chief “kept bothering the Pharmacist Mate” for pills to calm his nerves after depth charges, and later attempted to slit his own throat with a kitchen knife. Shilling and Kohl, “The History of Submarine Medicine in WWII,” 12.

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76 The chief was a submariner who had been on multiple patrols on other submarines, but began to show “extreme nervousness and mental depression.” The CO reported that the chief “kept bothering the Pharmacist Mate” for pills to calm his nerves after depth charges, and later attempted to slit his own throat with a kitchen knife. Shilling and Kohl, “The History of Submarine Medicine in WWII,” 12.
patrol and promised to have the concerned men transferred. After McGreivy addressed the crew at quarters by stating, “all right, sailors, if you don’t want to go to sea with Slade take one step forward,” only one person voiced his concerns and was swiftly transferred. McGreivy’s story is an example of the COB’s unique role as the chief negotiator between a submarine’s command and crew. McGreivy’s experience not only demonstrates the command’s willingness to transfer unhappy sailors and the captain’s awareness and concern for the crew’s morale, but also the crew’s reluctance to use their right to request a transfer.

The enlisted submariners’ right to unvolunteer was an important form of leverage that motivated their captains to negotiate, but the evidence suggests submariners did not want to unvolunteer. Therefore, it was also important for the enlisted submariners to recognize when to compromise. Although submariners were able to unvolunteer without the fear of formal punishment from the command, few submariners did, because it would have cost the benefits granted to submariners, such as extra pay. According to Billy Grieves, if someone wanted off of the submarine “all he had to do was request it, but nobody ever did.” The men’s own primary identity as submariners likely deterred some men from unvolunteering, because the act would have contrasted one of his core beliefs: sailors in the general service were inferior to the submariners. Another potential reason

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78 It is worth noting that on a submarine, military formalities were generally more relaxed, and it was common for submariners to call their captain, ‘skipper’ or ‘old man,’ but some traditional naval standards were kept in regards to rank. The evidence suggests that it would not have be acceptable for the COB to refer to the commanding officer by his first name when addressing the crew at quarters. McGreivy potentially may not have called the Captain “Slade” at quarters, but only stated it that way when telling the story, decades later, and after establishing personal friendship with Slade Cutter. McGreivy, *Sub: Oral Histories*, 20.
79 Submariners did request transfers and unvolunteer for multiple reasons, but perhaps Bill Grieves memory that no did speaks to the identity of the force during WWII. Grieves, The Digital Collections of the National WWII Museum.
few submariners requested to transfer or unvolunteer was the submariners’ special
kinship with their shipmates. Greater than peer-pressure, throughout submarine training
and qualification, every submariner learned that, due to the small crew and the amount
responsibility granted to every man onboard, each individual was crucial to his
submarine’s and shipmate’s safety. Some submariners, such as Grieves, believed that any
man’s absence would place his shipmates’ lives at greater risk. According to Grieves, all
submariners had one motive for remaining in the Submarine Force:

They didn’t do it for the flag or our beautiful country of America. They didn’t do it for
God or humanity. They did it for one reason: their shipmates. Each man knew he could
not be the weak link. He could not let his shipmates down. He had to give his best for as
long as it took. And this is what formed the unparalleled bond between men on a
submarine that exists to this day.  

Unvolunteering was rare, so the greater concern for most submarine officers was
probably submariners requesting a transfer to another boat. Not only did an officer’s
career advancement rely heavily on the success of his boat, but his life was also in the
hands of the men attached to his submarine. A submariner who wanted to transfer off of a
submarine but remain in the Submarine Force was allowed to swap assignments with
another submariner with the same rating if both men and their captains agreed. Knoblock
suggests that at least for members of the steward’s branch, transfers were rarely rejected
by the commands, but the submariner that wanted to change commands was responsible
for finding his replacement. Some men transferred to shore commands or relief crews for
a couple months, but others did so permanently. The motivations for transferring varied
from a submariner’s intuition that his luck was running out to disliking his boat’s new

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80 Based on the emphasis the qualification process placed on every submariner to learn every job
onboard, it appears the submariners’ belief that each man was irreplaceable was likely due more to the
kinship between his shipmates than the operational ability of the vessel. The point of the submarine
qualification process was to ensure that the submarine could safely operate in the event that any
crewmember was lost. Grieves, The Digital Collections of the National WWII Museum: Submarine
Information and Instruction Manual, Submarine Division Forty-One Submarine Training Unit (1942), i.
commanding officer.\textsuperscript{81} For example, submariner Carl Kimmons found a submariner on a relief crew that agreed to switch assignments with him after his XO, W.W. McRory, was promoted and became the boat’s new captain. Kimmons stated that he transferred because he feared that “McRory would be an overanxious fighter” based on the aggressiveness the new CO showed as the boat’s second in command, which Knoblock suggests was not uncommon amongst submariners.\textsuperscript{82} Knoblock argues, “submariners often avoided duty certain submarines, because her [the submarine’s] commander was seen as being too ‘gung ho,’ or reckless, taking too many chances that might result in the loss of the boat and its crew.”\textsuperscript{83}

Knoblock also claims that, similar to the rest of the navy, certain boats had a positive reputation, while others had a negative image. A submarine’s reputation “was often based on the officers that commanded them and what kind of men they were, both personally and in combat,” and that men obviously preferred to be crewmembers of a “happy” submarine, rather than “boats where the crew was not treated as well.”\textsuperscript{84} It is likely officers recognized that, in order to retain the most experienced enlisted submariners on their boat, they needed to be willing to negotiate with enlisted men and

\textsuperscript{81} Knoblock, \textit{Black Submariners}, 139-144.
\textsuperscript{82} Carl Kimmons, email, quoted in: Knoblock, \textit{Black Submariners}, 311.
\textsuperscript{83} Knoblock, \textit{Black Submariners}, 43, 139-144. Trading places with members of the relief crew, whether short-term or permanently, was not uncommon for stewards either, according to Knoblock. Kimmons’s fear that the CO would be too aggressive based on his actions as the XO is similar the men on the USS Seahorse who worried about remaining onboard after the promotion of their ‘madman’ XO, Slade Cutter, in McGreivy’s story. The commonalities suggest the navy did not transfer XOs to new boats after their promotion. The perception of XOs as overly aggressive is interesting and may be due to the new CO’s age or a stronger sense of security with the outgoing CO who served as a father figure onboard. The role of the XO on submarines during attack scenarios may have also called for greater aggression than the captain’s role. Although both stories occur toward the end of the war, multiple sources claim, submarine captains were fired early in the war (when they were not prepared for unrestricted submarine warfare and the torpedoes were not functioning properly) for not being aggressive enough.
\textsuperscript{84} Knoblock’s book examines the steward’s branch, but the evidence provided by interviews with other submariners suggests the procedure was similar for other submarine ratings. Knoblock, \textit{Black Submariners}, 43.
maintain high morale amongst the crew. For example after Eugene Fluckey, the CO of the USS Barb (SS-220) from January 1944 to August 1945, asked Swish Saunders to serve as COB, but Saunders worried that he would have a difficult time disciplining the men because he viewed them as his friends. Fluckey responded to Saunders concerns by stating: “Swish, I don't want a bastard, I want a leader. We don't drive men on board the Barb. We lead them. From my experience with bastards, they achieve about equal results. But there's one big difference. When you lead men, they ship over and want to stay with you.”

Due to the rapid production of submarines during WWII, submarine officers earned promotions relatively quickly in order to fill billets within the growing Submarine Force, but submarine duty provided “fewer apparent benefits” for enlisted men. A submarine captain’s acceptance of the crewmembers’ right to unvolunteer, as well as his recognition that the crew’s morale determined the boat’s success and the future of his naval career, granted the enlisted men leverage with which to negotiate for the surrender of specific privileges for officers. The crew’s power also motivated the CO to offer the men benefits of their own. Similar to the navy paying submariners more or giving submariners better food than other members of the navy in order to incentivize service on submarines and boost the Submarine Force’s morale, submarine officers provided the crew with unique privileges to raise morale and deter crewmembers from unvolunteering. For example, Submarine captains traditionally rewarded the crew for sinking an enemy vessel with a special feast, usually steak and eggs. According to Fluckey, however, some

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85 It is also important to note that Fluckey referred to Saunders by his first name. Eugene Fluckey earned the Congressional Medal of Honor and Four Navy Crosses during WWII. He is also credited with sinking the most tonnage during the war. Fluckey, Thunder Below!, 71.

86 By the end of the war, the average age for submarine captains was 30 years old. Jackson, The Men, 2; Zellmer, “A Submariner in Western Australia,” 80.
submarine officers broke naval regulations by sneaking whiskey on the submarine and serving it to the crew “for medicinal purposes.” Fluckey claims the captain only allowed the men to have one shot and had to be vigilant, because “submariners are, by nature, sneaky.” By controlling the whiskey’s supply and distribution, the CO and his officers held the power onboard, but by providing alcohol to the enlisted men, they also boosted the crew’s morale.

Perhaps the interesting privilege the submarine COs granted crewmembers to boost morale was allowing their crews to bring a mascot, or live pet, underway. Submarine mascots included roosters, dingo pups, parrots, monkeys, and according to John D. Alden, even kangaroos. Most mascots, however, were dogs. Although submarine captains allowed the mascots onboard in order to raise the crew’s morale, at least in the case of the USS Lamprey (SS-372), it appears that the mascot may have been used as a tool to for the men to assert power. According to an officer who served on the USS Lamprey, “we were in Australia one of the crew picked up a dog and we had him with us for the last two patrols and brought him back to the States. The sailors taught him

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87 Fluckey, Thunder Below!, 22.
88 His suggestion that of submariners as sneaky is evidence he believed the adjective accurately described every individual within the collective’s membership. It is also worth noting that the benefit rewarded as an accomplishment and that it was in keeping with the men’s perception of collective submarine identity because it rejected naval regulations. Fluckey, Thunder Below!, 22. Submarine captains also served ‘Gilly,’ or alcohol used to fuel the torpedoes, to the crew. According to Manning, “sanctioned alcohol-centered events have long been a military custom, precisely because they are felt to enhance unit cohesion,” but drinking decreases cohesion because officers and enlisted men do not drink together. However, it was not rare for WWII submarine COs to serve ‘Gilly,’ or alcohol used to fuel the torpedoes, to their crews and captains often joined men for beers while in port. Manning, “Morale and Cohesion in Military Psychiatry,” 9; McCain and Salter, Faith of my Fathers, 73; Blank, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress; Frank, Horan, and Ekberg: U.S.S. Seawolf, 188-189.
89 There is a record of most of the animals onboard, but no evidence of a kangaroo mascot; however, a wallaby would not be surprising, because wallabies are smaller and a U.S. destroyer had a wallaby mascot during part of the war. John D. Alden, interviewed by Mike Russert Wayne Clark, New York State Military Museum, June 6, 2006, accessed February, 18, 2015, http://dmna.ny.gov/historic/veterans/transcriptions/Alden_John_D.pdf.
to urinate on some of the officers’ shoes.”\textsuperscript{90} If Alden’s story is factually accurate, it suggests the men used the dog to serve as a form of justice against the officers in order to directly avoid being charged with insubordination. Even if the story is embellished, it reveals the submariners’ recognition of the division in the collective submarine identity between the two social classes (officers and enlisted men), and provides an example of creative ways the men hoped to curb officers’ behavior.

Lacking formal power, enlisted submariners were members of the low-status group, which political scientist Leonie Huddy claims “can resort to the tactics of social creativity and social change to enhance their group's standing.”\textsuperscript{91} In other words, enlisted submariners could not use traditional means to challenge their officers, because the officers held a superior naval rank; therefore, enlisted men had to find other means in which to negotiate power within the command. For example, Billy Grieves remembered seeing his friend, who didn’t “have a stitch on,” walking through the boat and officers’ country, so Grieves asked his shipmate, “where’s your clothes?”\textsuperscript{92} Grieves laughed as he shared his friend’s response: “they [officers] work me like a damn horse. I might as well look like one.”\textsuperscript{93} According to Grieves, his memory was one of the many “funny things that went on” that “kept life worth while.”\textsuperscript{94} The existence of an ‘officer country’ alone, is proof of the social division onboard, but the story also suggests at least some enlisted submariners harbored resentment for their officers. Although Grieves did not state what led to his friend feeling overworked or whether he was punished for his actions, his goal

\textsuperscript{90} Alden, New York State Military Museum.
\textsuperscript{91} Huddy, “Contrasting Theoretical Approaches to Intergroup Relations,” 956.
\textsuperscript{92} Grieves, The Digital Collections of the National WWII Museum.
\textsuperscript{93} Grieves, The Digital Collections of the National WWII Museum.
\textsuperscript{94} Grieves, The Digital Collections of the National WWII Museum.
was to gain attention and make a statement by walking naked through the hallway in which the officers lived and worked.\textsuperscript{95}

Generally, individual submariners were responsible for conducting the creative negotiations onboard. Rather than seeking to negotiate on behalf of his fellow crewmembers, an individual usually engaged in creative negotiations in order to gain personally. Whether the reward the enlisted submariner hoped to gain was less work or greater respect, his actions were motivated by the individual’s personal wants, but the submariner’s perception of the submarine collective’s values might have served as his justification. Similarly, the outcome of individual negotiations had the potential to affect other submariners’ expectations and their perception of the collective’s values.

Most officers accepted or even embraced the informal culture, but some officers, especially the young ensigns, were ‘sticklers’ for formal naval protocol and expected enlisted men to follow naval traditions and formalities that the men perceived as inconsistent the Submarine Force’s identity. In his personal correspondence with Knoblock, Hosey Mays, a steward on the \textit{USS Crevalle} (SS-291) and \textit{USS Bowfin} (SS-287) argued, “these young ensigns’ could never get coffee themselves.”\textsuperscript{96} Mays continued: “it was up to us to break them in. We [stewards] had our way of dealing with them.”\textsuperscript{97} According to Knoblock, although stewards were the lowest social group in the submarines hierarchy, they were able to negotiate power with officers by not preparing meals correctly, serving cold coffee, or not serving the officer coffee at all.

\textsuperscript{95} Officers’ country was a hallway with the wardroom and officers’ staterooms. It was not off-limits to enlisted submariners, but unless it was absolutely necessary (which it often was due to the layout of the submarine), the passageway was avoided out of respectful for the officers. Nudity and vulgarity were not uncommon on WWII submarines, but this submariner’s actions may have also been a statement about his masculinity.

\textsuperscript{96} Knoblock, \textit{Black Submariners}, 105

\textsuperscript{97} Knoblock, \textit{Black Submariners}, 105
Schratz recognized some young officers were not accustomed to submarine culture and stated, “the [enlisted] men…had their own guileless ways of influencing officers toward preferred behavior.” According to Schratz, one officer onboard his submarine always asked for coffee as soon as he got to the bridge. Then he would complain that it was ‘freezing cold’ and spit it out. Schratz stated that the enlisted watch below grew tired of the officer’s behavior and thought this particular officer should take his own coffee to the bridge, just like every other man onboard, officer and enlisted. Schratz recognized the enlisted man’s problem with the officer’s request and perceived lack of respect, but rather than confronting the officer in question, he allowed the enlisted man to take care of the situation himself:

To get the point across, one evening a mug was put in the conning tower air conditioning coil for several hours before he came on watch and a pot of molten hot coffee kept ready in the galley. As soon as the OOD [Officer of the Deck] ordered coffee, the pot was passed up to the conning tower, poured into the frosted cup and quickly sent to the bridge. The OOD grabbed the icy cup and swallowed a mouthful, started to complain and immediately lost his voice to the scalding beverage. Neither the incident nor the request happened again.

The enlisted submariner effectively negotiated power with his superior without being punished, because rather than directly disobeying the orders from his officer, the enlisted man merely flirted with insubordination. The enlisted man perceived the officer’s insistence on this special privilege as unacceptable to the submarine identity, so he used his informal power of getting coffee to negotiate with the officer’s formal power associated with rank. This story is also revealing because it suggests, at least in this case,

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98 Schratz, Submarine Commander, 56.
99 Schratz, Submarine Commander, 56.
100 Officer of the Deck (OOD) was an officer in charge of a watch-section. The crew and officers, with the exception of the captain, rotated in shifts and the OOD was the senior officer of the shift. The OOD was in the control room when the boat was underwater and on the bridge when the boat was on the surface. The bridge refers to the top of the sail, which was at the highest point of the submarine and allowed for the best sight for navigation and contact coordination. Schratz, Submarine Commander, 56.
that the CO provided space within his command for the negotiation to take place. The captain was aware of the incident but did not punish the enlisted submariner.

Wilbur Meyer spoke about a “spit-and-polish” officer onboard the USS Catfish whom the men detested, because the officer expected the men to follow naval formalities.\textsuperscript{101} The conflict itself reflects the crew’s perception of the Submarine Force and the men’s expectation for officers to be less formal. Outranked, Meyer and his shipmates lacked the power to reprimand the officer formally for his offence. In order to ‘punish’ the officer, the men sarcastically referring to him as, “the little admiral.”\textsuperscript{102} Although the officer held a higher rank than the crewmembers, it also appears the men perceived his behavior as a deviation from ‘submarine culture’ and did not believe his naval rank necessarily translated to respect or traditional naval privileges. It appears that the boat’s captain shared the mindset of his crew because, according to Meyer, one day when the CO was particular officer, the captain yelled: “Where is that little admiral anyway?”\textsuperscript{103} It is possible that the commanding officer used the crew’s nickname for the officer because the CO may not have respected this officer either. The captain may have also pretended to share the crew’s values because he understood the importance of the crew to his own success and recognized the officer was a threat to their men’s morale.

In the same interview, Meyer claimed the USS Catfish’s crew “was always pulling jokes and so forth,” which, according to multiple submariners, was a common habit for crews.\textsuperscript{104} Meyer’s CO not only allowed his crew to play jokes, but Meyer remembered that the captain took an active role in pulling pranks. An example Meyer

\textsuperscript{101}Meyer, Park Tudor School of Words Oral History Collection.
\textsuperscript{102}Meyer, Park Tudor School of Words Oral History Collection.
\textsuperscript{103}Meyer, Park Tudor School of Words Oral History Collection.
\textsuperscript{104}Meyer, Park Tudor School of Words Oral History Collection; Grieves, The Digital Collections of the National WWII Museum; Whitlock and Smith, The Depths of Courage, 188.
offers took place when the ship was on the surface and he was working topside. Meyer joked with the CO, “captain, don’t dive this boat while I’m back there, because I’m not too fast,” and the captain gave his assurance that he would not dive while Meyer was busy. According to Meyer, “while I was back there I heard, ‘Dive! Dive! Dive!’” Meyer threw his gun in the water and ran to the hatch to get below, but it was only a drill that the CO thought would be humorous. The CO of the USS Catfish’s participation in the pranks suggests, like most captains, he embraced the culture onboard, but it appears the young officers on their first submarine were less accepting of the informal social structure. Before initially reporting to their submarines, young officers, or ensigns, attended formal military training for a longer period of time than enlisted men. After graduating from the Naval Academy or completion of Officer Candidate School, which consisted of months of instruction led by officers from the general service, it is likely that new officers expected certain traditional naval privileges and level of prestige onboard their submarines.

Joseph Benedict Coulter Jr., a machinist mate on the S-42 (SS-153), suggests some enlisted submariners ignored orders from young ensigns, who recently finished college and became naval officers by attending ninety days at Officer Candidate School, or “90 day wonders.” Coulter claims the social environment on the S-42 was relaxed, except for a ‘90 day wonder’ who frustrated the crew. One time, the officer told Coulter and the other five enlisted members of the engine room crew to “wipe down the engines”

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105 Meyer, Park Tudor School of Words Oral History Collection.
106 Meyer, Park Tudor School of Words Oral History Collection.
107 Coulter, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
before leaving the boat. According to Coulter, the ensign’s order was an abuse of power because usually the ship’s crew was free to “take off and go on liberty” and a relief crew took control the boat when it pulled into port. Coulter attempted to justify his position by arguing that in the previous ports “nobody had ever told us to wipe down the engines.” Coulter claims, the officer was standing below an open hatch in the engine room while ordering the men to wipe the engine, and “a seagull flew over and dropped a load right on his left shoulder, went all the way down to belt.” Then, as the ‘90 day wonder’ went to his room to change clothes, the enlisted enginemen left for the Royal Hawaiian Hotel without cleaning the engine. Coulter and his fellow engineman did not debate the officer’s order with the goal of closing the gap between submarine officers and enlisted submariners on the S-42 or throughout the Submarine Force. Instead, the men’s motivation was for their own immediate benefit. Coulter simply preferred to spend his time at the hotel, probably drinking beer rather than cleaning the engine.

Coulter’s story reveals an interesting dynamic and power structure onboard the submarine because, although the ensign held a higher military rank, Coulter and the other enginemen did not recognize his authority or ‘superiority.’ Coulter argues that most of the “90 day wonders” had “no idea what they were doing. They were just there. And so

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108 In his story, Coulter suggests the story takes place in Honolulu, but he references the Royal Hawaiian Hotel which was the hotel submariners stayed in while they were in the submarine port: Pearl Harbor. “Take off and go on liberty” means to leave the boat for the night or longer. Coulter, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.

109 Coulter, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress. After each patrol, the crew turned over the submarine to a ‘relief crew’ made up of submariners attached to the squadron who performed maintenance and guarded the boat, until the submarine’s crew returned from a few weeks of liberty. It was common practice for the navy to send submarines to a U.S. naval yard for large overhauls and allow the crews to take leave after five patrols. For more information about submarine manning, see: Roscoe, United States Submarine Operations in World War II, 17.

110 Coulter, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
every once in a while, they would try to assert themselves and cause some problems.”

Although not explicitly mentioned, based on his rank and Coulter’s negative portrayal of the officer, the ensign was probably not qualified in submarines, which may have made the qualified enlisted men believe he was not a ‘real submariner.’ As an officer, the ensign held a higher naval rank than Coulter; however, if the officer was not qualified in submarines, his rank would not necessarily translate to power in Coulter’s perception of the informal social hierarchy on the submarine. Coulter does not mention if the enlisted men would have followed the orders if the officer did not have to change clothes, but he jokes that he took bird’s “load” as an omen and that now he has “a special regard for seagulls.” Even if the sea story may be embellished to provide humor for his audience, Coulter’s insistence that after returning from previous underways, the enlisted men were not required to clean the engine before going on liberty reveals that the crewmembers had expectations as to what they perceived to be legitimate orders from their officers. The story also sheds light on the power structure onboard WWII submarines, and suggests some degree of tension and resentment existed between members of the two social classes on the submarine.

Although the submarine identity was not the men’s primary identifier while on patrol, the submarine collective’s values were not unlearned or forgotten. The enlisted men used their perception of the collective submarine identity to justify grievances and negotiate with officers on the submarine. The collective submarine identity’s core values, such as the submariners’ distinction from, and superiority to, the general service, allowed

111 Coulter, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
112 Ensign is the most junior officer rank. As a ‘90 day wonder,’ the ensign did not have previous military experience. Due to the rapid promotion of submarine officers, it is likely that most officers were promoted to the next rank, Lieutenant (junior grade), shortly after he qualified in submarines.
113 Coulter, Veterans History Project, American Folklife Center, Library of Congress.
the enlisted men to legitimate their demands for a less formal social climate onboard. The crewmembers’ right to unvolunteer or request a transfer ensured the submarine’s CO addressed the concerns of the enlisted men under his command. It was important for enlisted submariners to recognize when to settle, because unvolunteering was a last resort. However, a submarine captain also needed to compromise before compromising the crew’s morale.

Although members of the Submarine Force shared a collective identity while in port, without individuals outside the boundaries of the in-group while on patrol, the collective submarine identity did not provide the individual submariners with an opportunity to distinguish themselves from others. In other words, the in-group’s cohesion was dependent upon the out-group’s presence. While a group meets individuals’ need for belonging, without an out-group, the in-group fails to meet the members’ need for distinction. Intergroup conflicts raised in-group cohesiveness and served to fuse individuals’ identity with that of the collective. However, intragroup conflict was more prevalent without the presence an out-group for the collective to contrast. Lacking an out-group with which to collectively negotiate, the in-group’s membership fractured into new factions and individuals negotiated for power with one another based on the boundaries of the new factions.
CONCLUSION

Although every individual is unique, scholars often classify individuals into groups in order to contribute to the historiography and answer significant issues.

Classification within academia is not only acceptable but also necessary, because even if the sources existed for an examination of each and every individual independently, the task would obviously be impossibly time-consuming and also fail to answer wider concepts. The scope of a scholar’s study often determines the narrowness of his or her categorizations. For example, every member of the Submarine Force during WWII was unique and the degree in which each individual associated himself with the submarine collective varied, but this project’s scope requires a degree of homogenization about the collective based on the majority of submariners’ experiences and perceptions.

Generalizations may be an unfortunate but necessary product of a study, but it is essential that the audience does not falsely perceive the categories as strict, monolithic groups.

Although it is human nature for people to “categorize and simplify,” Ania Loomba claims that the classification of individuals into groups can lead to dangerous effects such as stereotyping and intolerance.\(^\text{357}\) The classification of individuals into groups is considered natural behavior that may be necessary for some studies, but academics must be careful not to perpetuate the myth that a group’s membership is homogeneous. The scope of a study may lead the researcher to make claims based on individuals’ common characteristics. Scholars, however, have the responsibility to clearly inform their

audience that individual identities are complicated and depend on too many variables to be accurately portray as monolithic based on an attribute that individuals share.

The officers and enlisted men who served in the in the United States Submarine Force were members of the U.S. Navy. Most, but not all, primarily identified themselves and each other as submariners rather than sailors. Originally, the U.S. Navy initiated the intra-service rivalry by portraying submariners as outsiders, due to the press and government’s negative portrayal of submarines after Germany’s use of unrestricted submarine warfare during the WWI. The Submarine Force gained greater autonomy during the inter-war period, which granted submariners space to create their own unique identity during WWII. By negatively portraying traditional naval regulations during WWII, the Submarine Force’s leadership perpetuated the membership’s perception that submariners were different from sailors in the general service. The portrayal of outsiders as untrustworthy or incompetent fostered strong cohesion and *esprit de corps* within the force and granted the leadership authority, but it also gave submariners power to negotiate by rejecting naval traditions as the out-group.

During WWII, most U.S. submariners shared a unique kinship and identity that was based on their collective distrust of outsiders and perception of themselves as superior to members in the general service. As with most collectives, however, the collective submarine identity was not as monolithic as its members believed. The divisions within the social group were illuminated when a submarine was on patrol. As members of the in-group categorized one another based on new criterion and negotiated for power within the submarine, because the submarine collective no longer met the members’ need for distinguishing themselves from others. The in-group’s loss of
exclusivity while a submarine was on patrol caused belonging to the submarine identity to lose value, because the collective failed to meet the membership’s need for distinction from outsiders. In other words, an individual’s sense of belonging to the submarine collective temporarily lost value while underwater, because the in-group’s membership lacked a common out-group against which to collectively compete and negotiate.

After the war, WWII submariners monopolized the subject’s historiography for a number of reasons. First, the terminology and equipment onboard submarines made it difficult for outsiders to write about the subject. Submariners were probably less likely to share their experiences with outsiders, due to the collective’s distrust of others throughout the war. Another reason is that the submariners did not believe that outsiders fairly represented the Submarine Force’s efforts and results during the war. Whether directly or indirectly, the evidence suggests that their perception that other authors did not accurately credit the Submarine Force was a symptom of the collective’s distrust of outsiders.

Submariners’ perception of themselves as misrepresented or mistreated did not end with the war. Although submarines gained positive media attention and submarine officers advanced to higher positions within the navy after WWII, many members of the Submarine Force, whether they served during the war or volunteered afterwards, continued to believe that submariners were misunderstood ‘underdogs.’ Experienced submariners may have passed the force’s values to new volunteers on the boats or during submarine training. Post-WWII submariners may have also been exposed to the submarine literature which, written almost exclusively by WWII submariners, further perpetuated the perception of the Submarine Force as distinct from the general service.
The Submarine Force has gone through multiple changes but members of the submarine community today, which consists of multiple generations of submariners, present themselves as connected to the members of the submariners during WWII. For example, similar to WWII submariners, members of the submarine community today present themselves as a collective when threatened by outsiders. It is likely that although the Submarine Force has changed substantially since WWII, the force’s leadership actively fostered the post-WWII submariners’ perception that they were connected to the men who fought on submarines during the war. According to Psychiatrists, Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel “the ability to identify with a group and the past history of such identification are probably the most important... components of good motivation for combat.”

In other words, by presenting post-WWII submariners as the ‘same’ as WWII submariners, the Submarine Force’s leadership maintained the service’s historic values such as bravery and motivated the submariners to fight not only for themselves, but also for the submariners who came before them.

Although members of the submarine community present themselves as a united social group that shares a collective submarine identity with WWII submariners, the force’s identity has evolved with the development of new technology and shifts in the nation’s culture over the past seventy years. After WWII, the invention of nuclear-powered submarines created a rift within the submarine community and members of the Submarine Force had an identity crisis. Some submariners argued that a ‘real submariner’ served on a diesel submarine because it was tradition, while other argued that a ‘real submariner’ served on a nuclear-powered submarine because the new technology allowed

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the submariners to remain submerged for extended periods. The debate climaxed in the late 1960s as the number of submariners on nuclear-powered submarines eclipsed the number of diesel-boat submariners. Since then, members of the community also debate whether men on fast-attack submariners or ‘boomers’ are real submariners.

Although the Submarine Force has changed substantially since WWII, the submarine community today does resemble the collective submarine identity during WWII in many ways. For example, the Submarine Force still consists of volunteers who must meet high-standards to attend submarine training in Groton, Connecticut. A submariner today must also complete a strenuous qualification process on the submarine to earn his Submarine Warfare Insignia, or dolphins. Members of the Submarine Force today also often perceive themselves as a social group separate from and superior to the rest of the navy. Similar to WWII submariners, most submariners today also perceive themselves as a united collective to outsiders, but negotiate power while underway.

Blogs, forums, and Facebook groups that are dedicated to submariners provide evidence that members of the submarine community perceive a sense of belonging with submariners of all generations around their collective distinction from outsiders. Post-WWII submariner Jim Christley’s describes the ‘submarine tradition’ as:

There is something about the submarine service. It tends to create a bond between those who have served that is born of trust. Every submariner who ever put to sea and submerged has placed in the hands of another, their very lives. The bond is not one of close friendship, even though those do grow out of the time spent aboard a boat. It is one of mutual respect - blind to color, ethnicity, religion, nationality and gender. The bond is one of personal responsibility. Not everyone has it. Some don't even know what personal responsibility is. Submariners know what it is. It is their way of life. The trust and respect and sense of personal responsibility is.... ‘The Submarine Tradition...’

However, although submariners like Christley perceive the submarine community as a homogenous group and the online forums and groups were created with the intention to foster in-group unity, the spaces are where divisions within the community are most prevalent. Similar to the WWII submariners who split into factions while on patrol, without outsiders with which to collectively debate online, the bond between members of the dissolves. In other words, the ties that bind individuals to an in-group and its membership are not the individuals’ similarities to one another, but their collective perception of distinction from outsiders.\(^{361}\)

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