A STATE BETWEEN: A CARING-VIRTUOSIC ARGUMENT CONSIDERING DECISION-MAKING BEFORE WARTIME

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation attempts to illumine concepts used to deescalate warring measures designed to protect a nation-State, offered by traditional justice ethics, by synthesizing those ethics with the ethics of care. Because ancient, justice-based ethics were derived while moralizing the virtuosic roles that imply interdependency, and, more relatively, protection, it is imperative that we examine what war-measure contributions seem to be overshadowed in ethical decision-making affecting the community-at-large through virtue and care. In suggesting ideas for warring measures to be contemplated based on evaluating the protective human state of nature within the community-at-large, I expand on the intermediary caring state of nature existing between the extremes of Lockean-Hobbesian social contract theses. Considering views that are compatible with foremost just-war theories, I argue that our original state of nature is not absolutely cruel and not absolutely utopic, but originally engrossed in a sort of compulsive protection of community members, exhibiting traits of both care and virtue under differently-carried habits of protection. In regard to arguing a contest to a caring ontology, ideas of the caring-relational being is used to measure the question of how we ought to go about warring while simultaneously active in a society implementing a protective state of nature. The position of war being ethically unjust or ethically just ought to be evaluated by both the ethics of care and virtue ethics, producing a decision from the dialectical synthesis of compassionate conflict developing an ethical decision from both virtue and care ethics. Conclusively, this dissertation aims to present how protection-as-ontology is best understood by synthesizing virtue and care ethics, as both theses are normative and require analysis of observable character and cognitive-behavioral traits.
I. Interdependency and Independence: Special Knowledges, Relative Authority, and the Inclusion of Care Ethics

II. Compassionate Conflict: Dialectical Syntheses Between Care and Virtue Ethics Within the Community-At-Large

III. Virtuous Care as Protective Ontology in Human State of Nature as Applied to Popular Social Contract Theories

IV. The Ally- and Enemy-Perceived: Ontologically-Interdependent Relationships and Deriving General Wills of the Community-At-Large

I. Interdependency and Independence: Special Knowledges, Relative Authority, and the Inclusion of Care Ethics

Hence, while the generalisability of the results is limited, the (caring) thesis rather aims at contributing to the construction of a global Ethics of Care on a political level by developing a theoretical framework and testing its applicability exemplary. (Eberstein, 2016)

When we glance at what signifies protection\(^1\) under Robinson’s reasoning of relational ontology, we are struck with a primordial and present concern in that, if our existential ontology is relational as Robinson assumes, we should “question the term human in human security,” or, in human protection, which “could conceal the gendered

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\(^1\) Robinson uses the term “security.”
underpinnings of security practices” (53). A moral panic seems reasonable if we are to admit that our ontology is relational and that we are in some way trying to materialize the most ultimate disagreement that can had be by any living organism through war. When we analyze Robinson’s relational-ontological argument, we swiftly identify that relations existing within human security cannot conduce “collapsing” (53) of certain identities if we are to be a more caring, included people. Robinson terms the ontological argument as “that [when] all human beings exist at a fundamental level in relation to others” (54). This claim comes as an objection to the idea that we can make a “superficial empirical claim” that simply “refer[s] to connections between people” (54). To Robinson, if our “existence is relational” it defers to all “moral, social, and political subjects and to the ontological basis of human life” (54-5).

This claim is massive in scope, for so many ontological ethical theorists have undertaken this study with a massive heave of luck and scholarship! Robinson seems to be suggesting that it is a fundamental human ignorance to deny that our ontology, or, “the philosophical study of the nature of being, becoming, existence, or reality, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations” (Oxford) relies on caring relations between people in order to continue adding to our ontology (for, we cannot write if we have no in some way related to one other that the connections between us are not so much classifiable as they are relational and productive, not stagnant). When we begin to see that “to consider, and seek to address, an individual’s security” (55) takes the consideration of the relationship that individual has to other individuals, we have few other choices than to infer how Robinson’s philosophical ontology argument generates key questions about the fundamental aspect of human nature’s becoming to itself: that, to
come into existence is reliant upon non-violence suggests that our ontology is naturally
caring for we, again, are only able to talk about ontology because we have survived long
enough to do so. Robinson – as well as the defense-at-hand – correlates our
interdependent existence as motivated by the ethics of care.

In that justice ethics\(^2\) mostly deliberate decision-making in wartime, there are
seeming shortcomings in these ethics if forgoing an entire ethics such as the ethics of care
when inquiring whether to war. When making decisions of whether to war,\(^3\) we ought to
consult relative authority, which does not diminish the value of the care ethics in that
consideration process. Decisions made for the welfare, or, security of a State (or, nation-State[s]) being threatened ought to be deemed truly threatened through critically
evaluating the entire circumstance around the potential conflict. By excusing the care
ethics from the table of conversation, we can see that, in dominant western ethics
(particularly virtue, Christian, and utilitarian ethics), there will be limited dinner guests
speaking on altruistic matters through exclusionary dialogue (Stevenson). Relative
authority, that is, the authority one is granted by public trust for the well-being or the
betterment of the nation-State, is omitted by the nature of excluding care ethics from the
conversation, well intended or not, by its own biased refusal of pertinent authorities in
tense moments of decision-making. Summed with more eloquence and brevity, Aristotle
contends that “it is equally absurd to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician,
and to demand scientific proof from an orator” (1095a). Though we may incur limitations

\(^2\) Virtue ethics, which is the ethical system found within the justice-ethics, is the ethical system we will be
most privy to in this dissertation.
\(^3\) We recognize that war is not inherently cyclical, nor is war always declared; we recognize prolonged
wars, both declared and non-declared wars between nation-States, and global wars as substantiating what
constitutes as “war.”
in adopting Aristotle’s line of logic here, for many great scientists orate (Carl Sagan, who publicly informs of science proofs mainly through his art of oration) and many great mathematicians reason (Raymond Damadian, MRI inventor who reasons creationism alongside mathematical science), we may also observe the broader scope of his claim for relative authority. For, to omit the authority relative from a caring standpoint is to omit relevant and potentially pertinent decisions from arising under the ethical-conceptual framework most readily accepted. Challenged conclusions, even within the nation-State concerned with protection, is healthy in exchanging a smooth influx of global diplomacy for a same means, protection, drawn from different reasons of moral relativism. Relative authority disbands decision-making founded on base, compulsory power motivations and places emphasis on the authority and special, distinguishable professional skills (Luizzi), or special knowledges, that deems a decision credible by the decision-maker (thus perhaps unsheathing from this person a special knowledge unique to the individual but a knowledge that ought to be shared with society in its deficit of such knowledge); relative authority, rather, includes the inclusive and only excludes the inappropriate-exclusive. The human, said briefly “has a certain gift or faculty in relation to some good and admirable thing” (Aristotle 1101b), and said more contemporaneously, humans

4 Taking Ridley’s aim on how one should “resisting relativism” (4) is appropriate when we seek to make absolute statements from relative standpoints. However, that does not imply to act freely as one would with the knowledge that others, for better or worse, perceive differently if they perceive actual reality at all; even Theaetetus has his “limits” (49). Ridley also discusses “resisting bloodshed” (3), which freely investigates empirical inquiries in accordance with ethical questions that find value in measurement (utilitarian ethics), person-interactionism/consequence (deontological ethics), and habit (virtue ethics).

5 It can be assumed that, if every thinker is present and not excluded by some social mean, moral individualism would suffer greatly as a majority ideology in its name and application.

6 People’s “work, then, must be brought to an equality. . .the builder then must take some of the shoemaker’s work, and give him his own work in exchange” (1133a) contends Aristotle, elaborating on how relative authority is demonstrated and utilized by individuals in the community-at-large, but not bestowed for disagreeable reasons.
“deserve the state’s special concern in changing their status quo” (Yuan 118). The idea is that the humble admission of interdependence should diminish the possibility of an actualized plutocracy.

For, it is appropriate to disband from the conversation of a heightened threat, say, with one who is negating the care ethicist’s point taking into contemplation the ruling of Flomo v. Firestone. Well⁷, if it was not for our nation-State exchanging deals we knew weren’t tolerated in our own country (Flomo), may begin the care ethicist, if given equitable opportunity to speak, and if it was not for financial benefit in which this was done (not to mention, the import-export agreement involving labor laws long parted in the U.S.), perhaps Liberia would feel less exploited and Mr. Firestone (Flomo) would not have escalated trade tensions in another territory – we owe (in this thought experiment) Liberia some reparation; though neither they nor did we aggress to war, we initiated the line of communication; and, as it is often said, communication in the world is mostly made through construction or destruction, so we cannot help but see that we have initiated the Liberian people’s anger. Let us not allow our communication to become more destructive than our actions have already been to the Liberian community-at-large. Of course, they needed money. Of course, Mr. Firestone did, too. Of course, Mr. Firestone was well aware of the Liberian farmers’ routine life, and of course, in knowing his own company well and hopefully insomuch, knowing his assembly and manufacturing process well, Mr. Firestone cannot deny knowing the capacity at which the workers would be forced to meet demands they were most surely unaware of prior to accepting this trade-exchange. Observing Mr. Firestone not only sharing his special knowledge of

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⁷ Let us take this to be a thought experiment considering the input of the care ethicist.
enterprise and foreign trade, but using his special knowledge as a trite and partial bogey resistant to its own self-harm is a weakness, in the denotative, strict sense of the word, and not a strength; Firestone’s actions are, or ought to be, viewed as a special weakness in that, had he the humility to request the interdependent special knowledge of a social scientist, even, he would have potential access to the knowledge that exploitation goes further than the dollar which rubs in between a myriad thumbs, but into the community-at-large.

Mr. Firestone, finding through a learned social scientist, may have been informed that, yes, he was providing good economic work, but work that labor-laws in his own country made impermissible were knowingly imparted on Liberian agriculturists with no restrictions into another nation-State where this same company was introduced (Flomo). We can see how this example is uncaring of another nation-State’s moral relativism, but also inattentive to it. Say that the Liberian farmers showed no remorse with over-laboring their children to meet the demands of Mr. Firestone; here is where the justice-centric thinker may be inclined to say, “to each his own,” as it is said so often. The justice-centric thinker may be inclined to say, “the terms were laid clean; the Liberians knew what they were doing and they signed, they said yes, they said – ” and it is here that the care ethicist might respectfully interject, “but we have laws in our own country that prevent this exact, indistinguishable labor exploitation; we are not forcing an absolute, though perhaps coercing a more positive way of work that, only through having such work can a people come to implement labor laws such as our own – and in knowing that – we ought to enforce the same protection over child workers in Liberia, if doing business under our trade; these are customs that we would enforce in our nation-State, so it is
irrational and cruel to deny it to another.” The priority (Held) of measuring authority one may govern over a high body of peoples should relate to the decision-making persons’ personhood in that personhood is entirely ontological (Robinson); it is not in this suggestion to make a decision entirely personal, but to confirm that a special knowledge arises from the personal and can be incorporated successfully into the diplomatic. For brevity’s sake, humans seem to be ontologically bound to the relationship of protection and interdependency, not everlasting war. War, in its many contradictions, is the ultimate seeking of peace – for, what could be more peaceful than a nation-State at peace with other co-relative nation-States?

The value of interdependence can be traced back not only to Aristotle, but to Eva Kittay (as a direct contributor to care ethics) and Marxist (“of Karl Marx,” not “neo-Marxism”) thinking, too. Kittay takes the approach of relating the labor market to the non-disclosed aspects of applicable theorems to human nature (Kittay). Karl Marx also relates the ideas that the labor market is exploitative in that it seeks to commodify the person-as-market instead of promoting the interdependence between person and market (Somerville); i.e., the market does not exist without relation to the person, and reverse-wise. Let us consider these theories offered by Kittay and Marx as relatable approaches to understanding how care as an ethic has been undermined by the market system by its sheer lack of representation in mass-publication or in critical-thinking studies. It cannot be in our ontological interest to war, for that is an evolutionary contradiction; there is a

8 Let us concern ourselves with both Eva Kittay’s and Karl Marx’s emphasis on an empathetic concern from others made stable and rectified by the community-at-large and not the multitude of differences the two share; it is a patronizing statement to make, but a fair one, in that we should recognize the idea of communism to the extent at which applying its political philosophy entirely will not only deem this paper unreadable, but will devoid the point being made about caring-virtuosic integration being made possible through dialectic (which is not entirely allowable, dialectic, in communism).
popular “war is natural selection” half-chewed theory in the lay conversation considering war to be nature’s selective force on societies that are not “advanced.” Twenty per-cent of the world is considered socio- and eco-politically developed (Hoefnagels). So, this sort of thinking is not only denigrating to eighty percent of ontologically-related peoples, but thinking only able to be popular in one-fifth of the world’s perception; in that this thinking is, however, popular, that evolution somehow informs the organism to war (as if an organism would survive by decreasing its overall fitness by the killing of itself without a means of reproduction but for a sheer conceptual battle) (Coyne) gives us another insight into the lack of concern given to serious ethical ideas to reduce the frequency of letting diplomatic thinking reach happy-handledly towards the option of war.

Given this sort of relational nature-state, we ought to look into our species’ extremes between Lockean (empirically based – think a place without society is a place without possession of anything at all) and Hobbesian (abstractly based – think a place without society must be barren hell) states of nature (Able),9 for a more lukewarm state of nature representative in ancient, primordial societies neither absolutely barbaric nor absolutely utopic, or, ultimately reliant on the empirical or the abstract, yet existing as virtuous and interdependent, basing moral judgements from protecting others from the barbaric and utopic (as conceptual ideals of protection, to protect from the barbaric and to strive for the utopic) related to interdependence gained through protective actions habituated;10 perhaps this state of nature is that in which humans agree, in tacit or

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9 Note that, at least on their surfaces, these two social contract theories are extremes in themselves.
10 To qualify this lengthy sentence, it is to not only highlight the complication of finding a “truthful” synthesis from two extremes; this implies that prudent considerations are given to certain circumstances that present extremes that are not simple to tame. However, it is inasmuch as waste, or, an Aristotelian “empty notion” to try and identify extremes to run through a dialectical synthesis method if these extremes are not in some way inclusive of each other conceptually, if not materially.
verbalized bargains, to protect and accommodate the domicile, whatever habitat that may have been. This confers a sort of acknowledged interdependency which justice ethics remain bashful. Virtue ethics seem less bashful to interdependency in that they do incorporate behavior. It would be the job to synthesize, then, the virtue ethics aside from other dominant ethics when establishing an ontological argument for the normative syntheses of both care and virtue. However, even with theories that emphasize the wrongness of exploitation in relation to commodification of peoples (Somerville), we can see that a call-to-action is not enough if the voice is not present at the philosophical dinner table.

The purpose of protection seems to be, both empirically and abstractly, to amalgamate peoples into a livable society from the drifting unknown state of nature and the most-closely-known state of nature, to further enter into a – supposedly declared – completely imperfect society, building from what can be most-closely-known of the customs from that society;¹¹ and, in doing so, successively casting better moral lights, it seems – we sure have become less violent as a species; more problematic, possibly, but certainly less violent. Essentially, the purpose of protection is for the society to have the ability to establish purpose. Our better light, as a human, for better or worse, has always been protection. There are few weaker – by definition of evolutionary fitness – organisms than the virus compared to the self-acclaimed-to-be-self-sustained self-preserving human (Zimmer).

A victimless society echoes failed attempts of achieving easily-spoken ideals: backbreaking, trope-heavy models that do seem worth striving for, but are as mentioned,

¹¹ The larger question of what informs the way we come to judge the value of the customs of our society? is attempted through the caring-virtuosic argument.
backbreaking; nevertheless, understanding that protection is derived from tamed extremes sheds more discernment on its importance in the argument for caring decision-making. Striving implies an extreme, as if in a ceaseless misery of one’s own doing not for oneself at all. Since protection cannot be an extreme in itself, or it defeats itself by its own defined logic, protection in its multitude of forms does not imply radicalism; respectfully the opposite, it implies tameness and joyful reproduction of decent human behavior. Being decent enough a species to at once have congregated in what must have been a much muddled – and much more puzzling in its simplicity – society implies the resiliency of the human, which speaks of the human’s successful preservation. Our protection does not only score high on scholastic charts – our protection validates or denies scores on scholastic charts, for the virtue of protection is a habit that is uniquely and totally human in its frequency and selective applicability. Protection, therefore, cannot be an extreme, but the synthesis\(^{12}\) of two extremes that encourages safety in a fortunate wholesome community-at-large, which is an applicable model to a global approach. Care and virtue, as ethics, are conflicting extremes – at least in the strict Aristotelian sense – and we must use a proper dialectical synthesis, then, to again, tame the extremes and find a closest range of actions to comport our protective actions within (Aristotle); virtue theory most allows this type of reasoning within its ethical system, and more than deontological, utilitarian, and western-Christian ethics, for virtue ethics appear to be the most comfortable system with the idea of gradual change and deals with character traits (Coleman);\(^{13}\) thus, in application of its value systems over time, the ambiguity of virtue is

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\(^{12}\) The dialectical synthesis occurring between the extremes of protection-as-virtue and protection-as-relational-care.

\(^{13}\) The ethics of care offers normative approaches just as virtue ethics do. Kantian ethics focus heavily on consequentialism; utilitarian ethics, in regard to synthesis, do not seem applicable for the action places a
made more clear and ought to suggest there is “something missing” (Stevenson) in the ethical system.

In an attempt to advert from both heavy-handed consequentialist and normative teleology and non-consequentialist normative deontology, and instead focusing on virtue ethics (which seeks to answer ethical issues with the character traits of a person) (Audi), let us then concern ourselves over the striking commonalities shared by caring ethics and virtue ethics which distinguishes virtue theory as a classifiable ethical system able to manifest the concept of integrating care ethics in stating that to care is to protect, and to successively and successfully protect is a habit, thus can become virtue. The two theories are harmonious in their disagreeable, dyadic relationship; dialectical synthesis theory allows for caring ethics and virtue ethics to be carried to fruition. To Aristotle – and the virtue-theorists-at-large – an act is good or bad based on the character trait exhibited by the one who does action. This is why protective, habitual modalities – operating distinctly and, what appears to be most correctly, through traits of caring ethics – and the ontological argument of protective action as a caring action align so well with virtue theory – integrating the two concepts of how to “go about protection” is precisely the goal of the ethics of care. In any ethic deeming itself dominant, we are sure to lose voices that are imperative to compassionate conflict, the ruling of those with relative authority

value on life that is not relatable, but quantifiable. For these reasons and among others it appears that the ethics of care synthesizes more closely with virtue ethics.

14 The idea of an emergent care-ethics-as-application from already existing values is similar to Aldo Leopold’s notion of The Land Ethic: “there is yet an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land. . .ethics are possibly a kind of community instincts in the making. . .the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts” (Leopold). The idea is that worthwhile ethical systems are often ignored in favor of preexisting, dominant ethical systems.

16 Though there will be a considerable bit of attention given to compassionate conflict, it is important to remember that this concept refers to the conceptual dialectical synthesis of two antithetical concepts
from the low District Courts through to the higher Supreme Courts), and we are most sure under a dominant ethic to lose certain resolutions that are distinctive and concertized by the ethic dismissed. The dinner table being quieter is a peaceful illusion – though, the conclusion-challenging chatter around the chewing, as Thomas More would have it be for Raphael Hythloday in his *Utopia*, is less illusory and more fulfilling of wholesome ideologies (More).

Ideologies claiming to be wholesome with ethical systems designed to exclude reasonable voices are censored ideologies that tend to dominate as a nation-State’s super ethic. It seems to be, however, a social myth (Somerville) that any ethical system can call itself wholesome while at once excluding, and not to the degree in which exclusion is necessary, say, when one enters a dialogic setting with no real effort to obtain any relevant philosophical background to one’s argument, and resultantly spews errant-trailed *ad hominem* slurs in effort to posit. Relative authority handles this sort of academic-chauvinist, as relative authority, being wholesome, will be more ideologically diverse. Insomuch that decisions are made consulting one’s relative authority, it would be seemingly difficult to successfully deceive others into accepting ethical systems that either lack in some obvious and humanely pertinent totality, that refuse to be challenged, that remain dogmatic in their literatures, or, any systems that, under guises of rhetoric, are simply ethical systems that do not correlate with the human’s period of existence (even considering the change in the emphasis or meaning of certain words through time – e.g., the word “end” denoting both “final” and “an aim or goal”). There ought not to be sycophancy or obsequiousness in sober, serious nation-State decision-making when meeting. This concept will be further explored in relation to material, or, actionable queries as well as abstract, conceptual queries.
presented a threat. Sycophancy is transparent to those not easily deceived (though, being deceived pre-supposes wrongly a thing-or-two about one’s received education, which we will touch on lightly arguing for an equal democracy) (Tronto); for the purpose of this dissertation, evading deception in the ethics of care is somewhat analogous to one’s willingness to be conceptually-included because of one’s acknowledged special value to ethical practices in society, and thus so, fortifying the special moral value of care ethics.

II. Compassionate Conflict: Dialectical Syntheses Between Care and Virtue within the Community-At-Large

What comes after Postmodernism? By analogy with post-analytic philosophy, or post-philosophy, which seems to aim at creating a “New Alliance” between philosophy, literature and the arts, I would say that Postmodernism might be followed by some kind of “synthetic” movement which would reconstruct synthetically what has been deconstructed. (Gattinara, 2016)

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17 Joan Tronto’s caring democracy is implied by focusing the conversational interpretation towards the light of perspicuity, including the ethical standpoint often excluded from political decision-making, thus left without its being present to object to deceptive ethical practices rather than being in the room and for such deception to never run across the deceiver’s mind – for, the deceiver’s cleverness should be, if care ethicists are implemented thoroughly into decision-making, incapable of the creativity needed to fool the perspicuous-minded person.

18 It should be made aware that dialectal syntheses, if extant between the extremes of two nation-States, are also extant and at play in domestic day-to-day discourse, and thus should be analyzed to which degree the role plays in our decision-making within the community-at-large.
Hegel explains how humans abstractly, for the sake of the empirical, “need each other” in order to relate to one another through the meeting of the consciousnesses (Hegel); for, the only way for one to measure the ethical value – or any value that is – of oneself is by having one’s own self-consciousness reflected, much like the refractory tanning screen, back onto themselves from another person. Hegel implies and explains human interdependency as the view of ourselves being only possible if looked at in relation to others (Hegel). Of course, this thinking is the precursor that led Hegel to conclude that these meeting of the consciousnesses were, to a larger degree than expected, possibly shaping the ultimate (or, intelligible) reality. Now, this argument is far too existential, ponderous, and wondrously full of phenomenality to decipher, as many scholars would be kind as to admit. But, we can appreciate the stunning point G. W. F. Hegel is claiming concerning relational ontology - he concurs with Aristotle in that Hegel’s explanation, to be gently reduced, posits that we must depend on each other at least to the point of knowing our moral selves. So, in not coming to self-consciousness without another, it follows that there is a interdependency on some other (human) consciousness to reverberate back a mental image to the seeking-self. Once the seeking-self obtains that mental image – and only so by the courtesy of another self-seeking self-consciousness – are they able to come into an argument in the first place. It follows that once two self-conscious beings are able to communicate, they do so by conflict, which synthesizes into as close of a moral truth as (mainly) the community-at-large allows. We should stop here – what sort of conflict are we looking at? We are looking at dialogic

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19 It is important to remember that to Johann Fichte, the thesis-antithesis-synthesis method is an abstraction – Hegel seems to grapple with truth-seeking insomuch that his strict Hegelian dialectical method becomes more didactic and semantic than necessary for a practical, modal application.
conflict between two self-conscious individuals, interdependent on each other for such self-consciousness. Without each other’s interdependence, not to be confused with dependence, it follows that the concept of independence might not have occurred.

Concerning compassionate conflict and the two-sided dialectical method, the idea is not to edify the binary-reinforcing philosophical thought-experiment, but to analyze particular ideological extremes and find not a more moderate view for the purpose of political morality, but a more integrated view for the purpose of proper inclusion. Acknowledging social binaries with the expectation that the eradication of these social binaries by assessing the conflicts of black-and-white thinking through a sort of “poly” existence aimed to include through dialectical synthesis seems to be an ontological argument of relation more than a statement of computed truth. I.e., our ability to recognize the ailments of binary-thinking is our strength to apply binary-thinking to ethical synthesis to tame the extremes brought by the social realities constructed from polar-cognitive critical thinking patterns. Anything done wholly for its own sake and not at all or even in part for the community-at-large is, in essence, a thing done for the sake of itself. That seems fine. However, the concept of inclusion is not a simple philosophical endeavor that stands for a means to one end; insomuch, for inclusion to pull its entire weight and make available its entire effects to society, inclusion must remain virtuous and learn from, not by, the example of virtue ethics’ failures and accomplishments. Decision-making will be clearer and more inclusive, thus less offensive to the society-at-large, and more representative of our interdependent nature which requires protection. Binary thinking in society has the power to create ill social realities from non-inclusive social myths – by forcing members to act under common ideologies that represent false
dichotomies. However, thinking of the conceptual extremes in relation to virtue and ethics is not necessarily classifying binaries, but looking at dual dichotomies that help us get as close to the moral arc that is bent by our collective actions, the outcome of sequential individual action.

Observing convention with regard to the contemporaneous brings a tendency to shy away from the approach of “new convention” (for all convention is new as it is old, as convention is constant; convention is only more right or wrong, in succession through time) (Dworkin) is not to stoke conventional tradition, but to recognize that convention is only atrocious if it follows patterns of traditional abhorrence. Convention, in regard to protective decision-making, is in itself is a convenient way of achieving healthy discourse (Dworkin); the implication of tradition being associated with convention is in the repetition of the roles imparted by present convention. Convention, even in social advancement, is derivative of an informing past, which implies that new convention is not dissimilar in definition from old convention; what is so different, however, in embracing conventional approaches without implementing – like a host to the virus – the traditional social ills attached, which used convention against itself by having convention regulate illegitimate or crippling social customs.

Convention, however, is thus not analogous to tradition – that is a point worth following if using “custom” as a conduit for communication. We ought to place more worries concerning the community-at-large’s celebration of tradition, for we have seen how the longing for home, Nostos, typically bears romanticized notions of restoring a past typically romanticized (Cambridge). Let us not get confused here: integrating the

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20 Here, convention refers strictly to that which one in a society, for better or worse, adopts as a relative ways-about understanding and operating with the “things around oneself.”
conventional into the contemporary is not about reincorporating the dead into positions assumed by the living for traditions’ sake, but about bringing a first life to ethical concepts rooted from many of the now-deceased who were unable to offer such caring-ethical concepts as viable resolutions in their respective society. Aristotle thinks “it is safe to say that we just start from what is known to us” (1095b) when beginning critical thinking, but not in finishing critical thinking. Here, hostile tradition can be eliminated while new conventions, or, familiar ways to describe and live out our goings-on in a communicable manner, begin to structure themselves under better lights in the community-at-large. To finish critical thinking successfully, Aristotle may heavily depend on a statement of interdependency, stating that “we want, therefore, some one common measure of value . . . [which is] the need for each other’s services which holds the members of a society together” (1133a).21 This line of rationality, as it relates to Aristotle’s ethics, seems to suggest an intermediary position in discussing attaining an attitude within range of the mean of right action (1132b). Perhaps this suggestion leads us to readily adopt a dialectical synthesis – protection as virtue, protection as relational – between the two ethical systems to hold our actions closer to a moderate “mean” without allowing our aims to become extremes in themselves (though the ethical concepts of virtue and care are extremes, we are looking to synthesize these two extremes to produce an idea on how to more rightly carry characteristically human behavior).

When applying the theories of conflicting ethical systems such as the care and virtue ethics, we see a Hegelian dialectic in the tug between the two. Here is where our conflicting ideologies’ syntheses emerge, where compassionate conflict is integrated,

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21 To conclude his thought, Aristotle continues to say, “for if men had no needs, or no common needs, there would either be no exchange, or a different sort of exchange from that which we know” (1133a).
allowing through the aperture the new light that ought to shine on intelligent, important, serious decision-making. However, we must remember that confronting issues of war, in which we can imagine evolved macroscopically from prevailing home protection, have not successfully consulted the ethics of care. This implies that there is now a necessary, dialogic compassionate conflict in the decision-making process of the protecting nation-State itself, which further implies that all concepts are necessary when making decisions that protect and affect a community-at-large. For, if we are to war to protect a governed body of people, we must consult, too, the relative authority of the deciding bodies which will no doubt demonstrate care ethics if given a seat at the philosophical table, for they represent in parliamentary, lawmaking, or otherwise governmental presentations the bodies governed. We can see compassionate conflict emerging from care ethics; compassion, stemming from care, and conflict stemming from virtue ethics of confrontations of conflict. That there is a conflict even within the governing/protection body itself (for, applying a caring ethical system to a traditionally virtue-based ethical system – such as virtue ethics – does arise controversy) suggests the protective nation-State ought to analyze its own society’s resolution within conflicts presented by the question *ought we war to protect*. Protection is a concept both the care and virtue ethics agree upon but on fundamentally differing levels,²² Assessing the decision of whether to war under the lens of *compassionate conflict* not only includes both ethical systems in on the debate but consults the entire nation-State’s moral value and not only the virtue-centric relative morality (Cambridge).

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²² Operating as extremes of one another; this implies a moderate range that can be synthesized between the two through application to critical thought.
Let us remember that compassionate conflict in this sense does not refer to or consider conflict to be physical; dissimilarly, compassionate conflict in this text refers to the dialogic discourse that embraces differing conclusions and the challenging of such conclusions (conflict : virtue ethics) through a protected (compassionate : care ethics) intercourse of philosophical dialogue. We ought to, after assessing the validity of the synthesis (from the dialectic between care and virtue ethics), examine these values insomuch that acknowledging this decision bares a fully consulted value system that cannot be neglected. When Aristotle mentions that “opposites match with opposites” (Aristotle) we can see that there is a correlation behind human state of nature being ontologically resistant to acting any war as a true ethic is too caring, while a state of nature resistant to caring ethics is far too imprudent.

For a touch more on the application of the dialectical method to keen and properly authorized decision-making, let us relate the dialectical synthesis that compassionate conflict aims to act as an integrated ethical framework as. Let us take Adam Grant’s case on humble narcissism, two evident opposing ideas, or, theses, that, when converging, give us an antithesis to, from this bungled abstract, bring a more reasonable “closest truth” from the interaction (Grant) This concept can be used as an example of integrating to dichotomous conceptus to bring a more inclusive synthesis by the agreeable merging of the two; again, the key here is not to make co-existent the concepts of humility and narcissism, in their extremes, but to co-relate them, as coexistence implies tolerance and not relation. To coexist with another as to co-relate with another is to cheapen the ontological relationship between two peoples – the human-ontological meaning weakened, then, weakness the argument for caring ontology. This is where synthesis
differs from compromise in that through synthesis there is an attempt at inclusion and not at exclusion as in the attempt for “agreement” as compromise connotes. Shifting this tendency to simply tolerate, or, coexist with individual with whom one ignores the community of, but is part of a population, shifts towards a tendency to relate and potentially synthesize new ideologies with individuals, more conducive of a sounder nature, or, a more wholesome existence brought upon by the merging and not the discounting of the extremes. Humble narcissism seems to suggest for one to recognize one’s frailty in order to understand one’s weakness so that one might humble oneself in attaining the special knowledge one seeks from authorities-other (which will restructure one’s frailty by bricking it with interdependent guidance). A perpetually more wholesome self comes from a person-other, would admit the humble narcissist. This sort of decision-making meshes, to borrow Virginia Held’s word in double entendre, well with what ought to be more familiar dialectical syntheses so as to not be confined by the binaries, or, extremes, yet to be conceptually empowered by their synthesis, thus empirically empowered through appropriate action endowed to the community-at-large.

No better empirical analysis supports this abstract argument more than the Survivorship Type I\textsuperscript{23} ecological concept (which we will discuss when the appropriate platelet, if you will, is in the appropriate vein) (Hoefnagels). No better abstract analysis supports the empirical manifestation of a more correct or more debase decision-making process than the most inclusive dialectical synthesis of opposing theses. For this purpose,

\hspace{1em}\textsuperscript{23} This is, as stated, discussed in later detail as a bit of empirical evidence of protective ontology; though, it should not be assumed that this is used to convince of a particular truth, as no ethical system (especially one arguing from a dialectical standpoint) should strive for absolute truth. With this said, any scientific data is used as literature and because the evidence, though the intent for particular studies referred to in this thesis may have sought to find empirical truths, relate to ethics in some way that does not seek absolute truth.
it is worthwhile to analyze two extremes in conceptual thinking about our human state of nature which in its state, readied us for the tacit social contract. Locke works with the more optimistic view (through empirical, or, materialistic thinking) – Hobbes works with the more pessimistic view (through abstract thinking) (Able). Let us see if we cannot synthesize within the unfurling of this dissertation, and from our antithesis rising from the two theses of Locke and Hobbes, a range between the absolutes of empirical and abstract ideologies within a mean (or, extreme) that most sincerely represents a closest-truth-that-can-be-closest known. Might we perhaps derive protection from these two theses? It hardly seems impossible. Might we derive other syntheses from the aforementioned dialectic? Of course – but, we ought to use the most rational synthesis that equips our study with critical thought. Because dialectical synthesis allows for a state between the social contracts offered, which infers the human desire to get out of the pre-societal state of nature, we ought to consider the syntheses that follow from including a whole people’s conceptual thinking. Nonetheless, societies seem to have a stabilizing value to their entirety – that is, if they come to be and succeed, many members of the society agree to values and customs that keep (protect) the others in an altruistic fashion that is mutually beneficial, from the home out. It seems to be the proper time to bring up the human state of nature referencing protection and how the extremes of protection (to protect with relentless habit as reflexive virtue and to protect with too much empathy and no sense of, or, ability to apply limit) are demonstrated through the “moral mean” of binding to a social contract (Stevenson). For Hobbes, the state that people are all naturally in – without the social contract in play – is a “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. . .condition of men without effective government” (450). For Locke, the state that people
are all naturally in—again, without the adoption of the social contract—takes a presupposition of Hobbes’ hellish and chilling depiction of our bare state that works out the morbid wrinkles by setting a tone on the preservation of the love of our “great labor” (469) to mean nearly anything from tilling Saxonian Land (Callicott) to ordering others as a seventeenth-century-architect or rationalizing the painstaking aspects of striving to constantly protect one’s possessions from others as one would protect one’s own domicile from physical and emotional harm (Locke).

Therefore, virtue and care may very well synthesize to a closest truth between the theses: in virtue, the habit of protection and in care, the relation of protection. We see that Locke begs for a more sound society that rests on the property-making of things otherwise natural, and in that love of our creation through the laborious working unto and with nature, do we learn to enter social contracts so as to preserve, or, protect this work (as possession) and we see that Hobbes begs for a more sound society that does not rest contently on our materialization of our “great labors” as constituting for a complete society, rather focusing on the manifestation of a society from a hell as primary focus. In either case, though, we can see that both questions consult the virtue ethics (What does protection look like through comporting character?) and care ethics (What does protection look like through relational interdependency?). A close answer may respectably be that both ethical systems are conferring that protection is an ultimate aim carried out by differing modes; two sides to the same moral arc’s end points, able to be bent on either side until straight-as-can-be.

A puzzling social analogy (particular to the west) that would be useful to dispel not just for the sake of conceptualizing human relations but also for the sake of caring
decision-making, is the analogy that the western nation-State(s) is (and are) much like a “melting pot.” This reference is not specific to America but is relative to the discussion-at-hand. There have been many critical attempts at correcting this analogy, but those attempts mostly validate interdependence over interdependence (in a stew, you can still kick out potatoes if you like, and in a melting pot, it is as if the west has somehow lost its identity to gain identity). Peaceful cultural relativism existing through the universal ontological state of protective nature may very well exist in the ideal, and in more of an orderly manner rather than by simple pluralism (Somerville). For the present, imagine all the varieties of ripened fruiting plants and tilled, washed vegetation in the world; they are in a mesh bag that is so finely porous it does allow for a canteen to be filled, but for no pulp, rind, or plant-matter-whatever to be squeezed through the mesh. The leftover rinds and pulp are, imaginably, our tacit agreement to enter the social contract. The rinds and leftover squeezed vegetation represent traits and characteristics specific to the state of nature in which we are attempting to protect ourselves. When we abandon these traits, our relative morality need not matter, for the new community-at-large’s moral relativity will most likely be taken by the enterer of protection-by-society. go ahead with the canteen - try and sip out from all the fruit an apple, or a pear, or a guava, or a jícama root, or a bamboo shoot from all the vegetation! It would be possible to point to the canteen and say, “I taste it there!” but what would we be looking at? The melting pot analogy conflates – rather than relates – our identity under one supreme ideological identity, or, State identity (Somerville) – not one moral commonality, such as protection, but one

24 Let the act of “squeezing” the mesh back of fruits and vegetation stand for social harmony – likeable to a metaphor of tightly bound morally-relative bonds that highlight interdependence within the mesh bag’s squeezed concentrate. However, note the coercion that goes into squeezing people, or, concepts together. This is uncomfortable and should act to imitate the pressures felt imparted by disgraceful social customs.
“supreme” State ideology. This is an unhealthy way for society to operate in totality, as we often see this sort of moral conflation (and not moral relation) in nation-States bring out suffering societies.\textsuperscript{25} What can we garner from the integrated An amorphous mixture that is even-blended and sugary enough to not be so earthy or gamey (at least, in regard to the sense-phenomenon, umami), but a mixture that would certainly contain in it the ginger root nectar one has said to taste; but to find it will be to look at a whole society, and not a ginger plant. We can know very well what a ginger plant is without seeing it, if we have seen it, or, to extend what we may know about a ginger plant may have had a ginger root from the ginger. However, if a ginger plant was to somehow threaten our protection, we would need to understand the dialectical difference and attempt reasoning (bear with this personification! In its seriousness, there is a bit of facetiousness that in attempting to describe “who we are” often leads to solipsistic conclusions on those around us, which affects society in a multitudinous fashion – however, this social analogy seems worth expounding on!) with the plant, understanding that unlike the melting pot analogy – which with no discoverable identity would be a wasted cause – the canteen analogy presses us to understand the identity of our pluralistic communities existing within the nation-State.

Therefore, we do not, as in supping stew, tolerate only potatoes and carrots and much prefer meat; therefore, we do not, as in supping a melting pot, reaffirm identities through a metaphor which blended identities under a mythologized fondue; but, there are those with relative authority from special knowledges that do, as in sipping on a canteen of squeezed juice, understand concepts-eliminated, concepts-forgone, and concepts-

\textsuperscript{25} Somerville speaks about how this sort of what-forced-labor-is-to-ideology relates to totalitarian or authoritarian nation-States (197).
inappropriate, but do not intend to defame or identify the “ginger root from the ginger plant” (as society would do the Other-figure), but to bring to light the society’s indeterminable fermenting vegetation within the canteen-squeeze and, we can imagine – *apropos* – the society to then sweeten the whole canteen by implementing aspects of relational ontology offered as a holistic identity (or, to complete the analogy, to offset the “fermentation” not by isolating it, but by adding more of the impeccable values society is informed of from the human culmination of and within it).

There is a Scandinavian practice of *Friluftsliv* that engages and engrosses one within nature insomuch that the person becomes enlightened and, as study, can take to classes to learn more about nature (Morris). *Friluftsliv* differentiates nature as something separate from humanity, but necessarily integrates it in human life (Gelter); it is almost ritualistic in its practicing the art of one’s full enrapture in nature. This practice serves doubly here as example: first, for the sake of arguing for a keener look at moral relativism (specifically, in this usage, cultural relativism), and second, for the sake of noticing approachable dialectics in their abstract notions. Biologically, thus cosmologically, there is a major matter in our conserving or defacing of nature as interrelated symbiosis (Morris); but, the moral value we place on humans suggests that we are particularly interested in understanding our nature alongside nature’s nature. Since some people engage in nature without really benefiting it (extreme one) while others spend less time simply being in nature and acting to protect it (extreme two), we can

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26 Let the sole intent to “redefine” the melting pot analogy be to concurrently relate a progressed view of the analogy as it has extended itself to be seen differently in subsequent times under different lights, allowing to further understand the original intent of the melting pot analogy; however, the vegetation-and-mesh-bag analogy seeks not to simply tolerate each other in an manner akin to co-existence, but to relate to each other in a manner akin to co-relation.
merge these theses into an antithesis ready for dialectical synthesis: we can see a more closely “right” thing to do with these conflicting extremes would be to learn from the Scandinavians – as metaphor and as literal – and to put those Friluftsliv practices to efficient use when necessary and applicable within nature.

Though “prescriptions concerning human behavior towards the nonhuman world have existed” (Palmer 15) throughout history, the artificial edifications of, say, manufacturing a birdhouse presents a curious situation: for, if we are to take a tree, strip and sand it of its parts and, in the process, destroy the natural niche for birds just to reconstruct it with nails and paint into a makeshift niche for birds, we have manufactured natural artifice. Utilitarian approaches to this argument may have issues with all the birds sacrificed by creating a packing list of birdhouses where likely no birds will live at all, but instead mostly eat. Others, and those who practice Friluftsliv, will say that the joy nature brings to you will override that guilt and spark motivations of assigning good values to duties to protect it. Witnessing a bird fly into a birdhouse for brunch can be pleasurable, and although this is not what Gelter aims to get across in the Scandinavian philosophy, an urban-dweller may only have access to that much of nature’s available sensory information. In the case that the urban-dweller is closer to comprehending the moral value of nature by seeking what that value is, the utilitarian is worried about the hundreds of displaced birds over the years for one packing list of birdhouses.

Caring ethics meshed (Held 17) with virtue ethics furthermore suggests not the disbandment or upending of the virtue ethics entire, but an approach posited to integrate the two systems. So, we can see how it cannot be a moral absolute that humans all engage in Friluftsliv; nor is it enough to refer to moral luck that one may be able to experience
the apex of nature and simply idle in a stupor harming, but doing nothing, but perhaps a sort of moral virtue to habituate against those pivoting extremes. We may be looking at an argument that works with moral relativism, which disavows the idea that we can reach a decision-absolute when considering war and justice ethics. This moral relativism does not seem to persist violently when reasoning compassionate conflict before deciding whether the enemy is truly the enemy. Our state of nature, if inherently and indiscriminately violent, would not have come to form societies in the first place. It may be that ancient warring denies the aforementioned argument by attributing the rise of society with territorial expansion, but there is another counterargument favoring care ethics: we must, within ancient groups within the human populous, have cared enough to not kill one another so as to create societies at all. As Noddings contends, we did not, in our state of nature, let our actions induce such an outcome (Noddings 54). To maintain, as Noddings implies, is to commit a sort of akin-to-habit virtuosity, much like Aristotle contends does his virtuous friend becomes habitually able to discern right-from-wrong through good character (Aristotle). So, if we are maintaining in virtuosic manner our ontological relationships, we will be sure to consult the “special weaknesses” (Noddings), or, faults in our conceptual thinking which are given missing moral values informed by the less-than-acknowledged care ethics.

Annette Baier analyzes whether there are “significant difference in the ways in which women and men” (505) think about moral issues. Because the ethics of care argues that the feminine- and masculine-perceived persons concocted successful survival-traits (or, roles) in the state of nature so as to protect the family (so as to have a society, State, etc.), it is important to note that Gilligan’s work on “Jake and Amy” (505) proves that
men and women have different experiences in the world based on the resources allotted or allowed – this is why *Jake will always, perceptively, do “better than” Amy*, as made lucid in Gilligan’s commentary on solving the issue of the moral dilemma (Gilligan 67) – Jake has a special knowledge of the world denied to the feminine-perceived, Amy, and such knowledge being particularly readied for justice-oriented concepts (independence especially) is erasure.

However, the tests that Jake is geared for in Gilligan’s experiment are practical tests based on presupposed societal expectations – we ought to see what Jake does not know, rather than what Amy does not know, to measure what is most unknown between the two, and information to which each can benefit; and insomuch, discover that Amy most probably has a special knowledge of care ethics because she is simply she. To answer the question whether care is “a moral attitude or a perception” (505), we must examine that an attitude, in its very nature of definition, is a *virtue*. This suggests integration, which Virginia Held highlights in *The Ethics of Care* in explaining how, as Ronald Dworkin highlights in *Law’s Empire*, that the measure of integrity for any concept is illumined by the community-at-large (Dworkin coins the term *community personified*). In seeing the community as not a spontaneous and cordial interaction, we can see that the community, as Baier contests that “justice is a social value of very great importance, and injustice an evil” (507). Many arguments on the use of violence attempt to validate justice without there being any existing desert to correct an injustice.

Highlighting issues of care being an antiquated concept, Baier says *care* is not a menial “new buzz-word” (507), implying that care is more than sensation and ought to be applied practically to critical thinking. This statement also highlights the integration
theory of the ethics of care in that the statement admits that, if care is not an a “new concept” (508), we may trace care to an origin and, beyond that, we may trace care back in relation to our initial state of nature.27

III. Virtuous Care as Protective Ontology in Human State of Nature: As Applied to Popular Social Contract Theories

We make mistakes. We kill our own. We have been locked in a deadly embrace. . .each side always propelled by the abundant malefactions of the other; almost always looking to the short term. (Sagan, 1988)

Some Aristotelian views synthesize well in correlation to Heraclitus’ and Hegel’s28 concepts of conflicting extremes: Heraclitus states that “it is by battle that all things come into the world” (161), suggesting a necessary Hegelian tug, or, conflict between the ethical systems within a nation-State itself.29 But, if “opposites fit together” (161), as Heraclitus also contends and “out of discordant elements comes the fairest harmony” (161), we can see more clearly that compassionate conflict is a sincerer way to resolve the problematic of entirely virtuosic viewpoints in that it includes care ethics. Aristotle contends that “two of a trade can never agree” (Jones), suggesting, again, that

27 By state of nature, it should be assumed that this term is used henceforth as a philosophical term to account for the “state” at which humans existed pre-society “in nature”, in which it is presumed that upon entering such society, individuals tacitly adopt a social contract so as to reserve inclusion in the emergent society – the reason for the adoption of society and how we come to relate before, during, and after that society’s formation, is subject matter relevant to present debate (Abel).
28 Though, for this essay we will primarily concern ourselves with Hegel in his dialectical method.
29 What is more, to highlight that each nation-State should exhibit so much conflicting dialectic should infer that the conflicting dialectic with other nation-State’s should be more prudently approached
there is an ethical variable that has gone non-applied in the dialectical thinking process: this unaccounted ethical variable should be the ethics of care. Why not consult the ethics of care, may wonder, thus suggest, the “well-wishing” (161) pragmatic with caring intentions that are contradicted by inaction: to Aristotle, virtuosity is avoiding obsequiousness (162) so that actions are done in a genuine manner in relation to the persons for whom the actions are done. This, too, suggests interdependency on others, for one cannot know what actions to impart upon another without being interdependent on the special knowledge of the cared-for (Noddings). When Aristotle mentions that “man only sees what seems to be good for him” (162), he highlights the aforementioned claim, positing that there are positions of ethics that are derived from the seemingly and not the actual. Could an integration of the ethics of care bring not truth, but “the value of value judgements” (Stevenson 10)? And so, could that value system not attempt to seek entire truth, but what ought to be? Sure. This is the routing of ethical framework, of course, but to apply this line of thinking will not result in moral absolutes, but moral relativism derived from non-absolutist decision-making on why we protect each other enough in the state of nature to conceptualize and materialize a society. When we consider war as a State’s protection from a perceived enemy-State, we can see the importance in evaluating original states of nature in regard to the origin of human protection and how it ought to be utilized contemporaneously.

Envision, for the purpose of expounding a reductive example, an ancient people living in Siberia and an ancient people living in the Mojave Desert. Protection will occur in relative forms from what one ancient people will seek protection from: the Siberian state of nature will be at risk to encounter, and thus protect from bears, other threatening
peoples, and the cold (among many other impositions) while the Mojave Desert state of nature will be at risk to encounter, and thus protect from poisonous organisms, other threatening peoples, and heat. If protection is viewed as a caring virtue, it is worthwhile to ask ourselves how protection is related to ontology — protection from what? How did these protective forces shape original states of nature, pre-society? Is all that is in common with protection that we are protected from threats themselves, regardless of what the threat is, and, insomuch stated, that protection is a universal moral because threats to survival are entirely ubiquitous to the human? It appears that protecting the domicile does come from threats, but from different threats that confer the nation-State’s moral relativism, which struggles with a moral absolutist approach to universal caring. Perhaps the absolute is that we do care and that we do destroy – the synthesis ought to be to care enough not to kill, at least.

So, could the ethics of care, being a concept relative to the individual possessing the special knowledges that constitute an ethic of care, bring clearer answers when integrated with virtue ethics? To derive a stronger answer to that question would be to apply the unique and special knowledge of care ethics into decision-making in virtuous wartime efforts – to not exclude care ethics from heavy subjects at the philosophical dinner table. If, as Aristotle contends, “two of a trade rarely agree” (161), we should implement a conflicting “trade” of caring ethics so that a better-lit conclusion may be assessed on how to protect a nation-State when it is suspect of an enemy-perceived. A challenged conclusion, in regard to the ethics of care, is suggestive of forgone attempts to reach non-violent, diplomatic, and preventative war declarations, or, undeclared wars that still confer violence and death. So, when should a nation-State war?
The answer is ideally and logically never, as this action is fundamentally backwards by an empirical standpoint of evolutionary biology, but also fundamentally backwards by an abstract standpoint of relational ontology, as it is never entirely permissible to eradicate what relates to a person so directly for the sake of a better people. However, much like Noddings allows her Aunt Phoebe character, a family member with suggestively disparaging views on Others (110), we see that allowing conclusions to reach venomously radical “barricades” (110) is indicative of a hostile aggressor – Aunt Phoebe is worked with and not against,30 and insomuch is able to be deescalated, not temporarily pacified. We ought to identify the aggressor, not through a moral absolutism of what constitutes a universal aggressor, but from a morally relativistic standpoint so as to discover not a universal truth, but a closer right-and-wrong answer to seemingly unapproachable conflicting differences and how those differences may be beneficial in deescalating war. This claim pre-supposes an equal democracy within the nation-State, though, which is entirely problematic. Joan Tronto argues that the caring democracy, which will surely not be at a lack of justice-based decision-making, should not presuppose equality in the vote, for democracies can also be ineffective in resolving the integration of the ethics of care. Again, rises Noddings’ point for one to hyperbolically avoid arriving to the barricades so that there is less potential disparages to confront, such as Noddings’ Aunt Phoebe’s denigrating viewpoints on non-majority peoples able to be reevaluated by both the aggressor, Aunt Phoebe, and the de-escalator, the niece, who cares more for others’ critical thinking than her own affirmation of moral rightness.

30 Demonstrated through Noddings’ caring niece thought experiment.
We ought to disincline from seeking more independent solutions to hostile circumstances, for our interdependent solutions have been largely ignored, as if we may derive information simply by intuiting truths inept to be begotten by others. We ought to consider strongly reinforcing interdependent resolutions, shifting the focus from independent-solution-based cognition to interdependent-resolution-based cognition. Surely, this is a change that many anthropologists – and, truly many scholars of the like – will refer to as an enlightenment; but, it is not as if the skeleton key to unlock this bibliographic treasure of useful and unused concepts is not capable of being grasped. In fact, resolving the controversial global issues will require a skeleton key, one that is equipped to open many, many cryptic locks and not just one. Conceiving of a solution to a threatening issue is almost reflexive - one sees a fire, one puts water on it unless it is grease-borne; then one douses the flame in flour to one’s hopeful gratification. But, those are solutions to ending spontaneous fires and not resolutions to end the threat caused by fire. We can imagine hyperbolically that fire need not be permanently and eternally forgone, or, extinguished - because of its value to humanity – but that we ought to look for a resolution that is less reflexive and spontaneous in case fire should engulf the earth and lose its value immediately through its new threat. The idea is to disavow the fire from becoming this massive of a fire, or, as Noddings says, to deny the fire from “making it to the barricades” (110), at least in regard to fire being both benign and malignant.

We surely cannot imagine having let fire go undiscovered, but we ought to know how to resolve a spontaneous worldwide fire (hyperbolically), as we will find most of our temporal solutions feeble in this instance. We will also find it nearly impossible, in a world spontaneously burning everything alive, to be a long-living exclusively
independent thinker. It is quite peculiar that to inquire upon our candid, ancient state of nature by imagining the hyperbolic threat of imminent catastrophe, but it serves well to uncover our baser brain-states which continue to drive motivations. If we apply this same theory of interdependent reasoning to easily escalated situations such as the warring embrace, we can see that a solution is much less effective than a resolution in that a solution is worthwhile to discontinue befalling strife, but ultimately temporal. A negative act of force is, or, ought to be, resolved, not simply solved. Interdependent thinking is far different than interdependence, yet easily confused in western super-ethics chiefly.

Take Henry David Thoreau’s case for good measure. There is no possible way he effectually became totally independent, or, wholly severed from society, for the society is what informs one’s conceiving of the idea of independence itself. Therefore, it is possible to apply independent critical thinking while being interdependent on others’ knowledge, but to achieve social independence from a thing, or, a people of a society, is impossible. We can only come to understand what independence is from our interdependent relations, from which we are informed, and have allowed us to continue living as a relational species. Independence does not allow others’ conclusions to be assessed, as conclusions are just that – independent and not interdependent; on the contrary, independence severs itself from challenged conclusions. Nevertheless, thinking that is interdependent on the informer-other allows us to think critically (through interdependence) while humbling our interdependent information-gathering. Thoreau was not only interdependent on society in

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31 For linguistic purposes, and so that the subtle differences between dependence, independence, and interdependence can be made clearer, the prefix “de-” most closely denotes a Latin derivative of “decide” or “removal,” the prefix “in-” most closely denotes an English derivative which resembles another English derivative-prefix “en-” which most closely denotes “to restrict,” and the prefix for “inter-” is Latin and denotes “between” (see Universal Dictionary).
order to escape society (his wonderful, proverbial, and worthwhile contradiction) but also
interdependent on the protection offered from Ralph Waldo Emerson. Thoreau, even in
the conceptualized and the language used to orate and scribe his severance from society\textsuperscript{32}
borrowed from an alphabet and grammar instructor of some sort, or, sorts to scribe his
severance from society in his Walden. We are seeing synthesis in action, however, when
we consider social reform through civil disobedience: at one conflicting extreme there is
the ability to reform violently; the other, silently, thus complicit. The synthesis is to gain
social reform, if one wishes, through neither violence or silence but civil disobedience.

Thoreau successfully demonstrates interdependency – with a cause – mistaken for
introspective independence reliant on a sort of solipsistic individualism. Refined
criticisms are made by Bill McKibben: “there is a great deal [Thoreau] cannot teach us”
(5) McKibben cedes, in that Thoreau’s offerings are insightful in ways external to he as
author-and-informer. In taking on one of Thoreau’s great lines that “the sky is safe,”
McKibben contends that “the sky’s not safe after all; the sky is heating up” (6), evoking a
sense of purposeful doubt to the wholeness of Thoreau’s work. How much self-sacrifice,
really, can one make when one whose living is nearly solipsistic, in that one’s
conclusions in this purposefully hermitic lifestyle would go unchallenged, and, how
much “muchness” can a person truly give to society – even the forgoer of anything
“community” would understand that isolation with refutation to the community in which
helps achieve one’s isolation is an irrationality? Kazuo Ishiguro in his Remains of the
Day gives a fine example on when to draw a line between extreme self-sacrifice: the
tragedy that his protagonist comes to be from evading interdependence (even for the best,
altruistic intentions, though even the “best altruistic intentions” of the society may be ill, and in sacrificing oneself totally in this picture, say, might prevail social ills) for selflessness to serve others entirely to be told “once you’ve had your food, make yourself scarce” (Ishiguro).

It is not sound to assume that independence can exist on its own for another reason in that independence implies something else needed to gain independence from. But, considering McKibben’s earlier criticism of Thoreau being unimportant on a scope that is whole, he does contend that the man’s thinking makes him “a writer of the highest value to the twenty-first century” in that Thoreau “requires that we think more deeply about what it might mean to live an environmentally sane life” (5). Ah! So, it is not this paradigm that we should intrigue ourselves with that Thoreau believed himself (or, even if he did, let reasonable context in this case be our guide) a severed part of society, but the paradigm in which he shows us that he is, even in willful severance, part of society nonetheless in his own solipsistic Walden flatlands. It is also the case that, in learning how to live environmentally sound, as McKibben eloquently has it, one who does not necessarily secede from society may adopt traits Thoreau would be proud of – along with civil disobedience, which is in itself a deliciously conflicting phrase (much like compassionate conflict) that carries a worthy dialectical synthesis result of its own. This is much like our earlier example of Friluftsliv, where we have the extreme of absorber-of-nature in a culture in relation to the extreme of the abstainer-of-nature and the positive.

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33 With violence in society to coerce popular interests on one extreme and silence in society to complicity ignore popular interests on the other extreme – the synthesis being civil disobedience for the means to the end of disobeying customs civilly insomuch to not be violent or silent, but, and conceivably due to the impossibility or inability to advance popular interests in any other way, in one’s contribution, to be proactive engaging the interests of the community-at-large.
synthesis of the learner (from example of the absorber) of productive (by example of the abstainer) and a more bent range towards the mean of ends being just by their goodness in the actions in which manifest as goodness, too.

Some theories contend that war is absolutely and not relatively just, and there are theories that contend that reasoning the justness of war is rationalizing the irrational (Jones). The *jus post bellum* and *jus ante bellum* theories operate within these modes of thinking and are applied to reasoning the outcome of tough decision-making to war. The *jus post bellum* theory focuses on finding “purpose” to “justify actions before, during, and after combat” (61); however, Sigal Ben-Porath writes that “there seems to be a growing understanding in the United States that postwar conduct must be considered as part of the preparation for war” (63). We can squelch the moderate element that we ought to examine how to consider war from a standpoint that does not rely on war itself to learn from; perhaps, squelching the larger point from the two theories, if we see their rationales as extremes defending an ultimate mean of acting in accordance with protective ontology. In *Rethinking Security*, Fiona Robinson urges us to apply similar concepts derived from care ethics to the polis-at-large (Robinson). This suggestion does not disenfranchise the implication to extend the manners to decision-making in wartime. We can see how the ethics of care, in working with a dialectical synthesis, may approach weighing measures of handling violence with as much resolve as virtue ethics (or, have it with any of the justice-ethics).

Virginia Held, a modest and admitted slow-thinker,\(^{34}\) retroactively rejoinders that the ethics of care can handle violence in that “a feminist ethic of care, however, does not

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\(^{34}\) From an interview on her original insight into the ethics of care as an integrated and not exclusionary theory.
have to be completely pacifist, and advocates of this approach differ regarding the extent to which an ethic of care supports pacifism” (3), as contends Dr. Erik Wingrove-Haugland writing on “The Ethics of Care and the Ethics of War” in a proposal set at the 2016 Conference of the International Society for Military Ethics. Many voices of war are not willing to admit to dependence and pacifism but are willing to admit the principle of integration that Virginia Held originally wrapped tight-and-ready for care ethicists.

In that we have demonstrated not only that the caring ethical system can apply, but how it does apply its theories to decision-making in war, we may now ponder the following illustrations from literature to more closely examine, from as close as we may, post-war reflections, or, primary war texts and contemporary literatures that concede written war experiences, through both non-fiction-fiction (or, new journalistic) accounts and entirely non-fiction selections alike. We can see what Odysseus encounters significant ontological-ethical when relying on his entire independence from Troy, further exacerbating how his actions may have qualified absurdity. Take, for example, his intrusion on Polyphemus, or, Cyclopes’ home -and his eventual blinding, and assumed killing of the creature (who dwelt in a most solicitude before Odysseus and his erratic fleet’s arrival) (Homer). Why, if Polykleitos was an absolute threat, would literary critics contest his death?; or, why would literature critics wonder whether Odysseus was valid in his assertion of death to Polykleitos? It would be a more obvious revelation, to come to know the enemy-perceived, by having a simpler insight to critical thinking. Without integrating all of the principled values of a people that are insomuch looked upon as a

35 See criticisms made referencing to Fagles’ translation.
threat, we may only see an enemy-perceived; this blurred line, if you will, is rarely ever thickened to clarity.

Why did he have the right to kill Polyphemus under a value system that affirmed such killing? Why do we not pity Polyphemus? For his moral relation to Odysseus is entirely non-absolute – they are in two different worlds, and one may even argue that Odysseus is wrong in killing Polyphemus in his own land. We ought to be inclined to presume it is at least slightly objectionable for Homer to have his epic protagonist freely murder a “fringe-character,” if you will, such as Polyphemus.

What grandiose, self-nominated nature equips Odysseus to possess the chief ability to decide to kill Polyphemus? Perhaps our answer is that Odysseus operated under a value system that affirmed such killing without real root to consequence – deontology – but to the “obvious despicable” of Polyphemus’ existence (though there is no evidence that Polyphemus conducted himself incorrectly; quite the opposite, really, as Polyphemus was mostly peaceful and content in isolation) (Homer). Why, then, do we not pity Polyphemus? Is it that Odysseus’ struggles outweigh Polyphemus’? Utilitarian ethics come into the head when reasoning that way, and utilitarian ethics are far less able to accept the ethics of care, for utilitarian ethics focus on a majority – by its own ethical definition – and the ethics of care focuses on the fringe voice as requiring amalgamation within the majority (Held). Too, Polyphemus’ moral relation to Odysseus seems essentially non-absolute; their relationship looks more relative. Polyphemus and Odysseus are in two different worlds, and one may even argue that Odysseus is wrong in killing Polyphemus in his own land. His nostalgia, or, longing for the home, is indicative of his attempts to do justice, which are done incorrectly – he, longing for the home, or,
from where the caring ethics coercively developed (Held), is a representation of the ethical system he did not consult before his epic and alarmistic, violent voyage.

IV. The Ally- and Enemy-Perceived: Ontologically-Interdependent Relationships and Deriving General Wills of the Community-At-Large

You’re twenty-one years old, you’re scared, and there’s a hard squeezing pressure in your chest. What would you do? Would you jump? Would you feel pity for yourself? Would you think about your family and your childhood and your dreams and all you’re leaving behind? Would it hurt? Would it feel like dying? Would you cry, as I did? (O’Brien, 1990)

It is in this failure of foresight that States have warred against the motivation of extreme overprotection with protection as ought motivation when a State considers warring in the first place. We see clear motivations for warring because of resource conglomerate bravado (Matthew Yeomans), an example strong-standing enough to reiterate how certain conversation pieces about the meaning of protection and interdependency should always be considered when considering war against a nation-State with the same means of defense, but what is morally relativistic to such nation-State’s global, political, and majority-ethic-based reasoning for offense, thus defense. The highest form of defense, in regard to a State’s protection, is war. The highest of form of offense, in regard to a State’s interdependency, is believing to war against the enemy-perceived so as to protect the community-at-large. Though there are many final reasons
why wars were and are declared or undeclared, ended or continual, et cetera, quarreling nation-States ought to consider that they are all defensive under ontological protection and what that means to the nation-State causing offense. How, though, might we reveal obscurities and vagaries that surround what or who an enemy-perceived is if we can all agree that our state of nature is interdependent on human protection? It seems contradictory, which is no new claim, but in regard to protection, warring seems absolutely irrational, following no lines of logic or ethic, and insomuch should not be flimsily decided upon; warring ought to be the measure at which a nation-State is willing to ask themselves about why they have adopted their own means of protection, to perhaps find a cause in the threat coming from an enemy-perceived.

If the nation-State has investigated this feeling of threat to protection from the escalating tensions of this imaginary nation-State and has seen that the nation-State will war without compassion and under an unhealthy ideology, the nation-State under threat ought to ask what actual protection another threatening nation-State is capable of disrupting. Should enemy-perceived threats continue to arouse rhetorical politics that do not include caring ethics, but exclude them in the political process and adopt retributive ethics or pseudo-ethics, and should this enemy-perceived threat be an entire nation-State, one may say to oneself that the enemy-perceived is possibly one that is offending the nation-State insomuch that to war is the only measure to respond, so as to protect those who wish to keep healthy the human ontology to protect; but we may only say this if we have consulted not only justice-based lines of reasoning, but caring lines of reasoning that do not exclude any members from the philosophical dinner table – we must chew this meal slowly with everybody present. This is a view compatible with the ideal “Situation
Room.” This is where we are all interdependent on protection to survive and flourish (Aristotle) without falling into the habit of overlaboring and/or excluding members through utilitarian practices (say, three-hundred people have a rare influenza strain that is highly contagious, but incurable; enter Kant’s four formulations of the categorical imperatives, and we are still left with the possibility of sacrificing and not protecting these three-hundred people, of whom are most likely to be made up of the less-able) and acknowledging, applying, and utilizing our special weakness (Noddings) may very well enhance the ability for another nation-State to dissemble an absolutist approach to society. This is when we should be keen in not failing to synthesize, integrate, and be inclusive in our critical thinking.

If this is the case, that the protective state of nature is offended while not excluding a caring ethical system from a State that only works with retributive motivations, we ought to consider a sort of defense to protect that integration and interdependency we have established within the State-threatened. Said more practically, it is not enough to impart this integration of virtue and care into decision-making, but also to understand when other States have not and why not so. We must analyze the State-offending and see if there has been historical injustice and arrive at conclusions of reparations; or, if there is a caring ethic implemented alongside virtue ethics within the State-offended and the State-offender is simply warring not for protection, but for territorial expansion, resources, empire, et. al., we ought to consider that there is now a serious threat to the protective aspect of our original state of nature – which has

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36 That, roughly following the first and second categories, one uses the Kingdom of Ends thought experiment in order to reconcile how to self-legislate in a such a way “which can render the ‘kingdom of ends’ possible (McCloskey 390).
succeeded society – and how the threat is correspondent to the identified adversary State’s inability to recognize its own lack integration on limits of interdependence, protection, and, ultimately, its exclusion of care ethics. We ought not swiftly assume that the perceivably threatened State is the only State that is threatened.

A special weakness admits a possible inherent interdependency, which implies protection to the most correct degree, for this degree is humbled in its at once virtue to do good and its care to relate to others to understand how to care. For, for all in a society abled to protect the special weaknesses of other society members weakens the individual weaknesses and strengthens the interdependent ontological relation we must have shared in early nude and philosophically bare states of nature. This special weakness need not defame one or shame one but must humble one in focusing on the forte gained from one’s community-born society, which, like fungi in a petri-dish, does form populations and eventually the entire nation-State’s majority ideology. In order for this sort of special weakness to be emphasized and not shied away from, one must admit their interdependency on others to resolve this special weakness (whether it is that one cannot gain balance or that one cannot see letters and numbers in their correct character placement), so as to have the protection of the nation-State.

Plato’s ideal society contains a rigid hierarchal structure, from ascending order, consisting of authority-rulers (who are most “rational”), defenders (who are most “emotional”), and producers (who are most inclined to their “appetites”) (Jones). In his imagined Republic, Plato also implies that ultimate authority cannot be emotive, say, as a solider (who would be considered a defender) may be classified, in that it is irrational to conclude to war in that war is irrational in its nature and the authority-rulers must not be
irrational (Jones). Instead, it is held that the emotion of courage is displayed and that, ridiculously, a soldier is incapable of pure, rational thought. Let us not defend this outdated hierarchal society model and instead focus on the unique idea presented that soldiers are emotive, as it seems that an emotional soldier would not fit a typified canon of contemporary traits denoting “courage.” Noddings, if we remember, relates the living-scene between the dying person and a person that has killed another, agonizingly diarizing on the emotional aspects of killing. Michael Herr, with an at once open and reserved reluctance, writes of his tour as a correspondent in Vietnam openly in incontrovertibly emotional terms (through dialogue and his nonfiction-fiction novel, *Dispatches*), scripting numerous passages concurring how war is highly emotional, but rarely ever looked at as such. To Plato, it is emotional in itself to abstain from emotion. He would, again, call this courage. Those whose accounts attribute more to the general will theory (Rousseau) of how we ought to carry war – the experiential word of witness – ought to be analyzed.\(^{37}\) Taking again the many presuppositions that are evident in Plato’s ideal society, Plato explains this interdependent relationship between both rulers, who are ultimately rational, and defenders, who are incapable of rationality due to their ability to remain stoic as possible (which is, to Socrates, in itself an emotion inapplicable to rationale), or, to defend under an act of courage and not regret (Jones). The lugubrious task of separating the rational from the emotional, then, is a wasted attempt, according to Plato. War is emotional.

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\(^{37}\) The eyewitness experience, as best demonstrated through legal practices and, so, through *12 Angry Men* in explicated filmic literature, should be honored for its potency in relating to the community-at-large, but ought not to be used for any bearing (in ethics, that is) to discover some entire truth about a subject’s causation, ontology, or its existence and what problems may factor from attempting to discover absolute truth.
Rousseau’s general will theory is less naïve-realist than his state of nature argument (Stevenson) – the general will of the public ought to be that of all members of the public, which cannot be presupposed as similar or as fully representative in a caring democracy (Tronto). Our most likely way to discover a nation-State’s general will of the war experience is to first take primary accounts we have at our convenience, and at the warring person’s sake. Second, we will discover more of how the general will theory (Rousseau), most concretely derived from the abstract witness testimony received from those who have served in lines of duty, applies to the decision-making process – let us first peer into common theories of the man-at-war (observing any mythologies or Romanticizing, but taking reasonably to their contributions, as they are given in a vulnerably truthful manner), the testimonies of the warring person, and how these issues relate to the ontological relationships human demonstrate in protecting one another, even in morally relativistic situations (e.g., authoritarian warring, declared or not, for purposes clearly propagandistic or encouraging of political maliciousness within the State).

Taking time now to observe, for a closer envisioning of the general will of society from whose accounts rest as validating in their ends, creative and primary selections from works that include poetry from war after its cessation, might we relate to the text while doing so. Poetry From World War II (WWII), Against Forgetting (universal period), and Winning Hearts and Minds (Vietnam), in particular will suffice, for brevity and for reasons of encompassing and deriving the general will of society in a more recent

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38 As examples are relayed, so will they be applied to understanding what a more emotional aspect of war ought to be valued as in a caring-virtuosic argument.

39 For matters of accessible and popular serialization, periods are selected from WWII and on.
approach; let us seek this general will examining poetry of soldiers in a hopefully more honest, primary emotional literature borne of predominant virtue to care for protection.40

“So might you speak the world as who should know /
it as a tragic and desired place /
who saw its awful darkness face to face /
yet grieved to feel its fluid substance go.” 41

“Behold what quiet settles on the world. / Night wraps the sky in tribute from the stars. / In hours like these, one rises to address / The ages, history, and all creation.” 42

“New Year time is here . . . again / And there have been celebrations . . . / The caterers of violence / Managed the affair / And now, business is done.” 43

The familiar tone of these passages reifies the idea that the elements around are made beautiful only between elements of carnage. Particularly in the first poem, we are invited to witness war as gruesome; come the second poem and we are invited again to war as if it is something reservations can be made for; the third poem concertizes a cyclical narrative structured on ontological paradoxes in that we can see aversion to killing withholds different value than the habit of virtuous protection – a thing we should expect from New Year to New Year. There is an emotive and rational – have it that way, Athens – aspect to warring, but we have strategized a fair amount as a species; is it not fair, then, to concern oneself with the emotion-war continuum, and for the purposes of

40 Though, considering poets in the romantic period that wrote of introspection and intuition and self-evident truths, we should apply this approach to the rawness and vulnerability to express war through non-conventional avenues more than acquiring self-truths by “eye in the sky” Romantic introspection. We should also distinguish poets from rhetoricians, especially for this line of reasoning. War is emotional and informing - poetry of witness implies this.
41 Bronk, William. “Soldiers in Death.”
42 Reavey, George. “Past One O’clock.”
43 Thorne, Landon. “On Passing Graves Registration - - Dong Ha.”
this argument, a continuum which doubles as a reflection of one’s own protective ontology as not merely defense, but relational to one other? We must consider these critical and emotional standpoints as they relate to a special, painful knowledge that ought to rightfully inform an otherwise secondhand-informed general will non-opposed to these witness atrocities when those comprising the dominant general will have yet to consult the emotional aspects of war in a productive and applicable, actionable way to the act of war. Perhaps decisions would be made differently under this more thorough general will, though it can be sure hostile nation-State interactions are statistically at their lowest (Kristof), yet repeatedly perceived as ascending in hostility.

When George Orwell recounts a similar story of his gruesome traverse in war in his essay-compilation *Facing Unpleasant Facts* (188), “ce pauvre mort” (188), or, the *solemn/pitiful dead*, is how he refers to the sight-seeing of a correspondent, (who is unseasoned to witnessing war’s actuality), at the first time his comrade saw the Belgian side of ’45 Germany – the correspondent seeing the ineffable death around him “had suddenly bought home to him the meaning of war” (188). In no less than five pages, Orwell is quick to dismiss Occam’s Razor in that “our civilization is haunted by the notion that the quickest way of doing anything is invariably the best” (191). It is here that we realize the correspondent, abhorred by the war he was reporting, was only fed one part of the dialectic. The missing part(s) of the dialectic come from the raw, emotion of the act of killing to protect. It is primarily in analyzing witness stories of war’s immediate and lingering trauma of the “defender” that constitutes as a crucial informing of the general will of the act of war. In recalling a honey-sapped scene before a different open

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44 Simply that the right answer must be the easiest, or, most simple answer to come to.
fire – a living-room fire Orwell took to with his “Mum and Dad” – Orwell notes that “a good background to one’s memories, and the survival of the family as an institution may be more depend on [patterns] than we realize” (190).

Perhaps these patterns Orwell refers to are habits of protection that war instates absolutely without regard to relational ontology. After all, it is why Plato cannot admit that defenders are capable of being completely rational but does pat them on the back with emotion-as-courage being a fitness worth striving for. Yes, we should understand that it is irrational to war in any society, even it ultimate protection. It is even more irrational, then, to regard war as a resolution at all – war can only be a solution, for reparations are rarely paid in money, let alone sentiment. But it is equally irrational to think that human beings have not been given reason to war-to-protect, so we ought to consider what war means now that we have the consequences generally available to anybody in the roundabout twenty-percent of technologically developed societies.

That is not to say that only veterans or the combat-experienced ought to be considered in the decision-making process – this is to say that veterans and the combat-experience ought to be considered as necessary to a qualify the making of a holistic social decision (and may, by way of experience, possess the relative authority needed to qualify those special knowledges). If the general will of the feeling the society receives from declaring war should be analyzed using techniques that poetry of witness scholars use to craft work-from-realism and poignancy, we must ask what the general will of warring ought to be, but first understand what it is and that much of the general will for decision-making in war is formed from the solider experience. Noddings writes of the emotional experience of killing – piecemeal, as if working out one ingredient in a thorough recipe
for generations-to-come – and how one’s experience in such affairs, being emotional
“that we are not always less effective when we are emotional” (143). Noddings continues
to say that “in general. . .it is acknowledged that emotion may be facilitative in a
nonreflective” way and in a way that restores “the organism to a stable and less stressful
state” (143).

This emotional value – the value of the warring person and the candidness to
testify on the emotional aspect of their profession – applies to the decision-making
process in ceasefire and wartime! It applies to the general will, and it applies to a concept
which was to be made into the three-letter-verb war and these experiences are not just
testimonies for the hungry self-acclaimed voracious reader, but inputs for the judgements
we ought to be making when consulting matters that put others’ lives – in which we are
interdependently and ontologically bound to, respectively – into practices they seek of
their own devise for protection gained from special knowledges possessed by one else.

Though both Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s 1984 are the textbook
utopic-barbaric extrema of post-war (literally and textually) depictions of society; another
contemporary text, B. F. Skinner’s Walden Two, examines human behavior in a utopic
setting more closely - and on a more psychological level in Skinner’s distinctive
scholarship in behavioral psychology. Related to the range of the mean (Aristotle),
Skinner’s work can be seen as a sort of synthesis between Brave New World and 1984
much in the same way that protective ontology may be a sort of synthesis between the
extremes of nation-States adopting social contracts formed by exiting utopic or barbaric
states of nature. Here, Plato’s earlier-mentioned “emotive soldier” highlights a laughable
notion that soldiers are not capable of doing more than emoting – one would be sure that
it cannot be the case that authority, which evades war for the sake that it is the most inane of actions would deem those who war-to-protect emotive and not capably rational, but, to see this as a thought experiment into the emotional aspect of war may benefit – that, to be rational would be not to war and to instead authorize the rule to war (Jones). It is also quite an embarrassing notion that the soldier, or, defender, is incapable of higher rational thought as those who initiate war – as if the declarer can be emotionless, if even convinced in virtuous-protect – in that soldiers have given through their accounts several rational perspectives on how to war, the effect and affectation of war, and, for supplementary argument, generals and colonels handle boots-on-the-ground foot-work during special operations, which indicates their ability as both an infantryman (should the threatening situation emerge) and a rational person (in that strategizing in the irrational playing field of war ought to be considered a sort of rationale, in somehow making “sense” of the morbid and bungled situations around the highly decorated general).

Although this view is faulty, in that if it is for the rational to evade war because it is irrational, and the emotion to abstain from emotion precludes those that are warring from being rational, this line of logic places not people in positions based on relative authority but based on rationalized causes that ultimately do not have to do with a more peaceful philosophy, but a winning (or, strictly competitive) one. However, what we may gain from this piece of social reasoning while abandoning reasons that do not seem to make reason outside of supplying the nation-State with rationalized war-ready members, is that soldiers are considered emotional at all.45 We may then take from this idea of Plato’s that, if to war is strictly emotive as it is more closely courageous than rational (for

45 Though, we ought to also consider that one could, in theory, “choose” whether or not to war in Athens; it is Sparta in which this aversion might be unqualified even for the timid (Jones).
who would rationally end a life for the sake of continuing life at the home?), war is thus both emotional and rational.\footnote{It also seems absurd, in this doomed-by-hierarchy structure of The Republic, that those who are called consumers and who also occupy the lowest rung of Plato’s observable society would be strictly appetitive and would not be capable of reason or emotion to the degree in which these faculties being extended to the general will of society.}

Now that we have expounded war as emotional for special reasons of understanding the general will of society’s will-to-war, though not assumed as a typically emotional engagement, we may agree that the ethics of care are most certainly at performance even in doing justice; this is suggestive of a more conceptual aspect of warring which may require that the war-declarer-whomever analyzes further. If we are to focus on the protective aspect of our state of nature and correlate that with why we are defending, through the murder of a people, our nation-State from the enemy-perceived, therein is an antidote for the willing to minimize the potentiation of war to be declared (or, for war to exist even without declaration) (Somerville).\footnote{Somerville highlights that not all wars are declared that are extant and perpetual; it should be remembered that we ought to pay particular interest not the society-as-it-appears, but at those who are running it.} This suggestion may be a bit hopeful, especially considering moral relativism and that it is not always the case that societies are not the same as those running it (Geuras), but this suggestion is far less naïve than moral absolutism makes itself seem; if using a general theory at all to encapsulate what all nation-States desire, we may look at efforts from Rousseau’s work on the general will and the efforts from the aforementioned persons to convey the warring experience (Able); contributions made by those who constitute the dominant will of the community-at-large.

It may not be as easy as hunting-eggs to find a universalizing moral absolute defining how a nation-State chooses to protect itself, decipher the true-enemy from the
enemy-perceived, or how a nation recognizes that although warring can culminate as justice-initiated while still being an act emotional and caring, but a society’s general will to adopt protective qualities within itself suggests a general will to protect the nation-State. Though, our general view ought to largely include those who, as aforementioned, inform others from the witness experience of war (Forché) by textually identifying aspects of war that would potentially waste without their record. Many war veterans, domestic and foreign, cede that war is entirely emotional even without admittance in returning from battle and testifying through a sullen face that only comes from a unique experience of witnessing death-during-combat.

Bram Stoker’s *Dracula* provides yet another grotesque, but beneficial, ort of insight into the importance of having ideologies challenged and when exactly the incorrigible, unflinching ideology that seriously threatens protection is met in its most evident form. The Count’s line – an “endless life, the condition of living forever, of never dying” (Stoker) being a most morbid torture – expresses more than Gothic misery; his monotonous ideology does not change as he does not die, he therefore becoming more monstrous as society progresses into better views by successive generations. If we approach this monster-figure, like Jonathan Harker, we not only investigate his imposition, but the incidences of his imposition, thus a potential “rosebud” which shaped Dracula into the monster he became by continuing to live as those around him perished; we also, as a metaphor, in challenging the outdated and draconian ideologies, are given insights into how and why morality has shifted into different, and statistically better, lights and treatments of the community-at-large.
Still, we do see that if Dracula, as the story sits, continues to live, so do his ideologies. This suggests the impossibility of reasoning with the incorporeal and not the actual – two people are oftentimes more agreeable than disagreeable in the fact that they both agree on their disagreement. This disagreement is not a fruitful, or, productive agreement, though, as conclusions have been challenged, but kept and not “killed”⁴⁸ (as must be the Count, as fiction would have it literally) or altered for the better light. Oftentimes, killing the ideology is necessary in parable – but Dracula is a tale of fiction, and though most of the examples in this dissertation identify ideal situations (which may be in themselves a healthy fiction), we need not believe, for a more caring society, that the killing of Dracula is entirely necessary. Mister Harker was brave enough to traverse the Transylvanian Carpathian Cliffside ridges and brave enough to understand Dracula by Harker’s tuning his ear to the special dialect of Dracula that, coming from a special knowledge Jonathan Harker could not have attained on his own, delighted his ear with experience and the reminder of relational interdependency; the special weakness of the Count’s fundamental rosebud is an eternal unchanging ideology, the worst of all conceivable hells. We will know when we are incapable of possessing the fictionalized patience of Mr. Harker, and we ought to understand that an unflinching ideology is not necessarily to be warred but challenged publicly if the ideology impacts the general will of the society.

Mr. Harker is, however, fictitious, and did not even kill Dracula; though, the point is that this sort of patience is far too ideal. In tandem with the words of John Dryden “how ill my fear they by my mercy scan / beware the fury of a patient man,” we can see

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⁴⁸ Let us keep in mind that Jonathan Harker did not terminate Dracula, either. The Count’s life was ended by Van Helsing and Mina Harker, for a bit of academic folly (Stoker).
that the character-type that can successfully commingle with a Dracula-character is far too ideal and burdensome a task to ask even of the willing person; this is when we know the protective barrier may be near a point of threat, when we have reached the incorrigible, and insomuch should reason Dracula with a specially-knowledge-laden Harker-as-correspondent, or, we ought to then reason with a chair. We cannot all feasibly “be” a Mister Harker – the ideal is not checked by our ontology in the case, which does offer to protect all as a measure to ceaselessly pay homage to living, but all citizens taking it upon themselves to attempt to be Jonathan Harker is absurd and rings, again, of Raphael Hythloday’s account of the isle of Utopos (More). We will know when we meet this inveterate Dracula because we will have the persons needed in order to complete non-deceptive decision-making in the room. This person will be obviously ideologically-detracting and not making decisions for altruistic welfare, but for individual welfare related to some personal and indecipherable political morality (Dworkin). To “give the right things to the right persons at the right times” (1120b), as Aristotle contends, is to separate, by means of being present during conversations which, because of such presence, diminishes the frequency of passing deceptions of many kinds, the right giving to the right person(s) in the right range between the extreme, opposing arcs – the Count, unless for some purpose which should aid the general interest of the community-

49 For, sycophancy is transparent to those who are not easily deceived, thus, included if a one was in a room where, if this person was not otherwise in, a deceptive utterance may congregate freely open for the deceived but go extinguished if uttered in the presence of the person with the special knowledge.

50 Though “arcs” are used here to refer to Aristotle’s ideas of “The Golden Mean,” arcs may also be extended to mean the extremes of conflicting interactions, no real attention given to the weight of the extreme; i.e., an extreme of temperance would be entire abstinence, or complete inaction, though abstinence does not necessarily appear as an extreme to temperance. However, if one wishes acting temperate by inaction, there is no way to act, or behave, temperately – temperance is then forgone, and this line of reasoning ought to be applied concerning arcs-as-extremes (Aristotle).
at-large which he would be more representative of and not of himself, is a line, if ethicists are invited to the action of drawing, one may confidently procure.

Ten-to-seven thousand years ago is when the first human societies began to emerge (Lamoureux), if you take into consideration the elevated sentiency of being able to produce agriculture alongside being capable of rational thought (Aristotle). The species *H. heidelbergensis* (Zimmer) is the most current species preceding humanity, thus presumably the species on the “conceptual cusp” of ascending sentiency on its way to rationality. Were these *heidelbergensis* capable of rational sentiency? Surely not, but possibly to a degree in which we cannot place an exact meter upon, but can closely say, *before they applied their conceptual attitude to behavior, such as grasping, these organisms are yet to be quite as sentient as the human being*. But, do these preceding ancestors offer a sentient state higher than all extant organisms, another exampled Australopithecine (Sagan), besides the near-future *H. sapiens*? What shift in conceptual thinking occurred in our ancient, bare state? Because it is impossible to truly know, we must idealize that, form banding bonds of protection, habitually increased over time, offered observable moral values which we thus relate to protection, such moral values equipping an ethical system even in our state of nature. No field of study supports a “protective species argument” more than evolutionary biology but deriving an ethical framework from an ontological argument is the ethic of care’s sure potency – save a handshake for the ancient and moderate practitioners of protection!

The ecological concept of Survivorship Type I states that there is not only low mortality rate in young, but overall increase in organism fitness because of parental
protection\textsuperscript{51} evident in this the late-loss survivorship category (compare to, say, the ecological term for those organisms that produce many offspring, but without the protective care of their parents as in higher placental mammals called early-loss, or, Survivorship Type III, demonstrated clearly in amphibians) (Hoefnagels). Essentially, protection plays an essential role in extending the fitness, or, the overall longevity of a species’ existence. The ecological term Survivorship Type I\textsuperscript{52} projects late-loss in species through scientific theory (empirical-value), which is mainly responsible for a young organism’s parental care (abstract-value), denoting how our ontology \textit{and} epistemology may have heavily relied on principles emergent from protection-as-moral-value (Hoefnagels). How we come to be and how we come to know, through provocative Aristotelian claims of survivorship synthesized with care ethics’ claims of protective ontology, synthesizes \textit{protection} from the conflicting theses of care and virtue.

Perhaps after examining this stockpile of empirical, theoretical, and literary contributions, the educative world may be likened to an enlightened period in a current era of reflection, not engagement. Though some may have it that enlightening \textit{inspires} engagement, there is another side to new forms of evaluative critical thinking: the reflection-ist, or, the deconstructionist of texts, who, in their end, seeks to atone for the particular efforts excluded from previous studies not to be a critic-entire, but to examine what concepts may have been overlooked; this is done to apply the overlooked concept, if it should have any potency and relevancy to the community-at-large, to a broader span of

\textsuperscript{51} This is common in lower-sentient organisms that, in general consequence to not parenting for long periods of time, do not generate successful species-communities within the ecosystem as those organisms that are classified in the Survivorship Type I category.

\textsuperscript{52} Discussed earlier in regard to protective ontology relating most closely through evolutionary biology and philosophy, two dialectical extremes in their own scholarship.
thinking without exclusion to serious dialogic receptivity (specifically, to intermingle intelligences of various kinds in non-restrictive ways). We need to sincerely reflect on the uncelebrated not only to bring those disquieted in the public heart to the public heart, but to apply these concepts as serious, strenuous studies capable of shifting traditional thinking patterns for war immersion. There ought to be no undercutting of compassionate conflict’s necessity in a dialogic society, if by achieving a community-at-large and its cultivation in such society; and if by moral relativism is compassionate conflict’s synthesis for a better view made in that decisions for the protected are inclusive of the wishes of the protected, we are presupposing more political equality than is currently granted.

Presupposing that the aforementioned sorts of nation-State wishes will generally arise as a skirmish will lessen the surprise of the outcome of conflicting ideologies to varying degrees, or, what the extremes of conflict are dangerously and harmoniously capable of allowing. Nation-States attempting to adopt a caring ethic in talks typically framed in justice-jargon are oftentimes preoccupied by past reparations owed, territory acquisition, claims of cultural identity, claims of cultural preservation, trade restrictions and trade exploitations, and many other distractions that do validate another nation-State’s concern of protecting the populous within the State. However, no matter the offense-perceived, we ought to take into consideration that any nation-State is protective insomuch as it is operable and that that does not imply the populous’ satisfaction of the nation-State but does imply its operability and potentiality. By analyzing the offense-perceived through a caring lens which empathizes the virtue of protection (one that does not shy away from justice ethics of duty to retribution especially), we may understand
more fully the intentions of the enemy-perceived, why the enemy-perceived is offended (and if those offenses are necessarily valid), and how not to escalate or hastily outnumber the wishes of the enemy-perceived to the point war, but to offer suggestions of a form of protection within the State-offended. Say, with our first example, Liberia decided to initiate a threat to American workers in the Liberian plantations; it is more sensible to better offer the protection American trade businesses have established by reaffirming the protection they establish in the first place; say, strengthening the goal of employing rural farmers without exploiting or otherwise overworking the community-at-large.53

This reaffirmation of protection discernibly leads to an increased interdependency on the reaffirming entity; Noddings speaks of the dangers of admiration, so humility is an important suggestion in this circumstance (Noddings). In admitting to the Liberian people that their reparations are irreparable, in that emotional suffering is nearly impossible to measure, but that we may offer a rulebook, if you will, of ways that American workforces have handled labor issues in rural communities; perhaps this sort of “looking into” the cared-for (Noddings) will help analyze our own communities-at-large, where we may very well find the same labor issues in homeland rural communities (even under the restriction of labor laws).

Yes, it would be absurd to assume many declarations for war embrace the ideal society like a warm companion does their compatriot in a room made cold no longer; however, the ideal that has been encouraged is not something without reach, but a more able concept than we may be aware – as squeezing fruit through a mesh-bag in which the squeezed fruit leaves no pulp, but an even, blended juice – only shrouded by a canopy of

53 As Noddings contends – avoid the tumultuous barricades that are within foresight.
domineering justice ethics. Compassionate conflict stokes the ability to have a dialogic intercourse without the conversation meeting its most escalatory octave, this exchange starting within the domiciled home (Held 17), as the domicile-whatever is one’s first experience of human nature. If so within is so without, then the typically gendered (Held 18-24) domestic roles of each abode shifting on a paradigm of including the ethics of care in daily dialogic discourse may very well, over a series of successive adoptions of the concept and with the patient (sometimes arduous) help of the already-integrated thinker, bring a more inclusive verdict when nation-States feel threatened to the point of protecting their nation-State by war. Perhaps one would offer, waving, a caring interjection and would not be labelled as pining, would not equip one as decorated with a bleeding heart, or an interjection, waving, that would not be humored and then conversed fleetingly on a measurement (which can only be gauged by comparing caring ethics against justice ethics) over how “hardy” or “strong” a caring thought may masquerade itself for the sake of further over-qualifying the expectations set by justice-informed social custom. Perhaps a caring-ethical decision would bring fresh insight – and most certainly will, having been ignored until the late 20th century as a study which still fights for its seriousness as discipline (Held 5) – to the conversation of dinner guests speaking only of virtue, consequence, inherent badness, or, if we are lucky, talking of quantifying everything so as to qualify it.

We may imagine more sound decisions made when envisioning a societal long-thinker. Insomuch that this person maintains special knowledge – which, for the sake of dominance issues, must not include an entirely private language (Wittgenstein) in this special knowledge, rather a public knowledge available to any, only special to this long-
tinker in that it ought to be an essential calling of their characteristic nature to take on such task, as would self-associate the professional (Luizzi) – thus informing the faster thinkers who may, in result, apply quicker critical thought to burdening issues concerning sociopolitical welfare or sociopolitical strife, does the long-thinker expose their potent and utilizable value to ethics.

This ideal long-thinker does not rush conclusions, but aids those who do, for serious and protective purposes - in a manner that is respective to the quick-thinker’s sense of urgency, but prudent in one’s own long-thinking sense of handing information where and when it is needed so as to add and not detract from quicker decision-making. Let us imagine a one with precise philosophical diction, if you will, who may reaffirm the long-thinker from the idiosyncratic association with the inexperienced, hypothetically-bound arm-chair philosopher (which seems quite derivative of Plato’s dubbed “philosopher kings”).

Perhaps the justice-speaking dinner guests will have to pay particular attention to the caring ethicist’s utterances, as such utterances will sound like plain language to those who tend towards virtuosic ethical semantic, but plain language (only so much plain as language can be) with just enough a dialect that the words may well be hardly possible to refrain from an eavesdropping upon – much like the well-worded conversation that one overhears in a crowded space, but in a quiet instance, and what conversation one was not a part of but will keep to the earwigged speech nevertheless; a conversation so powerfully moving in its mundanity that it cannot be any other case for this imaged person to advert, if honestly investing in the ranges between brief and superfluous purposes of the dialogic intercourse.

54 Or, Aristotle’s perfect judge (1133a).
Perhaps the caring ethic’s interrelation to the philosophical dinner table should be friendly and humbled from its own epic journey from hidden concept to public conversation piece – like a caring-virtuous Noddings, the interrelation being virtuous (quite like being a far-more-contemporaneous Aristotle’s mutual “best friend”) in its insistence to be taken as authoritative based on special knowledges related to the decision-maker that confers the most correct, apposite decision-making; or, perhaps the caring-inclusive supper will be amicable in that the interjection has the acumen to not only inform of the warring bridge the community-at-large may very well potentially cross, but to most importantly underscore the implementation of ethical voices scampering finally from the home-at-large, to work ideas into the nation-State-at-large, and ultimately, to apply protective-caring for the relative world-at-large to impede war with every decision under the sun being made, so help our ontological morality (Johnson). It seems presently important to acknowledge healthy interdependence on the special knowledge of others, requested for the needs of our special weaknesses; it seems even more important than to analyze when interdependence should take the wheel again – if anything on earth should happen “naturally,” we may be lighthearted to assume it should be reluctance! So, the illusory “need” for one’s independence need not worry of its ceased dissemination through social thought, so long the human keeps their conventional historical fortitude keenly to the protective longing it, for such longevity, already has; offering a more wholesome system of living in society demonstrably asserting the value of interdependence needs not the limelight but the better light – and just as we suspect society-as-abstract to do its best at keeping itself sustained, so ought we, with what relation of contribution we may offer if we can at all, sustain our
obligation of relating to others so as to keep the abstract society in accord with the observable and livable society. Thus, independence will, as it has, continue to be façade as interdependence firms itself as the more lucid ethical gesture.

*To synthesize* rings similar as *to compromise*. Perhaps in some ways the dialectical thesis is a lengthy way to do just that (apply compromise in a philosophically expounded fashion) – however, more serious dialectical thesis focuses chart a more particular expedition of the dialectical application in that these conflicting cognitive-behavioral human patterns are not only evident as the recognition of social binaries that are mythologized into social realities for those fringed by the responsive society but are urged to be speedily implemented in matters of decision-making on scales of which gravitas calls for an answer upon those with the special knowledge of interdependent ontology and proper inclusion – not assimilation well-dressed – as applied to ethical decision-making. We ought to, afforded the time that we are surely and optimally afforded, synthesize and not compromise ethical thinking systems and encourage ample competence over idle confidence in approaches both foreign and especially domestic, so as to more correctly synthesize with other interrelated foreign-sovereign ideology in and out of one’s direct community-at-large. We ought to find meaning in the things that make themselves obvious as meaningful.
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