SHOW IRAQ THE MONEY: UNITED STATES AND UNITED KINGDOM
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT

HONORS THESIS

Presented to the Honors College of
Texas State University
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements

for Graduation in the Honors College

by

Coffey McCurdy

San Marcos, Texas
May 2018
SHOW IRAQ THE MONEY: UNITED STATE AND UNITED KINGDOM TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE BAGHDAD PACT

by

Coffey McCurdy

Thesis Supervisor:

Dr. Elizabeth Bishop, Department of History

Approved:

Heather C. Galloway, Ph.D.
Dean, Honors College
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Without the assistance of some incredible people, this thesis would not have been possible. To my advisor, Dr. Bishop, I am forever grateful for your unwavering support and belief in me. Thank you for assisting me in finding my true passion and opening doors to a future I could only dream of. To my family, thank you for allowing me to chase an incredible dream and always letting me know that there are people rooting for me. To my teammates, thank you for inspiring me and introducing me to a new part of the world. Studying the Middle East was something that never occurred to me until I attended my first Model Arab League meeting and now I wanted to study and teach about it for the rest of my life. To Nate, I do not know if I have the words to express how much your support meant to me and how it allowed me to finish this project.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sections

1. Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ iii
2. Abstract ............................................................................................................................. v
3. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1
4. Archival Information ..................................................................................................... 1
   a. United Kingdom Archives ......................................................................................... 2
      i. Record Group AB ................................................................................................. 2
      ii. Record Group EG ............................................................................................... 3
   b. United States Archives .............................................................................................. 3
      i. Record Group 59 ................................................................................................... 3
      ii. Record Group 84 ................................................................................................ 5
      iii. Record Group 286 ............................................................................................. 6
      iv. Record Group 469 ............................................................................................. 6
5. United Kingdom Documents ....................................................................................... 6
   a. Document One .......................................................................................................... 7
   b. Document Two ......................................................................................................... 8
   c. Document Three ..................................................................................................... 9
   d. Document Four ....................................................................................................... 9
   e. Document Five ...................................................................................................... 10
   f. Document Six ....................................................................................................... 11
6. United States Documents ........................................................................................... 12
   a. Document One ....................................................................................................... 12
   b. Document Two ..................................................................................................... 15
   c. Document Three .................................................................................................. 15
   d. Document Four ................................................................................................... 16
   e. Document Five .................................................................................................... 17
   f. Document Six ...................................................................................................... 19
7. Comparison .................................................................................................................. 19
8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 23
9. Endnotes ...................................................................................................................... 26
10. Bibliography ............................................................................................................... 30
The Baghdad Pact, an agreement intended to provide an avenue for economic, scientific, and military cooperation between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom (UK), provides a specific example to evaluate the level of technical assistance given to the Baghdad Pact member states by the UK and the United States (US). In order to limit the field, the researcher focuses on atomic assistance given to the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre, a training center built in Baghdad that conducted courses on different nuclear techniques requested by the pact member states. From this preliminary basis, the researcher asks, does the US or the UK provided more assistance to the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre? Ultimately, the point of the thesis is to ascertain which state, the US or the UK, provided more assistance and in what fashion was the assistance given. To find the answers to these questions, both the UK and US National Archives were assessed for documents relating to the Baghdad Pact and then were narrowed to those discussing the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre. Six documents from each archive were selected. The twelve documents are then presented with preliminary findings from each document and then compared to one another to show the level of involvement, gauged by the different types and quantities of technical assistance given to the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre. While most would assume that the US was the primary provider of technical assistance to the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre, the UK appears to be the largest provider of assistance. The technical assistance being provided to pact member states, by the UK, is quite large, why does the UK find this use of funds necessary? Why is the US largely uninvolved in the Baghdad Pact and its pursuits of atomic knowledge? Both of these questions, while briefly
mentioned in this thesis, necessitate more research to better understand both the US and UK’s relationship to the Middle East.
INTRODUCTION

Who provided more technical assistance to the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre; the United States (US) or the United Kingdom (UK)? Both states, post-World War II, were dominant world powers. However, as the UK attempted to rebuild after a devastating war, the US sprinted ahead to become a superpower, rivaled only by the Soviet Union. Most are familiar with the proxy wars fought between the US and the Soviet Union in Asia, the presence of the Warsaw Pact versus NATO in Europe, and the spread of communism as close to the US as Cuba, but few are aware that another front existed in the Middle East.

Established in 1955, the Baghdad Pact, consisting of Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, created an important border between the growing Soviet Union and the Middle East. While the pact addressed the attempts of communism to spread into the region and contained a military-oriented aspect, the relevant focus of the pact, for the following thesis, was the scientific component. As explained above, in the post-World War II world the UK fell into the shadows as the US came to center stage. Yet, both states provided substantial resources to the Baghdad Pact and provided extensive knowledge in the field of peaceful atomic technology. The US and the UK’s archival records shed light on numerous aspects of the pact including the technical assistance each state gave to the Middle Eastern pact member states. By utilizing archival documents from the United States and United Kingdom records, the following thesis attempts to distinguish which state provided more technical assistance to the Baghdad Pact.

ARCHIVAL INFORMATION

Below are introductions to the different record groups utilized to complete the following thesis. Consulting both the US and the UK National Archives allowed for the
researcher to compare and contrast both the US and UK’s archives as a way to verify discrepancies between the two states’ reports. For the UK Archives, the researcher believes it to be imperative that the readers understand the researcher obtained the documents from an advisor. Meaning, the researcher did not specifically select which documents they reviewed or did not review. While the researcher believes the documents received were a thorough collection of the UK records available on the subject area, another area of research is opened for the researcher to conduct an exhaustive search of the UK Archives at a later date to again certify or disprove the preliminary findings presented in this thesis. Of the UK record groups, the researcher found record groups AB and EG to provide the most information relevant to the thesis.

From the US Archives, record groups (RG) 59, 84, 286, 469 are used to ascertain the level of involvement of the US in the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre. Each record groups contains extensive information relating to the US involvement in a multitude of different areas. The following descriptions are in no way exhaustive of the records of these different groups. In fact, the record group overviews are mainly to explain the knowledge the researcher gained from the groups. Primarily, the researcher focused on Iraq while conducting research in the US National Archives meaning the research conducted is not exhaustive when opened to the Baghdad Pact as a whole. Additionally, there may be other record groups that contain documents relating to the Baghdad Pact and the technical assistance the pact member states received. As such, further research is necessary to certify or disprove the preliminary findings presented in this thesis.

UNITED KINGDOM ARCHIVES

RECORD GROUP AB
Transitioning to the UK Archives, the first record group utilized is the AB group, Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and its predecessor. Established in 1954, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, much like the US Atomic Energy Commission, addressed the research and development of atomic energy. Specifically, the group contains both the records from the UK’s research centres, notably Harwell, and private papers of well-respected UK scientist, notably Sir John Cockcroft. While the records go all the way back to 1939, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority is the most relevant agency for the following research.

**RECORD GROUP EG**

Record group EG, records created or inherited by the Department of Energy, provides documents relating to the supervision and regulation of fuel for both nuclear and fossil fuels. While the UK’s Department of Energy was not established until 1974, its predecessors, notably the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, records are also stored within this record group. Not unlike the US record groups 286 and 469 who contain overlapping records, both UK’s groups AB and EG contain records from the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. Thus, both sets of records were consulted to compose a thorough picture of the level of aid offered by the UK.

**UNITED STATES ARCHIVES**

**RECORD GROUP 59**

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of States, provides a wide range of information relating to the activities of the U.S. Department of State from 1756 to 1993. RG 59 is one of the largest record groups because of the broad nature of the documents stored here. For the purposes of the following paper, only certain subsections
were necessary to investigate.

Of particular importance was the decimal files. Decimal files are the State Department’s way of classifying documents by assigning numbers to every aspect of the document. To begin, the first number is the class, there are ten areas. The labels start with zero and stop with nine. The Department of States’ nine classes are divided into three sections, (a) “Miscellaneous; Administrative” (0-2), (b) “International relations; relations of one country with another, or of a group of countries with other countries” (3-6) and (c) “Internal affairs; domestic problems, conditions, etc., and only rarely concerns more than one country or area” (7-9).\(^2\) Specifically, for the following paper, Class 3 “International Conferences, Congresses, Meetings and Organizations. United Nations. Organization of American States. Multilateral Treaties” contains numerous documents relating to the creation of the Baghdad Pact.\(^3\)

Next, the number typically signifies the country the document depicts. For example, Iraq is number 87. Meaning, to find records about Iraq one must find those that have the country code 87. Additionally, the other Baghdad Pact states are labeled Iran (88), Turkey (82), Pakistan (90d), and the U.K. (41). An important note, during the 1950s the Middle East region, was referred to as the Near East. Within the decimal files, 80 denotes the Near East region as a whole. Also, because the Department of State operates internationally through embassies and consulates, the different embassies and consulates are assigned their own numbers. The U.S. mission to Iraq in the 1950s was in the capital Baghdad and assigned the number 157.

All in all, the Department of State decimal files can provide a wealth of information. However, an understanding of the vastness of the documents is important too. Attempting
to find documents requires searching numerous different decimal files to ensure that the
documents were labeled correctly and with an understanding that some documents can and
do fall into numerous categories at once.

**RECORD GROUP 84**

Contained within Record Group 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State is an extensive collection of U.S. Department of State documents relating to the specific posts in different countries. As such, the documents are organized by the post of which they pertain; whether the memorandum or other document was sent from or to the foreign service post. Of relevance to the following writing, are the documents coming from the embassy in Baghdad, Iraq. Traditionally, most of the records are memorandums sent from Washington, D.C. educating the embassy’s staff on the policy positions of the United States. Typically, the memorandums will address a single issue, but the US sends the document to numerous countries in the region. Additionally, the memorandum will include a stamp showing the different embassies who received the document. The stamp allows for an understanding of the different embassies, and missions, deemed necessary to receive the memorandum’s content.

Another part of the records included in Records Group 84, is the United States Information Services. Before 1953, the USIS operated within the Department of State and many of their workers’ offices were housed in the embassies and missions operated by the Department of State. USIS documents include important information relating to different events and surveys conducted in the given country. For example, a common occurrence in the 1950s was the US putting on free showings of movies about the Atoms for Peace program. After the movie, USIS officials would ask questions of the local population to
determine what they thought of the movie and more basic information like how many people attended.

**RECORD GROUP 286**

Contained within Record Group 286, Records of the Agency for International Development, are numerous documents detailing the different projects undertaken by the US Agency for International Development. RG 286 records are supposed to be post-1961, however, it is possible for documents dated before 1961 to be found within the records. For the purposes of the following paper, pre-1961 documents detailing US aid to Iraq were found and are referenced later.

**RECORD GROUP 469**

Contained within the records of record group 469, Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies, are documents from six different agencies and institutions that pre-date the US Agency for International Development (RG286), established in 1961. As mentioned above, the documents used in this paper from RG286 were misfiled and should technically be placed within RG469. Of the records placed in RG 469, those from the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) are referenced in this paper. Due to the wide variety of different agencies encompassed in the record group, a wealth of information can be found, but it requires a great deal of determination to sort through the documents to identify those that pertain to the specific field of study. Also, some of the agencies are predecessors or successors to other agencies within the record group, being able to identify which agency correspondences to the research and fits the time period criteria is imperative.

**UNITED KINGDOM DOCUMENTS**
The following six documents from the UK Archives are in no way an exhaustive explanation of every document showcasing UK technical assistance to the Baghdad Pact. Instead, the six documents represent the clearest examples of specific aid and resources given to the pact members, typically through the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre. Providing a thorough explanation of these documents allows for an in-depth comparison between the UK and US approaches to providing technical assistance. Each sub-section is specifically dealing with the document and the citation for the entire document is provided in the endnote following the last sentence in each sub-section. Direct quotes are also cited to provide the exact page number of the quote.

**DOCUMENT ONE**

On March 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 1956, a number of members from the different departments of the UK government met to discuss “the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Atomic Energy” of the Baghdad Pact\textsuperscript{7} While the UK appears to contribute a majority of the funds for the centre, Iraq agreed to pay for the building for the centre. Part of the document includes the statement “that United Kingdom interest was best served by each country paying its own nationals’ salaries.”\textsuperscript{8} Thus, putting some of the finical responsibility for the centre on all pact members.

At Harwell, the UK would be offering training for the centre’s lecturers. To allow the centre to get up and running, the UK would provide five lecturers to instruct the first set of courses at the centre. Also, the idea of selecting a Technical Director from the UK is floated. Selecting a director from the UK allows for the UK to keep considerable authority over the centre and make decisions, such as buying British equipment for the centre, that benefit the UK. Mentioned in the equipment section, the United States is believed to be
supplying, but not paying for, the furniture for the centre. Notably, perhaps due to the location of the centre, Iraq is believed to be providing a significant amount of the funding in establishing the centre.

The report includes a section on the US’s attitude. Following the Geneva Convention on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, the US and Iraq began negotiations over a bilateral technical agreement. Typically, the agreements include “the training of personnel, the provision of United States staff and the supply of a reactor.” As of March of 1956, Pakistan and Turkey already entered into bilateral technical agreements with the US. Interestingly, the US does not wish to provide a reactor and “the Iraq Government realise that the time is not yet ripe for them to have one.” Based on the US’s offer, the UK will consider providing a research reactor in a couple of years.

**DOCUMENT TWO**

As noted by the draft document, “Assistance to Baghdad Pact Countries: Note by the Atomic Energy Authority,” the primary purpose of the Baghdad Pact was to increase military cooperation between pact member states, excluding the UK. However, the UK Foreign Secretary wished to “offer[sic] U.K. assistance in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.” An important note, the draft includes statements that share the UK’s inability to produce a great deal of funding and notes a lack of resources for their own programs, however, the UK is prepared to offer their experts as a way of providing technical assistance.

Also included, in the draft document, is the beginning discussion of the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre (however, the name is not yet used as the conception is still being formed). Already pact member states believed that the UK providing the staff for the
facility would be “highly desirable in the formative phase of the Centre.” Not only would UK scientist assist in setting up the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre, but UK scientist could also “give lectures and advice” to pact member states.

**DOCUMENT THREE**

On March 29th, 1956, a member of the Foreign Office wrote a briefing for the UK Atomic Expert Delegate to the Baghdad Pact. Part of the briefing states the belief that the Chancellor will approve “an annual ceiling of £30,000 for atomic assistance.” Already the UK is providing equipment for the centre, some equipment appears to already have been purchased according to the writer’s comment that there may be issues with funding for the current year because of equipment already being given. Also, the UK is planning to provide even more resources to the centre, but is reserving the announcement “for the Head of the U.K. Delegation to announce” as “to make the maximum splash.”

While the following documents show a number of scientists coming to the UK for training, primarily at Harwell, the writer notes that the UK does not intend to fund each of the scientists who wishes “to study anything remotely connected with atomics.” However, the UK government appears quite set to be the only one receiving credit for their aid to the Baghdad Pact atomic efforts. Under point seven, on the brief, is a clear attempt to place the UK as the great power operating in the Middle East when it comes to atomic technical assistance. The writer goes as far as to state: “I should like to see our getting all the credit – which is, after all, no more than we deserve – for setting up the Training Centre and getting it all under way.”

**DOCUMENT FOUR**

On May 4th, 1956, a meeting in the Foreign Office, of the UK, discussed the
“Baghdad Pact Atomic Training Programme” following a meeting of the pact members in Tehran. Numerous logistical concerns were addressed including the hopeful filling of the position of director of the centre. As the first staff was set to start training at Harwell on May 28th, the people present hoped the director would be appointed and confirmed, so the first director could oversee the training of the staff.

Of note, under section three, the UK would provide the funding “for the Technical Director, Electronics and Laboratory Design experts and U.K. lectures for the training Centre.” Meaning, the bulk of the staff would be paid for by the UK. However, the first people to hold these positions were UK citizens. On the second page, the UK explains their understanding “that Governments should carry all expenses of their own nationals.” Meaning, the UK should only be covering the salaries of staff coming from the UK, however, it appears as though the meeting in Tehran implied that the UK would provide partial funds for all workers, regardless of nationality. Contrarily, the UK intends to send a telegram to their ambassador in Baghdad to clarify their understanding of the cost responsibilities as they relate to the centre.

Under section six, equipment, the UK is attempting to find British companies to manufacture the equipment needed for the centre with a discount. The UK’s reasoning behind all British equipment is when the students return to their home states, they will be taught on specific equipment and will request their universities and other facilities to request the same equipment. Thus, the UK government receives a double benefit of cheaper equipment being purchased on their end while also encouraging business for British companies.
On March 27th, 1957 J. C. Walker wrote to D. V. Bendall of the Foreign Office on the request for a nuclear research reactor for the Baghdad Pact. Within the letter, Walker notes the costs associated with obtaining the research reactor and claims the expenses would be quite high if the research reactor would be constructed in Iraq. Walker addresses Bendall’s concern of whether UK staff would be needed to run the research reactor or if it could sufficiently be maintained and operated by pact member states staff. While Walker does not believe it would be necessary for UK staff to operate the reactor, if there was a need for UK staff, Walker believes it may be difficult to encourage staff to make the trek to Baghdad to assist. Ultimately, Walker believes that the request from Baghdad for a research reactor is too soon. While the UK will entertain discussion of a research reactor and may relent in a few years, it will be “on purely political grounds.”

DOCUMENT SIX

“Brief for United Kingdom Representative to the Scientific Council,” contains the comments of the UK representative to the Baghdad Pact meeting of the Scientific Council and covers a wide range of topics. The topics discussed below deal specifically with the technical assistance offered and detailed within the briefing. One item discussed is the proposal of a 17-week training course on medical applications of atomic techniques. However, the writer of the brief believes it would be cheaper to simply send the students interested in the course to the UK for a class. While the UK appears quite generous with their commitment to the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre, they “do however expect the regional members to fill an increasing number of senior posts.” Meaning, the UK has been providing a great deal of assistance, specifically to the research centre, but the other member states are expected to start providing resources to allow the centre to function at
its full potential.

Lack of funds appears evident on page seven of the briefing when the document points to the fact that any request must be vetted before any promise of aid may be made. The writer also notes that the UK has commitments to other states, outside of the Baghdad Pact, who also require technical assistance. Additionally, the writer notes a number of other sources of technical assistance and funds that pact member states are receiving from, however, the US is not listed among the organizations. Noted here is an attempt to link the scientific initiatives of NATO with those of the Baghdad Pact.

According to the briefing, the UK government has no comment on “reports relating to reactors in the Middle East Countries.” Interesting that the UK has no comment, however, there is little context to why the government would not offer any opinion on the pursuit of Middle East Countries, noting the lack of specification to pact member states. Later, on page eleven of the briefing, the writer notes that Iraq is in the process of obtaining a research reactor and there is a discussion of whether the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre may be moved closer to the reactor to allow for use of the reactor by pact member states. Appears as though the UK while stating that funds are restricted is suggesting the introduction of a geologist, though not specific to the centre, to assist in the possible exploration of uranium mining.

UNITED STATES DOCUMENTS

As explained above, the six US documents are representative of the clearest examples of US technical assistance to the Baghdad Pact member states. Just as above the citation for the document is provided after the last sentence in each subsection.

DOCUMENT ONE
Officially, the establishment of the Baghdad Pact occurs in 1955. Extending upon the previous Truco-Iraqi Pact of Mutual Co-operation and Defence, Turkey and Iraq are the first two states to seek a mutual agreement to defend against the bordering Soviet Union. Upon the official creation and announcement of the pact in December of 1954, the two states were “open to other interested countries of the Middle East and friendly countries in other areas” to join their collaborative set-up. Following this announcement, both Middle Eastern states and a friendly country in Europe would all join the Baghdad Pact.

Before the UK could join the Baghdad Pact, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 needed to be voided. Both states agreed in friendly terms to part ways with the 1930 treaty in favor of the newly named Baghdad Pact. The friendly terms may be related to the Iraqis desire to shed some of the influence the British had over them while the British saw the Baghdad Pact as a way to continue to be involved with Iraq on the illusion of assistance. On a side note, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 provides an example of the continued semi-colonial hold the UK retained on Iraq, following the division of the Ottoman Empire post-World War I, before allowing Iraq to become an autonomous state. At this point, one can begin to see the long-standing ties the UK has with the region and Iraq in particular. Building on this relationship, the UK was the first state to join Iraq and Turkey in the Baghdad Pact on April 4th, 1955.

Following the Iraqi-Truco extension of friendship to other interested states, Pakistan joined in September of 1955. In the following month, Iran also joined the pact. Located strategically along the southwestern border between the Soviet Union and the rest of the Arab World, the Baghdad Pact attempted to be a buffer zone to prevent the extension
of communism further into the rest of the world. While Turkey was already a part of NATO, with Turkey also belonging to the Baghdad Pact, Turkey played an important role in forming the contention between Europe and the Middle East. With the addition of Iran, the total members reached five and the pact came into full effect. The creation of a Ministerial Council occurred and with it, the Baghdad Pact was up and running.

To mark the occasion of the first meeting of the Baghdad Pact on November 21st, 1955 at the Zuhur Palace in Baghdad, Iraq’s, Iran’s, Turkey’s, and Pakistan’s Prime Ministers were in attendance and the UK’s Foreign Secretary. Notably, there was no recorded attendance of any US officials at this first meeting. However, the notes indicate the US intended to retain communication with the Baghdad Pact through the Ambassador and Military Attaché in Baghdad. During the meeting, numerous administrative details were decided. Additionally, the members agreed to create two permanent committees, the Economic and Military committees. Establishing a permanent military committee reemphasizes the pact’s commitment to “defend their territories against aggression or subversion.”

Inherently, the Baghdad Pact members are aware of the attempts of the Soviet Union to undermine the states nearest them to gradually bring these states under the Soviet umbrella. Meaning, the members are working diligently to ensure their states continued to sovereignty and prosperity.

While the military committee provides a thrilling analysis of the impact of subversion tactics in the region, the economic committee is where the atomic research center idea stems from. In January of 1956, the economic committee met and confirmed that the UK would provide the “material and experts” in order to create an atomic research center for all pact members. There is no mention of the US in these preliminary plans for
the research center.  

**DOCUMENT TWO**

According to the notes from the first meeting of the Baghdad Pact, the UK was the first to offer atomic assistance to the pact member states. As other documents show, the UK would provide a substantial level of equipment and experts as a means of providing the proposed assistance to the Baghdad Pact member states “in the application of atomic techniques with special reference to local and regional problems.”  

However, the US also will provide resources, as noted by the pact member states in the penultimate closing point in their first meeting, “the five Governments expressed their gratification for the extensive economic assistance which has been freely accorded by the Government of the United States.”

**DOCUMENT THREE**

The US’s avoidance of joining the Baghdad Pact would constitute its own intense study, however, understanding the desire of the pact member states for US adherence underlines the power and respect the US held during the period. By offering financial assistance to establish the Baghdad Pact secretariat as a means to “give a substantial boost to declining morale,” the US Ambassador in Tehran is again emphasizing the importance that all pact member states place on the US. Also, the US Ambassador in Baghdad believes the pact member states value the US so highly that the only way for them to be satisfied is by the US becoming a full member of the Baghdad Pact. Of note in the US Department of State’s Daily Summary on April 3rd, 1956, is the belief by pact members that regardless of US adherence to the Baghdad Pact, the pact, or its members themselves, will receive “military and financial aid.”
Furthermore, the daily summary also included a strong accusation against both the US and the UK that the current problems in the Middle East are the result of the actions of the US and UK. However, the Turkish Prime Minister then says that each pact member state “should[sic] let the US know of the lack of confidence US policy has created in the minds of the Pact powers.” Even though the bulk of this daily summary is dedicated to how the pact members wish the US would solidify its commitment to the Baghdad Pact and join as a full member state, the pact member states, excluding the UK, also wish to call the US out for their involvement in the Middle East.

**DOCUMENT FOUR**

On February 12, 1957, the Deputy Secretary-General for the Baghdad Pact, Mohamad Sarfraz, sent Mr. Mann a copy of the draft chapter dealing with the organizational structure of the Baghdad Pact. As noted from the previous document, the US was not a member of the Baghdad Pact. At the forefront is the requirement that all decisions must be made unanimously, protecting the sovereign rights of each individual member state. Interestingly, the working language of the Pact is determined to be English.

Continuing on, the pamphlet notes that the council can meet at two different levels of representation. Drawing on the previous document from the US Archives, the Ministerial level is denoted in the presence of the Prime Ministers of four of the pact member states, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, and the Foreign Secretary from the UK. While the Ministerial level meetings occur sporadically, the Deputies’ level meets continuously in Baghdad and the members are of Ambassadorial rank.

In order to delegate the work, the Baghdad Pact was divided into committees. First, the military committee advises the member states on methods to improve their overall
security and to encourage the cooperation of member states in military matters. Second, the economic committee follows the same mission as the military committee, but, instead, focuses on opportunities for economic development and cooperation. Third, the Counter-Subversion Committee was tasked with identifying strategies for member states to avoid the temptations of subversion. Lastly, the Liaison Committee promotes communication between the member states. Additionally, there are numerous smaller councils and departments that assist with the day-to-day operations of the Baghdad Pact.

An important fact illuminated in the document, is the US being invited and accepting the offer of being a full voting member on both the economic and counter-subversion committees. However, according to the documents obtained thus far in the course of research, the US never becomes a full voting member of the military committee, nor will the US ever become a full member of the Baghdad Pact. The latter information will again be addressed within other US documents later in the paper.

Within the economic committee is the scientific council which governs the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Center. Of note on the draft, the US government employee who received the document took the time to change each “centre” to “center.” While the official language of the pact is English, it should be noted that it is British English, not American English. When the document was written, W. J. Whitehouse was serving as the director of the center, he is from the UK.44

**DOCUMENT FIVE**

Following a trip to Iraq, Dr. William Kerr, University of Michigan, communicated inquiries from the Iraqi government about obtaining equipment and expertise from the US. Specifically, the Iraqi government was interested in equipment pertaining to the medical
uses of isotopes and a research reactor. Dr. Kerr’s trip occurred in October of 1957 and the summary report is dated February 15th, 1958. One of the Iraqi government’s requests is for more information on a cancer therapy center. The intention would be for the center to be attached to the Royal Medical Center in Baghdad. According to Dr. Hazelton, Training Officer, ICA USOM Baghdad, Iraq has the funds for the center if they can receive an estimate to confirm the cost of a cancer therapy center.\footnote{45}

Upon returning from Iraq, Dr. Kerr completed a report of his experience. According to Dr. Kerr, “the visit was in response to a request from the USOM Baghdad which reported that the Secretary of the Iraq Atomic Energy Committee wished to discuss the setting up of a nuclear energy program for Iraq”.\footnote{46} However, from the summary presented in the report, Dr. Kerr appears to emphasize the desire for medical resources, not the pursuit of nuclear energy\footnote{47}. Another note of interest is while the Iraqi government set aside a considerable budget “for development of peaceful uses of atomic energy” little has been done with the money. However, Dr. Kerr points out that five scientists have been trained, three at Argonne National Laboratories and two at Harwell.\footnote{48}

An undated document from RG59 suggests the request expressed, in Dr. Kerr’s report, for information on the process of obtaining assistance in accruing a research reactor was followed through. Iraq, along with ten other states, is listed as “countries with which agreements for cooperation for research reactors are under discussion or formal negotiation.”\footnote{49} Interestingly, no other Baghdad Pact member state is included in this list. It appears as though Iraq was pursuing a research reactor of their own accord. Whether or not it was intended to augment the resources at the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Center, placing the reactor in Baghdad meant it would be in close proximity to the center, therefore accessible
to the other pact member states. Whitehouse, the current director of the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Center, believes that Iraq will pursue, with US assistance, a research reactor, however, the research reactor will not be part of the center. Among the meetings Dr. Kerr attended during his three-day visit to Iraq, one was with staff members from the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Center. Interestingly, a representative from Iraq commented on the lack of US involvement in Iraq, compared to the amount of assistance other Baghdad Pact member states are receiving.\textsuperscript{50}

**DOCUMENT SIX**

In order to develop an atomic weapon, the US created an extensive organization of facilities tasked with creating this deadly weapon. Of those some became centers of research and development and, following Eisenhower’s program Atoms for Peace, some of these facilities became open to foreign nationals to come and learn about techniques and research they could bring back to their home countries’ nuclear programs. For example, in 1957, Iraq sent two researchers to the School of Atomic Science and Engineering at the Argon National Laboratory. Sending researchers to other states highlights the attempts of states like Iraq to take advantage of the opportunities presented by powerful states.\textsuperscript{51}

**COMPARISON**

Before comparing the different methods of assistance presented in the documents above, an understanding of the importance placed on the level of membership of the US and the UK to the Baghdad Pact is needed. The UK was always a member of the Baghdad Pact, joining the pact second only to the founding members, Iraq and Turkey.\textsuperscript{52} However, as mentioned before, the US would never become a full member of the Baghdad Pact. Instead, the US would accept full voting rights on two committees, Economic and Counter-
Subversion. An important impact of the UK’s full involvement in the pact was their center seat to all of the happenings of the pact. Most of the technical assistance requests from the pact came to the UK. With more research, a clearer distinction between aid given to the pact member states individually and the aid dispersed via the Baghdad Pact would allow for a better understanding of which state ultimately gave more aid through the Baghdad Pact. While the documents used above largely point to the UK providing the largest chunk of technical assistance, there is also a clear pattern of US involvement. Another important distinction needed to be made is whether the assistance is atomic in nature. The original avenue of research dealt exclusively with atomic capabilities in Iraq, again limiting the scope of research. Therefore, the researcher cannot guarantee that all records were consulted to provide a thorough picture of the technical assistance offered by both the UK and the US to the Baghdad Pact. However, there is still a wealth of information to be learned from the few selected documents explained above. Of note are the types of assistance given by the US and the UK and the types of assistance the pact members states were looking to obtain. All of these inquiries open the door to further research topics.

Primarily, the technical assistance provided to the Baghdad Pact, specifically to the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre, can be broken down to the equipment and the experts provided. To start the centre, the equipment appears to be solely from the UK. Of particular interest is the UK not only supplying these resources but, also, noting their desire for the UK to receive all the credit, of which they believe they are due. It appears as though the UK is feeling as though they are in second place to the US and is attempting to show that the US will not be able to overcome the strong relationship the UK and the Middle East have developed over years of colonial occupation. While the US hesitated and
tip-toed around the idea of joining the Baghdad Pact, the UK jumped right in. Before the war, the UK and the US participated in a serious amount of information sharing leading up to the creation of the atomic bomb. However, the UK and the US were unable to continue the information sharing and the US eventually left the UK behind.55 Thus, the beginning of their disconnect over atomic expenditures. In fact, Walker in his letter to Bendall claims the UK is keeping their eye on the aid the US is attempting to give to pact member states. Also, Walker feels that while the UK wishes to “keep the Americans interested…there is no obvious scope at present for American aid in the training program.”56 Is this the UK’s attempt to retain their dominance in the region by being the sole provider of aid and thus being, in the eyes of the pact member states, the only state worth their time to communicate with? From the documents evaluated it appears that while the UK was struggling finically to be able to provide resources to the pact member states, via the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre, the UK government was still invested in providing some sort of assistance.

Of the staff sent to Baghdad to assist with the centre, sending Sir John Cockcroft shows the UK’s strong commitment to the centre’s success. Being the first director of the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre, Sir Cockcroft brought a certain level of prestige. Sir Cockcroft’s expertise in the field of atomic research is well-known and well respected. Also, from the briefings and other documents in the UK Archives, it appears as though Sir Cockcroft attended numerous meetings for the centre, interacting with the delegates. While the UK offered numerous opportunities for students from the pact member states to travel to the UK, normally Harwell and study, the student’s home state was responsible for the cost of the trip and any other expenses for the student to attend the courses. At first glance, this proposition appears as an excellent example of the UK’s generosity to spread atomic
knowledge in the region, yet the unwillingness, or possibly the inability, of the UK to fund these trips hints at a growing discrepancy between the UK’s helpful exterior and their war-torn economic woes interior.

Of the resources given to the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre, the pursuit of a research reactor by Iraq showcases the discrepancy between the UK and the US’s attempts at assistance best. While the Iraqi pursuit of a research reactor was not specifically associated with the centre, according to documents from the UK, the intention would be for the eventual use of the research reactor by the centre. While undated, the fact that Iraq was on the list for negotiations about a research reactor highlights the US willingness to work with the Iraqi government and to keep strong ties to the state. UK documents state the negotiations were underway in 1956. Iraq would not, however, receive the research reactor from the US because, during negotiations for the bilateral technical assistance agreement, the Iraqi coup d’état of 1958 occurred. While the researcher intends to continue studying Iraq after the coup d’état, for the purposes of this thesis, the information used is pre-April 1958. After the Iraqi coup d’état, the new Iraqi government withdrew from the Baghdad Pact, which would be subsequently named the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and turned to the USSR for technical assistance. Nevertheless, while the US drove straight forward with the Iraqi request for a research reactor, the UK’s approach was much more reserved. According to the UK document five (the letter from Walker to Bendall, 1957), the UK does not believe it to be a good time for the centre to pursue a research reactor. An important note made in the letter is “if such a research reactor were provided from the U.K. you may take it that, in conformity with declared U.K. policy, the Authority would be ready to supply and service the necessary fuel elements.” Meaning,
the UK would have an opportunity for continued involvement with the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre. While, yes, the UK is a member of the pact, their position is different from the other pact member states. The UK only remains relevant in the pact by means of what they provide the other pact member states with. Geographically both the US and the UK are not members of the region making serious trade or military cooperation complicated. However, the small exchanges of technical assistance and funds provided by the UK and the US keep the two states relevant to the pact and continue to strengthen the relationships they have with the pact member states. Therefore, the UK’s lack of interest in assisting with the Baghdad Pact’s pursuit of a research reactor calls into question how invested the UK is in the Baghdad Pact. However, to form a solid conclusion more research is needed around the state of the UK in March of 1957. Was the UK struggling financially? Was their attention turned to another region of the world? Did they not trust the pact member states to take full benefit of the research reactor? Was the expense involved in getting the research reactor to Baghdad too great to justify? Or was the UK no longer interested in being the main provider of technical assistance to the Baghdad Pact?

CONCLUSION

Ultimately, it is clear that the UK provided substantially more resources to the Baghdad Pact and was committed to the success of the pact’s mission. The rationality behind the US’s lack of involvement could stem from their distinct lack of connections within the region. Originally, the foundation of the UK’s relationship with Iraq is rooted in the colonial presence of the UK and the post-colonial requirements of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. While the US continued to spread their influence around the world in their war against communism, the Middle East was a region largely dominated by relationships
with the UK.

While this thesis’s intention was to answer questions about the level of involvement of the US and the UK in the Baghdad Pact, the end result of the research leads to a wide variety of questions and possible avenues for continued study. The original direction of thesis looked to atomic assistance only, however, this focus limits the end ability of the research to accurately portray US and UK involvement in the pact. Another opening, though, is following the paths of the scientist trained at the Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre back to their home countries to see what impact they had on the atomic pursuits of their home countries. For example, Pakistan would later develop a nuclear weapon. Did any of the scientist involved in the program trained at the centre or take advantage of fellowships offered by the UK and the US assist in Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon? What about Iran? Did Iraqi scientist from the centre assist in Sadam Hussein’s pursuit of nuclear weapons? Considering three of the four pact member states would go on to develop nuclear weapons programs, it seems conceivable that some of them received training at the centre. When researching the centre, however, the researcher did not come across a list of participates in centre courses and conceivably this could be an issue depending on the level of confidentially the state who has these records wishes to maintain. While some documents obtained from the UK and US Archives include names of scientist traveling to the UK or the US for training, these scientists do not constitute every scientist to be educated from the technical assistance given from the US and the UK.

In the end, the UK’s involvement in the pact is quite evident. Their substantial financial commitment to the pact placed the UK at the center of the pact’s meetings and plans. To begin the centre, the first lectures trained at Harwell in the UK. The first director,
Sir Cockcroft, is a world-renowned British physicist. While the US attempted in the later years of the pact to become more involved, the hold the UK placed on the pact member states and the centre allowed for the British to remain dominant.
ENDNOTES

3 Ibid.
7 “Baghdad Pact: Record of a Meeting held in the Foreign Office on March 2 to discuss the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Atomic Energy,” (1956); AB 6/1653; United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and predecessors: Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell; AB 6; Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Research Establishment: Harwell; RG AB, TNA, 1.
8 Ibid, 2.
9 Ibid, 3.
10 Ibid.
11 “Baghdad Pact: Record of a Meeting held in the Foreign Office on March 2 to discuss the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Atomic Energy,” (1956); AB 6/1653; United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and predecessors: Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell; AB 6; Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Research Establishment: Harwell; RG AB, TNA.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid, 2.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, 2.
19 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid, 2.

23 “Baghdad Pact—Atomic Training Centre Programme: Note on meeting held at Foreign Office on May 4, 1956,” (1956); AB 6/1653; United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and predecessors: Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell; AB 6; Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Research Establishment: Harwell; RG AB, TNA.

24 J. C. Walker, “Letter from J. C. Walker to D. V. Bendall,” (1957); 202; EG 1; Records of the Atomic Energy Division; RG EG, TNA, 2.

25 “Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre: Brief for United Kingdom Representative to the Scientific Council,” (1958); 202; EG 1; Records of the Atomic Energy Division; RG EG, TNA, 2.

26 Ibid, 3.

27 Ibid, 6.

28 Ibid, 7.

29 Ibid, 8.


31 Ibid, 10.

32 Ibid, 11.

33 Ibid, 10.

34 “Baghdad Pact Overview (Draft),” (n.d.); Box 9; Shelf 2; Compartment 28; Row 61; Stack 350; RG 84; NACP, 1.


36 Ibid.

37 “Baghdad Pact Overview (Draft),” (n.d.); Box 9; Shelf 2; Compartment 28; Row 61; Stack 350; RG 84; NACP.

38 “Council Communiqué,” (n.d.); Box 9; Shelf 2; Compartment 28; Row 61; Stack 350; RG 84; NACP, 3.

39 Ibid.

40 Department of State, “Suggestions on Support for Baghdad Pact,” Daily Summary (1956); Box 307; Shelf 7; Compartment 12; Row 51; Stack 250; RG 59.

41 Department of State, “Baghdad Pact Discussions,” Daily Summary (1956); Box 307; Shelf 7; Compartment 12; Row 51; Stack 250; RG 59; NACP.

42 Ibid.

43 Department of State, “Suggestions on Support for Baghdad Pact,” Daily Summary (1956); Box 307; Shelf 7; Compartment 12; Row 51; Stack 250; RG 59; NACP.

44 “The Present Structure of the Baghdad Pact Organisation,” (n.d.); Box 9; Shelf 2; Compartment 28; Row 61; Stack 350; RG 84; NACP.

45 ICA/Washington, “Report of Kerr Visit to Iraq, October, 1957,” (1958); Box 1; Shelf 5; Compartment 13; Row 76; Stack 150; RG 286; NACP.
46 Ibid.
47 William Kerr, “Visit to Iraq: October 1957,” (1957); Box 1; Shelf 5; Compartment 13; Row 76; Stack 150; RG 286; NACP.
48 Ibid, 2.
49 Department of State, “Countries with which agreements for cooperation for research reactors are under discussion or formal negotiation,” (n.d.); Box 6; Shelf 96; Compartment 7; Row 28; Stack 250; RG 59; NACP.
50 ICA/Washington, “Report of Kerr Visit to Iraq, October, 1957,” (1958); Box 1; Shelf 5; Compartment 13; Row 76; Stack 150; RG 286; NACP.
William Kerr, “Visit to Iraq: October 1957,” (1957); Box 1; Shelf 5; Compartment 13; Row 76; Stack 150; RG 286; NACP.
51 Government of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Letter to the United States Embassy in Baghdad confirming the attendance of two scientist at a training session at Argon National Laboratory,” (1957); Box 41; Shelf 3; Compartment 20; Row 81; Stack 250; RG 469; NACP.
Government of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Letter to the United States Embassy in Baghdad giving the names of two scientist to travel to the Argon National Laboratory,” (1957); Box 41; Shelf 3; Compartment 20; Row 81; Stack 250; RG 469; NACP.
52 “Baghdad Pact Overview (Draft),” (n.d.); Box 9; Shelf 2; Compartment 28; Row 61; Stack 350; RG 84; NACP.
“Baghdad Pact: Record of a Meeting held in the Foreign Office on March 2 to discuss the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Atomic Energy,” (1956); AB 6/1653; United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and predecessors: Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell; AB 6; Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Research Establishment: Harwell; RG AB, TNA, 2.
56 “Baghdad Pact: Record of a Meeting held in the Foreign Office on March 2 to discuss the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Atomic Energy,” (1956); AB 6/1653; United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and predecessors: Atomic Energy Research
Establishment, Harwell; AB 6; Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Research Establishment: Harwell; RG AB, TNA, 3.


59 J. C. Walker, “Letter from J. C. Walker to D. V. Bendall,” (1957); 202; EG 1; Records of the Atomic Energy Division; RG EG, TNA, 1.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Baghdad Pact—Atomic Training Centre Programme: Note on meeting held at Foreign Office on May 4, 1956.” 1956. Technical assistance to Baghdad Pact powers (AB 6/1653); United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and predecessors: Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell; Correspondence and Papers (AB 6); Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Research Establishment: Harwell; Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and its predecessors Record Group AB (RG AB), United Kingdom National Archives, Kew (TNA).

“Baghdad Pact Nuclear Centre: Brief for United Kingdom Representative to the Scientific Council.” 1958. International Relations (202); United Kingdom Atomic Energy Policy: Minutes, Papers and Registered Files inherited by the Department of Energy (EG 1); Records of the Atomic Energy Division; Records created or inherited by the Department of Energy Record Group EG (RG EG); United Kingdom National Archives, Kew (TNA).

“Baghdad Pact Overview (Draft).” n.d. Box 9; Shelf 2; Compartment 28; Row 61; Stack 350; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84 (RG 84); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).

“Baghdad Pact: Record of a Meeting held in the Foreign Office on March 2 to discuss the draft Report of the Sub-Committee on Atomic Energy.” 1956. Technical assistance to Baghdad Pact powers (AB 6/1653); United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and predecessors: Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell; Correspondence and Papers (AB 6); Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Research Establishment: Harwell; Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and its predecessors Record Group AB (RG AB), United Kingdom National Archives, Kew (TNA).


“Council Communique.” n.d. Box 9; Shelf 2; Compartment 28; Row 61; Stack 350; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84 (RG 84); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).
Department of State. 1956. “Baghdad Pact Discussions,” Daily Summary. April 3. Box 307; Shelf 7; Compartment 12; Row 51; Stack 250; Department of State Central Files, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).

---. n.d. “Countries with which agreements for cooperation for research reactors are under discussion or formal negotiation.” Box 6; Shelf 96; Compartment 7; Row 28; Stack 250; Department of State Central Files, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).

---. 1956. “Suggestions on Support for Baghdad Pact,” Daily Summary. April 9. Box 307; Shelf 7; Compartment 12; Row 51; Stack 250; Department of State Central Files, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).

“Draft: Assistance to Baghdad Pact Countries: Note by the Atomic Energy Authority.” 1956. Technical assistance to Baghdad Pact powers (AB 6/1653); United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and predecessors: Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell; Correspondence and Papers (AB 6); Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Research Establishment: Harwell; Records of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority and its predecessors Record Group AB (RG AB), United Kingdom National Archives, Kew (TNA).


Government of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1957. “Letter to the United States Embassy in Baghdad confirming the attendance of two scientist at a training session at Argon National Laboratory.” Box 41; Shelf 3; Compartment 20; Row 81; Stack 250; Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies (RG 469); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).

Government of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1957. “Letter to the United States Embassy in Baghdad giving the names of two scientist to travel to the Argon National Laboratory.” Box 41; Shelf 3; Compartment 20; Row 81; Stack 250; Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies (RG 469); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).
ICA/Washington. 1958. “Report of Kerr Visit to Iraq, October, 1957.” Box 1; Shelf 5; Compartment 13; Row 76; Stack 150; Records of the Agency for International Development, Record Group 286 (RG 286); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).

Kerr, William. 1957. "Visit to Iraq: October 1957.” Box 1; Shelf 5; Compartment 13; Row 76; Stack 150; Records of the Agency for International Development, Record Group 286 (RG 286); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).

“The Present Structure of the Baghdad Pact Organisation,” n.d. Box 9; Shelf 2; Compartment 28; Row 61; Stack 350; Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Record Group 84 (RG 84); National Archives at College Park, MD (NACP).


Walker, J. C. 1957. “Letter from J. C. Walker to D. V. Bendall.” International Relations (202); United Kingdom Atomic Energy Policy: Minutes, Papers and Registered Files inherited by the Department of Energy (EG 1); Records of the Atomic Energy Division; Records created or inherited by the Department of Energy Record Group EG (RG EG); United Kingdom National Archives, Kew (TNA).