

THE BORDER EFFECT: AN EXAMINATION OF NEWS USE
AND IMMIGRATION OPINION IN BORDER
AND NON-BORDER STATES

by

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Description
CCES	Cooperative Congressional Election Survey
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
DACA	Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals

ABSTRACT

Driven in large part by the outsized role of undocumented immigration as an issue in the 2016 presidential election and beyond, and as a contemporary issue in state-level politics, this study was interested in identifying the relationship between political identity, media use, and the role of residency – specifically, the role of border-state residency – on attitudes about immigration. Two studies – one using a substantial secondary data set from a national biennial survey and a second, original survey, found strong links between party identity, selective media exposure, and attitudes on immigration. Republicans are significantly likely to sort themselves by media platform and by specific media outlet, especially to conservative talk radio, cable television news, and online political blogs, and to avoid traditional objective sources like national newspapers and broadcast television news. Support for, or opposition to, immigration is largely predicted by party identification and media selection. Importantly, border-state residency was found to moderate the effect. Texans in the 2016 survey were significantly more empathetic to undocumented immigrants from Latin America than were Ohioans, and this effect held even within party identity and selective media use. But one year into the Trump presidency, public opinion had shifted. In the 2018 study, Texans were shown to report less tolerance for immigration, even on identical issues. A final finding reveals that the viewing of local news in newspapers and on television correlates with more oppositional views of immigration.

I. INTRODUCTION

Immigration has been a hotly debated issue in the United States and in many other Western democracies for decades (Beyer & Matthes, 2015; Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013). In a report on PBS NewsHour, Danielle Renwick and Brianna Lee of the Council on Foreign Relations stated that immigration has been "a touchstone of the U.S. political debate," involving the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the federal government (Renwick & Lee, 2017). According to CNN (Kopan, 2017), the issue also has become increasingly prominent at the state level. In the first half of 2017, state legislatures in the U.S. passed 90% more immigration bills than they did in the first half of 2016.

During the 2016 presidential campaign, immigration emerged as a prominent talking point when Donald J. Trump made it a central campaign issue (Newport, 2015; Renwick & Lee, 2017). In his speech in June of 2015 announcing his bid for the presidency, he made his now-famous remarks about immigrants from Mexico when he stated, "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best...They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people" (Reilly, 2016). As the Republican primaries progressed, Trump campaigned on hardline immigration policies, including mass deportations of undocumented immigrants, the building of a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, and a temporary ban on immigration from Muslim countries (Corasaniti, 2016).

Since that time, immigration has remained at the forefront of public debate as President Trump announced executive orders on immigration, and the administration's actions resulted in public protests and legal challenges by local and state governments

(Marimow, 2017; Renwick & Lee, 2017; Stack, 2017). In January of 2017, *The New York Times* reported that he had "set off a widening political and legal crisis one week into his presidency" by signing an executive order banning citizens from seven predominantly Muslim countries from travelling to the U.S. (Stack, 2017). Four months later, a *Chicago Tribune* headline reported, "Trump's revised travel ban faces legal challenges in courtrooms on both coasts" (Marimow, 2017).

In January of 2018, the president's first State of the Union address focused on immigration, introducing his "four pillars" of immigration reform. He stated, "For decades, open borders have allowed drugs and gangs to pour into our most vulnerable communities. They have allowed millions of low-wage workers to compete for jobs and wages against the poorest Americans" (Trump, 2018).

The policies of the Trump administration address Latin American immigration, such as his vow to build a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, but they also confront immigration issues affecting migrants from across the globe. According to the White House website, the president is committed to ensuring the swift removal of unlawful entrants as well as ending chain migration, eliminating the diversity visa lottery system, and moving the country to a merit-based entry system ("Immigration," n.d.).

"In its first year, the Trump administration delivered a broad crackdown on illegal immigration, and new limits on legal migration," reported NPR in a December 2017 report (Rose, 2017). NPR also reported that arrests by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) increased 40% between January and December of 2017. In April of 2018, CNN reported that the United States had admitted only 44 Syrian refugees since the start of the fiscal year (Koran, 2018). In the same time period the year before,

approximately 6,000 Syrian refugees had been resettled in the U.S. (Koran, 2018).

The policies of the Trump Administration have continually catapulted the immigration issue into the news headlines, and the continual news cycle shows no sign of slowing down. Recent national news has centered on the Congressional debate over Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (Rogin & Kahn, 2018), better known as DACA, and on the Trump administration's practice of separating children from immigrant parents who had crossed the U.S. border illegally (Rizzo, 2018). In 2017, top headlines centered on the president's urging of Congress to end the diversity visa lottery program following a terrorist attack in New York City (Edelman, 2017) and on his administration's announcement that it plans to end the protected status of tens of thousands of Haitian immigrants currently living in the United States (Tatum, 2017).

Many scholars have argued that mass media coverage plays a role in influencing how people perceive immigration and immigration issues (Kellstedt, 2003; Watson & Riffe, 2012). Studies have also shown that the media located in states bordering Mexico tend to cover immigration issues more often than the media in non-border states (Branton & Dunaway, 2009). At the same time, studies have found that public opinion concerning immigration in border states has often differed from the public opinion in non-border states (Dunaway, Branton, & Abrajano, 2010). The purpose of this study is to evaluate how media use during this heightened awareness of immigration issues correlates with public opinion about immigration in a major border and non-border state in the United States.

The data used for this study concerns political identification, media use, and public opinion on immigration in two states – Texas and Ohio. These two states were

chosen for this study due to their difference in proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border and potential to offer a unique perspective on how residents of a border and non-border state view immigration from Latin America. The state of Texas shares the longest border with Mexico of any state – 1,254 miles of the 1,954-mile border – while Ohio is a large Midwestern state. In addition, Texas has the third-largest Hispanic population in the country (39.4%; U.S. Census, 2016). In contrast, Ohio has a Hispanic population of 3.8% (U.S. Census, 2016).

Texas also has a higher number of unauthorized immigrants, totaling 6.1% of the population, compared to 0.8% for Ohio (Pew Research Center, 2016). But Ohio and Texas also provide an interesting point of comparison because they were the top states in the U.S. for refugee resettlement from October 1, 2017, through May 31, 2018, according to the Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. During that time period, Ohio received 1,020 refugees and Texas received 1,038 refugees (Department of State, 2018). This study examines how residents of the two states feel about a wide swath of issues that pertain to Latin American immigration, Muslim immigration, and refugee resettlement as well as policies that affect all immigrant groups.

Ohio is also a U.S. political battleground state that swung for Trump in 2016, helping him win the presidency. In an opinion piece for *The New York Times*, Thomas B. Edsall reported that Trump championed in rural and exurban counties in Ohio and other areas of the Midwest due to immigration concerns (Edsall, 2017). "What Democrats missed was the profound political impact recent immigration trends were having on the more rural parts of the once homogenous Midwest – that the region had unexpectedly become a flash point in the nation's partisan immigration wars," he said. Prior to the

election in 2016, the *Akron (Ohio) Beacon Journal* published an article stating that "Donald Trump's biggest applause line at rallies in Ohio continues to be a promise: 'Don't worry; we're going to build a wall'" (Schultze, 2016). This is despite the fact, the article stated, that the state ranks 12th from the bottom of U.S. states when it comes to the percentage of foreign-born residents.

This research includes an original survey conducted in early 2018 that targeted residents of Ohio and Texas as well as analysis of secondary data from the publicly available 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) database (Ansolabehere & Schaner, 2016). Examining data from two different sources provides a unique snapshot of political party identification, media use, and immigration opinion over an 18-month period that stretches from the 2016 presidential election to the period shortly after President Trump's 2018 State of the Union address.

This study builds upon the body of knowledge concerning political ideology and media selection by exploring the media use of people living in the border state of Texas and the non-border state of Ohio across platforms, including daily newspapers and national media sources such as cable news, broadcast TV, public radio and talk radio, and online partisan sources. It also explores public opinion on a variety of immigration issues in Ohio and Texas in 2016 and 2018.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Media Fragmentation

The fragmentation of the U.S. mass media has revolutionized the way that the American public receives the news. Fragmentation occurs when there is growth in the type and number of media outlets competing in the marketplace for the public's attention (Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012). In explaining the fragmentation of the U.S. media landscape, Hollander wrote:

In the last few decades, newspapers and broadcast television news programs faced growing competition from such sources as cable news networks, religious and talk radio programs, personality magazines, late-night talk shows, parodies such as *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*, and of course the dizzying number of sites available on the Internet. (2008, p. 23)

One of the greatest changes in how the U.S. public consumed news came with the advent of cable television. In the 1970s, more than 90% of U.S. media consumers watched the three major television broadcast networks – ABC, CBS, and NBC (Hollander, 2008). The introduction of cable television gave the average consumer the choice of more than 100 channels (Hollander, 2008). Today, thanks to the rise of cable television, satellite television, mobile technologies, and the internet, news consumers have thousands of outlets to choose between (Chalif, 2011). Political news and discussions are now commonplace on media channels ranging from established news organizations like CNN, which launched in 1980, to political blogs such as The Drudge Report to social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook (Chalif, 2011).

The varied mix of media choices available to consumers today also allows them to select their own unique mix of “old media” and “new media” from a marketplace that includes cable news, broadcast news, blogs, podcasts, and newspapers both in print and on the internet (Edgerly, 2015). In addition, according to Mancini (2013), the rise in media outlets has created new patterns of media consumption that can “either give life to new consumers or move traditional consumers from old to new media” (Mancini, 2013, p. 45).

Selective Exposure

The fragmentation of media has changed the habits of the U.S. news consumer. Scholars have demonstrated that the technological shift from a low-choice to a high-choice media environment has allowed people to customize their media diet (Hollander, 2008; Edgerly, 2015). Hollander argues:

A fragmented marketplace is one full of choices, a buffet from which individuals can choose sources more in line with their closely held beliefs or avoid those they see as threatening to those core values. (2008, p. 33)

Selective exposure is the process of individuals selecting media outlets that match their predispositions and beliefs (Hollander, 2008; Stroud, 2007; Tewksbury, 2005). Selective exposure was first identified in psychology literature and traces its roots to the cognitive dissonance theory of American social psychologist Leon Festinger (Gvirsman, 2014; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). The cognitive dissonance theory states that individuals prefer information that they expect to agree with in order to maintain their beliefs and

avoid cognitive dissonance (Gil de Zuniga, Correa, & Valenzuela, 2012; Gvirsman, 2014; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009). The selective exposure theory is also traced back to Columbia researcher Joseph Klapper, who in his 1960 book, *The Effects of Mass Communication*, argues that selective exposure among consumers of mass communication had been widely demonstrated.

In later years, the selective exposure theory received criticism, and results from various studies did not support it (Gil de Zuniga, Correa, & Valenzuela, 2012; Gvirsman, 2014; Stroud, 2008). In the last decade, however, the selective exposure theory has once again gained ground, largely due to the fragmentation of media and the growing number of media outlets that individuals can choose from today (Gil de Zuniga, Correa, & Valenzuela, 2012; Gvirsman, 2014). According to Gvirsman (2014), the revival of the study of selective exposure can also be tied to the "rise of politicized media content" (p. 77). Gvirsman also states:

Scholarly attention has also been drawn to the possible implications of consuming politicized media content. In particular, it has been argued that selective exposure tends to foster polarization by establishing different spheres for different audiences. (2014, p. 77)

Political Ideology and Media Choice

According to a number of scholars, individuals prefer information that mirrors their political beliefs, and political ideology often predicts media use (Gvirsman, 2014; Holbert, Hmielowski, & Weeks, 2012; Stroud, 2007). A study by Stroud (2007) found that political beliefs are an important indicator of which media outlets people turn to for

political information. A key finding from the study was that 64% of conservative Republicans used at least one conservative media outlet, while only 26% of liberal Democrats consumed a conservative media outlet. And the opposite also held true: 76% of liberal Democrats consumed at least one liberal outlet, compared to 43% of conservative Republicans.

A 2014 Pew Research Center study (Mitchell, Gottfried, Kiley, & Matsa, 2014) indicated that liberals and conservatives turn to very different news streams for news on politics and government. The study found that liberals rely on a much more varied array of news sources, including sources such as NPR and *The New York Times*, while conservatives tend to limit themselves to one main news source.

The partisan divide can especially be seen in viewership and the level of trust placed in Fox News. The Pew study (Mitchell et al., 2014) categorized participants as belonging to one of five ideological groups (consistent liberals, mostly liberals, mixed, mostly conservatives, and consistent conservatives) based on their responses to ten questions about political values. The study found that 47% of "consistent conservatives" named Fox News as their main source of political and government news. In contrast, 81% of "consistent liberals" stated they do not trust Fox News. Other studies have also shown that conservatives prefer Fox News, while Democrats prefer CNN and MSNBC (Chalif, 2011; Gil de Zuniga, Correa, & Valenzuela, 2012).

This media "sorting" by ideology leads to attitude polarization and may be bad for society. According to Stroud:

Different patterns of news exposure may lead people to develop different impressions of what is happening in the world around them. Without a shared

base of information, it is difficult to imagine citizens agreeing on matters of public policy and it is easy to envision citizens developing highly polarizing attitudes toward political matters. (2008, p. 342)

Selective Exposure and Immigration Views

According to another Pew Research Center study (Pew, 2014), public perception of immigrants is more positive than negative overall. However, the survey reveals a divide in how conservatives and liberals view immigrants in the United States. The study sorts participants into eight ideological groups (Steadfast Conservatives, Business Conservatives, Solid Liberals, Young Outsiders, Hard-Pressed Skeptics, Next Generation Left, Faith and Family Left, and Bystanders) based on political attitudes and values. The findings indicate that 73% of "steadfast conservatives" believe immigrants are a burden to society, taking jobs, housing and health care, while 93% of "solid liberals" believe immigrants strengthen our country through hard work and talents.

In addition to political ideology, media choice has also been shown to influence views on social issues such as race and immigration. In a 2012 study (Gil de Zuniga, Correa, & Valenzuela, 2012), the researchers used a national survey to examine the correlation between political ideology, selective exposure to cable news, and attitudes toward Mexican immigration. The study (Gil de Zuniga, Correa, & Valenzuela, 2012) looked at two cable news networks, Fox News and CNN, in order to measure the effect of conservative and mainstream media exposure. Findings indicated that both Republicans and Democrats who watched Fox News exhibit negative perceptions of Mexican immigrant and higher support for restrictive immigration policies.

Another study (Abrajano & Singh, 2008) set out to determine if an individual's news source correlates with immigration attitudes. This research focused on Latinos in the United States who spoke Spanish, and the study included Spanish-language media outlets and English-language media outlets. The researchers performed a content analysis of Spanish- and English-language TV news and analyzed data on immigration opinion collected by the Pew Hispanic Center. Findings showed that Latinos who consumed news on the Spanish-language media outlets were more knowledgeable of immigration issues and had more favorable opinions regarding illegal immigrants. Latino individuals who watched both Spanish- and English-language news were also more likely to have pro-immigrant attitudes than those who watched only English-language news outlets.

Contemporary scholarship has taken advantage of the refugee crisis in Europe to study the relationship between media use and public opinion about social issues. In a study looking at news coverage and public concern about immigration in Britain, the researchers (McLaren, Boomgaarden, & Vliegenthart, 2018) determined that media coverage is a factor in why some individuals feel more hostile toward immigration than others. In particular, they pointed out that coverage found in right-wing newspapers had a fairly powerful effect on individuals' concerns about immigration.

Border Proximity and Immigration Views

In a 2009 study, researchers found that news organizations in states located closer to the U.S.-Mexico border generate more coverage about Latino immigration overall as well as more stories on illegal immigration (Branton & Dunaway, 2009). In another study (Dunaway, Branton, & Abrajano, 2010), they explored the effects of immigration news in

border and non-border states. The study relied on a content analysis of newspaper coverage and an analysis of Gallup data over a 12-month period in 2006. Their findings indicated that media attention to immigration is greater in border states, and residents of border states are more likely to identify immigration as a "most important problem." The authors argue that their findings point to geography and news coverage as important indicators of immigration views.

A 2007 study explored how proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border in California influenced Anglo voting behavior on nativist ballot initiatives (Branton, Dillingham, Dunaway, & Miller, 2007). The two ballot initiatives included in the study were California's Proposition 227, which sought to stop the state's bilingual education program, and Proposition 187, which sought to deny state-funded social services to illegal immigrants. The researchers found that living closer to the border did have an effect on how people voted on ballot initiatives related to legal and illegal immigration. Specifically, they found that Democrats who lived close to the border were more supportive of the nativist propositions than Democrats who lived farther away from the border. In addition, findings indicated that voting behavior is also dependent on political ideology.

In a 2014 study on Canadian attitudes toward North American integration (Gravelle, 2014), the researcher examined how partisanship and border proximity were related to opinions on issues such as border security and cross-border trade between the two countries. While the study did not find that living closer to the border was a significant predictor of opinion concerning Canada-U.S. relations, findings did show that it moderated the effect of political identification. The author states: "These findings

reaffirm previous work that has found that 'distance matters' and that nuanced, contingent 'border effects' are at work in mass public opinion" (Gravelle, 2014, p. 469).

Based on the body of research cited in the literature review, this study set out to test four hypotheses:

H1: Political ideology will significantly predict media selection and level of support for immigration.

H2: Border state residency will moderate the relationship between ideology and support for immigration.

H3: Consumers of national newspapers and broadcast TV will be more moderate in their views on immigration, while consumers of partisan cable TV and talk radio users will exhibit more polarized immigration views.

H4: Consumers of local media, including local newspapers and broadcast news, will be less supportive of immigration than consumers of national news.

III. METHODOLOGY

2016 CCES

Guided by the literature on selective exposure and the distinctions between border and non-border states, and in order to determine if immigration attitudes differ based on an individual's state of residency and media use, the first stage of this study involved analysis of the publicly available 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) data. The CCES is a national survey administered by YouGov/Polimetrix and a cooperative effort between researchers in 30 universities across the United States. YouGov used a matched random sample methodology for the 2016 study.

CCES was chosen for this study because it meets several criteria, the first being that it allows for state-level analysis. Not only does the 2016 CCES have a large national sample of more than 60,000 participants (n=64,600), but it also features sizable samples from Ohio (n=2,698) and Texas (n=4,462).

The CCES is an internet-based survey that occurs every two years during congressional elections to determine how Americans vote, how they view members of Congress, and how public opinion on national issues varies with political geography. The CCES has been completed every other year since 2006. The survey is held in two waves, with participants asked two-thirds of the questions before each congressional election and the remaining questions after the election. These pre-election questions are the most pertinent for this study because they focus on political attitudes. The post-election segment of the survey measures voting behavior. For the 2016 survey, the pre-election wave took place from September 28 to November 7, and a post-election wave was fielded from November 9 to December 14. The enormous number of participants, distributed

across all 50 states, allows for a significant sample with the need for weighting.

In deciding what data sets would be most useful for this study, both the American National Election Study (ANES) and National Annenberg Surveys (NAES) were considered. While both of these surveys have extensive data sets that are frequently studied in political science, recent studies have asked few questions about the issue of immigration. In contrast, the 2016 CCES survey included a robust series of nine immigration items that were particularly useful to this study.

One of the key points measured by CCES is the salience of various political issues. In 2016, participants were asked, "How important are each of these issues to you?," followed by 15 issues pertinent during the 2016 election period, including gun control, abortion, taxes, immigration, the budget deficit, defense spending, social security, the environment, jobs, crime, national security, race relations, health care, gay marriage, and government corruption. Respondents used a five-point scale that included 1) Very High Importance; 2) Somewhat High Importance; 3) Somewhat Low Importance; 4) Very Low Importance; and 5) No Importance at All. The immigration item was selected for analysis for the present study, with very and somewhat high importance dummy-coded together for nominal-level analysis.

Delving further into the immigration issue, the 2016 CCES also asked, "What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration?" Respondents could select whether they support or oppose the following list of items: 1) grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crime; 2) increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexico border; 3) grant legal status to people were brought to the U.S. Illegally as

children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school; 4) fine U.S. businesses that hire illegal immigrants; 5) admit no refugees from Syria; 6) increase the number of visas for overseas workers to work in the U.S.; 7) identify and deport illegal immigrants; 8) ban Muslims from immigrating to the U.S.; and 9) none of these.

CCES also met the criteria of measuring the media use of respondents in the states of Ohio and Texas. The survey asked respondents if they had in the past 24 hours used a blog, TV, newspaper, radio, or social media. In addition, it asked two further questions regarding media use: "Did you watch local news, national news, or both" and "Did you read a print newspaper, an online newspaper, or both?"

As pointed out in the literature review (p. 6), political ideology has been shown to influence both media use and individual viewpoints on immigration. The CCES study also provides insight into the political ideology of respondents in Ohio and Texas. The survey used a 3-point scale to measure party identification, with 1 being Democrat, 2 being Republican, and 3 being Independent. This item was recoded (1 Democrat, 2 Independent, 3 Republican) to allow for more logical explanation from the mean. For example, a value below 2 suggests Democrat-leaning; a value above 2 suggests Republican-leaning.

Other demographic indicators measured by the 2016 CCES included age, gender, education, and household income. Education was measured with a 1-6 scale that used the following categories: 1) no high school; 2) high school graduate; 3) some college; 4) 3-year college; 5) 4-year college; and 6) post-grad. Respondents indicated their household income by selecting from 16 income brackets that ranged from "Less than \$10,000" to "\$500,000 or more." Finally, participants were asked to select which racial or ethnic

group best described them and whether or not they were of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent. As an illustration of the representation of the CCES sample, Texas (20.3%) had 10 times more respondents identifying as Hispanic than Ohio (2.2%), in line with the U.S. Census.

2018 Ohio-Texas Survey

Although the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey includes a battery of questions designed to gauge immigration opinion, it is somewhat limited in its measurement of media selection. CCES asked survey participants to select which media platforms they had relied on in the past 24 hours, including television, newspapers, radio, or social media. However, to fully answer the hypotheses posed in this study regarding media use and selective exposure, the researcher needed to take a thorough look at which media outlets are being selected for news in the states of Ohio and Texas.

To supplement the CCES data, an online panel survey was conducted in the states of Ohio and Texas. More than 600 people (n=638) took part, with respondents about equally split between the states (Ohio N=322, Texas N=316). It was administered by Qualtrics, which maintains a national panel of potential participants. For this large national pool, Qualtrics recruited participants in the two states and attempted to match the demographic variables reflected in the U.S. Census. Participants were compensated for participation.

The survey launched on March 26, 2018, and ended on April 11, 2018.

Qualtrics used consent language approved by the Institutional Review Board at Texas State University, which also approved this study. After consenting to take part in the survey, participants answered 28 questions measuring political affiliation, political

ideology, political interest, media use, knowledge of recent immigration news, and opinion on a variety of immigration issues. For the full survey instrument, see the Appendix Section.

Participants' demographic information, including age, gender, racial and ethnic background, education level, and income were also captured through a variety of questions – all of these modeled the CCES categories to allow for more valid comparisons between the two surveys. Respondents were asked to identify age, gender, racial or ethnic group, level of education, and total family income before taxes. In addition, the survey included a question regularly used by CCES asking respondents, "Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?" Another question borrowed from CCES asked, "Which of these statements best describes you?" and respondents were able to choose between immigrant citizen, immigrant non-citizen, first generation citizen, second generation citizen, third generation citizen, and other.

Variables

State of residence: An early survey question required respondents to select Ohio, Texas, or Other. Participants who chose "Other" were directed to a thank you screen, while those from Ohio and Texas were able to continue with the survey.

Political ideology and party identification: Political ideology was measured with a single item asking respondents to place themselves on a 5-point scale (1 = Strong Liberal, 5 = Strong Conservative). In addition, party identification was measured with a single item: "Generally speaking, which best describes your political affiliation?" Respondents selected from Republican, Democrat, Independent, or Other.

News consumption: The 2018 two-state survey used a 5-point scale to measure news consumption. The question asks respondents how often they read or watch 25 different news sources (1 = Rarely/Never, 5 = Often). The news sources included national newspapers, cable television networks, broadcast television networks, local television outlets, public television, public radio, news radio, talk radio, and partisan-leaning online news sources. See Table 13 for a full list of news outlets included in this study. Open-ended questions allowed respondents to designate which specific news outlet they rely on if they selected local TV news, news radio, or talk radio. Open-ended questions also allowed respondents to list the top three outlets that they rely on for news and which news outlets they used during last year's presidential campaign. Another set of open-ended questions asked participants to note the most recent immigration-related news stories they had heard of recently and to cite the news source/sources where they first learned of the story and went to learn more about the topic.

In addition, a Qualtrics filter question was placed that allowed for contingency responses based on residency (Ohio vs. Texas). All of the national outlets repeated but respondents in each area were also allowed to identify, on the same 1 to 5 scale, whether they read one of the top three daily newspapers published in the largest-circulation cities in each respective state. These publications were chosen because they represent large-circulation papers in the most populous urban center of the two states. For the state of Ohio, the newspapers included *The Cincinnati Enquirer*, *The Cleveland Plain Dealer*, and *The Columbus Dispatch*. For the state of Texas, the newspapers included *The Dallas Morning News*, the *Houston Chronicle*, and the *San Antonio Express-News*.

Support for immigration and polarization: In order to quantify the level of polarization on immigration issues, survey respondents were asked to select their support for 11 different immigration issues on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all supportive; 5 = Very supportive). Issues included building a border wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, DACA or Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, pathway for citizenship for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, sanctuary cities, immigrant detention centers, deportation arrests at courthouses by immigration agents, raids at workplaces by immigration agents, fines for U.S. employers who hire undocumented workers, increased deportations of undocumented immigrants, birthright citizenship, and increased border surveillance. The 11 issues included in this first issue matrix centered on issues generally pertaining to undocumented Latin American immigration to the United States.

A second issue matrix used the same 5-point Likert-type scale and asked respondents to rate support for a variety of general immigration issues. These included a merit-based immigration system, family reunification (also called chain migration or family-based immigration), extreme vetting (for potential immigrants), temporary work visas (also called guest worker program), temporary protected status (also called guest worker program), temporary protected status (due to environmental disaster or ongoing armed conflict in a home country), diversity visa lottery system (lottery for permanent resident card), Trump administration travel ban, and refugee resettlement. The items were selected based on recent news coverage, and definitions for the various issues were determined by researching language that has recently been used in national immigration polls administered by respected polling organizations, including Gallup,

Quinnipiac University, the Pew Research Center, ABC News/Washington Post, and NBC News/Wall Street Journal.

In addition, respondents were asked a variety of other single-item questions to measure immigration attitudes. The questions were taken from major national studies that look at public opinion on political issues and policy issues such as immigration. These sources include CCES, the Annenberg National Election Survey, Gallup, the Harvard Harris Poll, and the Pew Research Center. Multiple-choice questions included: Do you think that legal immigration to the United States should be increased, decreased or kept about the same as it is now?; How sympathetic would you say you are toward undocumented immigrants in the United States?; Do you approve or disapprove of the job President Trump is doing on immigration? A 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all supportive, 5 = Very supportive) asked how supportive respondents were of immigration from Europe, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Mexico/Latin America.

IV. RESULTS: 2016 CCES

Participants

The 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES) had a total of 64,600 cases nationwide. To test the hypotheses posed in this study, survey results for the states of Ohio and Texas were isolated. As noted in the Introduction on page 4, the states of Texas and Ohio were chosen for this study due to the difference in border proximity and immigrant populations of the two states.

The 2016 CCES data set included nearly twice as many participants from Texas ($n=4,462$, 6.91%) as participants from Ohio ($n=2,698$, 4.18%), roughly in line with U.S. Census estimates of population by state (Ohio, 11,658,609; Texas, 28,304,596; U.S. Census, 2017). The data set for Ohio and Texas combined included respondents that ranged in age from 18 ($N=21$) to 93 ($N=1$). Ohio respondents ($M=48.53$, $SD=16.37$), on average, were 1.8 years older than Texas respondents ($M=46.67$, $sd=16.78$).

Frequencies show that the respondents in Texas were significantly more likely to be younger and male than Ohioans (see Table 1). Texans also had significantly higher income and appear to have been more highly educated, although not significantly so. Respondents in both states lean more toward the Democratic party, but Texans are significantly more likely than Ohioans to identify as Independent or Republican.

The participant pool from Ohio was significantly less diverse than the Texas pool (see Table 1). The difference between the two states in the number of white and Hispanic participants was especially stark. In Ohio, 80.4 % of participants were white, 12.5% were black, 2.2% were Hispanic, 1.4% were Asian, 0.1% were Middle Eastern, 0.7% were Native American, 1.9% were mixed, and 0.8% reported other. Texas respondents were

58.2% white, 13.6% black, 20.3 % Hispanic, 3.4% Asian, 0.2% Middle Eastern, 0.6% Native American, 2.6% mixed, and 1.1% reported other.

Table 1
CCES: Participants
 Percentages and frequencies (Means) by state
 (Ohio, n=2,698; Texas, n=4,462)

Item	Ohio	Texas
Age *	48.5	46.7
Gender (Female)***	57.5%	54.3%
White***	80.4%	58.2%
Black***	12.5%	13.6%
Hispanic***	2.2%	20.3%
Asian**	1.4%	3.4%
Middle Eastern	0.1%	0.2%
Native American	0.7%	0.6%
Mixed	1.9%	2.6%
Other	0.8%	1.1%
Democrat*	42.8%	39.0%
Independent	30.2%	32.0%
Republican*	27.0%	28.9%
Education (3=Some College; 4=2-year degree)	3.45	3.64
Household income (6=\$50,000 – \$59,999)***	5.74	6.45

*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05; + p< .10

Political Ideology, Media Use, and Immigration Opinion

H1 predicted that political ideology (party ID) would predict media selection and level of support for immigration. The first tenet of H1— that party ID would predict media choice—was supported in the 2016 CCES data. The survey asked participants to select which media platforms they had used in the last 24 hours. Democrats in the two states were significantly more likely to consume news on all media platforms except one – radio. Democrats were more likely to consume news from any source in general and specifically from TV, newspapers and social media. Republicans were significantly more likely to consume news via radio (see Table 2).

Table 2
CCES: Party ID and media selection
 Independent sample T-tests (1=Democrat; 3=Republican)

Media platform	Sample	M	SD	t-statistic	df	Sig.
All media	Democrat	.97	.18	-1.804	6455	.000
	Republican	.96	.21			
Television	Democrat	.77	.42	-4.23	6455	.000
	Republican	.72	.45			
Newspapers	Democrat	.48	.50	-4.54	6455	.000
	Republican	.42	.49			
Radio	Democrat	.34	.48	3.833	6455	.000
	Republican	.39	.49			
Social media	Democrat	.74	.44	-4.159	6455	.000
	Republican	.69	.46			

Analysis of the 2016 CCES data revealed similarities and differences in media selection among the residents of the two states. Television was reported as being the leading platform for media use among both Ohioans and Texans. As seen on Table 3, 71% of Ohio respondents (n=2698) reported having watched television in the past 24 hours, while 72% of Texas respondents (n=4462) reported having done so. The difference between the states concerning television use was not significant.

Social media came in right behind television among respondents in both states. Seventy percent of Ohioans and 71% of Texans reported using social media in the past 24 hours. There was a statistically significance difference between the states on social media use. A statistically significant difference between Ohio and Texas on newspaper and

radio use also exists. Ohioans are significantly more likely to have read a newspaper yesterday than Texans, while Texans were significantly more likely to have listened to a radio.

Table 3
CCES: Media use by platform, Ohio and Texas
 Independent sample T-tests

Media platform	Sample	M	SD	t-statistic	Df	Sig.
Television	Ohio	.71	.45	-.654	7158	.193
	Texas	.72	.45			
Newspapers***	Ohio	.45	.50	2.851	7158	.000
	Texas	.41	.49			
Radio***	Ohio	.35	.48	-2.227	7158	.000
	Texas	.38	.49			
Social media*	Ohio	.70	.46	-1.194	7158	.018
	Texas	.71	.45			

*** p<.001; ** p<.01; *p<.05

The 2016 CCES data also supported the second tenet of H1. As predicted, political ideology is significantly predictive of support for immigration.

Multinomial logistic (nominal) regression was executed to test the explanatory role of partisanship versus media use across three scales on immigration. Within the eight immigration items included in the CCES survey, three scales did emerge with further testing. 1, Grant legal status to adults who have been in the country and have committed no crimes, and 3, Grant legal status to undocumented migrants brought here as children (DACA) fit fairly well as a scale of support for immigration (Cronbach's α =.714). Two enforcement items, 2, Increase border patrols and 7, ID and deport undocumented

immigrants scaled weakly (Cronbach’s $\alpha=.612$). Finally, a scale of the two items about Muslim immigration (5, Admit no Syrian refugees; 8, Ban Muslim immigrant to the U.S.) scaled exceedingly well (Cronbach’s $\alpha=.999$).

Among the CCES subset of Ohioans and Texans, platform use was, essentially, not very explanatory. For all media together (Nagelkerke’s R^2 of .023), and for newspapers (.022) and social media (.022), the R^2 never accounted for more than about 2% of the variance (see Table 4). Party identification was substantially more predictive (Nagelkerke’s R^2 of .174), accounting for 17% of the variance. So, while use of all media platforms generally – and newspaper and social media use specifically—seem more related to support for immigration, party identity was shown to be far more explanatory than platform.

Table 4
CCES: Media use and party ID on three immigration scales
 Nominal regression, media platform preference, party ID, immigration issues

Media use	R ²	Grant Legal Status			Immig. Enforcement			Oppose Muslims		
		B	SE	β	B	SE	β	B	SE	β
All media	.023	-.936	.157	.382***	-.398	.152	.671**	.076	.025	.927***
Paper	.022	-.608	.064	.544***	-.159	.064	.853*	-.041	.009	.960***
TV	.016	-.291	.070	.747***	-.580	.071	.560***	-.024	.010	.076*
Radio	.006	-.206	.065	.813**	-.313	.065	.732***	-.023	.009	.077**
Social Media	.022	-.521	.070	.594***	.065	.069	1.068	.047	.009	1.05***
Party ID	.174	-.951	.069	.386***	1.36	.070	3.89***	.001	.010	1.001

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

Table 5 details CCES findings regarding support for immigration issues and party ID in the two states. Differences by political ideology were significant on every single immigration issue. Regarding issue salience, Republican residents of both Ohio and Texas considered immigration to be a very important issue during the 2016 election

period. Republicans in both states were also more likely to support identifying and deporting illegal immigrants. Democrats were more likely to support admitting Syrian refugees and granting legal status to people brought here illegally as children but who have graduated from a U.S. high school.

Table 5
CCES: Support for immigration and political ideology
 Nominal Regression, Ohio vs Texas, Political Ideology, DV: % Support for Immigration

Immigration Issue	State	Democrat	Independent	Republican
Most Important Problem: Immigration Very Important	Ohio*	22.7	42.4	57.8
	Texas	29.7	45.6	69.0
Grant legal status to people brought here illegally as children but who graduated from U.S. high school (DACA)	Ohio**	58.2	45.2	26.3
	Texas	63.2	47.5	30.5
ID and deport illegal immigrants	Ohio***	27.1	44.3	68.1
	Texas	20.4	44.1	62.3
Admit no Syrian refugees	Ohio+	10.8	36.8	59.4
	Texas	10.6	43.7	68.5

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$

Border State Residency and Support for Immigration

H2 posited that border state residency will moderate the relationship between political ideology and support for immigration, and it was partially supported. In the CCES data, nominal regression found that while political ideology was far more predictive of support for immigration issues, border-state residency had a significant effect on some immigration views. For example, Ohio Republicans are even less supportive of DACA than Texas Republicans (see Table 5) but more supportive of

admitting Syrian refugees. Among every political party identification (Democrat, Independent, Republican), Texans were significantly more likely to consider immigration to be a very important problem.

Table 6 quantifies how residents of Ohio and Texas in the CCES survey differed in opinion about what the U.S. government should do about a series of immigration issues. There is a significant difference between Ohio and Texas on the following issues: grant legal status to people who were brought to the U.S. illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school; identify and deport illegal immigrants; and admit no refugees from Syria.

There was a somewhat significant difference ($p < .10$) on the issue of increasing the number of visas for overseas workers to work in the U.S. In this case, Texans are a bit more supportive than Ohioans of granting worker visas to immigrants. Importantly, and in support of H2, Texans in general are more supportive of Hispanic immigrants and less supportive of Syrian refugees.

Table 6
CCES: Immigration issues, Ohio and Texas
 Crosstabs, % support

Issue	Ohio	Texas
Fine U.S. companies that hire undocumented immigrants	65.1	65.1
Grant legal status to undocumented immigrants who have worked and paid taxes for 3 years	56.0	56.5
Increase border patrol	51.0	50.6
Grant legal status to undocumented immigrants brought here as children (DACA)	44.7	48.1**
Identify and deport undocumented immigrants	43.8	39.9**
Admit no refugees from Syria	33.0	39.6*
Ban Muslim immigrants	23.3	24.9
Increase immigrant worker visas	17.5	19.7+

** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; + $p < .10$

For the remaining issues, border state residency somewhat moderated the relationship between ideology and immigration support (see Table 6). The following issues were not significant on the state comparison: fine U.S. businesses that hire illegal immigrants; grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crime; increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexico border; and ban Muslims from immigrating to the U.S. Because border state residency did not significantly moderate all relationships between ideology and immigration support, H2 was partially supported.

Selective Exposure and Immigration Attitudes

H3 predicted that consumers of national newspapers and broadcast TV will be more moderate in their views on immigration, while consumers of partisan cable TV and talk radio users will exhibit more polarized immigration views. This hypothesis could not be fully tested with the 2016 CCES because the survey asked respondents about their use of general media platforms such as television, radio, newspapers, and social media instead of specific media outlets with polarized media content. The CCES data indicate a difference in media platform use and immigration opinion, but it was not significant across the different platforms.

If "Immigration" is factored in as a "Very Important" issue, television rises in importance in both Texas and Ohio. For those who considered immigration to be a very important issue, four-fifths of respondents (Ohio, 80.1%; Texas, 77.8%) reported watching television in the last 24 hours. Among overall respondents, approximately two-thirds reported watching TV in the past day (Ohio, 71.3%; Texas, 72.0%). Newspaper

and radio use also rise a bit if immigration is factored in as a very important issue, but not significantly. Social media usage drops among respondents who reported immigration being a very important issue, but not significantly. The same trend holds true for respondents who reported no media use.

Local Media and Immigration Views

H4 predicted that consumers of local media, including local newspapers and broadcast news, will be less supportive of immigration than consumers of national news. 2016 CCES findings supported this hypothesis.

While the 2016 CCES focused on determining media platform instead of specific media outlet, it did contain a question measuring viewership of local versus national news. The question asked, "Did you watch local news, national news or both?" and gave the respondents the choice of selecting 1 – Local newscast, 2 – National newscast or 3 – Both.

Table 7 illustrates state-level differences that exist in Ohio and Texas on media selection and immigration support. Local newscast viewership in both states is predictive of opposition to immigration, while viewing national news is associated with significantly more support for immigration, both of Hispanics and Muslims.

The established differences in the states, that Ohio was more supportive of Syrian and Muslim immigrants than Texans, and that Texans were more supportive of Hispanic immigrants than Ohioans, holds in comparing local versus national newscasts.

Table 7
CCES: Immigration positions by local or national newscast viewership
 Crosstabs, % support

	Ohio		Texas	
	Local newscast	National newscast	Local newscast	National newscast
Immigration important	43.8%	31.2%	41.1%**	63.2%
Ban Muslims	28.6%	19.3%	31.3%***	19.2%
No Syrian refugees	36.3%	25.7%	52.7%***	33.0%
ID and deport	48.6%***	32.0%	50.3%***	34.2%
Fine U.S. companies	71.4%	68.8%	72.3%	63.7%
Increase border patrols	69.8%***	43.7%	58.1%***	47.2%
Increase work visas	16.5%	28.4%	21.4%	28.0%
Legal status kids	43.1%***	59.8%	43.7%***	58.6%
Legal status adults	52.3%***	66.3%	51.6%***	63.9%

*** p=<.001; ** p=<.01

V. RESULTS: 2018 OHIO-TEXAS SURVEY

Participants

For the Ohio-Texas survey administered in March and April of 2018, more than 600 people (n=638) took part, with respondents about equally split between the states (Ohio N=322, Texas N=316). Diversity was closely representative of U.S. Census proportions (see Table 8). Compared to participants from Ohio, participants from Texas were significantly younger ($\chi^2(64) = 100.46, p < .05$). Texans were much more diverse, with a slightly higher percentage of African-Americans and more than five times the number of Hispanics. In Ohio, 82.6 % of participants were white, 12.7% were black, 4% were Hispanic, 2.2% were Asian, 0.3% were Middle Eastern, 1.2% were Native American, 0.3% were mixed, and 0.6% reported other. Texas respondents were 79.7% white, 13% black, 21.6 % Hispanic, 0.9% Asian, 0.3% Middle Eastern, 0.9% Native American, 1.9% mixed, and 3.2% reported other.

Respondents from Texas were slightly less educated, although with some college education on average, and reported a higher household income. Texans were substantially more likely than Ohioans to report being Republican.

Table 8
Ohio-Texas Survey: Participants
Percentages and frequencies (Means) by state
(Ohio, n=322; Texas, n=316)

Item	Ohio	Texas
Age *	46.8	40.7
Gender (Female)	51.6%	51.9%
White***	82.6%	79.7%
Black***	12.7%	13.0%
Hispanic***	4.0%	21.6%
Asian***	2.2%	0.9%
Middle Eastern	0.3%	0.3%
Native American	1.2%	0.9%

Table 8. Continued
Ohio-Texas Survey: Participants
 Percentages and frequencies (Means) by state
 (Ohio, n=322; Texas, n=316)

Item	Ohio	Texas
Mixed**	0.3%	1.9%
Other	0.6%	3.2%
Democrat*	35.7%	33.2%
Independent	33.9%	32.9%
Republican**	26.1%	31.6%
Education (3=Some College; 4=2-year degree)	2.93	2.91
Household income (5=\$40,000 – \$49,999) **	4.88	5.03

Note: Spanish/Latino/Hispanic identity was asked separately from racial identity

*** p< .001; ** p< .01; * p< .05; + p< .10

Political Ideology, Media Use, and Immigration Opinion

H1 posited that political ideology will significantly predict media selection and level of support for immigration. The first tenet of this hypothesis was supported by the data collected in the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey. This panel survey was designed to collect specific information on media use to address shortcomings in the CCES data. CCES listed four media platforms – television, radio, newspapers, and social media—and asked respondents to identify which platforms they had relied on in the past 24 hours. In contrast, the Ohio-Texas survey asked respondents to rate on a 5-point scale how often they obtained news from a list of 23 specific media outlets. These included national newspapers, local newspapers, broadcast and cable television news outlets, radio outlets, and four online partisan outlets.

The 23 news outlets suggested some obvious opportunities for scaling (i.e., Fox News, Drudge Report, conservative talk radio as Conservative Outlets), but to double-check validity, varimax component matrix factor analysis was also run on the media outlets. As expected, four conservative outlets emerged and were scaled (Fox News,

conservative talk radio, Drudge Report, Breitbart, Cronbach's $\alpha=.736$). Interestingly, National Public Radio (NPR) presented with the three expected liberal media outlets (MSNBC, Huffington Post, Daily Kos). Including NPR yielded higher reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha=.803$). These were correlated with party identification to validate what was already suspected – news users sort their media choice by ideology (see Table 9).

Table 9
Ohio-Texas Survey: Correlations of news source selection by party identity

	Democrat	Republican
National newspapers (The New York Times, The Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, The Wall Street Journal)	.110**	.013
Conservative media (Fox News, Breitbart, Drudge Report, conservative talk radio)	-.033	.195**
Liberal media (MSNBC, Huffington Post, Daily Kos, NPR)	.168**	-.017
ABC News	.138**	-.076
CBS News	.109**	.074
NBC News	.105**	-.018
PBS	.056	-.002
CNN	.169***	-.462***
Local TV News	.094*	-.083*
NPR	.062	.017

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

The 2018 Ohio-Texas Survey also asked respondents how often they turned to three local newspapers in each state. The Ohio participants had available *The Cincinnati Enquirer*, *The Cleveland Plain Dealer*, and *The Columbus Dispatch*, while Texas participants had the choice of *The Dallas Morning News*, the *Houston Chronicle*, and the *San Antonio Express-News*.

These newspapers were chosen for the study because they are located in the three most populous cities of the two states. In Ohio, 12.4% of respondents reported reading *The Cincinnati Enquirer*; 19.8%, *The Cleveland Plain Dealer*; and 16.8%, *The Columbus Dispatch*. In Texas, 25.6% of respondents read *The Dallas Morning News*; 27.3% read the *Houston Chronicle*, and 18.9% read the *San Antonio Express-News*.

In Ohio, Democrats were significantly more likely to report reading *The Cleveland Plain Dealer* ($r=.154$, $p<.001$). In Texas, Republicans were more likely to report reading *The Dallas Morning News* ($r=.141$, $p<.001$). None of the other four papers showed a significant relationship by party identity.

The Democrats were also significantly more likely to watch local TV news and all three network newscasts. In fact, the evidence here shows that Republicans clearly isolated themselves to consonant, conservative news outlets at the expense of all other available news outlets.

Border State Residency and Support for Immigration

H2 predicted that border state residency will moderate the relationship between political ideology and support for immigration. This hypothesis was only partially supported by the data from the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey. In this data set, two of the nine immigration items asking how supportive people were toward immigration showed significant differences between the states. Texans were significantly more likely to report being sympathetic toward immigrants who are in the United States illegally ($t(636)=-2.685$, $p=.007$) and supportive of immigration from Mexico and Latin America ($t(636)=-2.066$, $p=.039$).

The 2018 Ohio-Texas survey addressed immigration issues much more comprehensively than the 2016 CCES. It included 29 discrete items in a 5-item matrix,

Table 10

Ohio-Texas Survey: Immigration issues, Ohio and Texas

Means on immigration issues (1=not at all supportive; 5=very supportive)

	M	Ohio	Texas
Increased border surveillance	3.68	3.71	3.66
Birthright citizenship	3.53	3.60	3.45
America's openness is essential to who we are	3.48	3.55	3.42
Fines for U.S. businesses that hire undocumented	3.41	3.44	3.37
Reducing illegal immigration important foreign policy	3.40	3.39	3.42
Temporary worker visas	3.38	3.24	3.53
Pathway to citizenship for DACA	3.36	3.37	3.35
Temporary protected status due to war/disaster	3.35	3.32	3.37
Immigrants strengthen our country	3.35	3.25	3.45
Approve (1) or disapprove (5) Trump on immigration?	3.28	3.30	3.26
Extreme vetting	3.26	3.15	3.37
DACA – let childhood arrivals stay	3.21	3.30	3.12
Merit-based immigration	3.21	3.11	3.31
Illegal immigrants should be able to become citizens	3.21	3.25	3.17
Increase deportations of undocumented immigrants	3.19	3.17	3.21
Immigration increases risk of a terrorist attack	3.17	3.19	3.15
Immigration increased (1) same (3) decreased (5)	3.13	3.14	3.13
Family reunification/chain migration	3.03	3.02	3.05
How sympathetic toward illegal immigr. (1 not; 5 very)	2.94	2.79	3.09
Number of legal worker visas should be increased	2.94	2.91	2.98
Deportation arrests at courthouses	2.90	2.89	2.91
If American is too open, we risk losing our identity	2.90	2.89	2.90
Immigrants are a burden on our country	2.88	2.96	2.81
Build a border wall	2.87	2.86	2.88
Raids at workplaces	2.79	2.75	2.82
Trump administration travel ban	2.79	2.72	2.86
Undocumented immigrants commit more crime	2.79	2.79	2.78
Refugee resettlement to the U.S.	2.77	2.75	2.78
Immigrant detention centers	2.74	2.67	2.82

with 1 being not at all supportive and 5 being very supportive. Those items, with descending means, are listed in Table 10.

The 2018 survey also asked respondents in Ohio and Texas to rank their level of support for immigrants from five different areas of the world: Europe, Asia, Mexico/Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. The findings listed by descending

means are found in Table 11. Overall, respondents in both states were most supportive of European immigration and least supportive of Middle Eastern immigration. Respondents from Texas were significantly more supportive than those from Ohio concerning immigration from Mexico and Latin America.

Table 11
Ohio-Texas Survey: Support of immigration by point of origin
 Means on immigration issues (1=not at all supportive; 5=very supportive)

	M	Ohio	Texas
Support of immigrants from: Europe	3.37	3.39	3.34
Support of immigrants from: Asia	3.25	3.24	3.26
Support of immigrants from: Mexico/Latin America	3.16	3.05	3.28
Support of immigrants from: Africa	3.11	3.13	3.08
Support of immigrants from: Middle East	2.79	2.75	2.83

Even though Texans were more empathetic to illegal immigrants and supportive of immigrants from Latin America, this support did not carry through on all immigration issues. In contrast to the findings of the 2016 CCES survey, Texans who took the 2018 survey reported being less supportive than Ohioans of DACA in general and of a pathway to citizenship for DACA youth. Texans were also more supportive than Ohioans of increasing deportations of undocumented immigrants but less supportive of increased border surveillance and fines for U.S. businesses that hire undocumented workers.

Five of the items assessing immigration views were phrased in the negative: Undocumented immigrants commit more crimes than American citizens; immigration increases America’s risk of a terrorist attack; immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing, and health care; if America is too open to people from all over the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation; and controlling and reducing illegal immigration is a very important foreign policy tool. These items were combined into an Opposed to Immigration scale (Cronbach’s $\alpha=.837$). The four

remaining items were phrased in the positive: Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents; America’s openness to people from all over the world is essential to who we are as a nation; the U.S. government should make it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens; and the number of people who are allowed to legally move to the United States to live and work should be increased. These were scaled into a Support for Immigration scale (Cronbach’s $\alpha=.835$).

In answer to H2, there were no significant differences predicted by border state residency. Political party identity was highly and significantly predictive of these two scales, supporting H1. Democrats were substantially more supportive of immigration ($t(636)=-6.940$ $p=.000$). Likewise, political ideology also predicted support for immigration. Respondents who reporting being liberal were significantly more supportive of immigration than were those who identified as conservatives ($t(636)=-7.603$ $p=.000$). But state of residency didn’t significantly moderate the powerful effect of partisanship on immigration attitudes (see Table 12).

Table 12
Ohio-Texas Survey: Partisanship and immigration attitudes
 Bivariate and partial correlations controlling for state of residency

			Controlling for Ohio		Controlling for Texas	
	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep	Dem	Rep
Support for Immigration	.302***	-.215***	.302***	-.216***	.302***	-.216***
Opposed to Immigration	.284***	.389***	-.284***	.390***	-.284***	.390***

*** $p<.001$; ** $p<.01$; * $p<.05$

Selective Exposure and Immigration Attitudes

H3 predicted that consumers of national newspapers and broadcast TV will be more moderate in their views on immigration, while consumers of partisan cable TV and talk radio users will exhibit more polarized immigration views. This hypothesis was roundly supported by the data from the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey.

For this data set, two immigration scales were crafted to test partisan media use and attitudes on immigration. Varimax component matrix factor analysis identified 13 items which loaded high, all opposed to immigration. An Immigration Negative measure crafted from these items showed exceptionally high reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha=.950$) and consisted of all 13 items, all worded in a way that was less supportive of immigration. Respondents were asked to rate, on a scale of 1 to 5, whether they were not at all supportive (1) up to very supportive (5) on these items: Building a border wall; immigrant detention centers; deportation arrests at courthouses; raids at workplaces; fines for U.S. business which hire undocumented workers; increased deportations; increased border surveillance; the Trump Administration travel ban; immigrants are a burden on the country because they take our jobs, housing, and health care; America is too open to people from all over the world; undocumented immigrants commit more crimes than American citizens; immigration increases America's risk of a terrorist attack; and controlling and reducing illegal immigration is an important foreign policy tool.

An Immigration Positive scale was crafted in the same way. Fourteen items emerged which were phrased in support of immigration: DACA; pathway to citizenship; sanctuary cities; birthright citizenship; family reunification/chain migration; temporary protected status due to natural or manmade disaster; sympathetic to undocumented

immigrants; supportive of immigration from Africa, Asia, Middle East, Mexico/Latin America; America's openness to people from all over the world is essential to who we are as a people; the U.S. government should make it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens; and the number of people allowed to legally move to the U.S. should be increased. These also showed good reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha=.931$).

Bivariate correlations in the 2018 Ohio-Texas Survey (see Table 13) reveal that news users are generally more supportive of immigration than non-news users, and they also capture differences by partisan tenor of news outlets. For example, note in Table 13 that reading or viewing all of the national news outlets relates significantly with support for immigration until line 7, which is Fox News, at which time the significant relationship reverses. The same holds true for News Radio and Conservative Talk Radio. The relationship is significant but more nuanced for the broadcast network newscasts, local TV news and three of the partisan online news outlets (Drudge Report, Daily Kos, and Breitbart).

A single question on the 2018 Ohio-Texas Survey gauged support of President Trump's actions on immigration. It asked, "Do you approve or disapprove of the job President Trump is doing on immigration?" This item was coded as 1 – Very supportive and 5 – Not at all supportive. The findings indicated that state of residence was not a mitigating factor in predicting news choice and support for the Trump administration's immigration policies. Trump supporters in both states were significantly more likely to watch Fox News ($r=-.279$, $p<.001$) while Trump opponents were significantly more likely to watch CNN ($r=.102$, $p<.05$) or MSNBC ($r=.092$, $p<.05$). None of the national

Table 13
Ohio-Texas Survey: Media outlets and support for immigration
 Bivariate correlations

News outlet	Support for Immigration	Opposed to Immigration
New York Times	.358***	.050
Washington Post	.346***	.024
Chicago Tribune	.265***	.134**
Wall Street Journal	.312***	.109*
CNN	.296***	.001
MSNBC	.311***	.057
Fox News	.006	.313***
ABC News	.245***	.135**
CBS News	.200***	.157***
NBC News	.249***	.143***
PBS	.298***	.078
Local TV News	.083*	.088*
National Public Radio	.228***	.081*
News Radio	.050	.165***
Conservative Talk Radio	.064	.222***
Huffington Post	.323***	.099*
Drudge Report	.176***	.251***
Daily Kos	.264***	.153***
Breitbart	.190***	.248***

*** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$

newspapers showed a significant relationship with whether readers were supportive of Trump's work on immigration. While there were slight differences by state (i.e., CNN's correlation was .102 when controlling for state of residency vs. .103 in the bivariate correlation of support for Trump and media choice), support for the job Trump is doing on immigration was shown to be far more supportive than residency in predicting news consumption.

State of residency also wasn't predictive of consumption of the most partisan online news outlets on the topic of approval of Trump's job on immigration. Only three of the partisan outlets were significant with the support for the Trump question:

Conservative talk radio ($r=-.155$, $p<.001$); Drudge Report ($r=-.105$, $p<.01$); and Breitbart ($r=-.132$, $p<.01$). The left-leaning sites Huffington Post and Daily Kos showed no significant relationship with the item on approval of Trump’s immigration policies, nor did any other mainstream news outlets.

In the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey, differences emerged between the residents of the two states on choice of media (see Table 14) and, in some cases, patterns emerged. For example, Texans were significantly more likely than Ohioans to read all four national newspapers (*The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Chicago Tribune*, *The Wall Street Journal*) and to consume news from each of the partisan online outlets, both conservative and liberal (Huffington Post, Drudge Report, Daily Kos, and Breitbart). Ohioans, on the other hand, were significantly more likely to listen to news radio.

The national newspaper items scaled together well (Cronbach’s $\alpha=.911$) and, together, amplified the differences between the states ($t(636)=-3.447$, $p=.000$). The four partisan media items which were independently significant also scaled nicely (Cronbach’s $\alpha=.900$) and retained the interstate difference, despite two of the outlets being conservative (Drudge Report, Breitbart) and two being liberal (Huffington Post,

Table 14
Ohio-Texas Survey: Media use, Ohio and Texas
 Independent sample T-tests, (1=rarely; 5=often)

Media platform	Sample	M	SD	t-statistic	df	Sig.
New York Times	Ohio	1.81	1.34	-3.247	636	.000
	Texas	2.17	1.49			
Washington Post	Ohio	1.78	1.28	-3.196	636	.000
	Texas	2.13	1.46			

Table 14. Continued
Ohio-Texas Survey: Media use, Ohio and Texas
 Independent sample T-tests, (1=rarely; 5=often)

Chicago Tribune	Ohio	1.48	1.07	-2.647	636	.000
	Texas	1.73	1.30			
Wall Street Journal	Ohio	1.80	1.23	-3.095	636	.000
	Texas	2.14	1.48			
PBS	Ohio	2.25	1.39	-.962	636	.066
	Texas	2.36	1.47			
News Radio	Ohio	1.98	1.51	1.649	636	.001
	Texas	1.79	1.35			
Huffington Post	Ohio	1.76	1.27	-2.338	636	.008
	Texas	2.01	1.38			
Drudge Report	Ohio	1.50	1.13	-1.647	636	.029
	Texas	1.66	1.20			
Daily Kos	Ohio	1.46	1.11	-1.092	636	.098
	Texas	1.56	1.15			
Breitbart	Ohio	1.43	1.06	-2.101	636	.000
	Texas	1.62	1.20			

Daily Kos) ($t(636)=-2.068, p=.039$). It seems likely that some of the significant interstate differences are artifacts of the initial finding, that this sample of Texans seems more disposed to consuming news from more sources than the participants from Ohio.

Local Media and Immigration Views

H4 predicted that consumers of local media, including local newspapers and broadcast news, will be less supportive of immigration than consumers of national news. This hypothesis was supported.

Table 15 shows correlations of level of support for 16 immigration issues among readers of local newspapers in Ohio and Texas and readers of national newspapers. In general, readers of national newspapers reported more empathy for undocumented immigrants. A few differences did emerge between the states. For example, Ohioans were significantly more supportive of merit-based immigration, extreme vetting, and the Trump administration travel ban regarding seven predominantly Muslim countries. Texans were more supportive of increasing legal immigration to the United States. Readers of all newspapers— national, Ohio, and Texas —showed no significant support or opposition to the Trump administration immigration policies in general.

Regarding local newspaper use and immigration views, Ohio respondents who reported reading *The Cleveland Plain Dealer* were the most supportive of immigration (see Table 16). As is noted on page 35, Ohio Democrats were significantly more likely to report reading *The Cleveland Plain Dealer*. In comparison, Texas respondents who read *The Dallas Morning News* were the least supportive of immigration. As is also noted on page 35, the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey indicated that Republicans are more likely to report reading *The Dallas Morning News*.

Among the six local newspapers in Ohio and Texas, only *The Dallas Morning News* showed a relationship with a single immigration item: "Do you approve or disapprove of the job President Trump is doing on immigration?" (1=very supportive;

5=not at all supportive). Readers of the Dallas newspaper ($r=.141$, $p<.05$) were significantly more supportive of President Trump's immigration policy.

Table 15
Ohio-Texas Survey: Immigration support, national and local newspapers
 Correlations (1=not at all supportive; 5=very supportive)

	National newspapers	Ohio newspapers	Texas newspapers
Merit-based immigration	.184***	.224***	.112*
Family reunification (chain migration)	.294***	.250***	.284***
Extreme vetting	.165***	.206***	.130*
Temporary work visas	.227***	.211***	.152**
Temporary status due to disaster	.253***	.200***	.147**
Diversity visa lottery	.361***	.317***	.304***
Trump admin. travel ban	.086*	.118*	.102
Refugee resettlement	.309***	.233***	.252***
Immigration increased (1) or decreased (5)	-.145***	-.058	-.155**
How sympathetic to undocumented immigrants?	.335***	.255***	.290***
Immigrants from Europe	.295***	.293***	.178**
Immigrants from Africa	.337***	.284***	.237***
Immigrants from Asia	.348***	.314***	.238***
Immigrants from Middle East	.387***	.292***	.341***
Immigrants from Latin America	.361***	.325***	.252***
Trump immigration approval	.015	-.062	-.059

*** $p<.001$; ** $p<.01$; * $p<.05$

Table 16
Ohio-Texas Survey: Ohio and Texas Newspapers
 (1=Rarely/never; 5=Often)

State	Newspaper	M=	Support for Immigration
Ohio	Cleveland Plain	2.04	.293**
	Columbus Dispatch	1.84	.263**
	Cincinnati Enquirer	1.72	.203**
	3 Ohio papers ($\alpha=.613$)	1.87	.339**
Texas	Houston Chronicle	2.29	.293**
	Dallas Morning News	2.22	.177**
	San Antonio Express-News	1.95	.322**
	3 Texas papers ($\alpha=.697$)	2.16	.333**

*** $p<.001$; ** $p<.01$; * $p<.05$

An open-ended question on the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey asked participants to self-report the most recent immigration-related news story that they had heard about. Out of 322 respondents in Ohio, 71 listed a specific news story that they recalled from the news; out of 316 respondents in Texas, 63 listed specific stories. Stories about deportations, both from local and national news sources, were most often cited in Ohio (21 mentions) and in Texas (14 mentions). These topics were also commonly mentioned by respondents in the two states: DACA (11 in Ohio and 9 in Texas), the border wall (9 in Ohio and 5 in Texas), the National Guard on the border (7 in Ohio and 7 in Texas), immigrants committing crimes (6 in Ohio and 5 in Texas), and a caravan of migrants crossing Mexico (4 in Ohio and 7 in Texas). Two topics emerged that were unique to state of residency: three participants in Ohio mentioned a story about an immigrant woman seeking shelter in a local church, and five participants in Texas reported remembering stories about ICE raids (from various news sites and platforms).

VI. DISCUSSION

Immigration is a contentious public issue that has been hotly debated at all levels of government in the United States, from Congress and federal district courts to state legislatures and city council meetings. From 2016 to 2018, the issue also dominated the news cycles as President Donald Trump made immigration a key talking point of his presidential campaign and a prominent policy area of his presidency. This study set out to determine how media use during this time of heightened public awareness of immigration issues correlates with public opinion in a major border and non-border state in the United States.

Data for this study came from the publicly available 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES), administered in the fall of 2016, and an original 2018 survey conducted during the spring of 2018 in the states of Ohio and Texas. Analyzing data on political identity, media use, and immigration attitudes over this 18-month period offers the opportunity to glean a unique perspective on the interplay of these variables at the height of the 2016 presidential campaign and shortly after President Trump's 2018 State of the Union address. The states of Ohio and Texas were isolated for this study due to the difference in border proximity and immigrant populations of the two states. They were also the top two states for refugee resettlement in late 2017 and early 2018. On the political front, the states of Ohio and Texas provide a unique perspective on the moderating effect of border proximity on immigration opinion in the "red state" of Texas and more moderate political "swing state" of Ohio. Key findings of this study include the following:

Strength of Political Ideology in Media Selection

H1 posited that political ideology would play a strong role in media consumption and immigration support, and it was strongly supported by data from the 2016 CCES and the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey. Overall, this study found that Democrats are much more likely to consume legacy and mainstream news outlets (newspapers, broadcast TV) than are Republicans, who are far more likely to consume only conservative media. Findings also conclude that support for or opposition to immigration was strongly tied to political ideology.

The 2016 CCES asked respondents which media platforms they had relied on in the last 24 hours. Findings revealed that Democrats are more likely to use a variety of media platforms – including TV, newspapers, and social media – while Republicans were significantly more likely to consume news via radio.

The 2018 Ohio-Texas survey provided a more comprehensive picture of media selection by asking respondents to rate how often they obtained news from a list of 23 media outlets that included national newspapers, local newspapers, broadcast and cable television news outlets, radio outlets, and online partisan-leaning outlets. Reinforcing the CCES data, findings from the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey also show that individuals select specific media outlets based on political ideology. Republicans are significantly more likely to sort themselves by media platform and by specific media outlet, particularly relying on conservative media (conservative talk radio, Fox News, Breitbart, and the Drudge Report) and avoiding traditional objective sources (national newspapers, broadcast TV). Again reinforcing the results of the CCES study, Democrats in the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey were significantly more likely to obtain news from multiple

platforms. They relied on traditional mainstream media outlets, including ABC News, CBS News, and NBC News, as well as national newspapers such as *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, the *Chicago Tribune*, and *The Wall Street Journal*. Democrats were also more likely to select liberal media sources such as MSNBC, Huffington Post, and Daily Kos. The difference between Democrat and Republican reliance on CNN as a news source was particularly stark. CNN, which traditionally was considered an objective cable television news source, correlated positively with Democrats and negatively, strongly, with Republicans. CNN was part of Democrats' wider and more diverse media palate but seemed to be a source to be avoided by Republicans. Importantly, this 2018 data quantifies CNN's apparent – or at least perceived – shift leftward since its early years.

These findings are consistent with earlier studies on selective exposure, the process of individuals selecting media outlets that match their predisposition and beliefs. A number of scholars have found that political ideology often predicts media use and that individuals prefer information that mirrors their political beliefs. This study supported earlier findings by showing that Texans and Ohioans sort cable news outlets in particular by ideology, with Republicans favoring Fox News and Democrats favoring MSNBC and CNN.

The stark difference in this study between Democrats and Republicans on their reliance on CNN as a news source aligns with President Trump's public criticism of the cable news network. Trump has openly described CNN as "fake news" in tweets and public speeches since taking office. Perhaps CNN has, indeed, been adversarial in its coverage of President Trump; certainly, he has been adversarial in his criticism of the

network. Regardless, Republicans have been shown in this data to share his animosity. In addition, the tendency of Republicans to avoid national newspapers and broadcast TV as news sources could also be attributed to the Trump's ongoing criticism suggesting that ABC, CBS, NBC, *The New York Times*, and *The Washington Post* are "fake news media" (Britzky, 2017).

Power of Partisanship on Immigration Attitudes

H1 also anticipated that partisan ideology would predict level of support for immigration. As expected, this second tenet of H1 was supported by the analysis of data from the 2016 CCES and 2018 Ohio-Texas survey. Party ideology was found to be significantly predictive of support for immigration in both surveys.

Analysis of party ID and support for immigration in the 2016 CCES data revealed that differences by political ideology were significant on every single immigration issue included in the survey. For example, Republicans in Ohio and Texas were more likely to support identifying and deporting undocumented immigrants, and Democrats were more likely to support Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). In response to a question on Syrian refugees, 10.8% of Ohio Democrats and 10.6% of Texas Democrats supported "Admit no Syrian refugees," compared to 59.4% of Ohio Republicans and 68.5% of Texas Republicans.

In the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey, political party identity was highly and significantly predictive of two scales – Support for Immigration and Opposed to Immigration. Overall, Democrats were substantially more supportive of immigration. In addition, respondents who reported being liberal were significantly more supportive of

immigration than those who identified as being conservative.

These findings on the correlation between party identification and immigration attitudes align with public opinion polls on immigration. The 2014 Pew Research Center study (see page 10) found a divide between conservatives and liberals on how they view immigrants. According to a 2016 Pew study (Jones, 2016), the partisan divide on immigration steadily widened in the United States from 2006 to 2016.

Moderating Effect of Border-State Residency

H2 predicted that border state residency would moderate the relationship between ideology and immigration positions. Analysis of data from both the 2016 CCES and 2018 Ohio-Texas survey only partially supported this hypothesis.

In both studies, political ideology was found to be far more predictive of support for immigration, but in the CCES data, border-state residency did have a significant effect on some immigration views. For example, Texans were shown to be more empathetic to and supportive of undocumented immigrants from Latin America. This is despite the fact that Texas is a more Republican state and research has shown that Republicans are less supportive of immigration overall. This finding supports the hypothesis of the moderating effect of border-state residency. In addition, Ohio Republicans in the CCES were found to be even less supportive of DACA than Texas Republicans, suggesting that state of residence influenced opinion on this specific immigration view. However, because border state residency did not significantly moderate all relationship between ideology and immigration support, H2 was only partially supported.

In the 2016 CCES, Texas respondents from every political party identification – Democrats, Independents, and Republicans – were more likely to consider immigration to be a very important issue. This result mirrors the findings of a 2014 Gallup poll (Clement, 2014) that measured issue salience in border and non-border states. It found that the border states of Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas led the rest of the country in a spike in reporting that immigration was "the most important issue" facing the country. This finding also is consistent with a 2010 study on agenda setting and public opinion on immigration detailed in the literature review chapter. The researchers found that media attention to immigration is greater in border states, and border-state residents are more likely to identify immigration as a "most important problem." An interesting finding from this study is that Texas Republicans indicate concern for immigration by considering it to be a very important issue, but they also report being more empathetic than Ohioans about DACA and undocumented immigration.

Analysis of the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey results also showed that Texans were significantly more likely to report being sympathetic toward immigrants who are in the United States illegally and supportive of immigration from Mexico and Latin America. However, there also seems to have been a shift in how Texans feel about specific immigration issues that have recently been in the news. For example, in the 2018 survey Texans were found to be less supportive of DACA than Ohioans and more supportive of increasing deportations of undocumented immigrants. The 2016 results showed an opposite trend among Texans. This shift in attitude could be the result of a much smaller survey pool in the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey (316 Texas participants versus 4,462 Texas participants in the 2016 CCES). However, it also could be explained by news coverage

and public debate brought about by the immigration policy changes enacted by the Trump administration. In other words, it might be simply that Texas Republicans are falling more in line with the recent policies of their own political party or perhaps reflecting the opinions that they are seeing and hearing on partisan-leaning news outlets.

Even though political ideology was much more predictive of immigration attitude, living near the border or in a border state seems related with a more sympathetic view toward Latino immigration. Considering the states isolated for this study, Texas has a more substantial Hispanic population and diverse population overall than Ohio. According to the U.S. Census, Hispanics make up 39.4% of the Texas population and only 3.8% of the Ohio population (U.S. Census, 2016). The U.S. total is 18.1%. Likewise, in Texas unauthorized immigrants comprise a 6.1% share of the population, while the percentage in Ohio is only 0.8% (Pew, 2016).

Selective Exposure and Polarization

H3 predicted that consumers of national newspapers and broadcast TV will be more moderate in their views on immigration, while consumers of partisan cable TV and talk radio will exhibit more polarized immigration views. This hypothesis was roundly supported by the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey results. The 2016 CCES data was not as applicable to the testing of selective exposure because the survey asked participants about use of media platforms in general (television, radio, newspaper, social media) rather than specific news outlets that can provide a more comprehensive picture of media selection.

The 2018 Ohio-Texas survey supported existing scholarly research on selective exposure (p. 9) by revealing that Republicans clearly isolated themselves to consonant,

conservative news outlets at the expense of all other available news outlets. Democrats, on the other hand, were significantly more likely to read national newspapers and watch the three broadcast television networks.

Findings also indicate that consuming partisan cable, radio, and online outlets – like MSNBC or Fox, Drudge Report or Huffington Post – is significantly related with intensity and direction of support for or opposition to immigration. Individuals who relied on conservative-leaning cable television, talk radio, and online outlets reported less support for immigration than those who turned to legacy newspapers and broadcast TV for news. Table 13 on page 41 clearly shows the relationship between selective exposure and polarized immigration views. Reading or viewing four national newspapers (*The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Chicago Tribune*, and *The Wall Street Journal*), CNN, and MSNBC relates significantly with support for immigration. Conversely, consuming news on Fox News, news radio, and conservative talk radio relates significantly with opposition to immigration.

An interesting finding came from the question gauging support for President Trump's immigration policies. Both Ohioans and Texans who reported approving of the job President Trump is doing on immigration were significantly more likely to watch Fox News, while Trump opponents were significantly more likely to watch CNN or MSNBC. Reading the four national newspapers did not show a significant relationship with whether readers were supportive of Trump's immigration policies.

This study's findings on cable networks echo multiple studies that have been done on selective exposure among viewers of CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. Scholars have shown that partisan selective exposure often results in individuals reporting polarized

attitudes. This has been attributed to the "echo chambers" that are created when a person selects news sources that closely align with their own political views.

Local Media Effect on Immigration Views

Finally, H4 suggested that consumers of local media, including newspapers and broadcast news, will be less supportive of immigration than consumers of national news. This hypothesis was supported by data from the 2016 CCES and the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey. This is perhaps the most interesting finding of this study due to the fact that correlation between viewing local news and reporting less support for immigration issues holds for both time periods (2016 and 2018) and among consumers of both local television news and local newspapers.

The 2016 CCES included a question that asked respondents to report if they relied on local newscasts, national newscasts, or both for news. Results indicate that viewing of local newscasts, in both Ohio and Texas, is predictive of opposition to immigration, while viewing national news is associated with significantly more support for immigration, both of Hispanics and Muslims. Since the CCES question does not specify if the question about national newscasts refers to cable news or broadcast news, it is difficult to tie this finding specifically to selective exposure. However, it does show that viewing of local news correlates with more oppositional views to immigration. This held true along multiple immigration issues and among respondents in Texas and Ohio. People who reported viewing local newscasts indicated support for banning Muslim immigration and the resettlement of Syrian refugees, identifying and deporting illegal immigrants, fining U.S. companies who hire undocumented workers, and increasing border patrols.

Results from the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey showed that readers of national newspapers (*The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *the Chicago Tribune*, *The Wall Street Journal*) reported more support for pro-immigration policy than readers of local newspapers. The issues receiving support from national news consumers were temporary work visas, temporary immigration status due to natural disaster, the diversity lottery system, refugee resettlement, and family reunification (also called "chain migration" or "family based immigration"). National newspaper readers were also significantly more likely to report being sympathetic to undocumented immigrants than readers of local papers. The local publications included in this study for Texas were *The Dallas Morning News*, *Houston Chronicle*, and *San Antonio Express-News*; those included for Ohio were *The Cincinnati Enquirer*, *The Columbus Dispatch*, and *The Cleveland Plain Dealer*.

This finding might be due to the fact that local news and national news on immigration have been shown to differ in tone and subject matter. Several studies have illustrated that the local media, and newspapers in particular, frame news about undocumented immigration with a local focus. In addition, articles published inside border states tend to focus on the negative aspects of immigration more than those published in non-border states (Kim, Carvalho, Davis, & Mullins, 2011). This is an especially intriguing finding. Often, older adults are more likely to consume local news, especially newspapers, and older adults might also tend to be more conservative. But data from the 2018 study clearly shows Democrats are more likely to consume their local media (with the exception of *The Dallas Morning News*), suggesting that Republicans in Ohio and Texas – and likely elsewhere across the nation – are much more likely to limit their news consumption to a handful of national conservative outlets.

An open-ended question on the 2018 Ohio-Texas survey allowed participants to name the most recent immigration-related news story that they had heard about. The results were interesting because they reveal what news residents of a border and non-border state recall during the same time period. There were common themes in the news topics mentioned by survey participants in both states, including deportations, DACA, the border wall, the National Guard deployment to the border, and a caravan of migrants travelling across Mexico to the U.S. Several Ohio respondents remembered a story about an immigrant woman seeking sanctuary in a local church, which looks to have been covered by the local TV stations.

An interesting trend in the Texas responses was that five different people recalled stories about ICE raids, even though the sources cited ranged from YouTube to NBC, MSN.com, Twitter, and radio. No participants in Ohio recalled stories on ICE raids. This could be an indication that the different demographic and immigrant compositions of Ohio and Texas create unique experiences for residents in border and non-border states, perhaps also increasing or decreasing empathy for immigration.

Party identity is, by far, the most predictive variable of attitudes on immigration, and likely on a host of other partisan issues. What's interesting here is the clarification of how starkly Republicans sort themselves into a narrow selection of sycophantic national media outlets while Democrats expose themselves to a much wider array of sources, both local and national. Another especially intriguing finding is the apparent evolution of immigration attitudes from 2016 to 2018, in which Texans were shown to report less support for immigrants a year into the Trump administration on identical issues. Perhaps this illuminates a change in attitudes across right-leaning Texans; perhaps it supports the

rhetoric of the president; perhaps it reflects a change in the tenor and frequency of media coverage on immigration. Regardless, it clearly captures a dwindling support for immigration issues among Texans who, in 2016, were shown to be more empathetic toward Latin American migrants than their peers in Ohio.

It will be interesting to see if this trend continues over the coming months and years of the Trump presidency. A surprising national Gallup poll completed in June, 2018, immediately before the completion of this thesis, showed that a record 75% of Americans – and 65% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents – feel that immigration is a good thing for the United States (Brenan, 2018). The continual shifts in news coverage and public opinion during this time of heightened national and international debate on immigration is worthy of future study.

Limitations and Implications for Future Research

In conclusion, this study supports the body of research on selective exposure while also adding a unique perspective on the strong, significant relationship between party identification, media choice, and immigration position in a border and non-border state. For a fuller understanding of the role of media selection on public immigration opinion, future studies could include a content analysis of local and national news coverage on immigration issues during the time periods of the 2016 CCES and 2018 Ohio-Texas survey. Specifically, it would be beneficial to analyze the framing of immigration news in the national newspapers and in the local Ohio and Texas newspapers included in the 2018 survey.

Future research could also build on this topic by conducting a similar longitudinal

analysis of the 2018 and 2020 CCES. A limitation of the 2018 Ohio-Texas panel survey included in this study is that the participant pool is small compared to the large national pool of 60,000+ represented in the Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. Another limitation is that panel surveys often do not fully represent the larger U.S. population because they draw from particular groups, such as English-speaking, tech-savvy Americans. A longitudinal study based on CCES also would provide information on how news selection and immigration opinion continue to evolve over time and possibly in response to the current policy focus of the Trump administration.

APPENDIX SECTION

2018 Ohio-Texas Survey

What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received?

- High school incomplete or less (1)
- High school graduate or GED (includes technical/vocational training that doesn't count towards college credit) (2)
- Some college (some community college, associate's degree) (3)
- Four-year college degree/bachelor's degree (4)
- Some post-graduate or professional schooling (no post-graduate degree) (5)
- Post-graduate or professional degree (including master's doctorate, medical or law degree) (6)

Please indicate the racial or ethnic group that best describes you.

- White (1)
- Black or African American (2)
- Asian (3)
- Native American (4)
- Middle Eastern (5)
- Mixed (6)
- Other (7) _____

Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Which state do you live in?

- Ohio (1)
- Texas (2)
- Other (3) _____

What is your gender?

- Female (1)
- Male (2)

Ohio Survey

We're especially interested in learning more about where you go for news. Different people like different sources for news. On a scale of 1 to 5, select how often you read or listen to the news on the following sources.

	Rarely/Never (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	Often (5)
The New York Times (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The Washington Post (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Chicago Tribune (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wall Street Journal (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Cincinnati Enquirer (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Cleveland Plain Dealer (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Columbus Dispatch (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

CNN (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MSNBC (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Fox News (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
ABC (11)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
CBS (12)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
NBC (13)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
PBS (14)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Local TV news (please list station) (15)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
NPR (16)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
News radio (please list station) (17)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Conservative talk radio (please list program) (18)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Huffington Post (19)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Drudge Report (20)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Daily Kos (21)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Breitbart (22)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Other (please list news source) (23)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
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Texas Survey

On a scale of 1 to 5, select how often you read or listen to the news on the following sources.

	Rarely/Never (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	Often (5)
The New York Times (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The Washington Post (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Chicago Tribune (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Wall Street Journal (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Dallas Morning News (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Houston Chronicle (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
San Antonio Express-News (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
CNN (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
MSNBC (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Fox News (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
ABC (11)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

CBS (12)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
NBC (13)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
PBS (14)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Local TV news (please list station) (15)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
NPR (16)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
News radio (please list station) (17)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Conservative talk radio (please list program) (18)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Huffington Post (19)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Drudge Report (20)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Daily Kos (21)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Beritbart (22)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Other (please list news source) (23)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

What are your top 3 news sources, generally? Please list the names of the outlets below.

Now think back to last year's presidential campaign. Which news outlets did you turn to most often for news about the 2016 campaign? Please list the name of the top 3 outlets for campaign coverage below.

How often would you say you follow the news, generally?

- Most of the time (1)
- Some of the time (2)
- In the middle (3)
- Only now and then (4)
- Hardly at all (5)
- Don't know (6)

Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs, others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs...

- Most of the time (1)
- Some of the time (2)
- In the middle (3)
- Only now and then (4)
- Hardly at all (5)
- Don't know (6)

Some people have strong opinions on immigration, others do not. For each of the following, please select how supportive you are, where 1 is "Not at all supportive" and 5 is "Very supportive."

	1 Not at all supportive (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	5 Very supportive (5)
Building a border wall (along U.S.-Mexico border) (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
DACA - Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (immigrants brought here as children) (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Pathway to citizenship for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Sanctuary cities (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Immigrant detention centers (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Deportation arrests at courthouses by immigration agents (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Raids at workplaces by	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

immigration agents (7)					
Fines for U.S. businesses that hire undocumented workers (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Increased deportations of undocumented immigrants (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Birthright citizenship (automatic citizenship for any child born in the U.S.) (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Increased border surveillance (11)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

For the following immigration policies, please select how supportive you are, where 1 is "Not at all supportive" and 5 is "Very supportive."

	Not at all supportive (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	Very supportive (5)
Merit-based immigration system (immigration priority based on education and skills of applicant) (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Family reunification	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

(also called
chain
migration or
family based
immigration)
(2)

Extreme
vetting (for
potential
immigrants)
(3)

Temporary
worker visas
(also called
guest worker
program) (4)

Temporary
protected
status (due to
environmental
disaster or
ongoing
armed
conflict in
home
country) (5)

Diversity visa
lottery system
(lottery for
permanent
resident card)
(6)

Trump
administration
travel ban (7)

Refugee
resettlement
(8)



Do you think that legal immigration to the United States should be increased, decreased or kept about the same as it is now?

- 1 Increased (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 Kept about the same (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 Decreased (5)

How sympathetic would you say you are toward undocumented immigrants in the United States?

- 1 - Not sympathetic (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 - Very sympathetic (5)

How supportive are you of immigration from the following places?

	1 Not at all supportive (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	5 Very supportive (5)
Europe (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Africa (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Asia (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Middle East (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Mexico/Latin America (5) |

Do you approve or disapprove of the job President Trump is doing on immigration?

- 1 - Strongly approve (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 Strongly disapprove (5)

For the following statements, please select how supportive you are, where 1 is "Not at all supportive" and 5 is "Very supportive."

	1 Not at all supportive (1)	2 (2)	3 (3)	4 (4)	5 Very supportive (5)
Immigrants today strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents. (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Immigrants today are a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing and health care. (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
America's openness to people from all	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

over the world is essential to who we are as a nation. (3)

If America is too open to people from all over the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation. (4)

Undocumented immigrants commit more crimes than American citizens (5)

Immigration increases America's risk of a terrorist attack (6)

Controlling and reducing illegal immigration is a very important foreign policy tool. (7)

The U.S. government should make it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens. (8)

The number of people who are allowed to legally move

to the United States to live and work should be increased. (9)

Have you heard of any specific immigration-related stories lately? If so, *briefly* note the most recent immigration-related story or stories you have heard about. If you can't think of one, just write "Don't know."

Where did you first learn about the story or stories?

What news source did you go to in order to learn more about the story or stories?

Which of these statements best describes you?

- Immigrant citizen (1)
- Immigrant non-citizen (2)
- First generation citizen (3)
- Second generation citizen (4)
- Third generation citizen (5)
- Other (6)

Which best describes the type of community in which you live?

- Suburban (1)
- Urban (2)
- Rural (3)

Think about your own community and the place where you live. Do you live in a community with many new immigrants, some new immigrants, only a few new immigrants, or almost no new immigrants?

- Many new immigrants (1)
- Some new immigrants (2)
- Only a few new immigrants (3)
- Almost no new immigrants (4)
- Don't know (5)

How often do you come in contact with immigrants who speak little or no English?

- Often (1)
- Sometimes (2)
- Rarely (3)
- Never (4)
- Don't know (5)

Do you have any close friends who were born outside the U.S.?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Last year, what was your total family income from all sources before taxes?

- Less than \$10,000 (1)
- \$10,000 - \$19,999 (2)
- \$20,000 - \$29,999 (3)
- \$30,000 - \$39,999 (4)

- \$40,000 - \$49,999 (5)
- \$50,000 - \$59,999 (6)
- \$60,000 - \$69,999 (7)
- \$70,000 - \$79,999 (8)
- \$80,000 - \$89,999 (9)
- \$90,000 - \$99,999 (10)
- \$100,000 - \$149,999 (11)
- More than \$150,000 (12)

Generally speaking, which best describes your political affiliation?

- Republican (1)
 - Democrat (2)
 - Independent (3)
 - Other (please list affiliation) (4)
-

On a scale of 1 to 5, which best describes your political ideology?

- 1 - Strong liberal (1)
- 2 (2)
- 3 (3)
- 4 (4)
- 5 - Strong conservative (5)

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