Beyond the Flaming Walls of the World
Fantasy, Alterity, and the Postnational Constellation

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The planet is in the species of alterity, belonging to another system; and yet we inhabit it . . .
—Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Death of a Discipline

In his influential 1827 essay “On the Supernatural in Fictitious Composition,” Sir Walter Scott extols the beauty and power of E. T. A. Hoffmann’s writing but criticizes “the wildness of Hoffmann’s fancy,” declaring that the German romantic’s taste and temperament have “carried him too far ‘extra moenia flammantia mundi,’ too much beyond the circle not only of probability but even of possibility.” Scott is concerned that the “fantastic” mode is only acceptable to the degree that “it tends to excite agreeable and pleasing ideas.”¹ In his use of the Latin phrase (borrowed from Lucretius), Scott invokes a spatial metaphor to make a broader point. By venturing “beyond the flaming walls of the world,” the fantasy author indulges, in Scott’s view, in an extravagant aesthetic that evokes horror or even disgust by conjuring up a radical alterity that defamiliarizes the habitus and aggrandizes the horrible. Not stated directly by Scott but implied in his mild critique is the degree to which this outré sensibility disrupts the conventions and expectations of a national literature. In addition to providing a nationally circumscribed space for a particular country’s authors, such a literature, we gather, must somehow represent the recognizably national character of or in its narratives, a character that must above all be familiar to readers. Extravagant fantasy subverts, however, nationalistic standards of beauty by becoming “grotesque” and “Arabesque.” Such fiction undermines the national vocation of literature through its techniques of estrangement, that is, by its imaginative flights away from familiar landscapes, customs, and events; it tends to domesticate the strange elements and represent them in a comfortable, recognizable pattern.²

A romantic realism of the sort found in Scott’s own historical novels offers a fitting mode for such a national narrative, as the foundational legends and
myths can be incorporated into a calm, more quotidian, and rather familiar culture. In contrast, by positing a radical alterity from the outset, the fantastic mode exceeds national and cultural boundaries, drawing the narrative out into the world and beyond.

Today’s planetary turn in literary and cultural studies may be associated with a number of interrelated historical phenomena that have forcefully inserted the intertwined matters of spatiality, fantasy, and postnationality into the critical discussion. Above all, the multiformal processes now aggregated under the rubric of globalization, including those practices in the aesthetic or cultural spheres sometimes called postmodern, have occasioned the diminution of the national in favor of the global, the elevation of space above (or at least to the level of) time, and the interrogation of representational protocols linked to the nation-state. In sum, most of the formerly recognizable hermeneutics are deemed no longer suitable for making sense of the present, dynamic world-system. As numerous artists, critics, philosophers, and social scientists have observed, the revolutionary social transformations throughout the world in the postwar era have fundamentally altered the effectiveness of sense-making systems of past epochs, be they scientific, religious, or, as is my concern here, literary-cultural. Narrative fiction, for example, may no longer operate as it had in Scott’s day, when the “form-giving form” of the historical novel (to use Georg Lukács’s expression) could organize an ostensible totality (Lebenstotalität) through which the individual could locate him- or herself within a cognizable world-system. Scott’s historical novels attempted to shape the diffuse passions, partisan interests, and different spaces into a distinctively national imaginary geography, and, as Jonathan Arac has pointed out, these novels were essential precursors to national narrative in American literature. However, in the twentieth century, the postmodern predicament of representation is part and parcel of an existential crisis akin to being lost in space; it is an utterly alienating experience, evoking an anxiety that Martin Heidegger had associated directly with the uncanny, the unheimlich or “unhomely,” the Nicht-zu-hause-sein (“not-being-at-home”). But, then, the loss of a sense of “home” is also a recognition of the disruptions of “domestic” or national space caused by forces of globalization. Fredric Jameson’s highlighting of “cognitive mapping on a global scale” as both a partial solution to the crisis of representability and a vocation of postmodern art emphasizes the spatial anxiety and postnationality of such a cartographic project.

I would propose, in my turn, that such mapping is incomplete unless it is also speculative, figurative, and, in a broad sense, fantastic. Unlike the naively mimetic maps of an earlier epoch, the literary cartography of the postnational world-system has to be, in some ways, otherworldly. Such, at least, is my argument here. Although there is no question about the value of myth, folklore, or “national fantasy” in establishing national narrative, I would submit that, in the present world-historical moment, the radical alterity of fantasy is well positioned to foster a postnational and thus planetarily oriented literary
perspective. I am not speaking of fantasy as a genre, although I am interested in the potential of what Jameson has called “generic discontinuities” in narratives as part of the overall undertaking of literary cartography. Rather, I am thinking of fantasy as a discursive modality, one that is marked by its fundamental attention to otherness or otherworldliness. Fantasy, of which science fiction and utopia may be considered subsets, enables a figurative mapping of the (so-called) real world while using the (so-called) unreal or impossible as its means. In theory and in practice, the alterity of fantasy makes possible new ways of seeing—and, by the same token, of interpreting and perhaps changing—the world-system forming the untranscendable horizon of all thinking today. Somewhat as it did for earlier local, regional, or national space, but far more so, thinking planetary space in the age of globalization requires cognitive abstraction and imagination that makes “the literature of estrangement,” to use China Miéville’s phrase, the form potentially best suited to our postmodern and postnational condition. As Miéville asserts pointedly, “the fantastic . . . is good to think with.” For, to be sure, the fantastic allows us, among other things, to see the world anew, to visualize our world in novel ways, and to imagine different approaches to representing and otherwise engaging the world-system. In “constellating” and working through the various intersecting forces affecting the existential experience of life on the planet at this historical moment, we may venture—like the wayward imagination of Hoffmann in Scott’s analysis—beyond the flaming walls of the world in order to discover, in a more meaningful sense, the real world after all. In this “postnational constellation,” to recall the phrase Jürgen Habermas used in a different context, the principal vocation of literary and cultural work may be to project novel cartographies and alternative trajectories by which to navigate this increasingly unrepresentable, even unrecognizable, Lebenswelt. After the planetary turn and in the context of an increasingly visible world literature whose representative space is neither regional nor national but global, the postnational constellation may be an apt figure for the present world-system itself, and a fantastic mapping of the planetary space we occupy may constitute an urgent project for contemporary theorists and critics.

Imagining the Planet

Widely known as “Earthrise,” one of the past century’s most famous photographs depicts a distinct, blue-and-white planet emerging in the distance over the barren grey-white surface of the moon. Taken by Apollo 8 astronauts in lunar orbit on December 24, 1968, the iconic image became a worldwide sensation when it appeared on TV sets and in newspapers on Christmas morning. Humans have been using their vision and imagination to make sense of the world throughout their history, and yet never before had such a
vista been available to them, as, for the first time, they ventured beyond the boundaries of the terraqueous globe and looked back upon it as outsiders. From this new perspective, viewers of the “Earthrise” photograph were repositioned in the universe. Now able to achieve a critical distance from their planet, they were no longer cosmopolites comfortably at home in the world but saw the latter as a strange _otherworld_, as if for the first time. Arguably, in the contemplation of this image and of its ramifications, a planetary consciousness emerged.\(^{12}\)

This is certainly how American poet Archibald MacLeish envisioned the import of the event. Writing in the _New York Times_ only hours after the first appearance of the photograph, MacLeish considered the moment an epochal shift in humankind’s relationship to the world. Referring first to Dante’s geocentric universe, then to its waning and ultimate collapse after the Copernican Revolution and modern physics, which had rendered the earth a metaphysically meaningless ensemble of violent forces that could bring about the slaughter of millions in absurd world wars and nuclear destruction, MacLeish announced that “now, in the last few hours, the [planet] notion may have changed again. For the first time in all of time men have seen it not as continents or oceans from the little distance of a hundred miles or two or three, but seen it from the depth of space; seen it whole and round and beautiful and small.” As MacLeish explained on that Christmas day,

> The medieval notion of the earth put man at the center of everything. The nuclear notion of the earth put him nowhere—beyond the range of reason even—lost in absurdity and war. This latest notion may have other consequences. Formed as it was in the minds of heroic voyagers who were also men, it may remake our image of mankind. No longer that preposterous figure at the center, no longer that degraded and degrading victim off at the margins of reality and blind with blood, man may at last become himself.

> To see the earth as it truly is, small and blue and beautiful in that eternal silence where it floats, is to see ourselves as riders on the earth together, brothers on that bright loveliness in the eternal cold—brothers who know now they are truly brothers.\(^{13}\)

This somewhat grandiose interpretation of an astronaut’s timely snapshot indicates the extent to which a kind of planetary turn, in poetry, philosophy, and the arts and sciences as a whole was not only already under way but also deeply longed for by so many of the inhabitants of that “small and blue and beautiful” orb.\(^{14}\)

The image of the planet captured in and promoted by “Earthrise,” which functioned simultaneously as an aesthetic, scientific, ideological, and utopian work of art, occasions a powerful rethinking of the relations among space, narrative, geopolitics, and the world-system. Ironically perhaps, the
repercussions of the “Earthrise” phenomenon led not to the extension or intensification of the space age, but to a “return to earth,” as it were, with more scientific and humanities-based attention being paid to this planet and far less to Mars, Jupiter, and the great beyond. As Robert Poole observes in *Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth*, the postwar period had been dominated by rockets and space travel whose proponents could proclaim, with Wernher von Braun, that the party who conquered space would control the planet. This notion certainly inspired a great deal of military and political enthusiasm for space research. Along the same lines, science fiction depicting space exploration would dominate popular culture in various media throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Obviously, astrophysics, technology, science fiction, and interplanetary expeditions remain salient today—witness the recent burst of interest in the *Curiosity* rover’s Mars landing on August 6, 2012, for example—but they have no longer the cultural cachet they had achieved in the early 1960s. After “Earthrise,” the fevered imaginations of the populace turned back to the planet Earth. As Norman Cousins put it, “the significance of the lunar expeditions was not that men set foot on the Moon, but that they set eye on the Earth.”

*Time* magazine used the photograph as the cover of its final issue of 1968, with the one-word caption (“Dawn”) as if to emphasize the image’s liminal and inaugural role in marking the transition to a new stage of world history. Given the turbulence of that year—what with the assassinations, riots, and political turmoil in the United States; the upheavals and repressions in Prague, Paris, and elsewhere in Europe; and the warfare and violence of Vietnam, South America, and Africa—the “Earthrise” image, when couched as a “dawn,” acquired a poignant, optative, and utopian nuance. Where the future had previously been determined as a “space race” among antagonistic, destructive superpowers, this austere, beautiful vision of a small, fragile, and isolated planet reoriented the very idea of spatiotemporal progression. For many like MacLeish, this image was itself a sign that national boundaries and ideological differences were no longer of any great importance. The time had come to view the Earth and its inhabitants as a single people occupying a single global space.

What I want to suggest in dwelling on these pictures is that the moment of this global self-image constitutes a nexus where several important aspects of the planetary turn in the arts, sciences, and humanities intersect. Significantly, this literal turn back toward the planet from the outermost reaches of human space exploration is representative of an aesthetic planetary turn whereby the entire Earth is for the first time seen in its global totality. This moment coincides with tumultuous geopolitical events, most spectacularly visible in the wars of Southeast Asia and the Middle East, in the anticolonial national movements in Africa, in the revolutions in Latin America, and in the internal conflicts throughout Europe and the United States. Also, although this would come into focus more clearly only later, with the collapse of the Bretton
Woods agreement, the rise at this time of multinational capital and trans-
national economies was making the older colonial and mercantile financial
systems obsolete, paving the way to widespread financialization and other
forms of cultural-economic globalization.17 The boom in “Third World” liter-
ature complements and supplements the innovations in fiction and poetry
in the West, while a burgeoning aesthetic of postmodernism in fiction, cin-
ema, visual art, and especially architecture alters the way space and culture
are perceived. Thus the widely distributed “Earthrise” image of the planet
emerged at a time of radical transformation worldwide.18 Amid so much real-
world activity, something quite otherworldly—the earth itself—appeared.

To be sure, this “Earthrise” photograph conveyed a striking reality; in
deed, its photographic realism was literal, and grasping its import is crucial
to understanding its influence and effect in imagining the planet anew. But
the image was also the stuff of the most extremely outré science fiction: the
fantastic voyage beyond the moon. Parodied in Lucian’s True History and
celebrated by Georges Méliès in Le voyage dans la lune, with hundreds of
lunar fantasies occupying the spectrum in between, this sort of cosmic travel
made possible the discovery of hitherto unknown or unimagined realities.
The fantastic nature of the worldview afforded from outer space might be
taken to have inspired a wholly different way of thinking on the surface of the
little green-blue sphere. National, regional, and local concerns and conflicts,
for instance, suddenly may have looked trivial in the face of an abruptly more
salient global space. The rivalries that animated the geopolitical Weltanschau-
ungen of the era may have seemed petty and absurd from this postnational
and supracontinental perspective. This was indeed the case for the more
optimistic of commentators who dared to imagine a united and harmoni-
ous future that formerly only the most wide-eyed dreamers could envision.

As Poole points out in a reference to the Apollo 8 mission that produced the
“Earthrise” photograph, “the mightiest shot in the Cold War turned into the
twentieth century’s ultimate utopian moment.”19 And utopia, like the planet
itself, is a figure of radical alterity. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has put
it in her discussion of planetarity and world literature, the planet’s “alterity,
determining experience, is mysterious and discontinuous—an experience of
the impossible.”20

A Meditation on the Impossible

Utopia is currently a favored topic among many spatially oriented crit-
icists, including Jameson and David Harvey.21 In some respects, it represents
a paradigmatically modern genre or discursive form, with major literary
works (including Thomas More’s 1516 genre-establishing Utopia) coming
about during the Age of Discovery and the European voyages to the “New
World”22 and another wave of utopianism finding its voice and audience
amid the nineteenth century’s Industrial Age uncertainties with Charles Fourier’s phalansteries, Edward Bellamy’s “nationalism,” and William Morris’s “news from nowhere.” But, as I have argued elsewhere, a sort of utopian mode has reasserted itself most strenuously in the postmodern world of our globalization era, paradoxically a world in which utopian alternatives to the status quo seem utterly impossible, even inconceivable. Jameson has famously observed that it appears easier today to imagine the end of the world than the breakdown of late capitalism; often forgotten, however, is Jameson’s indispensable follow-up to this remark: “perhaps that is due to some weakness in our imaginations.”

An empowered imagination, one that would set out to map a planetary space rather than limiting itself to its local or national subsets, would need to come to grips with the radical alterity of the world, specifically with the fantastic otherworldliness emerging in conjunction with an altogether unfamiliar perspective, such as the view from outer space. Obviously, this imaginative project would have to exceed the limits of the real and the known; it would involve not only a consideration of the possible but also “a meditation on the impossible.” This meditation on the impossible seems in fact to be part of the cartographic efforts of fantasy, as the projection of imaginary spaces becomes an essential aspect of our engagement with the all-too-real world-system after the spatial or planetary turn.

Yet the term “fantasy” itself presents a problem. Numerous spatial critics have embraced utopian discourse as a means of conceiving radical alternatives to the status quo, but many of these commentators have been openly hostile to fantasy as a mode or genre on the grounds that fantasy is an escapist, politically reactionary, and backward-looking art form. A case in point is Darko Suvin’s groundbreaking 1979 science fiction study, which dismissed fantasy as anti-rational and metaphysical. Another is Jameson himself, who, in his own extensive statement on utopia, condemns any confusion between fantasy and science fiction (“We must now lay this misunderstanding to rest”), referring to their distinction as “The Great Schism.” Nor does it help that the most inescapably popular figure in fantasy literature, J. R. R. Tolkien (who, incidentally, was politically conservative), actively defended fantasy precisely as a kind of “escapist” practice. Complaining that anti-fantasy critics have confused “the Escape of the Prisoner with the Flight of the Deserter,” Tolkien asks, “Why should a man be scorned if, finding himself in prison, he tries to get out and go home. Or if, when he cannot do so, he thinks and talks about other topics than jailers and prison-walls?” Indeed, Tolkien goes so far as to claim that the world outside this prison is just as “real,” whether the prisoner can see it or not, which suggests a view of fantasy as an imaginative method for apprehending the “real world” rather than a means of escaping from it.

It is perhaps ironic, then, that a similar argument has been made by Miéville in his spirited defense of the genre against charges brought by Marxists and
Miéville has said some rather mischievous things about Tolkien, most famously that the Oxford professor’s influential presence was “a wen on the arse of fantasy literature,” although he has repented of this view a bit in recent years.\textsuperscript{29} As a Marxist, Miéville represents, of course, nearly the political antipode of Tolkien. Yet, even though he comes from such a different perspective, Miéville contends that fantasy is superior to realism when it comes to getting at the truth of “the real world.”\textsuperscript{29} After discussing Marx’s own analysis in \textit{Capital} of the fetishism of the commodity and the hidden social relations embedded in it, Miéville offers that “real’ life under capitalism is \textit{a fantasy}: ‘realism,’ narrowly defined, is therefore a ‘realistic’ depiction of ‘an absurdity which is true,’ but no less absurd for that. Narrow ‘realism’ is as partial and ideological as ‘reality’ itself.”\textsuperscript{30} Further, Miéville insists, “the apparent epistemological radicalism of the fantastic mode’s basic predicate,” namely “that the impossible is true,” makes it well suited to the task of an oppositional or critical project.\textsuperscript{31} As Miéville concludes, “the fantastic might be a mode peculiarly suited to and resonant with the forms of modernity. . . . Fantasy is a mode that, in constructing an internally coherent but actually impossible totality—constructed on the basis that the impossible is, for this work, true—mimics the ‘absurdity’ of capitalist modernity.”\textsuperscript{32}

Tolkien’s and Miéville’s positions respond to the perception that fantastic literary works are not only inferior to more realistic stories but also morally or politically suspect. Tolkien famously quarreled with fellow conservative C. S. Lewis over whether it was immoral for a Christian to embrace myth, which Lewis disparaged as “lies breathed through silver.”\textsuperscript{33} And, as a practicing fantasist as well as a socialist activist in his own right, Miéville is forced to defend fantasy from those on the Left who have objected to its escapism, nostalgia, or ideological incorrectness. Thus, even when the opposition to fantasy is less morally or politically charged, the prevailing view of political critics is that realism, with its familiar and recognizable world presumably shared by reader and writer, is the preferred mode.

This is, after all, Sir Walter Scott’s rejoinder to Hoffmann in “On the Supernatural in Fictitious Composition.” In finding Hoffmann’s work both \textit{grotesque} and \textit{Arabesque}—the very terms Edgar Allan Poe gleefully adopted to refer to his collected stories, although it is noteworthy that Poe had intended to name the revised and expanded collection \textit{Phantasy Pieces}—Scott does not hide a certain disdain for the otherworldly, which here covers the merely exotic (as the term “Arabesque” makes clear) as well as the twisted or horrible. His essay offers a foundational text for the debate about the suitable proportion of fantasy and reality in literature during the nineteenth century. This polemic also famously includes Nathaniel Hawthorne’s \textit{apologia} for “romance” as opposed to the more strictly realistic “novel,” which “is presumed to aim at a very minute fidelity, not merely to the possible, but to the probable and ordinary course of man’s experience.”\textsuperscript{34} And, as we have seen, this argument about how much fantasy is acceptable in serious
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literature—what Kathryn Hume has succinctly named the “fantasy versus mimesis” controversy—continues to elicit heated responses.

Yet again, it is important to reiterate that it is Scott who casually delineates the contours of the battlefield. To do so, he first quotes a paragraph of Hoffmann’s The Entail, in which a frightfully supernatural occurrence culminates with a calm, somewhat revelatory, but still eerie explanation. Scott then elaborates as follows:

The passage which we have quoted, while it shows the wildness of Hoffmann’s fancy, evinces also that he possessed power which ought to have mitigated and allayed it. Unfortunately, his taste and temperament directed him too strongly to the grotesque and fantastic—carried him too far “extra moenia flammantia mundi,” too much beyond the circle not only of probability but even of possibility, to admit of his composing much in the better style which he might easily have attained. The popular romance, no doubt, has many walks, nor are we at all inclined to halloo the dogs of criticism against those whose object is merely to amuse a passing hour. It may be repeated with truth, that in this path of light literature, “tout genre est permis hors les genres ennuyeux,” and of course, an error in taste ought not to be followed up and hunted down as if it were a false maxim in morality, a delusive hypothesis in science, or a heresy in religion itself. Genius too, is, we are aware, capricious, and must be allowed to take its own flights, however eccentric, were it but for the sake of experiment. Sometimes, also, it may be eminently pleasing to look at the wildness of an Arabesque painting executed by a man of rich fancy. But we do not desire to see genius expand or rather exhaust itself upon themes which cannot be reconciled to taste; and the utmost length in which we can indulge a turn to the fantastic is, where it tends to excite agreeable and pleasing ideas.

We are not called upon to be equally tolerant of such capriccios as are not only startling by their extravagance, but disgusting by their horrible import.

Neither a naive realist nor an advocate of a strictly mimetic narrative art, Scott is willing to forgive literature that extends “beyond the flaming walls of the world” so long as it can “excite agreeable and pleasant ideas.” Thus, he introduces a pragmatic and moral dimension into the discussion of literary aesthetics. That is, the question is less about what constitutes fantasy and more about the consequences of using such fantastic elements.

The French maxim that Scott paraphrases is Voltaire’s assertion that “all genres are good except boring genres.” However, he cribs the Latin expression not from literary fiction, whether fantastic or realistic, but from philosophy, specifically from Lucretius’s first century B.C.E. treatise De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things). In the original, the expression extra moenia...
flammantia mundi does not carry a negative connotation. On the contrary, in fact, for Lucretius the phrase signifies a great achievement, a sign of the intellectual courage of the scientific or philosophical mind willing to go beyond the superstitious chimeras of religion in order to seek the truths that lie “beyond the flaming walls of the world.” The famous line refers to Epicurus, the atomist and materialist Greek philosopher whose “victory,” according to Lucretius, brought religion down under our feet and placed human beings on a level with heaven. It is also worth noting that, in this original Epicurean context, the movement “beyond the flaming walls of the world” is not considered an attempt to escape from the real world into a false one but rather a brave discovery of precisely that more truly real world that had been hidden and veiled by the false realities of superstition and religion. In its oddly tortuous philological journey from the first century B.C.E. to the nineteenth century, the phrase as used by Scott had developed a meaning nearly opposite to what Lucretius had intended. However, in what might be considered one more turn of the screw or yet another dialectical reversal, one can argue that Scott’s own use of the expression as a means of criticizing fantasy actually reveals the power of fantasy as a device for social and literary critique.

Indeed, one could suggest that Lucretius’s defense of the materialist thought of Epicurus against the superstitions of religious belief finds modern and postmodern counterparts in Jameson’s pro-utopian argument against so-called practical thinking and also in Miéville’s defense of fantasy against its Marxist detractors (including, of course, such science fiction enthusiasts as Jameson himself). In both cases, a theorist inveighs against the prejudices and barriers to thinking that predominate in his place and time. For example, in Marxism and Form, Jameson acknowledges the anti-utopian positions of Marx and Engels in the nineteenth century. Referring in particular to the reemergence of utopian discourse in Herbert Marcuse’s critical theory, Jameson argues, however, that by the 1960s another “dialectical reversal” had occurred. He contends that while in the older society (as in Marx’s classic analysis) Utopian thought represented a diversion of revolutionary energy into idle wishfulfillments and imaginary satisfactions, in our own time the very nature of the Utopian concept has undergone a dialectical reversal. Now it is practical thinking which everywhere represents a capitulation to the system itself, and stands as a testimony to the power of that system to transform even its adversaries into its own mirror image. The Utopian idea, on the contrary, keeps alive the possibility of a world qualitatively distinct from this one and takes the form of a stubborn negation of all that is.

Along similar lines, utopian theorist Russell Jacoby has maintained that “any effort to escape the spell of the quotidian . . . is the sine qua non of serious
thinking about the future—the prerequisite of any thinking.” In this sense, the more realistic, practical, or feasible position becomes antithetical to the necessarily fantastic, critical project of meditating upon the impossible.

But, again, this is the very crux of Miéville’s defense of fantasy. In his “Cognition as Ideology,” Miéville questions the supremacy of Suvin’s influential characterization of science fiction as a form of cognitive estrangement, with the corollary that the estrangements of fantasy or myth are fundamentally non-alienating, metaphysical, mystifying, or anti-rational. Miéville decries the attitude that has allowed “generations of readers and writers to treat, say, faster-than-light drives as science-fictional in a way that dragons are not, despite repeated assurances from the great majority of physicists that the former are no less impossible than the latter.” Against the anti-fantasy sentiments of the spaceship enthusiasts or dragon detractors, Miéville files all genres—science fiction, utopia, and fantasy—under the label “the literature of alterity.” This intensive regard for otherness, whether presented in terms of the past or future, the earthly or the interstellar, the monstrous or the alien, is shared by all forms of the fiction of estrangement, including some, like Moby-Dick, that are inexpressibly “strange” even while featuring absolutely realistic (or, at least, possible) persons and events. Miéville’s terminology thus enables the fantastic to exceed or even invert tightly circumscribed genre boundaries. For Miéville, science fiction or utopia are mere subsets of the broader category of fantasy, which allows a meditation on the impossible that can enable a radically different vantage point from which to view the “real world.” As Miéville puts it, “we need fantasy to think the world, and to change it.”

Change and form go hand in hand here. What Jameson has said of the dynamic of form and world transformation in utopian thought applies equally well to the notion of fantasy as the literature of radical alterity: “utopia as a form is not the representation of radical alternatives; it is rather simply the imperative to imagine them.” Truly radical alterity would, in a somewhat literal sense, be unrepresentable since, in the apprehension of the novel otherworld and in its incorporation into our own mental databases, this representation refamiliarizes this otherness and, in one way or another, domesticates estrangement. As Jameson notes elsewhere, “insofar as the Utopian project comes to seem more realizable and more practical, it turns into a practical political program in our world, in the here-and-now, and ceases to be Utopian in any meaningful sense.” Or, on the flip side of the same argument, “the more surely a given Utopia asserts its radical difference from what currently is, to that very degree it becomes, not merely unrealizable but, what is worse, unimaginable.” Hence, we are left once more with a tenebrous conception of radical alterity as a meditation on the impossible rather than as a viable otherworld to dwell in.

Nevertheless, the value of this fantastic effort seems to be confirmed in the imaginative endeavor involved in mapping our own “real world,” particularly
the postmodern world-system in which the traditional guideposts are no lon-
er trust worthy or desirable. “Happy are those ages when the starry sky is
the map of all possible paths,” writes Lukács of the centuries dominated by
the epic. “The world is wide and yet it is like a home.”46 In our world-
system, the celestial cartography is not so reliable or heimlich, and the existential and
critical paradigm coming on the heels of the planetary turn may require the
speculative or fantastic extension beyond the world’s flaming walls in order
to chart, albeit provisionally and tentatively, both our location and our avail-
able courses of action.

“Shall I Project a World?”

The planetary space and fantastic mode of apprehending it find their nexus
in a speculative critical activity I have been associating with literary cart-
tography and geocriticism. I have been particularly interested in the ways
narratives map a postnational space that cannot easily fold itself into the
ideological and geographical atlases of an earlier configuration.47 I do not
mean to say that the existential mapping of one’s Lebenswelt (à la Heidegger
and Sartre, or even with Lukács’s “transcendental homelessness” as a model)
emerges only with the postmodern condition, but rather that this kind of
cartography reflects the profoundly different spatial and cultural anxieties of
a postnational world-system in which former certainties are made uncertain
and familiar codes lose their meaning. Ironically, in the postnational constel-
lation, the insights of a pre-national Weltanschauung might offer clues to a
speculative, fantastic geocriticism adapted for the critical exigencies of the
current moment of globalization.

The “pre-national” view I have in mind is a variation of the medieval
conception of the world, a vision described by Erich Auerbach in “Philol-
ogy and Weltliteratur” in the immediate aftermath of World War II, at what
might be thought of as the incipient stage of postmodernity. In this essay,
Auerbach maintains that the national (and nationalist) traditions of literary
study, however valuable in the past two centuries, were no longer suitable for
understanding the world. “To make men conscious of themselves in their own
history,” the critic reflects, “is a great task, yet the task is small—more like a
renunciation—when one considers that man not only lives on earth, but that
he is in the world and in the universe.”48 Auerbach asserts that “our philologi-
cal home is the earth: it can no longer be the nation. . . . We must return, in
admittedly altered circumstances, to the knowledge that prenational medi-
culture already possessed: the knowledge that the spirit [Geist] is not
national.” Auerbach then quotes the words of a medieval thinker, Hugh of
St. Victor, who taught that “the man who finds his homeland sweet is still a
tender beginner; he to whom every soil is as his native one is already strong;
but he is perfect to whom the entire world is as a foreign land.” By invoking
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this “mundus totus exilium est” as his motto, Auerbach turns on its head the wisdom of a medieval Christian, who cautions against attaching oneself to the earthly world; as Auerbach explains, “Hugo intended these lines for one whose aim is to free himself from a love of the world. But it is a good way also for one who wishes to earn a proper love for the world.”

The perspective of the exile, of one who cannot be “at home” in the world, is embraced by Edward Said in his reading of Auerbach and in his own work. In “Reflections on Exile,” Said argues that “seeing ‘the entire world as a foreign land’ makes possible originality of vision.” This originality of vision or critical distance is, I would add, not altogether dissimilar from that which obtains through a fantastic or otherworldly vantage, such as the one achieved by the Apollo 8 photographers who witnessed the planet Earth rising above the horizon of the moon. Both Auerbach’s plea for a postnational approach to world literature and Said’s conviction that the condition of exile affords one a paradoxically privileged position as an observer suggest that the exile is the exemplary figure for the critic in the age of globalization. This is not to say that the perspective of the exile, even if it captures the situation of the contemporary critic, is a comfortable one. The new vista afforded by finding oneself in an unfamiliar situation is more likely to be bewildering than liberating. Amid the spatial anxieties and temporal confusions of the postnational condition, the artist or critic is called upon to come to grips with things as best as one can. As I have proposed, this may require an exercise in the fantastic, a speculative and perhaps even unrealistic practice, but one that can produce a map, albeit a provisional one, by which to make sense of the world-system.

Lending itself to such mapping or reading is, to take just one example, a key scene in Thomas Pynchon’s 1966 novel The Crying of Lot 49. The protagonist, Oedipa Maas, finds herself inexplicably entangled within a global conspiracy, surrounded by bizarre characters, and lost in the confusion of competing, often inscrutable interests, while she is attempting to sort out the complex details of a dead man’s estate. At her wit’s end and thoroughly frustrated by her predicament, Oedipa resolves to reread Pierce Inverarity’s will in an effort to gain a clearer sense of things. Thus, she imagines herself as a “dark machine in the center of the planetarium” that can “bring the estate into pulsing stelliferous Meaning” and writes the following in her memorandum book: “Shall I project a world? If not project then at least flash some arrow on the dome to skitter among the constellations and trace out your Dragon, Whale, Southern Cross. Anything might help.”

“Projecting a world” seems a perfectly appropriate task for both the artist and the critic after the planetary turn, and Pynchon’s astronomical metaphor offers another intriguing trope for aesthetic and critical maneuvers. The constellation is at once utterly fantastic, inasmuch as the tracings drawn in the night sky are thoroughly imaginary, and also terrifiedly real, insofar as travelers and navigators have been able to reliably locate themselves and chart
courses in the world based upon these fantastic celestial drawings. With few exceptions, constellations are completely artificial, human-made, and even arbitrary. As anyone who has tried to identify and memorize the constellations will concede, their names are not particularly descriptive and rarely fit the images purportedly sketched in the skies. Canis minor, for instance, which comprises only two stars, looks more like a line than a small dog. In a recent, only somewhat tongue-in-cheek article titled “Starry Blight: How a Bunch of Peasants from Mesopotamia Ruined the Night Sky,” Daniel Engber refers to these constellations as “a smog of Bronze Age graffiti.” Yet, in antiquity as in the modern world, such imaginary lines, fantastically projected from human stargazers situated on the surface of this planet, have helped one make sense of one’s place in the world, serving as points of reference in a broadly defined terrestrial cartography, as well as operating in a quite practical way to help humans navigate the “real world” below the heavens. This is a clear example, among many others, of the real-world effects of fictions produced in a fantastic mode.

If the present world-system lacks traditional guideposts or reveals such markers to be less than helpful, then it may be fitting to advocate the fantastic project of “projecting a world”—of “constellating” the various forces, places, and events in the global space in new ways so that we can better understand and engage with the world. One of the formerly indispensable “guideposts” to be challenged or superseded in this effort is the nation-state itself. Although this spatio-political ensemble retains immense power even in the postnational constellation, and even though it tenaciously maintains its influence over literary and cultural studies (particularly in university curricula), its effectiveness is waning amid the overwhelming, trans- or supranational forces of the world-system. With the term “postnationality,” I might add, I refer specifically to the current condition, in the era of globalization, in which the nation-state is no longer the locus classicus or primum mobile of culture, of the economy, or even of politics. As Habermas has observed, in the past, “the phenomena of the territorial state, the nation, and a popular economy constituted within national borders formed a historical constellation in which the democratic process assumed a more or less convincing institutional form. . . . Today, developments summarized under the term ‘globalization’ have put this entire constellation into question.” Under the auspices of globalization, the national models, including those employed in the study of literature and culture, are no longer reliable or even desirable. The “historical constellation” in which the nation-state constituted the dominant force in social, political, economic, and spatial organization of the world-system is as much an imaginative projection as other constellations. However, just as the ideological comes to appear natural, the national paradigm has seemed so constitutive of human sociality that it is harder to imagine alternatives. The radical alterity of fantasy or of the fantastic mode broadly conceived enables and promotes a projection of a world that can, if only provisionally, be mapped.
Therefore, it is not surprising that literary and cultural critics such as Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno (or their Frankfurt School successor Habermas) should find the figure of the constellation so useful for theory. In organizing the swirling, vicissitudinous elements of modern culture and society, the critic draws imaginary lines not to fix such phenomena in place as a way of determining once and for all their true meaning or of constraining their mobile diversity but to arrange them in a cognizable pattern for further use. Amid the disorienting and dynamic phenomena of the postmodern condition, one may wish to “project a world,” in other words, to create patterns that, while obviously artificial, provisional, and imaginary, can aid us in conceptualizing and navigating the planetary space we inhabit. As Oedipa Maas knowingly concluded, “Anything might help.”

Along these lines, a fantastic, postnational criticism may enable a new way of seeing and mapping this planetary space that now provides the ultimate ground or horizon of thought in the age of globalization. Like those Apollo 8 astronauts who ventured into the universe and beyond the moon—quite literally “beyond the flaming walls of the world”—a critical practice such as geocriticism, operating as it does in a fantastic mode, may thereby achieve novel vistas, look back on the worldly world from our radically otherworldly perspective, project new constellations and maps, and maybe just see things a bit differently. In navigating the planetary space of a postnational constellation geocritically, we may thus embrace the strangeness of the contemporary world-system, imagine radical alternatives, and descry—if only in uncertain, tentative, and momentary glimpses—the features of other worlds.

Notes


9. As Fredric Jameson has put it, “all thinking today is also, whatever else it is, an attempt to think the world system as such.” See *The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press; London: British Film Institute, 1992), 4 (emphasis in original).


12. Indeed, as a number of environmentalist and ecocritics have noted, the “Earthrise” photo may have sparked the environmentalist movement and led to Earth Day, partially ended the “Space Age” by recalling attention to the planet Earth itself, and transformed humanity’s attitude toward the planet, confirming a “Spaceship Earth” vision that reimagines the global space not as an empty backdrop for human activity but as a dynamic and affective geographical domain. See Robert Poole, “From Spaceship Earth to Mother Earth,” in *Earthrise: How Man First Saw the Earth* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008), 141–69.


14. Similar in spirit to MacLeish’s conclusion, Arthur C. Clarke declared that the Apollo 8 mission constituted “a second Copernican revolution” and speculated that the children born that year might one day “live to become citizens of the United Planets.” Quoted in Poole, *Earthrise*, 5–6.

15. Quoted in Poole, *Earthrise*, 3.

16. Although subsequent missions would achieve lunar landing and other milestones of the space program, the Apollo 8 astronauts traveled the furthest from the Earth’s surface, going beyond the moon, hence gaining the vantage from which to capture the “earthrise.”


18. For a rather different analysis focusing on environmental criticism in its assessment of globalization and cosmopolitanism, see Ursula K. Heise, *Sense
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19. Poole, Earthrise, 11.


21. See, for example, Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future; and David Harvey, Spaces of Hope (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).


31. Ibid., 42–43. Note, however, that Miéville quite rightly does not claim that fantasy is itself a revolutionary mode or “acts as a guide to political action” (46). The value of fantasy lies less in its politics—which could lie anywhere on the political spectrum—than in its imaginative encounter with radical alterity itself.


35. See Kathryn Hume, Fantasy and Mimesis: Responses to Reality in Western Literature (New York: Methuen, 1984).


