

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA
FROM TRUMAN TO NIXON

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Cold War for the United States was a war that was not only waged in Europe but also in our own hemisphere in Latin America. Theoretically, the Monroe Doctrine had helped keep the United States sphere of influence away from outside European intervention. Yet it was not until the Cold War that U.S. presidents implemented a more aggressive policy towards all of Latin America. The containment policy applied in Europe was applied as well to Latin American nations. This thesis will look specifically at the beginning of Latin American policy from the Truman administration to the Nixon administration.

First, it is important and necessary to look at U.S. policy towards the region since Latin American independence. The interplay between politics and economics has long been part of the United States' approach to Inter-American relations. As early as 1818, while wars of independence still raged in Latin America, Congressman Henry Clay called for United States recognition of de facto revolutionary governments there for political and economic reasons. Politically, Clay declared, the United States could not help but identify with the "glorious spectacle of eighteen millions of people, struggling to burst their chains and to be free."¹ Secretary of State John Quincy Adams did not share

¹ David Green, *The Containment of Latin America* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 3.

Clay's optimistic view of Latin America's political and moral propensities. In 1820, he wrote "As to an American system, we have it; we constitute the whole of it; between North and South America."² But for reasons both of political security and economic advantage, Adams was soon ready to create such a community of interest where none existed. Adams convinced President James Monroe that any concession of special economic privileges to Spain in the area formerly under her imperial control would be contrary to the United States economic interests.³ The United States established economic interests in Latin America independently of any European country. The U.S. had realized during that time that Spain was a threat to the hemisphere and the interests of the United States. Adams called this "the denial of all exclusive privileges."⁴

During most of the nineteenth century, the United States commerce with Latin America grew steadily. By the end of the 1880s, however, the United States had moved to a new peak of industrial strength, and took up with renewed vigor and confidence the Clay-Adams-Monroe search for an Inter-American system based upon a hemispheric community of interest. Significantly, the late nineteenth-century approach, championed by Secretary of State James G. Blaine contained the same dual emphasis upon politics and economics as had that of Blaine's predecessors. The Pan American Union, established in Washington in 1889 at the time of the first Pan American Conference, functioned both as political secretariats for Inter-American consultations and as a trade information agency. Blaine supported an aggressive United States effort to bring commercial reciprocity to the Americas in order to stimulate the northward flow of raw materials and the southward flow of manufactured goods. Sensing the potential danger of

² Ibid.

³ Green 4

⁴ Ibid.

an aggressive political approach, he preferred to underplay United States political and military strength. The idea of an Inter-American community of interest remained at the core of the United States policy. Woodrow Wilson advocated it when he talked of teaching the Mexicans to elect good men. The assumption of mutuality of interests, and of the United States' good intentions, even benevolence, was a constant.⁵

At the same time, Latin America was developing a more skeptical view of United States policies. In the early 1900s, Uruguay's leading writer and intellect, Jose Enrique Rodo, published his famous piece *Ariel*. He portrayed the United States as a "misbegotten Caliban bent upon the spiritual and cultural destruction of Latin America."⁶ Many Latin American diplomats did attempt to hobble United States power in the hemisphere through juridical limitations. During three Pan American Conferences at Mexico City 1901, Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and Buenos Aires in 1910, a number of Latin American nations, led by Argentina, tried without success to get the United States to adhere to a mandatory nonintervention pact. When in 1903 the Colombian government balked at ratifying an Isthmian canal treaty, President Theodore Roosevelt supported a revolution which detached the strategic territory of Panama and made it an independent republic under United States protection. During the first thirty years of twentieth century, there was a constant battle over the terms on which Inter-American relationships were to be conducted. At the Havana Conference in 1928, hemispheric political relationships became politically strained as Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes defended United States intervention in Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua.⁷ It was not until 1933 that relationships began to mend when the United States first signed a non-

⁵ Green, 5-10.

⁶ Green, 16.

⁷ Green, 7.

intervention pledge in regards to Latin America, and not until the Buenos Aires Conference of 1936 was such a pledge formalized in a joint Inter-American declaration.⁸ At the same time economic ties also began to receive increasing notice.

In the economic field, United States officials continued to stress increased commercial cooperation and interchange. Every president from Theodore Roosevelt through Coolidge encouraged an influx of private U.S. capital into Latin America, especially in railroads, agriculture, and attractive industries. Such policies were successful in the Caribbean areas, where the United States military power could be deployed to back up or even open up profitable and secure opportunities for United States businessmen. In the stronger South American countries, and in Mexico, United States definition of the policy relationships could be resisted with somewhat greater force. Those countries, particularly the South American leaders Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, tended to maintain strong financial ties with Europe.

While the controversy over the Mexican Revolution and constitution raged, World War I had brought much of Latin America increasingly into the United States orbit. With the closing of European markets, Latin America turned to the only large scale industrial market capable of absorbing their commodity exports. While the need for markets on both sides brought Latin America and the United States into closer economic contact, the possibility of further nationalist revolution in Latin America raised serious questions about the kinds of relationships this increased contact would lead to.

The postwar decade raised more questions than it solved; events brought out conflicting perceptions north and south. For the United States, the 1920s was a decade of general optimism and expansion. Involvement in Latin American economic enterprises

⁸ Ibid.

increased sharply, particularly in the fields of oil exploration and banking. Between 1919 and 1929, direct United States investments in Latin American enterprises increased from \$1,987,000,000 to \$3,519,000,000, while portfolio investments (bonds and securities) increased from \$419,000,000 to \$1,725,000,000.⁹ From a U.S. point of view, the financial statistics largely told a good story. In Venezuela, oil prospects under the Gomez dictatorship were excellent; mining concession in Bolivia and Chile became increasingly profitable; and United States investors found themselves rushing to get into Cuba.¹⁰ The U.S. interventions were merely ripples on the surface of fundamentally calm waters. On the other hand, from the Latin American point of view, conflict with the United States was serious.

The Great Depression of the 1930s had serious long-range consequences for Latin American economic development. It became a turning point in its history and the history of the Inter-American relations. The result was the collapse of political stability in a number of countries. The Depression signaled a movement away from traditional liberal parliamentary governments and toward stronger forms of authoritarian control. When President Franklin Delano Roosevelt came to office, he introduced the Good Neighbor Policy that would help improve relations between Central and South America through cooperation and trade rather than military force.

During World War II, the United States gave economic aid to Latin America through its successful Lend-Lease program. Conferences emerged between both parties trying to cooperate and find unity. After the war, it was unclear to the United States if countries in Latin America understood the deep fear of Soviet Russia. The years 1945-

⁹ Raymond Mikesell, *Foreign Investments in Latin America* (Washington: Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs Pan American Union, 1955) 11.

¹⁰ Mikesell, 11.

1946 marked the height of communist influence in Latin America, owing largely to the prestige which the U.S.S.R had gained by successfully overcoming the Nazis. Some Latin American politicians openly acknowledged that they were using the communists in their countries for their own political purposes. Because the nations feared United States intervention, they viewed communist ideology of the Soviet Union as far less of an actual threat to Latin America than they anti-nationalist policy of the United States. The spread of communist ideology into the western hemisphere helped give rise to the creation of a Cold War policy towards Latin America.

CHAPTER II

TRUMAN

President Harry S Truman was the 33rd President of the United States from 1945 to 1953. He attempted to continue Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy and completed the building of an inter-American system which was intended to ratify United States supervision and control of Latin American economic development. Under his administration begins the creation of the U.S. foreign policy.

In the years immediately following World War II, tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the onset of the Cold War in Europe by 1947. During the same time period communists appeared to be on the verge of a military victory in China and were making headway in Greece and Turkey. In response, the United States developed a policy of containment to limit communist advances. The first expression of the containment policy came in March 1947, when President Truman proclaimed in a doctrine bearing his name, that henceforth, the United States would assist "free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."¹¹ The containment policy became the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy for much of the second half of the twentieth century and largely shaped U.S. responses in Latin America. Among the responses from Truman was the Rio Pact, and others like NSC 141 and the Point Four Assistance Program.

¹¹ Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala* (Austin University of Texas Press, 1982), 11.

Rio Pact

In August 1947, the nations of the Western Hemisphere, convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Subsequently, Ecuador withdrew because of political turmoil at home. The delegates focused their attention upon completing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Pact. Many American policymakers understood the significance of the meeting. President Truman traveled to the conference at its conclusion, arriving aboard the battleship, *U.S.S. Missouri*.¹² He joined the Secretary of State George Marshall and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) who took the lead for Washington on securing its goals of sustaining hemispheric solidarity and defense. The origins of the Rio Pact dated to the 1945 Conference on Inter-American Problems of War and Peace in Mexico City, often referred to as the Chapultepec Conference, after the castle in which the conferees met.¹³ There, the United States and the Latin American nations made their first attempt to strengthen wartime cooperation against a threat to the hemisphere.

Part III of the Act of Chapultepec recommended a regional arrangement for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.¹⁴ While creating no machinery to administer it, the Act emphasized that the activities be consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization when established, a direct reference to the forthcoming United Nations. Owing to the United States-Argentine controversy surrounding the presidential candidacy

¹² Longley, Kyle, "Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, August 15 to September 2, 1947"; available from [http://www.routledge-ny.com/enc/U.S.Latin Relations/sample1.html](http://www.routledge-ny.com/enc/U.S.Latin%20Relations/sample1.html); Internet; accessed 21 April 2007.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

of Juan Peron, nothing more could be accomplished at the time. Still, the ideas of Chapultepec were significant, especially as tensions continued to rise in the international arena in the aftermath of the war and, they served as the backdrop for the Rio Conference.

The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance also commonly known as the Rio Treaty, the Rio Pact, or by the Spanish-language acronym TIAR from *Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca*) was signed in 1947 in Rio de Janeiro by fourteen then Latin American countries and the United States. The central principle contained in its articles is that an attack against one is to be considered an attack against all; this was known as the "hemispheric defense" doctrine. The idea of a mutual assistance treaty had been agreed to at a Mexico City conference in 1945 as mentioned above, but the delay in making the accord final was due to largely dispute between the United States and Argentina's Juan Peron. Although no fan of Inter-American cooperation, Peron was unwilling to see Argentina left out of the regional grouping. Washington, too, finally came to see the importance of including Argentina in the agreement despite misgiving of over Peron's leadership.

The Rio Pact was the first joint security agreement entered into by the United States after the war. It preceded the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. The Pact was invoked many times, usually by the United States, to mobilize resistance to threats from communism. The treaty gives the image of collaboration and equality. First, it declared that an armed attack against any American country will be considered an attack against all. Each state is to assist in meeting the attack. However, the nature of the assistance, which is to be collectively given, is not states, no is the response automatic. Action

depends on a meeting of national foreign ministers. This also applies to aggression or threats to peace and security other than from an armed attack. These foreign ministers decided by two-thirds vote on the necessary response.

The Rio Defense Pact moved forward to counter the loss of the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act and Washington policy makers moved to make the Rio treaty as strong as possible. The Inter-American Military Cooperation Act was meant to be an authorized program of military collaboration with other American States including the training, organization, and equipment of the armed forces. The bill unfortunately did not pass in Congress in 1946. At the Rio conference Senator Vandenberg a key figure at the conference fought down an Argentine proposal to limit the Inter-American defense treaty to aggression from outside the hemisphere. On August 30, 1947 the treaty was approved in a form which covered internal problems as well as those stemming from the action of outsiders. By the end of 1947, the Rio treaty had been approved by the United States Senate and was in the process of being ratified by the governments of Latin America republic as well.

NSC-141

The National Security Council document, NSC- 141, provides explicit evidence of Truman's concern over reconciling a desire to be Latin America's good neighbor with a commitment to preventing the spread of communism. NSC-141 was written in early 1953 and was referred by the "intellectual last will and testament in this area of security

policy of the Truman Administration to the Eisenhower.”¹⁵ The document was based on the overall assumptions generated by NSC-68 and delineated the task in Latin America:

In Latin America we seek first and foremost an orderly political and economic development which will make the Latin American nations resistant to the internal growth of communism and to Soviet political warfare...Secondly we, seek hemispheric solidarity in support of our world policy and the cooperation of the Latin American nations in safeguarding the hemisphere through individual and collective defense measures against external aggression and internal subversion.¹⁶

The NSC-68 issued to Truman in April 1950, was a classified report written in the formative stages of the Cold War becoming the blueprint for U.S. military buildup to confront the Soviet Union. Policy advisors who wrote NSC-141 could clearly stipulate policy objectives, but they could make no new recommendations as to how these objectives could be attained. The only analysis they could advise was the “improvement of present programs.”¹⁷ In retrospect, however, the existing programs were inherently ineffective. The most publicized and criticized of these programs was the Point Four Assistance.

The Point Four assistance program was introduced at Truman’s Inaugural Address on January 20, 1949. The program was based on the realization and prediction that worsening economic conditions could lead to an increase in social unrest and open the door to communist subversion. The program called out for a new program of technical cooperation designed to elevate the masses of Latin America (and other areas around the world) out of misery, disease, and illiteracy. The program was originally administered by a special agency of the Department of State, but in 1953 it was merged with other

¹⁵ Immerman, 11.

¹⁶ NSC 141 “A report to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security on Reexamination of United States Programs for National Security,” 19 January 1952.

¹⁷ NSC-141.

foreign-aid programs. The program was financially doomed from the start. The NSC-68 required massive military expenditures since it called for the United States to defend the free world on a global front.

Some may argue that the Point Four assistance could have alleviated the economic distress responsible for Guatemala's economic reforms; United States domestic consideration precluded this being a viable option. More can be learned by analyzing the military programs. The Rio Pact, directed against an armed attack on any signatory nation, along with the military grant-aid program, reflected the growing fear of Soviet aggression in Latin America. NSC-141 puts forth this position very clearly. The basic Truman policy of resisting aggression was, of course, military containment. This was so because military containment was appropriate to Latin America as anywhere else. Truman officials suspected that Soviet agents were actively subverting the government but to invoke the Rio Pact they had to have proof. The United States policy makers discerned but a fine line separating nationalist reformers from Communist agitators, so fine a line that the distinguishing factor was often the effect of a reform on United State's interest.

Truman was succeeded by Dwight D. Eisenhower who would come into office and redefine defense in his terms. By the end of his presidency, Truman came upon a communist crisis in Guatemala and left it to Eisenhower to make the necessary and appropriate strategy to eliminate communism. Truman's policy in office began to show a great concern in economic and national security for the United States. This is has to do with timing of the Cold War beginning right after WW II. Truman did away with Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy and embraced a stricter policy towards Latin America.

By the summer of 1945, the overall strategy of the new Truman administration had become clear to the American people. The administration's Latin American policy centered on the idea of a closed hemisphere in an Open World. At the San Francisco Conference of 1945, Truman approved a strong American position on regionalism, figuring that while this would give the United States leverage for the creation of a tightly knit, well controlled system in the Western Hemisphere, the United States could still use its superior economic and political strength to pressure the Russians into forgoing parallel action in Eastern Europe

CHAPTER III

EISENHOWER

Eisenhower was the 34th president of the United States who served from January 1953 to January 1961. During his 1952 campaign, he proposed the New Look Strategy that attacked the Democratic policy of containment, criticizing it for spreading United States resources too thin, accepting the status quo too willingly, and concentrating too heavily on Western Europe. Eisenhower contended that the White House must wrest the initiative from the Kremlin and if possible, liberate areas from Communist control. Eisenhower appeared to be tougher than Truman. According to the *Nashville Banner*, “the day of sleep walking is over.”¹⁸ It passed with the exodus of Truman and Acheson, and the “policy of vigilance replacing Polyanna diplomacy is evident.”¹⁹ Up until recently many historians have depicted Eisenhower as a bland, do-nothing, largely ineffective president. Many scholars saw little new in his foreign policy.

When Eisenhower assumed the presidency in January 1953, his most pressing foreign policy problem outside the winding down of the Korean War was Iran, where Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh had nationalized the British oil companies and was publicly threatening the Shah’s rule. In August 1953 with the assistance of the CIA under the leadership of Kermit Roosevelt, Mossadegh was thrown out of office. This

¹⁸ Immerman 13.

¹⁹ Ibid.

pattern would repeat itself the following year in 1954 in Guatemala. Covert operations as seen above played a major role, and their use in Guatemala represented a significant departure from the policies of Truman. During the interwar years, spying was not a gentleman's profession.²⁰ But the covert aspects of the Guatemalan strategy exhibited the personal imprint of the president and, consequently, necessitated another historical corrective. One asset of his was his firsthand knowledge of clandestine operations, of what they could and could not accomplish. In addition to using the covert operations his close relationship with his Secretary of State also shaped America's foreign policy. Explaining Eisenhower's foreign policy in Latin American cannot be explained without identifying John Foster Dulles.

Conventional scholars almost unanimously attributed Eisenhower's foreign policy to his controversial secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. To many historians and observers, the indefatigable Dulles appeared to dominate United States diplomacy in the 1950s to so great an extent that "he carried the state department in his hat."²¹ The acknowledged power of his convictions, intellect, and rhetoric gave the impression of Dulles's preeminence with the president, the cabinet, the nation, and the international community. His frequent press conferences and interviews made him a favorite subject of the media and to most he was the conceptual font and prime mover of United States policy.²² However, this interpretation of Dulles is now challenged by recent available evidence. The papers of the Eisenhower administration revealed a foreign policy resulting from a high degree of multiple advocacies, with the final decisions resting

²⁰ Stephen E. Ambrose & Richard Immerman, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (New York: Double Day & Company, Inc.), Introduction.

²¹ Immerman, 14.

²² Immerman, 15.

firmly in the Oval Office.²³ Both Eisenhower and Dulles had a great deal of mutual respect towards one another. No decisions were reached without their having discussed the issues thoroughly during numerous conversations each day.²⁴ The National Security Council, the Operations Coordinating Board, and other informal organs carefully reviewed and analyzed all policy proposals and options. In reality, Eisenhower and Dulles agreed on the fundamental principles of foreign policy. They collaborated; one man did not dominate the other. Eisenhower was thought but was not indeed to be more compromising towards the communist than Dulles. This is because he favored summit meetings with Russian leaders, and pacific programs such as Atoms for Peace and Open Skies. In addition he possessed an amiable and conciliatory nature. In keeping with the conventional wisdom on their relationship, many historians consistently contended that Dulles drove the president to emphasize brinkmanship, and not negotiation. Although in public, Eisenhower seemed more inclined to peaceful coexistence with the communists than did his more vocal secretary, the fact is that both men firmly believed in the necessity for constant vigilance against the “red menace”.

At a cabinet meeting in the first year of his administration, the president underscored the generally unsatisfactory nature of United States policy toward Latin America, which he said stemmed from past preoccupations with European and Asian affairs. He urged his cabinet to remedy this potentially dangerous situation. He sent his younger brother Dr. Milton Eisenhower on a fact-finding mission to South America in which he visited all ten countries. The purpose of this mission was to acknowledge the importance of hemispheric solidarity to the United States and to promote this importance

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

to all United States citizens. Milton Eisenhower became Special Ambassador and Consultant to the President on Latin America and was one of America's foremost experts on the area.²⁵ He was highly intelligent, keenly sensitive man, who was well aware of Latin resentment of any American intervention into their internal affairs.

By analyzing the Guatemalan revolution from the viewpoint of the cold war ethos and developing a strategy which went beyond the Truman policy of military containment spiced with Point Four assistance, Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Republican policy makers ushered in a new era in Inter-American relations; an era marked by a protracted struggle between the United States and an assumed international communist conspiracy. The conflict in Guatemala posed threat to the U.S. of communist infiltration into Latin American. Using as a basis the Truman administration's policy on containment, the policy was applied to Guatemala but in a much more aggressive way.

Guatemala

In 1899, what was known as the Boston Fruit Company became the United Fruit Company (UFCO). UFCO became the largest banana company in the world with plantations in Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, and the Dominican Republic. The company owned eleven steamships, known as the Great White Fleet plus 30 other ships rented or leased and controlled 112 miles of railroad linking the plantations with ports.²⁶

In 1901, the Guatemalan dictator, Manuel Estrada Cabrera granted to UFCO the exclusive right to transport postal mail between Guatemalan and the U.S. This was

²⁵ Stephen E. Ambrose & Richard Immerman, 216.

²⁶ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer. *Bitter Fruit* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1982), 65.

UFCO's first entry into Guatemala. Minor Keith, founder of the UFCO, judged Guatemala thanks to Cabrera, to have an ideal investment climate. Keith formed the Guatemalan Railroad Company as a subsidiary of UFCO and capitalized it at \$40 million.²⁷ He contracted with Cabrera to build a railroad between Guatemala City and Puerto Barrios. UFCO also obtained permission to purchase lots in Puerto Barrios at a nominal price and received a grant of land one mile long by 500 yards wide on either side of the municipal pier.²⁸ Keith took a step further by negotiating a contract to build telegraph lines from the capital to Puerto Barrios.

Other countries in Central and South America also fell under the thrall of the mighty UFCO, but none were more under UFCO's thumb than Guatemala. United Fruit's Guatemalan operation generated about 25 percent of the company's total production. United Fruit gained control of virtually every means of transport and communications. The UFCO charged a tariff on every item on freight that moved in and out of the country via Puerto Barrios. The coffee growers of Guatemala for many years paid very high prices and this caused the price of Guatemalan coffee on the world market to increase.

The capital of the United Fruit Company Empire as mentioned above was in Guatemala, in the small town of Bananera, which became the company's headquarters. It was from this place that the UFCO managed to exempt itself from virtually all taxes for 99 years.²⁹ This company had the unconditional support of right-wing dictators who maintained their power by terrorizing the people and arresting prominent citizens who

²⁷ Richard H. Immerman, *THE CIA in Guatemala* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982) 83.

²⁸ Gordon L. Bowen, "U.S. Foreign Policy toward Radical Change: Covert Operations in Guatemala, 1950-1954," *Latin American Perspectives* 10, no. 1 (1983), in *JSTOR* [database on-line]; accessed 24 November 2006.

²⁹ Immerman. 83

were either killed on the spot or tortured in prison to extract confessions.³⁰ During one wave of repression under Jorge Ubico, hundreds were killed in just two days. But in 1944, the people of Guatemala overthrew Ubico. Following it, Guatemala held its first true elections in history. They elected Dr. Juan Jose Arrevalo Bermej to the presidency. A new constitution was drawn up, based on the U.S. Constitution. The new president was a socialist who built over 6,000 schools in Guatemala and made great progress in education and health care.³¹

At this time, about 2.2 percent of the population owned over 70 percent of the country's land. Only 10 percent of the land was available for 90 percent of the population, most of whom were Indians. Most of the land held by large landowners was unused. Arrevalo was succeeded in another free election by Jacobo Arbenz who continued the reform process begun under Arrevalo. Arbenz took a step further by proposing a plan to redistribute some of the unused land and make it available for 90 percent to farm. This became a problem for United Fruit and this is where the problem arose: UFCO was one of the biggest holders of unused land in Guatemala. The pressure mounted and finally UFCO complained to the Eisenhower administration announcing that Guatemalan had turned communist. The government of Arbenz was overthrown by a U.S.-backed invasion led by Arbenz's military opponents. The country then slid into a state of almost perpetual civil war between a series of right-wing military governments and various leftist guerrilla movements.

Both the U.S. State Department and company held strong political ties. UFCO had enviable connections to the Eisenhower administration. Secretary of State John

³⁰ Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, 70.

³¹ Ibid.

Foster Dulles and his former New York law firm, Sullivan and Cromwell, had long represented the company. Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, had served on UFCO's board of trustees.³² Ed Whitman, the company's top public relations officer, was the husband of Ann Whitman, President Eisenhower's private secretary. Ed Whitman had actually produced a film called "Why the Kremlin Hates Bananas" that pictured UFCO fighting in the front trenches of the Cold War. An official from UFCO later commented that fruit firm's success in linking the taking of its lands to the evil of international communism could be seen as the "Disney version of the episode."³³ Efforts on behalf of the company paid off. It picked up the expenses of journalists who traveled to Guatemala to learn United Fruit's side of the crisis, and some of the most respected North American publication, including the *New York Times*, *New York Herald Tribune*, *New Leader*, and *TIME Magazine* ran stories that pleased the company. A UFCO public relations official later observed that his firm helped condition North American readers to accept the State Department's version of the Arbenz regime as communism. The campaign succeeded and in 1954 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency orchestrated a coup, code-named "Operation PBSUCCESS. The invading force numbered only 150 men under the command of Castillo Armas but the CIA convinced the Guatemalan public and President Arbenz that a major invasion was underway.

CIA Intervention

The CIA's action to overthrow the government of Guatemala in 1954 marked an early zenith in the Agency's long record of covert action. Following closely on the

³² Stephen E. Ambrose & Richard Immerman, 218.

³³ Walter La Feber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1983) 53.

successful operations that installed the Shah as ruler of Iran, the Guatemalan operation, PBSUCCESS, was more ambitious and more thoroughly successful than either precedent. The first CIA effort to overthrow the Guatemalan president was a CIA collaboration with Nicaraguan dictator Anastacio Somoza to support a disgruntled general named Carlos Castillo Armas. This operation was code-named "PBFORTUNE" and was authorized by President Truman in 1952. As early as February of that year, CIA headquarters began generating memos with subject titles such as "Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed of during Military Operations," outlining categories of persons to be neutralized "through Executive Action"--murder--or through imprisonment and exile.³⁴ The "A" list of those to be assassinated contained 58 names--all of which the CIA had excised from the declassified documents. The invading force of Castillo Armas was numbered to be 150 men. In April 1952, Somoza visited Truman and said that if the U.S. provided arms that he would collaborate with Armas to overthrow Arbenz. It was then proposed that the CIA supply the needed arms and \$225,000 to Castillo Armas, and Nicaragua and Honduras should supply air support to the rebel Guatemalans. The plan included the assassination of over 58 Guatemalans and also agreed to collaborate with a request from General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, the dictator of the Dominican Republic, to assassinate 4 additional Santo Dominicans who were in Guatemala. In September the CIA secured State Department approval and Operation PBFORTUNE was set.³⁵ One of two major setbacks occurred shortly afterward when, while preparing for the arms shipment, the

³⁴ Gerald K. Haines, "CIA and Guatemala Assassination Proposals, 1952-1954"; available from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB4/cia-guatemala1_1.html; Internet; accessed 27 November 2007.

³⁴ U.S. State Department, "Foreign Relations, Guatemala 1952-1954"; available from <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frU.S./ike/guat/20171.htm>; Internet; accessed 13 January 2007.

operation had to be called off. Somoza had been speaking of the invasion plan with other Central American leaders and the operation's cover, which was very important due to the fragile diplomatic situation the United States had with the region, was blown. While Operation PBFORTUNE was officially terminated, the operation led a twilight existence with the arm shipment prepared prior still kept in waiting and with Armas being kept on a \$3,000 a week retainer, which allowed him to hang on to his small troops or rebels. Several other assassination plans continued after the termination of PBFORTUNE in October 1952, when the CIA learned the PBFORTUNE had been discovered.

After the summer of 1953, the National Security Council revived the project after a review of the situation in light of the success of the recent CIA-organized coup against Mossadegh in Iran. In August 1953, President Eisenhower signed operation PBSUCCESS that carried a \$2.7 million budget for psychological warfare and political action and subversion, among the other components of a small paramilitary war.³⁶ But, according to the CIA's own internal study of the agency's so-called K program, up until the day Arbenz resigned on June 27, 1954, the option of assassination was still being considered. While the power of the CIA's psychological-war, codenamed Operation Sherwood, against Arbenz rendered that option unnecessary, the last stage of PBSUCCESS called for a "roll-up of Communists and collaborators." Although Arbenz and his top aides were able to flee the country, after the CIA installed Castillo Armas in power, hundreds of Guatemalans were rounded up and killed. Between 1954 and 1990, human rights groups estimated, the repressive operatives of successive military regimes murdered more than 100,000 civilians. The names of the agency's intended victims were divided into two categories: persons to be disposed of through "Executive action" (i.e.,

³⁶ Stephen E. Ambrose & Richard Immerman, 229.

killed) and those to be imprisoned or exiled during the operation. Before releasing this document to the public, the CIA deleted every name, leaving only the rows of numbers to indicate how many people were targeted. In Guatemala, of course, "Operation Success" had a deadly aftermath. After a small insurgency developed in the wake of the coup, Guatemala's military leaders developed and refined, with U.S. assistance, a massive counterinsurgency campaign that left tens of thousands massacred, maimed or missing.

PBSUCCESS consolidated the entire successful event of previous operations, combining psychological, diplomatic, economic, and paramilitary actions. Economically, the Agency recruited the help of some top-ranking American businessmen who would be assigned to put covert economic pressures of vital imports and cutting export earnings. Diplomatically, the Agency planned to convene a meeting with the Organization of American States (OAS) with the specific intention of using it to ostracize and alienate Guatemala from other countries in the region, as well as increasing aid to neighboring countries Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador to win over their consent and, in the case of the later two, to gain the use of their land as staging area for the invasion. Once the building of pressure using diplomatic, economic, and propagandistic means reached its zenith, the CIA planned to then let Armas' rebels loose when the country was at its most unstable.

The CIA established operation headquarters in December 1953. They began recruiting pilots, overseeing the training of rebels, setting up a radio station to use for propaganda purposes, and stepped up the diplomatic pressure on Guatemala at the time. Although, the CIA couldn't halt the exports of coffee, a major industry in Guatemala at the time, they succeeded in foiling two deals to buy arms and ammunition from Canada

and Germany.

Arbenz noticed the unusual changes taking place. He was faced with dwindling military supply and witnessing the build up of armaments in neighboring countries. He started to seriously take into account the possibility of an invasion, which had been rumored for months. This brought Arbenz to conclude a secret deal with Communist Czechoslovakia for 2,000 tons of captured German arms that were left in storage since the end of WWII.³⁷ While the arms deal was met with a Soviet satellite, their knowledge was limited and the deal was strictly cash and carry. When the arms shipment arrived, the CIA took their opportunity and promoted the transaction as proof of the Soviet hand pulling the string and it ended up being major propaganda victory for the CIA insofar as winning the American public support for regime change in Guatemala was concerned. After the revelation of the Czech arms shipment and domestic support it whipped up, the U.S. drastically stepped up both its cover and overt campaigns. This culminated in a full out sea blockade of Guatemala by the American Navy. Known as Operation "Hardrock Baker," the U.S. positioned submarines and warships to stop and inspect all incoming ships for arms. The blockade's blatant illegality had a decisive psychological impact in Guatemala as well, extinguishing the remaining hope of international law coming in the assistance in case of an American invasion.

With the success and detailed planning of the CIA operation in Guatemala under the Eisenhower administration, this event set precedent for the Bay of Pigs under the Kennedy administration. President Kennedy tried to be the hardliner that Eisenhower was but his subtle, easy diplomacy and foreign policy did not measure up to his predecessor. Kennedy believed in negotiation and trying to move the United States away

³⁷ Stephen E. Ambrose & Richard Immerman, 229.

from an elitist and pro military reputation that it had. As we see in the following chapter, military aid granted to countries did not come to a halt, but increased.

CHAPTER IV

KENNEDY

President John F. Kennedy (1961-1963) and his administration in January 1961 offered a new U.S. approach toward Latin America and its armed forces: a foreign policy for Latin America based upon a revelation of the hemispheric political implications of Castro's successful revolution. Since Castro had overthrown the unpopular U.S. supported regime of Fulgenico Batista the Kennedy administration believed other internal revolutions against unpopular dictators in Latin America were imminent. Unfortunately, many of the dictatorships were receiving U.S. assistance. In response to this potential hazard to U.S. interests Kennedy changed the U.S. policy of blindly supporting any friendly Latin American government; his administration exerted political and economic pressure against the dictatorial regimes in Latin America and favored the democratic governments. Kennedy thought the United States had been associated with Latin American elites for too long. He believed in order to satisfy the needs of the Latin American masses without submitting to Communist inspired social revolution it was necessary for the United States to attempt improvements in the Latin American social, economic, and political situation.³⁸

³⁸ Don L. Etchison, "The United States and Militarism in Central America." New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.

The first substantial evidence of the Kennedy administration's change in U.S. policy toward Latin America occurred in early 1961 when the United States refused to recognize the military junta in El Salvador. This government had seized power undemocratically and the U.S. denied El Salvador recognition until it promised to hold elections and return the country to a constitutional government. On February 15, 1961, the junta finally accepted the conditions with the promise that the United States renewed its recognition. That same year, in an effort to promote improvements in the living conditions in Latin America, Kennedy announced March 31st the dramatic objectives of his Alliance for Progress to Latin America ambassadors in Washington. This initiative was designed to establish economic cooperation between North and South America. The program was signed at an inter-American conference at Punta del Este Uruguay in August 1961 and the plan called for Latin American countries to pledge a capital investment of \$80 billion over 10 years. The U.S. agreed to supply \$20 billion within one decade. Secondly, Latin American delegates required the participating countries to draw up comprehensive plans for national development. These plans were then to be submitted for approval by an inter-American board of experts. Third, the tax codes had to be changed to demand more from those who have most and land reform was to be implemented. In addition to declaring that the conditions that the U.S. was planning to finance the improvement of economic conditions, Kennedy expressed the importance of comparative political development reform. He told the ambassadors his administration hoped that democratic principles would prosper in Latin America.

More changes in U.S foreign policy toward Latin America were made by the Kennedy administration on September 4, 1961, when the amended Mutual Security Act

of 1954 was replaced by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act, explained that the United States Government recognized “the threat to world peace posed by the international Communist conspiracy.”³⁹ Furthermore, the act proclaimed that the best way to protect the security of the United States was to secure the freedom and independence of other countries by promoting “measures for the common defense against internal and external aggression, including the furnishing of military assistance, upon request, to friendly countries.”⁴⁰

By the end of 1961 the Kennedy administration had changed the emphasis of the U.S. foreign military strategy concerning Latin America; the armed forces of that area would now be encouraged to alter their concentration from defense against a foreign power to one of guarding internal security against communist subversion. Along with this major policy change the U.S. began to modify the type of military equipment it sold and granted to Latin American militaries. Heavy equipment was shipped less frequently and lightweight was no longer delivered in greater quantities. At that time the U.S. also began to train Latin American soldiers in the art of counter subversive.

In order to combat the internal communist threat in Central American and South America, the Kennedy administration followed three significant recommendations of the Draper Committee, which had studied the U.S. military assistance program in 1959. The committee was a bipartisan committee, created November 1958 under the Eisenhower administration to undertake a completely independent, objective, and non-partisan analysis of the military assistance aspects of the U.S. Mutual Security program. First, the Kennedy administration implemented the committee’s recommendation that the

³⁹ Etchison , 73.

⁴⁰ Etchison, 74.

responsibility for U.S. military aid be centralized in the office of the secretary of defense; formerly the responsibility had been in separate military departments. Second, the recommendation implemented that the command in the Canal Zone be placed in charge of U.S. military mission in Latin America.⁴¹ The third Draper committee recommendation approved by the Kennedy administration suggested that the U.S. military promote military civil action programs to the Latin American armed forces. In January 1962 Kennedy finally approved the programs which had also been suggested by the Pentagon.

Events of 1961 & 1962

Amongst all the foreign policy changes and modifications under the Kennedy administration there were also several events that occurred that required United States military action to be exerted. Through these events we can see a continuation of U.S. foreign policy stretching the containment policy to fight communism. First, was the Bay of Pigs which preceded the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The Bay of Pigs invasion was an unsuccessful attempt by United States-backed Cuban exiles to overthrow the government of the Cuban dictator Fidel Castro. Increasing friction between the U.S. government and Castro's leftist regime led President Eisenhower to break off diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961. Even before that, however, the Central Intelligence Agency had been training anti-revolutionary Cuban exiles for a possible invasion of the island. The invasion plan was approved by President Eisenhower. On April 17, 1961 about 1300 exiles, armed with U.S. weapons, landed at the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs) on the

⁴¹ Ibid.

southern coast of Cuba.⁴² Hoping to find support from the local population, they intended to cross the island to Havana. It was evident from the first hours of fighting, however, that the exiles were likely to lose. President Kennedy had the option of using the U.S. Air Force against the Cubans but decided against it. Consequently, the invasion was stopped by Castro's army. By the time the fighting ended on April 19, 1961 nearly 100 exiles had been killed and the rest had been taken as prisoners. The failure of the invasion seriously embarrassed the young Kennedy administration. Some critics blamed Kennedy for not giving it adequate support and others for allowing it to take place at all. The captured exiles were later ransomed by private groups in the U.S. Additionally, the invasion made Castro wary of the U.S. He was convinced that the Americans would try to take over the island again. From the Bay of Pigs on, Castro had an increased fear of a U.S. incursion on Cuban soil. The 1961 effort to invade Cuba with a force of CIA-trained Cuban exiles had failed disastrously; the Soviet Union had substantial reason to believe that the United States might attempt to do the job right the next time. The Bay of Pigs had demonstrated that the United States could act.

In October 1962, both the Soviet Union and the United States came to the brink of war. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world ever came to nuclear war. The United States armed forces were at their highest state of readiness ever and Soviet field commanders in Cuba were prepared to use battlefield nuclear weapons to defend the island if it were invaded. Because of both men, President Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev, war was averted. In 1962, the Soviet Union was desperately behind the United States in the arms race. In late April 1962, Khrushchev conceived the idea of

⁴² Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Cuba: A Time for Change," *Foreign Policy*, no. 20 (1975), in *JSTOR* [database on-line], accessed 17 March 2007.

placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba. A deployment in Cuba would double the Soviet strategic arsenal and provide a real deterrent to a potential U.S. attack against the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, Fidel Castro was looking for a way to defend his island nation from an attack by the U.S. Ever since the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, Castro felt a second attack was inevitable. Consequently, he approved of Khrushchev's plan to place missiles on the island. In the summer of 1962 the Soviet Union worked quickly and secretly to build its missile installations in Cuba. For the United States, the crisis began on October 15, 1962 when reconnaissance photographs revealed Soviet missiles under construction in Cuba. Early the next day, President Kennedy was informed of the missile installations. Kennedy immediately organized the ExCom, an executive committee of the National Security Council of his twelve most important advisors to handle the crisis.⁴³ After seven days of guarded and intense debate within the upper officials of government, Kennedy concluded to impose a naval quarantine around Cuba. The goal was to prevent the arrival of more Soviet offensive weapons on the island. On October 22nd, Kennedy announced the discovery of the missile installations to the public and his decision to quarantine the island. He also proclaimed that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba would be regarded as an attack on the United States by the Soviet Union and demanded that the Soviets remove all of their offensive weapons from Cuba. During the public phase of the Crisis, tensions began to build on both sides. Kennedy eventually ordered low-level missions once every two hours. On the 25th Kennedy pulled the quarantine line back and raised military readiness to DEFCON 2 which is the second level of the

⁴³ Graham Allison & Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision. Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Inc., 1999), 110.

Defense Readiness Conditions protocol.⁴⁴ Then on October 26th EX-COMM heard from Khrushchev in a letter. He proposed removing Soviet missiles and personnel if the U.S. would guarantee not to invade Cuba. October 27 was the worst day of the crisis. A U-2 was shot down over Cuba and EX-COMM received a second letter from Khrushchev demanding the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey in exchange for Soviet missiles in Cuba.⁴⁵ Attorney General Robert Kennedy suggested ignoring the second letter and contacted Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to tell him of the U.S. agreement with the first. Tensions finally began to ease on October 28th when Khrushchev announced that he would dismantle the installations and return the missiles to the Soviet Union, expressing his trust that the United States would not invade Cuba. Further negotiations were held to implement the October 28th agreement, including a United States demand that Soviet light bombers be removed from Cuba, and specifying the exact form and conditions of United States assurances not to invade Cuba.⁴⁶ Despite American intervention in the Caribbean, the United States continued to strengthen its military capabilities.

In the 1960s, in Latin America, military establishments and build-ups were widely unpopular and hated by the citizens of that country. Therefore, if the United States was to continue cooperating with the unpopular Latin American armed forces in military matters it made sense for the United States to work for an improvement in the image of Central and South American military establishments. Although the United States became acutely aware of the insufficient defensive capabilities of the Latin American armed forces in World War II, it was not until the late 1940s and early 1950s that the United States

⁴⁴ Graham Allison & Philip Zelikow, 218.

⁴⁵ Graham Allison & Philip Zelikow, 127.

⁴⁶ Allison & Zelikow, 352.

significantly attempted to strengthen those forces, but it was not until Kennedy came to office that a more aggressive military stance was pursued. Kennedy initially set the standard for President Johnson and President Nixon to follow. In the period of 1951 to 1960, right before Kennedy took office; there was a rise and effort to assist Latin American countries with military aid. The United States began to promote bilateral military treaties with individual countries. These agreements were written with the specific purpose of improving the Latin American armed forces and strengthening their capability for repelling any attempted aggression the might originate from communist countries. These agreements were called the Mutual Defense Assistance Pacts (MDAP). Among the countries that signed the pact were Nicaragua (April 1954), Honduras (May 1954) and Guatemala (June 1955).⁴⁷ By 1959 the United States had army missions in all of Central American with the exception of Costa Rica and Panama.

By the late 1950s, observers saw the U.S. foreign policy for Latin America was destitute. The Eisenhower administration had been indiscriminate in granting military aid to a government in Latin America regardless of its ideology or level of stability. Military dictators and democratic governments both received U.S. assistance. The criterion used by the U.S. government to decide whether or not to grant military aid to a country was simple: the recipient government had to be favorably disposed toward the United States and opposed to communism. This way of thinking and constructing foreign policy led to a negative impression of the U.S. and a heavy consequence. A consequence of such a compulsive military assistance policy was the United States was severely criticized for

⁴⁷ Robert D. Tomasek, "Defense of the Western Hemisphere: A Need for Reexamination of United States," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 3, no. 4 (1959), in *JSTOR* [database on-line]; accessed 17 March 2007.

aiding dictators.

After discussing the foreign policy under Truman and Eisenhower, a more developed and aggressive policy will begin to develop under the next following presidents. This will be done by as mentioned earlier, granting countries in Central and South America with defense and military assistance. Policy will also be triggered with more overt military action such as deployment of troops in Latin American countries. The Cold War at this time begins to accelerate and both the United States and the Soviet Union were not afraid to step up to the world stage and demonstrate their willingness to seek victory.

CHAPTER V

JOHNSON

After Lyndon B. Johnson became the 36th president (1963-1969) of the United States following Kennedy's assassination in 1963, the Johnson administration began to rearrange some of Kennedy's Latin American policies. In fact before it was two months old the Johnson administration had already recognized the usurping military juntas in Honduras and the Dominican Republic that the Kennedy administration had refused to recognize.⁴⁸ Furthermore in early 1964 the Johnson administration resumed the granting of economic and military assistance (that had been terminated by Kennedy) for the military regimes of Honduras and the Dominican Republic. The recognitions of and renewed assistance for the two nations clearly indicated that President Johnson was not going to follow his predecessor's policy of obtaining conditional promises from unconditional juntas. The recognitions of both countries certainly showed Latin American generals that Johnson was not intending to pursue the hard-line non-recognition policy that Kennedy had displayed to the illegitimate government of Honduras shortly before his death.

⁴⁸ Ethchison 76.

In the spring of 1964 it became clear that the Johnson administration would definitely not apply as much pressure on intervening military regimes as had the Kennedy administration. The official who influenced President Johnson to be more lenient with Latin American generals and colonels was Thomas Mann; “the architect of Johnson’s new departures in Latin American policy,” was Johnson’s assistant secretary for Latin American affairs.⁴⁹ On March 1964 Mann announced that the U.S. would pursue more of a realistic policy dealing with Latin American military governments. He explained further that the United States intended to display a greater concern with its own national security interests, its investments, and its desires to thwart communism in Latin America; this policy would be pursued rather than attempting to impose democracy in Latin American countries.

Appropriately, the new foreign policy used by the Johnson administration for Latin American came to be known as the Mann Doctrine, an aggressive and supporter of dictatorships. The Mann doctrine was subjected to widespread critical scrutiny and controversy. Many critics of the doctrine claimed that the United States was reneging on its promise to promote democracy in Latin American by reverting to the post World War II policies of indiscriminately recognizing and aiding military regimes. Evidently Mann comprehended the critical interpretation of his policy because in June 1964 he announced the U.S. government was not deemphasizing its pledge to strengthen democracy in Latin America. He also claimed that U.S. was still trying to promote constitutional governments in Central and South America. Although Mann defended the democratic idea of the Johnson administration’s Latin American policy in his June 1964 commencement address at the University of Notre Dame; only a few weeks earlier the

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Johnson administration had recognized Brazil's new government, apparently unconstitutional military regime in Latin America. This type of behavior seemed to indicate that the Johnson administration was not sincerely attempting to promote the development of democracy in Latin America.

The development of democratic government in Latin America was clearly not of primary importance to the Johnson administration. Like Eisenhower, Johnson was preoccupied with keeping communism out of Central and South America. Therefore if a de facto military government was friendly to the United States and opposed to communism the Johnson administration would recognize it. In February 1965 Mann submitted a memorandum to the House Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs that was entitled "Current United States Policy in Latin America."⁵⁰ This memorandum gave an explanation of how the U.S. government viewed that Communist threat in Latin America and of the action the Johnson administration was taking to eliminate the threat:

"The United States is playing a decisive role in the successful defense of this hemisphere against Communist aggression and subversion. Both on our own, and in close cooperation with other American governments, we have contributed in large measure to the defeats inflicted on the Cubans, Chinese, and Soviet Communists in their efforts to expand their rule and influence throughout Latin America....Some of our specific contributions to this result include military and technical assistance in resisting Communist subversion and guerrilla operations; training of Latin American military and police personnel for the same purpose; and, dissemination of information on the foreign and domestic activities of Communist regimes, particularly Castro....Our policy in Latin America is not one of sterile anticommunism, or preservation of the status quo. We are actively supporting the expansion of democracy in Latin America on the basis of political, economic, and social reforms. It is our hope and intentions that, with adequate defense against totalitarian intervention in Latin America will achieve further significant progress on the path of modern democracy."⁵¹

⁵⁰ Etchison, 77.

⁵¹ Ibid.

President Johnson was advised to take course of action that caused serious doubts about the supposed U.S. dedication to democratic principles in Latin America. Under the advice of influential Mann and others, in April 1965 Johnson sent the U.S. marines to intervene in the chaotic situation in the Dominican Republic. This intervention by the U.S. revealed the essence of the Johnson administration's Latin American foreign policy. The United States would aim to prevent the growth of communism in Latin America: principles of American non-intervention were ignored in favor of that objective. A *New York Times* journalist noted that beginning with the Dominican Republic intervention the actions taken by the Johnson administration "cast shadows on the United States relations with all of Latin America- indeed perhaps with all the world."⁵²

The Dominican Republic

After 30 years of General Rafael Molino Trujillo's dictatorship in the Dominican Republic, General Trujillo was assassinated in May of 1961. Over the next four years the Dominican Republic would have three leaders; only one, Juan Bosch would be democratically elected. The Dominican Republic's revolving door of national leaders began with Joaquin Balaguer. Concerned over the possibility of conflict and instability, President Kennedy pressured Balaguer and other elements of the Dominican Republic's society including the Trujillo family to pursue elections.⁵³ President Kennedy deployed U.S. military forces off the coast of the Dominican Republic expressing his determination

⁵² Etchison,78.

⁵³ Jerome Slater, "The United States, the Organization of States, and the Dominican Republic, 1961-1963," *International Organization* 18, no. 2 (1964), in *JSTOR* [database on-line]; accessed 19 March 2007.

⁵³ Ibid.

to see reforms implemented.⁵⁴ Tension between the two administrations rose significantly when the Trujillo family attempted to re-take control of the country. The Trujillo family shortly thereafter departed the country. Balaguer did not last much longer either. The Kennedy Administration quickly grew tired of his unwillingness to embrace democratic values and implement reform. Washington helped to force his resignation and then blocked a military attempt to restore him to power. Balaguer's removal opened the way for elections in 1962. U.S. officials quickly realized that General Trujillo had all but extinguished any semblance of the political opposition.

Eight organizations emerged to participate in the electoral process but not one had any significant history.⁵⁵ The parties spanned the political spectrum from conservative to communist. The left of center Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD) and its candidate Juan Bosch were able to garner considerable support. In December of 1962, the Organization of American States (OAS) monitored the Dominican Republic's elections.⁵⁶ To the surprise of many and particularly the United States, Juan Bosch was the undisputed winner. Despite his left of center leanings and the U.S. growing concern over communism, the Kennedy Administration supported the Bosch Government. Juan Bosch's tenure and democracy in the Dominican Republic was very short. Bosch, a poet, failed to develop the political skills needed to survive in post-Trujillo country. One of Bosch's greatest mistakes was miscalculating the U.S. concern over Communism.⁵⁷ When Bosch legalized the Communist party, he went too far for the conservative wing of the Dominican Republic's military establishment. In September of 1963, the military

⁵⁵ Salvador E. Gomez, "The U.S. Invasion of the Dominican Republic"; available from <http://sincronia.cucsh.udg.mx/dominican.html>; Internet; accessed 1 March 2007.

⁵⁶ Slater, 276.

⁵⁷ Gomez.

overthrew Bosch. He went into exile in Puerto Rico. When news of the coup reached Washington, President Kennedy was highly disturbed. The President stopped all U.S. aid and withdrew his ambassador. After several months of U.S. pressure, military leaders in the Dominican Republic decided to establish a civilian Triumvirate. Kennedy disillusioned with the prospects for democracy and the progress of the Alliance decided to recognize the new government. Unfortunately, President Kennedy was assassinated before he followed through on his decision. Some time passed before the Johnson Administration recognized the Triumvirate. The decision to recognize the latest Dominican regime might have been Kennedy's but whereas he had acted out of disillusionment, LBJ acted more out of indifference. President Johnson was obsessed with three issues: domestically, the Great Society, and internationally avoiding a "second Cuba" and the U.S. growing involvement in Vietnam. The two latter issues significantly contributed the U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965.

The civic triumvirate was followed until April 1965, after a constitutionalist uprising, headed by Colonel Francisco Camano and some young officials. Both Camano and the young officials, supported by the popular commands, fought and overcame the military coups, and called President Bosch to re-assumed power. It was when President Johnson ordered the invasion to the Dominican Republic, which began on April 29th, and was carried out by 42,000 U.S. marines. Under the OAS approval, several thousands of Dominicans were murdered by the settlers, who carried out these actions under the name of "Inter American Forces of Peace", and in spite of the heroic popular resistance, the trujillista Joaquin Balaguer was established in power.⁵⁸ The slogan "Avoid a new Cuba" was used as a pretext to violate the Dominican sovereignty and the international rights,

⁵⁸ Slater, 271.

repress the people, and extend the U.S. dominion over Latin America and the Caribbean.⁵⁹

Even though the United States initially intervened unilaterally in the Dominican Republic several weeks later after the marines arrived an intern-American peacekeeping force that included troops from Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador came to the Dominican Republic to aid the U.S. The occupation of the Dominican Republic by the United States did meet serious criticism at home and abroad. But on September 20, 1965, the U.S. Congress passed Resolution 560 that favored Johnson's action and his method of dealing with communism in Latin America.⁶⁰

Throughout the remainder of the Johnson administration the United States continued to lavish military assistance upon Latin American forces. However, in 1967 Congress amended Section 507 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 to restrict the value of defense article furnished by the United States to Latin American countries to \$10 million or less.⁶¹ Congress also set a limit of \$75 million on the amount of arms that could be sold to Latin American countries under Section 33 of the amended foreign military Sales Act. There are several explanations as to why Congress restricted that amount of money that would be used to supply arms. In the last years of the Johnson administration, Congress may have felt guilty about the impropriety of supplying million of dollars worth of arms to the poor countries of Latin America. Perhaps the U.S. needed to concentrate in sending its supply of arms to Southeast Asia or possibly Latin American militaries may have wanted more.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the generous aid to military regimes began

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Etchison, 78.

⁶¹ Etchison, 80.

with Kennedy and obviously followed through with Johnson. Under Johnson we see the United States seeking to protect its national security as its primary interest in the late 1960s. Aiding the poor Latin American countries to fight communism was first and if that meant to send American arms to rising dictators, then that is what was done, regardless of consequences that would follow in the country. For more than a decade Congress allowed the United States military establishment to encourage Latin American military leaders to improve and modernize their armed forces with American arms. Moving on to the following administration we will see even more military involvement in Latin America, particularly in South America under President Nixon.

CHAPTER VI

NIXON

It has been said the President Richard Nixon (1969-1974) stepped into office in January 1969 without any specific policy towards Latin America.⁶² Nixon appointed Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York in February 1969 to head a study mission to Latin America. The president instructed the governor to meet with officials in the southern countries and give him a full report with recommendations. Rockefeller made four journeys to Latin America in 1969. Before the Rockefeller mission completed its report Nixon had already made a declaration about his administration's general foreign policy strategy. This strategy was based on "strength," "partnerships," and a willingness to negotiate," came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine.⁶³ Foreign affairs was Nixon's consuming interest and in his view of himself, his field of main expertise. Though Nixon had been a devoted Cold War warrior who had criticized Kennedy and Johnson as inadequately militant in their Cuba and Vietnam policies, he was also a realist, willing to make deals with those who had power. Nixon's task was to adjust American policy to changing international realities as well as to mounting domestic revulsion against the war in Vietnam. Security, as he saw it, demanded no longer the rollback of communism but rather the reestablishment of the classical balance of power.

⁶² Etchison, 81.

⁶³ Ibid.

The goal of the Nixon Doctrine was to reduce the presence of the U.S. military in certain areas of the world by encouraging allies to develop their own defense capabilities. The Doctrine was first presented by Nixon at Guam in the summer of 1969 and was later elaborated on in Nixon's first report to Congress on U.S. foreign policy in February 1970. Nixon explained regarding his administration's policy: "The United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends."⁶⁴

While Nixon was establishing his doctrine in Guam and the Rockefeller mission was in Latin America, the U.S. Latin America Senate Subcommittee was conducting hearings back in Washington on United States military policies and programs in Latin America. The subcommittee, chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-ID) interviewed distinguished civilian experts on Latin America. Information presented at the hearings revealed the amount of U.S. military assistance and military sales to Latin America had substantially decreased in 1967, 1968, and 1969.⁶⁵ It was also revealed that the number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Latin America was scheduled to be reduced by 35 percent in 1970 compared to the 1967 level. The hearings ended with a consensus among the witnesses and with the Chairman, that the U.S. policy for Latin America needed to be thoroughly reviewed and revised. With the consensus established, the Rockefeller mission in Latin America was formulating new policy recommendations for the Nixon administration. In September 1969 the report was submitted to Nixon. The report gave great detail concerning social, economic, and political conditions in Latin America. On the subject of communism the report indicated that communism was still a threat to Latin America and to the security interests of the United States. The report recommended that

⁶⁴ Etchison, 81.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

it was necessary to continue providing military training programs for Latin American soldiers. Essentially, by doing this the Nixon administration was helping promote U.S. ideological domination over communist ideologies. In other military matters, the report recommended that the presence of the United States in Central and South America should be lowered by military personnel and missions. In addition, the report advised Nixon to seek an increase in the congressional arms limitation ceiling on military sales and assistance to Latin America. The report also advised the administration to change the name of the U.S. "Military Assistance Program" to the "Western Hemisphere Security Program. On the diplomatic level the Rockefeller report did not discourage the Nixon administration from recognizing unconstitutional military regimes. The Rockefeller report was published in a State Department bulletin on December 8, 1969.⁶⁶ This report ultimately had a major impact on Nixon and his administration's Latin American policy.

The Rockefeller report was still influencing the Nixon administration's Latin American policy in 1971. That same year, Nixon attempted to raise the legislated arms ceiling of Latin America. Ever since the ceiling was established in 1967 by Congress, the United States had lost millions of dollars' worth of armament sales to European countries. The increase in Latin American armed force in 1971 and 1972 promoted criticism that the United States was sacrificing principles of democracy for dollars. This increase in military arms was requested to line up with Nixon's doctrine of helping allied countries to defend themselves. Thus besides saying that military assistance helped friendly countries strengthen their armed forces the Department of Defense openly declared that military aid also functioned to make a monetary profit for the United States and to help the United States achieve some kind of political objectives. The trend that

⁶⁶ Etchison, 83.

continued to operate in the Nixon doctrine was recognizing de facto military regimes by aiding them with armament sales to them.

The Nixon administration put the doctrine and report to practice in late 1973 after the military of Chile had overthrown the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende Gossens in a bloody coup on September 11. In the months that followed the coup world attention was drawn to the United States in causing political destabilization.

Chile

During the 1960s, the United States identified Chile as a model country, one that would provide a different, democratic path to development, countering the popularity of Cuba in the developing world. To that end, the United States strongly supported the candidacy of Eduardo Frei Montalva in 1964 with overt and covert funds and subsequently supported his government in the implementation of urban and rural reforms. This support spawned considerable resentment against the United States in Chile's conservative upper class, as well as among the Marxist left. Soon after the 1970 presidential election of Salvador Allende followed and was viewed in Washington as a significant setback to United States interests worldwide; U.S.-Chile relations entered a new phase. Nixon was afraid the Chile would become "another Cuba." The administration proclaimed it would adopt a "low-profile," and wait-and-see policy towards the Chilean "experiment" with democratic socialism, but it was not long before President Nixon announced a tough stand on expropriations, aid, credits, and other financial agreements which, while not explicitly aimed at Chile, were widely understood

to be a clear warning to the new government of Santiago.⁶⁷ National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger was particularly concerned about the implications for European politics of the free election of a Marxist in Chile. Responding to these fears and a concern for growing Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere, the United States embarked on a covert campaign to prevent Allende from gaining office and to destabilize his government after his election was ratified. After the election, hostility towards Allende was evident not only in the behavior of U.S. officials but also in the liberal American press, including the *New York Times*, which contended editorially on September 6, 1970, the election was a “heavy blow at liberal democracy.”⁶⁸

Upon assuming power, Allende began to carry out his platform of implementing socialist programs in Chile, called *La vía chilena al socialismo* ("the Chilean Path to Socialism"). This included nationalization of large-scale industries (notably copper mining and banking), and government administration of the health care system, educational system, a program of free milk for children, and a greatly expanded plan of land seizure and redistribution (already begun under his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva, who had nationalized between one-fifth and one-quarter of all properties liable to takeover. The Allende government's intention was to seize all holdings of more than eighty basic irrigated hectares. Allende's increasingly bold socialist policies (partly in response to pressure from some of the more radical members within his coalition), combined with his close contacts with Cuba, heightened fears in Washington. The Nixon administration began exerting economic pressure on Chile via multilateral organizations,

⁶⁷ James F. Petras and Robert Laporte, Jr., “Chile: NO,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 7 (1972), in *JSTOR* [database on-line]; accessed 14 March 2007.

⁶⁸ James F. Petras and Robert Laporte, Jr., 134.

and continued to back Allende's opponents in the Chilean Congress. Almost immediately after his election, Nixon directed CIA and U.S. State Department officials to "put pressure" on Allende's government.

The possibility of Allende winning Chile's 1970 election was deemed a disaster by a U.S. government desirous of protecting U.S. business interests and preventing any further spread of communism during the Cold War; and U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered the CIA to develop plans to impede Allende's election, known as "*Track I*" and "*Track II*"; *Track I* sought to prevent Allende from assuming power via parliamentary trickery, while *Track II* tried encouraging the Chilean military to remove Allende prior to his assuming the presidency.⁶⁹ After the 1970 election, the Track I operation attempted to incite Chile's outgoing president, Eduardo Frei Montalva, to persuade his party (PDC) to vote in Congress for Alessandri. Under the plan, Alessandri would resign his office immediately after assuming it and call new elections. Eduardo Frei would then be constitutionally able to run again (since the Chilean Constitution did not allow a president to hold two consecutive terms, but allowed multiple non-consecutive ones), and presumably easily defeat Allende. The Congress instead chose Allende as President, on the condition that he would sign a "Statute of Constitutional Guarantees" affirming that he would respect and obey the Chilean Constitution, and that his socialist reforms would not undermine any element of it (his decision not to abide by it would directly lead to the Resolution of August 22, 1973). *Track II* was abortive, as parallel initiatives already underway within the Chilean military rendered it moot.⁷⁰ Shortly afterwards, Allende

⁶⁹ U.S. State Department, "Church Report: Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973"; available from <http://foia.state.gov/Reports/ChurchReport.asp#C.%20The%201970%20Election>; Internet; accessed 22 April 2007.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

was dead. An official announcement declared that he had committed suicide with an automatic rifle, purportedly the AK-47 assault rifle given to him as a gift by Fidel Castro, which bore a golden plate engraved *"To my good friend Salvador from Fidel, who by different means tries to achieve the same goals."*⁷¹

After twenty-seven years of withholding details about covert activities following the 1973 military coup in Chile, the CIA released a report in 2000 acknowledging its close relations with General Augusto Pinochet's violent regime. The report, "CIA Activities in Chile," revealed for the first time that the head of the Chile's feared secret police, National Intelligence Directorate (DINA), was a paid CIA asset in 1975, and that CIA contacts continued with him long after he dispatched his agents to Washington D.C. to assassinate former Chilean Ambassador Orlando Letelier and his 25-year old American associate, Ronni Karpen Moffitt.⁷²

The widespread violations of human rights in Chile, combined with a strong rejection of covert activities engaged in abroad by the administration of President Nixon, galvanized United States congressional opposition to United States ties with Chile's military government. With the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, the United States took an openly hostile attitude toward the Chilean military government, publicly condemning human rights violations and pressing for the restoration of democracy. Particularly disturbing to the United States government was the complicity of the Chilean intelligence services in the assassination in Washington of Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and one of his associates, a United States citizen. That incident contributed to the isolation of the Pinochet government internationally and led to a sharp rift in relations between both

⁷¹ Ibid.

countries. The Chilean military turned elsewhere for its procurement needs and encouraged the development of a domestic arms industry to replace United States equipment.

After the Nixon administration became history on August 9, 1974 due to the notorious Watergate scandal and was replaced by the Ford administration there was no new policy approach in regard to relations with Latin America. During the last week of October 1974 President Ford received a 54-page report that had been compiled by a twenty-three member commission on U.S.-Latin American relations. The 33 specific recommendations that were made in the commission's report were to be guidelines for a new policy framework for the United States toward Latin America. In regard to military matters a recurring theme throughout the report was that the United States should deemphasize hemispheric security as an issue of primary consideration.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The international cold war policy was outlined in the soft cited National Security Council's "Report by the Secretaries of States and Defense on 'United States Objectives for National Security,'" commonly known as NSC-68. This was prepared during the Truman administration while Dean Acheson and Louis Johnson headed these respective cabinet departments. Its basic premise was that the world was divided into two antithetical camps, led by the United States and the Soviet Union. The principal objective of the Soviet camp was to acquire absolute hegemony; thus conflict between the two systems was endemic. Such diplomatic pundits of John Foster Dulles considered the Soviet threat to exceed even that of Nazi Germany, because as he explained to representatives of the American republics shortly before the 1954 intervention in Guatemala, Communism constituted "not a theory, not a doctrine, but an aggressive, tough, political force, backed by great resources and serving the most ruthless empire of modern times."⁷³

Dulles and his colleagues considered Latin America to be a prime target for the soviet conspiracy because the region was of crucial importance to the United States. George Kennan, also known as the "Father of Containment" who was a key figure in the emergence of the Cold War, feared that Latin America was a fertile breeding ground

⁷³ Immerman, pg 10.

where the communists could “broadcast their seed of provocation and hatred and busily tend the plants which sprout in such vigor and profusion.”⁷⁴ By the beginning of the 1950s, analysts claimed that the Soviet Union was pouring hundred of agents into Latin America. These agents had been trained in the theory of techniques and sabotage, espionage, and propaganda at the Institute for the Study of Latin America Relations Prague. The Communist aim was quite simple: the destruction of Washington’s influence in the western hemisphere and the conversion of Latin America into a “hotbed of hostility and trouble for the United States.”⁷⁵ Once the proper equipment was established in any of the nations, Moscow could easily send in troops, equipment, and whatever else was necessary to threaten Washington. United States leaders viewed the prospect of the Soviet Union operation in their own backyard horrifying. Their fear came from two primary considerations. First, the intrusion of Soviet despotism was a direct and severe challenge to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. This was explained by Dulles in 1947 when he said, “Soviet policy in South America subjects the Monroe Doctrine to its severest test. There is highly organized effort to extend to the South American countries the Soviet system of proletariat dictatorship.”⁷⁶ This doctrine was the first and most fundamental of U.S. foreign policies. In 1954 Dulles simply applied this analysis to Guatemala’s situation. The second primary consideration that faced U.S. leaders was that Soviet intervention would shake the foundation of the global policy of containment which could readily precipitate a nuclear war.

In summary the U.S. policy in Latin American from the 1950s to the 1970s was to recognize friendly usurping military governments regardless of how they came to power.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

This policy was the same that was used by the Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. The recognition policy of these administrations was clearly in contrast to that of the Kennedy administration, the main difference being that the Kennedy administration verbalized its opposition to unconstitutional regimes but was willing to recognize them on their promise to hold elections. In both word and action the Kennedy administration generally tried to play the role of a protagonist in promoting democratic government in Central American and South America. The Nixon administration generally tried to play the role of a protagonist in promoting democracy in Latin America. The Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon administration did not make significant attempts to promote democratic government in Central and South America. The Nixon administration even went so far as to promote the overthrow of constitutionally elected civilian government in Chile through economic subversion.

The recognition policies of the U.S. government for dealing with Latin American military regimes have remained essentially the same in the last twenty-five years with the slight exception of the Kennedy administration. Under the Eisenhower administration the United States sold and granted surplus weapons to Latin American armed forces so that they could help the United States defend the Western Hemisphere against a redirected military assistance program that emphasized internal security against communist insurgence. This change was made by selling and granting Latin American armed forces lightweight, mobile military equipment. In addition, the training of Latin American soldiers in counterinsurgency warfare at U.S. military bases became a major excerpt of U.S. military assistance policy for Latin America under the Kennedy administration.

The Johnson administration followed Kennedy's military assistance program. The peak amount of military assistance granted to Latin America during the 1960s was in 1966. After that, the Johnson administration reduced the amount of military assistance given to Latin America's armed forces. This reduction was primarily due to the extensive military involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia. As the United States reduced its military assistance to Latin America and many of the South American countries began to purchase military hardware from European nations. The United States however continued to be the sole supplier of military equipment to the countries of Central America and continued to train large numbers of Central American soldiers under the military assistance training programs.

For the first two years of his presidency, Nixon followed his predecessor's Latin American military assistance policy. In 1971 the Nixon administration began to increase military sales to Latin America but continued to reduce military assistance grants. From 1971 until its demise the Nixon administration promoted armament sales to Latin American to try to win back some of the arms market that had been lost to Europe in the late 1960s. While the Nixon administration promoted the sale of military equipment to the Latin American soldiers, the U.S. government and military establishment believed that grants given for military training were certainly worth the cost. This is the policy that the Ford administration inherited when it came into office.

Containment Policy

U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War was based on the George F. Keenan's concept of "containment." In the summer of 1947, Kennan inadvertently added

fame or notoriety with the publication in *Foreign Affairs* of “The Source of Soviet Conduct,” the article that introduced the word “containment” to the world.⁷⁷ Kennan argued that the primary goal of the United States should be to prevent the spread of Communism to non-Communist nations; that is, to “contain” Communism within its borders. The Truman Doctrine aimed at this goal, and containment was one of its key principles. This led to American support for regimes around the world to block the spread of communism. The epitome of containment was the domino theory, which held that allowing one regional state to fall to communism would threaten the entire region, similar to a series of dominoes toppling. In the summer of 1948, Kennan outlined American foreign policy even further. “The fundamental objectives of our foreign policy,” he asserted, “must always be”:

1. to protect the security of the nation, by which is meant the continued ability of this country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers and
2. to advance the welfare of its people, by promoting a world order in which this nation can make the maximum contribution to the peaceful and orderly development of other nations and derive maximum benefit from their experiences and abilities.”⁷⁸

United States containment policy from Truman to Nixon rapidly evolved to become an active and effective policy. Its interests, just like any other nation, were national security and economic security. Definitions of national interest in international affairs tend toward the bland and unexceptional: they all seem to boil down, in one form or another, the need to create an international environment conducive to the survival and prospering of the nation’s domestic institutions.

⁷⁷ John Lewis Gladdis, *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 24.

⁷⁸ Gladdis, 26.

Up until the beginning of the Cold War, the U.S. was protected by great vast oceans on both sides and the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. trusted its sphere of influence and it was not until after world war, the U.S. calm natured foreign policy would be challenged by the red menace of communism that originated on the other side of the world. This red scare prompted administrations, one after and other, to become more aggressive, involved, and militarily active in Latin America. Communism was not so much of physical threat but a threat that could hurt American interests. The response to the threat was aiding governments financially and militarily to combat communism in their countries. But, unfortunately too much money was spent annually aiding what soon would turn into right-wing dictators and the destabilization of Latin American countries. Over the past years, the consequence of heavy U.S. involvement in these countries had lead to civil wars and embedded scars of the past. Today, most Latin American nations that were involved in the Cold War had resumed back to normalcy and stability. However, today, we see an increasing rise among these countries shifting to the left, especially in South America, where agendas are more socialist than capitalist. U.S. policy pays attention to the trends but can no longer impose its doctrine in these nations, for these nations have become independent from and less susceptible to being influenced by U.S. foreign policy.

APPENDIX A

NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security

(April 14, 1950)

*A Report to the President
Pursuant to the President's Directive
of January 31, 1950*

TOP SECRET

[Washington,] April 7, 1950

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TERMS OF REFERENCE

The following report is submitted in response to the President's directive of January 31 which reads:

That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.

The document which recommended that such a directive be issued reads in part:

It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudices the more fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being

held will be greatly increased. The question of use policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons--viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further question as to whether there should be a revision in the nature of the agreements, including the international control of atomic energy, which we have been seeking to reach with the U.S.S.R.

ANALYSIS

I. Background of the Present Crisis

Within the past thirty-five years the world has experienced two global wars of tremendous violence. It has witnessed two revolutions--the Russian and the Chinese--of extreme scope and intensity. It has also seen the collapse of five empires--the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, German, Italian, and Japanese--and the drastic decline of two major imperial systems, the British and the French. During the span of one generation, the international distribution of power has been fundamentally altered. For several centuries it had proved impossible for any one nation to gain such preponderant strength that a coalition of other nations could not in time face it with greater strength. The international scene was marked by recurring periods of violence and war, but a system of sovereign and independent states was maintained, over which no state was able to achieve hegemony.

Two complex sets of factors have now basically altered this historic distribution of power. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States and the Soviet Union in such a way that power increasingly gravitated to these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, anti-theoretical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world. Conflict has, therefore, become endemic and is waged, on the part of the Soviet Union, by violent or non-violent methods in accordance with the dictates of expediency. With the development of increasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction, every individual faces the ever-present possibility of annihilation should the conflict enter the phase of total war.

On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety arising from the risk of atomic war. On the other hand, any substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be assembled. It is in this context that this Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril.

The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment or destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself. They are issues which will not await our deliberations. With conscience and resolution this Government and the people it represents must now take new and fateful decisions.

II. Fundamental Purpose of the United States

The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to the Constitution: ". . . to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.

Three realities emerge as a consequence of this purpose: Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom, as set forth in the Constitution and Bill of Rights; our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life, for which as in the Declaration of Independence, "with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."

III. Fundamental Design of the Kremlin

The fundamental design of those who control the Soviet Union and the international communist movement is to retain and solidify their absolute power, first in the Soviet Union and second in the areas now under their control. In the minds of the Soviet leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority.

The design, therefore, calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and structure of society in the countries of the non-Soviet world and their replacement by an apparatus and structure subservient to and controlled from the Kremlin. To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass. The United States, as the principal center of power in the non-Soviet world and the bulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion, is the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must be subverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve its fundamental design.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The foregoing analysis indicates that the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union have greatly intensified the Soviet threat to the security of the United States. This threat is of the same character as that

described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948) but is more immediate than had previously been estimated. In particular, the United States now faces the contingency that within the next four or five years the Soviet Union will possess the military capability of delivering a surprise atomic attack of such weight that the United States must have substantially increased general air, ground, and sea strength, atomic capabilities, and air and civilian defenses to deter war and to provide reasonable assurance, in the event of war, that it could survive the initial blow and go on to the eventual attainment of its objectives. In return, this contingency requires the intensification of our efforts in the fields of intelligence and research and development.

Allowing for the immediacy of the danger, the following statement of Soviet threats, contained in NSC 20/4, remains valid:

14. The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet system.

15. The political, economic, and psychological warfare which the USSR is now waging has dangerous potentialities for weakening the relative world position of the United States and disrupting its traditional institutions by means short of war, unless sufficient resistance is encountered in the policies of this and other non-communist countries.

16. The risk of war with the USSR is sufficient to warrant, in common prudence, timely and adequate preparation by the United States.

a. Even though present estimates indicate that the Soviet leaders probably do not intend deliberate armed action involving the United States at this time, the possibility of such deliberate resort to war cannot be ruled out.

b. Now and for the foreseeable future there is a continuing danger that war will arise either through Soviet miscalculation of the determination of the United States to use all the means at its command to safeguard its security, through Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions, or through U.S. miscalculation of Soviet reactions to measures which we might take.

17. Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States.

18. The capability of the United States either in peace or in the event of war to cope with threats to its security or to gain its objectives would be severely weakened by internal development, important among which are:

a. Serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed communist activity.

- b. Prolonged or exaggerated economic instability.
- c. Internal political and social disunity.
- d. Inadequate or excessive armament or foreign aid expenditures.
- e. An excessive or wasteful usage of our resources in time of peace.
- f. Lessening of U.S. prestige and influence through vacillation of appeasement or lack of skill and imagination in the conduct of its foreign policy or by shirking world responsibilities.
- g. Development of a false sense of security through a deceptive change in Soviet tactics.

Although such developments as those indicated in paragraph 18 above would severely weaken the capability of the United States and its allies to cope with the Soviet threat to their security, considerable progress has been made since 1948 in laying the foundation upon which adequate strength can now be rapidly built.

The analysis also confirms that our objectives with respect to the Soviet Union, in time of peace as well as in time of war, as stated in NSC 20/4 (para. 19), are still valid, as are the aims and measures stated therein (paras. 20 and 21). Our current security programs and strategic plans are based upon these objectives, aims, and measures:

19.

- a. To reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence, and stability of the world family of nations.
- b. To bring about a basic change in the conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia, to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN Charter.

In pursuing these objectives, due care must be taken to avoid permanently impairing our economy and the fundamental values and institutions inherent in our way of life.

20. We should endeavor to achieve our general objectives by methods short of war through the pursuit of the following aims:

- a. To encourage and promote the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR.
- b. To encourage the development among the Russian peoples of attitudes which may help to modify current Soviet behavior and permit a revival of the national life of groups evidencing the ability and determination to achieve and maintain national independence.

c. To eradicate the myth by which people remote from Soviet military influence are held in a position of subservience to Moscow and to cause the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the USSR and the Soviet-directed world communist party, and to adopt a logical and realistic attitude toward them.

d. To create situations which will compel the Soviet Government to recognize the practical undesirability of acting on the basis of its present concepts and the necessity of behaving in accordance with precepts of international conduct, as set forth in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

21. Attainment of these aims requires that the United States:

a. Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the USSR, as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.

b. Assure the internal security of the United States against dangers of sabotage, subversion, and espionage.

c. Maximize our economic potential, including the strengthening of our peacetime economy and the establishment of essential reserves readily available in the event of war.

d. Strengthen the orientation toward the United States of the non-Soviet nations; and help such of those nations as are able and willing to make an important contribution to U.S. security, to increase their economic and political stability and their military capability.

e. Place the maximum strain on the Soviet structure of power and particularly on the relationships between Moscow and the satellite countries.

f. Keep the U.S. public fully informed and cognizant of the threats to our national security so that it will be prepared to support the measures which we must accordingly adopt.

In the light of present and prospective Soviet atomic capabilities, the action which can be taken under present programs and plans, however, becomes dangerously inadequate, in both timing and scope, to accomplish the rapid progress toward the attainment of the United States political, economic, and military objectives which is now imperative.

A continuation of present trends would result in a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites. This unfavorable trend arises from the inadequacy of current programs and plans rather than from any error in our objectives and aims. These trends lead in the direction of isolation, not by deliberate decision but by lack of the necessary basis for a vigorous initiative in the conflict with the Soviet Union.

Our position as the center of power in the free world places a heavy responsibility upon the United States for leadership. We must organize and enlist the energies and resources of the free world in a positive program for peace which will frustrate the Kremlin design for world domination by creating a situation in the free world to which the Kremlin will be compelled to adjust. Without such a cooperative effort, led by the United States, we will have to make gradual withdrawals under pressure until we discover one day that we have sacrificed positions of vital interest.

It is imperative that this trend be reversed by a much more rapid and concerted build-up of the actual strength of both the United States and the other nations of the free world. The analysis shows that this will be costly and will involve significant domestic financial and economic adjustments.

The execution of such a build-up, however, requires that the United States have an affirmative program beyond the solely defensive one of countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union. This program must light the path to peace and order among nations in a system based on freedom and justice, as contemplated in the Charter of the United Nations. Further, it must envisage the political and economic measures with which and the military shield behind which the free world can work to frustrate the Kremlin design by the strategy of the cold war; for every consideration of devotion to our fundamental values and to our national security demands that we achieve our objectives by the strategy of the cold war, building up our military strength in order that it may not have to be used. The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system. Such a positive program--harmonious with our fundamental national purpose and our objectives--is necessary if we are to regain and retain the initiative and to win and hold the necessary popular support and cooperation in the United States and the rest of the free world.

This program should include a plan for negotiation with the Soviet Union, developed and agreed with our allies and which is consonant with our objectives. The United States and its allies, particularly the United Kingdom and France, should always be ready to negotiate with the Soviet Union on terms consistent with our objectives. The present world situation, however, is one which militates against successful negotiations with the Kremlin--for the terms of agreements on important pending issues would reflect present realities and would therefore be unacceptable, if not disastrous, to the United States and the rest of the free world. After a decision and a start on building up the strength of the free world has been made, it might then be desirable for the United States to take an initiative in seeking negotiations in the hope that it might facilitate the process of accommodation by the Kremlin to the new situation. Failing that, the unwillingness of the Kremlin to accept equitable terms or its bad faith in observing them would assist in consolidating popular opinion in the free world in support of the measures necessary to sustain the build-up.

In summary, we must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union, confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its will. Such evidence is the only means short of war which eventually may force the Kremlin to abandon its present course of action and to negotiate acceptable agreements on issues of major importance.


The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake. Essential prerequisites to success are consultations with Congressional leaders designed to make the program the object of non-partisan legislative support, and a presentation to the public of a full explanation of the facts and implications of the present international situation. The prosecution of the program will require of us all the ingenuity, sacrifice, and unity demanded by the vital importance of the issue and the tenacity to persevere until our national objectives have been attained.

Recommendations

That the President:

- a. Approve the foregoing Conclusions.
- b. Direct the National Security Council, under the continuing direction of the President, and with the participation of other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, to coordinate and insure the implementation of the Conclusions herein on an urgent and continuing basis for as long as necessary to achieve our objectives. For this purpose, representatives of the member Departments and Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their deputies, and other Departments and Agencies as required should be constituted as a revised and strengthened staff organization under the National Security Council to develop coordinated programs for consideration by the National Security Council.

APPENDIX B
NSC-141



NSC 141
January 19, 1953

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

REEXAMINATION OF UNITED STATES
PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

- References:
- A. NSC Action Nos. 666 and 688
 - B. NSC 135/3 and Annex to NSC 135/1
 - C. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, "Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security", dated November 14, 1952

At the direction of the President, the enclosed memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security and its attached report on the subject, submitted pursuant to NSC Action No. 668-b, are transmitted herewith for the consideration of the National Security Council.

The report contains Conclusions (Part One - page 6) approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security on the basis of the Analysis contained in Part Two (page 34).


The appendices listed on page 103, which were of assistance to the Steering Committee on this Reexamination in reaching its conclusions, are being circulated separately through the members of the Senior NSC Staff as supplementary data in connection with the Reexamination. None of these appendices received departmental approval or clearance.

Special security precautions are requested in the handling of the enclosure.

JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary

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January 16, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Re-examination of
United States Pro-
grams for National
Security

We are enclosing herewith certain materials which you requested us to submit pursuant to National Security Council Action No. 668.

We believe it important to point out in this covering memorandum what this study has attempted to accomplish--as well as what it has not attempted to accomplish.

NSC 135/3 contains a balanced statement of the position of the United States in the world today; the threats which face us in the period ahead; and our basic strategy for meeting these threats. This study takes NSC 135/3 as its starting point and makes no effort to re-state or re-examine the conclusions reached in that paper.

The present study deals with the limited question as to whether the allocation of our resources under existing programs is appropriately related to the threats which we face and to our strategy for meeting these threats. The nature of this examination necessarily results in a concentration of attention on the dangers ahead and the respects in which existing programs may not adequately meet these dangers. In view of the limited purpose of this paper, no attempt was made to obtain the same over-all balanced view of our position as was contained in NSC 135/3. Nor was any attempt made to indicate what has been accomplished in the last few years or what strains and difficulties our growing strength is causing the U.S.S.R. We point these facts out in order that the study not be misunderstood and interpreted as an unduly pessimistic assessment of our position at the present time.

We also wish to emphasize one additional point. This study reaches the conclusion that there is need to apply more resources to our continental defense and our civil defense programs. This conclusion has as its premise that these programs for defense of the United States against atomic attack constitute new and distinct requirements and that

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resources additional to those now programmed should be made available to meet them. No conclusion has been reached as to the extent to which these programs should be undertaken in the event additional resources are not made available. We feel that we must not sacrifice our capability of projecting our power abroad by concentrating too heavily on the purely defensive aspects of our security should general war occur.

In view of the short time available, we have not had an adequate opportunity to carry to greater depth and precision the consideration of certain of the basic questions dealt with in the study, particularly with respect to the impact on our strategy and programs of modern atomic weapons. Nor has there been an opportunity to consult with other interested departments and agencies with respect to those portions of the study with which they may be particularly concerned. It is therefore suggested that it may be desirable for the National Security Council to take this study under further consideration.

/s/ DEAN ACHESON

Dean Acheson
Secretary of State

/s/ ROBERT A. LOVETT

Robert A. Lovett
Secretary of Defense

/s/ W. AVERELL HARRIMAN

W. Averell Harriman
Director for Mutual Security

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REPORT BY THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE
AND THE DIRECTOR FOR MUTUAL SECURITY

on

REEXAMINATION OF UNITED STATES
PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

A. Terms of Reference

1. Pursuant to NSC Action No. 668, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security were directed on September 4, 1952, "to undertake, in consultation as appropriate with other departments and agencies, the preparation of materials necessary for a re-examination of the amounts and allocations of resources to various areas in terms of kind, quantity, timing and priority, to determine:

"a. Whether a general increase in the level of free world programs and military forces is required to deal with the several threats.*

"b. Whether the present allocation of resources as between U.S. military forces and other free world forces is appropriate.

"c. Whether the present balance between military assistance and the various types of economic assistance is appropriate.

* This question is dealt with last in PART ONE - Conclusions of the accompanying report.

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"d. Whether these allocations are in proper relationship to the threats facing the United States in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East, to the importance of these areas for U.S. security, and to United States commitments."

2. The Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security herewith submit their report in response to the directive of September 4. They have approved the Conclusions (PART ONE) on the basis of the Analysis (PART TWO).

B. United States Objectives and Strategy

3. The starting point of this paper is the statement of United States objectives and strategy for national security contained in NSC 135/3. In re-examining the amounts and allocations of resources for national security, this report attempts to assess the probable contribution to national security of present programs in the light of the objectives stated in paragraph 4 of NSC 135/3. The statement of objectives reads as follows:

"... it must remain the immediate, and we believe attainable, objective of the free world to develop and sustain for as long as may be necessary such over-all strength as will (a) continuously confront the Kremlin with the prospect that a Soviet attack would result in serious risk to the Soviet regime, and thus maximize the chance that general war will be indefinitely deterred, (b) provide the basis for winning a general war should it occur, (c) reduce the opportunities for local Soviet or satellite aggression and political warfare, (d) provide an effective counter to local aggression if it occurs in key peripheral areas, and (e) permit the exploitation of rifts between the U.S.S.R. and other communist states and between the satellite regimes and the peoples they are oppressing..."

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"The United States should develop and maintain, in cooperation with its allies, a position of strength, flexibility and depth adequate to deter the Soviets from deliberately initiating general war and to discourage them from pursuing courses of action involving grave risk of general war.

"To achieve such a deterrent, the United States should take the necessary measures to:

"a. Develop the political unity of and encourage the growth of strength and determination in the free world so as to minimize the likelihood that the Soviets would believe they could undertake local aggression without serious risk of war.

"b. Develop and retain, under all foreseeable conditions, the capability to inflict massive damage on the Soviet war-making capacity.

"c. Assure ready defensive strength both military and non-military, adequate to provide in the event of general war a reasonable initial defense and to ensure reasonable protection to the nation during the period of mobilization for ultimate victory.

"d. Round out and maintain the mobilization base, both military and industrial, in the United States at a level which in the event of need will enable us to expand rapidly to full mobilization and, consistent with the maintenance of a vital and democratic society, provide the means for protecting the mobilization base against covert attack and sabotage.

"In the light of the capacity of the U.S.S.R. to deliver an atomic and possible thermonuclear attack, the United States should develop a substantially improved civil defense as an essential part of the total national security program in order to (a) provide reasonable protection for the American people and maintain their morale, thereby enhancing the freedom of action of the U.S. Government, and (b) minimize damage to war production plants and facilities and increase the capability of the country's economy to recover. At the same time the American people should recognize their vital role in the total program of national security, and be prepared to accept and live with a substantial degree of vulnerability in fulfilling that role."

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C. Major Developments Subsequent to the
Date of Approval of NSC 135/3

4. In making this re-examination, certain developments subsequent to the date of approval of NSC 135/3 have been taken into consideration. These developments include the following:

a. There has been a reduction of the prospects for an early settlement of the Korean issue. This is indicated by the Communist rejection of the United Nations General Assembly resolution.

b. The situation in Indochina has become more precarious. The situation in Iran has continued to deteriorate, although very recently the prospects for settlement of the oil dispute have improved.

c. There has been a reduction of the prospects for an early ratification of the EDC Treaty and related European arrangements.

d. The United States has developed a thermo-nuclear device.

e. Added information on communist intentions has been gained from the statements of communist leaders at the recent communist party congress in Moscow. These statements give some basis for the view that the Soviet rulers will direct their major efforts during the immediate future to dividing and weakening the Western

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alliance, while maintaining and perhaps increasing their cold-war pressures against what they estimate to be the particular vulnerabilities of the West.

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