

EUROPEAN UNION/UNITED STATES RELATIONS:
FACTORS THAT WILL INFLUENCE
THEIR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP IN THE
NEW WORLD ORDER

THESIS

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When the crisis manifested between the United States and the European Union (EU)¹ over how to confront Iraq in 2003, many people seemed puzzled by the sudden split and contention between old allies. However, upon examining the evolution of the US and EU governments, societies, cultures and way of thinking about the world, it is clear that there have always been differences, and even contention at times, between the two.

After World War II, America assumed a new global role from isolationist to one of defender and protector of liberty against the communist threat, while Western Europeans' new less global role was to rebuild their societies and ward off the geographic threat of communism while simultaneously retreating from onerous colonial responsibilities. As a result, Western Europe declined as the dominant global leader and power politics player that it had been for centuries. World War II changed these traditional roles and with this shift came a change in world-views: Europe emerged economically and militarily destroyed while America strengthened. Their roles had reversed. Although France was still fighting colonial wars in many parts of the world into the 1960s, kicking the US military out of France and withdrawing from NATO, thus participating in power politics, diplomacy and negotiation slowly replaced power politics for many EU nations as a way to approach and navigate international issues. The US

¹ Throughout the thesis, I will use EU interchangeably with specific country names, when appropriate. It is difficult to isolate one country since the EU is an economic block, but the paper will be dominated by references to France and Germany and quotes by their leaders since they are the main powers of the EU. However, I do think that France is the major culprit in the deterioration of US/EU relations. References to 'Europe' or the 'EU' refer to "old Europe" or Western Europe and not the newly expanded EU comprised of 25 members, which includes East European nations.

as the new global power was able to defend and even enforce its policies with military and economic might. America now believed it had a place in the world – a mission and means to defend those ideals. The Europeans were devastated and fatigued by never ending conflicts, not just in the twentieth century, but for many; therefore they saw power politics, as it was conducted in their past, as a futile route to obtaining international and national security, and viewed themselves as experts in this area. In an interview with *Newsweek* journalist Eric Pape, the French Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin said:

Europe's violent history of wars and tragedies has enabled us to draw lessons for the present. Power can be strong only when it is legitimate...a country relying solely on its own power [referring to the US] will draw together all the forces of opposition, frustration and resentment.²

These post WWII world-views, diplomacy and appeasement versus using military power when necessary, and the proper use of force, are what clashed over the Iraq issue. These different approaches to foreign relations, approaches that were partially camouflaged throughout the Cold War, will continue to dominate US/EU relations in the future.

Coupled with these divergent world-views, is a prevalent anti-Americanism in much of Western Europe, particularly in France and Germany, which has resurfaced with more virulence and vehemence (compared with the past) since the end of the Cold War and the Iraq War. Americans have retaliated to the blatant anti-American sentiments against their country by boycotting French products and not traveling for their summer vacations to these historical spots. Western Europeans are not alone in their anti-American sentiments³; the United States is seen as a unilateral brute strong-arming its way around the world, and the EU is capitalizing on those viewpoints to its advantage – winning political campaigns and pushing international agreements forward such as the Kyoto Treaty and the International Criminal Court. I predict that EU

² Eric Pape, "We Learned Our Lessons," *Newsweek (International ed)*, 15 December 2003, 62

³ Many EE nations which have joined the EU are pro-American and are supporting the US in Iraq.

governments will continue to capitalize on these 'anti-American' sentiments of their populations to gain global and national leverage. Paralleled with anti-Americanism is the fact that Europe has a growing Muslim population and voting bloc, which will continue to feed on this sentiment and alter domestic politics.

Several other factors will continue to influence relations between the US and the EU: a growing political and economic trading block in the EU will grant the Continent much global influence and disagreements over trading may continue as was evident over US subsidized agricultural products recently. The World Trade Organization (WTO) will also play a part, hopefully beneficial, in their relations. Counterbalancing the EU's growing economic influence will be its weak military compared with the US military. The divergent military capabilities were made evident in the Yugoslavian wars of the 1990s when the US had to help the Europeans because of EU nation's weaker militaries. Consequently, the EU seeks to ensure its influence with the United States through questioning American political legitimacy. Throughout the Cold War US hegemony was accepted and "...the American system of Cold War alliances balanced the leadership needed in seeking a common good against the flexibility required to satisfy individual interests."⁴ While European powers, that in and of themselves were not global powers, had a say in the direction of security and geopolitical debates, they conferred legitimacy to American power. However, when their "purpose" and influence with US decision-makers was lessened by the fall of communism, resistance to the remaining super-power increased. The world seemed to like it better when they knew which side of the fence to play on. During the 1990s, there was not a threat "worse" than the crumbled Soviet empire, so US hegemonic power became that threat. In relation to the Iraq conflict, which illustrates these legitimacy and power issues on a grand scale, John Lloyd, the former editor of the *New Statesman*, wrote that European intellectuals "see America as a larger danger than Saddam Hussein and cry out against

⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, (Cambridge, Mass & London, England: Harvard University Press, 2004), 113.

it. All see it as in terms of empire, domination, greed.”⁵ America has become the new enemy for some. This resentment towards American power has overshadowed logic and the need to address the new global threats that exist in our new terrorist world.

Some EU nations such as France and Germany have been waging a propaganda war against the US in essence claiming that its own diplomacy and softer negotiating style are more effective than the US’s more aggressive, strong-arming style. The success of triumphing over the countless conflicts in Europe and “solving the German problem” is being used by certain EU powers to herald their superior peacemaking skills and legitimate their integration paradigm as the only “method for peace.” Need they forget that it was the safety of NATO and its security blanket which provided the platform for these historic reforms and crisis management? This has produced an air of legitimacy for the EU in global politics, and somehow made the EU’s approval of US actions necessary for the US to have global legitimacy. In this way, the EU’s political influence somewhat balances US military strength. The EU uses international law and organizations to enforce this air of legitimacy.

In US politics, the actions of our allies have angered many Americans, but not deterred us from supporting action in Afghanistan and initial, yet waning support in Iraq. The recent Presidential election proved that the American people support the actions of Bush and have legitimized future military operations around the world where terrorism is a threat. American patriotism has returned and cannot be discounted as a force to be reckoned with. Americans respond to adversity and attacks, not by hiding, but by reassessing capabilities and vital interests. This tenacity has converted into patriotism, because we believe in our nation’s history of democracy and freedom and will fight to defend it. Patriotism aided the effort during WWII, when the nation galvanized after Pearl Harbor to defeat Hitler and Japan. September 11th had the same effect on many Americans. John Gaddis says, Americans, “...when confronted with

⁵ William Shawcross, *Allies The U S, Britain, Europe, and the War in Iraq*, (New York. Public Affairs, 2004), 90

unexpected dangers...tend to expand rather than contract our sphere of responsibilities. Running and hiding has rarely been our habit.”⁶ This time in our history will hopefully support this tradition.

Overall these various factors; divergent world-views, growing anti-Americanism, a growing EU trading block, individual European countries’ domestic politics, an imbalance in military capabilities and US patriotism will add up to a return to power politics that is based upon diplomacy (soft power) versus military (hard power). I claim that since the end of the Cold War and the threat of communism, EU/US relations have become unfettered and will transform itself, one democratic view against another. I do not believe that we will wage conventional war against one another, but the EU is trying to find a new voice, and it may come at the expense of the relationship, at least temporarily. If not curtailed, this may have serious consequences on the fight against global terrorism and rebuilding Iraq into a safe democracy.

One thing to keep in mind is the nature of things; balance in all things is inherently desired by nature – yin/yang. Perhaps this divergence is a necessary evil to return the world to balance, so that the US does not in fact misuse the power, the hegemony it possesses. With the Soviet counter-balance gone, a new pole is possibly required or “...the existence of an alternative more frightening than [American] hegemony.”⁷ It is safe to say that that threat is terrorism, but some do not want to see or do not see that that threat is in fact more frightening than American hegemony. The famous British historian, Lord Acton once said, “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.”⁸ I don’t think that Europe is afraid of power, only power concentrated in America’s hands. France particularly would like to regain some of its own power it once had. However, Europe should recognize that repeatedly undermining

⁶ Gaddis, 37.

⁷ Ibid, 117.

⁸ Lord Acton quote retrieved from <http://quotes.liberty-tree.ca/quotes/nsf/quotes!ReadForm>.

the US in its efforts is not in their best interest, just as it would not have been during the Cold War.

The intention of this thesis is to point out trends and events in US/EU relations that have been set in motion since the end of the Cold War, how these events led to the Iraq crisis and what they ultimately mean for their new relations. I do not intend to solve the issue nor make wild predictions, but outline recent history and how history has a tendency to repeat itself.

CHAPTER II

EVOLUTION OF TWO DEMOCRACIES

A. Background

1. The History of the Great European Powers

Many of the dominant European powers had been very imperialistic throughout history and this continued in the late 1800s and early 1900s. For example, Prussian territory was expanded under the leadership of Otto Von Bismarck to unite the Germanic speaking nations and he created the present day Germany in 1871. Italy was also eager to extend its reach and attempted to do this in Ethiopia and other North African countries. The Spanish had significant territories within the US and the Western Hemisphere and of course, the United Kingdom's reach was at its peak in the mid-1800s through the early 1900s. The French still maintained interests in Indochina and Africa, but their European dominance was late 18th to early 19th centuries under Napoleon Bonaparte's reign. It was evident, though, that Germany was the dominant power in Europe from 1900 till the beginning of WWI (see table 1) and many of its policies precipitated conflict that culminated in the outbreak of WWI in 1914.⁹ The Germans had waited for the right time to press for European hegemony and took advantage of their military superiority; it was pure power politics at work:

By 1903...Germany was a potential hegemonic. It controlled a larger percentage of European industrial might than did any other state...and the German army was the most powerful in the world. It now had the capability to consider going on the offensive to gain more power. It is not surprising that at about this time Germany began to think seriously

⁹ John J Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W N.Norton & Company, Inc , 2003), 253.

about altering the European balance of power and becoming a world power.¹⁰

Prior to WWII the world-view and foreign policy approach of the powerful European nations were aggressive, dominating and expansionistic – *realpolitik* or *matchpolitik*. The policies of leaders such as Bismarck, Napoleon, and Louis XIV, and the English, Danish, Portuguese and Spanish monarchies demonstrate that power politics figured prominently in foreign policy formulation while military and economic strength were at their disposal to pursue their ambitions. They all played roles in colonizing and invading neighboring and distant countries in order to secure land and precious minerals, making them wealthier, and therefore more powerful.

2. The History of the United States

Since the birth of the United States, until the end of WWII, the US held what most people label as an isolationist foreign policy towards Europe. In the book “Surprise, Security, and the American Experience” by author and Yale professor of history and political science, John Lewis Gaddis, isolationism is described as unilateralism:

The term [isolationism] is a misnomer, for the United States never actually attempted to *isolate* from the rest of the world ...Americans were always extensively involved in international trade, and a steady flow of immigration, together with improvements in transportation and communications, produced a complex web of international cultural connections...¹¹

Instead, Gaddis says that “The United States did...avoid commitments to act in concert with other great powers against future contingencies which no one could foresee.”¹² In other words, the US adopted an international “don’t get involved in their [Europe’s] business” stance. Over the last two centuries, this posture has been translated as

¹⁰ Mearsheimer, 188

¹¹ Gaddis, 24

¹² Ibid.

isolationism, but in real fact has been a policy to preserve American borders against enemy attack and infiltration and a willingness to act alone (unilateralism). Knowing that its forces were not sufficient against the British Royal Navy or other European powers, the US sought to expand its territories to buffer itself from possible attacks: "Safety comes from enlarging, rather than contracting, its sphere of responsibilities."¹³ As the centuries progressed, the world would see that this philosophy dominated US foreign policy.

American ambition drove this expansion while it simultaneously fit the need of protection. John Quincy Adams, Gaddis points out in his book, was the chief grand strategist for nineteenth-century America and was not shy about declaring US ambitions: "any effort on our part to reason the world out of a belief that we are ambitious will have no other effect than to convince them that we add to our ambition hypocrisy."¹⁴ The goal of the US government was to establish regional hegemony in the Western Hemisphere by expanding across all the Americas and defeating and preventing any European presence. International interference in Europe was non-existent, "...in part because staying out of Europe's wars was deeply ingrained in the American psyche..."¹⁵ This philosophy and world-view was much established by our revered President George Washington, who said in his *Farewell Address* in 1796:

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or very remote relation...Our detached and distant situation invites us to pursue a different course...Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world...*Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.*¹⁶

Further solidifying this American policy and viewpoint about its international role was

¹³ Gaddis, 13.

¹⁴ Ibid, 27.

¹⁵ Ibid., P 252 Note: Gaddis points out that Washington may have gotten some of his thoughts from writings of John Quincy Adams on this topic.

¹⁶ Charles Kovacs, "US-European Relations from the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8 (2003). 436

the creation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, which outlined the United State's new foreign policy. It stated that the US would not become involved in European wars, that those powers could not accumulate territory in the Western Hemisphere nor make alliances with nations in the region.¹⁷ America's chief concern was to buffer its territory from the threats outside, in order to protect its liberty and democracy, and to maintain distance from European conflicts. Although the US did go to war with Great Britain in 1812, was involved in the Mexican War of 1845, and the Spanish-American War of 1898, generally speaking, the United States maintained its distance from European affairs because "...when it came to dealing with the European giants, it claimed to abjure power and assailed as atavistic the power politics of the eighteenth-and nineteenth-century European empires."¹⁸ This sentiment would change.

B. World-Views Change

The power distribution in the world began to shift in the early 1900s, and so too the world-views of various nations. At the outbreak of WWI, the United State's wealth had increased closing the economic gap with its European counterparts; in 1880 the UK possessed the majority of the world's wealth at 45% compared to the US's at 23%, but this shifted in 1890 when the US gained a 35% advantage over the UK's 32% share.¹⁹ (See table 2) However, this did not translate into military might for the United States at that time. Due to its sheer land mass and population, it is not surprising that the United States began to recognize its potential global influence and to exercise that strength more overtly, at the behest of some European nations in the early twentieth-century. While Europe had been embroiled in one conflict after another for decades, the US was able to focus on strengthening its economic base, which provided the capability of establishing a stronger military. John Mearsheimer, author of The Tragedy

¹⁷ Gaddis, 247

¹⁸ Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review* 113 (Jun/July 2003): 5.

¹⁹ Mearsheimer, 220.

of Great Power Politics, states that one way nations strive to gain regional hegemony is through wealth building “because economic might is the foundation of military might.”²⁰

United States involvement in WWI was precipitated as much by economic and strategic concerns, as by power politics. The use of Germans U-Boats became an issue for President Wilson to face starting in 1915 after the Lusitania, a British passenger liner (although there was ammunition on board), was sunk by one off the British coast, killing 128 Americans. The Germans, in response to an angry Wilson, agreed not to attack passenger ships and apologized. However, in 1916, the Sussex, an unarmed French merchant liner, was attacked by a U-boat, again angering President Wilson. In response, the Germans released their Sussex Pledge, declaring that they would reduce casualties on attacks on merchant ships in the future. Not a year later did the Germans announce unrestricted U-Boat warfare on merchant ships heading towards Allied ports and limiting US ships to one a week, as long as they did not carry armaments. Soon after, a correspondence, known as the Zimmerman Note and intercepted by the British, between German foreign secretary Zimmerman to the Mexican government encouraging Mexico to attack the US if the US joined the allies, precipitated the US to declare war on Germany. These repeated violations by Germany and the fact that the seas were being hijacked by U-Boats making trade and movement dangerous, was a huge catalyst for our involvement. This was partly because Wilson had campaigned for his Presidency to protect the freedom of the seas, which submarine warfare obviously jeopardized, and partly because trade with France and Britain was also in jeopardy. If the Triple Entente lost the war, this huge trading bloc would be threatened. Subsequently, this could all result in Germany being in a position to threaten US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and was therefore “[t]he principle reason that the United States sought to prevent a European hegemonic...fear that such a power would be free to intervene in the Western Hemisphere.”²¹ That fear was the

²⁰ Ibid, 143.

²¹ Mearsheimer, Supra Note 60, 493.

original intent of passing the Monroe Doctrine a century earlier; to prevent European influence near US territory. When the US perceived a balance of power threat in its region, it was shaken out of its idealistic, isolationist revelry. United States involvement in WWI was an early indicator of the US's ability to defend its interests and willingness to use what power it had to do so in a previously off-limits region of the world-Europe. The willingness of the US to get involved in European affairs contradicted its century-long held foreign policy position and was a subtle yet decisive shift in its world-view.

Although the United States did not become a member of the League of Nations because the US Congress failed to advise and consent to the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, in which the League was created, the US did not completely remove itself from international affairs, as many have concluded. Americans remained engaged in international trade by producing one-half of the world's industrial goods and leading in global exports of \$5.4billion²²; assisted with humanitarian efforts with League organizations; cooperated on naval tonnage disarmament efforts with other major powers, which included the Washington Naval Conference in 1921, setting a tonnage limit among the five leading powers; and the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 where 62 nations agreed to renounce war. The passing of the Stimson Doctrine in the US Congress influenced a resolution in the League to be passed reflecting the same language that would not recognize the territory in Manchuria that Japanese forces had invaded, calling it illegal under international law. However, these influences and involvements which the US was able to wield could not overcome some of the significant and historical events taking place in parts of the world, reflecting the ongoing power politics and aggressive world-views of some nations.

Unfortunately, the League was unable to prevent these events or enforce the Covenant due to apathy and early signs of appeasement and buck-passing and the absence of the United States. Although the Assembly did deem Italy's invasion of

²² G. Feldmeth, "American Foreign Policy 1920-1940," (Lecture Notes) at Trinity College, Australia <http://library.trinity.wa.edu.au/subjects/sose/history/usfa.htm> (Last visited Jan 4, 2005).

Ethiopia in 1935 as a violation of the League mandate and impose economic sanctions on the nation, this was insufficient to prevent Italy from conquering Ethiopia in defiance of the Covenant. On two occasions in the 1930s, Japan invaded China (1931 Manchuria and 1937 China main). On the first occasion, "...the Assembly [League] decided Japan had not resorted to war in violation of the Covenant, and therefore Article 16 did not apply."²³ On the second occasion, the Assembly did decide that Japan had violated the 1922 Nine-Power Treaty and the Covenant. However, "...each member state...was judged to be free to apply such individual enforcement action against Japan as it saw fit – and none of them took any action."²⁴ Just before the full outbreak of WWII, between about 1933-1938 France and Britain were practicing appeasement, negotiation and buck-passing, which "... [are] not particularly useful for dealing with aggressors. [They] call for conceding power to a rival state, which is a prescription for serious trouble..."²⁵ They neglected their duties to uphold the decrees of the Treaty of Versailles as Hitler slowly chipped away at the agreement. The most significant and early warning-sign breach was the re-armament of his military, a direct violation of the Treaty. Hitler reoccupied the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland in 1936, breaching Articles 42 & 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, which decreed that no fortifications of troops were to be placed there, but neither France nor Britain, the Treaty's guarantors, took steps to stop him. The beginning of the end came when the French and British brokered the famous "appeasement deal", the Munich Agreement of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia²⁶, at the Munich Conference in 1938, where they acquiesced to Hitler and agreed to his demands to occupy the Sudetenland in exchange for his agreeing not to make further territorial advancements in Europe or

²³ "Art 16 of the Covenant provided for the imposition of sanctions against a member that had resorted to war in violation of its obligations under the Covenant." See *Law Among Nations*, 557.

²⁴ Gerhard Von Glahn, *Law Among Nations* 7th Ed., (Mass: Allyn and Bacon, 1996), 558.

²⁵ Mearsheimer, 139

²⁶ The Sudetenland was a territory that had previously been a part of Germany who till lived there. Although Germans had happily integrated into being part of Czech, Nazi propaganda incited nationalism resulting in a movement for secession from Czechoslovakia. Hitler used this leverage when brokering his deal with the French and British. He promised not to invade the rest of Czech

Czechoslovakia. This promise was seen as a way to secure peace between the nations. Present day politicians call it the “Munich Lesson”. Here were the most powerful nations in Europe making an agreement with a leader who had repeatedly violated an international treaty, and trusting that Hitler would not violate that one. So convinced was British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain of that agreement that he said at the end of his famous speech after the conference on September 30, 1938, “I believe it is “peace for our time.””²⁷ These events worried President Roosevelt, and he may have responded sooner, but he was constrained by Congress under the Neutrality Act of 1935-37 which “mandated impartiality toward both aggressors and the victims of aggression when wars broke out”²⁸ and an obviously under-reactive European audience.

A combination of an inept League of Nations coupled by cowering nations led to WWII. What happened to powerful Britain and France? Perhaps their empires were stretched too far across the globe and resources unavailable for homegrown threats, however, that analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. Britain was the only power in reach of the Continent (Russia was in bed with Hitler at this time) able to put up a fight. That left the United States, which noted earlier in this paper, had built its wealth sufficiently to aid Britain through weapons manufacture. The US was supplying Britain with weapons through the Lend-Lease Act and ipso facto fighting Germany (that’s how the German’s viewed it). Then, the unimaginable happened: Pearl Harbor. In quick succession, the assault on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese and German declaration of War against the United States precipitated US involvement in one of the single most influential wars in history. Once again, the US was forced out of its isolationism as far as involving itself in European affairs (unilateralism) to go to the aid of its British allies (France was now under the Vichy regime and in collaboration with the Nazis and so

²⁷ Neville Chamberlain, “Peace in our Time,” (Speech)
<http://www.britannia.com/history/docs/peacetime.html> (last accessed 3 January 2005).
²⁸ Gaddis, 45

officially not an ally). The reasons were not completely benign – economic and strategic concerns played a role, but our involvement was essential to the victory in 1945. For the first time in history, the US aligned itself in a *Grand Alliance*. Even President Wilson called America an “Associated Power” with other powers during WWI instead of referring to them as “allies”.²⁹

With a victory under their belt, Americans wanted to return to “normal again”, but were shaken from this delusion as they witnessed the descent of the Iron Curtain across Eastern Europe. Between 1946 and 1947 Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, with the help of the Soviets, established Communist governments, and in 1948 Czechoslovakia had a coup which overthrew the democratic government and installed a Communist regime, again with the aid of the Soviets. The Greek Civil War between 1944 and 1949 was fought between the British and American backed government and Greek Communists, and resulted in the Truman Doctrine to be passed to “provide economic and military support to Greece and Turkey and to any other country threatened by communism.”³⁰ Coupled with these events and the Berlin Blockade on June 24, 1948, Western Europe and the United States were compelled to form the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). From that point forward, the US’s military and security role in Europe was solidified, not to mention the Marshall Plan, the economic arm of European recovery. Since the European powers, devastated by the War, were unable to defend themselves from Soviet aggression, the US adopted that role. Thus, the beginning of a trend in foreign policy for decades to come where the US was the strongest and able to take advantage of its position, while our EU allies were weaker, and took on a more passive stance. According to Robert Kagan, military and economic might translate into a more assertive foreign policy:

When the United States was weak, it practiced the strategies of indirection, the strategies of weakness...When the European powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial

²⁹ Gaddis, 49

³⁰ “Czechoslovakia Coup (February, 1948),” in *The Cold War Museum*, www.Coldwar.org, excerpt from the Truman Doctrine http://www.coldwar.org/articles/40s/czech_coup.php3 (last accessed 3 January 2005)

glory...These very different points of view, weak versus strong, have naturally produced different strategic judgements, differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing threats...³¹

According to Mearsheimer, appeasement and buck-passing are the strategies of the weak. Put another way, the European powers were forced into a passive role using appeasement, diplomacy and international law as methods of foreign policy negotiation.

After WWII, the strategies of internationalism and balance of power changed for the European nations. They universally rejected the old paradigm of *matchpolitik* to embrace a culture that puts "...emphasis on negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism."³² Repeated experiences of being involved in wars and conflicts for centuries changed the European nations' views on foreign policy and approach to international relations. The German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer made this statement at a speech in Berlin in May of 2000:

The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of the individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.³³

What he seems to be saying is that the older version of power politics as it was reflected in territorial skirmishes and warmongering in Europe before 1945 was replaced by a new paradigm of cooperation and adherence to principles of international law. Perhaps that kind of power politics has disappeared, but has not another form of it emerged in its place? Has not the use of international law and the United Nations French veto been used as a form of power politics throughout the decades? Was not the creation of the EU itself a form of power wielding, a counterweight to the United States? Yes, I think that Europe rejected the idea of the use of physical power and military force (since it

³¹ Kagan, 3.

³² Ibid

³³ Kagan, 15-16

had little) as a way to operate in the global system, but I do not think that it abandoned power politics completely.

C. Effects of Divergent World-Views

With the threat of communism now laid to rest, relations between the US and the EU are at a crossroads. Although NATO is still stationed in Europe, its purpose has been in question and recently it has adopted policies for reasons other than thwarting the Soviet Union's advance upon Europe. The era of the 1990s tested this new relationship, but mostly pitted one world-view against another more transparently than had been exercised in the past. Certainly, Europeans have questioned American foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Former French President Francois Mitterrand criticized the United States on its arms build-up, the Vietnam War, the Nicaraguan "contra" conflict and the Star Wars Defense Initiative (SDI) and even labeled the US as an "...irresponsible...global power."³⁴ Somehow, these reproaches were never very serious or were whitewashed over to keep the Atlantic Alliance unified against their common communist enemy.

It is understandable that Europe emerged from the debris and rubble of WWII committed to forging a new Europe in light of their past and a new thinking about how to avoid future conflicts: "By destroying and discrediting the pre-war political and economic order, the war created a fertile climate for fresh approaches to the problem of conflict between the Western European countries."³⁵ As a result, the European Economic Community (EEC) was successfully created, consequently, Europe's principal mission is to spread its version of a system that preserves peace, as it has done in Europe: "...by making a success of integration we are demonstrating to the world that it

³⁴ Sabrina P. Ramet, "The United States and Europe - Toward Greater Cooperation or a Historic Parting?-An Idealist Perspective," in *Coming in From the Cold War: Changes in US-European Interactions since 1980*, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet et al. (Maryland: Rowland & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 3.

³⁵ Robert A. Jones, *The Politics and Economics of the European Union*, (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, Mass: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc, 2001), 3.

is possible to create a method for peace.”³⁶ Peace is a major principle of Christianity whose Western roots lay in Europe. From Emperor Constantine forward, the Continent and its people have been directed by their religious beliefs and the Catholic Church has been a dominant religious and political force there for centuries. It should therefore not be surprising that “the “founding fathers” (Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, and Jean Monnet) of the European Community were Christian Democrats and practicing Catholics.”³⁷ This “method for peace” that was forged was based on an apostolic endeavor.

The idea of integration was a shift in thinking for European nations long accustomed to a Westphalian sovereignty model of geopolitics. However, an even more divergent European world-view has come from a shift away from its Christian roots as a society and that of its integration as its population has become more secular. Although there is a secular movement in the United States, it is smaller and less robust than in the EU, as the recent re-election of President Bush demonstrated. The US has maintained much of its Judeo-Christian beliefs in everyday life compared with its EU counterpart. Friction between the US and the EU could also be attributed to anti-religious attitudes of many Europeans and their subsequent disdain for Americans’ religious ethos, and particularly towards President Bush who speaks openly and proudly of his beliefs.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the United States emerged from the War initially trying to isolate, but as events unfolded, we were forced to look outward and have remained in this posture to the present. This new posture was a new outlook on what constitutes maintaining national security. In the nineteenth-century the idea was to attain Western Hemispheric hegemony by securing and expanding the borders of the US and ensuring that nations in close proximity to the US also remained uninfluenced

³⁶ Kagan, 10-11

³⁷ Maswoodur Rahman Prince, “Vatican for power expansion in EU,” *The Independent (Bangladesh)*, October 17, 2003, in *Catholics For Choice org*, <http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/nobandwidth/English/new/inthenews/101703Independent.htm> (accessed November 26, 2003)

and unoccupied by Europe. As the oceans grew less prohibitive to movement in the early twentieth century, as transportation technology improved, securing America evolved and expanded across the waters. The Panama Canal was an example of US hegemony expanding in the Americas in the early twentieth-century. Today, the US recognizes new dangers lurking in many parts of the world again and is thrust into the protector position, as it was in WWII. Not unlike its European counterparts, the US wants and seeks to maintain peace, but our method and effectiveness depends on our military capabilities. How else did the US counter Soviet threats throughout the world? How else have Europeans enjoyed peace on their continent? So, yes, the EU may say power politics is or should be dead and replaced by diplomacy and forging of economic ties to create peace, a set of policies that the US has promoted (take the proliferation of Multinational Corporations since the 1970s) and supports. However, those policies work in tandem with a realist approach which says that there are enemies that want to destroy our way of life and the ONLY deterrence or defense against that is by using and maintaining forces.

Europeans and Americans have arrived at different conclusions about "...the efficacy of power, the morality of power, [and] the desirability of power..."³⁸ from very different experiences. Europe was destroyed by the use of traditional power politics (the use of force and territorial ambitions) and America was strengthened by its ability to defend itself and its allies by the use of force. Of course, Europeans are fearful of returning to its recent violent past and hold dear to its Kantian, perpetual peace doctrine, made possible by a powerful United States military stationed in its backyard. Europeans are proud of the great accomplishment "they achieved" by living six decades without a war and integrating historically arched enemies:

The new Europe is indeed a blessed miracle and a reason for enormous celebration – on both sides of the Atlantic. For Europeans, it is the realization of a long and improbable dream: a continent free from nationalist strife and bloody feuds, from military competition and arms races. War

³⁸ Kagan, 1.

between the major European powers is almost unimaginable.³⁹ However, it should be noted that this was made possible *because* of American power, not their own, and that their achievement is also an American achievement. For Americans, their experiences do not lend themselves to the fears held by their EU counterparts. Instead, US experiences illustrate that our power and willingness to use it against ours and our allies' enemies (in WWI and WWII) was and is our strength. International idealism such as President Woodrow Wilson's "war to end all wars" speech and his Fourteen Points, and the famous "Munich lesson" failed to protect the Europeans and us. This is our experience: "Americans are idealists, but they have no experience of promoting ideals successfully without power."⁴⁰

We arrive at the post Cold War era with these divergent world-views, ideals which have been suppressed by that common threat, Communism, for decades. Now, these world-views are in danger of endangering the alliance because one fears the other will jeopardize its ideals and the other one fears questioning and doubting of its power and legitimacy. One side has grown used to using integration as a model for peace through trade relations mainly, and the other has been used to using (sometimes forced into using) force and power, both economic and military. I do not intend to imply that the US never uses soft diplomacy nor that some EU nations abandoned power politics completely after WWII. A strong argument could be made that France has been using an alternate approach to power politics to achieve its goals of re-asserting itself as a global power and being a counter-weight to US power. One way that the EU seeks to assert its power is through media propaganda and criticism by isolating features of US foreign or domestic policy decisions or initiatives that "seem" scathing to the uninformed. For example, European criticism of American agricultural subsidies in 2002: On the surface, this seems reasonable and easy to target Americans as being self-interested, once again. However, the truth also is that since its inception, the EEC

³⁹ Ibid., 13.

⁴⁰ Kagan, 16.

has sought through its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) to do something similar – to support its farmers through tariff protection that exceeds “...to the tune of four times per annum what American farmers receive in subsidies.”⁴¹ Another example of taking a policy out of context in order to make propaganda is when the 1972 rule requiring coeducational public schools was reversed on May 8, 2001 by the U.S. Department of Education when it was determined that girls and boys educated in single-sex private schools performed better academically than the public coeducational schools. The “European press wouldn’t buy this explanation. The real reason, they charged, had nothing to do with educational standards: it was really a reactionary maneuver emanating from George W. Bush and his cronies, who wanted to cater to the Christian Right’s concern for their children’s chastity.”⁴² By distorting facts or not exposing all the facts, some in the EU media seek to denigrate US policies.

Both sides are idealists trying to support and spread a democratic idea; their goal is the same, but their methods differ. Unfortunately, the state of our different world-views – of how to address global threats, the proper use of force – has placed us opposite one another rather than aligned. During the Cold War, we saw the threat of Communism equally and generally agreed on the way to tackle the problem which allowed us room to disagree without undermining our alliance. The irony is that if it had not been for the threat, the possibility of the use of US military power, Communism and Soviet expansionism could have defeated the Europeans. It was our strong military presence in Europe and elsewhere that thwarted that threat. Two things have changed since 1989: Europe is no longer threatened by Soviet Communism and their need for the US security blanket has been eliminated; and there has emerged a new, more insidious threat called terrorism which equally threatens us. Will we be able to come to an agreement about how to confront the new threat of the twenty-first century?

⁴¹ Jean-Francois Revel, *Anti-Americanism*, (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003), 171.

⁴² Ibid, 175

CHAPTER III

THE POST COLD WAR WORLD: *International Organizations, Treaties and the Military*

The number of international organizations and signing of treaties grew significantly after WWII. This was evidently in response to the world crisis from which the world emerged where a need to cooperate on matters that affected all nations was recognized. Issues on trade, the environment, human rights and others, seen as mutual topics for discussion in an ever-expanding global market, became foundations for important bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, treaties and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs). The content of some of these agreements and purposes for the creation of some organizations are important to understanding how they were a product of these new world-views. The EU nations, once only a handful, is now a huge conglomerate of 25 nations working together to maximize their position and influence in the world. The creation of the EU was a direct result of needing to find peace and security in a historically unsafe land. The United States and European nations have been architects of these entities (let us not forget that the US was at the forefront of the creation of the United Nations and Bretton Woods and highly supportive of the EEC), however, I believe the motives have been somewhat different. The US wants to maintain and secure its role in the world established in WWII while the EU wants to make a world of perpetual peace through cooperation and unity (on its terms) discarding old paradigms of power politics. This is not to imply that the US has malicious intent and surely has benevolent influence in these institutions that it is involved with, nor is it to say that the EU has only benevolent, utopian intent above its own interests, but only that, although the countries cooperate on many matters of

mutual concern, they have different reasons for doing so and this could (and has) affected relations between them.

A. Treaties

The cracks in the relationship began to emerge in the 1990s with two significant international treaties; The International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Treaties. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, and especially after violent, human rights abuses in the Yugoslavian conflicts, a divisive argument ensued over the ICC. The ICC is an international treaty intended to promote and uphold international laws relevant to human rights abuses and war crimes committed during conflicts. The treaty's origin can be traced back to the creation of the United Nations, however, was put on the backburner for various reasons. The subject bore scrutiny and gained attention anew in 1994 after the "ethnic cleansing" atrocities reported in Yugoslavia. The US, the EU, and many other nations were in negotiations over this treaty for several years. There was much wrangling and many disagreements about language in the treaty that made the US negotiators (Clinton Administration) hesitant to sign off on it. Clinton did provisionally sign it, believing in the basic purpose but doubting some of the underlying principles of the treaty. He recommended that it not be ratified, and the Bush Administration concurred. The United States disagreements and eventual withdrawal from the treaty were perceived by many Europeans as unilateral and arrogant. The US has been vilified by many of the signatories, namely the EU, and viewed as uncooperative and raising itself above international law. They seem to have forgotten or chosen to overlook American Constitutional law which grants the Senate the right to advise and consent to the ratification of treaties, which can prevent Presidential ratification.

The treaty would authorize any signatory to bring suit against a soldier stationed on its territory who was deemed in violation of the laws of the treaty. US

soldiers are stationed on every continent (unlike most other signatories) in the world for peacekeeping and other missions. The possibility and likelihood (in light of current world opinion of the US) of this happening to a US soldier was unacceptable to the United States. It was not in the national interest of the US to subject its troops to political jockeying. There are ample laws in place in the US justice and military systems to bring violators of international laws of war to justice. The American legal system is ruled by trial by jury, whereas the EU system is judge based. There are judicial and legal differences that have been the actual culprits of disagreement over the ICC. The US military does not want its soldiers' fates to be in the hands of foreign judges.

The discord over the ICC Treaty illustrates that a new working relationship between the US and the EU has evolved where previous constraints to disagree have been removed: "Now that the USSR no longer exists, any such restraint is gone and criticism is waged with great fervor, especially by the major [EU] powers, which would like to push a potential or actual unipolar system towards multipolarity."⁴³ The EU pursues its world-view agenda tied to international law, trying to tether the US to its will, while the United States adheres to its world-view to protect its national security interests to the perceived detriment of "international principles." America's world-view is as a superpower relegated to a position of protector of democracy and its job is to protect its national interests and sovereignty and not necessarily align itself to global interests, especially when they clash with its own interests.

Two divergent world-views clashed over the implementation of the ICC and eventually caused the US to withdraw and negotiate bi-lateral treaties, under Article 98, with over 90 nations not to have its soldiers subject to the treaty's laws: One side advocating for integration, strict adherence to international law, and a progressed use of international organizations as the solution to global peace and prosperity while the

⁴³ Osvaldo Croci, "A Closer Look at the Changing Transatlantic Relationship," *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8 (2003), 480.

other side, who supports using a combination of the above, but ultimately "...remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal world order still depend on the possession and the use of military might."⁴⁴ The EU powers claim to be dismayed by those bi-lateral treaties, but originally the EU encouraged the US to do this; yet another example of the EU using propaganda power politics to paint the US in a negative light and overlooking their part.

The Kyoto Treaty is a global environmental contract intended to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) of the major pollution creating countries. President Bush has incited much criticism for withdrawing from it. President Clinton signed the Protocol in 1997, but it was never ratified because the unofficial vote in the Senate was 95-0 against the Protocol; therefore the Treaty was never sent to the Senate for the needed advise and consent for Presidential ratification. Thus, the US had been a signatory but not a ratified member, like many other signatories to the Protocol, including many EU nations. The reasons for not accepting the treaty were scientific, economic and that no reliable studies that prove that the treaty would make a significant impact on global warming. There are oil, car and energy industry lobbyists that have pressured Congress against accepting the stipulations of the treaty because those stipulations/regulations would have a huge economic impact on the US economy and those industries. The cost to the consumer could be significant and a political quagmire for the Senators who would have to favor ratification.

Once again, the United States is seen as the stick in the mud, not willing to play nice with the other children. The Bush Administration recognizes that global warming is an issue that should be addressed, so Bush announced his climate change policy on February 14th, 2002, that poses to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs) up to 18% by 2012. As for the treaty, the US cannot adhere to an international body which dictates how it

⁴⁴ Kagan, 3.

should proceed to reduce GHGs when those policies would hurt the US economy and a treaty that gives special exemptions to two other major contributors of carbon dioxide; India and China.

The environment has become such a hot button issue, that it is no surprise that the US is seen in not caring about the environment by not ratifying the treaty. The Kyoto Treaty addresses different concerns than the ICC, but the reaction of the US to both treaties and subsequent responses by the international community are similar. The US has been painted, once again, as a unilateralist, not an internationalist. The Europeans want to make everyone collaborate on these and other treaties, regardless of the national economic or political consequences to an individual country. The hypocrisy of these “conflicts” is that on closer examination, these treaties reveal that each country seeks to protect its own interests, but the US is singled out as the only self-interested party. There was an emissions trading system incorporated into the Protocol to provide incentives for countries to meet their reduction limits by the set timeframe:

The Protocol would allow each country with a binding emission reduction target to use emissions trading, and other flexibility mechanisms such as “bubbling” emissions with other countries, to meet the target. Developed countries that reduce their emissions more than their required national targets could then sell their excess “credits” to another country that is finding it more difficult or expensive to reduce its emissions.⁴⁵

The US believed that there should be no cap on these “credits”, while the EU thought that there should be. The irony and the hypocrisy is that “...the EU would not impose such a cap on its own ability to “bubble” the emissions of its members.”⁴⁶ Furthermore, “Groups of participating nations may comply jointly and reallocate commitments among themselves, as the European Union (EU) plans to do within a European “bubble”...”⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Angela Antonelli, “Road to Hague : A Desperate Effort To Salvage A Flawed Climate Change Treaty,” (The Heritage Foundation, Research, Energy and Environment), 17 November 2000
<http://www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/BG1401.cfm> (accessed November 17, 2001)

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Henry D Jacoby et al., “Kyoto’s Unfinished Business”, *Foreign Affairs* 77, no 4 (July/Aug 1998), 54.

By trading their credits among the now 25 member union, the major industrialized nations within the EU will be able to credit their CO2 emissions with other less-developed nations accomplishing a feat of not having to “do” much to stay in compliance with the Treaty: “The creation of such a bubble for the EU is entirely consistent with other EU institutions. It provides a mechanism for differentiation within the EU while its leaders seek uniform commitments from non-Europeans.”⁴⁸

B. International Organizations

The European Union (EU)

In rather quick succession, several events occurred in Europe whose impact on world politics can still be felt today: The fall of the Iron Curtain across Eastern Europe, which precipitated many of the other events to occur shortly after; the declaration of the Truman Doctrine; the proposition of the Marshall Plan in 1947 and the creation of the Benelux Union; the creation of the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) in 1948 intended to effectuate the Marshall Plan; the creation of the Brussels Treaty Organization (the precursor to the Western European Union-WEU)⁴⁹ on March 17, 1948 whose “...main feature was the commitment to mutual defense should any of the signatories be the victim of an armed attack in Europe.”⁵⁰ The military arm of this organization eventually merged with the military structure of NATO in December 1950. The organization evolved into the WEU in 1954 and helped Western Germany integrate into the Atlantic Alliance. Today there is some collaboration between the WEU and NATO towards a European defense, but its future looks to be moving towards obscurity;

⁴⁸ Jacoby, 6

⁴⁹ The WEU was a modification in 1954 to the Brussels Treaty to add Italy and W. Germany to the self-defense organization which had been merged with NATO. Its aim was to integrate W. Germany into the Atlantic Alliance. Today the organization has evolved and is separate from the EU, but is still considered the security arm of Europe.

⁵⁰ “Origins of WEU. from the Brussels Treaty to the Paris Agreements (1948-1954),” (West European Union (WEU), WEU History, Origins of WEU), <http://www.w eu.int/> (Last accessed 3 January 2005).

the creation of the Council of Europe of ten members⁵¹ on May 5, 1949, whose original purpose was to “defend human rights, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law; develop continent-wide agreements to standardize member countries' social and legal practices; and to promote awareness of a European identity based on shared values and cutting across different cultures.”⁵² These mandates still propel the work of the now 46 member organization; the Berlin Blockade by Soviet Forces on June 24, 1948, considered to be the first major Cold War event; the establishment by the Treaty of Paris of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which abolished cross-border trade barriers for those industries ; and the formation by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 of the European Economic Community (EEC), which created a common European market and was the foundation of the EU.⁵³ These were the result of a concerted effort to create regional and international organizations, which provided unity and cooperation among nations, in certain key areas after WWII, and therefore, one of the major results of the War in Europe was a new thinking about how to avoid wars in the future: “By destroying and discrediting the pre-war political and economic order, the war created a fertile climate for fresh approaches to the problem of conflict between the Western European countries”⁵⁴; the concept of “never again” rose out of the rubble. How to co-operate was on the minds of these nations, a *new thinking*.⁵⁵

Many ideas emerged about how to proceed; some sought to replace the independent sovereign state with a European government and parliament or by transferring some state functions to supranational authorities, the federalist approach, while others wanted to make the state work more efficiently through intergovernmental co-operation.⁵⁶ As it turned out, European nations initially opposed any system that

⁵¹ Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Now comprised of 46 nations.

⁵² “About the Council of Europe,” (Council of Europe), http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe/default.asp (Last accessed 3 January 2005). They were concerned about German rearmament.

⁵³ Jones, 13-14

⁵⁴ Ibid , 3.

⁵⁵ Ibid , 4

⁵⁶ Jones, 4.

undermined the sovereignty of the nation-state. As a compromise to the federalist approach, the ECSC and the EEC were formed in the 1950s. This approach was “...aimed to create a united Europe in a piecemeal, *ad hoc*, way by encouraging technical co-operation between European countries in specific functional areas...This was expected to lead to a gradual erosion of sovereignty and to a gradual shift of loyalties from the national to the European level.”⁵⁷ The European Parliament’s recent activities reflect this goal of unifying Europe beyond just technical cooperation. In order for nations to be accepted into the Union, they must undergo scrutiny of their government and laws, not just their economic well-being. Turkey is being pressured right now to conform to European secular laws rather than some of its Islamic laws that would make adultery a crime. Nations which are members of the European Union are subject to changing national laws that do not conform with EU laws; a subtle infringement on national sovereignty.

In 1957, the European Economic Community Treaty, or the Treaty of Rome, laid a foundation mainly for economic integration such as the creation of a common market by removing tariffs, a common external tariff criteria from third countries, and a customs union, to name a few. As stated above, the intention of creating an organization that would transcend national boundaries was always a goal for the original architects of the EEC. That dream came closer to realization in 1992 with The Treaty on European Union, better known as the Maastricht Treaty, whose preamble sums up these goals by referring to the determination to lay “...the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”⁵⁸

The creation and adoption of the Euro, the foundation of which was laid in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as an integral part of Maastricht Treaty or EU, certainly furthered those aspirations. The Euro has had an added benefit and desired outcome of competing competitively with the US dollar. Compared with the US dollar,

⁵⁷ Ibid , 8.

⁵⁸ Ibid , 14

the Euro, which went into circulation for 12 of the 15 EU members January 1, 2002 ⁵⁹, has remained stronger on average the last couple of years. The historical exchange rate average for the last 732 days is 1 US dollar to .86951 Euros.⁶⁰ In that way, the EU as an organization has had an impact on US markets and currency and provided Europe with an economic leverage.

To add to the success of the Euro, 10 new members were added to the EU in May, 2004, and “[i]n one fell swoop, by adding their combined GDP to that of the current EU 15, Europe had finally caught up to the United States in economic size.”⁶¹ Ironically, many of these new members, former victims of totalitarianism, support the US in Iraq. This article, by Adam Posen, poses that the parity between the two economies will not last. He says that demographics and productivity growth will continue to favor the US:

Absent some change in current trends, the U.S. economy will be nearly 20% bigger than the enlarged European economy in 2020...even under the one most favorable to Europe [3 projections the author makes about growth], parity will not be maintained.⁶²

Posen considers three scenarios that he thinks reflect his prediction: the baseline scenario is that all nations, the US, the EU and the rest of the world (RoW) will continue to grow at their annual averages of 1993-2003. The US's share of GDP is unchanged by 2020, the EU share declines 3% (this falls 15% by 2020 compared with the US) and RoW adds 4%. The second scenario is demographic determinism. Demographics could influence the US share of GDP, which, with declining birth rates due to more affluent African-American and Hispanic populations, declines 0.02% per year and the EU declines, based upon an aging population and overall declining birth rates, by 0.07% per year. By 2020, “the relative gap between the U.S. and the EU

⁵⁹ “Euro” (Encarta.com), http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_1741502307/euro.html (Last visited October 16, 2004)

⁶⁰ FXhistory Historical Currency Exchange Rates, (Onada.com) <http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory> (Last visited October 16, 2004)

⁶¹ Posen, Adam S “Fleeting Equality: the relative size of the U.S. and EU economies to 2020,” (September 2004), 1, <http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/fp/cuse/analysis/posen20040901.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2004)

⁶² Ibid.

economies...is wider than in the baseline scenario, with the U.S. national income worth \$24.0 trillion, and the EU economy \$19.1 trillion (a 20% difference).” The last scenario is European reform, the one most beneficial to the EU. Posen predicts that with the accession of the 10 countries, the EU economy is expected to grow by 0.5% in 2008 and the same per year until 2020. In this situation, the US and EU economies decline at a slower rate, with the US share going from 21.1% to 20% and the EU from 21.3% to 18.6% by 2020.⁶³ Even though this is one source, and an unexpected prediction (I thought the EU economy would be a real competition to the US and may still be), the article further points out how the economic disparities, if they happen, will have consequences upon transatlantic relations. These predictions, if accurate, also illustrate that Americans are more productive than their European counterparts – we do not rely upon a socialist system to “take care of us” and do not have government imposed laws dictating businesses grant six vacation weeks annually to their employees. In France, they also have laws limiting the workweek to 35-37 hours per week, reducing the amount of labor input into the economy. If these government centered mandates continue, Posen’s theories may be realized, and all the talk of a United Europe to compete with the US may be over reaching.

Relative to economic growth of the EU, military spending (the military aspect of EU/US relations will be discussed shortly), or lack thereof by the EU member states, “...will deepen current debates over burden sharing, the sustainability of non-military expenditures for foreign policy or alliance efforts, and the sustenance of domestic arms production.”⁶⁴ He further states that competitiveness on both sides of the Atlantic could “...feed self-destructive economic policies...exaggerating the tension between provision of a social safety net and growth...”⁶⁵

⁶³ Posen, 2 All data for this paragraph from this page

⁶⁴ Ibid, 2-3

⁶⁵ Ibid., 3 Posen’s article was very interesting and I thought inclusion of some of his ideas and predictions compelling. It seems that either way, whether the EU becomes a serious competition to the US or not, there will be consequences to their relationship.

Part of the EU's structure includes the Common Agricultural and Fisheries Policies (CAP), a set of policies initially established to "...enable agricultural problems common to all countries to be dealt with by collective action..."⁶⁶ [such as external protection and providing markets for products]. It removed tariffs from products traded among the members of the EU and placed tariffs on imports from external countries. As membership has grown, adjustments have had to be made to accommodate for the introduction of the Eastern European countries, which are predominantly agrarian economies. A saturation of wheat and butter in the EU and international markets occurred for a time during this transition and negatively impacted the United States.

As the EU grows, so do the challenges of integrating these nations with various economic and governmental abilities. It is difficult to discern whether a strong economy will emerge from the enlarged EU, but what is probably reliable is that there will be consequences to the transatlantic relationship. The United States was initially encouraging of this union after WWII; hopefully it will not regret it.

The World Trade Organization

Discussion of trade leads to the introduction of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its impact on EU/US relations. The old saying that money makes the world go around is very true where the EU and US are concerned. Although much discussion thus far has focused on world-views and philosophies, economic concerns are important to their relationship, especially since the EU is growing larger and more powerful; a serious contender to the US at least economically.

Much of the contention in the WTO between the US and the EU has been over agricultural issues, hence the reason for introducing CAP above. The EU is not the only one to employ subsidies and protections on its agricultural markets. The US has a long history of subsidizing this industry to protect its farmers from the adverse affects of

⁶⁶ Jones, 210.

weather and markets. Hence, tensions have existed in the WTO over this issue given the partiality to subsidies by both parties. This is a highly charged political and economic issue for them; there are powerful lobbies and industries involved in the US and EU nations to fighting to protect their interests domestically.

The WTO, in tandem with the European Union and its growth, could affect the US considerably in years to come. The EU has found and will continue to find itself in a powerful position. Their world-view that trade and economic cooperation is the avenue for peace will influence and I think already has influenced the European Union's reliance on these multilateral organizations as negotiating tools, and, since they have gained more power in this area, will have the ability to chip away at the United States' desire to remain autonomous. The EU as a political and economic organization and the WTO are just the sort of institutions that EU members feel provide the vehicle to world cohesion. This ideal contrasts with the United States' view on the role of these organizations – they are not to supersede national sovereignty or interests but assist nations in collaborating on issues of mutual concerns to achieve a common solution. Condoleezza Rice, prior to becoming national security advisor, wrote:

Foreign policy will most certainly be internationalist, but it will also proceed from the firm ground of national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community.⁶⁷

This is not to say that the EU is benevolent for trying to spread world peace through these organizations. Lacking military leverage, therefore brute force power, the EU consortium has found an alternate vehicle to exercise its power – legitimacy – through world institutions:

...it[military weakness] has produced a powerful European interest in inhabiting a world where strength doesn't matter, where international law and international institutions predominate, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength have equal rights...Europeans have a deep interest in devaluing and eventually eradicating the brutal laws of an

⁶⁷ Javier Solana, "The Transatlantic Rift," *Harvard International Review* 24 (Winter 2003), 65

archaic, Hobbesian world where power is the ultimate determinant of national security and success.⁶⁸

It appears that the Europeans have not caught up with reality; terrorists are not rational, they cannot be negotiated with - Palestinians have repeatedly declined peace deals with Israel in favor of jihadism – the Taliban did not want to negotiate a peace with the US and defiantly stood their ground – the “insurgents” in Iraq have no inclination to negotiate peace with the US or its allies because they want us out and they do not want democracy to prevail. In light of these real-world crises, America has chosen to exercise its strength and hope for diplomacy later.

The EU wants the US to play along on their terms, disregarding its own national interests, as if the EU disregards its own interests. When, as in the case of the above mentioned treaties, the US does not play along because of flaws in the language of a treaty that could harm US interests, the EU cries out that the US is a unilateralist and does not abide by international law.⁶⁹ This directly questions US legitimacy, and this is the power some EU nations (along with other institutions and nations) have been able to wield over the United States.

C. The Military Relationship

While the end of the Cold War was a major victory for the West, it ushered in a period of adjustment and evolution that diminished the centrality of Europe for the United States. The disappearance of an existential threat, the reduced strategic importance of the European theater, and the increasing US focus on other priorities removed some of the glue from EU-US relations.⁷⁰

Throughout the Cold War, it was accepted by both parties that the United States secured and protected its European allies militarily with NATO and nuclear armaments

⁶⁸ Kagan, 6.

⁶⁹ Take for example the statement in September 2004 by Kofi Annan of the United Nations that the ‘invasion’ of Iraq was illegal under the UN Charter. This labeled the US as an international criminal. Let’s just forget the language passed by the UNSC in those dozens of resolutions that provided the legal legitimacy to use force if the resolutions were breached by Saddam Hussein (no fly zone breach for starters).

⁷⁰ Solana, 63

as deterrence against Soviet aggression because "...Americans did not mind the Europeans getting away with an almost free ride, convinced that their own security depended on that of Europe."⁷¹ Up until the end of the Cold War, "[i]ts (the Europeans) sole but vital strategic mission was to defend its own territory against any Soviet offensive...[they] remained the geopolitical pivot (between the US and the Soviets), allow[ing] Europeans to retain international influence well beyond what their sheer military capabilities might have afforded."⁷² Since the Communist threat has been removed from our shared reality with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the Atlantic Alliance security relationship has had to be reassessed and Europe has had to adjust to not being the "...strategic centrality..."⁷³ to American foreign policy. With the void left in Eastern Europe, both parties were befuddled about how to proceed. Only a new crisis in the region would test this new relationship, the security dilemma:

The Balkan conflict at the beginning of the decade revealed European military incapacity and political disarray; the Kosovo conflict at decade's end exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern warfare that would only widen in subsequent years.⁷⁴

The lack of or delay in the European response to the Balkan crisis could be justified and understandable because they may not have had time to build their military capabilities since the end of the Cold War and certainly not the experience in rapid deployment of troops. The US's delay in assistance was attributed to domestic concerns at home; an incumbent president still high on success from the Persian Gulf War and unwilling to become enmeshed in another battle, one that he and most Americans thought was "Europe's problem". Likewise, the Europeans saw the crisis as an opportunity to take on a new leading regional role. Jacques Poos, the President of Council of the European Union of Luxembourg said that "The age of Europe has

⁷¹ Croci, 484.

⁷² Kagan, 3.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Kagan, 4.

dawned.”⁷⁵ John Shalikashvili, an American four-star army officer stationed in Brussels said: “We forget this now, but...there was enormous optimism about what the new Europe could do...The Europeans could handle this one, they were saying...and the Americans were only too glad to accommodate them.” In addition, he also said that “The Europeans were not yet up to it, and the Americans were for a variety of reasons were taking time off.” Eventually, the US did provide air support to UNPROFOR, the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia as it was called, through NATO because “[t]he UNPROFOR forces had proved to be an almost perfect instrument for the Serbs, too weak to resist them...” and “...EU-UN forces, handicapped by exceptionally obtuse rules of engagement and without practical political objectives, were unable to cope.” In time, it was clear that NATO and a “...large US component”⁷⁶ would be needed and eventually did provide air support for relief and humanitarian efforts.

The more significant transparency of EU military ineffectiveness came during the Kosovo conflict between 1997 and 1999. With their past weakness in Bosnia, “[t]he Europeans, unsure that they wanted to make any new commitment in the Balkans, were waiting for American leadership.” That led to a new use of NATO as an offensive military force, rather than its intended role as a defensive force. This was advocated by General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander in Brussels: “Only the use of force by NATO... would stop him [Milosevic].” When the air campaign ensued “...the US flew more than 70% of the strike missions paid around 80% of the cost of the air campaign and provided even higher proportion of vital logistical assets.”⁷⁷ Although EU armed forces outnumber those of the US on the ground in Bosnia and Kosovo now, it is only possible because the mission is less demanding and has been stabilized by the initial air assault by the US.

⁷⁵ David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, (New York Touchstone, 2002), 85

⁷⁶ Ibid., 86; Ibid., 88, Ibid., 127, Kovacs, 447, Ibid

⁷⁷ Ibid, 397; Ibid., 396, Malcolm Chalmers, “A Transatlantic New Deal : What Europe should pay to promote US engagement”, *The Foreign Policy Centre*, Brief no.2. Europe and the Bush Presidency, 10.

The obvious military imbalance between the allies had a significant impact on their relationship; Although they "...ultimately stood together in the confrontation...the Kosovo war (in particular) produced in Europe less satisfaction at the successful prosecution of the war than unease at America's apparent omnipotence." Therein lays the crux of the matter: the European powers (mainly France and Germany) resent US strength because it means that the US, as in Kosovo, has the power to dictate global policy. Their military weakness was initially a product of post WWII reconstruction, whereby military security was provided by the US while they rebuilt their societies. Their weakness is recently a product of domestic realities in the EU nations where the population does not and will not tolerate increased spending on defense which would divert funding from social programs. The United States at times has spent up to 5% of GDP (Reagan era) on defense, but more consistently at 3%, while our EU counterparts as a whole have spent less than 2%.⁷⁸ In 2001, the United State's defense budget was 3.2% of GDP while the EU15 was 1.9%.⁷⁹ In 2003 US, defense spending was \$376 billion while its NATO partners equaled about \$140 billion.⁸⁰ The lack of funding by the EU powers, compared to US defense spending, demonstrates their world-view that power is not the vehicle for sustained peace, while US's funding demonstrates the opposite. It also illustrates that the US has assumed responsibility for maintaining world order and that Europe has declined to increase their responsibility, especially in light of the new world order shaping in its own backyard. There is lip service paid by the Europeans to increase military spending, but it falls on deaf ears and it is ultimately "...inconsistent with the ideals of postmodern Europe, whose very existence depends on the rejection of power politics...European integration has proved to be the enemy of European military power...and an important European global role."⁸¹ The paradox for Europe is that it has been at the hands of the US and our power that has allowed them

⁷⁸ Kagan, 5, *Ibid.*, 8.

⁷⁹ "Special Report: Europe in the world. Facing responsibility," *Economist*, 22 November 2002, 22

⁸⁰ Shawcross, 89.

⁸¹ Kagan, 21

their relative tranquility and removal from the major power politics of the world. The US has protected them for so long that Robert Kagan calls their world “paradise”. Consequently, as the risks around the world increase, and the European Union’s response is to criticize the United States for its “unilateral” actions, while not participating itself in addressing these threats (which are really global not just American), resentments fester on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Balkan conflicts of the 1990s was the beginning of Europe’s realization that they cannot match the US military strength and their discomfort with that realization (now that they don’t need the power directly for their security). Their world-view is to have military/power politics play less of a role in the world and to use their successful example of integration and cooperation as a model to solve world threats. However, I don’t think it’s quite that black and white; in Kosovo the EU used and saw the need for force, but they seem to abhor the use of power when used by the US for missions that are not directly related to European security and label those operations as “unilateral”. Although they would prefer less military engagement (as would the US I might add!), their overall angst with the US is that they no longer have Washington’s ear. This is one of the key points causing the current rift in the transatlantic alliance. Whether or not they ever truly held Washington’s ear is debatable.

When it has truly mattered, how often has the EU soft style approach effectively worked? The Iran negotiations that are in progress, which the EU is leading to stop their nuclear productions program, on the surface, support their view of international peacemaking. However, have the Iranians just appeased them? There is a theory that the Iranians are buying more time to work out the kinks in their nuclear program. Furthermore, the treaty is not legally binding without consequences if testing resumes. This makes me pause and ponder as to the true effectiveness of diplomacy without consequences. The US had a similar outcome with North Korea when Secretary Albright negotiated with them to stop their nuclear program. The US promised aid in exchange for the cessation of their nuclear testing program, however, they breached

that treaty by resuming, or so America says, testing. Consequently, we stopped sending our aid. Even with ramifications integral to a treaty, how effective was it for negotiating with a rogue state bent on advancing its own agenda?

CHAPTER IV

IRAQ AND THE DOMESTIC FRONT

A. The European Union

Several factors have been influencing certain EU nations' foreign policies and views about the United States, particularly in the last decade and particularly related to the Iraq War in 2003. Although those factors were prevalent throughout the Cold War, they are just now becoming transparent and, consequently, vital to understanding and hopefully fixing the transatlantic rift.

Anti-American sentiment has had a prominent place in European, especially French and German, societies for many years. Some may think that it is a recent phenomenon, a reaction against certain Bush Administration policies already discussed in this paper. In fact, "anti-Americanism was almost as virulent during the period of threatening totalitarianism [Communism] as it has been after the threat disappeared."⁸² It "...became the new rock 'n' roll."⁸³ Therefore, it appears that anti-Bush sentiments are a convenient scapegoat to hide the truth; anti-capitalism and general anti-Americanism. Poking fun at other cultures and religions is normal, but what is unusual about the form of anti-Americanism that is prevalent in some European nations is the political impact it has had on national elections, domestic politics and foreign policy.

In their last elections, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and French President Jacques Chirac campaigned on anti-American platforms particularly related

⁸² Revel, 3.

⁸³ Ibid , 79.

to the Iraq War, which neither country supported nor have they aided till this day. The Chancellor was in real danger of losing that election until he realized that the population was outraged against the Iraq War and, in turn, changed his political platform to support that sentiment. In fact, he "...deliberately created an atmosphere of anti-Americanism..." to the point that "...one of his ministers compared George W. Bush to Adolph Hitler."⁸⁴ Consequently, by playing the Iraq card, Schroeder was able to narrowly defeat his opponent and divert attention away from his dismal economic failures.

Likewise, Chirac, a man under the shadow of charges of corruption in France and also close to losing that election, won only because he was the lesser of two evils – his opponent, Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the far right National Front Party (NFP), was considered a fascist by the French population, so "[f]aced with the choice of "the crook versus the fascist," 80 percent of those who voted chose the crook."⁸⁵ His anti-American sentiments and desire to make a place for France as an opposing power to the US didn't hurt him either.

Spain was a member of the US coalition to invade Iraq. On March 11, 2004, there was a terrorist attack against a Spanish train in Madrid that claimed about 190 lives. It is believed that Al Qaeda is responsible. As a result of the disaster, the Spanish public voted Jose Maria Aznar out of office in support of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero who campaigned on an anti-Iraq platform by promising to remove Spanish troops from Iraq if elected. This is a powerful reminder of how domestic politics is affected by anti-American sentiments, in this case anti-Bush sentiments. President Zapatero did remove the troops. In essence, anti-Americanism, although a slow, background pulse for decades in Europe, gained momentum and influence on domestic political outcomes for two countries in particular.

⁸⁴ Revel, 103.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 99.

Tony Blair has taken much criticism by members of Parliament, his own cabinet and of course Britons for his support of President Bush in the war. He was referred to as Bush's poodle. So far, though, Blair has escaped a direct political defeat as a result of his US support. This may be that as a whole, Britain is more aligned philosophically with America than with its Continental peers.

The variety of challenges faced between the US and its EU allies after the Cold War over treaties, international organizations, military campaigns in the Balkans and a history of divergent world-views preceding those events, has culminated in a resurgence of anti-American sentiment, once just wallpaper on the wall in cafes, now a tiger difficult to tame. The effect of these sentiments has been to erode the perception of American legitimacy in global affairs, a matter to which we will return shortly. Another domestic political factor that is gaining power in Europe and particularly in France is its growing Muslim population. In order to understand the impact of this on France's local politics and how it shaped the Iraq debate in 2002-2003, a look into historical French Middle Eastern policies is important.

Ironically, Jacques Chirac, the current president and the chief opposer of the use of force against Saddam in 2003, is the same man who helped Saddam gain nuclear technology and sold him \$1.5 billion worth of weapons⁸⁶ with a convenient agreement to purchase Iraqi oil on "favorable terms" in 1975. The consequence of selling Iraq nuclear capabilities provoked the Israelis to bomb the Iraqi Osirak reactor in 1981. Saddam Hussein called Chirac "...a personal friend and a great statesman..."⁸⁷ In later years, particularly during the Iran-Iraq war (which Iraq initiated by invading Iran) Chirac tried to distance himself from his relationship with the Iraqi leader and, to Saddam's great dismay and anger, France backed the international United Nations coalition against Saddam after he invaded Kuwait in 1990. There is speculation that Saddam has used his past dealings with Chirac, which have been characterized as

⁸⁶ Shawcross, 93

⁸⁷ Ibid

unsavory and masked from public view, to blackmail him into certain behavior. This suspicion was fueled by a statement made by Saddam during an interview with French reporters given in 1991, after the Gulf War, to the question, “Has Iraq financially supported French politicians and...parties?”, which was published in *Notre Allie Saddam* [Our Ally, Saddam]:

Who did not benefit from these business contracts and relationships with Iraq?...With respect to the politicians, one need only refer back to the declarations of all the political parties of France, Right and Left. All were happy to brag about their relationship with Iraq and to refer to common interests. From Mr. Chirac to Mr. Chevenement... politicians and economic leaders were in open competition to spend time with us and flatter us. We have now grasped the reality of the situation [of France’s support of the 1991 Gulf War, a betrayal in Saddam’s eyes]. If the trickery continues, we will be forced to unmask them, all of them, before the French public.⁸⁸

In light of this, some of French behavior related to Iraq since the Gulf War makes sense, especially if the allegations are true. The French continued to side with Iraq during the late 1990s as mounting international pressure for Saddam to comply with weapons inspectors increased, part of numerous UN resolutions for them to disarm and allow the inspectors to enter the country to make that determination. In breaking news recently, has been the UN Oil-for Food scandal, in which high-level French officials are being implicated (along with some US oil companies perhaps and UN Secretary General Kofi Anan’s son Kojo Anan) in skimming off the money intended, through UN resolutions, for the Iraqi people. The extent of this scandal has not yet surfaced, but will be interesting to follow and apply to this thesis and analysis of why France resisted helping its longtime ally in the war.

In the meantime, Iraq and France had arranged some lucrative business dealings through French oil company Total/Fina/Elf, which gave them access to some prime oil fields in Iraq. The Majnoon oil field alone could produce an estimated 30 billion barrels of oil, enough to meet French needs for thirty years, along with the bin

⁸⁸ Shawcross, 96

Omar field with approximately 440,000 barrels a day. The estimated cost of production was around \$2 per barrel.⁸⁹ It is clear that the ties that bind France (Chirac in particular) and Iraq go back a long way and have influenced policymaking in France.

The Iraq relationship is a microcosm of a broader, long-term Arab French policy:

Since the end of World War II...the Middle East has been for France an essential piece of a global political project characterized by the attempt to transcend a purely regional... European role for itself...France saw itself as a potential mediator between East and West and...North and South. For France, the Middle East represented an ideal region for implementing this aim.⁹⁰

The Muslim population in France, estimated to be about 10%⁹¹ of the populace, is growing in political importance and is supported by this long pro-Arab history. During Chirac's political campaign in 2002, one of his "...inner circle...warned the president: If he backed the United States over Iraq, he would face nothing short of an "insurrection" from France's 5 million Muslims."⁹²

Europe as a whole is undergoing a profound shift in religious thinking. As I mentioned earlier, secularism has taken hold of the population. This movement transcends the separation of church and state in society, but rather a vehement opposition to any reference or influence of religion, in particular Catholicism:

The immediate crisis has been caused by opposition in the European Parliament to the nomination of Rocco Buttiglione, an Italian politician and devout Catholic, as European Commissioner for justice and home affairs.⁹³

Notable is that Buttiglione was forced to remove his candidacy after all. What this debate is indicative of is a growing "...tension between secular and religious views of "European values"..."⁹⁴ The writing of the EU Constitution sparked this controversy as discussion of whether to include references to the EU's Christian roots in its preamble

⁸⁹ Shawcross, 97.

⁹⁰ Dominique Moisi, "Iraq," in *Transatlantic Tension s. The U S , Europe and Problem Countries* ed. Richard N. Haas (Maryland Rowland & Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 125-126.

⁹¹ Caldwell, "Hating L'Oncle Sam", 10

⁹² Shawcross, 99

⁹³ "Real politics, at last?; Charlemagne," *The Economist* EUROPE, October 30, 2004.

⁹⁴ "Real politics "

emerged, and which did not make the final cut into the document. The Vatican was lobbying for inclusion, sparking for people in Europe old feelings of religious zealousness and control of the church over social rights. Europe holds dear to the International Conference on Population and Development (ICDP) and the International Women's Conference both which advocate for reproductive rights. Catholic beliefs contradict more recent tenets of the human rights community. Therefore, secularism, as a reaction against the Vatican and Catholicism and their inherent views on homosexuality and family values, which conflict with the liberal movement on the Continent, has taken root and is causing tension on the political front:

Fundamental to secular tradition is that church and state be separated, not that public officials hold no private religious beliefs of their own. Slowly, but surely, Europe is allowing some time-honored principles to be sacrificed in the name of secular fundamentalism. Catholics and other religious people are wondering how limited their roles might become in the future in Europe, even in non-public institutions such as universities.⁹⁵

As a result, an intolerance of religion has emerged in European society affecting domestic political outcomes.

There are many factors that influence the French political process, as it relates to US-French relations and French-Iraq/Arab relations. Anti-Americanism and pro-Arab policies, that include economic ties and a growing Muslim voting population within France, have already proven detrimental in the Iraqi War and to US-French relations. In addition to these factors, France has been particularly pursuant of being "different" from the US:

...in its tradition of being an independent voice against bigger powers, France displays a degree of resentment at the indication that coalition policy toward Iraq is dictated primarily by the United States.⁹⁶

Although other European nations may not adhere to French Iraqi policies, in

⁹⁵ "Eurothink," *The Washington Times*, Sunday, November 14, 2004, B02.

⁹⁶ Kenneth I. Justerm, "Iraq An American Perspective", in *Transatlantic Tensions: The US & Europe and Problem Countries* ed. Richard N. Haas (Washington DC. Brookings Institute, 1999), 107.

particular, and the Middle East in general, there exists a prevalent anti-American and anti-religious/secularist tone. European's world-view has allowed these factors to influence them domestically, which in turn has affected their views on the United States. It is now the flavor of the month to despise the US and its policies and European politicians definitely receive rewards for outwardly defying the United States. The US Presidential election outcome demonstrated that Americans do not fear a President who is outwardly Christian and who appears to be governed by his personal beliefs. Compare this outcome to the one mentioned above for the European Parliament. These factors could have continued serious consequences for future EU/US relations. If the US views the Europeans, France and to a lesser degree Germany as "out to get us", it will have the unfortunate consequence of alienating the US from trying to collaborate with them on key international issues.

B. The United States

The United States has been a superpower since the end of WWII. Why this resentment of US's status as a superpower or hyperpower today?⁹⁷ Europe did not mind it during the Cold War because US power was balanced by Soviet power, and as long as there was a communist threat in Europe's backdoor, European leaders had the ear of Washington and influence in US foreign policy affairs. However, Europe's security ceased to be a concern to Washington or Europe after communism was eliminated, thus reducing Washington's need for Europe's collaboration on matters of foreign affairs. Hence, the US entered into a period where it has been the only superpower, unchallenged by any other nation. This has been the concern for its EU allies – having too much power that does not require their consent, advice or approval for US operations. Of course, this oversimplifies the reality – the US has used the United Nations to gain international cooperation for many missions, such as the Gulf

⁹⁷ Herbert Vedrine coined the phrase "hyperpuissance" to describe current US superpower status

War, while the EU has conveniently ignored the UN in dealing with Kosovo, opting instead for NATO. Europe's claim that the US acts unilaterally without international agreement is stretching the truth. The reality is that the EU no longer has the same influence it once had in Washington, and that concerns the EU leaders:

Long accustomed to shaping the world, Europeans do not want to sit back now and let the United States do all the driving, especially when they believe that it is driving dangerously.⁹⁸

The threats of communism shaped and directed US/EU politics; they mostly agreed about the threat and what was required to defend themselves against it. Because the EU agreed with the US, they conferred legitimacy on us: "The influence of the United States...expanded during the postwar years, for the most part with the consent of those subject to it."⁹⁹ However, this has changed considerably for both sides – the perceptions of what threats exist and how to resolve them has divided them and has altered the political landscape of the United States. Domestic politics in the US beats to a different drum now, one of self-preservation and another of their mission to liberalize unrepresented populations. The United States National Security Strategy (NSS) was released on September 17, 2002, parts of which evolved from an important speech given by President Bush at West Point on June 1, 2002. The general gist of the strategy constructed a new approach for the United States on the global arena:

We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.¹⁰⁰

The strategy reflects a new thinking of how to respond to the new, unprecedented threats of the twenty-first century. America realized that it was vulnerable again, and had to rethink its "free security" (termed by a professor at Yale, C. Vann Woodward) again – a concept born out of geographic distance from Europe and later from a

⁹⁸ Robert Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* 83 (Mar/Apr 2004), 67.

⁹⁹ Gaddis, 64.

¹⁰⁰ Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," 83.

militarily strong nation. These were no longer the basis for our security after September 11, 2001 and our American identity was in crisis:

Suddenly Americans could no longer confidently work, travel, or even stay at home without fearing for their lives. The boundaries between everyday existence and a dangerous world had been shattered, as had the assumption of safety that had long become...part of what it meant to be an American. September 11th was not just a national security crisis. It was a national identity crisis as well.¹⁰¹

The role of the United States in the world evolved into to a lone superpower, and each military success increased confidence in its ability to “take on the world” wherever threats may exist. The events in the Balkans and the Gulf War crystallized in the American public and Washington’s psyche that they were the leaders of the free world. More importantly, by the close of the 1990s, the idea that the use of force was a necessary and an acceptable response to certain threats had been reinforced:

Beginning with the Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. military began to demonstrate just how devastating the combination of incomparable military power and cutting-edge innovation could be. A series of military victories – in the Gulf, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan – each a more impressive demonstration of American military virtuosity than the last, slowly convinced both civilian policymakers and the public that the U.S. military dominance now gave the nation a unique and unprecedented tool.¹⁰²

With the exception of Afghanistan (as that came later in the series of events I am going to describe), the military victories demonstrated for Americans (and perhaps the world) that they were a force to be reckoned with and invincible. However, 9/11 was a blow to this sense of invincibility and temporarily stunned us. How could we have been attacked on our own soil, we asked? In hindsight, a decade of these successful, global military campaigns and US’s role in defeating communism fed a feeling of invincibility in America. Americans were accustomed to responding to other nations’ internal conflicts and helping them to restore peace and order and provide humanitarian assistance. Americans have little experience with attacks against them on their own

¹⁰¹ Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy,” 83.

¹⁰² Philip H Gordon et al, *Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq*. (NY, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc, 2004), 56

soil; juxtapose that with the daily reminder to Americans that people around the world die daily fighting to come to the United States to search for the American dream and you have a population unable to comprehend how it is hated or how an attack could have actually happened. In other words, Americans had been lulled into a false sense of security, “free security”. US policymakers had been concerned about these threats, but much seemed to go unnoticed in the public. There wasn’t sufficient evidence that we would be attacked and there was not support from Americans to conduct preemptive operations.

During the mid to late 1990s, the United States experienced an unprecedented economic boom and period of relative security. Americans turned their focus inward. President Clinton was elected based upon a platform of “it’s the economy stupid” and not on foreign policy. Americans grew weary of overseas missions and wanted domestic concerns to be the government’s priority. Domestic politics within the US was influenced by a variety of these concerns. After 9/11, Americans were forced out of their revelry to face the realities of a new world, a new threat, and this would be the defining factor of twenty-first century US politics.

Our sense of military virtuosity still existed, and Americans got hard to work in showing the world that they were not going to “sit back and take that!!” September 11th galvanized the American people in a way unseen since Pearl Harbor and catapulted them into a new self-defined world role. That event has had a huge psychological impact on Americans, one that the Europeans have not fully grasped. Dominique Moisi, a French foreign policy expert said, “[i]n the past, the Americans needed us against the Soviets and would never go so far as to punish France for straying. However, that changed after 9/11. You have been at war since then, and we have not, and we have not integrated that reality into our thinking [and what that means] in terms of America’s willingness to go it alone. We have fewer common interests now and

more divided emotions.”¹⁰³ Americans perceive the threat of terrorism differently than Europeans and we are willing to act unilaterally if necessary, since, as our experience has proven, we have both the resolve and the military capability to do so. Actually, Americans are just returning to their early roots of unilateralism that John Quincy Adams formulated for the US in the nineteenth century to respond to the security problems of his time:

Equally influential within the American diplomatic tradition was a second Adams doctrine [the first was preemption], that of *unilateralism*. The idea here was that the United States could not rely upon the goodwill of others to secure its safety, and therefore should be prepared to act on its own.¹⁰⁴

Bush is being accused of acting unilaterally; that he did not secure the consent and support of US traditional allies (France and Germany) to go to war in Iraq. Our tradition of defending American security could certainly support that perception. However, the NSS actually, according to Gaddis, indicates a more multilateralist language than we are used to employing. Note the terminology of *cooperation and encouragement*: “Bush calls for cooperation among the great powers... [and] specifies the encouragement of free and open societies on every continent.”¹⁰⁵ These words certainly do not suggest coercion and domination, but a working together. Nevertheless, we are a nation that does not often hesitate to defend and secure our liberty and freedom when we feel that it is threatened and that has been the unilateralist criticism. Our early founders fought the bloody Revolutionary War to forge a brand new nation, against the odds of the time. I believe that war carved out an identity of a people who are willing to go to any lengths to fight for their liberty; we feel threatened again from an un-masked enemy and have taken up arms to defend ourselves.

¹⁰³ Thomas L. Friedman, “The Western Front.” *The New York Times*, March 23, 2003, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50713FC3D540C708EDDAA0894DB404482&incamp=archive:search> (accessed March 23, 2003).

¹⁰⁴ Gaddis, 22.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 84

Consequently, this new mission Americans find themselves in has affected the Atlantic Alliance relationship. We have the capability of engaging in prolonged military campaigns without the aid or consent of the EU and since the collapse of the Soviet threat, the EU is no longer central to US foreign policy. US focus has moved away from securing Europe. US world-view, little unchanged since the Cold War began, is one that involves the use of force to protect its freedoms and to extend freedom to others, so hard fought for in the Revolutionary War and later in the War of 1812. Since 9/11 Americans' perception on the applicable and necessary uses of force changed:

In the 1980s the U.S. military conducted 19 foreign operations to 14 different countries; in the 1990s it conducted 108 such operations to 53 different countries...this increased pace reflected in part greater flexibility accorded to the United States by the demise of the Soviet Union, [and] it also increasingly reflected a belief that U.S. military power had become more effective and more applicable to foreign policy problems.¹⁰⁶

As the war on terrorism intensified, the Bush Administration sought ways to eliminate the threat. Along with key allies such as Britain, Spain, Australia and East European nations, we saw a national and international security threat in Iraq and paved a way to eliminate Saddam Hussein from power, once and for all. The decade-long violations of United Nations resolutions to dismantle Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and nuclear weapons programs gave the leverage to us to pursue this agenda. Whether the US wanted to make war on Iraq for old personal reasons, a threat of WMDs or any other number of legitimate claims, they knew that they had the capability of executing a victory and removing Saddam Hussein from power. After 9/11, policymakers were no longer willing to take chances with US security, and had good public support for invading the country. Although Bush did seek UN support by detailing how the resolutions had been repeatedly violated by Saddam and pointing to intelligence that indicated his existing WMD and nuclear programs and capabilities, he

¹⁰⁶ Gordon, *Allies at War*, 57

knew that the US could invade Iraq without our traditional allies' support (but still had the support of 30 countries) and would have to if pushed, which we were.

The tendency and willingness for the US to consult with its allies on foreign policy matters and request support decreased for the reasons stated above, but also because of some anger towards its EU partners. At every turn there seemed to be some opposition, whether warranted or legitimate, to US policies and as the 1990s progressed further criticism of its stance against the ICC Treaty and Kyoto Protocol. Again, that was due to Europe's increased desire to set itself apart from the US, but nonetheless had the effect of alienating the US and decreasing its desire to seek EU counsel.

During the Iraq debate, France in particular was campaigning around the globe trying to convince other nations not to support the US war in Iraq and stonewalling support in the UN Security Council. It is also reported that French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin "...told Powell that France would support military action against a defiant Saddam, and then reneged at the last minute."¹⁰⁷ The American people were becoming outraged. A national campaign ensued to boycott French products in opposition of French attitude and ingratitude. Anti-Europeanism was on the rise in the United States. Americans responded by being increasingly willing to act alone. More and more I hear phrases such as "those damn French" in everyday conversations.

John Kerry, the failed democratic candidate in the 2004 presidential election, campaigned that he could bring these allies to the table and create a multilateral coalition. The nation obviously had doubts about that, as do I. Many EU leaders built their incumbencies on an anti-American posture and Chirac stated that he wouldn't send troops to Iraq, nor did he send troops, when asked (I thought that we were unilateralists!) by us, to give support for the Afghan elections in October, 2004.

Many say that Bush is whom they defy. The intelligentsia of Europe does not care for him, while Kerry comes from the same aristocratic, albeit American,

¹⁰⁷ Bill O'Reilly, "No Brie for Me," *BillOReilly.com* (Weekly Column), 1 June 2004 website (accessed July 6, 2004).

intelligentsia mold with which they are comfortable. However, the deeper dislike, even disdain for Bush, is his religious posture, his open comfort with speaking about God and the exercise of his moral compass in tandem with his beliefs. Kerry might have provided the bridge, but at what cost?

CHAPTER V

LEGITIMACY AND IRAQ

The crisis over Iraq in 2003 was a confluence of a slow, yet increasing disagreement on the proper use of force, and roles of international organizations and international law in addressing global threats. Obscured by the Cold War differing European and American world-views became apparent as debates were waged over a myriad of issues outlined in this thesis. Dominique de Villepin said that the Iraq debate was about "...two visions of the world...[t]he differences over Iraq were not only about policy. They were also about...principles."¹⁰⁸ Therefore, the rift in the Alliance, as a result of the Iraq War, has been in the making for several years.

This is the critical time in history that could mar the future alliance. It has already occurred to some extent. The question is whether either side realizes the danger the rift could have for future world order. If these two democratic entities cannot agree on the threats that face the world and work collaboratively to effect change, the world could be in serious trouble:

A great philosophical schism has opened up in the West, and a mutual antagonism threatens to debilitate both sides of the transatlantic community. At a time when new dangers and crises are proliferating rapidly, this schism could have serious consequences.¹⁰⁹

Was it just a difference in world-views, philosophies and the like that prompted some of our European allies to oppose the US in Iraq? Underlying the current climate of anti-Americanism (and some could say it is more about anti-Bush), at least in Europe, is that "...a majority of Europeans h[ave] come to doubt the legitimacy of U.S.

¹⁰⁸ Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," 65.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 66

power and of U.S. global leadership.”¹¹⁰ How has this happened? Again, many argue that President Bush is the cause of this sentiment towards the US, but I have outlined that it was mainly during the 1990s, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, that these different viewpoints surfaced and, ultimately, that the freedom from communism in Europe’s backyard provided leverage to its leaders to openly criticize and defy US policies (where in the past it was usually less overt). The EU sought to define itself during and after the Cold War through international organizations and treaties, but most conspicuously afterwards, and the US has not always played along; for the US national interests, as always, trumped international interests. This protectionism has been unacceptable and infuriating to the EU, and slowly resentment has built towards us. As the United States marches forward addressing global problems through a lens of national security interests, our allies withdraw from us more and more. This is one reason for the crisis of legitimacy the US faces. Robert Kagan states that US legitimacy rested on three pillars of legitimacy: a perception by Europeans that the Soviet Union posed a threat to them that only the US could counter; they believed that communism was a mutual ideological threat; and that due to the strength of both superpowers, the US’s power was kept in check.¹¹¹

Why is US legitimacy important? If the EU had not questioned the legitimacy of US action in Iraq perhaps the situation on the ground would not be so dangerous. If the EU had helped militarily and given us public as well as Security Council support perhaps the terrorists on the ground in Iraq would not have been so emboldened to kidnap and behead victims. With the obvious knowledge that the United States is the sole world superpower, and has not used its power for imperialist motives, but instead to help with humanitarian efforts, to help its European allies in the Balkans, even when we didn’t want to, why would our allies now question our legitimacy and use of our

¹¹⁰ Kagan, “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy, 66.

¹¹¹ Ibid, 67

power? They have benefited from it for decades, and when we needed their help, some have recently turned their back on us (that is how many Americans feel). Europeans do not see it that way, but rather that it is somehow their duty to try to restrain this runaway power! In fact, Charles Krauthammer, a news columnist, wrote that “[t]he Iraq crisis, and the roiling uneasiness in the world about U.S. policy, have provided France with an opportunity for the ultimate grand stroke – an attempt to actually break the American monopoly of power in the world...France is trying to contain the U.S.”¹¹² Kagan reiterates this by saying that “...Europe’s assaults on the legitimacy of U.S. power dominance may also become an effective way of constraining and controlling the superpower.”¹¹³ Whether or not that is true, their goal of trying to do this may have the effect of increasing anti-Americanism and disdain for us and resistance to helping America in its fight against terrorism.

Certain EU powers, those that wish to make a mark for themselves in their region, have questioned the US’s right to preemptive attack because they do not perceive the same threat and do not feel directly threatened in the same manner the US feels threatened; hypocrisy exudes here. When the Europeans needed the US military power to secure it and make it whole whether it was from the Soviet threat or during the Balkan crisis, US power was welcomed and legitimized. Since US focus has changed to the Middle East and the “war on terrorism.”¹¹⁴ Europeans have felt out in the cold. They have lost influence with Washington, directly felt when the US went to war in Iraq without UNSC approval or their approval, and “...United States...crisis of legitimacy ...is in large part because Europe wants to regain some measure of control over Washington’s behavior,”¹¹⁵ hence, a continued influence in world affairs, a position they believe is part of their long tradition and heritage. This is a legacy they see slipping away from their grasp.

¹¹² Charles Krauthammer, “France’s Game,” *Time*, 17 March 2003

¹¹³ Kagan, “America’s crisis of Legitimacy,” 68.

¹¹⁴ Note that the EU uses different language: “fight against terrorism” not ‘war’

¹¹⁵ Kagan “America’s crisis of Legitimacy,” 68.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The crisis over Iraq was a watershed moment in the relations between the United States and the European Union, but it was also an accumulation of other factors that were precipitated by the end of the Cold War and the communist threat. This is a new era in world affairs; each nation is discovering its place in a world not dominated by Soviet-US relations, where in the past they may have had a defined role to play on one side or the other. Many nations were able to manipulate the situation to their advantage like obtaining aid money and/or armaments such as in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War, or in the case of the EU, an influence in Washington's foreign policy decision-making.

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has been attempting to define its new role as a world power, but discovering that it lacks certain strengths, especially military strength. As outlined in this thesis, they had to depend upon the United States to provide the military offenses in Kosovo, but at the same time resented the help. When the Iraq crisis bloomed, there was already a feeling in Europe that the US was acting unilaterally in many international negotiations by opposing the ICC and Kyoto Treaties, and playing double standards by denouncing the ABM treaty. The EU was appalled when the US signed bi-lateral treaties with many of the ICC signatories exonerating US military personnel from the tenets of the treaty; it was considered an act of unilateralism. These issues exacerbated the prevalent anti-American sentiment across Europe. When President Bush began talk of a war with Iraq in response to repeated UN

resolution violations, there was immediate resistance by many world leaders because they (France and Germany) did not want to be seen as acquiescing to US foreign policy.

The real issue of this thesis is not to denigrate the sovereign nations of France and Germany, who have the right to have their own opinions and policies, for disagreeing with US foreign policy in Iraq. The issue is what form the disagreement took, the reasons for it, what led to it and most importantly, the cost the divergence between the US and the EU, as it reflected in the Iraq debate, will have and has had on the global fight on terrorism and on the ground in Iraq. Reasons like resentment, anti-Americanism, a need to stand apart from the US and to make a power play (even monetary) seem to be what drove some EU powers to go a different way than the US and its allies in Iraq. Even within the EU, there is dissension and disagreement about the proper role of Europe in the Iraq crisis. My question is whether those reasons were valid enough to jeopardize the alliance over an issue that should be of mutual concern – the interference and violation of international law by Iraq, and the work that needs to be done in the world to secure it from terrorism.

The cooperation between the US and the EU powers helped to defeat communism and even though at times they did disagree on issues and policies, they were able to put them aside to fight their mutual enemy. And ironically enough, Europe did experience its own terrorist attack in Spain, which the Spanish responded to by appeasing the situation and electing a candidate which opposed its forces being in Iraq. Even now, the Iranian negotiations are an attempt to appease by negotiating with empty treaties rather than imposing sanctions or reprisals for resumption of nuclear power testing. The threats of WMDs and terrorism are just as close to Europe, if not closer, than they have been to the US. Therefore, the question arises, “Why aren’t they more scared or working more diligently to thwart that threat?” Many nations did not see the connection between terrorism and Iraq, and they say that terrorism has increased since the US invasion there, thereby validating their position not to join the coalition. Perhaps if more EU powers had been willing to side with and provide ‘legitimacy’ to the

US, a country that has repeatedly “gone to bat” for them in numerous conflicts, maybe less violence would have ensued in Iraq. Saddam was able to use the divergence to his advantage during the struggle in the Security Council. He was able to use that weakness in consensus to stall inspectors and create havoc between the traditional allies.

This divergence has been a long time coming, reflected in various disputes already discussed in this thesis, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, and has provided a platform for nations who lost their “idea” of themselves since the 15th-19th centuries, to regain some glory. These nations need to realize that the United States is the superpower, which the EU relied on during the Cold War, and that unless they built up their own armies rapidly and efficiently, that they cannot become a pole to the US like the Soviet Union was. These “[c]ritics of U.S. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative. If the United States retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world – and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark Age.”¹¹⁶

There are two sides to the issue about cooperation; the United States sees that “[s]imply complaining about US unilateralism will not help to shift American thinking. Rather than denouncing the US, the EU should focus on getting its act together, by improving its own foreign policy performance.”¹¹⁷ If the EU is concerned that the US doesn’t listen to them or care about their views, then the EU should stop complaining about US policies at every turn, a tendency that has been growing for over a decade. The United States observes that it can do no right in the eyes of the EU; when it doesn’t respond to a crisis, it is criticized and when it does respond it is criticized. The EU sees that “[i]f Washington show[ed] more respect for the agendas of others, they [others] are

¹¹⁶ Niall Ferguson, “A World Without Power,” *Foreign Policy*, no.142 (Jul/Aug 2004): 32

¹¹⁷ Steven Everts, “Divided they Stand,” *World Link* 15, no 2 (March 2002): 4.

more likely to respond to ours [US].”¹¹⁸ There is a perception around the world, and in the EU, that the United States does not show concern for other governments’ points of view. Perhaps this criticism is correct. However, we must remember our earlier discussion of world-views: the US sees itself as the only power able to respond to world crises and is willing to use force. The US is finding less resolve and commitment in its traditional allies to assist them and thus it acts “unilaterally”, even when other countries do join it as in Iraq!

Both sides have much to learn from one another – they should listen to each other. A dialogue has to ensue. If not, the danger is that the Western alliance will fail to respond to common threats of the 21st century. I think that the US cannot fight this fight alone, nor should it have to: “The big lesson from Iraq is that the international community should remain united...”¹¹⁹ More importantly, “[i]f both the United States and Europe could come to a consensus, despots and human-rights violators would have a far more difficult time sustaining power, as no sovereign nation could handle the brunt of the two greatest armies in the world.”¹²⁰

In conclusion, the need should be seen for the EU powers to combine their roles as democracies and strength of legitimacy, economy and integration with the power of the United States military, economy and its democratic role to fight the new fight, terrorism, and to help Iraq to become another democratic nation. Even if some key EU nations opposed how the US went into Iraq, they should at least recognize that its assistance could help destroy the insurgent opposition. They [Europeans] should “...wake up to the fact that their security now depends more than ever on developments that will take place beyond their borders.”¹²¹ Europeans have alienated Americans also by repeated criticisms, albeit valid ones, without providing alternative solutions to the

¹¹⁸ Edward C. Luck, “Making the World Safe for Hypocrisy”, *The New York Times*, 22 March 2003, A11.

¹¹⁹ Pape, 62.

¹²⁰ M Edward Guest, “Will a dominant Europe emerge again?” *Kentucky Kernel* (U-Wire-University of Kentucky), May 1, 2003, Database Factiva http://80-global.factiva.com.libproxy.txstate.edu/en/eSrch/ss_hl.asp Document uwnr000020030502dz5100034 (accessed July 6, 2004).

¹²¹ Gordon, *Allies at War*, 197.

problems. Therefore, “by criticizing the Americans whatever they do, and on every occasion – even when they are in the right – Europeans...compel them [Americans] to disregard their objections...The American reflex, conditioned by the constant avalanche of anathemas coming at them, causes them to keep thinking: “They’re always blaming us, so why consult them at all?”¹²² In “Allies at War”, Gordon and Shapiro reverberate this thought: “The more Europeans reject the notion that some international problems have to be dealt with by force, the more they reinforce the conclusion among some Americans that consultation is a waste of time and Washington must go it alone.”¹²³ On the other side, the US should do more to listen to its allies and its concerns, or work diligently to change the perhaps somewhat false perception that it doesn’t listen:

...even the appearance of taking the world seriously would enhance American influence immeasurably – from European intellectuals to Islamic fundamentalists, anti-Americanism feeds voraciously off the claim that the United States is callously indifferent to their views and needs of others.¹²⁴

What other countries do not seem to want to understand is that with the power that the United States possesses comes certain responsibilities - which we have taken upon ourselves for our own security but which are also beneficial to the rest of the world. Bush said that “We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act.”¹²⁵

This alliance is in danger of disintegrating because each views the use of force and power differently. Each sees its role in the world differently. So many factors have been culprits to the slow rift that has evolved since the end of the Cold War and climaxed over the Iraqi War, that it may appear to be sudden or without historical patterns already in place. This thesis has attempted to illustrate that these various factors were camouflaged under the Communist threat, because of the necessity both sides saw of not playing them up. However, once the threat was lifted, Europe saw a

¹²² Revel, 171.

¹²³ Gordon, 196

¹²⁴ Ibid, 200

¹²⁵ Gaddis, 85

horizon clear of danger and thus open for redefining its global role. Issues such as anti-Americanism, a growing Muslim population, and a reliance on international organizations and law were all prevalent before the post-Cold War era. America on the other side has continued mostly on the same path – one of superpower used to using force when necessary to defend its and others' liberty and extending freedom to other countries.

The challenge that exists for the US and the EU is how to marry these divergent world-views to the benefit of all, without sacrificing its own ideals and history. For those powers within the EU who are stubbornly holding on to appeasement and negotiation as the solution to all world problems and rejecting out of hand any use of force to secure its own and others' security, they need to rethink their belief system and challenge their constituents to alter theirs as well. For those in the US that are dedicated to forging only a US vision in the world, putting aside its allies concerns, they need to realize that we live in a global world reliant as much on others' economies as their goodwill. So why not embrace these differences and utilize each one's strengths to assist the alliance?

APPENDIX

Table 1 Manpower in European Armies, 1900-1918 (World War 1)						
	1900		1910		1914	
	Standing Army	War Potential	Standing Army	War Potential	Standing Army	War Potential
Austria-Hungary	361, 693	1,872,178	397,132	2,750,000	415,000	1,250,000
United Kingdom	231,851	677,314	255,438	742,036	247,432	110,000
France	598, 765	2,500,00	612,424	3,172,000	736,000	1,071,000
Germany	600, 516	3,000,000	622,483	3,260,000	880,000	1,710,000
Italy	262, 684	1,063,635	238,617	600,00	256,000	875,000

Source John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York. W W Norton & Company, 2001), 303.

Table 2 Relative Share of World Wealth, 1830-1910									
	1830	1840	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910
UK	47%	57%	59%	59%	53%	45%	32%	23%	15%
Germany	4%	4%	3%	9%	13%	16%	16%	21%	20%
France	18%	14%	10%	12%	11%	10%	8%	7%	6%
US	12%	12%	15%	13%	16%	23%	35%	38%	48%

Source John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York. W W Norton & Company, 2001), 220.

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