

PIONEERS OF PEACE: STUDIES IN TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY

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1: INTRODUCTION

The field of international relations contains a vast conceptual framework in which many theories have emerged and attempt to explain the behavior of political actors. Many of these theories have focused on the contest and constraints between major global powers. However, since World War II many of the world's intense and intractable conflicts have been between different identity groups within a country. Many conflicts around the globe today have not been wars between states, but rather smaller conflicts characterized as protected internal conflicts.

Over the past half-century, violent and protract conflicts between identity groups have dismayed and challenged the international community.¹ Its response has been extremely active in seeking to terminate intrastate wars and rebuild civil society with an array of regional bodies, development agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations like the United Nations (UN). (In this thesis identity groups are defined as a collection of individuals whom associate with each other through commonalities in cultural, ethnic, or religious affiliation.) These efforts have had a considerable impact. Not only interstate conflict but intrastate as well has seen a considerable decline since the mid-1990s. Critics of the international approach to peace building and development, however, describe the international community's proscriptive methods as mechanical and unresponsive to the ways “formal institutions depend on the actions and practices of their component individuals and groups.”² International commitments to peacebuilding and development assume that success requires putting in place the right programs. Often these

¹ Fisher, Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse 2001, p.307.

² Lund, Intrastate Conflicts and the Problem of Political Will, 6.

programs ignore local personalities and group perceptions. The traditional approach pays little or no attention to fostering “buy-in” from the very societies that the international community endeavors to help.³ The mixed performance of the international community in areas of peacebuilding and conflict resolution has inspired an exploration for more effective means to resolve intractable social conflicts and advance towards a sustained peace.

Alternative methods of Conflict Resolution, which fall outside the purview of traditional approaches, are advanced in the field of “Track Two diplomacy”. American Foreign Service Officer Joseph Montville, coined the term “Track Two diplomacy” to describe the methodology and field research of earlier scholars. Montville defines Track Two diplomacy as

Unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups or nations which aims to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human material resources in ways that might help resolve their conflict...Track Two diplomacy is a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or, in the first instance, to manage conflicts by exploring possible solutions out of public view and without the requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage.”⁴

Track two diplomacy is a process designed to assist official leaders to resolve or, in the first instance, to manage conflicts by exploring solutions out of public view and without requirements to formally negotiate or bargain for advantage. Track two diplomacy seeks political formulas or scenarios which might satisfy the basic security and esteem needs of the parties to a particular dispute. On its more general level, it seeks to promote an environment in a political community, through the education of public opinion, that would make it safer for political leaders to take risks for peace.”⁴

Montville describes Track Two diplomacy as another tool that can fit into the statecraft tool kit. Track Two facilitators engage antagonists in a conflict in a set of informal talks designed to supplement official negotiations and “is in no way a substitute for official, formal, 'track one' government-to-government or leader-to-leader relationships.”⁵ Montville

³ Lund Intrastate Conflicts and the Problem of Political Will, 6.

⁴ Burton Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, 7.

⁵ Burton, Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy, 7.

was interested in persuading his diplomatic colleagues that such dialogues could produce positive outcomes in peace negotiations. Montville felt troubled by the “long standing professional bias against nonofficial involvement in international affairs was leading his colleagues to dismiss something which was subtly changing the landscape of their profession, whether they liked in or not.”⁶ Montville recognizes that national leaders engaged in a *protracted social conflict* are often unable to seek peaceful solutions despite the need for leaders to be, or at least seem to be, formidable in the face of the enemy. A leader who risks peace in a time of great tension, without sufficiently preparing his constituents, could lose their political base, or even face assassination. The utility of Track Two diplomacy is to assist officials in exploring possible solutions out of public view without bargaining for advantage or producing any binding agreements.⁷

Theoretical Framework

Despite the considerable literature on Track Two diplomacy and boarder unofficial conflict resolution techniques, scholars have conducted relatively few comparative case studies on these initiatives or their relationship to the ultimate outcome of a peace negotiation. Based on the premise that unofficial negotiation encourages a constructive dialogue that 1) changes the attitudes of the participants enough to acknowledge the feasibility of peace 2) designs mutually acceptable solutions to conflict and 3) transfers the sentiments into the official peace agreements, this thesis will attempt to shed light on the successes and failures of two cases of Track Two diplomacy. An exploration of these cases could provide potential value for understanding the factors which enhance or undermine Track Two initiatives. This thesis explores the factors in the unofficial negotiations process

⁶ Jones Track Two: Diplomacy in Theory and Practice, 9.

⁷J. V. Montville A Case for Track Two, 7.

that contributed to the parties' decisions in two identity-based conflicts: The Mozambique peace process (1990-1994) and the Harvard Study Group (HSG) initiative in Cyprus (1999-2003)

The research in this thesis will analyze this question in two case studies: What is required for success in Track Two diplomacy? And What are the limits to Track Two Diplomacy? The research reviews the strategies and internal factors employed by mediation teams and examines how their efforts impacted the overall peace process. The strategies and internal factors employed by the mediation teams in the two case studies will be examined under the analytical framework provided by Edward Azar and Herbert Kelman, whose scholarship greatly contributed the study of unofficial conflict resolution techniques. Their research suggests that intractable conflicts, such as the Mozambique civil war or the Cyprus crisis, are not just driven by objective interests, such as territorial or sovereignty issues -- they are also driven by basic human needs, such as acknowledgement, representation, and legitimization of different identities. However, their research fails to address the role of culture in conflict dynamics. Culture is an essential part of any conflict. Culture can be a variable that can help or serve to hamper Track Two diplomacy initiatives. Ultimately, the Mozambique case ended in a negotiated settlement, while the Cyprus case did not. The Mozambique civil war was a conflict within a generally homogenous cultural zone, but the Cyprus case was a conflict between disparate cultural systems. A generally homogenous cultural zone can be defined as social groups within a geographic region that share a common historical background. Likewise, disparate cultural systems can be defined as dissimilar social groups from essentially different historical backgrounds. Although cultures are powerful, they are often subconscious, influencing conflicts and attempts to resolve them in imperceptible ways.

Analyzing specific cases like Mozambique and Cyprus yields insights into a process that may teach us lessons that can enhance our understanding of conflict resolution. The peace process in Mozambique was a success in part because of the Community of Sant'Egidio's efforts. However, Sant'Edigio officials were not polished academics, or professional diplomats. A group of high school students formed the Community of Sant'Egidio in 1968. The founders based their institution on the principles of prayer, friendship, and service. Years later, the amateur diplomats would facilitate a peace process of immense complexity, which produced lasting effects. The Cyprus case was much the contrary. A group of academically trained professionals, known as the Harvard Study Group (HSG), facilitated an unofficial dialogue between Greek and Turkish participants while a simultaneous UN sponsored official dialogue was underway, aimed at achieving an official peace settlement. Despite efforts by both official and unofficial mediators, intercommunal negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots collapsed. This thesis will attempt to examine each case using the framework provided by the early scholarship into unofficial conflict mediation.

A useful starting point would be to offer an overview to the early scholarship into Track Two diplomacy. Before Montville coined the term Track Two diplomacy, John Burton, in the mid-1960s, introduced the concept of unofficial mediation facilitated by a third party.⁸ A central component to Burton's initial foray into conflict mediation was the idea that basic human needs lie at the heart of intractable conflicts. Burton identified physical security, effective participation, and acceptance of identity as basic human needs. Individuals strive to satisfy these basic human needs through the formation of identity groups. In his

⁸ Fisher, *Historical Mapping of the Field of Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 65.

research, Burton labeled these human needs as "non-negotiables" and the denial of such needs would likely result in conflict.⁹ Burton used the term *deep-rooted conflict* to identify conflicts that are not based on tangible, negotiable interests, and positions, but underlying needs that cannot be compromised.¹⁰

During his career, Burton led many mediation efforts using his *controlled communication* approach. His methodology would involve bringing together representatives of groups or states engaged in violent conflict in private, informal discussions in the presence of an impartial third party.¹¹ Burton saw the role of the third party to be injecting knowledge regarding the conflict dynamic and help the participants stand back from the conflict and view it as a problem to be solved.¹² The ultimate goal of controlled communication is that the exploratory dialogue between two adversaries that could provide a path toward mutually satisfying solutions. A prime benefit of the controlled communication approach to the overall peace process is in preparing the groundwork for negotiation by establishing the conditions under which it can be successful.¹³

The research in this thesis will draw heavily on the work of Edward Azar. Similar to the concept of *deep-rooted conflict*, Azar coined the term *protracted social conflict* (PSC) to denote ongoing disputes based on identity between communal groups over a long period of time.¹⁴ According to Azar, historical factors in multi-communal societies can lead to structural inequalities and differential access to governing authority, which could result in one group

⁹ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 31.

¹⁰ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 6.

¹¹ Jones, *Track Two: Diplomacy in Theory and Practice*, 8.

¹² Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 27.

¹³ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 28.

¹⁴ E. E. Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 18.

gaining a monopoly on political power.¹⁵ Countries that are vulnerable to PSCs typically come from a colonial legacy of "divide and rule."¹⁶ In the wake of decolonization, the new rulers came to power and kept the inequitable power structures in place, which led to mass disenfranchisement.

In examining these historical divisions, Azar adopted the basic human needs analysis from Burton to further explain his PSC model. Azar argued that human needs are the primary motivating factor in conflict dynamics.¹⁷ The satisfaction of basic human needs (physical security, effective participation, and acceptance of identity) is fundamental to state building. Hostility and distrust are not the only factors driving protracted social conflicts. But also, the dissatisfaction of intangible needs that are necessary for individuals to grow and develop can keep a conflict active over a long period of time. More so than Burton's *deep-rooted conflict*, Azar's PSC model provides a social and political context to intractable identity-based conflicts.

The research in this thesis will also use Herbert Kelman's *interactive problem-solving* workshop model to provide a framework for evaluation of the two case studies. Kelman's blend of conflict mediation took inspiration from Burton's *controlled communication* approach but incorporated social-psychological aspects in his analysis. Like Burton's approach, Kelman proposes to bring together representatives of conflicting parties in a relatively isolated and preferably academic setting to engage in face-to-face communication with the guidance of social scientists.¹⁸ However unlike Burton, a set of assumptions, which Kelman

¹⁵ Fisher, *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, 308.

¹⁶ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 80.

¹⁷ E. E. Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 20.

¹⁸ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 59.

derived from a social-psychological analysis, "informs" his workshops about the nature of international and intercommunal conflicts and conflict resolution.¹⁹

Kelman emphasized the facilitative role of the third-party in his problem-solving approach. The third party sets the ground rules and enforces the agenda. Kelman's research expands the responsibilities of the mediating team. The third party does not take part in the substantive discussions between the participants but guides the dialogue in a constructive direction that will foster an atmosphere of exploration. The task of the third party is to create the conditions that allow ideas for the resolution of a conflict to develop out the interaction between the participants. In Kelman's workshops, it is crucial for the third party to not impose its ideas on the participants. But rather it is necessary for the participants to develop their own solutions to the conflict. Meanwhile, the third-party should only act as a repository of trust for the participants who, by definition, do not trust each other.²⁰ The goal of Kelman's workshops is to create an environment where participants can accrue specific insights about the other side that are significant enough to be fed into the political discourse and the policies related to the conflict.

The research in this thesis will use the work of Azar and Kelman as a framework to evaluate the successes and shortcomings of the two case studies: the Mozambique peace process and the HSG Cyprus initiative. This approach requires a careful examination of the conflict dynamic in each case study to identify the underlying causes to the prolonged nature of the intercommunal dispute. Classifying each case study analyzed in this thesis as a protracted social conflict will bring to the surface the causative factors and escalatory processes of each conflict dynamic. For Azar, by giving emphasis to issues such as security,

¹⁹ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 8.

²⁰ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 276.

identity, and recognition may lead in part to a realization of the importance of basic human needs and their role in intractable conflicts.²¹

Finally, after examining the history of the conflict and extrapolating their underlying causes the analysis will determine the extent to which the two track initiatives were successful using Kelman's problem-solving workshop model. Kelman's model for conflict resolution is grounded in the discipline of social-psychology, which incorporates institutional and psychological factors into its analysis. While most conflicts arise out of objective and ideological differences, the interplay between psychological factors perpetuates and escalates the crisis.²² Kelman's analysis emphasizes the link between subjective perceptions and objective interests. Overcoming the social-psychological barriers between the participants in a problem-solving workshop can provide opportunities for negotiation. The Track Two initiatives in Mozambique and Cyprus illustrate that these social-psychological barriers are critical to the eventual outcome of the negotiation.

²¹ Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, *Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East*, 46.

²² Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 65.

2: AN EXPLORATION OF THE EARLY SCHOLARSHIP: JOHN BURTON, EDWARD AZAR, AND HEBERT KELMAN

Montville coined the term “Track Two diplomacy” in 1981, but the theoretical and methodological foundations emerged well before that. The conceptual genesis of modern Track Two diplomacy arose in the mid-1960s when John Burton and his colleagues conducted a series of peacebuilding workshops, which led to the creation of the Centre for the Analysis of Conflict at the University College London. A former Australian diplomat, John Burton, earned his first degree in psychology from the University of Sydney. He later received doctoral degrees in economics and international relations from the University of London. Burton’s meteoric and at times controversial professional life in the Australian Foreign Service culminated with him becoming disenchanted with what he perceived as an excessive reliance on traditional “realist” concepts. After gaining notoriety through various speeches and writings, which disputed the “peace-through-power thought system,” Burton left the official world of diplomacy and moved to London where he took an appointment to head the department of international relations at the University of London.¹ Burton and his colleagues developed a view that certain human needs are non-negotiable and instead focused on how identity groups perpetuate intractable conflicts. Not surprisingly, Burton found himself at odds with the academic establishment. The prevailing realist notions dominated discussions over international relations under a framework that emphasized power politics as the primary goal of states. The realist template limited conflict resolution to power mediation where states attain security using leverage in the form of rewards or punishment to persuade antagonists toward a settlement.²

¹ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 19.

³Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 165.

As Burton battled entrenched assumptions about the nature of conflict, another battle brewed in Southeast Asia. The United Kingdom, looking to disentangle itself from its colonial possessions, contemplated the establishment of the Malaysian Federation in 1961. This move intended to unite the territories of Brunei, Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore. Indonesia, which had territorial ambitions for the region, opposed the plan as did elements inside Brunei and Sarawak. Armed rebellion ignited in Brunei and Sarawak in late 1962. British forces quickly defeated the uprisings. The defeat forced many insurgents to retreat to the jungles along the border with Indonesia. Supported by the Indonesian government, the Malaysian insurgents began a guerrilla war along the border.

A United Nations mission investigated the situation in Malaysia and confirmed most of the population favored the establishment of a Malaysian Federation. This resulted in the unification of The Malaysian Federation in September 1964. Refusing to grant diplomatic recognition, Indonesia intensified military confrontation with Malaysia and began taking a more direct role in guerilla operations. The United States successfully brokered a cease-fire in early 1964, but was unable to reach a settlement. Later in September 1965, Indonesian paratroopers launch a major offensive into Malaysia ending many hopes for a peaceful solution.

Back in London, John Burton watched the events in Southeast Asia unfold with keen interest. Eventually, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who himself tried to negotiate an end to the conflict, granted Burton permission to invite representatives from Malaysia and Indonesia for discussions held in London. In the invitation, Burton stressed that the purpose of the discussions was academic research rather than a pretense to persuade

each side to produce a settlement.³ His approach generated a positive response and the first of a series of workshops started in December 1965, lasting five days. The workshop held two representatives from each country with a panel of ten academics. Burton now had the perfect opportunity to test techniques designed to evoke an analysis of the underlining causes of the conflict, while assisting the representatives to develop potential solutions. Questions soon arose, however, about how the workshop should be conducted and the role of the panel members.⁴ Was the panel to act as mediators or academics? Should there be an agenda? The panel decided that none of the ordinary rules applied. Burton's experiment was to have no agenda, no time limit, or expectations of a binding settlement to the conflict. The participants were to simply discuss the case at hand until all parties felt satisfied.

Burton and his colleagues initiated the workshop by instructing the participants to explain what they thought was the cause of the conflict. Predictably, each group proclaimed the official position of their respective governments. The panel listened to each side's arguments, speaking only to provide interpretations of each perspective, and to draw parallels to other conflicts. The forum flowed into a more productive environment as trust began to grow between the representatives and the panel. Soon, the representatives no longer felt the compulsion to phone their respective offices to see if their delegation should continue. After examining a mutual analysis of the conflict, the panel tasked the representatives with developing options that could encourage each group toward a consideration of a resolution or settlement. The approach employed by Burton and his team differed from traditional negotiation, which often emphasized official positions and demands. The panel intended the discussion to focus on principles and possibilities that

³ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution* 1997, 21.

⁴ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 22.

could lead to a mutually satisfying solution. In modern conflict resolution terminology, this become known as “prenegotiation.”⁵ The rest of the meetings bounced between analysis and exploration of options until the panel could “sense” an agenda was forming.⁶ During the meetings, the representatives reached a series of understandings, but were reluctant to commit anything to paper. Nevertheless, it is apparent the discussions that took place at the London meeting was within the framework of the Manila Accord signed in 1966, which ceased hostilities and restored full diplomatic relations between Malaysia and Indonesia. This successful application of unofficial conflict resolution marked the birth of Track Two diplomacy.

The London meetings provided Burton and his colleagues with an opportunity to devise an original theory of practice for conflict resolution. Burton coined the term "controlled communication" to capture the approach of bringing together high-level representatives of groups or states locked in a violent, protracted conflict to private, informal discussions in the presence of an impartial third-party panel. According to Burton, the role of the third-party panel is to control communication and guide the interaction toward a nonthreatening atmosphere.⁷ The aim of the interaction is for the two conflicting parties to jointly explore perceptions and misperceptions about the conflict, and development common functional interests that can lead to mutually satisfactory solution. Burton's method departed from traditional modes of mediation and arbitration in conflict resolution. In the realist framework, mediators hold to the power to bring about either rewards and punishments to the conflicting parties. In contrast, controlled communication helps explore

⁵ Jones, *Track Two: Diplomacy in Theory and Practice*, 8.

⁶ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 23.

⁷ Burton, *Conflict Resolution: Track Two Diplomacy*, 65.

the origin and escalation of the conflict in the hope of finding avenues out of the conflict dynamic. The third party does not direct the interaction toward resolution, like in traditional method, but facilitates the dialogue that clarifies the interests, values, needs and to help deduce possible outcomes on the basis of this analysis.

Basic human needs played a central role in Burton's conflict analysis. The most fundamental of these needs is physical survival and well-being.⁸ These factors are contingent upon the satisfaction of infrastructural needs for basic physical resources, i.e. food, clothing, energy, and water. The deprivation of such needs does not automatically give rise to conflict, however, the degree to which these needs are satisfied can contribute to the conflict dynamic in a number of ways. Burton identified other basic human needs such as access to, or effective participation in, the social institutions that allocate physical resources and security. Individuals strive to meet these needs through the formations of identity groups. Burton suggested that fulfilment of fundamental needs underlies institutions that promote group integrity, such as ethnic groups or political parties.

Edward Azar

Burton designed his controlled communication approach to address the subjective needs of the participants. His efforts in exploring new ways of resolving international disputes attracted the attention of scholars searching for methods outside the realist paradigm.⁹ This new method of unofficial, informal interactions, facilitated by a third party inspired a small but active community of “scholar-practitioners.” Among the first of these scholar-practitioners was Edward Azar. Born in Lebanon in 1938, Azar came to the United

⁸ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 23.

⁹ Jones, *Track Two: Diplomacy in Theory and Practice*, 14.

States as a graduate student in international relations at the University of North Carolina. He distinguished himself early in his career through quantitative research into how interstate crises and conflict episodes reflect measures of interstate interactions.¹⁰ At the University of North Carolina, he developed a data base, the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), which included measures on international and domestic events. Using COPDAB, Azar could determine the degree of hostilities versus friendliness in international interactions between the years 1945-1972. He used the data base to track the frequency and nature of violent conflict around the world.¹¹ Azar and his colleagues used the data to push against many “superpower-inspired” perspectives that dominated most geo-political analysis of conflict resolution.¹²

Azar’s efforts proved to be a difficult initiative. The bipolar standoff between the great superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) reinforced the notion that the power, the responsibilities, and the prerogatives of the superpowers overshadowed the smaller states of the world. Superpower states established the agenda for international relations and determined the parameters in the international system. Smaller states can interact in this arena, but must follow the “rules” set by the great power states. Thus, in an international system overlooked by titans, smaller states are less significant and their actions, without the sanction or disapproval of a superpower, is irrelevant.¹³

Azar’s analysis of international conflict from 1945-1972 indicated that conflict situations was on the increase, yet the conflicts were skirmishes that lay on the periphery of great power politics. He reported most of the conflicts were smaller scale disputes centered

¹⁰ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 77.

¹¹ Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, *Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East*, 46.

¹² Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, *Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East*, 45.

¹³ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 80.

around civil and ethnic upheaval as opposed to strategic conflicts between two superpowers. Azar also found around 90 percent of the conflicts took place within third world countries. Moreover, any interventions by a superpower or its allies tended only to exacerbate the conflict¹⁴ The results convinced Azar to shift his focus from strategic competition, deterrence, and containment to an acknowledgement that two-third of the world's conflicts are small, protracted, and socio-ethnic disputes.

Azar never sought to disprove realist positions. He agreed with realists, for instance, that the structure of a conflict is itself a product (or “output”) of the interaction situation (regional or international). His research intended to supplement realist approaches and better predict ethnic and regional conflict. Realists, however, tend to focus on macro-level interactions. Azar's approach, by contrast, sought micro-level explanations, which peered in the heart of prolonged conflicts. The realization led Azar to coin the term protracted social conflict (PSC) and over the period of two decades he developed a model that captured the reality of intractable conflicts. He defined protracted social conflicts (PSCs) as “hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity.”¹⁵

Azar applied his PSC framework to conflicts in the Middle East. In the late 1970s, he participated with two other scholar-practitioners, Herbert Kelman and Stephen Cohen, in a problem-solving workshop on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin (1978) later published an analysis of the conflict, providing the first exposure into Azar's methodology. Azar and his colleagues established that in the Israeli-Palestinian context, traditional “superpower-inspired” approaches, which focused on power politics to explain all

¹⁴ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 77.

¹⁵ Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, *Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East*, 50.

manner of interactions, failed because they ignored structural properties on the conflict on a local level.

The implications of PSCs in the Middle East held pessimistic conclusions. First, strong equilibrating forces will spoil attempts at settlement, partly because of vested interests depend on continued hostilities. Peace also threatens personal and national identities. Meanwhile, the protracted conflict demonstrated further by its appalling absorptive capacity. This means the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will sap enormous quantities of human and material resources. Azar warned if political differences are not bridged immediately, but social differences are far deeper can require time to heal. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a struggle for recognition and acceptance that cannot be “won” or “lost” through protracted conflict. To that end, successful peacebuilding requires the approach of gradualism in PSCs. Finally, Azar and his colleagues expected to see the conflict remain in its traditional role as an excuse for inaction and the outcome is fundamental needs for development remain ignored.

A distinguishing element of Azar’s work, like John Burton before him, is the assimilation of research, theory, and practice. During the 1980s, Azar moved to the University of Maryland and there in collaboration with John Burton, helped to establish the Center of International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). This institutional initiative incorporated Azar’s interest in development needs and conflict resolution, and Burton’s experience with problem-solving forums. For a brief period, the CIDCM was a leading institution in Track Two initiatives holding several problem-solving forums on the Falkland-Malvinas and the Lebanese civil war. Burton’s ideas over how “human needs” impact many ethnic and social conflicts influenced Azar’s later work as he began to

development a model for PSCs. Azar's reinterpretation of PSCs focused on the frustration and damage caused when basic human needs go unfulfilled. The implications of development, security, recognition, and human needs on conflict resolution were clear as Azar developed a model of PSCs. Therefore, it is important to understand Azar's approach as it applies to Track Two diplomacy.

Using his initial definition of PSCs, Azar expanded on the concept to include causative factors, escalatory processes and possible outcomes. Moving further away from realist power politics, Azar saw structural inequalities, which grew out of colonial legacies of "divide and rule" at the heart of PSCs. He found emerging states in the Third World are particularly vulnerable to PSCs. Thus, in many multi-ethnic communities, maldistribution of resources, historic rivalries, and colonial policies place identity groups in conflictual relationships. PSCs begin with five clusters of variables: human needs, communal context, governance and the role of the state, and environmental factors, and international linkages.

Needs deprivation is the primary motivating factor in PSCs.¹⁶ Individuals strive to fulfill their basic human needs (such as security, access, and acceptance) through the formation of communal identity groups. A single communal group or coalition of groups, in the Third World for example, typically dominate the power structures within a society and disregard the needs of other groups, causing deep societal fragmentation. A lack of effective participation and economic imbalances leads to the marginalization of certain identity groups. Because individuals strive to fulfill their needs through an identity group, grievances resulting from needs deprivation express themselves collectively by the marginalized identity group. The dominate group within these societies, however, tend to refuse to accept or even

¹⁶ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 21.

recognize these grievances. Failure by the state to meet the collective demands of the different identity groups within its borders becomes the kindling from which PSCs can burn out of control.

It is important to examine what Azar called the *communal context* for a complete understanding of the genesis of PSCs. Multi-communal societies vulnerable to PSCs, like those born out of a colonial past or with long-standing internal rivalries, are the prime participants in the conflict dynamic. Azar also emphasized the role of the state as regulator of PSCs. *The role of the state* or governing authority is the administrator of social, political, and economic interactions. Azar felt that the state is the central actor in the satisfaction of basic human needs.¹⁷ Often in states prone to PSCs, the dominant group or a coalition of groups monopolize political authority. The dominant group uses its power to maximize its interests at the expense of the marginalized group. Authoritarian modes of governance limit institutional access by excluded groups, expediting a crisis of legitimacy in the eyes of the outcasts. Moreover, *environmental, or developmental problems* (such as depletion of natural resources, degradation of the environment, or rapid population growth) may further constrain the state's capacity in bridging an inter-societal rift.

Azar paneled two problem-solving forums held at CIDCM regarding the Lebanese civil war in 1984. During this time, a decades-long bitter, protracted civil war raged inside Lebanon. In May and again in October of 1984, influential Lebanese citizens nominated by community leaders came to Maryland to discuss the origins and dynamics of the conflict and possible paths to resolution.¹⁸

¹⁷ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 18.

¹⁸ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 93.

Lebanon is a small country on the eastern edge of the Mediterranean, bordering Syria to the north and Israel to the south. Lebanon is distinguished by its cultural diversity. The major communities that constitute the Lebanese population are, on the Christian side, the Maronites, the Greek Orthodox, and Greek Catholics. The Muslim side of the Lebanese population is just as diverse with the Shi'a, Sunni, and the Druzes. Besides Arabic, French and English are common languages among the relatively well-educated population. The country has a large Christian population going back to the Byzantine empire. Later, the Ottoman empire ruled the territory until the end of World War I and the French incorporated it into their empire. Finally, France granted Lebanon its independence in 1943. The National Pact of 1943 established modern Lebanon and attempted to protect its identity by encouraging political compromise and integration.¹⁹ The National Pact institutionalized power-sharing along religious or "confessional" lines, based on each group's proportion taking from the 1932 census population. This arrangement is reflected in the verbal agreement made by the Lebanese elites, whereby the president of the Republic of Lebanon would always be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker of parliament a Shi'a Muslim.²⁰ In the years after independence, Lebanon experienced significant demographic shifts when the Muslim population outgrew the Christian one. According to Azar, religious identity is valued as a source of personal security and also plays a crucial role in political action.²¹ Given this situation, Lebanon was unable to establish a strong state mechanism to provide physical and economic security for its diverse population. Civil disputes reached a boiling point with the outbreak of violence in 1958. The government was able to introduce some minor reforms. However, major political and

¹⁹ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 93.

²⁰ Irani, *The Maryland Problem-Solving Forums: Edward Azar's Lebanon*, 66.

²¹ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 25.

military events in the Middle East continued to divide the Lebanese population. Full-scale civil war broke out in 1975 along varying religious lines, which brought tremendous human and economic costs to the country.

The CIDCM held the first problem-solving workshop regarding Lebanon against the backdrop of the ongoing civil war. To represent the views of the various factions, the forum brought together several scholars, political advisers, and consultants from different identity group within Lebanon – i.e. representatives from the Maronite Christians, the Druzes, and Muslim communities. The discussion began with each participant explaining the views of their community and the conditions that brought them to the workshop. Next, the discussion moved on to the main focus of workshop, whether each group desired an integral, united Lebanon. Rancor among the participants ran high, each group expressed strong emotions, and many deadlocks occurred. The first forum did reveal a number of common needs and values among each identity group. Namely, each group expressed common interests in property rights, economic privileges, leadership roles in government, and assurances of physical security. The clear conclusion was that all identity groups in Lebanon wanted a united, independent, and multi-religious Lebanon. The final day of discussion was marked by the desire among the participants to return home with concrete accomplishments and remain in contact with one another.

The second forum again brought together several influential members of Lebanese society including some members of the previous workshop. In light of the previous workshop's conclusion that established each identity group wanted Lebanon to be united and independent, the forum moved on to discuss communal needs and grievances. The workshop process mirrored the first with each participant explaining the views of their

community, difficult issues brought heated conversations, and the forum ended on a note of hope and concern. A notable difference in the second forum, however, was that the participants drafted a set twenty-two principles on how to move forward toward a united Lebanon. Each group reviewed and offered input in to drafting of the set of principles. Some of these principles were:

- In the hierarchy of political values, the highest is the preservation and development of the State of Lebanon.
- By a Lebanon State is meant a united, Arab, independent State which is a meeting ground for Christianity and Islam.
- The State of Lebanon should develop into a non-communal political system.
- Justice requires (a) that all kidnapped persons be unconditionally freed; and (b) that all Lebanese displaced citizens have the opportunity to return to their previous abodes as soon as security permits.
- The armed forces of the government of Lebanon should be under the command of government authorities, and should be reformed, retrained, and re-equipped for their poicing role, and should cooperate with local forces and police until such time as local forces become redundant.
- Stability and peace in Lebanon will continue to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.²²

After the second forum concluded, some participants established an informal network that used the same set of principles drafted in the CIDCM workshop to produce the "National Covenant Document" in 1988. The Lebanese parliament, along with its Arab partners subsequently integrated this statement into the "Taif Accords," which finally unified Lebanon after years of civil war.²³

²² Irani The Maryland Problem-Solving Forums: Edward Azar's Lebannon, 65.

²³ Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, 94.

Herbert Kelman

Herbert Kelman spent most of his career as the Cabot Professor of Social Ethics in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University, in addition to several years at the University of Michigan as a core contributor to the world's first *Center for Research on Conflict Resolution*. In the early 1950s he was involved in the Research Exchange on the Prevention of War, the first organized effort at peace research. Later he helped establish the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1957. In 1966, Kelman met John Burton, as Burton was first exploring his innovative workshop approach to conflict resolution. Kelman soon began to incorporate his background in social psychology to Burton's workshop method of intervention. Burton invited Kelman to join the third-party panel in an unsuccessful foray into the Cyprus conflict. Although Kelman's first workshop experience had its shortcomings, he found an intriguing avenue for social-psychological concepts and methods relevant to conflict resolution. Later in his exploration of conflict resolution, his dialogue based interactive problem-solving workshops regarding the Israeli and Palestinian conflict helped to advance the concept of unofficial and informal interaction between two adversarial groups, facilitated by a third party -- i.e. Track Two diplomacy.

Kelman describes the workshops as having a dual purpose.²⁴ The design of the interactive forum helps affect both *educational* -- changes in attitudes, perceptions, and ideas among the participants - and *political* -- transferring the changes to the political dialogue and decision-making process-- arenas within a target society. The workshops provide the participants opportunities to interact, become acquainted with each other, and humanize their images. The intended affect is that specific leanings acquired by the participants fed

²⁴ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 61.

into their own political leadership or public. These learnings include: insights into the views from the other side, readiness for negotiation, availability of potential negotiation partners, and mutually acceptable solutions.²⁵

Because of the dual purpose, the problem-solving workshop has a dialectic character. Some of the conditions favorable in the workshop setting may be antagonistic to transfer of specific leanings to the political arena, and vice versa.²⁶ For example, the fact that a workshop provides the freedom for participants to explore new ideas with an adversary in the hopes of transferring those ideas, may be antagonistic with the political process back home, which is grounded in political realities. Also, the unofficial representatives have the advantage of being less constrained by official positions during the workshop. However, this means they can have less influence on official decision making. Finally, the setting of the workshop, usually in neutral territory, insulate the participants for their side's official positions to encourage openness and exploration. Yet, the distance away from the realities on the ground can create an illusionary atmosphere of comradery.²⁷ Thus, a third-party consultant is a requirement for the workshop to be successful. The task of the third-party consultant is to balance the contradictory elements in the design and implementation of the workshop so that the educational and political purposes will be achieved.

²⁵ Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy*, 90.

²⁶ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 62.

²⁷ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 61.

Kelman's problem-solving workshop adopts a social-psychological approach to conflict resolution.²⁸ Social-psychology incorporates institutional and psychological factors to its analysis. While most conflicts arise out of objective and ideological differences, the interplay between psychological factors perpetuate and escalate the crisis.²⁹ Kelman's analysis emphasizes the link between subjective perceptions and objective interests. Overcoming the social-psychological barriers between the participants in a problem-solving workshop can provide opportunities for negotiation.

The problem-solving workshop informed by a set of assumptions about the nature of international and intercommunal conflict, derived from a social-psychological analysis.³⁰ According to Kelman, the assumptions are general in nature although they refer most directly to conflicts between identity group and may not be equally applicable in other cases. The problem-solving approach is likely to be most relevant in conflicts in which identity issues play a central role. The first among these assumptions is *the individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis*. Articulated through their core identity group are the needs of human individuals. Basic human needs such as economic and psychical security are the ultimate criterion for a mutually satisfactory resolution to a protracted conflict. Unfulfilled needs, especially identity and security concerns, and existential fears based on national existence, typically drive the conflict, and create barriers to its resolution.³¹ The problem-solving workshops seek to push behind the parties' incompatible positions and explore the identity and security concerns that underlie them to find possible avenues toward a mutually satisfactory solution.

²⁸ Kelman, Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East, 8.

²⁹ Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, 62.

³⁰ Kelman, Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East, 8.

³¹ Kelman, Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East, 9.

Through the workshop process, Kelman looks to find relevant "points of entry" on which to base a psychological analysis.³² The scholar-practitioner seeks to identify certain cognitions, emotions, insight, intentions, and interactions between individuals that determine outcomes in the conflict. These points provide a theoretical model that can identify certain processes central to maintaining the protracted nature of the conflict. Changes at the individual level -- in the form of new ideas and insights through interaction with an adversary group -- in a workshop environment can then feed back into the political debate and the decision making in the two communities.

Next, *international conflict must be viewed not merely as an intergovernmental or interstate phenomenon, but also as an intersocietal phenomena.*³³ Problem-solving workshops seek to explore the divisions between the two societies in the pursuit of a peaceful solution to the conflict. In particular, the workshop forum explores the role of internal divisions within each society -- i.e. the crucial relationship between *intragroup* and *intergroup* conflict. Internal divisions can greatly affect decision making and create serious constraints to peaceful solutions. Intragroup and intergroup divisions can, however, provide opportunities and the levers of change. According to Kelman, by challenging the monolithic image (through the workshop forum) of the enemy that parties in conflict tend to hold enables the parties to differentiate each other in a new way. Viewing conflict through the lens of a intersocietal phenomenon, Kelman warns, requires expertise and careful analysis of public opinion on both sides, consensus building, and coalition building across the conflicting societies.

³² Kelman, Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East, 9.

³³ Kelman, Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East, 9.

An important implication of the intersocietal view of conflict is negotiations and third-party interventions should be directed toward conflict *resolution*, not merely *settlement*. For Kelman, conflict resolution implies arrangements and accommodations that emerge out of the interaction between the participants themselves. Moreover, the arrangements and accommodations that emerge from the interaction needs to address the basic needs of the parties and to which each party are committed. Only this kind of solution is capable of transforming a protracted conflict into a peaceful society. Any third-party efforts should be aware, however, that conflict resolution, as defined by Kelman, is a gradual process. There is no presumption that the conflict can ever be permanently resolved. Kelman writes:

"The real test of conflict resolution in deep-rooted conflicts is how much the process by which agreements are constructed and the nature of the resultant agreements contribute to transformation of the relationships between the parties."³⁴

Thirdly, *conflict is an interactive process with an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamic*. The needs and fears of parties involved in an intense, protracted conflict impose perceptual and cognitive constraints on their processing of new information. Echoing Azar's study into the effect of protracted social conflict within a society, Kelman asserts that the combination of demonic enemy images and virtuous self-images on both sides contribute to the escalatory dynamic of conflict interaction and to resistance to change in a conflict relationship. Generally, a set of "conflict norms" govern each party locked in a protracted conflict. These modes of behavior encourage a militant, uncompromising, threatening posture, which only serves to reinforce the enemy's hostile image and creates self-fulfilling prophecies. Conflict norms tend to entrench the two communities into myopic perspectives on history and justice. Conflict resolution efforts require reversing the escalatory and self-perpetuating

³⁴ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 10.

dynamics of the conflict, such as an interaction conducive to sharing of perspectives, differentiation of the enemy image, and insight into the process that contributes to escalation.

Kelman's approach to the conflict resolution hopes to move beyond strategies based on threats, and to expand and refine strategies based on promises and positive incentives. The problem-solving workshops are based on the assumption that *conflict resolution requires a wider range of influence processes than those typically employed in international conflict relationships*. A key element in this process is mutual assurance. In protracted conflict between two identity groups, parties can encourage each other to negotiate seriously by reducing their fear, rather than increasing their pain. The problem-solving workshop model attempts to contribute to a creative redefinition of the conflict from zero-sum to positive sum gains. Finally, Kelman and his colleagues based the expanded conception of conflict resolution on the assumption that *international conflict is dynamic phenomenon, marked by the occurrence and possibility of change*. Conflict resolution efforts under the problem-solving template seeks to discover possibilities for change, identify conditions for change, and overcome resistances for change. Thus, Kelman's incorporation of social-psychological approach is consistent with Burton's and Azar's understandings about the nature of conflict by attempting to go beyond the traditional, realist assumptions on the causation and resolution of international conflict.³⁵

Since 1971, Kelman and his associates conducted numerous workshops on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, viewing the two sides in the context of distinct identity groups deadlocked in a protracted conflict. Over the years, Kelman and his colleagues engaged with opinion leaders, decision makers, and policy advisors in the Middle East. While following the

³⁵ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 11.

general principles laid out by scholar-practitioners like John Burton and Edward Azar, Kelman engaged in the development and application of conflict resolution through what he called "interactive problem solving." He would later define the approach as

An academically based, unofficial third-party approach, bring together representatives of parties in conflict for direct communication. The third party typically consists of social scientists who, between them, possess expertise in group process and international conflict, and at least some familiarity with the conflict region. The role of the third party in our model differs from that of the traditional mediator. Unlike many mediators, we do not propose and certainly, unlike, arbitrators, we do not impose solutions. Rather, we try to facilitate a process whereby solutions will emerge out of the interaction between the parties themselves. The task of the third party is to provide the setting, create the atmosphere, establish the norms, and offer the occasional interventions that make the process to evolve.³⁶

Kelman's definition of problem solving workshops is notable for several reasons. First, the selection of the participants brings together unofficial representatives (usually mid-level bureaucrats, academics, highly influential members of a community) of conflicting parties to engage in face-to-face communication. The ideal participants are not involved in policymaking, but through their connections, capabilities, and influence can affect the decision-making process. The end goal of the workshop is to transfer the changes in thinking about the conflict engendered by the participants and other contacts and inject these new ideas into the political discourse. The closer the participants are to the centers of power, the greater the likelihood any progress made in the workshop will *transfer* to the decision-making process. By that same token Kelman writes, the closer the participant is to the centers of power, the more constrained they are likely to feel and they reluctant to enter an open, noncommittal, exploratory, and analytical discussion.³⁷ The third-party consultant,

³⁶ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 15.

³⁷ Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy*, 90.

however, must consider these contradictory elements before selecting participants to engage in a problem-solving workshop.

Second, the design of the forum seeks to promote a special type of communication with a very specific objective. The aim of interactive problem solving is to promote change in individuals --through interaction in small groups-- and channel the experience to larger social structures.³⁸ Kelman viewed the workshop in the literal sense, such as a carpenter's.

[the workshops] provide a specially constructed space in which the parties can engage in a process of exploration, observation, and analysis and in which they can create new products that can be fed -- exported, as it were-- into the political debate and the decision-making process in the two societies.³⁹

Broadly stated, workshops seek to transform the relationship between the conflicting parties through creating a political environment conducive to conflict resolution -- both in the short and long term.⁴⁰

In his 1978 paper, *Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance*, Kelman argues that a sustained settlement must be responsive to the needs and fears of both parties. The core element of the conflict was the mutual denial of the adversary's national identity. Resistance to each side's national identity stemmed from the fear that acceptance of the other side's nationhood undermined its own claim to Palestine. Moreover, each side believed the other to be intent on its destruction. The way out of this deadlock, according to Kelman, was to work toward the psychological prerequisites for mutual acceptance. First, the two sides had to acquire insight into each other's perspective to understand the resistances to mutual acceptance. Second, each side had to realize there were rational people

³⁸ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 279.

³⁹ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 279.

⁴⁰ Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy*, 82.

on the other side and there were issues to talk about, rather two mutually exclusive lists of demands. Third, each side needed to understand the distinction between ideological rhetoric and operational programs.⁴¹ The Israelis had to be convinced that a unified Palestine did not preclude the acceptance of a State of Israel. Palestine had to be persuaded that the State of Israel did not necessitate an expansionist state or automatic policies of annexation and settlement. Fourth, both sides had to see mutual concessions could bring about a resolution. Fifth, each side had to believe leadership changes conducive to a stable peace could take place on the other side. Israelis had to be convinced that the PLO was a political entity beyond its terrorist label, and that moderate element had some control over the organization. Palestinians had to be persuaded that Israeli leadership could become more conciliatory. Finally, Kelman wrote that each side had to witness the responsiveness to the human psychological needs by the other through symbolic gestures. Kelman concluded that the conditions for mutual acceptance could best be created through direct interaction that confronted mutual concerns and found mutually acceptable solutions to a resolution of the protracted conflict.

In the late 1970s, there was no indication that either the Israelis or Palestinians were ready to offer acceptance. Thus, the psychological prerequisites went unmet. Despite this, over the next two decades Kelman continued to refine his approach to conflict resolution with problem-solving workshops focused on the Israeli and Palestinians conflict. During this time, he developed a set of ground rules that the third-party consultant would present to the workshop participants. Kelman designed the ground rules to overcome the usual accusatory, legalistic, and hostile interactions that typically accompany tense peace negotiations. He

⁴¹ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 16.

wanted to replace the undesired interactions with an analytical, task-ordinated environment, which had the potential for each party of the conflict to find mutually satisfying solutions. The ground rules call for an analytic dialogue, stresses the role of the third party as a facilitator of communication rather than an audience or adjudicator to be convinced.⁴²

The central ground rule is of the problem-solving workshop is privacy and confidentiality.⁴³ Privacy is especially important. Generally, it is politically risky for participants to meet with the enemy. In some cases, exposing these controversial meeting can lead to legal troubles or even assassination. Confidentiality is equally important. Kelman writes, “[confidentiality] enables participants to engage in the kind of interaction that is crucial to achieving the purposes of the enterprise.”⁴⁴ The workshop has no audience, no publicity, no record, and statements made in the course of the process cannot be cited with attribution outside of the workshop setting.

Privacy and confidentiality protect the nature of the interaction that Kelman hopes to produce between the participants and is essential for rules 2-4. The second ground rule stipulates that the participants “focus on each other,” and not constituencies, audience, or the third party. Kelman wishes each participant will,

“...listen to each other, with the aim of making their own perspective understood. We want them to think out loud, to experiment with ideas, to explore different options, without having to worry about how others would react if their words in the group were quoted outside. This is why we have no audience, no observers, no publicity, and no record.”⁴⁵

Focusing on each other in a closed and confidential atmosphere enables the participants to engage in a type of discussion that is generally not possible between two

⁴² Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 60.

⁴³ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 275.

⁴⁴ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 275.

⁴⁵ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 275.

identity groups locked in a protracted conflict. Kelman's third ground rule aims for analytic discussion, absent of any polemical rhetoric typical among parties engaged in a bitter conflict. The purpose is to assist the participants in gaining an understanding of each other's needs, fears, concerns, priorities, and constraints. Kelman does not intend for the analytic discussion to exclude expressions of emotion, but to use them as "raw material for enhancing the participants analytic understanding of the concerns of the other side and the dynamics of the conflict."⁴⁶ A successful analytic discussion between the two parties will develop insight into how the conflict-driven interaction between the two sides tend to exacerbate, escalate, and perpetuate their conflict.

Analytic discussions can serve as an aid for the parties to move to a problem-solving mode, in contrast to an adversarial mode (ground rule 4). The participants must treat the conflict as a shared problem that requires a joint effort rather than reducing the discussion into arguments over whose side is right or wrong based on historical or legal objections. Kelman does not expect the participants to abandon their ideas about justice of their cause, nor does he claim that both sides are equally right or wrong. The fourth rule merely attempts to avoid the allocation of blame. Discussion which work along these lines encourages the participants to seek mutually satisfactory solutions to the conflict.

Kelman designed the problem-solving workshop to encourage the participants to feel safe enough to work together and find solutions to their protracted conflict. Unlike official negotiating sessions, however, there is no expectation for the parties to reach an agreement (ground rule 5). Most of the participants are unofficial representatives (mid-level bureaucrats, academics, highly influential members of a community) and are not in the

⁴⁶ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 276.

position to make official agreements. This rule is in place simply to heighten the informality of the dialogue. For Kelman, the measure of success is if the participants “come away with a better understanding of the other’s perspective, of their own priorities, and of the dynamics of the conflict...” in the hope that the progress made in the problem-solving workshop will transfer to the decision-making process or the public. ”:⁴⁷

The sixth rule emphasizes equality among the participants. Asymmetries in power, moral position, or reputation clearly play an important role in most conflicts. Problem-solving workshops take into serious consideration how power dynamics affect the participants. But the two parties are equals in the workshop setting in the sense that each party right to voice its needs, fears, and concerns. Kelman uses an example from an Israeli and Palestinian workshop:

“Within the rules of the workshop, Israeli participants cannot dismiss Palestinian concerns on the grounds that the Palestinians are the weaker party and therefore, in a poor bargaining position; nor can the Palestinians participants dismiss Israeli concerns on the ground that the Israeli participants are the oppressors and, therefore, not entitled to sympathy.”⁴⁸

In the workshop setting, each side has the right to express their communities needs and fears, to which each party will be given equal attention in the search for a mutually satisfactory solution.

Kelman’s final ground rule concerns the facilitative role of the third party. In his model, the third party does not take part in the substantive discussions. Kelman writes, “[the third party] does not give advice or offer its own proposals, nor does it take sides, evaluate the ideas presented, or arbitrate between different interpretations of historical facts or

⁴⁷ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 276.

⁴⁸ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 276.

international law.”⁴⁹ The main tasks of the third party is to use the ground rules to allow the ideas for resolving the conflict to emerge out of the interaction between the parties themselves. The third party helps to keep the discussion moving in a constructive direction and intervenes with relevant questions, observations, and even challenges. Kelman, however, limits interventions by third party to:

“... focus on the content of the discussion, e.g. by suggesting how interactions between the parties; on the process of the interaction, e.g. by suggesting how interactions within the group may reflect the dynamics of the conflict between the two societies; or the on theoretical formulations, e.g. by offering concepts that might be useful in clarifying issues under discussion.”⁵⁰

Moreover, parties who, by definition, do not trust each other need to view the third party as a “repository of trust.” The participants, according to Kelman, should feel confident the third party will protect their interests.

Kelman’s formula for conflict resolution proceeded on the principle that useful ideas emerge out of the interaction between the conflict parties themselves, the third party plays a crucial role in guiding the interaction. The third party is responsible for a variety of functions during the problem-solving workshop. Along with enforcing the ground rules, the third party proposes a broad agenda that encourages the participants to move from exploration of each other’s concerns and constraints to the generation of ideas for win/win solutions and for implementation of such solutions.⁵¹ The way in which Kelman designed the agenda and the order of discussion facilitate the that type of discussion the ground rule encourage. With personal introductions and ground rules established between the participants, the workshop proceeds with a five-part agenda. The first discussion is an

⁴⁹ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 276.

⁵⁰ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 276.

⁵¹ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 92.

exchange of information between the two sides which serves to break the ice and set the tone for the type of interaction the workshop hopes to generate.⁵² The third party asks the representatives from each side to talk about how their community views the conflict, also the spectrum of views within the community, and their own position on that spectrum. The first exchange serves as a shared base of information and sets the precedent for the two sides to deal with each other as mutual resources, rather than solely as combatants.

The next two phases of the agenda go hand-in-hand. First, the interaction moves to a “needs analysis,” which is the core agenda of the workshop. The third party ask the participants to discuss the central concerns in the conflict – the fundamental needs that would have to be addressed and the existential fears that would have to be reduced if a solution is to be satisfactory. Kelman discourages the parties from debating the issues raised, although the participants can ask questions for clarification on the other side’s perception of the conflict. The goal of the needs analysis seeks to provide each side with an adequate understanding of the other’s needs, fears, and concerns. Only when the parties demonstrated an understanding of the other’s needs will the interaction move to the next phase of the agenda: joint thinking about possible solutions. According to Kelman:

“We want the participants to generate ideas for a solution that are anchored in the problem – that address the parties’ felt needs. What they are asked to do in this joint-thinking phase of the agenda is to develop, through an interactive process, ideas about the overall shape of a solution for the conflict as a whole, or perhaps a particular issue in the conflict that would address the needs and fears of both sides.”⁵³

The fourth phase of the workshop agenda is a discussion of constraints on solutions to the conflict. development of common ground through the needs analysis and joint-thinking about possible between the parties allows the participants to evaluate the political

⁵² Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy*, 277

⁵³ Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy* 277.

and psychological constraints within the two societies that would create barriers to implementing the solutions brought forth from the interaction. This is very important, Kelman claims, because the parties often find it extremely difficult to understand or even recognize the constraints of the other side.

Finally, depending on how much progress the workshop made and how much time is left, the fifth phase involves the third party steering the interaction toward another round of joint-thinking – this time regarding way of overcoming the constraints presented in the fourth phase of the agenda. Kelman cites an example of one workshop deciding on a publication of two adjoining op-ed pieces in the *New York Times*. The participants discuss ideas about what their governments, their societies, and they themselves might do to help overcome the barriers to negotiating mutually satisfactory solutions to the conflict.

In his pursuit of solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Kelman was involved in a variety of efforts. Normally, he conducted one-time events, or rather workshops with a different set of participants each time. In the 1990s, Kelman switched tactics and invited the same participants in an ongoing series of workshops between 1990-1993. There are several advantages to a continuing workshop forum. According to Kelman, it represents a sustained effort to address concrete issues, enabling the participants to push the process of conflict analysis and interactive problem solving farther than can be achieved in one-time workshops. The participants in these meetings were all individuals with broad experience and high credibility in their respective communities, close to the center of the political mainstream (occupying positions in political organizations, academic institutions, think tanks, or the media) that endowed them with the access to frame issues and the perception of decision makers and the public. The workshops began to focus on intermediate level

issues and major political concerns that would be on the table for the final-status negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. Kelman writes:

"the issues to be addressed by such discussions include the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and the right of return, the future of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the final borders of the Palestinian polity, the nature of Palestinian self-determination, and future relationship among the states in the region."⁵⁴

By 1992, the political situation in had changed dramatically with the initiation of the Arab-Israeli peace talks. Four of the six Palestinian "alumni" from Kelman's 1990-1991 workshops were appointed to the official negotiating team on the Arab-Israeli peace talks. Also in 1992, the political situation in Israeli changed with the victory of the Labor Party in the national elections. With the formation of a new government and appointment of workshop participants to official positions in peace talks, the workshop participants had an opportunity to become increasingly influential in their own society. On September 1993, a breakthrough occurred in the conflict with the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, expressed in the exchange of letters between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and in the opening of formal negotiations between the two sides, i.e. The Oslo Accords. "Alumni" from Kelman's workshops were involved in the back-channel talks in Norway that broke the deadlock in the public negotiations in late 1993.⁵⁵ In many ways, the back-channel talks represent a culmination of two decades of unofficial interaction between Israeli and Palestinian influentials hosted by Kelman's interactive problem-solving workshops. It is clear that Kelman's intention in using this forum of interaction was to create a favorable political environment to peace settlement. Sadly, this breakthrough would not last. In a testament to Kelman's third social-psychological assumption and to the limits of his

⁵⁴ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 22.

⁵⁵ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 72.

own interactive problem-solving workshops, an Israeli nationalist killed Rabin in 1995 because of his participation in the Oslo Accords.

3: THE MOZAMBIQUE PEACE PROCESS

Mozambique's long colonial history ended in 1974. In seeking a unified national identity, in the context of anti-colonial and anti-capitalist struggles, the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) attempted to rebuild the country along socialist principles. As a result, Frelimo's actions provoked resentment and opposition from other segments of Mozambican society. Born out of this ensuing conflict, the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) emerged as the most formidable military resistance to the Frelimo government. From 1975 to 1992, a tragic civil war enveloped Mozambique, leaving lasting scars on a country ready reeling from centuries of colonial rule. The conflict did not end until 1992 with the Rome Peace Accords. Integral to bringing the two adversarial parties together was the Community of Sant'Egidio. The community took the lead in early mediation attempts between the Frelimo government and Renamo. The research in this thesis suggests that the initial meeting between Frelimo and Renamo, facilitated by the Community of Sant' Egidio, on July 8th-10th 1990, had a profound impact on the outcome of the official peace accord.

Analyzing specific cases like Mozambique yields insights into a process that may teach us lessons that can enhance our understanding of conflict resolution. This chapter will first examine the origins of the dispute and then relate the internal conflict dynamic to Edward Azar's research into protracted social conflicts. The Sant'Egidio officials, who facilitated the intervention in Mozambique, did intend for the interaction to be an exercise in Track Two diplomacy. However, whether intentional or not, the Community's actions share several commonalities with Herbert Kelman's interactive problem-solving model. By using the scholarly framework provided by Azar and Kelman, this chapter will explore the extent of influence the Sant'Egidio officials had on the peace process.

Origins of the Dispute

The civil war in Mozambique grew out of seeds of misfortune planted long before the country gained official independence in 1975. Its whirlwind history is marked by the scars left by centuries of Portuguese colonization. Later, the Cold War filled the void left by Mozambique's colonial masters and foreign powers used the young country as a geo-political chess piece. A less harrowing beginning for a country cannot be imagined.

Mozambique straddles the southeastern tip of Africa, which shares its borders in the north with Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia; to the west with Zimbabwe; and in the southwest with South Africa and Swaziland. Its eastern edge is a long and beautiful Indian Ocean shoreline. The Portuguese empire arrived in 1498. However, Portugal never colonized the interior in the totalitarian way favored by most European settlers. (Colonizers in the Americas or in the rest of Africa, transformed entire cultural, economic, political, and social landscapes of their conquered territories.) The treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal, mediated by Pope Alexander VI, granted Portugal all the land east of the forty-six meridian and Spain all the land west of the forty-six meridian. For the next four centuries, Portuguese settlers and traders concentrated mostly on the coastal regions of the colonial empire where they maintained control of the money economy and overseas commerce.¹ Scantly concerned with the inhabitants in the interior, the Portuguese ignored the many ethnic groups that for centuries thrived in Mozambique without Westphalian reverence for well-defined national boundaries. The ethnic groups included; the Macau and the Luma in the north; the Sena and the Nhau in the central region; and the Shangana in the south.²

¹ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 4.

² Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 252.

In the beginning of the twentieth century, the mining boom in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia fortified cooperation between Portugal and the United Kingdom. Capital from London developed ports and railroads to serve industries in South Africa and Rhodesia. The Portuguese granted agricultural and industrial concessions to London-backed firms and provided unskilled Mozambican labor to work in South Africa.³ At the end of World War II, while the winds of change swept other European powers and their colonial administrators to contemplate how to restructure their empires, Portugal undertook no such reevaluation of Mozambique. Portugal did not partake in the decolonization process popular in the 1960s, which transformed African countries into fresh and hopeful new states. Portugal not only denied the legitimacy of Mozambique and its wishes for independence, but continued to encourage European settlement in its colonial possession.⁴ By the 1960s, the Portuguese military confronted the growing nationalist forces in Mozambique with hostility and wholesale human rights abuses were common.

Frelimo

Nationalist forces began to organize into fighting units. Soon, the independence movement took on a name in a meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, when three nationalist forces joined to form the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo).⁵ The movement's founders elected Eduardo Mondlane, an anthropologist with a PhD from the Northwestern University and whose wife was an American, to be Frelimo's first president. In 1964, Frelimo launched its armed struggle against the Portuguese authority. Internal friction within Frelimo's leadership dominated the early years of the movement. Two factions slit the

³ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 5.

⁴ Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 252.

⁵ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 80.

movement's forces: the dominate group hailed from the Mozambique's southern tribe, the Shangana, and favored a radical Marxist policy that not only aimed to defeat the Portuguese but also restructure society away from traditional authorities to scientific socialism.⁶ The other faction desired to maintain much of the Portuguese administrative and government structures to develop a new generation of leaders without incorporating any disruptive communist ideology. Internal acrimony boiled over in 1968, rioters sacked Frelimo's headquarters in Dar es Salaam, and a parcel bomb killed Mondlane.

Frelimo's radical-wing ascended to power when Samora Machel, former nurse turned military commander, succeeded Mondlane. Frelimo insurgent forces, backed by China and Russia, expanded their presence in the northern region of Mozambique, gaining territory closer to their logistical base in Tanzania. Machel's forces reached the strategically important Beira corridor by 1973, located in the central part of the country. Despite the Portuguese force's obvious superior weaponry, it could not protect the country from an insurgency that relied on small arms and land mines.

Portugal eventual lost the political will to continue fighting. Reeling from a military coup that drastically changed the government in Lisbon, Portuguese authorities relinquished control of Mozambique in 1975. Portugal granted Frelimo sole control of the country without the prerequisite of a free and fair election for the transition to independence.⁷ Frelimo presented itself as a "the sole legitimate representative of Mozambique."⁸ The movement immediately launched a harsh agenda to erase all traditional authority, putting into practice its Marxist vision. The new government removed or subjugated local authority

⁶ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 84.

⁷ Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 253.

⁸ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 8.

that was in place for centuries during the colonial period. Under Machel, Frelimo nationalized private homes, rental property, and other land holdings, the practice of medicine and law, and educational institutions.⁹ Soviet bloc technicians arrived to train Mozambican bureaucrats and by the end of 1979, 200 Cuban military officers advised the Mozambican Armed Forces (FAM). The risk of creating a new state are immense for a land absent a single national identity and deprived of functional infrastructure, capital, and human resources.

In addition to state-building, the Frelimo government had to contend with external adversaries. The war in Rhodesia became the most pressing problem in the early years of the Frelimo government. The assertion of a new national identity built on socialist principles over traditional authority created dissatisfaction in the rural parts of Mozambique. The Rhodesian military intelligence promptly used the angst incurred by Frelimo's oppressive measures to fuel resistance to the central government. Machel's decision to close the Beira corridor to Rhodesian commerce and discreetly allow Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) military installations in the western Mozambique explicitly threatened Rhodesian interests. The Rhodesian intelligence services created in 1977, a new instrument of retaliation: the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo).¹⁰ The Rhodesian government wanted Renamo to provide intelligence on ZANU operations and to keep pressure on Machel's government. This marked the beginning of Mozambique's civil war.

The Frelimo government domestic policy not only failed economically, but provoked a fierce internal resistance. The Frelimo's domestic policies alienated large segments of Mozambique's population, making it easier for Renamo to find recruits. The epitome of

⁹ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 9.

¹⁰ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 10.

Frelimo's oppressive domestic policy was "Operation Production." The policy forced a massive population transfer to collective farms in the countryside. By 1983, Machel's government deported over 50,000 unemployed residents (30,000 alone from Mozambique's capital, Maputo) from the cities to rural farms to work as malnourished peasant slaves. Military brigades rounded up potential deportees, most of whom were summarily transported to the north. Deputy Interior Minister Teodato Hunguana described the programs aim: "We want this [Maputo] to be a clean city, a productive city, not a city of parasites."¹¹

Huge population transfers did little to help Mozambique's economy. Between 1980 and 1985, port traffic, export crops, and industrial production fell by more than half, and foreign debt more than tripled. The volume of exports of key cash crops dipped from almost 800,000 tons in 1981 to little more than 150,000 tons in 1986.¹² Mozambicans enjoyed a \$400 per capita gross national product at the beginning of 1980, but by the end of the decade the number dropped to \$100.¹³ The Frelimo government bears most of the responsibility of its failed policies. However, drought in the agricultural areas, a global recession, and unrelenting predation by Renamo forces contributed to Mozambique's deepening poverty and misery. On October 19, 1986, Machel died in a plane crash inside South Africa leaving his country in complete desolation.

Within two weeks of Machel's death, the Fremilo central committee elected Joaquim Chissano as president of Mozambique and as head of Frelimo. In the election within the politburo, Chissano had defeated the architect of Operation Production, Minister of the

¹¹ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 10.

¹² Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 12.

¹³ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 12.

Interior Armando Emilio Guebuza, who was a part of Machel's inner-circle of radicals. Chissano, like Machel, came from the Shangana tribe in the south, and had studied in Paris before independence and spoke French, Portuguese, and English fluently. As foreign minister to the Frelimo government, Chissano had an aura of pragmatism and flexibility. Chissano lacked Machel's charisma, but took a more intellectual, studied approach to issues. These qualities would come to help him led Mozambique on a remarkable change of course in only a few years.

Renamo

Renamo started as a ragtag insurgency with no clear ideology, but had a fierce determination to defeat the Frelimo government. Led by Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo exploited the discontent generated by the Frelimo government's policies. Unlike Mondlane, Machel, and Chissano, all of whom hailed from the Shangana tribe in the south, Dhlakama belonged to the Ndau tribe from Mozambique's central region. His only formal education was at a rural Catholic mission school, and perhaps because his father was a Ndau chief, he resented Frelimo's policy of eradicating traditional authority.¹⁴ Other Renamo leaders came from rural backgrounds and lacked the educational advantages of the Frelimo leadership. A senior military commander, Raul Domingos, a member of the Sena tribe allied to the Ndau, was recruited during his adolescent years, and trained by the Rhodesians and South Africans. Vinente Ululu, senior civilian adviser, speech writer for Dhlakama, and English teacher, studied in a church school in Tanzania. The goal of this motely ensemble of insurgents during the entire war was to make impossible the Frelimo government's ability to function

¹⁴ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 13.

properly.¹⁵ Renamo preferred to attack villages and infrastructure by demolishing schools, bridges, hospitals, and roads.

By 1985, Dhlakama headed a military organization of about 12,000 troops, organized in the northern, central, and southern zones. The Renamo were not as well armed as Frelimo's forces, yet often bested their opponent through intelligence, command and control, morale, initiative, and tactics. South Africa became Renamo's chief external supporters after the fall of the Rhodesian regime in the country that was renamed Zimbabwe. Portuguese business interests that had lost properties in Mozambique after independence were rumored to support Renamo. But Renamo representatives repeatedly denied the accusation. South African support consisted primarily of training, small arms and ammunition, medical supplies, and communications equipment.¹⁶ Renamo filled their rank by recruiting from inside Mozambique. The insurgents maintained themselves by raiding the civilian population for food and capturing military supplies from Frelimo forces. South Africa promised in 1984 to halt its support of Renamo in the Nkomati Accord (negotiated by Machel). However, the covert relationship continued unabated.

The Community of Sant' Egidio

The Community of Sant' Egidio (Saint Giles in Italian) is a Catholic lay organization officially recognized by the Vatican. Its main activities included prayer, spreading the Gospel, ecumenism, and service to the poor. A group of high-school students led by Andrea Riccardi founded the Community in 1968.¹⁷ Every night the small group of founders gathered at their local church Trastevere, Italy, south of Vatican City. The young men spend their time

¹⁵ Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 254.

¹⁶ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 14.

¹⁷ Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 256.

together praying, reading the Bible, discussing the Gospel, and eventually they would spread their teachings throughout the world. Today, the Community is more than 50,000 members in 70 different countries. Sant' Egidio's commitment to tolerance and dialogue has led them to mobilize against racism, ant-semitism, and the end of violent conflict around the globe. For example, Sant Egidio organized a cease-fire agreement in 1982 between Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt and the patriarch of the Lebanese Melchites.¹⁸ However, Sant Egidio's greatest accomplishment in the field of conflict was the contribution it made to ending the Mozambique's Civil War.

The origins of the Community's involvement in the Mozambique conflict, begin in 1962 with the Second Vatican Council, which was a significant moment of change in the Catholic Church, especially with its relationship to the world.¹⁹ Following the leadership of Angelo Giuseppe Roncalli, Pope John XXIII, the Catholic church reformed from a controlled, centralized, structure to a more creative, open exchange of ideas. The Catholic church became more open to religious freedom with a special emphasis being place on human dignity. The Community's principles of sustained ecumenical commitment, genuine work with the poor, open non-proselytizing testimony, and inter-religious dialogue would have been very difficult prior to the transformation. Bartoli writes: "These sensitivities contributed to the creation of a setting that was operative during the pre-negotiation, negotiation, and post-negotiation phases of dealing with the conflict of Mozambique."²⁰

The ties between Mozambique and the Sant'Edigio Community begin in 1976. A young Mozambican priest studying in Rome, Don Jamie Goncalves, befriended members of

¹⁸ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 17.

¹⁹ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 85.

²⁰ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 85.

Sant'Edigio.²¹ Goncalves left Rome and later became Archbishop of Beira (a hotbed of fierce fighting between Frelimo and Renamo forces), but kept in contact with the Community. Later, Goncalves told the members the problems facing the Catholic church under a repressive Socialist government in Mozambique. In the first years of independence the Machel government confiscated some church properties, closed church schools and clinics, and imposed restrictions on religious leaders. Goncalves was even imprisoned for six months.

Contacts between Frelimo and Sant'Edigio began when the Community organized a meeting between Goncalves and Senator Gerardo Chiaromonte, leaders of the Communist Party in Trastevere. After hearing Goncalves' story of repression of religion, Chiaromonte used his connections to set up a meeting between Enrico Berlinguer, then head of the Communist Party of Italy, and members of the Sant'Egidio Community, including Goncalves. Berlinguer promised to use his authority and weight of the fraternal party support given by the Italian Communist Party to persuade Frelimo to remove restrictions against the practice of religion. These contacts establish the web of connections which opened a dialogue between Frelimo and members of Sant'Egidio.

The Community's humanitarian assistance brought it into contact with Renamo, whose fighters lived in the jungle and regularly raided rural communities. Sant'Egidio members developed ties with missionaries in Mozambique, who often served in areas where Renamo insurgents operated. Representatives from Sant'Egidio in 1982 (perhaps help by the fact that Goncalves was from the same area of Mozambique as Dhlakama) negotiated

²¹ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 17.

the release of priests and nuns held captive by Renamo.²² As a result, Sant'Egidio, and Gonclevs in particular, began to develop credibility and trust with the insurgents.

Mozambique's Civil War as a Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

Mozambique's history from the colonial period, to independence, to the bloody civil war that followed accurately reflects Edward Azar's analysis of PSCs. Azar defined PSCs as “hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity.”²³ Azar's cluster of preconditions for PSCs (human needs, communal context, the role of the state, environmental factors, and international linkages), along with the dynamics (communal actions and strategies, state action and strategies, and built in mechanism of conflict) all exist in the Mozambique case. Mozambique evolved out of a legacy of "divide and rule," making it particularly vulnerable to PSCs. The country fractured along tribal and communal rivalries after independence. Frelimo attempted to unify the country under a socialist umbrella. However, the Shangana tribe from the south dominated the government and systematically eradicated the traditional authorities of Mozambique's other tribes. Failed economic policies meant basic human needs would remain ignored and further repressive policies compounded the people's misery. The Renamo insurgency was a reaction to all of this and external assistance (fueled by Cold War paranoia) kept them supplied for years.

Needs deprivation is the primary motivating factor in PSCs and Mozambique was no exception. The Machel government declared itself the "sole representative of the people" after independence and directly took power without holding any elections. According to

²² Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 19.

²³ Azar, Jureidini and Mclaurin, *Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East*, 50.

Azar's analysis of PSCs, a single communal group or coalition of groups, in the Third World for example, typically dominate the power structure within a society and disregard the needs of other groups, causing deep societal fragmentation.²⁴ Thus, the Frelimo government effectively prevented its people access to, and participation in, critical social institutions essential for fair and just distribution of resources and opportunities needed for security. A lack of effective participation and economic imbalances leads to the marginalization of certain identity groups.²⁵ Individuals strive to fulfill their needs through an identity group, grievances resulting from needs deprivation express themselves collectively by the marginalized identity group. Frelimo refused to accept or even recognize the grievances of their public. Failure by the Frelimo government to meet the collective demands of the different identity groups within its borders created a niche for an eventual civil war.

it is important to examine what Azar called the *communal context* for a complete understanding of Mozambique's conflict.²⁶ Mozambique is a multi-ethnic society consisting of the Macau and the Luma in the north; the Sena and the Nhau in the central region; and the Shangana in the south.²⁷ Maputo, located south of the country, has been the governmental and administrative capital of Mozambique since the colonial era. The Shangana tribe, by luck of geography, was in the best position to dominate the other tribes after the Portuguese relinquished control of Mozambique. It is no surprise, therefore, that both Machel and Chissano were from the Shanagana tribe. Dhlakama, on the contrary, belonged to the smaller Nhau tribe.

²⁴ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 82.

²⁵ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 19.

²⁶ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 19.

²⁷ Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 252.

Azar also emphasized the role of the state as regulator of PSCs. *The role of the state* or governing authority acts as the regulator of social, political, and economic interactions. In the early years after independence, the Frelimo government promoted a new nationalist, socialist identity. The government nationalized the economy and directly controlled property and many of the country's functions.²⁸ The Frelimo government, according to Azar's analysis, was the most crucial actor in satisfying all basic human needs. The Frelimo government, however, lacked trained and experienced personnel.²⁹ Even the Soviet-bloc technicians were ill-prepared for the daunting task set before them. Moreover, *environmental or developmental problems* (such as depletion of natural resources, degradation of the environment, or rapid population growth) may further constrain the state's capacity in dealing with communal tensions. Drought in agricultural areas along with Frelimo's disastrous collective farms policy (i.e. Operation Production) contributed to the volume of key cash crop exports falling from 800,000 tons in 1981 to little more than 150,000 tons in 1986.³⁰

Finally, *international linkages* exacerbate the role of the weak state in the deprivation of needs to the public and protract nature of conflict.³¹ The Soviet Union was the main external supporter of the Frelimo government.³² Moscow, at one time, supplied fighter jets, tanks, and other heavy equipment to Frelimo's military. The Soviet Union and Cuba each sent in more than 500 military advisers. The Frelimo military, however, was never a proficient fighting force, and made no substantive progress against the insurgents.

²⁸ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 18.

²⁹ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 253.

³⁰ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 12.

³¹ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 19.

³² Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 19.

Azar's analysis of international linkages emphasized external powers assisting autocratic state government, but failed to include how outside interference in regional insurgencies contribute to protracted conflicts. Rhodesian military intelligence unit supported Renamo by training and supplying the insurgency until the Smith regime fell to ZUNU fighter led by Robert Mugabe. South Africa, whose security policy was driven by alleged threat of a "total onslaught" by Communist states against southern Africa, became Renamo's chief patron.³³ Compared to the Soviet Union, South Africa's support was minimal. South African military intelligence trained troops and provided communications equipment. Renamo, however, captured most of their equipment from Frelimo supplies. Though over time, Renamo proved itself to having a superior intelligence-gather efforts, command and control, and leadership in small units.

Azar defined PSCs as "hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity."³⁴ Classifying the Mozambique civil war as a PSC brings to the surface the causative and escalatory process that drove the conflict over an extended period of time. For Azar, giving emphasis to issues such as security, identity, and recognition may lead to a realization of the importance of basic human needs and their role in intractable conflicts. Next, this thesis will now turn to the events that made up the Track Two initiative in Mozambique to gain a deeper understanding of the Mozambique peace process.

³³ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 20.

³⁴ Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, *Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East*, 50.

Nature of the Intervention

It is important to note that the peace process involved many actors both domestic and international. The commitment and intensity of these actors made the Mozambique peace process a reality. Most of the credit for the peace process rests on the Mozambican people themselves. Their collective participation no doubt had a great impact on reducing continual hostilities. The Mozambican people reaffirmed their commitment to their country, when in the first election held after the peace deal, 87 percent of all Mozambicans voted in the election after the peace settlement had been implemented.³⁵

Analyzing specific cases like Mozambique yields insights into a process that may teach us lessons that can enhance our understanding of conflict resolution. The Mozambique civil war is best understood as a protracted social conflict in keeping with Azar's criteria. The Frelimo denied members of the Renamo basic human needs. Ideology and ethnicity linked different identity groups together with mutually incompatible goals. The mostly educated Marxist-Leninist Frelimo was a Shangaana tribe dominated political force that traditionally were at the seat of power, even during the colonial period. After independence, in the 1970s, Frelimo leadership wanted to fundamentally alter Mozambique culture along revolutionary Marxist principles. Tribes from the underdeveloped northern and central parts of the country were steeped in more traditional forms of authority and soon resented the central government in Maputo for tearing their cultural identity from Mozambique society.

The situation in Mozambique is not unlike the Lebanese or Israeli/Palestinian conflict, which experienced the same level of intractable bloodshed. In Lebanon, Edward

³⁵ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 267.

Azar suggested that an ineffective power sharing government failed to represent the changing population demographic when the Muslim population growth outpaced the Christian population.³⁶ Lebanon was unable to establish a strong state mechanism to provide physical and economic security for its diverse population. In the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, Herbert Kelman proposed the core element of the conflict was the mutual denial of the adversary's national identity. Resistance to each side's national identity stemmed from the fear that acceptance of the other side's nationhood undermined its own claim to Palestine. Moreover, each side believed the other to be intent on its destruction. Finally, in Mozambique, colonial rule, and later the Frelimo, left the country without effective dispute settling institutions such as the judiciary and multi-party political system. Under Machel, Frelimo nationalized private homes, rental property, and other land holdings, the practice of medicine or law, and educational institutions.³⁷

Each of the situations Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, and Mozambique fit Azar's definition of a protracted social conflict. During each of these conflicts problem-solving workshops brought together members of each side in an open, interactive forum. Azar conducted a workshop with a diverse collection of influential Lebanese citizens where the participants drafted a letter with twenty-two principles on how to move toward a united Lebanon. Elements of the twenty-two principles were incorporated in the 1989 Ta'if Accord, which ended the Lebanon civil war. Herbert Kelman similarly hosted workshops where members of Israeli and Palestinian society discussed the conflict that raged on in their land. Eventually "alumni" from Kelman's workshops were involved in the back-channel talks in

³⁶ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 96.

³⁷ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 9.

Norway that broke the deadlock in the public negotiations in late 1993.³⁸ Though success in Track Two diplomacy is a nebulous concept (an idea explored later in this thesis) it is important to understand these conflicts and examine the efforts made by third party facilitators to determine what contributions if any these efforts produced. The Mozambique peace process is another well-known case where an unofficial third party mediated a peace negotiation that ended nearly twenty years of civil war.

The unofficial beginning of the Mozambique peace process occurred in 1981 meeting in Rome organized by Sant'Egidio between a Catholic Bishop, Don Jamie Goncalves, and then head of the Italian Communist party, Enrico Berlinguer, where the parties discussed ways to remove the restrictions on religious freedom in Mozambique.³⁹ After Goncalves recounted his story of experience with religious repression in Mozambique, Berlinguer offered to use his influence and authority given by the Italian Communist party to persuade Frelimo to remove restrictions against the practice of religion.⁴⁰ To the surprise of the Catholic leaders, Berlinguer said that Mozambique first had to pass through the phase of Christianity before it would be prepared for Communism (neglecting the fact that Mozambique's colonial ruler, Portugal, was heavily influenced by the Catholic Church)

The meeting had a transformative impact on how Goncalves conceptualized the possibility of political intervention.⁴¹ the Catholic Sant'Egidio and the Italian Communist party found common ground in Mozambique. Later in subsequent meetings between 1981 and 1984, Goncalves and Berlinguer explored new interpretative frameworks of the internal dynamic of Mozambique's political landscape and worked on solutions that could benefit all

³⁸ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 72.

³⁹ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 90.

⁴⁰ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 17.

⁴¹ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 90

actors in the conflict. The brainstorming sessions in Rome allowed for the exploration of strategies and alternatives that could move Frelimo government and Renamo closer. More importantly, the meetings opened a dialogue between the Frelimo government in Maputo and the Community of Sant'Egidio in Rome, a turning point that would prove critical in organizing the eventual peace process.

Thanks to the connections made in the Gonclaves-Berlinguer meetings, members of Sant'Edigio, Andra Riccardi and Don Matteo Zuppi, gained the support of Italian governmental officials for programs set up by Sant'Egidio to deliver food and medicine to Mozambique (at the time a severe drought affected Mozambique for a number of years).⁴² In August 1984, Riccardi and Zuppi went to Mozambique on an official visit, bringing two planeloads of humanitarian aid.⁴³ The two representatives of Sant'Egidio were received by then minister of foreign affairs and future president of Mozambique, Joachim Chissano. During this period, the contracts between the Frelimo government in Maputo and the Community of Sant'Egidio grew significantly, culminating in the facilitation of a meeting between President Samora Michel and Pope John Paul II on September 7, 1985.⁴⁴ After Michel died, Chissano was elected president and continued to have open relations with the Community of Sant'Egidio. In 1988, Catholic bishops had an informal meeting with President Chissano where the president encouraged to Church to seek contact with Renamo.⁴⁵

The request by President Chissano to use unofficial mediators to seek contact with an insurgency demonstrates the utility of Track Two diplomacy. It was not politically viable

⁴² Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 18

⁴³ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 90.

⁴⁴ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 91.

⁴⁵ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 94.

for Chissano to officially seek contact with the Renamo insurgency, but a third party, like the church leadership in Mozambique, could do the job the government was unwilling to do. It was the beginning of a process that was in preparation for years. The willingness of the Frelimo government to use religious channels to connect with Renamo forces was a massive departure its official positions regarding the insurgency and pushed it on the path toward reconciliation with the insurgency.

In reaching out to Renamo, Sant'Egidio proved helpful. The first official contact between the Community and Renamo involved the release of a Portuguese nun, Sr. Lucia, held hostage by the insurgency. Using its vast network of contacts, members of Sant'Egidio established direct contact with Renamo's leader, Alfonso Dhlakama, and requested the liberation of the nun. The handover occurred on April 25, 1988, in a pre-arranged place in a missionary on the border between Mozambique and Malawi.⁴⁶ As a result, Sant'Egidio began to develop a relationship of trust and credibility with the Renamo insurgency. The Community of Sant'Egidio discovered the importance of maintaining positive and constructive relations with both sides of the Mozambique conflict. The 1988 release of the Portuguese nun in Mozambique proved that the Community's network of contacts in both sides of Mozambique's conflict and within the Italian government were reliable. More important, Renamo appeared open to the exploration of dialogue with Sant'Egidio.

Don Goncalves was, once again, indispensable in shaping Sant'Egidio's relationship with Renamo. A representative of Renamo, Da Fonseca, who acted as an intermediary in the liberation of Sr. Lucia, clearly preferred to work with Goncalves. On several occasions, the representative of Renamo refused to speak with clergymen other than Goncalves. The

⁴⁶ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 94.

Community facilitated two meetings with Da Fonseca and Goncalves with the aim of achieving direct contact with Renamo's leader, Alfonso Dhlakama.⁴⁷ Sant'Egidio achieved this goal in February 1989, when Goncalves along with a church delegation met with Renamo leadership, including Dhlakama.⁴⁸ Goncalves discovered that Dhlakama had come from the same tribe as him, the Ndau. They spoke in their native tongue and found the quality of the communication to be high. Goncalves spoke candidly about Renamo's massacres and ask Dhlakama to commit to the principle of renouncing violence as a way to bring about change.⁴⁹ The visit was a fundamental turning point and a great success. Though far from a negotiated cease-fire, the success Sant'Egidio experienced with meeting between Goncalves and Dhlakama could be considered the basis of a dialogue.

It was at this point in the spring and summer of 1989 that preliminary "meetings" between intermediaries from Kenya and Zimbabwe representing Renamo negotiated with delegations from the Frelimo government took place in Nairobi.⁵⁰ Though the "meetings" in Nairobi were distant and indirect, the positions of the conflicting parties were established. Renamo, still a ragtag insurgency, demanded the government recognize it as a legitimate political party. On the other hand, Frelimo wanted an immediate cease-fire agreement before official negotiations were to begin.⁵¹ It was clear now that both parties were tired of fighting, yet numerous issues stood in their way. Sant'Egidio was now in the perfect position to break the impasse and facilitate a direct dialogue between Frelimo and Renamo. Sant'Egidio officials moved quickly to convene talks in Rome.

⁴⁷ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 94.

⁴⁸ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 27.

⁴⁹ (Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 27.

⁵⁰ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 94.

⁵¹ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 31.

The initial meeting in Rome would prove to be the single greatest moment in the overall peace process. The two Mozambican delegations, who had been at war for nearly two decades, met for the first time on July 8th, 1990 in Sant'Egidio's offices in Rome. Sant'Egidio officials guaranteed confidentiality during the process. No press or reporters greeted either delegation as they arrived at the airport in Rome. Sant'Edigio officials promptly welcome the delegation and quickly left. The discussions took place inside SantEgidio's largest meeting room. The participants all sat at a large U-shaped table, and chose Portuguese as the language. Armando Guebuza headed the Frelimo government's delegation and was known for his strong approach.⁵² Throughout the meetings, Guebuza forcefully asserted that the Frelimo government was the sole legitimate political party in Mozambique. And he reiterated that only after a complete cease-fire agreement was reached with the Renamo insurgency would peace negotiaions begin. However, Renamo's forces and sympathizers never recognized the Frelimo government as legitimate. To the insurgency, Frelimo had pushed its way into power without the full consent of Mozambique's people. Raul Domingos led the Renamo delegation. Domingos was a military leader inside the insurgency with no institutional experience. Domingo was able to offer a military dimention to the talks. Also, he was from Beira of the Sena tribe and had strong connections to areas in central Mozambique.

Two high-ranking Sant'Edigio officials, Andrea Raccardi and Don Matteo Zuppi led the mediating team. They termed themselves as "observers" and described their role was to explain one party to another. The observers also were joined by Italian politician Mario

⁵² Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 97.

Raffaelli and Don Jaime Goncalves. Raccardi gave a riveting introductory speech that said among other things:

"We are aware that we have in front of us Mozambican patriots, truly Africans, without the presence of foreigners. Each of you have deep roots in the country Your history is called Mozambique. Your future is called Mozambique. We ourselves are here as hosts of an event that we feel to be totally Mozambican. In this perspective, our presence intends to be forceful where friendship is concerned, but discreet and respectful.⁵³

Echoing Raccardi's calls for unity, Italian politician Mario Raffaelli state that to conduct a successful dialogue, the parties should avoid recriminations about the past, and seek ways to express their differences peacefully within the framework of pluralism and national unity.⁵⁴

Tensions between the Mozambican delegations was palpable despite the observers' initial pleas. However, both parties avoided contentious remarks and kept within protocol. The Frelimo government saw the overall peace process as beginning with a cease-fire, after which Renamo would reintegrate into Mozambican society.⁵⁵ For the Frelimo government, the cessation of hostilities was the beginning point; for Renamo, it was the last point. Renamo wanted to change the political system, including changing the constitution and allowing it to emerge as an electable political party. Another issue brought forth was the inclusion of foreign countries in the peace negotiations. Later, the participants agreed to adjourn the meeting until the next day. The first day of the meeting had been a reasonable success. The conversation held by the two Mozambican delegations focused on an exchange of views. The observers felt that by stating their differences, the delegations could take steps toward mutual acknowledgment.⁵⁶

⁵³ Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 99.

⁵⁴ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 33.

⁵⁵ Hume *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 34.

⁵⁶ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 95.

The second meeting focused on establishing a common agenda. While the starting positions were very distant, with Frelimo demanding a cease-fire and Renamo stressing democratization, the observers pushed the parties to agree to merge their demands into a joint communique. Throughout the day, the observers shuttled between the two delegations until an agreement was drafted. In the communique, the two parties expressed satisfaction at their first direct, open, and candid meeting; expressed an interest in meeting again; and expressed an interest in continuing a constructive search for a lasting peace for all Mozambicans.⁵⁷

More important, the joint communique embraced democratic pluralism. In the document, the two delegations emphasized their "readiness to dedicate themselves fully, in the spirit of mutual respect and understanding, to the search for a working basis from economic and social conditions for the building of a lasting peace and normalizing the life of all Mozambican citizens."⁵⁸ This passage states that Mozambique's future will not be decided by a single political party, but instead by many different political parties. The notion of pluralism had an important implication for Renamo. In the past, the insurgency saw itself as resistance movement, but now wanted to enter into Mozambican society as a political party. This would be the framework for all future negotiation between the government of Frelimo and Renamo. On July 10th, 1990, the two sides signed the joint communique. Each delegation recognized the other as compatriots and members of the same Mozambican society. This framework would prove strong enough to nurture the peace process up to the official negotiation and beyond.

⁵⁷ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 34.

⁵⁸ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 265.

The negotiations would continue for another two years. In time, the negotiations would go from informal brainstorming sessions at Sant'Egidio's offices in Rome to regular communications with the United Nations (UN). On October 4, 1992, the Frelimo government and Renamo officially signed the peace agreement. Sant'Egidio officials remained active in the peace process throughout this time., Andrea Raccardi and Don Matteo Zuppi went back and forth between Frelimo and Renamo hotels on the night the two parties signed the agreement.⁵⁹ in the document, each side agreed to demobilize their forces followed by the formation of a unified national army and elections. The principles of democratic pluralism outlined in the peace agreement echoed similar statements found in the joint communique. The success of the peace agreement could be attributed to the fact the both the Frelimo government and Renamo designed it. The delegations did not perceive the agreement as an imposed document, but as the result of an original experiment in which they were able to have a national dialogue and to a reach genuine agreement.⁶⁰

After extrapolating their underlying causes of the Mozambique conflict using the analysis provided by Azar and examining the nature of the Sant'Egidio efforts, it is possible to determine the extent that the organization was successful using Kelman's problem-solving workshop model. Kelman's model for conflict resolution is in grounded the discipline of social-psychology, which incorporates institutional and psychological factors to its analysis. While most conflicts arise out of objective and ideological differences, the interplay between psychological factors perpetuate and escalate the crisis.⁶¹ Overcoming the social-psychological barriers between participants in a problem-solving workshop can

⁵⁹ Hume, *Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices*, 35.

⁶⁰ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio* 266.

⁶¹ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 62.

provided opportunities for negotiation and possible peaceful settlement. Therefore, the extent that Sant'Egidio's initiative in Mozambique was able to break down these social-psychological barriers can provide insight into the initiative's impact on the eventual outcome of the peace negotiation.

Mozambique Peace Process as Interactive Problem Solving

Analyzing specific cases like Mozambique yields insights into a process that supply lessons that to enhance our understanding of conflict resolution. The peace process in Mozambique was a success in part because of the Community of Sant'Egidio's efforts. However, Sant'Edigio officials were not polished academics, or professional diplomats. A group of high school students formed the Community of Sant'Egidio in 1968. The founders based their institution on the principles of prayer, friendship, and service. Despite their humble background, the amateur diplomats were able to facilitate a peace process of immense complexity, which produced lasting effects.

Sant'Egidio officials played an unofficial facilitative role in the Mozambique peace process, not unlike the scholar-practitioners in previous Track Two initiatives. Several noted commonalities exist between Sant'Egidio efforts in Mozambique and the interactive problem-solving model developed by Herbert Kelman during the 1970s. Kelman's interactive model for conflict resolution brings together politically influential members of conflicting parties in a private, confidential setting for direct, non-committal communication.⁶² He applied the term "workshop" to describe the specific interaction the two parties. Kelmen wanted to create a unique environment for conflicting parties "to

⁶² Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 6.

engage in face-to-face communication with the guidance of social scientists, who are knowledgeable about conflict theory, group processes, and the region in question."⁶³

The Dual Purpose of Kelman's Interactive Problem-Solving Workshop and the Mozambique Peace Process

The Community of Sant'Egidio officials, who facilitated the intervention in Mozambique, did not intend for the interaction to be an exercise in interactive problem solving (or in Track Two diplomacy for that matter.) However, the affects that the Community had on the Mozambique peace process have some commonalities with Kelman's model. One commonality, among the many this paper examines, is what Kelman described as the dual purpose of the workshop.

Through the interactive forum, the third-party facilitator hopes to design a process that affects both *educational* -- changes in attitudes, perceptions, and ideas among the participants - and *political* -- transferring the changes to the political dialogue and decision-making process-- arenas within a target society.⁶⁴ The problem-solving workshops provide the conflicting parties opportunities to interact, become familiar with the other participants point of view, and humanize their images. The intended affect is that specific insights acquired by the participants fed into their own political leadership or public. The insights practitioners hope to gain include: views from the other side, readiness for negotiation, availability of potential negotiation partners, and mutually acceptable solutions.⁶⁵

⁶³ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 59.

⁶⁴ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 61.

⁶⁵ Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy*, 90.

It took more than 10 years and numerous meetings, encounters, and efforts by various actors for before the Frelimo government and Renamo signed the official peace accord in 1994. From the beginning of Sant'Egidio's envisioned the answer to the Mozambique crisis was political and not military.⁶⁶ When talking about the dual purpose of interactive conflict resolution, Kelman writes to the needs for participants "to move away from official positions and to mutually explore new ideas with the adversary."⁶⁷ During the first meeting between the Frelimo and Renamo delegations on July 8th, 1990, founder of the Community of Sant'Egidio, Andrea Riccardi, gave an introductory speech which attempted to create a collaborative environment when he said "Your history is called Mozambique. Your future is called Mozambique."⁶⁸ The leader of the Frelimo delegation, Armando Emilio Guebuza, picked up on the spirit of collaboration at the conclusion of the first day of the meeting and saluted the Renamo delegation as "os nosso compatriotas" (our own compatriots). Raul Domingos, who led the Renamo delegation, also responded positively by addressing Guebuza as "minister." These moments are essential ingredients of a successful problem-solving workshop and the peace process at large. The next day, members of each delegation signed the Joint Communiqué.

Sant'Egidio's efforts in Mozambique correlate with Kelman's dual purpose of a problem-solving workshop. Top officials on each side in Mozambique conflict were beginning to humanize the other. The Community of Sant'Egidio was not as team of polished academics or professional diplomats, rather were a committed network of that facilitated the delegation to work constructively. Though Sant'Egidio did not intend to

⁶⁶ Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 264.

⁶⁷ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 61.

⁶⁸ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 99.

imitate Kelman's interactive conflict resolution model, the Community's efforts were successful in facilitating changes in attitudes, perceptions, and ideas among their participants and transferring the changes to the decision-making process.

Kelman's Social-Psychological Assumptions and the Mozambique Peace Process: The Individual as the Basic Unit of Analysis and Points of Entry

Kelman sees social interaction as the heart of the problem-solving workshop.⁶⁹ He created a set of assumptions about interactive conflict resolution derived from a social-psychological analysis of conflict. These assumptions pay close attention to interaction between psychological and institutional factors that typically make up the dynamics of intergroup and international conflict.⁷⁰ In the Mozambique peace process, Sant'Egidio's approach had elements of these assumptions.

One such commonality with Kelman's social-psychological assumptions in Mozambique's peace process is *the individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis*.⁷¹ According to Kelman, the needs of the individuals are articulated through their core identity group. A lack of effective participation and economic imbalances leads to the marginalization of certain identity groups. This was certainly the case in Mozambique after the Frelimo government came to power. Frelimo wanted to eradicate traditional authority within Mozambican society and replaced with a Marxist vision. The Renamo insurgency was a reaction to that. Using Edward Azar's words, a protracted conflict developed due to a

⁶⁹ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 61.

⁷⁰ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 62.

⁷¹ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 11.

severe deprivation of basic human needs such as lack of effective political participation and security guarantees

The goal of Sant'Egidio was to reverse that trend. Sant'Egidio officials had the emotional intelligence to pick up on the respective demands of the delegations and seek a mutually satisfying solution. For Frelimo it was acknowledgement; For Renamo it was democratization. It was important for the Frelimo government and the identity group that supported it (mainly from more urban, educated south) for Renamo to acknowledge them as a legitimate government.⁷² On the other hand, Renamo and the identity group (mainly from the less developed central and northern regions) demanded an expansion of political rights. The Community hoped to push behind the parties' incompatible positions and explore the identity and security concerns that underlie them to find possible avenues towards a solution that was acceptable to both delegations.

Through the interactive workshop process, Herbert Kelman looks to find relevant "points of entry" on which to base a psychological analysis.⁷³ The scholar-practitioner seeks to identify certain cognitions, emotions, insight, intentions, and interactions between individuals that determine outcomes in the conflict. These points provide a theoretical model that can identify certain processes central to maintaining the protracted nature of the conflict. Changes at the individual level -- in the form of new ideas and insights through interaction with an adversary group -- in a workshop environment can then feed back into the political debate and the decision making in the two communities.

⁷² Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 99.

⁷³ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 9.

Examples of the points of entry that Kelman writes about can be found in the Mozambique peace process. The joint communique is one such example. It must first be noted that the level of enmity between Frelimo and Renamo were extremely high due to many years of long and bitter fighting. However, the exploratory dialogue between the two sides in the initial meeting in 1990 began to bridge the gap. During the process, the Sant'Egidio officials facilitated an interactive problem-solving forum where the parties involved recognized and acknowledged each other. They framed this recognition in terms of belonging to the same "Mozambican family" as "compatriots."⁷⁴ The joint communique emphasized the Frelimo government and Renamo's "readiness to dedicate themselves fully, in the spirit of mutual respect and understanding, to search for a working basis from the economic and social conditions for building a lasting peace and normalizing the life of all Mozambican citizens."⁷⁵ The delegations drafted into the joint communique ideas of pluralism and inclusiveness. The ideas were enough to nurture the peace process all the way up to the official signing of the peace accord in 1992. After the peace accord, the national election held in 1994 brought out more than 5.4 million Mozambicans to vote.⁷⁶ The internationally supervised elections marked the infusion of the insights gained from the interactive peace process (facilitated by Sant'Edigio) into Mozambican political life. The peace accord also was key in a step-by-step process of repatriation, resettlement, demobilization of the opposition restructuring of the military with both Frelimo and Renamo forces.

⁷⁴ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 100.

⁷⁵ Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 265.

⁷⁶ (Bartoli, 1999, 266)

Kelman's Ground Rules and the Mozambique Peace Process

In designing his problem-solving workshops, Kelman came up with a set of ground rules to overcome the usual accusatory, legalistic, and hostile interactions that typically accompany tense peace negotiations. He wanted to replace the undesired interactions with an analytical, task-ordinated environment, which had the potential for each party of the conflict to find mutually satisfying solutions. The ground rules call for an analytic dialogue, stresses the role of the third party as a facilitator of communication rather than an audience or adjudicator to be convinced.⁷⁷ The principles behind Kelman's workshop ground rules such as confidentiality, analytic discussion, or the facilitative role of the third party can be seen in practice with Sant'Edigio's efforts in the Mozambique peace process.

The central ground rule in the problem-solving workshop is privacy and confidentiality.⁷⁸ Privacy is especially important. Generally, it is politically risky for participants to meet with the enemy. In some cases, exposing these controversial meeting can lead to legal troubles or even assassination. Sant'Edigio intuitively knew this rule when, prior to the initial meeting between the government of Frelimo and Renamo, they discreetly greeted each Mozambican delegation at the airport in Rome and promptly escorted them out.⁷⁹ Confidentiality is equally important in Kelman's central ground rule. He writes, “[confidentiality] enables participants to engage in the kind of interaction that is crucial to achieving the purposes of the enterprise.”⁸⁰ The principle of confidentiality was equally important for the Sant'Egidio officials, specifically information management. This strategy of confidentiality was employed by the Sant'Edigio to minimize a disruptive and possibly

⁷⁷ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 60.

⁷⁸ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 275.

⁷⁹ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 97.

⁸⁰ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 275.

inflammatory diffusion of information. For example, Frelimo had an internal debate in which hard-liners openly opposed compromise with Renamo.⁸¹ The need for confidentiality was necessary for Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano to ensure his party would follow his leadership. Sant'Egidio's approach to privacy and confidentiality proved crucial in counteracting negative news, and to adsorb negativities in general, in order to assist the growth of mutual understanding.⁸²

Another ground rule stipulates that the participants “focus on each other,” and not constituencies, audience, or the third party. During the initial meetings between both sides of the Mozambique conflict, Sant'Egidio officials attempted to include each party into a larger, more interpretive framework. The Community sought to make a rational atmosphere where the emphasis was on the parties themselves.⁸³ Sant'Egidio officials treated the Frelimo and Renamo delegations not as a formal unified team but as a group in which personal dynamics were always playing an important role.⁸⁴ The tensions that typically accompany such a dialogue were offset by the excellent quality of the rational atmosphere.

Another of Kelman's ground rules concerns the facilitative role of the third party. In his model, the third party does not take part in the substantive discussions. Kelman writes, “[the third party] does not give advice or offer its own proposals, nor does it take sides, evaluate the ideas presented, or arbitrate between different interpretations of historical facts or international law.”⁸⁵ The main tasks of the third party is to use the ground rules to allow the ideas for resolving the conflict to emerge out of the interaction between the parties

⁸¹ Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 263.

⁸² Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 97.

⁸³ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 96.

⁸⁴ Bartoli, *Mediating Peace in Mozambique: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 264.

⁸⁵ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 276.

themselves. The role of the Sant'Egidio officials was to explain one party to another, at times repeat, with more precise language, what the other was saying. Sant'Egidio officials noticed a tendency of the delegations to not accept the other's position as legitimate starting point. However, the delegations seemed to welcome the same idea if presented by a neutral party.⁸⁶ Kelman argues that the role of third party help to keep the discussion moving in a constructive direction and intervenes with relevant questions, observations, and even challenges. The Community provided an atmosphere where serious discussion on alternative solutions could take place. The facilitative approach by Sant'Egidio in the July 1990 meetings led to the first breakthrough in the talks: each delegation realized that negotiation was feasible.⁸⁷

Herbert Kelman designed his problem-solving workshop create an analytic atmosphere, where mutually satisfying solutions could be found. By focusing on each other's needs, fears, concerns, and constraints, each party can develop insight into the causes and dynamics of the conflict. The efforts by the Community of Sant'Egidio officials incorporated principles of Kelman's problem solving approach. The July 1990 talks between the Frelimo government and Renamo achieved the analytic dialogue that the problem-solving approach requires. At the start of the talks, the initial tension was palpable, but each delegation expressed their needs and fears through the proper protocol. The government wanted "normalization" and the insurgency wanted "democratization."⁸⁸ Any framework for peace needed the participants to incorporate these fundamental orientations. The joint communique signed by each member of the two delegations clearly states that the interests

⁸⁶ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 97.

⁸⁷ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 98.

⁸⁸ Bartoli, *Learning from the Mozambique Peace Process: The Role of the Community of Sant' Egidio*, 98.

of the Mozambican nation will not be represented by a single party, but by many different parties. The analytic discussions facilitated by Sant'Edigio planted the seeds of pluralism and inclusiveness that would see its way through to the official peace accord and beyond.

Conclusion

This chapter classified the Mozambique civil war as a PSC and brought to the surface the causative and escalatory processes that drove the conflict over an extended period of time. Azar defined PSCs as “hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity.”⁸⁹ According to Azar, giving emphasis to issues such as security, identity, and recognition may lead to a realization of the importance of basic human needs and their role in intractable conflicts. This chapter unraveled the causes to the Mozambique conflict using Azar's analytical framework. Needs deprivation is the primary motivating factor in PSCs and Mozambique was no exception. The Machel government declared itself the "sole representative of the people" after independence, and directly took power without holding any elections. Azar's research states that a lack of effective participation and economic imbalances leads to the marginalization of certain identity groups.⁹⁰ Individuals strive to fulfill their needs through an identity group, grievances resulting from needs deprivation express themselves collectively by the marginalized identity group. Frelimo refused to accept or even recognize the grievances of their public. Failure by the Frelimo government to meet the collective demands of the different identity groups within its borders created a niche for an eventual civil war.

⁸⁹ Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, *Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East*, 50.

⁹⁰ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 19.

Next, by examining the nature of the Sant'Egidio efforts, this chapter determined the extent that the organization was successful, using the analytical frameworks provided by Kelman's problem-solving workshop model. Kelman's model for conflict resolution is grounded in the discipline of social-psychology, which incorporates institutional and psychological factors to its analysis. While most conflicts arise out of objective and ideological differences, the interplay between psychological factors perpetuate and escalate the crisis.⁹¹ Overcoming the social-psychological barriers between participants in a problem-solving workshop can provide opportunities for negotiation, and possibly, a peaceful settlement. Therefore, the extent that Sant'Egidio's initiative in Mozambique was able to break down these social-psychological barriers can provide insight into the initiative's impact on the eventual outcome of the peace negotiation.

When examined under the analytical framework provided by Kelman's problem solving workshop, the efforts overtaken by Sant'Egidio officials in Mozambique were a success. The Sant'Egidio officials were able to break through social-the psychological barriers of the participants and forge a path to a sustained peace. The initial meeting between Renamo and Frelimo on July 8-10, 1990, is a classic example of an informal and unofficial interaction between two adversarial groups facilitated by a third party. For years, Sant'Egidio cultivated a relationship with both the Frelimo government and Renamo forces. The effort to get both groups to the negotiating table hit a major milestone when Frelimo and Renamo co-drafted and signed the joint communique on the last night of the meetings. The spirit of democratic pluralism carried from the joint communique into the peace accord when both parties recognized the legitimacy of the other. A reinvigorated electorate followed

⁹¹ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 62.

through with promises of peace made by their leaders and widely participated in the next election.

Although Azar and Kelman's research was integral to developing unofficial conflict mediation techniques, their research does not address the role of culture in conflict mediation. One striking feature in the Mozambique case is that protracted conflict revolved around two identity groups from a generally homogenous culture. A generally homogenous cultural zone can be defined as social groups within a geographic region that share a common historical background. On the surface, the two sides appear incompatible: Frelimo government started as a Marxist-inspired political movement, while Renamo was ragtag insurgency with no clear ideology. However, each side shared a common history. Each side developed out of a shared colonial experience. In the Mozambique peace process, the Sant'Edigio efforts were engaged in the context of a generally homogenous cultural zone. What must be taken into consideration in Track Two diplomacy initiatives is the potential for a clash of cultures that can serve to widen the divisions within a society engaged in a protracted conflict. Azar and Kelman's research fails to address how to fill divisions between two disparate cultural systems. Disparate cultural systems can be defined as dissimilar social groups from essentially different historical backgrounds. Cultural experience cannot be overlooked in Track Two diplomacy and will be explored further in the next case where the two identity groups did not share a common cultural background.

4: THE HARVARD STUDY GROUP'S CYPRUS INITIATIVE

The Cyprus conflict features predominately among the examples of an intractable international conflict that is based on disparate cultural systems. Disparate cultural systems can be defined as dissimilar social groups from essentially different historical backgrounds. Three decades of countless, persistent efforts to conclude a negotiated settlement on the island of Cyprus has challenged the international community for nearly fifty years. In 1960, Cyprus broke free from its colonial past and emerged as an independent state. However, a legacy of conquest deprived the small island of a unified national identity. Intercommunal violence broke out in 1963, which led to UN Peacekeeping forces being sent to the island. Since then, numerous official and unofficial conflict resolution initiatives, at times supported by the United States, The United Kingdom, and most recently the European Union failed to seal the rift between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and, since 1974, to reunify the island.¹

The initiative that came the closest to achieving a negotiated settlement, the UN sponsored Annan Plan, ended in failure in 2004. At the same time as the Annan Plan was being formulated, unofficial meetings (from 1999-2003) between representative from both sides of the Cyprus conflict were regularly holding meetings. The Harvard Study Group (HSG), a team of academically trained professions, facilitated the initiative. Though the HSG operated independently of the official UN process, the group's aim was to facilitate the start of negotiations, and once the negotiations began, jointly develop ideas that could be useful in the process.² Unfortunately, the Annan Plan failed to bring about a negotiated settlement.

¹ Chigas, The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process, 231.

² Chigas, The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process, 232.

On April 24, 2004, the Turkish Cypriots voted overwhelmingly for the UN plan for unification of the island, while the Greek Cypriots equally rejected it.

The research in this chapter does not support the idea the HSG meetings directly influenced the official UN mediated process. The failure of the Annan Plan to conclude a negotiated settlement, despite the involvement of unofficial mediation efforts by the HSG, provides an incentive for this chapter to conduct a critical appraisal of the peace process. The basic goal of the HSG was to facilitate insights into possible solutions for the ongoing dispute. However, at the end of the process no settlement was provided. This chapter will explore what contributions the efforts of the HSG made to the Cyprus peace process.

Origins of the Dispute

Cyprus is a small island in the eastern Mediterranean, approximately 70 kilometers (40 miles) south of Turkey. The island's strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, Africa made it a coveted possession of larger, more powerful states. The ancient Greeks were the first to colonize Cyprus but not the last; nearly every successive ruling empire in the region conquered the island up to 1571, when the Ottoman Empire gained control. The Ottoman empire's period of control left a lasting mark on the island as its population grew to include two distinct identity groups: the Greek Orthodox Cypriots and Turkish Muslim Cypriots. Religion and cultural differences were sharper in Cyprus than in Mozambique. While taking an appraisal of conflict resolution efforts in Cyprus, the disparate cultural systems on the island cannot be overlooked.

In 1878, Cyprus came under British administration and an era of colonial rule began. The British dealt with two identity groups separately in terms of education, religion, and

cultural affairs, but the colonial rulers granted the island considerable autonomy.³

Economically the Turkish Cypriots were poorer, but some managed to become a part of the administrative elite. The Greek Cypriots were a blend of working class and middle class citizens, characterized as having a strong enterprising spirit. Few Greek Cypriots spoke the Turkish language, while around 40 percent of Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek, with English increasingly becoming the common language.⁴ Overall, by the time Britain granted Cyprus independence in 1960, the two identity groups on Cyprus only had a limited sense of a national identity. Instead of being exclusively Cypriot, the population divided itself along ethnic identities. A legacy of conquest that prevented the island from unifying under a single national identity became the foundation for the bloody protract conflict that would ensue.

Colonial rule gave rise to nationalist sentiments among the Greek Cypriot community. Opposition by the Greek Cypriot community did not demand independence from Britain, but rather unification with Greece, also called *enosis*.⁵ Dissatisfaction among the Greek Cypriot community erupted into guerilla warfare in 1955 with the formation of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA). The campaign of violence by the EOKA fighters against British rule spilled over into the Turkish Cypriot community with many on the Turkish side caught in the crossfire. The Turkish Cypriot Community opposed unification with Greece. In particular, they feared the of becoming an underrepresented minority in an "enemy" country.⁶ In a reaction to the concept of *enosis*, the Turkish Cypriots called for the island to be divided between Turkey and Greece, which they labeled *taksim*.

³ Fisher, Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse, 309.

⁴ Fisher, Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse, 309.

⁵ Chigas, The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process, 232.

⁶ Chigas, The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process, 233.

British actions exacerbated the intercommunal conflict by forming an auxiliary security force, the Turkish Defense Organization (TMT), which engaged in fighting the EOKA until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958.⁷

The intensity of the fighting prompted the international community to come to the aid of Cyprus and produce a complex power-sharing arrangement. Negotiations between Greece and Turkey led to the 1960 London and Zurich Agreements, which established the architecture of the new Republic of Cyprus.⁸ The new 1960 constitution explicitly ruled out both *enosis* and *taksim*. The constitution formed a national parliament with two communal chambers to deal with issues such as education, culture, and religion. The smaller Turkish Cypriot community, which made up 18 percent of the population, would be represented in public services and the security forces at a level of 30 percent to 40 percent.⁹ Archbishop Makarios III became the president of the republic, representing the Greek Cypriot side. Dr. Fazil Kutchuk was named vice-president and leader of the Turkish Cypriot community.¹⁰ Finally, a set of treaties helped guarantee the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus which established: two sovereign British military bases on the island; allowed Greek and Turkish troops to monitor the island; and provided for military intervention by Britain, Turkey, and Greece forces.¹¹

The elaborate power-sharing agreement quickly unraveled. From the onset, most Greek Cypriots were unhappy with the constitutional arrangement and still supported

⁷ Fisher, *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, 310.

⁸ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 233.

⁹ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 233.

¹⁰ Fisher, *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, 301.

¹¹ Fisher, *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, 310.

unifying with Greece. The Turkish Cypriots broadly accepted the power-sharing agreement, but regretted not partitioning the island between Greece and Turkey. The fledgling Republic of Cyprus still lacked the spirit of bi-communal cooperation and a singular national identity necessary for the power-sharing arrangement to work. The acrimony between the two communities culminated in a political stalemate when Greek Cypriots proposed a set of constitutional amendments to resolve the constitutional gridlock. The Turkish Cypriots (who had been blocking taxation and other legislation to protest the lack of joint municipalities) viewed the amendments as an attempt to reduce their representation and fundamentally undermine the power-sharing arrangement.¹² The constitutional crisis marked the beginning of the persistent intercommunal violence that has characterized the Cyprus conflict. Fighting broke out in the capital city of Nicosia on December 21, 1963. The conflict soon engulfed the entire island, causing the deaths of hundreds and displacing more than 30,000 Turkish Cypriots away from mixed areas to enclaves in the north where they could be better protected.¹³ International diplomatic efforts averted direct military intervention by Turkey's military. In 1964, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) deployed to Cyprus, mainly to protect the Turkish Cypriot community, and remains on the island to this day.

Intercommunal discord in Cyprus intensified after a military dictatorship took control of Greece in 1967. Greek interference on the island manifested in support for the EOKA-B, a pro-Greece nationalist movement. On July 15, 1974, elements of the Greek Cypriot National Guard, led by Nicos Sampson, overthrew president Makarios in a Greek-

¹² Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 233.

¹³ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 233.

sponsored coup.¹⁴ Sampson, a former EOKA gunman known for his anti-Turkish and nationalist views, pursued the left-leaning supporters of Makarios all over the island. Once again, the ensuing violence swept up the Turkish Cypriot community prompting Turkey's military to intervene. Turkish forces moved to occupy approximately 37 percent of the northern part of the island.¹⁵ The United Nations scrambled to broker a ceasefire, which extended the 'Green Line' (buffer zone) from Nicosia, where it had been originally implemented, across the entire length of the island. The Green Line, like the UN Peacekeeping Force on the island, has remained constant and unfixed on this day.

Parties to the Conflict: The Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities

The gain a deeper understanding of the failure of mediation attempts in Cyprus and especially of the Annan Plan, this chapter will briefly analyze the social-psychological factors in Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. All peace negotiations have started from the premise that the partition of the island in 1974 primarily shaped the social-psychological framework of both sides.¹⁶ The events of 1974 dramatically changed the nature of the Cyprus conflict by giving the rift in Cypriot society a geographic and ethno-demographic dimension.¹⁷ Concerns from the Turkish Cypriot community centered on the belief that any reunification of the island through the formation of a federation would degrade their position to a pre-1974 condition as an underrepresented minority dominated by the Greek Cypriot community. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriots perceived any federal solution without the withdrawal of Turkish troops as worse than the status quo.

¹⁴ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 234.

¹⁵ Fisher, *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, 311.

¹⁶ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 588.

¹⁷ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 590.

The Greek Cypriots

The Greek Cypriots feared that a relinquishment of their claim to the island would invite a full military occupation by the Turkey's military. A general sense of distrust for the Turkish Cypriot secession objectives influenced nearly all of the Greek Cypriot's negotiating positions.¹⁸ The fear is evident in the Annan Plan process with the rejection by the Greek Cypriots of a joint federal or transitional government and their repeated calls demilitarization of the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁹ Decades of marathon negotiations with little to no progress added to the disillusionment in the Greek Cypriot community and encouraged its leadership to explore different avenues to enhance their position.²⁰ The Greek Cypriots strategy included building up their military defense, calling on international assistance, and vigorously pursuing accession to the European Union, which ironically undermined the peace process by providing the Greek Cypriot side addition leverage to modify any agreement.

However, it is important to note that, aside from the Greek Cypriots' wide-spread belief in its "historical" destiny to rule the island, they were willing make concessions. For example, the Greek Cypriot community largely abandoned all mainstream political forces that espoused the concept of *enosis*, or the unification with Greece.²¹ Over time, dependence on Greece diminished and the Greek Cypriot community gave less consideration to Athens in policy decisions. Segments of Greek Cypriot community cautiously came to accept a bicomunal/bizonal federation, though fears of a full-blown Turkish occupation persisted. The Greek Cypriot political culture demonstrated an ability to conduct internal debate over

¹⁸ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 591.

¹⁹ Schiff, *The Critical Role of Prenegotiations in Ethno-national Conflicts: Cyprus and the Annan Process*, 140.

²⁰ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 591.

²¹ Schiff, *The Critical Role of Prenegotiations in Ethno-national Conflicts: Cyprus and the Annan Process*, 142.

the future of the island. Greek Cypriot policy makers became more inclined to incorporate common interests (rather than political objectives) that were shared between both sides of the dispute. Finally, The Greek Cypriot community demonstrated an ability to acknowledge historic sensitivity with the Turkish Cypriot community, including areas of special concern such as the protection of pre-1974 property rights in the south of the island.²²

However, burgeoning economic prosperity, a revival of ethno-nationalism, and the possibility of accession to the European Union contributed the general reluctance of Greek Cypriot policy makers to relinquish exclusivity over state sovereignty.²³ The collective fears of the Greek community on Cyprus still was colored by the events of 1974. The rift between moderate and hardline factions within the Greek Cypriot political system widened and became more entrenched. During the Annan negotiations, the leadership within the Greek community would often proclaimed that "our borders are at Kyrenia," a town on the northern coast of the island.²⁴ While publically denouncing the Turkish Cypriot community, the Greek leadership would simultaneously engage negotiation for a compromise solution. The net effect of contradictory rhetoric and policy by the leadership of the Greek Cypriot undermined the peace process because expectations were incompatible with negotiated outcomes.²⁵

²² Schiff, *The Critical Role of Prenegotiations in Ethno-national Conflicts: Cyprus and the Annan Process*, 142.

²³ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 591.

²⁴ (Michalis, 2007, 592)

²⁵ (Michalis, 2007, 592)

Turkish Cypriots

The Turkish Cypriot community would not easily forget their treatment by the Greek community prior to the partition of the island. Throughout many negotiations regarding Cyprus, including the UN-sponsored Annan Plan, the Turkish Cypriot community's primary aim was to secure the post-1974 conditions through enhancing or preserving their administration over the island.²⁶ The intercommunal violence that occurred between the years of 1963-1974, which killed scores of Turkish Cypriots and displaced thousands more, was the most significant factor in the Turkish community's overall distrust of the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish community feared a strong federal state would strengthen the Greek Cypriot position and re-establish their minority status.²⁷

Territorial concessions were generally a major sticking point for the Turkish Cypriots. Though the Turkish Cypriots held the advantage in terms of territory, the international community nevertheless expected concessions from them. For example, the Turkish Cypriots' reluctance to address the resettlement of Varosha and their refusal to grant the return of the northwestern town of Morphou failed to meet the Greek Cypriots' minimum territorial demands, which impeded the progress of the Annan Plan negotiations.²⁸

On a deeper social-psychological level, the Turkish Cypriot needs for recognition of their collective group identity resulted in their pursuit for self-determination. The need for recognition evolved out of a reaction to simmering ethno-nationalist movements in Greek community, which excluded the Turkish Cypriots. Intercommunal discord along ethnic lines

²⁶ Schiff, *The Critical Role of Prenegotiations in Ethno-national Conflicts: Cyprus and the Annapolis Process*, 145.

²⁷ Fisher, *Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*, 315.

²⁸ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 592.

in Cyprus pushed the Turkish Cypriots toward seeking support from mainland Turkey. External support from Turkey remained an additional obstacle to a negotiated settlement. The Greek Cypriot community grew suspicious about the extent of the Turkish Cypriots' commitment to a unified Cyprus and viewed them as pawns in Turkey's larger strategic policy in the region.

It is important to note that after 1974, the Turkish Cypriot community saw the emergence of different political parties and subsequently an opposition to the political establishment. President of Northern Cyprus Raul Denktas held a virtual monopoly on political power for thirty years in Turkish Cypriot and generally opposed any conciliatory positions toward the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot opposition advocated for coexistence with the Greek Cypriots and less dependence on Turkey.²⁹ The Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and Communal Liberation Party (TKP) were the two major opposition parties that promoted coexistence with Greek Cypriots and mainly drew their ranks from middle and professional classes.

Cyprus as a Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

The Cyprus problem is clearly an identity-based conflict. Though violence in recent time has significantly decreased, the scars from its past still show up today. The intercommunal dispute on Cyprus mirrors other protracted social conflicts around the globe. Azar defined PSCs as "hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity."³⁰ The nature of the Cyprus issues is characterized as a prolonged and sometimes violent intercommunal

²⁹ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 594.

³⁰ Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, *Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East*, 50.

dispute by two identity groups for such basic needs as security, recognition, acceptance, and fair access to political institutions. The intercommunal strife is driven by needs-based demands from both sides, which has gone on to the point of exhausting the dispute into a bitter stalemate. To gain a deeper understanding of PSCs, Azar came up with a cluster of preconditions for PSCs (human needs, communal context, and the role of the state), which are present in the Cyprus case.

it is important to examine what Azar called the *communal context* for a complete understanding of the Cyprus conflict. Cyprus has evolved out of a legacy of "divide and rule" making it particularly vulnerable to PSCs.³¹ The country split along religious and cultural identities after independence. The Cyprus 1960 Constitution was a complex power-sharing agreement. Constant political maneuvering and jockeying for the upper-hand culminated in a proposal by the Greek Cypriots for a set of constitutional amendments which would reduce the autonomy of the Turkish Cypriots. Soon after the Turkish representatives rejected the amendments, Cyprus society embarked on a hostile and intractable process of separation. Intercommunal discord would dramatically change in the events of 1974 with Turkish military intervention and subsequent the partition of the island. In many respects, all mediation attempts by the international community on Cyprus have dealt with the effects of the events in 1974.

Azar states that needs deprivation is the primary motivating factor in PSCs.³² Individuals strive to fulfill their needs through an identity group, grievances resulting from needs deprivation express themselves collectively by the group. Among these needs, Azar points to physical security, acceptance, and participation as being most relevant to PSCs.

³¹ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 18.

³² Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 21.

A needs analysis of the Cyprus issue finds that the Greek Cypriot community feared a relinquishment of their claim to the island would invite a full military occupation by the Turkey's military. A general sense of distrust for the Turkish Cypriot secession objectives influenced nearly all of the Greek Cypriot's negotiating positions.³³ The collective fears of the Greek community on Cyprus still was colored by the events of 1974. The Greek Cypriot community sought guarantees to sovereignty and physical security. For the Turkish Cypriot community, a needs analysis yields different results. The Turkish Cypriot community would not easily forget their treatment by the Greek community prior to the partition of the island. According to Azar, the deprivation of human needs could be the denial of access to, or effective participation in, the social institutions in which allocation and exchange power takes place.³⁴ The intercommunal violence that occurred between the years of 1963-1974, which killed scores of Turkish Cypriots and displaced thousands more, was the most significant factor in the Turkish community's overall distrust of the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish community feared a strong federal state would strengthen the Greek Cypriot position and re-establish their minority status.³⁵

Azar also emphasized the role of the state as regulator of PSCs. *The role of the state* or governing authority acts as the regulator of social, political, and economic interactions.³⁶ An example of the role of the state in the Cyprus case comes shortly after independence in the 1963 Constitutional crisis. A proposal by the Greek Cypriots for a set of constitutional amendments that they hoped would resolve the legislative deadlock on contentious issues

³³ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 591.

³⁴ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 21.

³⁵ Fisher, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 315.

³⁶ Azar, *Protracted Social Conflict and Second Track Diplomacy*, 18.

such as the right to veto by the president and vice-president.³⁷ The Turkish Cypriots viewed the amendments as attempt to undermine the power-sharing arrangement in the 1960 Constitution and rejected the proposals. Intercommunal discord has yet to recover from this event. Papadopoulos' rejection of the Annan Plan is a more contemporary example of the role of the state in Cyprus' PSC. Exasperated by the Turkish Cypriots refusal to demilitarize, Papadopoulos called for a resounding "no" vote at the referendum, which effectively ended any chance of success for the Annan Plan.³⁸

This chapter classifies the intercommunal dispute in Cyprus as a PSC. By using Azar's analytical framework, this chapter sought to explore the causative and escalatory process that drove the Cyprus conflict over an extended period of time. For Azar, giving emphasis to issues such as security, identity, and recognition may lead to a realization of the importance of basic human needs and their role in intractable conflicts.³⁹ The Cyprus problem is clearly an identity-based conflict. The nature intercommunal discord in Cyprus is characterized by prolonged and sometimes violent disputes by two identity groups. The two identity groups in Cyprus strive for such basic needs as security, recognition, acceptance, and fair access to political institutions. Next, this chapter will explore the events that made up the HSG initiative in Cyprus to gain a deeper understanding of the peace process.

Nature of the Intervention

In 1997, Special Adviser on Cyprus to the UN Secretary- General Diego Cordovez made a request to Robert Rotberg, president of the World Peace Organization and adjunct professor at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, to create an informal

³⁷ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 233.

³⁸ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 597.

³⁹ Azar and Cohen, *The Transition Between Egypt and Israel*, 82.

conference that would bring together Greek and Turkish Cypriots and representatives of the international community.⁴⁰ Called the Harvard Study Group (HSG), the aim of the initiative was to identify possible areas of agreement as well as understanding the underlying reasons for disagreement regarding the two Cypriot communities. The stated objectives of the HSG reiterated this design:

The key goal of the Harvard Study Group project (HSG) is to enrich people's thinking on the Cyprus issue. By bring together informed and influential Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the project is intended to assist in injecting informed realism into public debate... thereby facilitating progress toward a negotiated settlement...

The overall objective of the HSG is to bring together Greek and Turkish Cypriots so they can, in a constructive and realistic manner, move away from stalemate toward a vocabulary for solution that both sides can accept.⁴¹

In 1999, the U.S. Embassy, through the UN Special Projects Services, agreed to finance five HSG meetings over twelve months. The first two meetings took place in the United States in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Ireland, Israel, and Jordan were host to the following three meetings. The participants expressed a desire to meet with people from Israel and Ireland to learn from their conflict resolution experiences.⁴² Rotberg's team wanted to bring together a group of participants that represented the full spectrum of political views on the Cyprus issue. The facilitators sought participants that had some degree of influence with decision makers in their community, but could think outside the party line. Participants were given the understanding that they were not expected to make any commitments or produce a binding agreement.

⁴⁰ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 240.

⁴¹ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 241.

⁴² Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 244.

The Meetings

The selection of participants was important to success of the initiative. The first meeting included six Greek Cypriots and seven Turkish Cypriots.⁴³ The Greek Cypriot participants included several members of Parliament, high-ranking members of political parties, a former ambassador to the United Nations, and a former presidential candidate. The Turkish Cypriot side included several high-ranking officials from political parties (including the main opposition party that advocated for coexistence with the Greek Cypriots, the CTP), businessmen, and a former official of President of Northern Cyprus Rauf Denktash's government. The thirteen participants would constitute the core membership of HSG throughout the process. Unfortunately, the initial group did not involve representatives from two major Greek Cypriot parties, the communist Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) and the center-right Democratic Party (DIKO), which would eventually come to power in 2003 and became the primary spoiler in the Annan peace process). This meant that the perspectives of the DIKO and AKEL were ultimately not represented in the group dialogue.

In Cambridge, Massachusetts in May 1999, the HSG began their problem-solving journey. In the first meeting, the participants were encouraged to discuss what results they expected from the process. When the participants arrived, they were aware that the parties had been growing further apart since the previous summer. Only months before, President of Northern Cyprus Rauf Denktash announced he would suspend all talks about a federal settlement and would instead only insist on confederation and recognition of two sovereign states on the island.⁴⁴ For this reason, the participants were skeptical of the possibility of a

⁴³ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 242.

⁴⁴ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 251.

solution and the usefulness of the study group. Consistent with the uncertainty of the overall peace process, the participants in the HSG meetings made clear to Rotberg's team that they did not want to develop any joint recommendations, statements, or memos to submit to decision makers on both sides (like the joint communique in the Mozambique case), but preferred to discuss their experience with the group privately.⁴⁵ The risk of this decision was that different participants could transmit different interpretations or perceptions to their leadership, possibly escalating the crisis. The initial meeting ended with little progress, but the participants agreed to meet another time.

As the members of the group gained confidence and greater insight into the areas of agreement on both sides, the discussion gradually became more concrete. In the second and third meetings, the participants were able to discuss how a federal system would work. As inter-group trust strengthened, the participants dived into matters relating to customs, taxes, and administrative structure of a bizonal/bifederal system of government.⁴⁶ The participants gained encouragement when, only a few days before the third meeting in October 1999, the UN Secretary General, in clear effort to restart official talks on Cyprus, issued invitations to the two heads of state in Cyprus, which would serve as the basis of the Annan Plan. Also, by the third meeting, political developments on Cyprus would have implications for the HSG. President of the Republic of Cyprus Glafkos Clerides had reshuffled his cabinet and two of the participants had moved into government positions: one as government spokesman and another as minister of communication.⁴⁷ The government reshuffling was intended to send a message to the Turkish Cypriot side and international community this Greek Cypriot

⁴⁵ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 243.

⁴⁶ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 253.

⁴⁷ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 245.

administration was serious in reaching a settlement. The fact that two HSG participants were members of the government heighten the potential influence of the study group on the overall peace process. However, now that some participants were a part of the Greek Cypriot government, the study group became vulnerable to criticism from outsiders, who questioned whether the HSG initiative was truly unofficial and exploratory.

The political development at the time cause considerable anxiety within the study group, which contributed to HSG's mixed bag of results. UN sponsored proximity talks between the two governments in Cyprus were held in May 2000, but a media blackout prohibited any press statements by the parties, which had caused a great deal of speculation over the outcome. The study group entered this atmosphere of uncertainty during the final meeting in February 2000. The meeting was tense and several participants reverted back to their "official" positions on several points. Robert Rotberg, who led the facilitating team, hoped to produce a joint statement by the participants at the conclusion of the process. Rotberg prepared a document titled "Headings of Report and Recommendations" as a basis for discussion.⁴⁸ The joint statement may have proved to be a bit too bold of a move because the document contained new material and possible resolutions to disagreements that had remained after previous meetings. The proposal stated that the suggestions were meant to stimulate discussion and facilitate consensus building. However, in the context of the political environment at the time, the joint statement had the opposite effect. The Greek Cypriot participants viewed the document as favoring the Turkish Cypriot's position. One participant said that even if the Greek Cypriot participants accepted the document it would have been a nonstarter for the larger Greek Cypriot population.⁴⁹ Participant from both sides

⁴⁸ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 246.

⁴⁹ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 246.

rejected the joint statement preferring not to construct a unified statement as the official negotiations proceeded. Instead, the study group focused on historical reconciliation.

The Collapse of the Annan Plan

The UN sponsored Annan Plan began two years after the conclusion of the HSG meetings. But many people both inside and outside the HSG could see that the ideas developed and discussed in the study group were reflected in the drafts of the plan. One participant believed that the "basis of the Annan Plan was through us. The principles we developed were elaborated upon, become the roots".⁵⁰ Rather, it does not appear that the insights gained from the HSG directly influenced the official UN mediated process. The Annan Plan was held under strict confidentiality and there was little contact between the U.N sponsored Annan and the facilitators of the HSG meetings. However, some of the participants of the HSG meetings would go on to hold influential positions within government, and possibly incorporating their ideas about solutions to the Cyprus problem into the Annan Plan. The influence was more indirect.

Despite numerous failures by the international community since the partition of the island in 1974, a UN proposal named after UN Secretary General Kofi Annan sought a comprehensive peace settlement in Cyprus. The UN published the Annan Plan on November 2002.⁵¹ A central component of the plan was to link the island's accession to the European Union with a settlement.⁵² The Annan initiative called for two meetings. The first intervention took place in March 2003. The next in January 2004. The initial meeting in

⁵⁰ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 252.

⁵¹ Schiff, *The Critical Role of Prenegotiations in Ethno-national Conflicts: Cyprus and the Annan Process*, 137.

⁵² Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 595.

Hague ended in failure. President of the Republic of Cyprus Glafkos Clerides had earlier signaled his interest in resuming talks by reshuffling his administration (incorporating two HSG participants). The gesture was not enough for President of Northern Cyprus Rauf Denktas who rejected the UN proposal. However, important political developments would change the negotiating dynamic before the next Annan meeting in 2004.

Turkish Cypriot opposition parties mobilized voters to challenge Denktas. In December 2003, an election in Northern Cyprus produced a "hung" parliament consisting of anti-Denktas parties and pro-Denktas parties. As a result of coalition building in Parliament, the leader of the opposition and pro-settlement CTP party Mehmet Ali Talat replaced Denktas as chief negotiator of the Annan Plan.⁵³ Two years before the Annan plan, CTP party members actively participated throughout the HSG meetings. On the Greek Cypriot side, DIKO and AKEL (two political parties not included in the HSG's meetings) formed a coalition that allowed them to come to power under the leadership of Tassos Papadopoulos who replaced the Glafkos Clerides as president. Papadopoulos and his coalition were not involved in the HSG meetings or the Annan Plan, and approached any negotiated settlement, not as an opportunity for cooperation, but as an effort to safeguard their claim of sovereign over the entire island.⁵⁴

The collapse of the Annan initiative did not take long. In the final meeting in 2004, substantial differences emerged between the two sides. However, both parties did agree to hold respective referendums on unification regardless of the outcome of the negotiations.⁵⁵ Papadopoulos, exasperated by the Turkish Cypriots refusal to demilitarize, called on his

⁵³ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 255.

⁵⁴ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 597.

⁵⁵ Schiff, *The Critical Role of Prenegotiations in Ethno-national Conflicts: Cyprus and the Annan Process*, 138.

Greek Cypriot constituents to reject the referendum. The initiative that come the closest to achieving a negotiated settlement in Cyprus failed on April 10, 2004. The Turkish Cypriots voted overwhelming for the Annan Plan with 64.9 percent voting 'yes.' The Greek Cypriots equally rejected the Annan Plan with 75.8 percent voting 'no'.⁵⁶

Kelman's Problem-Solving Workshop and the Harvard Study Group's Initiative in Cyprus

Assessing the impact of the HSG made can be difficult in the absence of a negotiated settlement. However, the research in this chapter does point to the study group having made some positive contributions to the Annan plan, specifically, and more broadly, to Cyprus society. The unofficial mediators of the study group brought two adversaries together to facilitate changes in the attitudes, perceptions, and relations between the participants in the dialogue. Rotburg and his team hoped that the participants would transfer their experiences to influence key decision-makers on both side. The research in this thesis shows that the transfer of ideas generated in the study group did occur with a degree of success with some participants going on to hold positions of influence and possibly transferring their experiences into the Annan Plan.

Analyzing specific cases like HSG's mediation initiative in Cyprus yields insights into a process that may teach us lessons that can enhance our understanding of conflict resolution. Though a negotiated settlement remained elusive, the study group was a success in part because Rotberg's team brought substantive expertise and experience the forum. The mediators of the study group played an unofficial facilitative role not unlike the scholar-practitioners in previous Track Two initiatives. Although, the HSG did not set out to use the

⁵⁶ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 597.

Kelman's approach conflict resolution many commonalities exist. Kelman's interactive model for conflict resolution, brings together politically influential members of conflicting parties in a private, confidential setting for direct, non-committal communication.⁵⁷ He applied the term "workshop" to describe the specific interaction the two parties. Kelmen wanted to create a unique environment for conflicting parties "to engage in face-to-face communication with the guidance of social scientists, who are knowledgeable about conflict theory, group processes, and the region in question."⁵⁸

The key goal of the HGS was to enrich thinking on the Cyprus issue.⁵⁹ The study group's efforts are a classic example of an informal and unofficial interaction between two adversarial groups facilitated by a third party. The facilitative team sought a group of participants who were representatives of the full spectrum of political views on the Cyprus issues with good channels of communication to key decision-makers in their societies. High-level politicians within opposition parties also attended the forum. After the meetings ended in 2003, some of these officials went on to hold influential positions within government. Using Kelman's problem-solving framework as an analytical guide, this thesis will provide insights not only into the successes of the HSG initiative in Cyprus but also contribute to a broader definition of success in Track Two diplomacy.

⁵⁷ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 6.

⁵⁸ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 59.

⁵⁹ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 241.

The Dual Purpose of Kelman's Problem-Solving Workshop and the Harvard Study Group's Initiative in Cyprus

One commonality between HSG and Kelman's problem solving workshop is what Kelman described as the dual purpose of the workshop. Through the interactive forum, the third-party facilitator hopes to design a process that affects both *educational* -- changes in attitudes, perceptions, and ideas among the participants - and *political* -- transferring the changes to the political dialogue and decision-making process-- arenas within a target society.⁶⁰ The problem-solving workshops provide the conflicting parties opportunities to interact, become familiar with the other participants point of view, and humanize their images. The intended affect is that specific insights acquired by the participants fed into their own political leadership or public. The insights practitioners hope to gain include: views from the other side, readiness for negotiation, availability of potential negotiation partners, and mutually acceptable solutions.⁶¹

The overall objective of the HSG was to enrich thinking and bring together Greek and Turkish Cypriots so they can move away from stalemate toward a "vocabulary of solutions."⁶² At the end of the first meeting, one participant noted their shift in perception to "satisfy, not nullify" the interests of the other side.⁶³ When talking about the dual purpose of interactive conflict resolution, Kelman writes to the needs for participants "to move away from official positions and to mutually explore new ideas with the adversary."⁶⁴ One Greek participant in the HSG forum realized for the first time how important the issue of security

⁶⁰ Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy*, 89.

⁶¹ Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy*, 90.

⁶² Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 241.

⁶³ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 248.

⁶⁴ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 67.

remained for the Turkish Cypriots. Minimal communication between the two societies resulted in many of the Greek Cypriots assuming that since the 1974 intervention by Turkey and subsequent consolidation of Turkish Cypriots to north of the island, had taken care of the Turkish Cypriot's security fears.⁶⁵ The intercommunal talks facilitated by the HSG helped to clarify misinformation about the other side's experience, perspectives, and needs. Insights like these are essential ingredients of a successful problem-solving workshop and the peace process at large. The HSG was able to deepen the understanding of the participants engaged in the dialogue, and to help them comprehend each side's priorities. Some of these participants would later go on to hold positions of influence in their governments, which possibly led to a transfer of their experiences and insights into the Annan Plan.

One notable example of possible transfer from the unofficial dialogue to official negotiation was with Turkish Cypriot opposition party the CTP. Several CTP members reported that the study group discussions enriched their own party's platform.⁶⁶ Kelman wrote the dual purpose of the workshop was to providing an educational and political benefit.⁶⁷ A problem-solving workshop creates a specially constructed space in which the parties can engage in a process of exploration, observation, and analysis (education) and in which they can create new products that can be fed into the political debate and the decision-making process in the two societies (political).⁶⁸ The ideas developed in the HSG forum including creative solutions to the Constitution and right of return for Greek Cypriot citizen to the north of the island were incorporated into the platform of the CTP. When party leader Mehmet Ali Talat replaced the anti-settlement president of North Cyprus as

⁶⁵ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 250.

⁶⁶ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 253.

⁶⁷ Kelman, *Interactive Problem Solving as a Tool for Second Track Diplomacy*, 89.

⁶⁸ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 279.

chief negotiator after an electoral upset in 2003, these ideas went directly to the negotiating process.

Kelman's Social-Psychological Assumptions and the Harvard Study Group's Initiative in Cyprus: The Individual as the Basic Unit of Analysis, Points of Entry, and Conflict Viewed as an Intersocietal Phenomenon

Kelman's problem-solving workshop adopts a social-psychological approach to conflict resolution.⁶⁹ Social-psychology incorporates institutional and psychological factors to its analysis. While most conflicts arise out of objective and ideological differences, the interplay between psychological factors perpetuate and escalate the crisis.⁷⁰ Kelman's analysis emphasizes the link between subjective perceptions and objective interests. Overcoming the social-psychological barriers between the participants in a problem-solving workshop can provide opportunities for negotiation.

Kelman's problem-solving workshop is informed by a set of assumptions, derived from a social-psychological analysis of conflict, which explains the nature of intercommunal conflict and resolution. The assumptions pay close attention to interaction between psychological and institutional factors that typically make up the dynamics of intergroup and international conflict.⁷¹ In the HSG, the Rotberg and his team's approach to conflict resolution had elements of these assumptions.

Although, the HSG did not set out to use the Kelman's approach conflict resolution many commonalities exist. One such commonality with Kelman's social-psychological

⁶⁹ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 8.

⁷⁰ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 62.

⁷¹ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 62.

assumptions in the study group's approach is *the individual represents the most appropriate unit of analysis*.⁷² According to Kelman, the core identity group articulates the needs of the individuals. Unfulfilled needs especially for identity and security typically drive the conflict for prolonged periods of time and create barriers to resolution. By exploring the identity and security concerns, the negotiations could possibly overcome the participants incompatible positions. The HSG initiative in Cyprus is similar to Kelman's problem-solving workshops through the incorporation of a broad spectrum of viewpoints. The core needs of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots provided the opportunity for the forum to break through the psychological barriers in the conflict dynamic. The broad range of perspectives embraced within the study group made it difficult to achieve consensus but ensured a thorough discussion of the issues.⁷³

The presence of so many viewpoints included both "hard-liners," who were anti-settlement, and members of pro-settlement opposition parties, especially on the Turkish side. The presence of hard-liners was important to any outreach to rejectionist point of view was minimal before the beginning of the study group.⁷⁴ The participants in the study group were mostly elite members of their society with good channels of communication to key decision-makers. Some the participants, like members the CTP, would go on to hold high-level positions within their government. One pro-settlement Turkish Cypriot participant of the study group commented that a deeper understanding of their counterparts enabled him and his colleagues to develop concrete answers to questions surrounding negotiated settlement. The Turkish Cypriot participant noted the discussion about customs, taxes, and

⁷² Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 9.

⁷³ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 257.

⁷⁴ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 257.

property rights were included in the talks.⁷⁵ The discussions and options developed in the study group provided the participants with answers to criticism to the negotiations of a bizonal, bicomunal federal structure. More importantly, the ability to offer specific answers to questions about a reunited Cyprus state would operate allowed the Turkish Cypriot participant to paint a more precise picture of what a settlement would look like and how to deal respond the concerns of the Greek Cypriots. Like Kelman's problem-solving process, the HSG incorporated individual needs articulated by a diverse array of viewpoints in to its conflict resolution initiative, which may have provided a framework for future negotiations for the participants that would later serve in high-level positions of government.

Through the interactive workshop process, Herbert Kelman looks to find relevant "points of entry" on which to base a psychological analysis.⁷⁶ The facilitator seeks to identify certain cognitions, emotions, insight, intentions, and interactions between individuals that determine outcomes in the conflict. These points provide a theoretical model that can identify certain processes central to maintaining the protracted nature of the conflict. Changes at the individual level -- in the form of new ideas and insights through interaction with an adversary group -- in a workshop environment can then feed back into the political debate and the decision making in the two communities. Examples of the points of entry that Kelman writes about can be found in HSG initiative in Cyprus. The broad range of perspectives that the HSG included ensured a thorough discussion of the issues and a degree of "realism" in the dialogue.⁷⁷ Thorough discussions on realistic and pragmatic solutions

⁷⁵ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 253.

⁷⁶ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 9.

⁷⁷ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 257.

served as the point of entry into the participants communities, which ensured the discussions and the products of the study group would remain relevant.

Other commonalities exist between Kelman's problem-solving workshop and the HSG's initiative in Cyprus. Another assumption that informs Kelman's workshops is *international conflict must be viewed not merely as an intergovernmental or interstate phenomenon, but also as an intersocietal phenomena*.⁷⁸ Problem-solving workshops seek to explore the divisions between the two societies in the pursuit of a peaceful solution to the conflict. In particular, the workshop forum explores the role of internal divisions within each society. After the end of the first HSG dialogue between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, one participant noted the shift in their perception that any successful settlement had to "satisfy, not nullify," the needs of the other side.⁷⁹ Another participant commented that the most important insight they gained from the HSG process was that one had to consider the voice of the other side, "because if you don't understand the problems of the other side and they don't understand yours, you won't have a solution."⁸⁰ According to Kelman, by challenging the monolithic image (through the workshop forum) of the enemy that parties in conflict tend to hold enables the parties to differentiate each other in a new way. Several participants in the HSG meeting were able to shift away from an adversarial mode of thinking to a more mutual gains-based framing of the process. Understanding the institutional and psychological factors that prolong a conflict helped the HSG develop ideas for the mutually satisfying solutions. Some of these ideas, including creative solutions to the Constitution and right of return for Greek Cypriot citizens to the north of the island, were incorporated into the platform of the pro-

⁷⁸ Kelman, *Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in the Middle East*, 9.

⁷⁹ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 248.

⁸⁰ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 249.

settlement CTP. When party leader Mehmet Ali Talat replaced the anti-settlement president of North Cyprus as chief negotiator after an electoral upset in 2003, these ideas went directly to the negotiating process.

Kelman's Ground Rules and the Harvard Study Group's Initiative in Cyprus

In designing his problem-solving workshops, Kelman came up with a set of ground rules to overcome the usual accusatory, legalistic, and hostile interactions that typically accompany tense peace negotiations. He wanted to replace the undesired interactions with an analytical, task-ordinated environment, which had the potential for each party of the conflict to find mutually satisfying solutions. The ground rules call for an analytic dialogue, stresses the role of the third party as a facilitator of communication rather than an audience or adjudicator to be convinced.⁸¹ The principles behind Kelman's workshop ground rules such as analytic discussion, or the facilitative role of the third party can be seen in practice in the HSG initiative in Cyprus.

One ground rule stipulates that the participants “focus on each other,” and not constituencies, audiences, or the third party. Kelman wished that each participant would,

“...listen to each other, with the aim of making their own perspective understood. We want them to think out loud, to experiment with ideas, to explore different options, without having to worry about how others would react if their words in the group were quoted outside. This is why we have no audience, no observers, no publicity, and no record.”⁸²

Focusing on each other enables the participants to engage in a type of discussion that is generally not possible between two identity groups locked in a protracted conflict. This process can be seen in the statements by the participants of the HSG. One participant commented on the importance of considering the voice of the other side, "because if you

⁸¹ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 60.

⁸² Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 276.

don't understand the problems of the other side and they don't understand yours, you won't have a solution."⁸³ The participants listened to each other, built on each other's ideas and inquired into each other's underlying interests, concerns, and perception in areas of disagreement. As a result, the participants were able to move on from advocating for competing models of government or allocation of power, and instead formulate mutually satisfying solutions. The experienced may have provided a framework for negotiation for certain participants would later hold high-level positions in their government, such the CTP members.

Kelman's third ground rule aims for analytic discussion, absent of any polemical rhetoric typical among parties engaged in a bitter conflict. The purpose is to assist the participants in gaining an understanding of each other's needs, fears, concerns, priorities, and constraints. Kelman does not intend for the analytic discussion to exclude expressions of emotion, but to use them as "raw material for enhancing the participants analytic understanding of the concerns of the other side and the dynamics of the conflict."⁸⁴ A successful analytic discussion between the two parties will develop insight into how the conflict-driven interaction between the two sides tend to exacerbate, escalate, and perpetuate their conflict. The HSG was successful in creating a non-accusatory atmosphere in their meetings. Several participants shifted from an adversarial mode of thinking to a mutual gains-based dialogue. The decisions on framing the issues helped avoid polemical exchanges. For example, rather than discussing the labeling a unified Cyprus a "federation" or "confederation,"-- both sensitive issues in Cyprus -- the participants focused on outlining the

⁸³ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 249.

⁸⁴ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 276.

delegation of administrative authority in the state.⁸⁵ As one participant noted, the goal of a successful settlement in Cyprus was the satisfaction and not nullification of the interests of the other side.⁸⁶

In Kelman's fourth rule for problem-solving workshops, the participants must treat the conflict as a shared problem that requires a joint effort rather than reducing the discussion into arguments over whose side is right or wrong based on historical or legal objections.⁸⁷ Kelman does not expect the participants to abandon their ideas about justice of their cause, nor does he claim that both sides are equally right or wrong. In the HSG, participants shared their needs, concerns, and fears underlying their view of the Cyprus issue. Rotberg and his team designed the initiative for the participants to jointly analyze the underlying issues, and jointly develop ideas for resolution. The first two meetings had an emphasis on developing a common set of goals for the process and a definition of a shared problem, which helped the dialogue to stay in a "mutual gains" track.⁸⁸ According to Kelman, discussions which work along these lines encourages the participants to seek mutually satisfactory solutions to the conflict.⁸⁹

Kelman's final ground rule concerns the facilitative role of the third party. In his model, the third party does not take part in the substantive discussions. Kelman writes, "[the third party] does not give advice or offer its own proposals, nor does it take sides, evaluate the ideas presented, or arbitrate between different interpretations of historical facts or international law."⁹⁰ The main tasks of the third party is to use the ground rules to allow the

⁸⁵ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 260.

⁸⁶ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 275.

⁸⁷ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 249.

⁸⁸ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 260.

⁸⁹ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 275.

⁹⁰ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 275.

ideas for resolving the conflict to emerge out of the interaction between the parties themselves. The facilitating team in the HSG brought a valuable mix of skills and expertise to the initiative and only intervened in the forum to structure and manage the dialogue.⁹¹ Rather than arguing over alternative modes of government or allocation of resources, the participants moved on to discuss options that might satisfy both sides. The process of discussing the options was as important as the options themselves. One participant commented that the HSG initiative assessed and refined different options with the objective of constructing "a joint vision that does not destroy what each other has now, but which offers benefits for the future."⁹² Rotberg's team was successful in creating an analytic atmosphere, which fosters joint thinking on solutions to the Cyprus issue. Thanks to the efforts by the facilitating team in the HSG initiatives, some of the participants would carry their experience in joint analysis to high-level positions within their governments and possibly incorporating these insights into the formulation of the Annan Plan.

Conclusion

This chapter classified the history of intercommunal discord on the island of Cyprus as a PSC and brought to the surface the causative and escalatory process that drove the conflict over an extended period of time. According to Azar, giving emphasis to issues such as security, identity, and recognition may lead to a realization of the importance of basic human needs and their role in intractable conflicts. This chapter examined the causes to the Cyprus conflict using Azar's analytical framework. Needs deprivation is the primary motivating factor in PSCs. ⁹³ The Cyprus problem is clearly an identity-based conflict based

⁹¹ Chigas, The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process, 249.

⁹² Chigas, The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process, 250.

⁹³ Azar and Cohen, The Transition Between Egypt and Israel, 82.

in a disparate cultural system. The nature intercommunal discord in Cyprus is characterized by prolonged and sometimes violent disputes disparate cultural systems. The two identity groups in Cyprus strove for such basic needs as security, recognition, acceptance, and fair access to political institutions.

Next, by examining the nature of the efforts of the HSG initiative, this chapter determined the extent that the organization was successful, using the analytical frameworks provided by Kelman's problem-solving workshop model. Kelman's model for conflict resolution is grounded the discipline of social-psychology, which incorporates institutional and psychological factors to its analysis. While most conflicts arise out of objective and ideological differences, the interplay between psychological factors perpetuate and escalate the crisis.⁹⁴ Overcoming the social-psychological barriers between participants in a problem-solving workshop can provide opportunities for negotiation, and possibly, a peaceful settlement. Therefore, the extent that the HSG initiative in Cyprus was able to break down these social-psychological barriers can provide insight into the initiative's impact on the eventual outcome of the peace negotiation.

When examined under the analytical framework provided by Kelman's problem solving workshop, the efforts overtaken by the HSG initiative in Cyprus experienced a degree of success. Though the HSG initiative was not able to break through the social-psychological barriers of the participants and forge of path to a sustained peace. According to Kelman, the end goal of the workshop is transfer the changes in thinking about the conflict engendered by the participants and other contacts and inject these new ideas into the political discourse.⁹⁵ The ideas developed in the HSG forum including creative solutions

⁹⁴ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 62.

⁹⁵ Kelman, *The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution*, 274.

to the Constitution and right of return for Greek Cypriot citizen to the north of the island were incorporated into the platform of the CTP. When party leader Mehmet Ali Talat replaced the anti-settlement president of North Cyprus as chief negotiator after an electoral upset in 2003, these ideas went directly to the negotiating process. Unfortunately, this was not enough to carry the day on April, 10th, 2004. The initiative that came the closest to achieving a negotiated settlement in Cyprus, the Annan Plan, failed.

In many ways, The HSG initiative in Cyprus mirrors Kelman's own efforts in the Middle East. In 1992, four of the six Palestinian "alumni" from Kelman's 1990-1991 workshops were appointed to the official negotiating team on the Arab-Israeli peace talks. Also in 1992, the political situation in Israel changed with the victory of the Labor Party in the national elections. With the formation of a new government and appointment of workshop participants to official positions in peace talks, the workshop participants had an opportunity to become increasingly influential in their own society. On September 1993, a breakthrough occurred in the conflict with the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, expressed in the exchange of letters between Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and in the opening of formal negotiations between the two sides, i.e. The Oslo Accords. "Alumni" from Kelman's workshops were involved in the back-channel talks in Norway that broke the deadlock in the public negotiations in late 1993.⁹⁶ Sadly, this breakthrough would not last, an Israeli nationalist killed Rabin in 1995 because of his participation in the Oslo Accords and the peace settlement quickly unraveled. In Palestine, like Cyprus, disparate cultural systems become a Gordian knot, which constrains most conflict resolution initiatives. Disparate cultural systems can be defined as dissimilar

⁹⁶ Fisher, *Interactive Conflict Resolution*, 72.

social groups from essentially different historical backgrounds. In the Mozambique peace process, the Sant'Edigio efforts were engaged in the context of a generally homogenous cultural zone. What cannot be overlooked in Track Two diplomacy initiatives is the potential for a clash of cultures that can serve to widen the divisions within a society engaged in a protracted conflict. Azar and Kelaman's research fails to address how to fill divisions between two disparate cultural systems.

The HSG's efforts in Cyprus speaks to the limitations of Track Two diplomacy when engaged in disparate cultural systems. Even though Turkish Cypriot pro-settlement parties, that participated in the HSG meeting, found their way into positions of influence in their community, the initiative fell victim to political and cultural divisions. As a result of coalition building in the Turkish Cypriot Parliament, the leader of the opposition and pro-settlement CTP party Mehmet Ali Talat replaced Denktas as chief negotiator of the Annan Plan.⁹⁷ However, on the Greek Cypriot side, DIKO and AKEL (two political parties not included in the HSG's meetings) formed a coalition that allowed them to come to power under the leadership of Tassos Papadopoulos who replaced the Glafkos Clerdes as president. Papadopoulos and his coalition were not involved in the HSG meetings or the Annan Plan, and approached any negotiated settlement, not as an opportunity for cooperation, but as an effort to safeguard their claim of sovereign over the entire island.⁹⁸ Track Two diplomacy is not a cure-all remedy, the political will, both within government and society at large, is essential ingredient for success in Track Two diplomacy. The Cyprus case and the Israel/Palestinian workshop proves the limitations of Track Two diplomacy. Even when a participant from an unofficial dialogue makes their way to a position of influence in an

⁹⁷ Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 255.

⁹⁸ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 597.

official peace negotiation, the peace deal can end in failure. In Cyprus, disparate cultural systems has become a Gordian knot, which several peace negotiations have failed to untangle.

5: CONCLUSION

The research in this thesis analyzed two cases of Track Two diplomacy: The Mozambique peace process (1990-1994) and the Harvard Study Group (HSG) initiative in Cyprus (1999-2003). An exploration of these cases could provide potential value for understanding the factors which enhance or undermine Track Two initiatives. Analyzing specific cases like Mozambique and Cyprus yields insights into a process that may teach us lessons that can enhance our understanding of conflict resolution. The peace process in Mozambique was a success in part because of the Community of Sant'Egidio's efforts. The amateur diplomats facilitated a peace process of immense complexity, which produced lasting effects. However, the Sant'Edigio efforts in Mozambique were engaged in the context of a generally homogenous cultural zone. A generally homogenous cultural zone in can defined as social groups within a geographic region that share a common historical background. The Cyprus case was much the contrary. A group of academically trained professionals, known as the Harvard Study Group (HSG), facilitated an unofficial dialogue between Greek Orthodox and Turkish Muslim participants while a simultaneous UN sponsored official dialogue was underway, aimed at achieving an official peace settlement. But the Cyprus conflict features predominately among the examples of an intractable international conflict that is based on disparate cultural systems. And despite efforts by both official and unofficial mediators, intercommunal negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots collapsed.

The research in this thesis drew heavily from Azar's study of protracted social conflicts. The Mozambique civil war and the history of intercommunal discord in Cyprus are key examples of protracted social conflicts. Azar defined PSCs as "hostile interactions which

extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity.”¹ In the thesis, Mozambique's history from the colonial period, to independence, to the bloody civil war that followed accurately reflects Edward Azar's analysis of PSCs. Likewise, the Cyprus conflict features predominately among the examples of an intractable international conflict that is based on disparate cultural systems and group identities.

Next, the thesis used Herbert Kelman's *interactive problem-solving* workshop model to provide a framework for evaluation of the two case studies. The Sant' Egidio officials in the Mozambique case were able to break through the social-psychological barriers of the participants and forge of path to a sustained peace. The HSG initiative experienced a degree of success by a number of participants entering the Annan Plan peace talks. However, spoilers to the peace process, such as President Papadopoulos, prevented an official settlement from occurring.

The ultimate purpose of this thesis was to ask "what is the measure of success in Track Two diplomacy" and "what are the limits of Track Two Diplomacy?" The measure of success in Track Two diplomacy could be that participants from both Track Two initiatives examined in chapters 3 and 4 entered official peace negotiations. However, only one case in this the thesis ended in a negotiated settlement: Mozambique. Does that mean the HSG initiative in Cyprus was a failure? This thesis believes the HSG was not entirely a failure and more research is required into the factors that negatively impacted the Cyprus peace negotiations and other peace negotiations under similar contexts.

¹ Azar, Jureidini and McLaurin, *Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East*, 50.

The measure of success in Track Two diplomacy should be judged by the extent that the unofficial mediation efforts were able to break down the social-psychological barriers that perpetuate the conflict dynamic. However, what must be taken into consideration in Track Two diplomacy initiatives is the potential for a clash of cultures that can serve to widen the divisions within a society engaged in a protracted conflict. Azar and Kelman's research fails to address how to fill divisions between two disparate cultural systems. Disparate cultural systems can be defined as dissimilar social groups from essentially different historical backgrounds. The potential impact of a shared cultural experience on the outcome of a peace settlement cannot be overlooked. Certainly, the HSG's efforts in Cyprus speaks to the limitations of Track Two diplomacy when engaged in disparate cultural systems. Unofficial conflict resolution is not a cure-all remedy. This analysis proves that political will, both within government and society at large, is an essential ingredient for success in Track Two diplomacy. Even though members of the Turkish Cypriot pro-settlement that participated in the HSG initiative, their efforts could not achieve a lasting peace. The HSG's efforts fell victim to disparate cultural systems inside Cyprus. As a result of coalition building in the Turkish Cypriot Parliament, the leader of the opposition and pro-settlement CTP party Mehmet Ali Talat replaced Denktas as chief negotiator of the Annan Plan.² However, on the Greek Cypriot side, DIKO and AKEL (two political parties not included in the HSG's meetings) formed a coalition that allowed them to come to power under the leadership of Tassos Papadopoulos (who replaced the Glafkos Clerdes as president). Papadopoulos and his coalition were not involved in the HSG meetings or the Annan Plan, and approached any negotiated settlement, not as an opportunity for

² Chigas, *The Harvard Study Group on Cyprus: Contributions to an Unfilled Peace Process*, 255.

cooperation, but as an effort to safeguard their claim of sovereign over the entire island.³

Track Two diplomacy is not a cure-all remedy, the political will, both within government and society at large, is essential ingredient for success in Track Two diplomacy. The Cyprus case and the Israel/Palestinian workshop proves the limitations of Track Two diplomacy when engaged in disparate cultural systems. Even when a participant from an unofficial dialogue makes their way to a position of influence in an official peace negotiation, the peace deal can end in failure.

Thanks in large part to the efforts of the Community of Sant'Edigio, the Mozambique peace process successfully broke through the social-psychological barriers that fueled the conflict for over a decade. The efforts by the Community shared commonalities with Kelman's research into interactive problem-solving workshops. Despite the commonalities and their potential impact on the eventual outcome of the peace negotiations, a generally homogenous cultural system between the Frelimo government and Renamo cannot be overlooked as a factor in to initiative's success. Likewise, in Cyprus, the question of culture cannot be ignored. The HSG's effort also had several commonalities with Kelman's problem-solving workshop techniques and experienced a degree a success with the ascendance of several of the participants to positions of high influence with their governments. But the overall peace process fell victim to political and cultural divisions was not able to overcome the social-psychological barriers that perpetuated intercommunal discord on the island. Therefore, Track Two diplomacy encounters its limits when attempting to garner the political will for a peaceful settlement between disparate cultural systems engaged in a protracted conflict.

³ Michalis, *The Cyprus Talks: A Critical Appraisal*, 597.

The research in this thesis forewarns future Track Two initiatives of the potential pitfalls of engaging in conflict resolution. The measure of success in Track Two diplomacy should be judged by the extent that the unofficial mediation efforts were able to break down the social-psychological barriers that perpetuate the conflict dynamic. However, more research is required into how to forge a path toward mutually acceptable solutions between disparate cultural systems, such as those in Cyprus and around the world, that are engaged in a protracted social conflict.

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