

KONRAD ADENAUER'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS AMERICA: 1949-1963

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ABSTRACT

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During the years after the conclusion of the Second World War, a new Chancellor in Germany took up the responsibility to help lead his country out of the smoke and ruins of Nazi Germany. It was during the years between 1949 and 1963, that Konrad Adenauer was elected Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, a period which spans most of the preliminary phase of the Cold War. During this period of time, West Germany was politically separated from East Germany. As Adenauer took office he was a co-founder of the Christian Democratic Union, a successor to the Centre which hoped to embrace Protestants as well as Catholics in a single confessional party. Adenauer's achievements include the establishment of a stable democracy in defeated (West) Germany, a general political reorientation

towards the West, recovering limited, but far-reaching sovereignty for West Germany by firmly integrating it with the emerging Euro-Atlantic community also known as NATO. It was Adenauer's primary focus as chancellor was to regain Germany's sovereignty and it was this desire that caused Adenauer to want a democratic West German state firmly anchored in the West.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Only eighteen years after Hitler's defeat, West Germany had become a trusted member of the North Atlantic alliance and one of the most prosperous and economically powerful countries in the world whereas in May 1945, when the Nazi government signed its unconditional surrender, the German people were exhausted, disillusioned and bewildered. The entire country was in a state of confusion, the amount of devastation ranging from the total destruction of most major cities to the collapse of the economy had taken, Germany was effectively a third world country. However, by 1963 West Germany had a volume of foreign trade, which in volume, was second largest only to the United States.

From 1949 to 1963 the government of West Germany was dominated by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its leader, Konrad Adenauer, was elected the republic's chancellor in 1949. As West Germany's first leader, Adenauer sought to transform the country from a postwar occupied zone to an independent nation accepted as an equal by other countries. The goal of independence became more attainable after the United States, Britain, and France recognized that Western Europe could not withstand Soviet pressure without the aid of a strong West Germany.

Toward the end of his period of power, the Chancellor, then eighty-six years old, finally overreached himself in the famous Spiegel affair of October 1962. The charismatic spell of the old Chancellor was broken. The leading figures of the CDU ceased to consider him indispensable, and they forced his retirement in favor of Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard.

It is, however, probable that Adenauer was the greatest German statesman since Bismarck. The foreign and domestic policies of the Bonn Republic were an extension of his powerful personality. His successes in foreign policy have been especially impressive: He took over a country still shackled by alien occupation and achieved sovereignty within six years. A nation that was a moral leper, he made a respected member of the Western community of nations. Adenauer achieved rearmament in the face of great foreign and domestic obstacles. He turned a defeated and defenseless Germany into the strongest conventional military power in Europe, west of the Iron Curtain. He gave effective support to the development of European unity and Atlantic solidarity.

Adenauer, though far from liberal in his personal outlook, presided over a government which emerged from elections conducted within a basically liberal-democratic order. The successes which he won inevitably gave prestige to that order. Germans began to associate liberal democracy with success in foreign policy, rather than with a series of humiliations: with rising prosperity instead of catastrophic inflation and a depression of unprecedented severity; and with strong and stable government, not a kaleidoscopic shifting of weak and ephemeral ministries. Many traditional foes of democracy in Germany began to concede, albeit reluctantly, that a

democracy which produced Adenauer, and kept him in power for fourteen years,
could not be all bad.

CHAPTER II

HISTORIOGRAPHY

The Historiography of Konrad Adenauer varies from time to time. Most authors in their research do not want to discredit such a great man who “brought Germany out of the ruins of National Socialism,” but want to show, with some help, the very aspects which made him a great statesman.

In Richard Hiscock’s *The Adenauer Era*, the author states that although Adenauer’s greatest achievements were in the field of foreign affairs, his foreign policy, as a whole, had two serious limitations. The first was that he pursued a rigid anti-communist line based on the military strength of the western alliance, and his diplomacy toward Moscow showed little flexibility or constructive purpose; secondly, during the last years in power he partially undid some of his great work for the integration of Europe.¹ He also states that Adenauer found in communism an enemy against which he could gather support for his policies, especially in light of the allied occupation, just like Hitler was able to rally his forces together against bolshevism and the “eternal Jew.”² Hiscocks also proclaims that Adenauer publicly stated on many occasions the Germany’s only hope of reunification was dependent on the

¹Hiscocks, Richard. *The Adenauer Era*. J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia/New York, 1966, p. 256.

² Hiscocks, 257

Federal Republic's establishing a position of strength as a member of the Western alliance.³ Adenauer could not have taken any serious or major political initiative without full American approval and support.⁴ His policies were reflected in his attitude to the different American administrations like his relationship with the Eisenhower – Dulles regime. He was a close personal relationship with then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles because they both shared a deep rooted hatred toward communism, mainly due to their religious convictions. During the Kennedy administration a great change occurred when the new president was much younger than the chancellor and belonged to a generation which Adenauer didn't really understand. Hiscocks' claims that at this point the relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic began to deteriorate very rapidly and reached their lowest point since 1949, mainly due to the fact that Kennedy and his secretary of State Dean Rusk had been carrying on secret talks between the Soviets about the status of Germany.⁵ Hiscock's conclusion is that the death of John Foster Dulles and the election of John F. Kennedy caused Adenauer to be out of harmony with the United States.

In Frank Mayer's *Adenauer and Kennedy: a Study in German-American Relations, 1961-1963*, Mayer represents a side to American-German foreign relations on the basis of what happens when too incompatible personalities are forced to cooperate. Mayer also states that German-American relations during the Cold War years 1945-1989 dominated the diplomacy of the Western Alliance or NATO by

³ Hiscocks, 263

⁴ Hiscocks, 266

⁵ Hiscocks, 269

directing the energies and establishing the priorities of both America and the Federal Republic of Germany. His book begins by setting the stage for the continuing growth of the Western half of Germany and contends that the Korean War was the main catalyst that provoked the United States to take a strong Western foreign policy with the free Federal Republic. Mayer also offers a new and thoughtful interpretation of the challenges posed by even the slightest shift in ideas about the Federal Republic of Germany. The main points that he reaches in Adenauer and Kennedy with regard to the deterioration of the German-American partnership pivot around the Berlin Wall crisis and the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship. Mayer shows this deterioration by portraying Adenauer as a worried and concerned politician who cannot understand the new administration in Washington and its commitment towards Adenauer's main goal of German unification. It is clear that Adenauer saw Kennedy's willingness to negotiate over Berlin as a threat to reunification. Adenauer had grown increasingly suspicious of the United States as both the Eisenhower and then the Kennedy administrations dealt with Khrushchev's demands on the question of Berlin. Mayer further examines the continuing split between Germany's allegiance to America by showing Kennedy's lack of understanding of Adenauer's policies and his turn to France and ultimately a European led role on the continent.⁶

In Thomas Schwartz's *America's Germany*, Schwartz points out how dependent U.S. policy became on Adenauer's continued mastery of the delicately balanced internal politics of the Federal Republic. Although in retrospect the Federal

⁶Mayer, Frank A, *Adenauer and Kennedy: A Study in German-American Relations, 1961-1963*. Palgrave Macmillan, 3/1/1996.

Republic's integration into the West looked inevitable, without Adenauer's statesmanship and vision the post war story might have been far different.⁷

In James Richardson's *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance*, Richardson addresses Germany's postwar political relations with the West and gives full credit to Chancellor Adenauer for moving Germany toward the West. While at the same Richardson also contends that the cause of the major friction between Bonn and Washington came about during the Kennedy administration handling of the Berlin crises.⁸

Wolfram Hanrieder's *West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response*, Hanrieder divides Chancellor Adenauer's foreign policy into two periods the first from 1949 till 1955, which was characterized by conventional bipolarity and American atomic unipolarity. This period of German policy, according to Hanrieder, was compatible with Germany's need for security and for political and economic recovery, in which the United States was insistent upon German rearmament and control of German power while Chancellor Adenauer desired American protection and Germany's integration into Western Europe. Hanrieder's post 1955 second period of German foreign policy was characterized by

⁷Schwartz, Thomas A. *The Berlin Crisis and the Cold War*. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. 8.

⁸Smith, Jean Edward., *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance* Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 82, No 2, (Jun., 1967), 269-270.

nuclear bipolarity, in which Chancellor Adenauer's Eastern and Western policies were undermined by the United States' eagerness for a European détente.⁹

In David Clay Large's, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era*, the author investigates the history of West German rearmament from the end of the Second World War to the creation of the Bundeswehr* in 1956. Large discusses the subject of rearmament and the tensions of the Cold War, the efforts of the Western Alliance to build an effective defense system, and the debates on the issue of rearmament that raged in West Germany. Large, like many others, studies in depth the controversial early years of Chancellor Adenauer and his recognition that the West's fears of Soviet military strength offered the new West German state a great opportunity to trade troops for sovereignty and a place in the Western community of nations. Large also points out that Adenauer fought a tough battle when dealing with the ratification of the European Defense Community Treaties and the ultimate French overruling of them, which left Adenauer in a sense of stalemate without any further forward progress by the new Federal Republic. As Large also notes, the German people at the time were also not so enthusiastic about their country being able to rearm, but the fear of a Soviet incursion, which dominated Western thought, led Germany on the road to joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the birth of the new German armed forces, which Adenauer

⁹Hanrieder, Wolfram F., *West German Foreign Policy 1949-1979* Westview Press 1980. Journals 2.

* The Bundeswehr is the armed forces of Germany and its administration. It is a federal defense force with Army (Heer), Navy (Marine), Air Force (Luftwaffe), Central Medical Services (Zentraler Sanitätsdienst) and Joint Service Support Command (Streitkräftebasis) branches.

believed were the answers to staving off an attack from the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany.¹⁰

Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany, Charles Williams divides the story of Adenauer's life into four distinct phases: the first his growing up in the Kaiser's Germany; secondly, his life in Weimar Germany; thirdly, in Germany under Hitler; and, finally, his own Germany. Williams contends that Adenauer was one of the truly great leaders of the twentieth century. In an astonishing political career that spanned six decades, this extraordinary statesman lifted Germany out of the ruins of the Second World War and helped shape the modern political landscape, both of his own country and of Europe. Williams also portrays Adenauer's strong character as being the only reason for the forward progress that West Germany made during his tenure as Chancellor, and that it was Adenauer, whose power base within the C.D.U. came from his position as Mayor of Cologne, who championed an alliance with France through which the two countries could, in time, dominate a united Europe. The author discusses the influences of Adenauer's Catholic upbringing and his deep dislike of Britain, then goes into scrupulous detail on the living conditions, way of life, and the family members throughout the Life of Konrad Adenauer. One also gets the feeling that Williams was a close friend to Adenauer and always very positive of Der Alte's* policies. His usage of Adenauer's quotes before each chapter also gives

¹⁰ Large, David Clay., *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era.*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press. 1996.

* Der Alte, is a commonly used German word relating to Konrad Adenauer which means the old one.

the reader a kind of insight into what Adenauer was really thinking during the many political chapters of his life, as well as in his personal life.¹¹

Another biography on the Federal Chancellor was written by Charles Wighton called *Adenauer: A Critical Biography*. Wighton portrays Adenauer as a great man, but ruthless in the way he went about with his policies. Wighton also states that Adenauer, in his political persona, succeeded in establishing a regime of personal authoritarianism seldom equaled in a constitutional and parliamentary state. He follows up by stating that while Adenauer was chancellor that he treated his ministers as personal assistants, the members of parliament as lackeys, the German Constitutional Court as a personal convenience, and the Bonn Constitution as a device to be amended to suit his own purposes. He also wonders why the ministers, parties, and parliament went so far as to give Adenauer these almost dictatorial powers, and whether the German people, no matter what kind of democracy they have, cannot be capable of developing a genuine Western democracy. One of Wighton's main focuses in his book deals with the concept of West and East Germany. What he tries to contend is that the British and the Americans suggested to themselves that Adenauer would be content with the borders within Germany. They thought this way because they believed that Adenauer was a Roman Catholic, who all his life loathed Protestant Prussia and what he regarded as the evil city of Berlin, and at heart never wanted German reunification, a sentiment that almost certainly was shared by some of the post war Occupation Powers. Wighton's closing thoughts on the Chancellor accuse Adenauer of maintaining the tensions in Central Europe and

¹¹ Williams, Charles., *Adenauer The Father of the New Germany*. John Wiley and Sons, Inc. New York, 2000.

that what ever the judgment of history is on Adenauer, his decision to retire brought the strongest sighs of relief in many West European capitals.¹²

On a different note, G.R Boynton and Gerhard Loewenberg did a study called *The Evolution of Public Perceptions of Adenauer as a Historic Leader: Test of a Mathematical Model of Attitude Change* as a way to find an association of memorable political leaders with formative political events as the classic dispute over whether great men make great events or whether the events are themselves the conditions of great leadership. They state that since 1950 the Institut Fuer Demoskopie at Allensbach has repeatedly asked a representative sample of the German Population an open ended question to determine its judgment about the person who had done the most for the country in its history. When the question was first asked in January of 1950, four months after Adenauer's election as the first Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, not a single respondent regarded him as the person who had done the most for Germany; one third considered Bismarck to be the greatest German at the time; and a tenth gave the honor to Hitler.¹³

The failure to see Adenauer as a great leader at the time gave Boynton and Loewenberg an initial clue to the conditions under which a population attributes greatness to its leader because by 1950 Adenauer had already served as the President of the Staatsrat in Prussia and was the long time mayor of the city of Cologne. However, between the years of 1951 and 1953, Adenauer rose rapidly in the judgment of his contemporaries as Germany's most capable politician. They further

¹²Wighton, Charles., *Adenauer: A Critical Biography*, Coward-McCann, Inc, New York. 1963.

¹³Boynton, G.R., Loewenberg, Gerhard., *The Evolution of Public Perceptions of Adenauer as a Historic Leader: Test of a Mathematical Model of Attitude Change*. Social Science History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn 1976) p.79.

stated that it was not until Adenauer's second term as Chancellor 1953-1957, that he began to be regarded at the same height as Bismarck, and it was not until his retirement in 1964 that Adenauer was considered the one man who had done the most for Germany.¹⁴ There were two findings, however, one negative, and one positive. The first was their demonstration that the process of recognizing historical greatness cannot be explained in terms of the development of other attitudes, such as satisfaction with policy outputs. Their positive finding was that the structure of change of a two- stage process, one being Adenauer's Chancellorship, and the other being his retirement , that showed people gradually understanding what the man actually did for the country because it is sometimes hard to see greatness until it has already passed by.¹⁵ Their research on the greatness of historical figures serves that no single piece of evidence can validate a mathematical representation of political phenomena and that there were shared and individual attributes that contributed to the greatness of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. This pattern of Adenauer's ascent to greatness amongst the German people can be seen in a few graphs presented by Erich Neumann and Elisabeth Noelle in the Verlag fuer Demoskopie.

¹⁴Boyton, G.R., Loewenberg, Gerhard , *The Evolution of Public Perceptions of Adenauer as a Historic Leader: Test of a Mathematical Model of Attitude Change* Social Science History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Autumn 1976) p.82.

¹⁵Boyton, Loewenbuerg:, 96.

Table 1.
In Your Opinion, Which Great German Has Done Most For Germany?
September 1950

People	Percent as of 1950
Bismarck	35
Hitler	10
Fredrick the Great	7
Hindenburg	6
Goethe	4
William II	3
Martin Luther	3
Charlemagne	2
Stressmann	2
Robert Koch	2
Karl Marx	1
57 other names	6
None, don't know	15
Total	103

16

Table 2.
In Your Opinion, Which Great German Has Done Most For Germany?
September 1955

People	% Total Population	% Men	% Women
Bismark	32	37	28
Adenauer	15	14	15
Frederick the Great	6	7	5
Hitler	6	7	5
Kaisers, Kings, Generals	11	11	11
Authors, Artists, Philosophers	7	5	8
Scientists, Inventors	4	5	4
Others	2	2	2
Don't Know, No Answer	17	10	24
Total	106	106	107

17

¹⁶Neumann, Erich P., Noelle, Elisabeth., *Statistics on Adenauer Portrait of a Statesman*. Verlag Fuer Demoskopie, Allensbach- Bonn, 1962, p.139.

¹⁷ Neumann, Noelle:, 154.

Table 3.
In Your Opinion, Which Great German Has Done Most For Germany?
December 1958

People	% Total Population	% Men	% Women
Adenauer	26	21	30
Bismarck	23	23	16
Frederick the Great	2	2	2
Hitler	4	4	4
Kaisers, Kings	7	6	7
Authors, Artists, Philosophers	4	3	4
Scientists, Inventors	3	3	2
Others	1	2	1
Don't Know, Undecided	21	16	26
Total	101	101	100

18

¹⁸ Neuman, Noelle:,147. Charts made by Phillip Reavis.

CHAPTER III

THE SHAPING OF KONRAD ADENAUER

Konrad Herman Adenauer was born on January 5, 1876, in Cologne, Germany and was registered the day after as a new citizen of the Prussian state. He was the third son of Johann Konrad Adenauer and Helena Schaffenberg who at the time of Konrad's birth were both citizens of the city of Cologne and Roman Catholic. Even at his birth the paradoxes of Konrad Adenauer's life were already shaping his life. He would have an immense attachment to his birth place "the city of Cologne" and to Germany itself, despite being a staunch Roman Catholic in a predominantly Protestant Prussian State,¹⁹

Johann Konrad Adenauer was the son of a baker and a Rheinland Catholic by birth and his mother Helena was the granddaughter of an oboist from Saxony and of mixed Protestant and Catholic birth. Adenauer's father had served the Prussian army for fifteen years with his loyalty to the Prussian state and his king. Johann's military career, however, ended abruptly when he was wounded at the battle of Koenigsgraetz during the Austrian-Prussian War of 1866.²⁰ Now unable to continue a career in the military, he became a clerk for the Prussian Judicial system and after thirty years was

¹⁹Williams, Charles. *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*. John Wiley and Sons, Inc, New York. 2000. P. 4.

²⁰Wighton, Charles., *Adenauer A Critical Biography*. Coward-McCann, Inc, New York. 1963. p. 21.

promoted to senior clerk in the court of Cologne. As a reward for conscientious service, Johann Adenauer was in 1891 awarded the Order of the Red Eagle (4th class) and later in 1905 he was awarded the Kronenorden (3rd class) which was significant enough to have been engraved upon his tombstone.²¹ These achievements left a profound impression upon his son Konrad.

Johann was still a military man, however, and although he spent most of his life behind a desk, he maintained the traditional military moustache, pointed beard, and high collar that reached up to his chin. Johann was a man who longed for a career in the military, but due to his wounds, knew he would never be able to realize this desire. However, he had two compensations for his lost military service, his family and his religion, both of which were taken with the utmost seriousness.²²

Religious observance became the center point for life in the Adenauer house. Daily prayers were conducted morning and night, before meals and at Sunday mass (sometimes twice on Sunday). Lectures of a religious nature were held in the home and included discussions about purgatory and eternal hellfire. When dealing with his family Johann Adenauer was as stern in setting rules of behavior as promoting religious instruction. He was very determined that his sons should have the educational advantages, which he never had, and if he were to spend what little money the family had then it would be to deliver his children to a good school.²³

²¹ Williams, Charles. *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*. p. 6.

²² Williams, 6

²³ Weymar, Paul., *Adenauer. His Authorized Biography*. E.P. Dutton & Company, Inc. New York, 1957. Translated from the German by Peter DeMendelsohn. p.16.

Until the 1870s the schools in Germany were under the supervision of the religious authorities. This almost “state within a state” quality of the Roman Catholic Church, resulted in then President Bismarck’s Kulturkampf of the 1870s. Johann Adenauer was left to decide on whether to be a good Prussian or a good Catholic. He then took it upon himself to teach his son Konrad before he entered grade one of the Prussian Volksschule the basic elements that were part of the regulations of 1872, and to never deviate from the true faith of Roman Catholic Christianity.²⁴

After attending the Prussian Volksschule Konrad Adenauer’s abilities and proficiency in reading, writing, arithmetic, and appreciation for the Prussian State resulted in being accepted at the Gymnasium, which at the time only one in ten boys was able to achieve.²⁵ During Konrad’s enrollment at the Prussian Gymnasium he succeeded at every subject and was always in the top six of his class.²⁶

After Konrad Adenauer’s successful completion of the Prussian Gymnasium, he took the oath of allegiance at a public meeting of the Cologne civil court on June 1, 1897, an oath which required him to be “submissive, loyal and obedient to his Royal Majesty the King of Prussia,” and ended with “so help me God.” Whatever feelings Adenauer had at this point about God or his loyalty to Prussia were now formalized in the most binding of manners and were to become the basis for his life and career.²⁷

²⁴ Williams, Charles. *Adenauer. The Father of the New Germany*, p.17.

²⁵ Williams, 18

²⁶ Williams, 21

²⁷ Williams, 34

In 1903 Adenauer was granted a twelve month leave of absence from the office of the state prosecutor to enable him to stand in for an ailing Hermann Kausen, who at the time was a low senior lawyer. This in turn would become one of the great turning points in his career, for Hermann Kausen was the leader of the Centre Party in Cologne, an exclusively a Catholic party that controlled the majority on the Cologne city council. With this new promotion Adenauer was given the chance to develop his forensic skills as a prosecutor and a professional lawyer.²⁸

Adenauer's political career began after he married in 1904 Emma Weyer, the twenty-four-year-old daughter of a respectable, prosperous Cologne family. By virtue of this marriage, he was brought into contact with the societal and political trendsetters among the burghers of the Rhineland. In 1906 Adenauer reached the age of thirty, started a new career, moved to a new house, lost his father and gained a son, all of which had an impact on the direction his life was taking him. The year 1906 was to turn the youthful Adenauer into a man and to point him to a lifetime career. When he took position to act as a temporary judge in the Cologne district court in 1906 he was surprised when an unexpected opportunity arose. It so happened that a vacancy occurred for the job of Beigeordneter (deputy to the mayor or member of the city government) in the administration of the city of Cologne, which was a senior post answerable directly to the mayor and a post of great responsibility.²⁹

A position as a senior civil servant commanded respect in the social constellation of Cologne and Adenauer was conscious of both of his own and his

²⁸ Williams, 40

²⁹ Williams, 45

father's ambitions. At the time of Adenauer's decision to go into politics, Cologne was split between, the Liberal Party and the Center Party. The leader of the Centre Party group on the council was none other than Adenauer's former employer Hermann Kausen, and it was to Kausen that Adenauer went for advice.³⁰

When Adenauer approached his former employer he was told that there was already another man who would likely get the chance to be on the council, but, Adenauer stood firmly and stated "ich bin bestimmt genau so gut wie der andere"*³¹. To Hermann Kausen, this plea came as a surprise, and he was so impressed that Adenauer was recommended by his former boss as the Centre Party's candidate for the Cologne City Council. Adenauer's next step was to confront family members who had powerful connections in the Liberal Party. Adenauer's wife Emma's uncle, Max Wallraf was approached by Adenauer who he gained his uncle-in-law's support. He then won the support of both the Liberal and Centre parties. On March 7, 1906 Adenauer was elected Beigeordneter with no fewer than thirty five votes out of thirty seven. This was without a doubt the most decisive moment in his life, and he was then to put the law behind him and to start his long and productive political career.³²

On July 22, 1909, at the age of thirty-three Adenauer was elected first deputy to the mayor of Cologne and thus became the second most powerful man in the city. This came at the onset of the First World War and his duties as first deputy led to almost complete control of the city, because his uncle-in-law, the incumbent mayor,

³⁰ Williams, 48

³¹ Williams, 45. * I am as good as the other man, German translation.

³² Williams, 50

was not willing to be so decisive in matters concerning the war and the fortified city of Cologne.³³ After the death of his wife in 1916 Adenauer went through a one year period of grieving until his election on September 18, 1917, when he was chosen the youngest mayor in the whole of Prussia and Cologne at the age of forty one.³⁴

After the armistice signing on November 11, 1918, there was a stipulation in the agreement which allowed for the British occupation of the Rheinland, and in particular, the city of Cologne. Adenauer feared that this stipulation might cause the city to react violently, however official relations during 1919 and 1920 were on the whole satisfactory and harmonious. (Unofficial relations were marked by severe tensions most of which dealt with labor unrest and the shortages of food.)³⁵

In September of 1919 Adenauer married Gussi Zinsser a family friend not much older than his own children and in June of the following year she delivered his first child.³⁶ Unfortunately four days later the infant suddenly died.

On June 6, 1920, elections were held for the Weimar Republic's new Reichstag just a few months after the ratification of the finalized peace treaty that concluded World War I. The elections caused uneasiness, but not between Liberals, the Social Democrats or the Centre Party but rather between those who supported the republic and those who did not. The Centre and Right parties formed the new government in Berlin, and the Centre party, of which Adenauer was a member (and as mayor of a major German city and as a senior member of the city of Cologne) turned

³³ Williams, 55

³⁴ Williams, 75

³⁵ Weymar, Paul., *Adenauer His Authorized Biography*. P, 42.

³⁶ Weymar, 58

the tide in favor for him to make a major move in his politics. Adenauer was to now concentrate his energy not merely on the city of Cologne, as he has done his entire life, but on Germany itself.³⁷

On May 5, 1921, the Allies demanded a sum of two hundred and fifty million dollars to be paid within twenty-five days to cover war expenses, which were owed to them through the war reparations clause in the armistice treaty. Germany had far fallen behind on payments, and the Fehrenbach government at the time appealed to the United States for mediation. At the time, Washington was no longer interested in European matters. With support for his government now slipping away in the Reichstag there was only one way out for Fehrenbach, and that was to accept the Allies, conditions and resign as chancellor. This Fehrenbach did, and the great German inflation era had begun.³⁸ It was at this point that Adenauer was invited to become chancellor of the Reich. On May 9, 1921, the Centre Party group in the Reichstag held a meeting to discuss the succession of Adenauer to the chancellorship to replace Fehrenbach, who was after all a member of the same party and it would only be right if they got to choose the next successor.³⁹ Support for Adenauer was already in place as the leader of a coalition government including the Centre Party and the Social Democratic Parties when, Adenauer insisted that he must think it over before accepting the candidacy.⁴⁰

³⁷ Williams, Charles. *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany* p, 125.

³⁸ Williams, 129

³⁹ Williams, 129

⁴⁰ Williams, 130

After deciding to accept the prestigious honor, he proceeded to offend merely everyone. Even his own party was shaken by his demands for such things as being able to choose his ministers freely from whatever party he deemed fit, while he advised the Social Democrats that they should for the time being not talk further of socialization. Adenauer even passed a law that would deliver the nine hour work day to the workers of the country. Needless to say this abruptly ended his candidacy in May 1921.⁴¹ However, Adenauer did in fact achieve the goals that he wanted by going to Berlin and that was to avoid the chancellorship and be elected president of the Prussian Staatsrat* on May 7, 1921.⁴²

At three p.m. January 30 1926 marked end of the British occupation of the Rhein. After seven years the Union Jack was lowered in a brief ceremony at British Army Headquarters and by 3:30 the same day the flag of Cologne was hoisted jubilantly, which duly left Adenauer as sole caretaker for the city of Cologne.⁴³

By the time 1932 rolled around the Nazi Party was in full swing, and yet, Adenauer believed that the larger threat to the country came in the form of communism. He even went so far as to develop a strategy for dealing with the Nazi party, mostly by just ignoring it, enabling him to concentrate more on the threat of communism, which to Adenauer was the worst evil that had yet appeared on earth, but the real danger became all too surprisingly clear to Adenauer when he learned that

⁴¹ Williams 131

* Staatsrat, means, the German Upper House. Once established in this position Adenauer was not to be dislodged and was re-elected each year for the following twelve years. Ibid; 132.

⁴³ Williams, 165

in the March and April elections of 1932 the Nazi Party had fallen just short of an overall majority.⁴⁴

When Hitler was elected chancellor of the German state in March of 1933, there began a chain of events that would send Adenauer out of the political arena for a dozen years. When Chancellor Hitler arrived at Cologne it would be customary for the mayor to go out to the airport to greet him. This Adenauer did not do,⁴⁵ which in turn angered the new Chancellor who insisted that he would not stay in the city but in a nearby town. Along with his disobedience to the arrival of Hitler, Adenauer also declared that there is to be no posting of the Nazi flag on any city building or property and that all flags should be taken down immediately. After declaring this, the Nazi Party took down the names of the city workers who obeyed Adenauer's wish for future reference. Finally on March 23, 1933, Hitler granted the Enabling Act, which gave dictatorial powers to the new Chancellor and ended the Weimar Republic's feeble attempt at democracy. Hitler's government now had legal sanctions to do what it wanted and banned all opposition parties and subsequently, Adenauer was dismissed as Mayor of the city of Cologne.⁴⁶

Now that Adenauer's strong distaste for Hitler and the National Socialist government was known, he was also left without a job, and due to some unwise investments he was left virtually bankrupt.⁴⁷ Throughout the years leading up to the end of the Second World War, Adenauer was faced with many hardships. He kept a

⁴⁴ Williams, 197

⁴⁵ Wighton, Charles., *Adenauer: A Critical Biography*. p, 57.

⁴⁶ Wighton, 58

⁴⁷ Williams, Charles. *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany* p, 217.

low profile and tried to remain out of sight for fear of being arrested and thrown into a detainment camp.

On the morning of August 24, 1944, the Gestapo came to Adenauer's house to arrest him for the second time. Operation Thunderstorm allowed the Gestapo to arrest without cause anybody who might be a threat to the Reich.⁴⁸ This time, Adenauer was taken to the Gestapo prison at Braunweiler near the fair grounds outside of Cologne. Fortunately, after a month of imprisonment and with a little help from his son who at the time was in Berlin, Adenauer was released on November 26.⁴⁹ The war was now slowly coming to an end and now all Adenauer had to do was wait for the advancing American troops to put a final end to the war. Finally, on the 16th of March a United States Army jeep pulled up in front of Adenauer's house with a message from the U.S. Military Governor of Cologne inviting him to return to the city as the mayor.⁵⁰

There is no doubt about the influence Johann Adenauer had on his son. His greatest gift may well have been providing him with a "moral compass." With a foundation based on his religious beliefs and commitment to his country, young Konrad Adenauer was taught the meaning of God and country, and the need to serve both. Certainly his early encounters with the electoral process and representative government, secured a place for himself as a favorite of the people he served. And he proved over and over again the strength of his father's gift, as he stood fast against

⁴⁸ Williams, 278

⁴⁹ Adenauer, Konrad., *Memoirs 1945-1953*. Translated by Ruhm von Oppen. Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1965. P. 17.

⁵⁰ Adenauer, 20

both Fascism and Communism, and threats to the common good, in particular to his fellow citizens of Cologne and eventually to all of Germany. He knew, too, the importance of personal integrity. He sensed what was necessary for the Weimar Republic, and when faced with opposition, when to step aside and fight another day. He knew all too well that a stand against Hitler would cost him his job, but not his integrity. His uncompromising upbringing and faith would enable him to survive the whirlwind and manage Germany's recovery.

CHAPTER IV

BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS

The Bundesrepublik Deutschland BRD, (*Federal Republic of Germany*, abbreviated FRG) was founded in the early stages of the Cold War. Although Chancellor Konrad Adenauer pursued a policy promoting integration into the western alliances from 1945, Germany in 1955 did not have any military branches, that is, an army, navy, or air force. During the period, Adenauer led Germany, and invested considerable effort into improving its relations with its neighbors. Voluntarily, the FRG made payments, especially to France and to Israel, in recognition of crimes committed by Germans against foreigners and German victims of Nazi brutality. Cross-national contact on a local level was promoted in the form of city partnerships. The Federal Republic was described as an economic superpower (the world's third largest economy), yet a second rate political power. For the time being, the Federal Republic of Germany was satisfied with this position, aware that Europe was unwilling to see a German government play a dominating role in European politics. But Adenauer, understood that there could not be any neutral middle ground for Germany between Western Europe and the Soviet Bloc, so he turned Germany to the West and anchored it to the Western Alliance and the United States.⁵¹

⁵¹ Williams, Charles., *Adenauer. The Father of the New Germany*. p.275.

One of the most important domestic issues, which confronted the German people in 1949, was the building of a viable democratic structure of government. That was no easy task in a country in which the majority of the people had been enthusiastic Nazis at one time or another. Consciousness of the guilt for the Nazi period dominated the legislative work of the early years of the Bonn Republic. From fiscal policies that were once dominated by the black market and trade in cigarettes, to the ten to one Deutsche Marks to U.S. Dollar in 1945 a healthy economy eventually evolved. By 1951, as a result of a growing economy, the Deutsche Mark to Dollar ratio improved to 5.3 to 1. The effectiveness of the new parliamentary system and constitution was being felt. As a result, much of the credit for this reawakening of Western Germany went to the new iron clad policies of its Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, who called for the German people to turn their backs on the past, to put away their old nationalistic ways and join him in becoming "Good Europeans". Adenauer also wanted to share a closer tie with Western Europe, as much so with France as the United States, in order to end the prolonged quarrels that had plagued the European nations for many years and had high costs that affected so many people so dearly.

CHAPTER V

ADENAUER'S ULTIMATE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Adenauer himself had two main objectives that he personally wanted to take care of as soon as he entered the political arena as Bundeskanzler. The first was to regain for Germany the confidence of the allies and to convince them that the majority of the German people were not as bad as they were commonly perceived to be. Secondly, Adenauer wanted to win Germany a place in the western alliance as the best defense against any possible Soviet aggression.⁵²

Adenauer himself was an unlikely player in the building of this new Federal Republic. He had never really left the security of his own city of Cologne yet having taken on the chancellorship at the age of 73, he was, remarkably successful in impressing the Allied High Commission with his concept of Germany's international position and with his qualities as a negotiator. The Allies came to appreciate him, because he was reliable, level headed, willing to incur public criticism, was frank without evasion, and inspired confidence into anyone that he would meet.⁵³

The Marshall plan, which was announced in 1947 and went into effect the following year, brought Germany economic aid from the United States worth in all nearly fourteen

⁵² Williams, Charles: *The Father of the New Germany*. p. 29

⁵³ Williams, 29

billion dollars, at a time when such assistance was sorely needed. The success of the Marshall plan, and that the great expenditures of the United States, was the rebuilding and restoration of European countries sharing a common Western heritage.

The extension of the Marshall Plan to Germany was first of all a deed of extremely great political significance. Thereby, in spite of her past, Germany was placed by the President of the United States, by Harry Truman, on an equal footing with other suffering countries. The extension of the Marshall Plan to Germany achieved a twofold success: First, the Germans were given new hope, and second, they were helped by the provisions of the Plan ⁵⁴

Adenauer deeply appreciated the significance of the Marshall Plan, yet political differences eventually compelled Bonn to make choices between Washington and Paris. ⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Oral History Interview with Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-63. Bonn, Germany. June 10, 1964, By Philip C. Brooks., Harry S. Truman Library Independence, Missouri.

⁵⁵ Hanrieder, Wolfram F., *West German Foreign Policy 1949-1979*. Westview Press 1980. p.25.

CHAPTER VI

THE OCCUPATION STATUTE

Allied changes in the structure of German government had a lasting impact on administrative developments. However, the first process in this attempt at a new government meant for the Allies that all civil servants in the current German government must be removed. The Allies therefore linked denazification of the civil service to the general denazification program which sought to isolate and punish all adherents of the Nazi regime. Consequently, when the general denazification came to a virtual halt in 1948, the civil service purge also ended.⁵⁶

While the military governments in the Western Zones had removed 53,000 officials from their posts, only 1,004 of these civil servants were declared permanently ineligible for office. The remainder could reapply for government positions and often won key appointments. The Allies had little choice in this matter, as a strict denazification policy would have permanently disqualified almost all civil servants as well as most individuals who had the training necessary to hold high level administrative positions. Hatred for the war years was mellowing out as the cold war rivalry with the Russians was beginning to intensify, the Western Allies increasingly began to find it necessary to establish a strong government in West Germany as soon

⁵⁶Herbert, Jacob. *German Administration since Bismarck.*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1963. p.158.

as possible. The decision was ratified by the Bonn government in 1951 when it ruled that all civil servants not judged “major Offenders”⁵⁷ could regain their positions or be retired on a full pension.

The Allies executed the denazification program and all other measures independently in the separate American, British, and French occupation zones. It soon became clear that the occupation of Germany in airtight zones was a folly. The western zones were patently too small economically and too unbalanced to become self-sufficient. The United States also did not share French fears of a central German government if its powers were sufficiently restrained by a federal system of checks and by independent legislative and judicial bodies.⁵⁸

Accordingly, the American position was:

The United States favors a united Germany with a federal structure. It does not oppose a central government for Germany. . . . It would prefer an ultimate central regime of federal character, that is, of defined and limited powers with residual powers reserved for the *Laender** governments. It would approve such a degree of federalistic autonomy as may be the outgrowth of indigenous German sentiment.⁵⁹

Consequently, the United States took the initiative and created a bi-zonal government with the British zone in 1947. At that time, the French still objected to a central regime, however, with the Berlin Blockade during the winter of 1947-1948, the French were finally convinced that a regional government embracing all three

⁵⁷ Herbert, 158

⁵⁸ Herbert, 158

* *Laender*, German for the local state, governments, as in the city state of Berlin, or the state of Bavaria within the Federal Republic of Germany.

⁵⁹ Herbert, Jacob. *German Administration since Bismarck*, p.159

Western zones was imperative. Then in July of 1948, England, France and the United States invited the Germans to draft a constitution. The Western powers specified certain conditions, which insisted on a more decentralized national government than the Germans had originally desired. The Germans themselves drafted a constitution in lengthy negotiations over the course of the year, and then insisted upon calling their document a “Basic Law” instead of a “Constitution”^{60*}. After the German Laender ratified the Basic Law in May of 1949, Germany regained full control over legislation and administration. Still, the Allies retained responsibility only for foreign affairs and reserved for themselves the right to participate in denazification and economic development. The Allies also retained, as their prerogative, the right to intervene in any matter “ if they consider that to do so is essential to security or to preserve the democratic government of Germany or in pursuance of international obligations of the Allied governments”.⁶¹

The Occupation Statute for the German state was an instrument that would define the relationship between the three occupying powers of Great Britain, France, and the United States, and the Federal Government of West Germany. The allied governments gave assurance to the Federal Republic that they desired and intended that the German people should enjoy the maximum self-government consistent with the occupation. The allied powers saw the Occupation Statute as consisting of laws over disarmament and demilitarization, reparations, industrial controls in the Ruhr, foreign affairs, foreign trade,

⁶⁰ Herbert, 160

* Basic law, also called the German Grundgesetz in order to indicate the provisional nature of their government pending the reunification of West Germany with the Russian occupied East Germany. However, today the legal constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany “after reunification” is still known as the Basic Law.

⁶¹ Herbert, Jacob. *German Administration since Bismarck*, p.160

displaced persons and refugees, and protection of the allied forces and their dependents. In other words, the Allied High Commission had granted the creation of the Federal Republic of West Germany and the time of military government was at an end.⁶²

After the transfer of the Occupation Statute, the United States was involved in actively supporting the German economic revival, and promised the German people a large and growing share of political control over their own affairs. As the Nazi memories still lingered on in the minds of the European neighbors, and because the Germans received little credit for their accomplishments such as the creation of their Basic Law (or constitution), many viewed the new republic with little legitimacy, which included as well, restrictions on trade and relations with other countries.⁶³

With the Third Empire and the Nazi dictatorship behind him now, Adenauer wanted to wipe out the disgrace that was left over from the Nazi era, and therefore he set out to replace nationalism with a new European ideal. The idea of working for Europe or political integration was about to take center stage. Once the Federal Republic of Germany had come into being, it was not always easy, especially during the early years, to separate foreign policy from internal policy. The Allied High Commission was going to be a major influence on the new government and Adenauer was dedicated already to the ideal of a united Europe based upon common western ideals. Konrad Adenauer, once elected to the chancellorship took upon himself to single handedly pull Germany out of the depths of the third world and try to make his newly founded country a leader in the eyes of the Western

⁶²Eisenhower, Dwight D., *Mandate for Change, The White House Years.*, Doubleday & Company, Inc. New York, 1963. p. 47

⁶³Hiscocks, Richard. *The Adenauer Era.* J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia/New York, 1966. p.37

communities. His first diplomatic task as chancellor (at this time in 1949 he was not responsible for German Foreign affairs) was to establish good relations with the Allied High Commissioners. This task, which he undertook, was based mainly on his own tactics and personal qualities. Adenauer's staunch anti-Communist, and a Christian Democratic positions, were an asset when dealing with the Allied High Commission. As a result of these fundamental beliefs, Adenauer's representation of the new German republic and the German people themselves, would have the support of the Allied High Command. This in turn enabled Adenauer to work not only with Allies, but with other nations as well. However, by the summer of 1948 it had become well known that the United States in particular, with the help of the Western Allies, was going to run Germany's foreign as well as domestic policies, at least for the time being.⁶⁴

The 15th of September was to be a day of high drama, as it was the first time a freely elected German parliament had been called upon to elect a head of government for the new German Republic. When the vote finally came through it was as tight a race as there could have been.⁶⁵ Out of 402 members of the Bundestag, Adenauer had received 202 votes, which was a bare majority of one. It was also noted that thirteen members had been absent for one reason or another, and the deciding vote that gave the chancellorship to Konrad Adenauer was that of his own vote.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Hiscocks:, 38

⁶⁵Williams, Charles. *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*. John Wiley and Sons, Inc, New York. 2000. p. 348.

⁶⁶ Williams, 349. When the news went out that Adenauer had won the chancellorship the Soviet News Agency, TASS, issued a statement "American puppet Adenauer is Chancellor of the West German separate "government"" and therefore Adenauer's credibility had been established. Williams; 349

The new government of the Federal Republic of Germany was therefore presented to the Bundestag on 20 September 1949, along with a statement from the Chancellor on his government's general policy stance. * Adenauer was duly presented to the occupying powers on the following day, coincidental with the entry into force of the Occupation Statute. So it was on the morning of September 21st 1949 that Adenauer and five of his colleagues arrived at the Hotel Petersberg* to present themselves as the new government of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to receive formally the Occupation Statute. When Adenauer presented the members of his cabinet to the occupying powers he had pointed out that this was the first contact between the Federal Government and the Allied High Commissioners, and that first impressions of the newly formed government were to be duly noted during the meeting. ⁶⁷

In the years since 1945 few West Germans had shown intelligent or persistent interest in foreign policy. Preoccupation with the struggle for survival was forced upon them in the initial post war period. The Germans, in addition, had little experience in conducting their own political affairs, because they had been more the subjects of the Kaiser and Hitler, than citizens. Party leaders, civil servants, and industrial groups participated in the formulation of foreign policy from time to time, but it has been stated without exaggeration that, "Adenauer exercises not only the strongest single influence on the formation of West German foreign policy but, in

* The British noted rather sourly that "as usual Adenauer considers that his bread is spread entirely with American Butter", 350.

* Hotel Petersberg is located near the city of Bonn, Germany.

⁶⁷ Williams, Charles. *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*. p.351.

fact, the dominant influence.”⁶⁸ Adenauer had made foreign relations his special province, and devoted most of his working time to international affairs and exercised a more effective control over the implementation of policies than most individual leaders in any other NATO country.

There are, however, many reasons why Chancellor Adenauer’s role was so powerful in the Federal Republic’s foreign policy. For instance, there was a gradual devaluation of the authority of the occupation powers giving Adenauer the opportunity to accumulate power with every Allied concession. Adenauer also personally assumed greater responsibility for the exercise of German sovereignty, for it was to him that Germany’s Allied guardians looked to for reassurance that the new freedoms would not be abused. The process initiated by the Petersberg Protocoll of November 1949, and continued revisions of the Occupation Statute in March 1951 culminated in the Contractual Agreements of May 26, 1952*, which restored sovereignty and gave Bonn full authority over its external affairs, except for certain rights retained for the Allied powers which concerning the stationing of forces in Germany, the status of Berlin, the unification of Germany, and the signing of a peace treaty with the newly reunified country.⁶⁹

With every step along the Germany’s road to independence, Adenauer’s responsibilities increased, and after the Petersberg Protocoll he assumed his role as

⁶⁸Freund, Gerald. *Germany Between Two Worlds*. Harcourt, Brace & Company, New York. 1961, 54.

* See also Bonn Convention.

⁶⁹ Freund, 55

chancellor with more authority that had been previously exercised by the Allied High Commission.

CHAPTER VII

EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY AND THE REARMAMENT OF GERMANY

The rearmament issue had been raised and debated, but by no means firmly decided upon, when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. Though many in the West drew ominous analogies between the Korean situation and that of divided Germany, the Far Eastern conflict only gradually convinced the United States, the West's lone superpower, to adopt West German rearmament as its official policy.⁷⁰ Once that decision was made, the goal of rearming Germany became the key to Washington's vision for Germany and Europe. In addition to shaping America's policy toward Bonn, it dramatically affected relations among the three Western Allies. Indeed, the German rearmament question quickly emerged as the first major test of the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance.⁷¹

The alliance was strained because of Washington's enthusiasm for rearming the Germans was not shared equally by Great Britain or France. Both, of course, had been severely tested by the Germans in two world wars, and both were anything but sanguine about the revival of Marshall Germany. Though, with some cajoling,

⁷⁰ Large, David Clay., *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era*. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill & London., 1996, p. 4.

⁷¹ Large, 4

London eventually came around to the American line, while France proved determined to prevent, or at least to delay, the military revival of its old enemy.⁷²

As one of Adenauer's main focuses for the involvement of Germany in the European community, Adenauer needed to somehow gain the favor of the Allied High Commission, in particular the American side. However, plans for rearming West Germany created many problems among the members. For instance, France had to be convinced that if Germany were to be rearmed she would never again be allowed to use her power to turn on her western neighbors. But any means of achieving this legitimatizing objective would prove to be harder than anyone could perceive. With this came the onset of the need for a European Defense Community (or EDC). Proposed by the French Premier, the EDC was a way to merge the armed forces of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg. The European Defense Community was in theory to become a hard and dependable core that would work in correlation with NATO. Adenauer and President Eisenhower were convinced that the EDC would in fact be the best possible answer to the sovereignty of Germany question. Although, a few countries were still reluctant to join the EDC, in the end the only obstacle to the ratification of the EDC would be the French government.⁷³

On February 5th 1953, Adenauer first met, the new United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Adenauer was initially suspicious of Dulles because of his militant Presbyterian religious beliefs and his so called aversion to Catholics plus the notion that everything with Dulles was either black or white. However, it turned out

⁷² Large, 5

⁷³ Hiscocks, *The Adenauer Era*. 70

that Dulles was not the narrow puritan he had thought, but that Dulles shared many of his views including the underlying morality of government in which there was only good and evil, and that was that.⁷⁴ With the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, Dulles had proclaimed, “the Eisenhower era begins and the Stalin era ends,”⁷⁵ and with that American policy toward Germany changed. Adenauer had not yet appreciated that Dulles’s support for the European Defense Community was due in large measure to the shift in US defense policy based on America’s nuclear superiority over the Soviets, and that the United States felt that they no longer needed a large conventional army stationed in Germany. Dulles also believed that when the Americans did reduce their forces that the European Defense Community would take over a large part of the burden. Adenauer did not find out that American policy toward the European Defense Community had changed like this until his first visit to America in April of 1953.

When Adenauer arrived in America, he was first bombarded by reporters in a short press conference and told the journalists, “That upon landing in the United States I felt above all one thing: gratitude to the American people.”⁷⁶ and that the German people thanked the Americans for all that they had done for them by also stating,

I believe that it is rare in history that a victor has helped the vanquished in this way. This help has been expressed in many ways, from individual to individual, from organization to organization, by decision Congress and by measures of your

⁷⁴ Williams, Charles. *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*. 402

⁷⁵ Williams, 402

⁷⁶ Adenauer, Konrad. 1965. *Memoirs 1945-1953*. Henry Regnery Company, Chicago. Translated by Beate Ruhm von Oppen. p. 439.

government. The German people have derived courage and from all of this, we have regained confidence and, above all, we have learned that in the life of nations too, force and egotism are not the only motivating powers. Those responsible for American politics as well as American public opinion have an exemplary awareness of the fact that power and wealth mean obligations toward others. The American people have not only recognized this obligation, they have acted accordingly. In the history of our times, which contains so many dark chapters, it will be written in golden letters that the United States, true to its tradition and on the basis of its strength, has undertaken the defense of the freedom of the world. (Konrad Adenauer) ⁷⁷

Upon meeting President Eisenhower, Adenauer was greeted warmly and told that he was among friends who had the desire of a free Germany at heart. After further greetings, the meeting turned directly into American and German policy issues. Eisenhower stated firstly that the problem of the Saar should be taken up with Secretary of State Dulles, and that America would be glad to be of assistance in the matter, but before Eisenhower could finish, Adenauer brought up the matter of the European Defense Community and the unification of Europe. Adenauer continued by stating, "We Germans endorse the American policy and would show ourselves to be true and reliable partners." ⁷⁸

In the Afternoon, Adenauer then met with Secretary of State Dulles to continue his debate over the European Defense Community. Adenauer was concerned that the ratification process was taking too long and that it would still be another five months before any more progress could be made. He was worried that the continued delay would bring about a major standstill in Europe and proposed that

⁷⁷ Adenauer, 440

⁷⁸ Adenauer, 442

the Americans act on a clause within the European Defense Community treaty that would allow it to take effect without the full ratification of all Allied members. However, such a solution had proved futile, and Dulles replied that the United States could do nothing in this respect without consulting the British and the French. However, Dulles himself was eager and in favor of Adenauer's suggestion, but that it would be better to say nothing in public as that might lead to the crystallization of certain opposition.⁷⁹ Dulles also repeated that the United States would look favorably on the German proposal once Germany had done everything possible for ratification.

After Adenauer's return to Germany, a NATO council meeting took place in Paris on 14 December 1953. There Secretary of State Dulles piled on the pressure by stating that if the European Defense Community treaty failed, the United States would face an agonizing reappraisal of its foreign policy. This announcement was meant to terrify the French, implying as it did that the United States would turn its back on Europe and retreat into isolationism as it did after the First World War. After Dulles's futile attempt to persuade the French, Adenauer was beginning to come to the conclusion that the European Defense Community Treaty would fail in the French National Assembly, whatever concessions were made.⁸⁰

On the 30th of August 1954, the French Assembly under the leadership of the Mendes-France government voted 319 to 264, with 43 abstentions, not to allow the motion to ratify the European Defense Community Treaty on to its agenda. At that point, the European Defense Community Treaty was effectively dead. It was then on

⁷⁹ Adenauer, 444

⁸⁰ Williams, Charles. *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*. 412

September 11th that Anthony Eden set off on a hurried round of European capitals to see whether there was common ground for an extension of the 1948 Brussels Treaty of mutual defense between Britain, France and the Benelux countries which would include West Germany and Italy if French opposition to German membership to NATO was insurmountable. The whole matter of German membership was, in any event, to be on the table.⁸¹

The London Nine-Power Conference opened in Lancaster House on 28 September 1954. The conferees were quickly able to agree that West German sovereignty should be granted independent of final ratification of a rearmament plan, but France still opposed any remilitarization of Germany through the Brussels Treaty and NATO. To counteract the French the British proposed that if Germany entered NATO then the British would guarantee to maintain British troops on the continent. This Dulles was waiting for, and stated that this was just the gesture he needed to convince Congress that the Europeans were willing to do their share.⁸²

During the conference Adenauer stood up to declare that, “any West German production of ABC weapons*, as well as the manufacture of guided missiles, heavy warships, long range artillery, and strategic bombers would not be produced by the government or any government of the Federal Republic of West Germany.”⁸³ This

⁸¹ Williams, 419

⁸² Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era*. 217.

* The term ABC weapons (atomic, biological, chemical) has in English largely been superseded by weapons of mass destruction. ABC weapons are designed to kill large numbers of people, chiefly civilians but potentially also unprotected military personnel. The threat of ABC attacks forces military troops to use protection limiting their battle endurance.

⁸³ Large, 218

statement was without certain merits; it might mean that Germany could not produce these items, but Adenauer did not state that they could not possess them. The statement was well received by all of the members of the Nine-Power Conference and especially by Secretary of State Dulles.

The Adenauer government had decided not to attempt ratification of the Paris Treaties until the French Assembly had acted on them, thus reversing the European Defense Community Treaty order of events. It finally took a British action to convince the French that the order for the continuation of a standing British army on the continent required the ratification of the Paris Treaties by all members. With this in hand the French approved the treaties just barely. The Paris Treaties were duly passed on 27 February 1955, by a vote of 324 to 151. On March 18 the Bundesrat, having had its moments of defiance during the European Defense Community debates, accepted the various agreements without opposition. German president Heuss signed the treaty into law on the 24th of March. All of the powers had by now ratified the treaties so the diplomatic path was finally cleared for West Germany's rearmament as a full member of the North American Treaty Organization alliance.⁸⁴

On May 5th 1955, the Allied High Commission formally ended the Occupation Statute and thereby its own authority: henceforth the Western powers would be represented in Bonn by ambassadors.

⁸⁴ Large, 219

CHAPTER VIII

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RECOVERY

The Potsdam Agreement* provided that Germany would be treated as an economic unit, and the four zones of occupation were expected to share their industrial and agricultural output. This was done to help stave off the reactivation of Germany's industrial war machinery. In March 1946, the four occupying powers agreed on a Level of Industry Plan, which called for the dismantling of those plant facilities that would bring German production above the estimated ceiling set at approximately fifty percent of the 1938 level of heavy industrial production. However, as early as September of 1946, Secretary of State James Byrnes stated that the United States did not want to deny the German People their opportunity to work their way out of their hardships just so long as they shared the idea of respect for human freedom. From this the Level of Industry plan was raised from fifty percent of the 1938 economy to seventy to seventy-five percent of the 1938 level.⁸⁵

* The Potsdam Agreement, or the Potsdam Proclamation, was an agreement on policy for the occupation and reconstruction of Germany and other nations after fighting in the European Theatre of World War II had ended with the German surrender of May 8, 1945. It was drafted and adopted by the major victorious powers, the USSR, USA and UK, at the Potsdam Conference between July 17 and August 2, 1945.

⁸⁵Hanrieder, Wolfram F., *West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response* Stanford University Press, California, 1967, p.21.

Undoubtedly, one of the major economic events of Germany's postwar reconstruction was the currency reform of June 1948. The technical results were the contraction of the money supply through a drastic devaluation of the Reichsmark*, and the reorganization of the private and public debt structure. The economic, psychological, and social implications could hardly be exaggerated, because the actions taken caused the collapse of black and grey markets and confidence in a reliable currency was restored to economic life almost overnight.

One of the most significant events for the war torn countries of Europe and including Germany, was the Announcement of the Marshall Plan. On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall* spoke at Harvard University and outlined what would become known as the Marshall Plan. Europe, still devastated by the war, had just survived one of the worst winters on record. The nations of Europe had nothing to sell for hard currency, and the democratic socialist governments in most countries were unwilling to adopt the draconian proposals for recovery advocated by old-line classical economists. Something had to be done, both for humanitarian reasons and also to stop the potential spread of communism westward. The United States offered up to \$20 billion for relief, but only if the European nations could get together and draw up a rational plan on how they would use the aid. For the first time,

* The Reichsmark (Symbol: RM) was the currency in Germany from 1924 until June 20, 1948. It was replaced by the Deutsche Mark in West Germany. It was introduced in 1924 as a replacement of the Papiermark. This was necessary due to the hyperinflation which had reached its peak in 1923. The currency exchange rate between the old Papiermark and the Reichsmark was 1,000,000,000,000:1 (One trillion to one). It was pegged to the Dollar at a rate of RM4 to US\$1.

* George Catlett Marshall, GCB (December 31, 1880 – October 16, 1959) was an American military leader and statesman best remembered for his leadership in the Allied victory in World War II and for his work establishing the post-war reconstruction effort for Europe, which became known as the Marshall Plan.

they, the European Countries, would have to act as a single economic unit; they would have to cooperate with each other.

In the speech Marshall outlined the problem: "Europe's requirements are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character." He then suggested a solution: that the European nations themselves set up a program for the reconstruction of Europe, with United States assistance. The significance of Marshall's plan was immediately recognized.⁸⁶

The Marshall Plan that was announced in 1947 went into effect the following year. It helped to rebuild and restore those countries sharing a common Western civilization with to the United States. Germany was no exception, having been guided since the end of the war by the policies of Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer himself said,

The extension of the Marshall Plan to Germany was first of all a deed of extremely great political significance. Thereby, in spite of her past, Germany was placed by the President of the United States, by Harry Truman, on an equal footing with other suffering countries. The extension of the Marshall Plan to Germany achieved a twofold success: First, the Germans were given new hope, and second, they were helped by the provisions of the Plan⁸⁷

⁸⁶Marshall, George C. *The Marshall Plan Speech* On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall outlined a program of economic assistance to war-torn Europe at Harvard University in Cambridge, Mass.

⁸⁷Oral History Interview with Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-63. Bonn, Germany. June 10, 1964, By Philip C. Brooks., Harry S. Truman Library Independence, Missouri.

The New German state, which had been established by the three Western occupying powers in 1949 under the Occupation Statute, was endowed with only a limited measure of sovereignty. The Allied High Commission, which succeeded the military governors of the occupation regime, in effect controlled the Federal Republic's political and economic relations with other countries, and was invested with broad powers to regulate, or at least supervise, domestic political and economic developments. In particular, the High Commissioners were charged with ensuring that the political development of the new state would proceed along democratic lines.⁸⁸

For Adenauer and his supporters, the goal of political recovery meant, in its widest implications, the right to have foreign policy and the return of a democratic Germany to the society of free nations. More specifically, Adenauer aimed to include Germany as an equal and respected partner in a Western European Union, which would irrevocably tie the Federal Republic of Germany to the cultural and political traditions of Western Europe and forestall the recurrence of a Nazi, or any other, dictatorial regime.⁸⁹ The content and direction of West Germany's sociopolitical order was to be shaped by a close and permanent attachment to the cultural values of the Western democracies. The sovereignty that Adenauer sought to have restored to the West German state was thus of a rather special kind: he was willing to subsume some of its elements, once they were gained, to contractual agreements that would bind Germany to the West in integrative international structures. As a consequence,

⁸⁸Hanrieder, Wolfram F., *West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response*. Stanford University Press, California, 1967, p.49.

⁸⁹ Hanrieder, 50

he could advance his demands in the name of European integration and the Western Alliance, rather than in terms of a discredited German nationalism.⁹⁰

Adenauer's post war foreign policy was an encompassing existential experience for him, and for many of those who felt the consequences of that policy in their daily lives. Constrained as it was, their diplomacy became for the Germans a matter of immediate and practical importance, a glaring and constant demonstration of how their present and future security and welfare depended upon the outside world.

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Adenauer's version of the goal for political recovery could be achieved even with the curtailing of Germany's freedom of action. He was deeply skeptical about the political maturity and political circumspection of his compatriots because he was determined to tie West Germany to the West and thus be able to prevent his successors from following a policy of neutrality between East and West. Moreover, the pro Western course that the German government charted could count on the political assent and electoral support of the Federal Republic's citizens, in large part because Adenauer's policies promised rapid progress toward economic reconstruction as well as political rehabilitation. Although rearmament was not popular and was adamantly opposed by the Social Democrats*, it was widely perceived as a

⁹⁰ Hanrieder, 50

⁹¹ Hanrieder, Wolfram F., *The Foreign Policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-1989*. German Studies Review, Vol. 12, No. 2, (May, 1989) p.315.

* The Social Democratic Party of Germany abbreviated SPD, which stands for Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands is one of the oldest political parties of Germany still in existence and also one of the oldest and largest in the world, celebrating its 140th anniversary in 2003. Rooted in the workers' movement, it formerly was more explicitly socialist (and is still a member party of the Socialist International).

cornerstone of Adenauer's Western policy that enabled the Federal Republic to gain immediate political benefits.⁹²

Indeed, economic and political recovery were themselves highly complementary, and a weak West German economy would have been a liability for the Western alliance that would undermine political stability and open up opportunities for Soviet maneuvers in West Germany. Because of the integrated features of the Western alliance, the faltering of one partner in the alliance would have weakened the power of all three of the major powers. The tensions that were mounting during the first phases of the cold war had created an atmosphere in the West that was more generally in sympathy with West German aspirations to restore a viable economy.⁹³

By 1955, when the Federal Republic of Germany joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bonn's Western policies had proven remarkably successful. West Germany, under Adenauer, had achieved an astonishing economic revival; Bonn's political leverage within the Western alliance had increased enormously since 1949. As another outcome of these successes, the Western powers legally committed to support the cause of German reunification.

⁹² Hanrieder, 316

⁹³ Hanrieder, 317

CHAPTER IX

ADENAUER AND WEST GERMAN ENTRANCE INTO THE NORTH AMERICAN TREATY ORGANIZATION

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO, sometimes called the North Atlantic Alliance, Atlantic Alliance, or the Western Alliance, is an international organization for defense collaboration established in 1949 in support of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington D.C. on April 4, 1949 by the founding countries of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1966, France withdrew from the integrated command of NATO and all NATO forces left France. NATO headquarters are located in Brussels, Belgium.

The core of the treaty is Article V, which states:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. Consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. ^{*94}

* This provision was intended so that if the USSR and its allies launched an attack against any of the NATO members, it would be treated as if it was an attack on all member states. This marked a significant change for the United States, which had traditionally favored isolationist policies. However, the feared

The first clear-cut indications that the Western powers expected the Federal Republic of West Germany to contribute to the Western defense effort were soon forthcoming. In September of 1950, the Western powers announced their decision to end the formal state of war with Germany. The Allies agreed to reinforce their troops in West Germany, and encourage the establishment of German mobile police units to be available to the Federal Government in emergency cases. The creation of a separate, national German army was regarded as undesirable, but plans to incorporate German units in the lower echelons of an integrated European army were being formulated.⁹⁵ At the same time, the NATO council decided to accelerate the defense measures spelled out in the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949, and instructed the NATO Defense Committee to draw up plans for the efficient and speedy inclusion of West German contingents in a Western defense establishment.

The occupying powers agreed there was a German problem and that had to be managed. Indeed, one of the American reasons for sponsoring the North American Pact was the conviction that NATO would be beneficial in this respect. For the United States one of the most important functions of NATO included its role in

invasion of Western Europe never came. Instead, the provision was invoked for the first time in the treaty's history on September 12, 2001, in response to the September 11 attacks on the United States the day before.

⁹⁴ North Atlantic Treaty charter. *Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949* The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

⁹⁵ Hanrieder, Wolfram F., *West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963. International Pressure and Domestic Response*. Stanford University Press, California, 1967, p. 39.

bringing Germany back into the fold.⁹⁶ Adenauer wanted a West German police force and gave the High Commissioners a memorandum to this effect at the end of June 1950, mentioning the danger of the East German force and the thirty Soviet divisions which he estimated were stationed in the DDR.* His interest in the possibility of German military collaboration with the occupying powers is traceable to late 1948, when at his request former General Hans Speidel* prepared a secret memorandum on what form the contribution might be offered. In late 1949 Adenauer in a highly publicized newspaper interview suggested that Germans should contribute to a European army, but was met with large domestic and international opposition.⁹⁷ It was reported early in 1950 that a group of German generals had given Adenauer a list of rearmament requirements, and by mid-1950 the Chancellor's readiness to commit the Federal Republic to an apparently unpopular course was clear.

Adenauer wrapped the rearmament ploy in a covering of other considerations, which he thought could be realized in conjunction with a revision of American policy. These included a firmer United States commitment to German defense; an assurance that the war planning would attempt to avoid making the territory of the Federal

⁹⁶McGeehan, Robert., *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense After World War II.*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago 1971, p. 13.

* Deutsche Demokratische Republik, otherwise known as East Germany GDR.

* Hans Speidel was born in Metzingen, Germany, on 28th October, 1897. Speidel remained on the Eastern Front until he was appointed as Chief of Staff to General Erwin Rommel in April 1944. After the suicide of Rommel he retained the post under Gunther von Kluge and Walther Model. It was later claimed that Speidel was credited in playing a major role in sabotaging Hitler's orders for the demolition of Paris. Speidel was held prisoner for seven months before escaping to Allied troops. When NATO was formed Speidel became commander of Allied Land Forces in Europe (April 1957 - September 1963). Hans Speidel died in 1984.

⁹⁷McGeehan, Robert., *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense After World War II.* p.19.

Republic a battleground; and a rapid return of German sovereignty.⁹⁸ One way of pursuing these objectives was by offering a German contribution to Western defense; rearmament was a way of forming a link with the Western allies which would commit them to defend Germany in case of a war the Soviet Union, and it was a way to move toward political sovereignty with Germans not serving as mercenaries.⁹⁹

Before the Korean War, the overall assumptions of Germany rearming or even becoming a part of the Western Alliance were few and far between. However the Korean War was the catalyst that would send Germany on a trajectory towards Membership in the Western Alliance and ultimately its own sovereignty. On December 18 and 19 of 1950 the NATO Council and the defense committee had met in Brussels and announced agreements on several important matters. An integrated NATO force was, however, to be the last to be established. General Eisenhower was to then be appointed by President Truman as Supreme Commander at the request of the council, and a production board was to oversee the utilization of Europe's economic resources for defense.¹⁰⁰

At the conclusion of the Brussels' Meeting in December 1950, a lasting significance was left behind. For one reason the German rearmament question was not agreed upon, because the United States, in deciding to allow the ingredients of the original package proposal to be separated, withdrew its ultimatum that German rearmament had to be agreed to if the other elements were to be forthcoming, and thereby took the step which meant that NATO could be properly launched for the

⁹⁸ McGeehan, 20

⁹⁹ McGeehan, 20

¹⁰⁰ McGeehan, 87

West Germans.¹⁰¹ A NATO agreement had been more important all along than that of an integrated force under a single commander be established and push the Federal Republic, a defeated, politically occupied, and psychologically ambivalent country, into raising troops.

The Brussels Meeting may be seen as an end to a period, which witnessed the manifestation of virtually all the interrelated and overlapping aspects of the German rearmament question. It also marked the conclusion of the period of American inflexibility. France's position in turn became very problematic in the following years because of the Eisenhower Administration impatience with the vagaries of the Fourth Republic's domestic politics, and because at this time Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Adenauer concurred on methods of dealing with the Soviet Union. At the current time, the most important factor in the shifting power relationships within the Western Alliance was the growing importance of West Germany for the defense posture of the West. The gradually widening role that NATO planner assigned to West German military contingents provided Bonn with a bargaining lever of increasing effectiveness although there was not yet a single West German soldier under arms.¹⁰²

By 1954 NATO had approximately fifteen divisions under arms, and considerable progress had been made in planning and constructing an elaborate infrastructure of communications networks, fuel pipelines, port facilities, supply lines, and headquarters installations. The teamwork developed in joint maneuvers

¹⁰¹ McGeehan.90

¹⁰² Hanrieder, Wolfram F., *West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963. International Pressure and Domestic Response*. 41

and joint planning, coupled with the physical apparatus of a coordinated infrastructure, had transformed NATO from a traditional military alliance into an integrated coalition army.¹⁰³

The dual purpose of NATO planning, which prepared for the contingency of defense and simultaneously tried to sustain the credibility of nuclear deterrence, met with cautious official response in the capital city of Bonn. The concept of mobile strategy and elastic defense had already stirred up a lively debate in the German press and among German military experts because it appeared to accept the possibility that an attacker would penetrate deeply into West German territory; this would subject West Germany to being the first to be overrun and the first to be liberated. But whatever misgivings Government circles may have entertained in private, the political and contractual commitments that had already been made, and the attendant reward of sovereignty, hardly allowed a reversal or even a public reappraisal of the Government's rearmament policy.¹⁰⁴ In March 1955, Adenauer flatly argued that only membership in NATO could obviate the possibility that the Federal Republic would become a battlefield in a hot war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The White House announced on March 10, 1955, that the following message had been sent by President Eisenhower to the Prime Ministers of the seven nations signatory to the protocols establishing the Western European Union Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

¹⁰³ Hanrieder, 43

¹⁰⁴ Hanrieder, 45

At London on September 29, 1954, the United States Secretary of State in order to facilitate efforts to produce an effective collective defense of Western Europe, indicated the conditions under which the United States might be prepared to make a policy declaration similar to that which was announced when the earlier European Defense Community plan was under consideration.(3) I am glad to affirm that when the Paris Agreements have been ratified and have come into force, it will be the policy of the United States:

(1) To continue active in the various organic arrangements established under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to consult with other members of NATO on questions of mutual concern, including the level of forces from the respective NATO countries to be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe

(2) To consult, if so desired, with the Agency for the Control of Armaments of the Western European Union with a view to assisting in the achievement of its objective of controlling armament and preventing unjustified military preparations within the members of the Union

(3) To continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area while a threat to that area exists, and will continue to deploy such forces in accordance with agreed North Atlantic strategy for the defense of this area;

(4) To cooperate in developing the closest possible integration among the forces assigned to NATO in Western Europe, including those contributed by the German Federal Republic, in accordance with approved plans developed by the military agencies and the Supreme Commanders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in accordance with the Resolution adopted by the North Atlantic Council on October 22, 1954;

(5) To continue to cooperate toward Atlantic Security by sharing information authorized by Congress with respect to the military

utilization of new weapons and techniques for the improvement of the collective defense;

(6) In consonance with its policy of encouraging maximum cooperation among the free nations of Europe and in recognition of the contribution which the Brussels Treaty, as amended, will make to peace and stability in Europe, to regard any action from whatever quarter which threatens the integrity or unity of the Western European Union as a threat to the security of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty calling for consultation in accordance with Article IV of that Treaty.

In accordance with the basic interest of the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty, as expressed at the time of ratification, the Treaty was regarded as of indefinite duration rather than for any definite number of years. The United States calls attention to the fact that for it to cease to be a party to the North Atlantic Treaty would appear quite contrary to our security interests when there is established on the Continent of Europe the solid core of unity which the Paris Agreements will provide.¹⁰⁵

On May 5th 1955, West Germany, became a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with full rights to its own sovereignty as well as being considered an equal amongst the free societies of the Western countries.

¹⁰⁵ Eisenhower, Dwight D , *Statement by the President of United States Policy Respecting the Western European Union, March 10, 1955(1)*., Government Printing Office, 1957. American Foreign Policy 1950-1955 Basic Documents, vol. 1. Complete Document.

CHAPTER X

THE END OF AN ERA

The central dilemma of Adenauer's foreign policy in the latter parts of the 1950s to the early 1960s was one that saw the necessity of making difficult choices between Washington D.C. and Paris, choosing between Bonn's security interests and its desire to construct a viable European community by navigating through President John F. Kennedy's transatlantic Grand Design and Charles DeGaulle's design for a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.¹⁰⁶

As the year 1961 approached, Adenauer was very ill and questions were beginning to circulate about his age and whether or not he could continue to serve as Chancellor, let alone be able to stand the strain of the Federal elections that were due to be held in September of 1961. However, there was going to be a new strain on the aging Chancellor, which was the inauguration of a new generation President in the United States. With the election of John F. Kennedy political circles in West Germany began to wonder if Adenauer was truly drifting toward the end of his career.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶Hanrieder, Wolfram F., *The Foreign Policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-1989*. 320.

¹⁰⁷Williams, Charles., *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*. p. 485

John F. Kennedy's diplomacy symbolized a fundamental shift in personalities, style of government, and basic objectives which critically affected the German-American alliance. Two events, the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and its aftermath and the Franco-German Treaty of 1963, help to illustrate the relationship and to clarify if, in fact, tension and mistrust characterized the Adenauer-Kennedy era. Before John F. Kennedy assumed the American Presidency, his foreign policy interests did not include any extensive analysis of post war Germany. In 1951, he visited the Federal Republic, but concluded that the SPD's Kurt Schumacher*, not Adenauer, was the, "strongest political figure in Germany,"¹⁰⁸ since he greatly admired the logic of Schumacher's arguments. By 1957, Senator Kennedy wrote, "that the age of Adenauer was over."¹⁰⁹ Kennedy also rejected Adenauer as a relic of the Cold War, whose links to the Eisenhower administration's anticommunist foreign policy were not in keeping with the idea of diplomatic flexibility, which Kennedy reflected as his foreign policy priorities.¹¹⁰ This show of emotion and non reverence could be seen clearly when the first meeting between Adenauer and the young President took place on April 14, 1961.

With statuesque mein, and betraying no emotion, Adenauer listened as John F. Kennedy bid him a flattering good-bye. Nor did the earnestness leave the Chancellor's eyes when the President of the United States before the television company microphone called him, "a friend, a great European and an outstanding leader." Kennedy voiced the words without much reverence or warmth, in

* Dr Kurt Schumacher (13 October 1895 - 20 August 1952), was the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Germany in the early years of the German Federal Republic.

¹⁰⁸ Mayer, Frank A., Adenauer and Kennedy: An Era of Distrust In German-American Relations?, German Studies Review, Vol.17, No.1 (Feb., 1994), p. 83.

¹⁰⁹ Mayer, 83

¹¹⁰ Mayer, 83

the smooth routine manner of a head of a corporation who is paying high homage to a worthy company jubilarian. He made no effort to bring the Chancellor up to his side, but let him tag along one step behind. Without giving up his grim and stern composure, Adenauer finally put out his hand which Kennedy let go after a perfunctory squeeze, leaving the fingers of the Chancellor's hand for a second dangling loose in the air.¹¹¹

In wider terms neither Washington nor Paris pursued foreign policy programs that were compatible with German interests, which was ultimately forcing Bonn to choose from two alternatives that were intrinsically flawed. Opting for Washington meant supporting a strategic posture that the German government no longer viewed as fully serving German security interests; and opting for Paris meant supporting a European order that fell far short of Bonn's preferences. Moreover, neither Washington nor Paris pursued Eastern policies that satisfied Bonn and that could have allayed Bonn's suspicions that its allies had lost interest in resolving the issue of Germany's division.¹¹²

Although the security of the Federal Republic in the 1960s depended as much on the United States as it had in the 1950s, it was subject to increasing strains. During the 1960s, as American nuclear superiority began to diminish with the development of Soviet nuclear strategic capabilities, an intense doctrinal debate took place within NATO that revolved around the question of how the credibility of the American nuclear commitment to Western Europe could be sustained now that the United States was gradually becoming vulnerable itself.¹¹³ From the German

¹¹¹Kempski, Hans Ulrich, *Medium Temperatures in Washington*, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, April 15, 1961. The Library of Congress, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, box 90.

¹¹²Hanrieder, Wolfram F., *The Foreign Policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-1989*. 320.

¹¹³Hanrieder, 321

perspective, American diplomacy was becoming too conservative and French diplomacy too innovative. Washington's European policy in the 1960s was too conservative in the sense that it seemed to favor a legitimization of the European status quo. The Kennedy administration had revamped the NATO strategy despite German misgivings, showed little resolve during the Berlin crisis of 1961, and apparently accommodating the Soviet Union in Europe even at the expense of German interests. The possibility that the United States would assent to legitimizing the division of Europe and Germany, which was the central foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the 1960s, was a nightmare for Adenauer and his successors.¹¹⁴ It was during these few years of the Kennedy administration and the Johnson Administration that would ultimately lead Adenauer to step down from his career in politics forever.

On October 27, 1958, Walter Ulbricht*, the deputy Prime Minister (but in practice leader) of the German Democratic Republic, made a speech claiming that the whole of Berlin was within the territory of East Germany. On November 10th Khrushchev* announced that all Soviet rights and duties in Berlin would be turned over to the GDR, and that all Allied troops should be withdrawn from Berlin. The next day Khrushchev sent a letter to Washington demanding that the four power status of Berlin be reworked or a separate treaty with the East German government would be made. However, when the same letter arrived in the other Western capitals,

¹¹⁴ Hanrieder.324

* Walter Ulbricht (June 30, 1893 – August 1, 1973) was a German communist politician. As First Secretary of the Socialist Unity Party from 1950 to 1971, he held the most influential role in the early existence of East Germany (the German Democratic Republic).

* Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchov (Khrushchev), April 17, 1894 – September 11, 1971) was the leader of the Soviet Union after the death of Joseph Stalin. He was First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1964 and Chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1958 to 1964.

Adenauer was in a bit of a panic. Adenauer's worries came from the fact that he had just met with DeGaulle, and worried that the French, who were preoccupied in Algeria, would not want to confront the Soviets. He knew that the Americans would step up to keep the status quo in Berlin, because the Kennedy administration was adamant in their Detente policies, so now he just needed reassurance from the British. London quickly replied that Britain, too, was going to insist on the status quo in Berlin, Adenauer was relieved, and so were the German people, he said. However, in a time of crisis, Adenauer felt that he did not have the authority to conduct his country's affairs in the way that he would have liked, and it irked him badly that it always seemed to be a matter of appealing to one ally or another.¹¹⁵

During the Berlin crisis from 1958-1961, the first half of which occurred under the Eisenhower administration, Ike himself feared an anti-American and pro-Neutrality backlash in Western Germany if he publicly forced Adenauer to accept a new international status for West Berlin. In the meantime the West German government sought to win more time, because its government saw Berlin as the symbol for its claim for unification. When Khrushchev issued his second ultimatum in June of 1961, President Kennedy opened a new avenue to a quick end of the confrontation by giving his unequivocal support for the freedom of West Berlin, but he also indicated his willingness to grant East Germany its de facto recognition.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁵ Williams, Charles., *Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany*. p. 464

¹¹⁶ Mayer, Frank A., *Adenauer and Kennedy: A Study in German-American Relations, 1961-1963*.
p 43

In August 1961, headlines in the German newspapers were reading, “Der Westen tut nichts”^{*} and they were capturing the German sense of, fear, frustration, and demoralization surrounding the most traumatic event of the Federal Republic’s twelve year history. This was all happening during the 1961 elections when every candidate had something to say about the lack of resolve on the part of the Western Allies.

The chancellor had long held that there was no use in negotiating for the mere sake of hearing yourself talk. You must first agree about the principle objectives of our negotiations. His realism led him to conclude that Soviet policy in Europe would not respond to Kennedy’s new initiatives, as its diplomacy was, by nature, aggressive, its goal, domination. In a letter to the U.S. President, Adenauer explained:

In the centuries of the Czars, at least since Peter the Great, Russia was already aggressive and intent on constantly increasing its territory, especially towards the West. Unfortunately, the history of Russia during the last century is largely unknown in the world. One has to know it in order to follow the right policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.¹¹⁷

To Adenauer, the flexibility that Kennedy championed in his efforts to approach the Soviets was a mere illusion. However, the first conference between the two heads of state was dominated by a mutual attempt to avoid conflict. The chancellor wanted to “get along well with Kennedy,”¹¹⁸ and when Adenauer questioned American leadership in NATO, he was quick to add that this situation had

^{*} Der Westen tut nichts, German for the West does nothing, given in response to the Western Allies’ lack of countering the Berlin crisis in 1961, by the German newspapers.

¹¹⁷ Mayer, Frank A., Adenauer and Kennedy: An Era of Distrust In German-American Relations? 85.

¹¹⁸ Mayer, 86

also existed “under my friend Dulles.”¹¹⁹ Adenauer, at the same time, also assured Kennedy that the Federal Republic was prepared to do everything necessary for the joint cause of protecting Western interests in Berlin in light of the fact that the city was an allied responsibility, however, if the allies, in general, and the Americans in particular wanted Bonn’s input, it would be necessary for the three Western Powers to work out jointly with the Federal Republic a program for action to be taken in a number of specifically designated contingencies.¹²⁰ John F. Kennedy did not oppose such an inclusion in the ambassadorial group, but he did not make it an allied priority for almost five months would pass before Bonn became part of the contingency planning process.

Such was the dialogue between the two leaders. Adenauer wanted to create a more cohesive NATO before the Americans began disarmament talks with the Soviets, but Kennedy wanted to undertake both simultaneously. Adenauer sought the United States for support for a reunified Germany with Berlin as its capital, but the U.S. President only spoke of defending the freedom of the residents of West Berlin. There was no real meeting of the minds on such a crucial issue as the actual plans to defend Berlin since Kennedy did not discuss or debate his perceptions of Germany with Adenauer.¹²¹

The Americans were caught by surprise on August 13 1961, when the communists sealed off the Eastern sector of Berlin. It took the American government twelve hours to issue a statement about the event, and the Allies three days to produce

¹¹⁹ Mayer, 86

¹²⁰ Mayer, 87

¹²¹ Mayer, 87

a protest note. Adenauer had already sent his protest to the German people concerning their indecisive allies.

After the Berlin Wall began to go up....absolutely nothing yet happened... even though the Russians had broken their treaties and erected the wall, the Americans put up with it....The Americans even tried to tell us that it was a good thing because the flow of refugees was stopped.¹²²

By the May 7, 1962, Adenauer publicly questioned Kennedy's efforts to negotiate with the Russians over Berlin. Kennedy, was unable to find an acceptable basis for agreement with Moscow, which never abandoned its demand that the Western garrisons be withdrawn from Berlin. The New Frontier, as it was being called now, had soured the German-American relationship because of the critical reports on the direction of U.S. policy toward the Federal Republic. Adenauer's policy toward France and its President Charles DeGaulle came to be seen in Washington as a movement away from alliance solidarity, one that questioned America's leadership role in Europe. The New Frontier did not sympathize with the objectives of Adenauer's foreign policy: reunification, non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic, or the Franco-German Treaty.¹²³ The German Chancellor then drew his own conclusions that Kennedy and his government would compromise German interests. Thus the German-American relationship experienced an era of diplomatic discord, produced by policies and personalities that failed to comprehend each other's priorities, and created undercurrents of doubt and distrust.

¹²² Mayer, 88

¹²³ Mayer, 98

Not many people know that one of Konrad Adenauer's favorite people in America was a senator, Vice President, and also the President of the United States. The relationship between Adenauer and Lyndon Baines Johnson was something of an odd couple. Both men were rough and frequently unscrupulous politicians and neither spoke a word of the others' language. Most of the correspondence between the two occurred while Johnson was Vice President under Kennedy. However, Adenauer considered Johnson to be "almost European"¹²⁴ because the Texan was not of Kennedy's the new generation.

¹²⁴ Williams, Charles., Adenauer : The Father of the New Germany, p. 491

CHAPTER XI

SCANDAL

By the end of 1962, Adenauer, along with many other top ministry officials were involved with what soon became the “Spiegel Affair.” The magazine called *Der Spiegel* is a weekly publication, which during the Adenauer era performed the useful function of forcing public attention on issues, and scandals, which politicians preferred to keep wrapped up. Besides being frequently critical of Adenauer himself, it had on several occasions spotlighted actions by Defense minister Franz Josef Strauss of distinctly questionable propriety, although he afterwards explained them to the satisfaction of the Bundestag majority. They included a report that, on one of the crucial nights of the Cuban Missile crisis, the Minister of Defense had been drunk. At almost the same time *Der Spiegel* published an article on the position of the Bundeswehr in NATO which not only contained privately-obtained information as to future defense plans but claimed that at the Minister's instigation so much attention had been given to the use of tactical nuclear weapons as to impair the efficiency of conventional training.¹²⁵

About two weeks later police raided the office of *Der Spiegel* and the homes of some of its senior staff, on the pretext that there had been a leakage of vital defense secrets.

¹²⁵ Hiscocks, Richard. The Adenauer Era. J.B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia/New York, 1966, p. 242.

In the subsequent controversy both Adenauer and Strauss at first attempted to minimize their parts, only to have it demonstrated that they both had told lies to the Bundestag. Adenauer's first expedient was to dismiss the two senior officials who had done as they were told but this did not suffice to stop the FDP Ministers from resigning. Before they returned, the Cabinet had to be reconstructed, Strauss had to resign and the Chancellor had to confirm his intention of retiring in 1963.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ Hiscocks, 243

CHAPTER XII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It is a subject of continuing fascination to imagine what direction the Federal Republic of Germany might have taken if the dominating figure of Konrad Adenauer had not become chancellor in 1949. A strong streak of arbitrary authoritarianism, if not megalomania, was indeed the great flaw in his political style. He was not only a born autocrat, but had become cynical in his view of human nature. He was deeply convinced that his foreign policy was the only correct one for Western Germany. He was also sure that a victory by the Socialist opposition, which opposed his foreign policy, or increased strength of the FDP, which was an unreliable coalition partner on foreign policy questions, must be avoided at any price. For that reason he did not hesitate to use the most questionable means ranging from character assassination to intimidation-in order to maintain himself and the CDU in power.

Men are associated with times of fundamental political change have made Max Weber's category of the charismatic leader a beguiling source of explanation for the authority of leaders who appear in abnormal times. To Weber, legitimate, rational, and traditional authority is clearly dependent on the existence of political continuity, while charismatic authority is an attribute of the relationship between a leader and his following.

The frequent association of memorable political leaders with formative political events is the source of the classic dispute over whether great men make great events or whether the events are themselves the conditions of great leadership.¹

Over time, however, Adenauer determined that German sovereignty and security were being threatened by an unreliable and timid American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, especially at the end of the Eisenhower administration. He then joined those temperamentally continental and Francophile members of his party usually known as Gaullists, who saw in de Gaulle's return to power in 1958 the chance to move the Federal Republic away from over reliance on the United States. As Adenauer began rejecting American diplomatic initiatives, he offended and frightened those in his party that wanted to stay loyal to and tied to the United States.

Although Adenauer had had one thing going for him that no other chancellor has had since him, that of being the first chancellor in Germany to enjoy the support of a majority party in parliament, the support of his own party was now slipping away*. The Der Spiegel affair, the vacillation between a strong alliance with the United States versus Europe, and the cold war policies of the Soviet Bloc, simply became overwhelming. Adenauer was now 87 years old, and had been a part of shaping German politics for parts of six decades. There is no question that regardless of his age, German sovereignty and German acceptance as an equal on the European continent would be equal goals to sustain his country in the years to come. His embrace of Western ideals of self-government was

¹G.R. Boynton and Gerhard Loewenberg, The Evolution of Public Perceptions of Adenauer as a Historic Leader: Test of a Mathematical Model of Attitude Change. *Social Science History*, Vol.1, No. 1, (Fall 1976), p. 79-100.

* In 1950 he won the only single party election in free Germany, a feat which has never been repeated.

not something forced upon him, they were in fact ideals for a successful community. To his credit, Adenauer, through great personal effort and dedication achieved those goals for his country. His only weakness may have been his failure to mentor others to maintain and perpetuate those goals in the late 1950s after the approval of the Allied Powers, and in particular of the French to allow Germany to stand alone as a democratic society. It has been said, that the greatest of leaders know best not only when to lead, but also when to step aside and allow others to share the glory. Adenauer as a result may have fallen just short of that greatness, and yet he left behind a nation destined to achieve higher goals, the highest being that of formal unification with Berlin and Eastern Germany.

APPENDIX

Konrad Adenauer was born 5 Jan 1876, Cologne, German Reich

15 Sep 1949, elected, 3rd session of the first Bundestag, Ersatzplenarsaal, Bundeshaus (former Pädagogische Akademie), Bonn

15 Sep 1949, appointed, decree of the Bundespräsident (Federal President)

20 Sep 1949, oath of office taken, 5th session of the first Bundestag, Ersatzplenarsaal, Bundeshaus (former Pädagogische Akademie), Bonn

9 Oct 1953, elected, 2nd session of the second Bundestag, Plenarsaal, Bundeshaus, Bonn

13 Oct 1953, appointed, decree of the Bundespräsident (Federal President)

20 Oct 1953, oath of office taken, 3rd session of the second Bundestag, Plenarsaal, Bundeshaus, Bonn

22 Oct 1957, elected, 2nd session of the third Bundestag, Plenarsaal, Bundeshaus, Bonn

7 Nov 1961, elected, 2nd session of the fourth Bundestag, Plenarsaal, Bundeshaus, Bonn

15 Oct 1963, discharged (expiration of term set at 24:00 15 Oct 1963), decree of the Bundespräsident (Federal President) acting on the letter of resignation dated 10 Oct 1963

He died 19 Apr 1967, Rhöndorf near Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany

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VITA

Phillip Reavis was born in Joplin, Missouri, on October 3, 1979, the son of James L. Reavis Jr. and Phyllis Ann Reavis. After completing his work at Humble High School, in Humble, Texas in 1998, he went to the Gymnasium Bad Nenndorf in Bad Nenndorf, Germany for the next year and a half. In 1999 he entered Texas State University-San Marcos. During the summer of 2002 he also attended the Freie Universitaet in Berlin, Germany where he worked further on his International Relations Skills. He received the degrees of Bachelor of Arts in both International Studies and German from Texas State University-San Marcos in 2004. During the following year he was employed by the Department of State where he worked as an intern for the American Consulate in Munich, Germany. In June 2004, he entered the Graduate College of Texas State University-San Marcos. During the following year he was employed by the Department of State where he worked as an intern for the American Consulate in Munich, Germany.

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