

**COMMUNISM IN ROMANIA: A  
COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION  
OF THE GHEORGHIU-DEJ  
REGIME AND THE CEAUSESCU  
RULE**

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of  
Southwest Texas State University  
in Partial Fulfillment of  
the Requirements

For the Degree

Master of ARTS

By

Anne-Marie Wulff Laustsen, B.A.

San Marcos, Texas  
May 2002

COPYRIGHT

by

Anne-Marie Wulff Laustsen

2002

*For my parents*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My gratitude goes out to those who helped me through the process of completing this thesis.

Thank you to the faculty, colleagues, and fellow students at SWT. A special ‘thank you’ to the members of my committee: Dr. Arny Leder, Dr. Chris Frost, and especially to Dr. Ted Hindson for his guidance and support.

I’d also like to thank my friends for listening to my ideas, providing feedback and technical support, and putting up with me when stress and annoyances got the best of me: Jessica Smith, Gerard Perches, Alex Hernandez, Carlos Garcia, Nancy Safavi, Christine Hensley, Melinda Packman, and Andrew Perez. I apologize to those I left out.

Last, but definitely not least, my greatest appreciation to Ben Harcrow for ensuring that I stayed focused, and most importantly, for his everlasting supply of love and encouragement.

Thank you!

Thesis submitted on April 11, 2002

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .....	viii
----------------------	------

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS .....	ix
-----------------------------	----

### CHAPTER

I.	Introduction.....	1
II.	The Rise of Communism in Romania.....	3
III.	Gheorghiu-Dej and the Foundation for Romania's Foreign Policy.....	12
IV.	Romania's Resources and Gheorghiu-Dej's use of Intelligence .....	22
V.	The Gheorghiu-Dej Leadership .....	29
VI.	Ceausescu: Dissenting from the USSR.....	38
VII.	Oh Romanian! Paying her Debt.....	52
VIII.	The Cult of Ceausescu .....	62
IX.	Gheorghiu-Dej versus Ceausescu .....	77
X.	Postscript: Romania after the Revolution.....	82
XI.	Conclusion: The Future of Romania .....	103

### APPENDICES

A.	Romanian Communist Party Leadership .....	106
B.	Transcript of the Trial of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu .....	107
C.	Letter from Ceausescu to Reagan, February 12, 1988 .....	118

BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	120
--------------------	-----

## TABLES

	Page
TABLE	
1. Romania Foreign Trade by Area, 1965-1980 .....	54
2. Romanian Oil Production, 1975-1983.....	56
3. Contrasts between Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu .....	78
4. Romanian Inflation Rate, 1993-1998 .....	95

## ILLUSTRATIONS

	Page
FIGURE	
1. Soviet Share of Romanian Foreign Trade, 1958-1960 .....	25
2. Exchange Rate: Romanian Lei vs. U.S. Dollar .....	96

## **CHAPTER I**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Romania is a unique country. Her history, her culture, her people are like that of no other country in the region, or in the world for that matter. No country compares to Romania in her rich cultural heritage and natural resources. Her history is filled with tragic events, romantic fairytales, vampires, and other creatures of the night. She has experienced one colorful century after another, though none quite like the Twentieth. The Twentieth Century was eventful for Romania. For the first time, all Romanian people were united under the Kingdom of Romania. The Twentieth Century also brought her into two world wars, out of which the second ended her short-lived Kingdom and installed a communist regime. Even as a communist country, Romania was like no other communist country. She was independent, the maverick of the East-bloc. In the rest of the East-bloc, the Soviet leadership installed Moscovites to head up the Communist Party, whereas in Romania, the home communists took power. Other Communist leaders viewed her as never being able to be a “proper” Communist country - Romania, in fact, was distinctive. She later did become a “proper” Communist country and experienced one of the most bizarre regimes the world has seen. When the late 1980s brought a wave of changes to Eastern Europe, Romania experienced the bloodiest revolution of all. Once

again, Romania is like no one else. In the years to come after the fall of Communism, it seems the problems experienced in Romania are unique to her.

When the Communists came to power in 1947, they came with the intent to stay. Although their leadership has long been overthrown, the effects of the Communists are still seen in Romania today, more than a decade after the last Communist was overthrown. What the Communists have left the Romanians with is a sense of “sameness,” a sense of “the more things change, the more they remain the same.” Romania is struggling to overcome the years suffered under Communism. However, the rewriting of history by the Communists has diminished the spirit of uniqueness so characteristic of Romania. Romania has become a unique country isolated by her own uniqueness, but incapable of escaping the legacy left by the communists. Her internal problems seem to be devastating to the point of no solution. In that, the effects of Communism in Romania have long outlived the people who brought it to Romania in 1947.

## CHAPTER II

### THE RISE OF COMMUNISM IN ROMANIA

“As in most East European countries, communism came to Romania with the Red Army” (Georgescu, 1985, p. 1). Initially, there was great hostility between Romania and the Red Army. Aside from a small underground movement of maybe 1,000 communist, Romania viewed the USSR as the enemy. In 1944, however, Romania barely avoided an invasion from the Soviets and created a friendlier atmosphere between them and the Soviets. During the first years of World War II, Romania’s government had been under the dictatorship of Marshal Ion Antonescu, whose pro-German policies had taken a heavy toll on Romania and left Romania in a position with a hostile Red Army approaching. On August 23, 1944, the Marshal was ousted and a pro-Soviet leadership installed. Many players took part in the coup in 1944, King Michael I played a key role, and the Communist Party took part as well.

Exactly how big a role the Communist had is uncertain. “More than forty years of myth-making have obscured exactly what role the Communists played in the *coup* against Antonescu on 23 August 1944” (Almond, 1992, p. 47). The Communist leadership to come became notorious for rewriting history, and both Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceausescu would later take complete credit for the overthrow of Antonescu. King Michael and others involved have diminished the role of the Communists. “Even in

exile, their defeated rivals had every reason to play down the Communists' part, just as [Gheorghiu-]Dej and then Ceausescu wrote and re-wrote the glorious history of their own role in the overthrow of the dictator" (Almond, 1992, p. 47).

While it is not certain how important the Romanian Communists were in the ousting of Antonescu, it is certain that they took the lead in the new government and would change Romania in the years to come, putting the Romanian people under one of the harshest communist regimes. At the end of the war, Romania was left with few friends. Antonescu had sided with Nazi Germany; under his regime, the Romanians were infamous for their destruction of the Jews. It has been said that not even the Nazis themselves could rival the brutality that the Jews suffered in Romania under Antonescu, and that the Romanians had been as efficient as the Germans, they would have been successful at completely annihilating all Romanian Jews. Antonescu's pro-German stands had left Romania with absolutely no allies in the West. To make matters worse, he had declared war on the Soviet Union, leaving Romania squeezed from both sides.

Even after Antonescu was overthrown and Romania switched sides, Moscow was still uncertain of Romania's loyalty. As a result, those Moscow could count on, the Communists, were put in power in the new Romania. King Michael was briefly allowed a small role, but was eventually forced to abdicate and was exiled in Switzerland. In the early years, Communism in Romania faced much turmoil. At the time when Antonescu was overthrown, the party counted merely 1,000 members, many of whom were in prison. To complicate matters for the communists, they had been greatly persecuted under Antonescu. Many of them had been imprisoned by him for their anti-Romanian activities, although that was not completely negative for the party. "Antonescu's decision

to lock up the Romanian Communists together merely provided the Party's leaders with the opportunity to indoctrinate their less well-trained followers at leisure and to plan the Party's future strategy" (Almond, 1992, p. 37). It was also while in prison that future leader, Ceausescu, would meet his mentor, Gheorghiu-Dej. The imprisonment under Antonescu actually served as a networking opportunity for the Communists.

It had not been difficult for Antonescu to charge the Romanian Communists with anti-Romanian activities. Initially, the Romanian Communists were faced with a difficult task of establishing themselves. The party was not very popular among the general population, perhaps because of its minority membership. "The Communist Party was the party of disgruntled minorities *par excellence*: it was disproportionately composed of Hungarians, Germans, Ukrainians, and Jews" (Almond, 1992, p. 32). In anti-Semitic Romania, a party associated with Jews and other non-Romanians had a hard time gaining popularity with the people and establishing a legitimate power base. The make-up of the membership not only made it hard for the party to generate public support, it also left it vulnerable to attacks. Because of the large number of "non-Romanians" in the Romanian Communist Party, it was easy for its opposition to charge it as an anti-Romanian conspiracy, a charge the Communists were often faced with. The Party was well aware that it needed Romanian members in order to survive. The Communists "...welcomed any pure Romanian recruit with open arms. Nicolae Ceausescu was a godsend to them" (Almond, 1992, p. 33). This also was an important factor in having Gheorghiu-Dej in a leadership position: he was one of the few pure Romanians in the party who was qualified.

A party in such distress obviously did not take power on their own in 1944, although, later Communist propaganda claimed that they did. They relied heavily on the Soviets to get in power, stay in power, and legitimize their rule. As a result, in the early post-war years in Romania, the leadership was very much dominated by Moscow. The Soviet leadership added more difficulties to the already fragmented Communist Party in Romania. Power struggles and tensions existed among the Romanian Communists and Moscow did its part to further the gap, by making it obvious that it had its own favorites.

The first post-Antonescu government in Romania was a coalition government under Nicolae Radescu, appointed by King Michael in December 1944. The Communists were given a small role in the government, but did not hold any positions of power. This first government was fragmented and unable to dampen the growing dissent among the Communists. "A week or so after being sworn in, it became quite clear that the government was barely in control" (Giurescu, 1994, p. 18). At this time, much infighting was going on in the Romanian government and the Communists were causing the tension by constantly attacking the traditional parties. King Michael warned the Soviet Vice-deputy minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrey Vishinsky, "the Communist Party's activities may throw the country into anarchy" (Giurescu, 1994, p. 19).

Temporarily, the Communists ceased their attacks and the Soviets did not promote an immediate Communist takeover, probably because the gentleman's agreement between Churchill and Stalin in October the same year still "was not confirmed yet by facts so the Soviets presumably adopted a wait and see attitude" (Giurescu, 1994, p. 19). The agreement between Churchill and Stalin gave the Soviets ninety percent predominance in Romania, and it showed how little - at this point - the

West cared about Romania. King Michael and others had hoped things would turn out differently; that Churchill would come to their aid, not throw them to the Russians. However, as mentioned at this point, the West did not seem interested in Romania at all. For the time being, the Communists would keep a low profile, which lasted until February 1945.

During this time, the PCR was predominately split into two camps, the home Communists led by Gheorghiu-Dej and the Moscovites, led by Ana Pauker. Gheorghiu-Dej had emerged as the leader on the home front while still in prison in 1944, when the current secretary general of the party, Stefan Foris, was purged. "At a meeting in the Tirgu Jui prison hospital on April 4, 1944, it was decided to reorganize the leadership; Foris was to be dropped and Gheorghiu-Dej designated head of the party" (King, 1980, p. 43). The group led by Gheorghiu-Dej consisted mainly of ethnic Romanians, many of them prominent members of the party who had spent time in Romania's prisons. Pauker's Moscovite group consisted of the non-ethnic Romanians: the Hungarians, the Jews, the Ukrainians, and those who had avoided imprisonment in Romania by seeking exile in Moscow.

Pauker had been involved in the Communist movement since 1915 and had spent a lot of time in Moscow in exile. Her husband, Marcel Pauker, had been a devout Communist himself and was "a leader of Romanian Communism in the early 1920s" (Levy, 2001, p. 37); Marcel was eventually purged from the party and executed. Ana Pauker has sustained much criticism for staying in a party and continuing her loyalty to the same leadership that killed her husband. The fact is that although saddened by her husband's execution, at the time of his purge, they had been estranged for years and both

had children outside of the marriage. Pauker came to play an important role in the PCR. “Officially Romania’s Foreign Minister from 1947 to 1952 - the first woman in the modern world to ever hold such a post - Pauker was actually the unofficial head of Romania’s Communist Party immediately after the war and for a number of years was the country’s true behind-the-scenes leader” (Levy, 2001, p. 2). There was great rivalry between Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej. Gheorghiu-Dej seemed to be the legitimate leader amongst the home communists, but “the Russians considered [Pauker] the most important Communist in Romania” (Levy, 2001, p. 53). Pauker’s power and influence in the party was limited by her being a Jew, she fell into the category of the non-Romanian members of the Party.

The right time for a Communist takeover in Romania would come in February of 1945, when demonstrations against Radescu would be widespread. Gheorghiu-Dej has claimed to have orchestrated those demonstrations, while Pauker attempted to stay in the background. In response to the demonstrations, Radescu singled out Pauker in his attacks on the Communists and “branded her and the ethnic-Hungarian [Vasile] Luca ‘hyenas’ and ‘foreigners without God or country’” (Levy, 2001, p. 69). Pauker attempted to keep a low profile and just work behind the scenes, knowing her being a Jew might pose a threat to the Party. However, “...she quickly became known among Romanians and the foreign press as the Iron Lady of Romania, the omnipotent hand behind Communist demonstrations against the Radescu government in February 1945” (Levy, 2001, p. 69).

It would only be a matter of weeks from the February demonstrations before Radescu would fall. In March 1945, a Communist-led government was installed under the leadership of Petru Groza. Groza was handpicked by the Soviet leadership. After the

demonstrations in February and the political crisis growing in Romania, Vishinsky would pay a visit in Bucharest “and delivered an ultimatum to King Michael: dismiss Prime Minister Radescu and appoint Groza to the post or Vishinsky could not guarantee the continuance of Romania as an independent state” (King, 1980, p. 49). Groza was appointed and a new coalition formed. This new coalition, however, was seen as being pure bogus and both the United States and Great Britain, as well as King Michael protested its undemocratic nature. The Soviets, of course, put full support behind Groza, and when King Michael asked for his resignation in the summer of 1945, he did not listen.

The next few years were marked by unfair elections, whose legitimacy met protests from Great Britain, and the Groza government virtually removed any power that the opposition had. King Michael continually appealed to Great Britain and the United States for help, however, “[t]he signing of the allied peace treaty with Romania in February 1947 ended any moderating influence that the United States and Great Britain may have been able to exercise over the communist government” (King, 1980, p. 51). By mid-1947, the PCR had solidified its power and practically eliminated all opposition. The opposition parties were dissolved, banned, and their leaders imprisoned. “The final step in creating a monolithic regime was the forced abdication of King Michael on December 31, 1947, and the proclamation of the Romanian People’s Republic” (King, 1980, p. 51).

From the first day of 1948, Gheorghiu-Dej began to work towards a Romania under his complete control. Members of the former Groza government were condemned for “chauvinism, bourgeois nationalism, and economic sabotage” (Fischer-Galati, 1967, p. 36). Years of consolidating power were to come, until Gheorghiu-Dej successfully

became the sole ruler of Romania. The power struggle between Gheorghiu-Dej and Pauker ended when he purged her in 1952. She spent a few months in jail in early 1953, but her trial was cancelled after Stalin's death. When she was released from prison, she was put under house arrest under constant surveillance by the Securitate; in 1954, she was released from her house arrest and allowed to live with her daughter. She died on June 3, 1960 after years of a painful battle with cancer. "*The New York Times* reported her death some two weeks later, but the Romanian press ignored it completely" (Levy, 2001, p.225), probably under orders from Gheorghiu-Dej who did not want the memory of the Iron Lady to spark any new opposition to his rule. Gheorghiu-Dej had consolidated his power and kept the Romanians in a regime of terror, having rid the Party of Pauker he had rid it of any real opposition. He has been almost successful in rewriting history to diminish her role in the rise of the PCR and her name has been almost entirely erased from Romanian history, with the exception of whenever Gheorghiu-Dej needed a scapegoat. Any unsuccessful Communist policy in the 1940s has been blamed on Pauker and her name has been dragged through the mud. Even as she had been purged and fell ill, Gheorghiu-Dej kept an eye on her: "Immediately after her death, her nearby neighbors suddenly vanished and new families promptly replaced them - plainly indicating that the former had all been Securitate agents" (Levy, 2001, p. 225).

After years of party struggles, the PCR had become unified and would continue under the leadership of men who managed to abolish any opposition to their rule, in addition to win Romania's independence from the same Red Army that had been instrumental in putting the PCR in power. The Communist in Romania would never have assumed power if it had not been for the Soviet domination of Romania. Ironically, the

PCR would spend its future years, trying to establish itself as a legitimate party without Soviet influence.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **GHEORGHIU-DEJ AND THE FOUNDATION FOR ROMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

Foreign policy was a complex issue for Gheorghiu-Dej. He faced the task of balancing a certain sense of independence from Moscow with the fact that without the Soviets it is doubtful that he or the Communist party would be in power in Romania. Though, often attributed to Nicolae Ceausescu, Gheorghiu-Dej was responsible for Romania's independence from Moscow, or at least for the basis of what would take shape as an independent foreign policy. Gheorghiu-Dej laid the foundation for Romania's break with the USSR. After struggle and careful planning, Gheorghiu-Dej eventually succeeded.

Various events became significant in the Romania-USSR relationship. Now, as mentioned in the prologue, the Romanian Communist Party was very much a product of the USSR. The Soviet troops played a significant part in the overthrow of the Marshal Antonescu regime and in placing a Communist leadership in Romania. This does symbolize a somewhat positive relationship between the leaders of the two nations. It also meant that for starters, Gheorghiu-Dej had to be extremely careful in his moves in regards to the USSR. The people who had put him in power could easily remove him as well. Gheorghiu-Dej knew this. He made great use of his Foreign Minister, Ion

Gheorghe Maurer, who also was responsible for Gheorghiu-Dej's release from the Targu Jiu detention camp in 1944. Maurer, made Foreign Minister in 1957, was known for his diplomatic abilities and instinct. He earned his Foreign Minister post after a successful visit in Paris in 1956. "From then onwards he was closely associated with Gheorghiu-Dej's adoption of a foreign policy which was increasingly independent of the Soviet Union, while still retaining support of Moscow" (The Times (London), February 2000).

The Romanian quest for independence began with "a carefully concerted campaign of 'de-Sovietization' and 're-Romanianization' (M. Shafir, 1985, p. 48). Street names, which had been given Russian sounding names, were changed back to original Romanian names. By the end of the campaign, Russian had been eliminated "as a compulsory school subject" (Deletant, 1999, p. 287).

A major occurrence that Gheorghiu-Dej took advantage of was the revolts in Hungary in 1956, which began on October 23 and started out with massive protests in Budapest. "The Hungarian uprising allowed Gheorghiu-Dej to demonstrate amply his fidelity to the Soviet Union" (Deletant, 1999, p. 260). Gheorghiu-Dej used the Hungarian disturbance to better his own standing with the Soviets. "Romania was the Soviet Union's most active ally during the Hungarian crisis. Its support of the Soviet Union went beyond the political arena into the domain of practical assistance and open encouragement" (Deletant, 1999, pp.267-268). The Romanians strongly encouraged military intervention in Hungary, provided military backup to Soviet forces and allowed for military rule within her own territories. "On 30 October the Timișoara, Oradea and Iași regions were placed under military rule as Soviet troops based in Romania were concentrated on the frontier with Hungary" (Deletant, 1999, p. 262).

It has been said that “Gheorghiu-Dej was as anxious as Khrushchev to bring the Hungarians back into the socialist fold” (Deletant, 1999, p. 264), but why? This military encouragement stands in sharp contrast to the Romanian condemnation of the USSR intervention in Czechoslovakia twelve years later. The answer to why Romanians would encourage a use of force in Hungary and condemn the same act in Czechoslovakia is quite simple. In fact, it is simpler than just being due to differences in leadership of Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu, or due to changes occurring in policy during the decade that passed between the two incidents. The answer lies in the simple fact that the 1956 military action was against Hungary, Romania’s neighbor and longtime rival. Issues dealing with Hungary were very close to home, since instability in Hungary could easily cause instability in Romania amongst the Hungarian minorities. “They [the Romanians] had two main concerns: a successful revolt in Budapest against Communist rule might spread to the two-million strong Hungarian community in Transylvania, thus sparking an anti-Communist rising in Romania; and a non-Communist Hungary might lay claim to parts of Transylvania” (Deletant, 1999, p. 263).

The Soviets moved quickly and replaced the Imre Nagy leadership with that of János Kádár in Hungary. Gheorghiu-Dej immediately congratulated the new Hungarian government; he was also among the first foreign leaders to pay a visit in Budapest in recognition of the new leadership and approval of the tactics by which they came into power. “Gheorghiu-Dej’s fulsome praise was doubtless driven by relief that a repressive regime had been restored to power in Hungary instead of a government pledged to introduce liberal measures which might well have stimulated discontent and demands for

similar treatment at least among the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, if not more widely in Romania” (Deletant, 1999, p. 268).

After the Hungarian uprising, Gheorghiu-Dej had strengthened his ties to Moscow and made new allies. However, it had also become clear to Gheorghiu-Dej and the Russians as well, just “how dependent he was on force, and on the Soviet Union as the source of his power” (Deletant, 1999, p. 269). This became a turning point in his relationship with the Russians, as he slowly began to free Romania of the Soviet grip on her.

The first step in moving towards independence for Romania was for Gheorghiu-Dej to ensure that he had a united party behind him. The uprising in Hungary, which ultimately led to Nagy’s fall, could have been avoided had he carefully removed his enemies. In response, Gheorghiu-Dej tightened his control of the party in Romania. “...Gheorghiu-Dej used the political credit which he had gained through his fidelity to Moscow during the Hungarian uprising to strengthen his personal hold on the party and to take action against his remaining rivals” (Deletant, 1999, p. 271). Several purges of the party took place, as well as an increase in the force of the Securitate, the secret police. Opposition was crushed, challenges removed, and Gheorghiu-Dej emerged as the supreme party leader. He also tightened his grip on the country’s youth, by appointing one of the toughest party members as Minister of Education. Mass arrests and labor camps became quite dominant of Gheorghiu-Dej’s age of terror. Having removed his internal challenges, he began to distance Romania from the USSR.

The symbolic representation of this distancing was the “rewriting” of history; the Communist Party suddenly was said to have played a larger part in the overthrow of

Antonescu than it actually did, and it was slowly faced out of history that the real liberator of Romania from its Fascist dictatorship was in fact the USSR (Deletant, 1999). The literal representation of the distance between the two nations came in 1958, when the USSR announced its intentions of withdrawing its troops from Romania. “A US Army intelligence report of January 1950 estimated the Soviet presence in Romania at two divisions, totaling 30,000 troops, supplemented by a 2,000 strong security force” (Deletant, 1999, pp.269-270).

According to Deletant, getting the USSR to withdraw its troops from Romania was the conception of Gheorghiu-Dej’s perceptive, yet somewhat paranoid mind and it was taking form already in 1955, three years before the announcement. The paranoid aspect came from his fear “that Khrushchev might try to purge him as a Stalinist” (p. 273). The second aspect, his perceptive nature had greatly influenced the timing of such request with the signing of the treaty between the USSR and Austria in 1955, where Austria declared neutrality and the USSR responded by withdrawing its troops from Austrian soil. The Romanians argued “without the need to maintain lines of communication with its force in Austria, the Soviet Union lost its justification for keeping troops on Romanian...territory” (Deletant, 1999, p. 274).

In 1955, Khrushchev was not to be persuaded by this argument, or anything else. However, in 1958 Khrushchev had begun a policy of opening towards the West. It was also known that the Communists in Romania, led by Gheorghiu-Dej, had a firm grip on the people and did not need Soviet military to control its citizens, Gheorghiu-Dej’s reign of terror could do that on its own! “Romania’s strategic position, flanked as it was by other Warsaw Pact states, made it a safer proposition for the Soviet Union on security

grounds for a troop withdrawal, and any fears about Romania's reliability as an ally had been dispelled by its actions during the Hungarian revolution" (Deletant, 1999, p. 275). In withdrawing troops from Romania, and a few years earlier from Austria, Khrushchev was sending – what he thought was – a signal of peace on behalf of the USSR. It has been said that in return, Khrushchev was hoping to see NATO troops withdrawn as well. "For Romania, the most significant impact of Soviet withdrawal upon the Romanian leadership was its psychological one" (Deletant, 1999, p. 275).

Part of the disagreement and Romania's wanting to be independent from the USSR, was that Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev simply did not get along, nor did they like each other. It was said that they would often sit in the same room for hours in silence, only to later get into childish arguments over the proper way of sowing maize, or what weight Romanian policy said to slaughter pigs at. Khrushchev had also attempted to rid the Romanian party of Gheorghiu-Dej, leaving Gheorghiu-Dej with no other option than to find new associates; "Khrushchev's half-hearted attempt to oust [Gheorghiu-]Dej in 1957 encouraged him to look for allies to counter Soviet influence" (Almond, 1992, p. 101). The ultimate disagreement between the two, however, was caused by Khrushchev's plan to use Romania as the breadbasket for the industrialized nations in the East-bloc. The plan "would have obliged her to remain a supplier of raw materials, and to abandon her programme of rapid industrialization, thus risking economic chaos at home" (Deletant, 1999, p. 283).

Had Khrushchev been able to push his plan through, the Romanian attempt to become independent would have been in vain, she would be forced to depend on the USSR for economic reasons. Perhaps, that was the goal of Khrushchev; making a country

economically dependent on the USSR would force that country to fall in line with policies set forth by the USSR, domestic or foreign. If Romania had taken on the role of breadbasket and supplier of raw materials, it “would have made the country susceptible to further economic exploitations by the Soviet Union, which was precisely what Gheorghiu-Dej had sought to avoid by embarking on the policy of industrialization” for Romania (Deletant, 1999, p. 283).

It would have been somewhat easy for the USSR to either leave their troops in Romania, or use further force to rid Romania of the Gheorghiu-Dej leadership in favor of a Soviet friendly leadership. However, Khrushchev took no such steps. Rather he did pull the Soviet troops out of Romania, which as mentioned could have been influenced by his own motivation in terms of signaling peace to NATO and seeing their troops withdrawn. It has also been argued that Khrushchev’s handling of Gheorghiu-Dej was not some elaborate plan to influence the West, rather, it was a sign that Khrushchev did allow for some degree of diversity and autonomy within the East-bloc. For instance, he did allow Gheorghiu-Dej’s refusal to participate in the economic policies set forth for the East bloc.

In the early 1960s Khrushchev again accommodated his policy toward the bloc states with Gheorghiu-Dej’s resistance to economic specialization within the bloc. This acceptance was given rather grudgingly, but when it is considered that the bloc specialization that Gheorghiu-Dej stifled had been a cornerstone of the Soviet leader’s policy toward Eastern Europe, the fact that he did not take strong enough measures to oust the Romanian leader demonstrated a remarkable degree of restraint (A. Braun, 1978, pp. 6-7).

If considering the plans for Romania being the breadbasket for the East-bloc the first blow to the Romania-Soviet relationship, the second complication to the relationship would be the Sino-Soviet conflict and Romania’s role in it. Romania attempted to remain

neutral during the Sino-Soviet rift. The neutrality, however, was complicated by Romania's ties to China. Romania attempted to mediate between the two and use the situation to her advantage.

On October 14, 1964, Khrushchev was removed from the Soviet leadership, which gave the Romanians a new opportunity to pursue further independence. "Exploiting the change in the Soviet leadership" (Deletant, 1999, p. 284), Gheorghiu-Dej requested the Soviet withdrawal of KGB from Romania. The Soviet KGB Chairman, Vladimir Yefimovici Semichastny, responded via a rather threatening telegram, reminding the Romanians "that Romania lived 'under the Soviet protective umbrella' and that it would regret Gheorghiu-Dej's move" (Deletant, 1999, p. 284). After much debate and correspondence between Gheorghiu-Dej and Leonid Brezhnev (Khrushchev's successor), the KGB counselors were removed from Romania, "thus the Romanian security and intelligence services became the first such agencies of a Warsaw Pact country to get rid of its Soviet counsellors" (Deletant, 1999, p. 285).

During the discussions of the KGB removal from Romania, the effectiveness of the KGB being in Romania came under scrutiny. According to Deletant, the Romanian Securitate complained that the KGB interfered in its work, and that the intelligence information the Soviet agents provided was outdated, at times as old as seven years old (1999, p. 285). Obviously, the Romanians had very little use for seven year old intelligence information, which only strengthened the argument of lack of effectiveness in the relationship between the KGB and the Securitate.

Romania's relationship with the United States during this time period was very much a product of change in U.S. foreign policy towards the USSR. The policy of

containment extended not only to the USSR, but to its satellite states as well. “The Truman administration put sharp restrictions on trade with Communist countries into effect in early 1948” (T. Baylis, 1994, p. 46). Trade did not completely end, but was at an extremely low level, where it continued to be until Stalin’s death in 1953 (Baylis, 1994, p. 47). Changes in U.S. leadership brought changes in U.S. policy towards the East-bloc. President Kennedy and President Johnson both took steps towards loosening restrictions on trade with the East-bloc. “[They] sought to create a more favorable atmosphere for loosening the inhibitions on East-West economic exchange and took specific measures to promote that end” (Baylis, 1994, p. 52). This, however, was complicated by the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, giving the Presidents and Congress differing policy goals.

Congress, for its part, imposed a series of restrictions on East-West trade that became more severe as U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War grew deeper. Even in 1962, it inserted provisions in Kennedy’s Trade Expansion Act removing the president’s discretion in granting MFN status to any Communist nation” (Baylis, 1994, pp. 52-53).

President Kennedy did manage to ensure “a \$140 million wheat deal between the United State and the USSR” (Baylis, 1994, p. 52). This deal was significant because of what it symbolized; it was the proof of “the possibilities and the potential profitability of expanded East-West trade” (Baylis, 1994, p. 52). The changes in the U.S. foreign policy towards the East-bloc will be discussed in further detail in chapter six, due to the fact that the most significant changes did occur after Gheorghiu-Dej’s death in 1965.

Gheorghiu-Dej did see some of the fruit of changes in U.S. policy as his reign came to an end. “In 1964, the Johnson administration relaxed export controls toward Romania on all goods and technology without an immediate military potential; the Romanians, in return, ‘gave assurances’ that they would not reexport such goods”

(Baylis, 1994, p. 52). It is not known for certain whether the Romanians kept their promise at the time, however, there is evidence to suggest that Gheorghiu-Dej's successor, Ceausescu, re-exported an array of goods to the USSR.

By the time of Gheorghiu-Dej's death in 1965, Romania had made it clear that she would pursue foreign policy independently from Moscow. Gheorghiu-Dej had laid the groundwork and Ceausescu would continue the quest of independence.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **ROMANIA'S RESOURCES AND GHEORGHIU-DEJ'S USE OF INTELLIGENCE**

Major economic changes took place during Gheorghiu-Dej's reign, not only in terms of a shift in export and to whom Romania exported, but also in terms of how Romania's resources were produced and where they came from. Much of the tension between Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev was caused by the argument of the distribution of Romania's resources. Being a country with great land and agricultural resources, Khrushchev expected Romania to be the breadbasket for East Europe, while the rest of the East-bloc industrialized. Gheorghiu-Dej, however, disagreed. He believed that Romania, like everyone else, should follow plans of industrialization. Later, he began exporting resources to the West. Industrialization, and later collectivization of the farms, was halted a bit by internal party struggles between Gheorghiu-Dej and Pauker.

Post-war Romania was quite well off compared to other war-torn countries in Europe. Enver Hoxha visited Romania in 1948 and commented on the standard of living in Romania, which was actually quite high at the time. "Hoxha was convinced that Romania would never be a proper communist country until all the fashionably dressed women, and full shops and cafes with coffee and cream, were swept away. It was done soon enough" (Almond, 1992, pp. 52-53). Within a few years of Gheorghiu-Dej's

leadership, virtually all economic sectors were under government control. The elimination of the private sector started “with the banks, the industrial plants, the mines, and then private ownership of homes, restaurants, small shops, medical practices, and taxis” (Georgescu, 1985, p. 2). Romania would eventually met Hoxha’s definition of a “proper communist country.”


Under Gheorghiu-Dej, the Romanian foreign intelligence service, DIE (from the Romanian Departamentul de Informatii Externe), was heavily involved in trade and economics. Ceausescu later stated that Jews and Germans were among Romania’s best export commodities, referring to the money that the Romania government was given in return for each Jew or German allowed to emigrate, Gheorghiu-Dej had laid the foundation for this arrangement. According to Ion Pacepa, former head of the Romanian intelligence service, in the 1950s, a British businessman working for the Israeli foreign intelligence service, Henry Jacober, informed the DIE that the Israeli service would pay a set amount for each Jew the Romanians allowed to emigrate. The agent for the DIE who dealt with Jacober was Gheorghe Marcu, and the unwritten agreement became known as the “the Jacober-Marcu gentleman’s agreement” (Pacepa, 1987, p. 74). Initially, the Romanians turned down the proposal, but it was later accepted when Jacober promised to build an automated chicken farm in Romania in return for exit visas for 500 Jewish families. A modern chicken farm was built, and “when Gheorghiu-Dej made a visit there a few days later, he liked it ... and ordered five more chicken farms” (Pacepa, 1987, p. 73). Eventually, the Ministry of Interior by help of DIE became the largest meat producer in Romania. The Romanians issued exit visas for Jews, in return, Jacober paid for chicken, turkey, pig, and cattle farms to be built in Romania. Thousands of animals were

produced annually at these farms and then exported to the West. In the “early 1960s, the annual number of emigration visas for Romanian Jews was entirely dependent upon the eggs, chicken, turkey, pork, beef, and cornflakes exported to the West” (Pacepa, 1987, p. 74). The Romanians intelligence service became increasingly involved in the meat industry. It went from managing the exit visas for the Jews, to actually attempt to obtain better breeds for production.

By far the most spectacular DIE livestock operation ... was the one run between 1958 and 1965 smuggling live, uncastrated Danish Landrace pigs out of Denmark, with Jacober's help. The white, lop-eared Landrace pig found in Central and Eastern Europe had been transformed in Denmark into a superior hog by selective breeding. The Landrace pigs were the key to Denmark's export trade in Wiltshire bacon to England. Denmark maintained its monopoly and extremely high prices by prohibiting the export of Landrace pigs for breeding. Over a period of seven years, however, the DIE smuggled thousands of piglets out of Denmark. They were anesthetized and transported, first in diplomatic automobiles, then in special diplomatic pouches, and finally in large TIR trucks protected by diplomatic seals. By the beginning of 1965, Romania was producing 50,000 Landrace pigs a year, all exported to the West as bacon and ham with Jacober's help (I.M. Pacepa, 1987, pp. 74-75).

This shady business of human trade that Gheorghiu-Dej was involved with was top secret and not even those closest to him knew about it. “Ceausescu ... learned of this operation only in 1965, when he came to power after Gheorghiu-Dej's death. He denounced it as ‘outrageous,’ abolished it, transferred the animal farms to the Ministry of Agriculture, fired Marcu from the DIE, and drastically reduced Jewish emigration” (Pacepa, 1987, p. 75). Ceausescu later reinstated the program, only this time exchanging exit visas for hard currency.

Gheorghiu-Dej's strive for economic independence from the USSR had consequences. Romania had to find someone else to rely on. This influenced the foreign

**Figure 1. Soviet Share of Romanian Foreign Trade, 1958-1960**


---

*Source: M. Shafir, 1985, p. 48.*

relations, especially with the West. “After 1962 relations between [Romania and the United States] gradually improved. The main reason Romania became more tolerant of the United States was the Romanian need for economic assistance in order to maintain its independence within the CMEA” (R. Forrest, 1982, p. 385). Trade was slowly being opened up for between the countries. The United States slowly began to lift some of its restrictions on dealing with the East-bloc, and especially Romania. There had been a shift in policy and in attitudes amongst the Americans. People had begun to realize the profit prospects of trading with the East European countries. “In short, American export controls were perceived as more harmful to the United States than to the socialist states for both political and economic reasons” (Forrest, 1982, p. 385). The United States slowly changed its attitudes towards East Europe; however, Gheorghiu-Dej would not see

the full benefits of this. “[I]n 1964, the Johnson administration had already articulated its ‘bridge building’ policy toward Eastern Europe, but it was never really implemented, partly because of its overwhelming preoccupation with Vietnam” (Ratesh, 1985, p. 62). The true fruit of the United States foreign policy towards the East bloc would be harvested by Ceausescu after Gheorghiu-Dej’s death. Gheorghiu-Dej did, however, manage to begin wider trading with the United States and Western Europe.

As Romania began trading more with the West, and especially exporting the Jacobean meat, her trade with the USSR drastically declined (Figure 1). “The total Soviet share [of Romanian foreign trade was] reduced from 51.5 per cent in 1958 to 43.7 per cent in 1959 and 40.1 per cent in 1960” (Shafir, 1985, p. 48). This trade shift happened concurrently with Romania’s attempts of becoming politically independent from the USSR.

Industrialization was an important part of Romania’s new economic goals. “Romania was one of the least developed countries in the area at the time of the Communist takeover in 1944” (T. Gilberg, 1975, p. 141), which left the Gheorghiu-Dej leadership with a long way to go in terms of industrialization. The lack of support for this from Khrushchev did not make matters easier for the Romanians. Before the communists, industry in Romania was concentrated in just a few areas, leaving the rest of the country in an old-fashioned shape. There were also other problems that the communists had to address when industrializing Romania. “Not only was there heavy concentration of industrial activity in a few areas but the capacity of Romanian manufacturing was low and concentrated in a few fields, primarily in light and consumer goods industries” (Gilberg, 1975, p. 141). The heavier industries were almost non-existent in Romania;

“machine building, steel production, and the extraction of minerals and fuels were woefully underdeveloped” (Gilberg, 1975, p. 141).

After the Communist takeover in East Europe, there was a push for rapid industrialization. The regime under Gheorghiu-Dej was no different. Plans to invest in heavy industry and transportation were launched; this however, would cause problems. “Once the priority needs of industry and transportation for investment funds had been met there was little left for developing agriculture and other low-priority sectors” (J. M. Montias, 1967, p. 25). One of these low-priority sectors was housing; little new housing was build. “In Bucharest, for example, a total of 872 new apartments were added to the housing stock from 1949 to 1952, nearly half of which were one-room dwellings; meanwhile the population increased by over 100,000 inhabitants” (Montias, 1967, p. 25). This of course caused overcrowding due to the lack of private building of housing. To afford the heavy price of industrialization, food was rationed, though not to the same grotesque extend as during the Ceaurescu regime. More raw materials were being imported for usage in the industries.

Collectivization of the farms was slow. “In 1953, when the first peak of collectivization was attained, over three fourths of the country’s arable land was still in private hands; only about 7 percent of the arable land had been incorporated into collectives of the Soviet type; the rest was divided between state farms and loose ‘associations’...” (Montias, 1967, p. 29). The slowness of the collectivization in Romania was partly due to the party simply not being strong about yet to enforce its policies as well as being weakened by internal party struggle. As the party was strengthened, polices

were implemented and the by 1962, collective farms “controlled ninety-five percent of the arable land” (Georgescu, 1985, p. 2).

Policies were imposed on farmers to make certain mandatory deliveries to the state, however, in the early 1950s the peasants also enjoyed some freedom in selling goods on the free market as long as they had met their quota to the government. “In 1950 these free sales, for which much higher prices were usually obtained than in transactions with the state, contributed close to two thirds of the peasants’ cash incomes from the sale of farm products” (Montias, 1967, p. 30). This of course gave the peasants an incentive to produce more, so that they would have more to sell on the free market. This benefited in feeding the growing population as well as having enough left over to export. “A rising volume of exports during this period was essential to finance not only the rapidly growing import of raw materials and semifabricates but also machinery and equipment...” (Montias, 1967, p. 31).

Although, Gheorghiu-Dej’s economic policies were oppressive, they did leave a strong foundation for Ceausescu to start on, although Ceausescu initially would reverse some of Gheorghiu-Dej’s policies, among other things “giving more freedom to private enterprise” (Georgescu, 1985, p.5). The late 1960s and early 1970s were very prosperous for Romania; unfortunately, Ceausescu’s mismanagement and reversal of his own policies would leave the Romania economy in shambles.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **THE GHEORGHIU-DEJ LEADERSHIP**

Limited information has been published on Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej's personality and leadership style. This chapter will focus on what we do know about Gheorghiu-Dej. The vast majority of published work on Gheorghiu-Dej relates to the mentor role he played to Ceausescu and to his tyrannical means of terrorizing the Romanian population during his 1947-1965 reign. Gheorghiu-Dej is credited as for playing a key role in the Communist take-over in Romania in late December 1947, but his presence in the Romania Communist Party was felt long before then. He was a native Romanian and a "self-taught Marxist" (Almond, 1992, p. 38). People like Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu were met with open arms by the communist party, which at the time had a proportionally large membership of Jews and other minorities. In anti-Semitic Romania, a native, full-blooded Romanian like Gheorghiu-Dej was necessary to the survival of the communist movement.

Gheorghiu-Dej was popular within in the party early on and played a major role in the formation of the party throughout the 1930s. His first milestone accomplishment is considered the 1933 railway strike, which he - a railway worker himself - allegedly orchestrated, "[t]he violence accompanying the breaking of the strike secured [Gheorghiu-]Dej's revolutionary reputation" (Almond, 1992, p 38). The truth is at the

time of the strike Gheorghiu-Dej was already in jail, where he would remain until 1944. However, word of his involvement in the strike, fueled his popularity. While imprisoned, he would play a vital part in party leadership as well as first meeting a young Ceausescu. In 1944, he was central in orchestrating “the removal of Stefan Foris, the Comintern’s nominee, from his office as general-secretary on the charge that he was a ‘traitor’” (Almond, 1992, p. 44). Gheorghiu-Dej’s definition of traitor was someone who was against him, Gheorghiu-Dej subscribed to the same belief as Ceausescu would come to hold. “[Gheorghiu-]Dej had already worked out the essential precept of any would-be Stalinist leader: What communism is, I embody; therefore anybody who is against *me* is against Communism” (Almond, 1992, p. 45). This same rhetoric would be heard under Ceausescu as well. Gheorghiu-Dej was harshly criticized by Pauker for the ousting of Foris. The two of them would have more confrontations to come. “As a prominent party leader later emphasized, [Gheorghiu-]Dej and Pauker’s power struggle was intense and permanent from the first moment after the war, but at the same time, it reflected genuine policy disputes” (Levy, 2001, p. 77).

As mentioned in chapter two, at this time when Gheorghiu-Dej was imprisoned, the party was divided into two factions: the home communists and the Muscovite group. Gheorghiu-Dej managed to appeal to both groups, “the home communists recognized him as the party’s leader while in jail, and the Muscovite group endorsed Gheorghiu-Dej’s position because it felt that they could use him as their puppet” (S. Roper, 2000, p. 5). Little did the Muscovite group, and especially Pauker, realize that they would later end up as Gheorghiu-Dej’s puppets and be used as scapegoats for every negative occurrence within the party, or in Romania. Pauker played a key role in the early years after the war

as well. Having spent many years in Moscow, she had connections that Gheorghiu-Dej did not. However, she was not only female, she was also a Jew, meaning a Pauker leadership would never be given legitimacy in anti-Semitic and nationalistic Romania. Pauker also faced criticism for being too subordinate to Moscow. There was a Romanian joke about Pauker walking around with an open umbrella in Bucharest on a clear, sunny day. When asked why, she replied, “it’s raining in Moscow.” To some people, her important connections in Moscow seemed to be a little too close. She attempted to use Gheorghiu-Dej as a front man and there are those who argue that during these early years, it was actually Pauker, not Gheorghiu-Dej, who ran the party. In fact, Gheorghiu-Dej himself has supported that notion. “Throughout the early postwar years, he insisted, they deliberately reduced him to a ‘front man’” (Levy, 2001, p. 77).

It is highly likely that Stalin not only allowed, but also contributed to the internal power struggle between Gheorghiu-Dej and Pauker. “Stalin apparently was unwilling to give [Gheorghiu-]Dej a free hand to monopolize power” (Levy, 2001, p.81), in that aspect, Pauker may very well have been Stalin’s puppet. She was there to ensure the continuing infighting and friction in the party. Gheorghiu-Dej had to prove himself to Stalin, because he was “an enigma of sorts to Stalin, as he was the only satellite leader never connected to the Comintern or directly linked with Moscow” (Levy, 2001, p. 81).

Gheorghiu-Dej was cunning and manipulative in his dealing with politics and people. He purged the party of “unacceptable” members, mainly those brought in by the Pauker-led Muscovites, completely undermining the support for the Muscovites. The party under Gheorghiu-Dej emphasized a true, working class membership. A membership to which Gheorghiu-Dej would be viewed as the hero who had organized a major strike

the decade earlier. A working-class railway worker himself, he gained extreme popularity with the new party membership. Gheorghiu-Dej enjoyed popularity among the pure Romanians in the party and to an extent among the people. However, unlike Pauker, he did not have a favorable relationship with Moscow. “Moreover, while Gheorghiu-Dej commanded the sincere and abiding loyalty of many who were imprisoned with him, he lacked Pauker’s charisma and personal charm” (Levy, 2001, p. 85). When he began to undermine the Muscovites and eventually purged Pauker, it was not simply because of politics, the personal rivalry played a huge part as well. Gheorghiu-Dej wanted to destroy Pauker, it was that simple. “He bitterly resented Pauker’s attempt to make him a figurehead, begrudged her international standing and popularity among Soviet officials while always finding his name misspelled in *Pravda*, and reviled her ‘motherly,’ patronizing attitude towards him” (Levy, 2001, p. 85).

When Romania, like the rest of the East-bloc, underwent Stalinization and farms were collectivized, Gheorghiu-Dej had Pauker in charge of implementing the goals. Collectivization was met with violent opposition from Romanian peasants, Pauker attempted to force it upon them, and when it failed, Gheorghiu-Dej blamed Pauker for its failure, damaging her standing not only with the Romanian people but with the Soviet leadership as well. “Gheorghiu-Dej argued that the home communists had put forward the principle of voluntary participation in collectivization” (Roper, 2000, p. 20) and by doing so, he put the entire blame for the violence on Pauker, and gained further popular support himself. The Soviet leadership, of course, was extremely dissatisfied with the failed collectivization in Romania, “with the blame squarely on the shoulders of the

Pauker group, the home communists would gain a political advantage with the Soviet leadership” (Roper, 2000, p. 20) .

The way that Gheorghiu-Dej managed to put the entire blame on a single individual for failed programs while maintaining himself and even further his popularity, became very characteristic of his leadership. He cold bloodedly sacrificed members of the party to further himself and he managed to play the right cards at the right time. For example, he held off on too much criticism of Pauker and the Muscovites, only criticized them when failed policies warranted it. In 1952, he purged the party of Pauker and her followers, accusing them of fraud and of hindering the implementation of collectivization and industrialization. Romania was not the only country where purges took place in the early 1950s. Other East European countries were doing the same thing, only they were purging their parties of home communists. “Elsewhere the Muscovite communists were viewed as politically and personally closer to the Soviet Union. The home communists were viewed as potentially nationalistic and less politically reliable, but this was not the case in Romania” (Roper, 2000, p. 23). Gheorghiu-Dej’s acceptance the Stalinist plans of industrializing the country had shown the political stability of the home communists. He thereby had “proven himself a devout Stalinist, and he had enough support to push through Soviet economic and industrial plans but not enough to pose a serious threat [to the Soviets]” (Roper, 2000, p. 26).

Ironically, Gheorghiu-Dej would later deny his ties with Stalin in order to remain in power under Khrushchev. After Stalin’s death, Khrushchev wanted the East-bloc purged of Stalinists, and one would imagine Gheorghiu-Dej, the devout Stalinist, would be the first to go. However, once again, Gheorghiu-Dej managed to save himself and

instead purged the party of the remaining Muscovites. After all, it had been they, not him, who had been responsible for implementing the Stalinist collectivization. He launched “continual denunciations of Pauker’s alleged brutality against the peasantry” (Levy, 2001, p.117), the brutality which she had imposed while trying to implement collectivization. He also accused her of repression within the party, charging “that Pauker and her allies sought to duplicate the mass repression taking place throughout the Soviet bloc during Stalin’s anti-Tito campaign” (Levy, 2001, p. 134).

During Khrushchev’s attacks on Stalin and his followers, Gheorghiu-Dej never admitted that he had been wrong in following Stalin, that he had been just as morally corrupt. In fact, “Gheorghiu-Dej admitted merely that Stalin had soiled his reputation by indulging in the personality cult and by allowing the security police to use terror; he added that Stalin’s ‘departure from the Marxist-Leninist concept of the role of the personality’ had a ‘negative influence’” (D. Deletant, 1999, p. 254). Gheorghiu-Dej had to be careful in his criticism of Stalin, in case anyone called him on actually having followed Stalin. It is ironic that Gheorghiu-Dej would comment on Stalin allowing the use of terror by the security police, when in Romania the Securitate was greatly strengthened under Gheorghiu-Dej’s rule. In fact, he allowed the Securitate to take measures that even Ceausescu condemned once he came to power.

Arrests for no reason, long prison and death sentences without trial became reality in Romania under Gheorghiu-Dej. “Brutality was the characteristic feature of the men chosen to head Romania’s security police” (Deletant, 1999b, p.65). This brutality and terror was a reflection of Gheorghiu-Dej’s own personality and drive to rule through coercion. Gheorghiu-Dej staffed industries and farming plants with prison labor. “If you

cannot find the people you need in the jails, just arrest the ones you need and then use them' was Gheorghiu-Dej's usual answer" when ministers complained about lack of manpower within their sectors (I. M. Pacepa, 1987, p. 74). This is an interesting contrast to the Gheorghiu-Dej who had publicly claimed to believe in the voluntary participation in collectivization, but as noted, he said what he had to in order to blame someone else for the problems and stay in power himself. The brutality in Romania had been present from the moment the Communists took over. In 1948, Hoxha went to Bucharest and was chauffeured around by Gheorghiu-Dej himself in a bulletproof vehicle. In his memoirs, "...Hoxha has left us the reaction of a militant Stalinist to the state of affairs that existed in Romania at the moment of the Communist takeover" (Almond, 1992, p. 51). The state of affairs was one noted by conspiracy, suspicion and a strong militant presence.

Gheorghiu-Dej also built the foundation for Romania's independence from the USSR, as was true for Ceausescu as well, Gheorghiu-Dej relied heavily on nationalism. His quest for independence also helped bring legitimacy to communist regime in Romania.

Gheorghiu-Dej's rift with Moscow, by striking the chord of deep anti-Russian sentiment felt by most Romanians, attracted some support for his regime. Drawing on this sentiment offered Gheorghiu-Dej a simple way of increasing the regime's popularity while at the same time putting a distance between himself and his Soviet master. (Deletant, 1999a, p. 287).

When he broke from Moscow and Romania underwent a "de-Sovietization" and Romanian street names were brought back, it appeared to the public as though the Romanian communist party had achieved enough power not to need the strong support from the USSR anymore. The legitimacy of the Communists in Romania has been an issue that the party has had to deal with throughout its reign. As a

pure Romanian, he was able to play on the Romanians' feeling of nationalism. He used the increasing distance from Moscow to tighten his grip on Romania.

“[Gheorghiu-]Dej did not try to curry favour with his people by making partial liberalizations. Instead, he tried to appeal to their nationalism as his best card in an effort to legitimize his rule” (Almond, 1992, p. 61). When Romanian underwent its “re-Romanianization”, it helped increase his popularity with the Romanian people. The Russians were unpopular within Romania, Gheorghiu-Dej knew this, and he used it to his advantage.

While building the independence from Moscow, Gheorghiu-Dej still had to act with care so that the Soviets would not invade Romania and replace him. Amongst other things, he put other individuals in top positions, so that he was not the single central leader in the Party. In the mid-1950s, Gheorghiu-Dej had entrusted Gheorghe Apostol with the Party's First Secretaryship, “Apostol had then given up the position when [Gheorghiu-]Dej felt secure enough from Soviet intervention to take back all the top jobs in Romania into his own hands” (Almond, 1992, p. 63).

Gheorghiu-Dej established a regime of terror where he eventually would be the supreme ruler. Any opposition was crushed, anyone opposing him was called a traitor, and he laid the groundwork for the terror of the secret police. Once Gheorghiu-Dej got rid of Pauker and had consolidated all power in his own hands, he was able to rule through fear and coercion. He saw no need to attempt to legitimize his leadership, instead he just had the secret police terrorize the people, holding Romanians in a grip of fear. When Gheorghiu-Dej died in 1965 and Ceausescu came to power, the Romanians were relieved,

hoping for a better future. They had sustained eighteen years of Gheorghiu-Dej's brutality. No one dreamed that Ceausescu could be as bad as Gheorghiu-Dej; after all, Ceausescu was the hope for the future. Gheorghiu-Dej's terror regime was initially condemned by Ceausescu, but he would eventually continue where Gheorghiu-Dej had left of. "In that sense, the impact of Gheorghiu-Dej on Romania has long outlived his personal power. Ceausescu's apprenticeship was successful" (M.E. Fischer, 1989).

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **CEAUSESCU: DISSENTING FROM THE USSR**

When Ceausescu came to power in 1965, he initially established a foreign policy in line with the precedent set by Gheorghiu-Dej. Ceausescu soon became the darling of the West, everyone's favorite communist leader. He was in more than one sense the maverick of the Warsaw nations. He gained his favor with foreign leaders through meticulous planning, psychological manipulation, and, what appeared to be, independence from Moscow. However, history would show us that the *prima facie* value of the Romanian policies and her leader was not what it appeared to be. Eventually, the ties to the West, so carefully engineered, fell apart.

One of the key elements of Ceausescu's foreign policy was his use of his Prime Minister, Maurer, who served as Foreign Minister under Gheorghiu-Dej. Maurer had been very engaged in Gheorghiu-Dej's foreign policy in terms of independence from Moscow, "both then and later as Prime Minister [under Ceausescu], Maurer was an important component of this clever balancing act, with his suave, civilized exterior" (The Times (London), February 2000). Maurer was among the few who politically survived a shift in leadership after the death of Gheorghiu-Dej. He maintained a role of importance, perhaps because he was able to help lift Ceausescu's standing with the world.

He remained an important instrument of Romanian foreign policy, making official trips to London and Bonn, as well as keeping the fires warm with Moscow. In 1967, during the Vietnam War, Maurer met President Johnson in New York and afterwards headed a delegation to China, and though little came of either, they gave the impression that Romania was playing a mediating role, a perception which, if only momentarily, raised the country's international standing (The Times (London), February 2000).

In his 1987 book, Ceausescu outlined his policies and thoughts on foreign issues.

His independence was not merely a matter of making decisions independent of the Soviets; it was a matter of keeping Romania independent of everyone. He describes a sovereign Romania, a Romania that fought hard to ensure that she would never again be at the mercy of foreign nations. "For almost 500 years, our people had been under foreign domination and had had to fight ... hard battles to win its national independence; this is why it cherishes and wishes to secure its sovereignty and independence alongside its path to development" (Ceausescu, 1987, p. 18). It was a strong move for Ceausescu to play the "independence-card," using patriotic language to talk about independence for Romania, no one would speak against him; "Communist and anti-Communist Romanians alike could agree on the need to preserve their country's independence" (Almond, 1992, p. 3). His talk about independence helped solidify his leadership and unify the Romanians.

The notion of independence applied to external as well as internal issues.

Ceausescu played to the nationalistic feeling of the Romanians, emphasized the struggle they as a people had gone through, and he made it clear that Romania in the future was not going to let anyone interfere with her sovereignty, or in other words, her domestic policies. "Romania's policy of independence was born out of the struggle against foreign domination, for the assertion of the right of the people to be the master of its own destiny,

to decide its fate independently without any outside interference.” (Ceausescu, 1987, p.11). As we will later see, one of the main causes of the deterioration of the relationship between Romania and the United States was that Romania felt her sovereignty threatened when the U.S. started looking into her internal affairs such as alleged human rights violations, warranted or not.

In addition to advocating independence, Ceausescu’s foreign policy was also loaded with statements of peace and international security. He had an idealistic image of a Europe, free of military blocs, in other words, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact had to be abolished. “...We consider that it is only through the abolition of the military blocs that we shall be able to reach actual security in Europe, that we shall be able to exert an influence for creating conditions of security throughout the world.” (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 439). Speaking to both the Americans and the Soviets, Ceausescu saw no need for the involvement of foreign troops in Europe. The presence of foreign troops was an infringement upon the sovereignty of the European nations in the eyes of Ceausescu:

Military blocs must be excluded, non-European troops must leave Europe, military bases must be eliminated, foreign troops must withdraw from the territory of a foreign State, within their national frontiers, we must create conditions for Europe to be free from nuclear armament. (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, pp. 438-439).

Ceausescu was strongly opposed to NATO and believed it should be eliminated, perhaps because that was one Western club that he would not be able to gain membership in.

Military blocs, he believed, threatened the international security. “We declare in favor of the abolition of the aggressive NATO Pact and as a consequence of it also of the Military Warsaw Treaty. We consider that the military blocs have become anachronical in political life.” (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 439). The reality at the time was that NATO

was not going to be abolished, which Ceausescu probably was aware of. So, instead he used to existence of NATO to justify the being of the Warsaw Treaty. He also used NATO as a reason for building Romanian defense. “[A]s long as the imperialists maintain the aggressive NATO Pact, we are obliged to take measures for increasing the defence capacity of our country, alongside the other socialist countries in the Warsaw Treaty, to consolidate the cooperation in order to ensure conditions for any aggressive attempt of the American imperialists, of the forces of reaction to be crushed” (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 439).

Ceausescu’s continuation of the independent foreign policy for which Gheorghiu-Dej had set the tone enthralled the West. No matter how much he denounced the NATO alliance, he longed to build a bridge to the countries that belonged to NATO. Ceausescu made major progress early on in his reign. Already in 1967 - merely two years after coming to power - he led Romania to become the first East-bloc nation to establish diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. His outreach to the West had begun. His relations to the West involved diplomacy as well as trade. Under Ceausescu, Romania also became the first East-bloc country to join the International Monetary Fund.

Not only did Ceausescu enjoy friendly relations with nations outside the East-bloc, he also blatantly defied Moscow on occasion. The first time in June 1967, when Romania continued its relations with Israel, despite the fact that the East-bloc, led by Moscow, had cut all diplomatic ties to Israel after the Six-Day War. “Ceausescu undoubtedly believed that the pro-Israeli gestures would win Romania influence in Washington and would perhaps lead them to accept his differentiation of Romanian foreign policy from the Kremlin’s at face-value” (Almond, 1992, p. 103). Ceausescu, in

his quest for recognition, wanted to be responsible for settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. He “played a key go-between role in setting up talks between Israel’s Menachem Begin and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1989) in 1977. Ceausescu would continue his involvement in the Middle East throughout his years in power, mainly as a negotiator, hoping he one day would be able to gain the prestigious Nobel Peace Prize for settling the conflict. However, he also maintained strong ties with other countries in the region. “Ceausescu’s double-game of continuing to recognize Israel while courting the Arab states paid dividends in his relations with the Western democracies. They saw him as the ‘honest broker’ who might help negotiate a resolution of the Middle East problems” (Almond, 1992, p. 119). It was to great economic gain for Ceausescu to establish good ties with the West and his involvement in the Middle East helped him do so. He has been credited for helping ensure the agreement between Egypt and Israel, “[t]his debt helps to explain [President] Carter’s willingness to receive Ceausescu in April 1978” (Almond, 1992, p. 120). The reality is that, although, Ceausescu might have played some part in the negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis and appeared to take pro-Israel stands he also fostered “Romania’s influence in the region as a supplier of arms and the provider of a safe haven for the training of Palestinian terrorists, among others” (Almond, 1992, p. 119).

Ceausescu not only attempted to play a key role in the Middle East. He spoke on issues such as reunification of the two Germanys as well. “Conditions must be created for the unification of Germany to be the result of the understanding between the two German States, between the Germans themselves. Until then, one must of course proceed from today’s realities of the existence of the two German States and together with them

we must work for European security” (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 438). Playing on the rhetoric of international security and world peace, which had become the theme of Romanian foreign policy, Ceausescu acknowledged the temporary division of Germany. His language dealing with Europe shows how strongly Romania felt connected to the Europeans and the importance of a sense of unity with Europe. “Like other peoples in Europe, we are interested in the solution of the German issues in a democratic and peaceful way, excluding all possibilities for a revival of German militarism and revanchism. Like other European peoples, we are interested in Germany’s not possessing atomic weapons under any form” (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 438).

Shortly after Ceausescu defied Moscow by keeping relations with Israel, he not only refused to participate in but also openly criticized the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. His criticism of the invasion was one rooted in ideology.

“There is no acceptable reason to allow, even for a single moment, the idea of military intervention in the internal affairs of a fellow Socialist state... We consider that, in order to consolidate the relations between Socialist countries and Communist parties on a true Marxist-Leninist basis, we must stop the interference in the affairs of other countries or parties for good.” (Ceausescu as quoted by Mihai Retegan, 2000, p. 188-189).

This became the most significant event in Ceausescu’s quest to establish himself as being independent of Moscow and to obtain the recognition he craved. “It was an act of courage for which he and his country gained worldwide respect” (D. Deletant, 1999, p. 115). He had gotten the West’s attention. From this point on, Ceausescu would continue to defy Moscow. He would have independent policies and establish relations with countries hostile to the USSR, such as the long-time enemy, China. His defiance would

eventually culminated in his refusal to implement Gorbachev's policies of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* in the 1980's.

The United States of America and Romania began developing close ties throughout the 1960's, especially during the later half of the decade. This happened for two reasons; first of, the events of independence on Romania's behalf helped her gain favorable recognition by the U.S. Secondly, there was a shift in the American Foreign policy towards the East European nations. The Truman Administration's restrictive policies of containment were outdated and slowly giving way for trade relationships, extended to those East-bloc nations deserving of it. There were, however, some issues where Romania did not look favorable upon the United States, like the case of Vietnam.

As much as Ceausescu wanted to establish a relationship with the West and especially the United States, when it came to Socialism, Ceausescu would side with Vietnam over the United States. In a speech given by Ceausescu on June 12, 1966, he stated, "nowadays, when the Vietnamese people, when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, are attacked and bombed by the American imperialists, we manifest our socialist internationalism by helping the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to defeat the American aggressors" (Ceausescu, 1969b, p.451). This statement did not affect Romania's relationship with the United States; the trade benefits for Ceausescu probably out weight his desire to protect socialism.

In the years 1964-66, President Johnson relaxed export controls towards the East, beginning the policy of differentiation with Romania as the third beneficiary after Yugoslavia and Poland. "In short, American policy had shifted from a presumption that trade with the East was to be fundamentally distrusted unless proven innocuous to an

activist drive to expand such trade” (T. Baylis, 1994, p. 53). According to Baylis (1994), both economic and political motivations sparked this shift in policy. The economic motive came from American business realizing the potential of trade opportunities with the East-bloc, while the political reasons came from the belief that “trade could help build bridges to the East European states and might increase their autonomy” (Baylis, 1994, p. 54).

Major advancements in the U.S.-Romania relations were made during the Nixon administration. It was no coincidence that President Nixon became the first U.S. President to visit Romania; rather it was a product of Ceausescu’s careful planning and foresight. Two years before Nixon’s official visit in August 1969, he visited Romania as a private citizen. Having just retired from politics, he had been “snubbed on a visit to Moscow and not received at any official level” (Pacepa, 1987, p. 99). In contrast, Ceausescu received Nixon in Romania with full state honors. Part of Ceausescu’s genius was his detailed and perceptive study of foreign leaders, even when they seemed of no importance to others. Despite Nixon being basically a “nobody” in the world of politics in 1967, Ceausescu made an imperative decision in receiving Nixon with such honor at the time. “...A few months after his inauguration as president, Richard Nixon paid Ceausescu back by becoming the first United States president ever to visit Romania. The visit was an important coup for Bucharest” (Pacepa, 1987, p.99).

Romania had had her eye on a warm relationship with the United States for years, and she benefited greatly from Ceausescu’s foresight to treat Nixon respectfully. Nixon’s visit to Romania was a strong symbol of the newly formed tie. Romania would continue to strengthen the relationship with the United States, hoping to eventually obtain the

sought-after Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status. Although, Romania did not get the MFN status until Nixon had left office, Nixon did improve trade relations with Eastern Europe:

Romania was the chief beneficiary of special American treatment in this period. In 1971, the [Nixon] administration further shortened the commodity list for that country and made it the first bloc nation permitted to receive the newly reauthorized Eximbank financing. The administration supported Romanian membership in GATT and in 1972 sought Congressional approval for MFN treatment for the country; this status was granted only in 1975, however, after Nixon had left office (Baylis, 1994, p. 54).

In the late 1970s, U.S. policy towards East Europe would, once again, change.

With the Carter administration came a new approach towards the East bloc.

Differentiation, which Nixon had laid the groundwork for, was carried out by Carter.

According to the differentiation policy, "Eastern Europe should not be seen as a monolithic bloc but rather as an area populated by countries of great historic, geographic, ethnic, and cultural diversity, a diversity that still existed despite the imposition of an alien ideology" (Ratesh, 1985, p. 64). This view of Eastern Europe meant that policies towards Romania were no longer treated within the context of the U.S-Soviet relationship; rather it was dealt with on its own merits. The Carter administration also made an issue of human rights (although some, i.e. Iranian revolutionaries would rather have been without Carter's notion of human rights). This change in U.S. foreign policy, as well as new relations with other East bloc countries, put a damper on the relationship with Romania:

Both the differentiation approach and the human rights policy tilted the Carter administration toward a more favorable recognition of Hungary. At the same time, Americans were also fascinated by the astonishing pace of the Polish liberalization with the emergence of Solidarity, a development

that made the Romanian experiment in independence in foreign policy while it continued domestic repression look much less attractive (Ratesh, 1985, p. 65).

Romania was no longer the important ally she had been during the Nixon administration, but did enjoy the benefits of MFN status. With MFN came the privilege of lower tariffs. On the flipside, MFN also came with the restrictions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Congress passed the Jackson-Vanik in 1974 and by that conditioned the granting of MFN. In accordance with the amendment, MFN could only be granted to countries allowing free emigration of their citizens or “a presidential finding of substantial progress toward that goal” (Baylis, 1994, p. 55). Every year during the annual renewal of MFN, the Romanians assured the United States that they were following the stipulations set forth by the Jackson-Vanik amendment and kept emigration a priority. “Romanian statements were not, however, matched by their actual behavior. While emigration to the United States did grow steadily, Jewish emigration to Israel declined” (Ratesh, 1985, p. 64). The Securitate also began harassing Romanians who had applied for exit visas, and emigration procedures were made more burdensome. While the Romanians were telling the U.S. that emigration was allowed, they were actually restricting it further. It was eventually the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which put an end to the MFN status of Romania, after having caused various political problems and obstacles in the relationship between the U.S. and the Romanians.

When Carter lost his re-election bid, the Romanians joined other discontent nations in the celebration of Reagan’s victory. The Romanian leadership held “an almost mystical belief that, for Bucharest, Republicans were better than Democrats” (Ratesh, 1985, p. 65). Ceausescu’s strongest ally in the White House had been Nixon, a

Republican. He probably felt that Reagan would be just as pro-Romania as Nixon had been; after all, they were both Republicans. The Romanians were also well-aware of Reagan's harsh anti-Soviet stand, and they believed "that a tougher anti-Soviet stand would tend to imply more recognition for their dissent from Moscow and would therefore shelve, temper, or at least balance out the human rights criticism" (Ratesh, 1985, p.66).

The reality was that Reagan not only took an anti-Soviet stand, but an anti-Communism stand, and the Romanian communists would not see any major benefits of his presidency. Reagan continued the policy of differentiation and did not "shelve" the human rights criticisms. Domestically, human rights were deteriorating in Romania and the living conditions for the Romanians worsened greatly. It was around the same time as Reagan's election, that Ceausescu decided to pay off Romania's \$10 billion debt over the next ten years. In order to do so, he had to export every exportable good from Romania, at the expense of the Romanians. With the worsening domestic conditions, the U.S.-Romania relationship hit an all-time low. The annual MFN renewal became a bitter struggle, the U.S. was constantly threatening Romania with loss of MFN, and Ceausescu became extremely defensive of Romania's internal matters. Ceausescu attempted to fight off criticism from the U.S. with his rhetoric of independence and sovereignty of Romania.

Other than Romania's participation in the 1984 boycotted Olympics, there were no highlights in Romania's relationship with the West. Romania started to become increasingly dependent on Moscow for economic assistance and the West had no use for Romania anymore. Furthermore, human rights violations were spiraling out of control and the West was noticing. U.S. Ambassador to Romania, David Funderburk, was

sounding the alarms with the State Department, attempting to bring attention to Romania's domestic conditions. Funderburk was not alone. Amnesty International also focused on Romania. The 1980's were a decade of torture and oppression for the Romanians. In the July 1987 Report, Amnesty International described violations such as, but not limited to, psychiatric confinement of political prisoners, torture, ill-treatment and deaths in custody, house arrest, and the like. Ceausescu's critics fell especially victim to Romania's blatant disregard of basic human rights.

[T]he Romanian authorities have violated internationally recognized human rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression, the right to leave one's country, the right to fair trial and the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment (AI, 1987).

Ceausescu's outrageous record of human rights violations would be the final blow to the U.S.-Romania relationship. In 1988, Romania renounced its MFN status based on the conditions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The past years of human rights violations had tensed the relationship between the United States and Romania. At its annual MFN review in 1988, it was quite clear that Congress would not have extended MFN to Romania again. To save face, Romania renounced MFN. In his February 12 letter to Reagan, Ceausescu wrote:

As regards your reference to the difficulties involved in approving the most-favored nation clause, I should like to inform you that we have decided to reject extension of this clause under the conditions set forth by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. It is our view that approval of this clause should be based on the existing trade agreement, renouncing any preconditions (see Appendix C).

As the Western ties deteriorated in the early 1980s, Ceausescu began to look for other international alliances. Romania attempted to create bonds with nations worldwide;

Ceausescu reached out to the Third World countries. He did not discriminate based on economics or geographic location. If having good relations with a country could benefit Romania – or better yet, Ceausescu himself – an attempt was made to establish a friendship with it.

Romania, a country with a long history, of over 2000 years, has always valued her independence and is determined to develop relations with all the countries, with no distinctions to their social system, on the basis of principle of the observance of national sovereignty and independence (Ceausescu, p. 19, 1987).

In tact with his falling out with the West, Ceausescu was also losing foothold within the East-bloc. His ideas were no longer new and revolutionary. Ironically, in the latter half of the 1980s Ceausescu, once known to be the young, liberal leader, had suddenly become the opposite. He was now the upholder of the traditional, the old Stalinist ways, and Gorbachev was now the maverick promoting reform, as Ceausescu once had done himself. Tables had turned. Romania continued her sole ways, being different from the Russians, only now the Russian were reforming and liberalizing, while Romania was stuck in being the kind of regime, Ceausescu so utterly had opposed in his younger years. He was bitterly opposed to the new Soviet leadership under Gorbachev and the *Glasnost* policies. “Mr. Ceausescu, posing as the champion of all in Eastern Europe who oppose glasnost, has repeatedly accused the Soviet Union of ‘deviating from the true path of socialism.’ As recently as two weeks ago he unequivocally attacked the principles of decentralized management and limited autonomy which are so close to Mr. Gorbachev’s heart” (R. Basset, 1987, *The Times* (London)).

Ceausescu began to be an annoyance to the Soviet leadership. As domestic conditions in Romania fell apart, Gorbachev grew increasingly impatient with the

Romanian tyrant. "...[T]he Kremlin chief made it clear that he is disturbed by economic mismanagement and human rights violations in Romania. He said that the failings of any socialist country could bring discredit on the entire communist system" (M. Dobbs, 1988, The Washington Post). Romania had become isolated, not only from the Western world, but even within the East-bloc. For Western leaders it had become an embarrassment to be associated with Ceausescu, it seems it was just as much an embarrassment for other Communist leaders as well.

## **CHAPTER VII**

### **OH ROMANIAN! PAYING HER DEBT**

Gheorghiu-Dej had attempted to industrialize Romania and turn farming into collectives. Ceausescu attempted to follow in those footsteps. Early on in the Ceausescu reign, economics seemed to be going the right way. Industry was yielding profit as projected. Romania prospered and became a powerhouse in foreign trade, especially with Less Developed Countries. However, as Ceausescu's ambitious grew, both economically and in terms of his own power, and he ventured into various large-scale building projects, the economy began to crumble. Debt accumulated and combined with failed oil deals, Romania's economy headed for a fall. In the early 1980s, Ceausescu's ambition once again got the best of him and he projected to pay off Romania's billion- dollar debt before 1990. This, of course, was utter economic suicide and the Romanian people paid dearly for it. Ceausescu exported everything. "[The decision] meant that everything that could be sold abroad for hard currency, raw materials, or energy was exported. Food products and consumer goods were among the easiest to sell" (Ratesh, 1991). The Romanian people was left starving and cold, while their leader attempted to regain control over his failed economic plans; "the lack of food, heat, and electricity had earned Romania the bitter name of 'Ceauswitz'" (Kligman, p 147, 1998).

In the mid-1960's, when Ceausescu first came to power, things looked positive for Romania's economy. The new leader had enthusiastic visions for Romania, both for her recent achievements and for those to come. There was a bright outlook for Romania's future. In a speech given at the June 12, 1966 meeting with the party active in the Argeş Region, Ceausescu spoke on improvements in the recent developments. "We have scored great results in developing the industry. Today, we produce ten times more than in 1938. Agriculture has also developed, although not as rapidly as industry" (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 430). Because of the developing industry, it was expected that the standard of living would be raised from the low it was at during the Gheorghiu-Dej years. After all, Ceausescu was the new hope and seen as a Liberal. The darkness of Gheorghiu-Dej was over.

In the 1960s, the product of Romanian industry and agriculture, mainly stayed in the country, meaning the people benefited from the developments, Ceausescu said, "It has ensured the permanent supply of agricultural foodstuffs to the population, as well as certain quantities available for exportation..." (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 431). When addressing the issue of agriculture, Ceausescu credited the success to the use of the cooperativization and collectivization of agriculture. More importantly, the success was attributed to ideology: "Of course this is the result of the correct Marxist-Leninist policy of our Party, which relies in the whole work for developing agriculture on the broad masses of the peasantry" (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 431). Again, as with foreign policy, Ceausescu upheld the ideology. It has been guessed that Ceausescu's dedication to Marxist-Leninist ideas was actually what kept the Russians from coming down hard

**Table 1. Romanian Foreign Trade by Area, 1965-1980**

	1965	1970	1975	1980
CMEA Countries (incl. Mongolia, Cuba in 1975, and Vietnam 1980)	60.4%	49.0%	37.8%	33.7%
Other Socialist Countries (incl. China, North Korea, Yugoslavia)	4.5%	6.8%	6.9%	6.8%
Advanced Capitalist Countries (incl. All non-socialist European countries, USA, Canada, Japan)	28.9%	35.6%	38.1%	32.8%
Developing Countries (incl. Israel)	6.0%	8.2%	15.8%	25.2%

*Source* Shafir, 1985, p 49

on him. He may have had his own ideas and policies, but if nothing else, at least he justified his actions through use of ideology.

In an interview granted to Italian journalists in June of 1966, Ceausescu stated, “We attach great importance to developing the economic exchanges and the multilateral relations of fraternal cooperation with all the socialist countries”, referring to CMEA countries, “I can safely assert that these economic relations generally develop quite favourably. Suffice it to show that over 60 per cent of our foreign trade is conducted with the socialist countries...” (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 462).

Romania shifted her trading from trading with USSR to trading with other countries, and especially tried to gear it toward the West. She attempted to establish trade relations with Lesser Developed Countries, this initially seemed like a good plan. The LDC’s did not have the same quality standards as the West, and Romania could therefore export cheap, lower-quality products to these nations. This, however, did not work long

term, especially not in terms of crude oil. “[T]he Soviet Union was unwilling to supply Romania with crude oil under the same favourable terms from which Moscow’s other CMEA partners benefit, unless Bucharest paid the political price” (Shafir, 1958, p. 111). Whatever crude oil Romania did import from the USSR, she paid dearly for. The Russians demanded payment in form of hard currency. Instead, Romania shifted towards the LDCs, as seen in table 1, there was a huge jump in the share of foreign trade with LDCs between 1970 and 1980, mainly because of the oil issue. At the end of the 1980s, Romania did become more economically dependent on the USSR again, due to her financial problems.

The energy industry was especially affected by Ceausescu’s policies of independence. He wanted Romania to be self-sufficient, and as with everything else the consequences were not taken into consideration. “Romanian oil engineers were directed to increase output from the oilfields, disregarding basic principles of reservoir management; even so, Romania’s domestic oil production fell far short of its refinery capacity” (W. Patterson, 1994, p. 17). According to Shafir, Romania’s oil refining capacity was increased from 18.5 million tons in 1973 to 25.4 millions tons in 1978 (p. 110). However, the actual production never reached the capacity, nor the planned production (see table 2), plus Romania started exporting more oil, thereby making it impossible to fulfill both domestic energy needs and the export demands. Issues on the international scene also play a factor. The oil market was shaken by both the Iranian revolution and war in the Gulf (Shafir, 1985, p. 111). Ceausescu’s production management was about as poor as his fiscal management. Once again, his grand

**Table 2. Romanian Oil Production, 1975-1983**  
(Crude oil in million tons)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
Planned production	14.6	14.7	14.9	15.1	14.8	15.0	12.6	12.5	13.5
Actual production	14.6	14.7	14.7	13.7	12.3	11.5	11.6	11.7	11.6

*Source Shafir, 1985, p 111*

ambition for Romania caused the country to take a fall. The way he dealt with the energy production and his drive for more and more production, backfired and only caused Romania more problems in the future:

Romanian crude oil is sweet and of good quality, and its refineries were set up to process this standard of material. But Ceausescu, determined to expand exports of petroleum products, arranged to import sour lower-quality crude, particularly from Iraq; and the imported crude rapidly fouled the refineries and polluted their surroundings. Romania once a major energy exporter, became an energy importer (Patterson, 1994, p. 17).

Thus, putting Romania even further in debt. Not only did this put her further in debt, it also backfired in terms of being self-sufficient and independent. A country has a certain sense of independence when it is the supplier of a product, for example energy, and other countries need that product. Romania used to be the country supplying energy, but her role shifted to where by importing, she had to rely on other nations and lost part of that self-sufficiency that was so important to Ceausescu.

Other issues that became detrimental to Romanian economy were natural disasters; the earthquake of 1977 which greatly debilitated Romanian industry, and the bad weather of 1980 and 1981 which took its toll on Romanian agriculture. "These natural disasters affected the costs of current output and of investment planning and upset

foreign trade balance, since the latter had been geared to a considerable extent towards exports of agricultural products to Western and other markets” (Shafir, 1985, p. 107).

Ceausescu’s vast building projects and expensive habits were adding to the Romanian debt. When combining all the factors of spending, the failed attempts at oil production, the import of less quality oil, the bad weather and its affect on agriculture, etc. combined with Ceausescu’s plan to pay off Romania’s billion-dollar debt by the year 1990; it is clear that Romanian economy was in trouble. This, of course, would have grave consequences on the home front. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, everything was exported for hard currency. Items easiest to sell on the international market were, of course, foodstuff. Ceausescu began to export everything, including what the Romanians were supposed to eat. Strict rationing of food was imposed on the Romanian people. In the early 1980’s, the Program of Scientific Nourishment was created. It was designed to cut calories from the national diet. At one point in time, that included meat was excluded from the Romanian diet in an attempt to reduce the calorie-intake. Obviously, this kind of restrictions cause desperation among people, but their attempts to acquire food were crushed with severe punishment. In its 1987 report, Amnesty International reported on death sentences that had been imposed, although never carried out, on individuals for stealing meat!

The Program of Scientific Nourishment was not a matter of the Regime expressing concern for the health and well being of the population, rather it was a result of Ceausescu’s bad economic policies. By exporting everything that could be traded for hard currency, especially foodstuff, he left the Romanians nothing to eat. To justify the food rationing to the public, the regime did not say it was due to financial

mismanagement; rather they “... accused large segments of the population of overeating and consequently created a Rational Nourishment Commission to watch over the implementation of a Program of Scientific Nourishment” (Ratesh, 1991). The Romanian people starved as a result of Ceausescu’s economic policies. The regime was handing out death sentences to people who stole meat out of desperation, and had only small rations allowed per person, that is, if there was food available to buy at all. In contrast to this, one should look at a typical meal at the Ceausescu residence, which had an abundant menu during the 1980’s:

Appetizers: eggplant au gratin, pickled mushrooms, green pepper salad, cucumbers with yogurt and dill, rolled ham; Fish: stuffed salmon, trout with tomatoes, grilled carp; Entrees: stuffed Parisian melons, lamb chops, veal medallions, chicken fillets, goose liver, stuffed cabbage; Assorted grillade: filet mignon, roast pork, grilled Cornish hens; Garnishes: mixed vegetables, peasant rice, potatoes au gratin; Dessert: fruitcake, crepes with fruit and cheese, assorted ice creams, petits fours; Drinks: brandy, vodka, beer, cabernet sauvignon (A. Codrescu, 1991).

It should also be noted that while Romanians were allowed only one 50 watt bulb to light their houses, and to heat to a temperature of fifty degrees during the wintertime, the Ceausescus were living in palaces with gold plated bathtubs and Elena purchasing one fur coat after another from foreign countries. Quite the imbalance of resource distribution!

Another aspect of the domestic resources was Ceausescu’s goal to increase the population of Romania. He wanted the 23 million people population to increase to roughly 30 million by the year 2000 (Ratesh, 1991). Contraception and abortion were banned and women had the duty to “supply” children to the State. The next step was the decree that obliged families to have at least four children (Pacepa, 1987). Families were forced to have children that they could not afford having, and the children, who were

born and survived, were often abandoned by parents who simply could not afford to feed them. They were left in overcrowded orphanages, referred to as “warehouses for children” by *The Washington Post* (1990), under conditions similar to those of Hitler’s concentration camps.

Ceausescu’s fertility policy and regulation of human reproduction are often regarded as a product of Ceausescu’s policies of the later part of his regime, he had actually made references to problems with the population growth - or lack thereof - already in 1966, only one year after he came to power. On June 23, 1966, Ceausescu gave a speech at the National Conference of Women. After speaking on the increase of material wealth, the higher standards of living, and the improvements made for children, Ceausescu states: “In spite of all these, a decrease in the number of births, a slow rate of increase of the country’s population has been recorded during the last years” (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 478). He goes on to citing “Shortcomings” in the country’s legislation as being the reason for the low number of births, he also cites weak legislation as being a threat to the family and makes references to “undoing the marriages.” Although, he does not specifically state what these shortcomings are, he does say that “measures are being examined to improve the present legislation in view of defending the integrity of families, of increasing the responsibility for the family, the raising of children and for favouring the increase of birth rate” (Ceausescu, 1969b, Vol. I, p. 478). Later that same year, Ceausescu signed a decree making abortion illegal in Romania.

On October 1, 1966 - one decade after abortion had been liberalized – the Council of State issued Decree 770, which forbade the interruption of the course of a pregnancy. The preamble to this decree stated: ‘The interruption of a pregnancy represents an act with grave consequences for the health of women, and its detrimental to fertility and the natural growth of the population (Kligman, 1998, p. 52).

This same decree also encouraged families to have at least three children, as well as proposing, “close supervision and monitoring of pregnant women to ensure that they did not terminate their pregnancies, and it discouraged the use of all contraceptives” (T. Keil & V. Andreescu, 1999, p. 481). The regime used an array of tactics to coerce people into having children. Punishment was imposed both on women who had illegal abortions and on the doctors who performed them. Furthermore, a tax was introduced “on adults older than twenty-five years, single or married, who were childless. Romanians, ironically, referred to this as the nation ‘celibacy’ tax” (Keil & Andreescu, 1999, p. 481).

Ceausescu also had the plan of systematization. Villages were bulldozed and their inhabitants were forced to move into state owned concrete apartment buildings, many of which did not even have running water! This was a further attempt not only to create uniformity among people. It was also an attempt to take away the Romanians’ economic independence. Owning your own home was an act of economic freedom and independence; a luxury not allowed in Ceausescu’s Romania. The houses that were not bulldozed as a result of systematization, fell victim to Ceausescu’s grand building plans. He single-handedly destroyed one-fifth of old Bucharest to make room for his projects. The tragic was not only in the fact that historic buildings and churches were destroyed, but also in the slap in the face to the Romanians who lived in the houses doomed by Ceausescu. If your house was in the way of the Ceausescu building plans, it had to be bulldozed – often at the homeowner’s expense! Sadly, protests from the West were louder when Ceausescu began to bulldoze historic buildings, than the protests heard over how he treated his people.

The increase in rations being put on goods in Romania went hand in hand with an increase in what was expected: more children should be born, more industrial production. This trend may have been coincidental, however, Ceausescu might have been well aware of the consequences of such conditions for the people: “Ceausescu knew that revolutions do not arise from despair but from hope. Keeping the ‘common people’ of Romania down by always increasing the demands put upon them and diminishing their rewards was good policy as well as economically necessary if his ever-more ambitious plans were to be accomplished” (Almond, 1992, p. 161). He never got a chance to accomplish his ambitious plans, nor did he succeed in keeping his people in such despair that they would not rise up against him. Many building projects started during the Ceausescu regime, remained unfinished a decade after the revolution. Ceausescu left his mark, both physically on Romania and scarred the Romanian economy for years to come.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE CULT OF CEAUSESCU

In his best known work, *The Prince*, Niccolo Machiavelli stated that “[a leader] ought to be both feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared than loved...” (1952 version, p. 90). Several hundred years later, a twisted version of Machiavelli’s wisdom became the basis for the leadership of the Romanian dictator, Ceausescu. As Machiavelli advised, Ceausescu ran a country of fear; his people harassed and terrorized by the secret police, the Securitate, while his personality cult created the illusion of a revered leader.

When Ceausescu came to power in 1965 after Gheorghiu-Dej’s death, he was initially seen as liberal. Having sustained 18 years of Gheorghiu-Dej’s terror, the Romanians looked to Ceausescu for better times to come than what they had experienced under Gheorghiu-Dej. “In general, life seemed to be improving, and there was sufficient ambiguity in Ceausescu’s pronouncement for citizens to hope that the future without Gheorghiu-Dej would be better than the past” (Fischer, 1989). The new Ceausescu leadership was one marked by strict adherence to ideology, emphasis on nationalism, and continuation of Romania’s attempted independent foreign policy from the USSR.

His political opponents had underestimated Ceausescu. He was actually never meant to have become the party leader, or leader of the country for that matter! “[I]t is

said that [Gheorghiu-]Dej proposed that the politburo should choose not Ceausescu but Gheorghe Apostol as his successor” (Almond, 1992, p. 62). After the death of Gheorghiu-Dej, the Romanian leadership was comprised of Prime Minister Ion Gheorge Maurer, President of the State Council Stoica Chivu, and First Secretary Ceausescu. Maurer have later allegedly confirmed Gheorghiu-Dej’s choice was Apostol. The early years after Gheorghiu-Dej’s death did seem promising; the new leadership appeared to run the country smoothly. “The late 1960s and early 1970s were probably the most prosperous years of the entire postwar period. For the first time since 1944, they were also years of hope” (V. Georgescu, 1985, p. 6), history - as written by Ceausescu - credits Ceausescu for the prosperity and the hope. In fact, he himself was referred to as the “New Hope.” However, according to Georgescu, the evidence points to Prime Minister Maurer and his followers as having been the driving force behind Romania’s prosperity (1985).

The Maurer group had hoped to use Ceausescu “merely as an ally against the old Stalinist” (Georgescu, 1985, p. 6) and did not put a lot of stock in Ceausescu’s political capabilities. They were wrong in their underestimation and it cost them the party leadership. As disillusioned as Ceausescu may become later in history, in his early days he was quite clever and cunning. In 1967, he became President of the State Council and with a Machiavellian move; he placed pro-Ceausescu people in key positions of the party, and “by the tenth party congress in 1969 he was able to control the Central Committee” (Georgescu, 1985, p. 6). Those who have studied Ceausescu’s leadership and the party under him have all made the same observation: Ceausescu rotated people from one political position to another, he never allowed anyone (other than Elena) to hold a position of power for very long at the time. The reason behind this is simple; by rotating

people, always switching them around, he made it impossible for anyone to rival his dominance of the party. It was imply impossible to gain a strong enough power base to challenge Ceausescu. By 1974, virtually all opposition had been eliminated and Ceausescu had enough control of the party to become President of the Republic. Eventually, Ceausescu would become so powerful that he *was* the Communist Party in Romania. “The Romanian Communist Party and Ceausescu came to be identified as one and the same: Ceausescu, PCR” (Kligman, 1998, p. 124). The party appeared to worship him and as his personality cult grew, so did the devotion. “Like Stalin, Ceausescu managed to annihilate the party by converting it into a passive body of almost four million members whose sole duty was to worship him” (Tismaneanu, 1990, p. 221). This worship was seen at every rally the communist party held; at every speech Ceausescu gave, hired party members provided the plaudits, making is seem as if a complete devotion to Ceausescu existed among the people.

In the beginning of his reign, Ceausescu and his supporters attempted to justify his leadership, partly though people’s participation. It was as if he was trying to legitimize the totalitarian leadership by dressing it up as something else. It seemed that he attempted - like so many other leaders - to lead by right, not by coercion alone. “In addition to promising everything to everyone, the new leaders used a variety of political techniques to encourage popular acceptance of the regime” (Fischer, 1989). These techniques included encouraging the people’s participation in the political structure, and showing a leader that was reaching out to the people through visits.

The main strategy to increase the population’s sense of participation was the introduction of multi-candidate elections. These elections had two important purposes: “it

persuaded gullible Westerners - and they were legion, at least in foreign ministries, the media, and universities - that genuine democracy was under way; and they enable [Ceausescu] to remove neatly Communists whom he disapproved of - the People had spoken” (Almond, 1992, p. 68). Candidates in the elections had to be approved by the Communists in order to run, also there was a great deal of election fraud taking place, seeing how it was Ceausescu’s people counting the ballots. “Of course, in the end it was a matter of indifference to the regime who won. Once elected to the Grand National Assembly the candidates would vote as they were told, so the local people would choose freely from the candidates put in front of them” (Almond, 1992, p. 68). It was all about image, Romania appeared to be on the road to democracy, and people were told that they had a say in the government.

The second strategy of giving people a sense of participation was the visit or tours that Ceausescu would take to places outside of Bucharest. These visits were created to make it seem as if everyone had a chance to give their input. The visits did not happen quietly, in fact, they were quite theatrical. “The staging of the visit was very dramatic, with motorcades in flower-draped cars, ovations, balcony appearances, and the traditional Romanian greeting of bread and salt upon arrival” (Fischer, 1989). Perhaps, these visits were merely a precursor to what were to come in terms of Ceausescu’s personality cult during the later years of his reign. While, Ceausescu was actually doing quite well politically, the darker sides of his personality were slowly beginning to show.

Ceausescu formed close ties to the leadership of Western countries, most significantly, the United States. As he formed strong ties with foreign leaders, he became stronger within Romania. Each state visit was a symbol of prestige. In the 1994 book,

*Romania Versus the United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985-1989*, former U.S. ambassador to Romania, Roger Kirk, and the Romanian acting deputy director of the Department of the Americas, Mircea Raceanu, tell a strange tale of a deranged Ceausescu, upset when lower ranking diplomats would visit Romania instead of high ranking officials. It seemed Ceausescu only felt the President of the United States himself was worthy of spending time with, because only he carried prestige adequate for Ceausescu. Ceausescu became upset when he was denied visits from the top executives; and instead had to settle for a mere Secretary of State visiting Bucharest. This shows the high opinion Ceausescu had of himself.

Ceausescu's self image is also shown in publications from Romania. Practically, all books published in Romania during the Ceausescu regime carry his portrait on the first page. As with all other portraits available of Ceausescu in Romania at the time, it is a portrait of a never-aging Ceausescu. Books written by Ceausescu are more political propaganda than anything. In 1987, Ceausescu's book, *An Independent Foreign Policy for Peace and Cooperation*, was released in the United States. The foreword greatly praises Ceausescu and his achievements on the world scene in regard to promoting discussions between Egypt and Israel, making the sole decision of attending the 1984 boycotted Olympics, and the like. The book was meant to give the Americans a little insight on the thoughts of Ceausescu on foreign policy. In reality, it is propaganda. By 1987, when this book was released Romania had lost most of her credibility with the U.S. due to her human rights violations. In fact, the relationship between the two countries was so undermined that Romania was at the risk of losing her MFN status.

The dust jacket of *An Independent Foreign Policy for Peace and Cooperation* is lined with quotations from various world leaders, all very favorable of Ceausescu and all - probably - very out of date and very out of context. President Carter is quoted as having said “I would say that more than to any other leader, and I include here myself, to President Ceausescu is owed the visits made by the Egyptian President to Jerusalem and in Israel.” Judging from the quote, President Carter, is acknowledging Ceausescu as a more influential leader than himself. Chances are that Ceausescu probably did believe he was more powerful than even the President of the United States was! President Carter is not the only US President quoted on the dust jacket, President Nixon and President Ford are quoted as well. Interestingly, Reagan is not quoted, probably because he is the President that Ceausescu is attempting to salvage the relationship with. Ceausescu is also quoting kind words used by European royalty:

We, in Great Britain, are impressed by your determination in asserting your independence. Consistently, Romania has maintained her distinctive position and has played an important part in world politics. You, personally, Mister President, are a statesman of a world stature, having an experience and influence that are being largely acknowledged (Queen Elizabeth II of Great Britain).

The interesting aspect of these quotes is not the fact that they are being (mis)used; rather it is the fact that Ceausescu himself was convinced that this is how the world saw him. He was convinced that he was widely respected and revered not only in Romania but also in the world. Even in 1987 after much criticism from the West over human rights. It must be noted that there are no years given for the dates of the quotes. It is not surprising that Queen Elizabeth at one point in time had addressed Ceausescu with such honor, probably at the 1978 state visit when Queen Elizabeth knighted him. The British

Monarchy was not alone in honoring Ceausescu. Other European monarchs did so as well, including Queen Margrethe II of Denmark who bestowed the Order of the Elephant upon Ceausescu. However, Ceausescu seemed to believe that once something positive had been said, it would stand for years to come regardless of how much his people suffered. He seemed to believe that he was invincible, that the world's opinion of him would never change and was eternally favorable. In Ceausescu's world, he simply could do no wrong.

The honors bestowed upon Ceausescu from the European monarchs had great political impact on Ceausescu. He already saw himself as being royalty. His regime was built on his personality cult with undertones of dynastic socialism. The honors made him feel even more rightful in his ways of handling the Romanians. "The lavish donation of Western honours helped to reinforce Ceausescu's propaganda that his period in power represented a complete new epoch in Romanian history. 1965 became the 'year zero'" (Almond, 1992, p. 101). Although, European monarchs have very little political influence, the West failed to realize that regardless of how much the monarchs are stripped of political power, there is always implied political issues, or in the case of Ceausescu, indirect politics. For instance, for every state visit Her Majesty Queen Margrethe II receives in Denmark, her speeches are combed for political statements. If any political statements are found, they are simply removed before she gives her speech. As monarch, she is a figurehead and does not play a political role. However, in the case of Ceausescu the mere fact that European royalty received him was political and increased his power in his own eyes. Even though it was symbolic when Queen Elizabeth, Queen Margrethe, and other monarchs in late December 1989 renounced

Ceausescu and took back honors he had received from them, it was still a political move that should have happened much sooner.

Ceausescu thrived from the attention he was getting from the West, especially after the defiance of Moscow after the invasion of Prague. Little did the West know that Ceausescu's stand against interference by other communist parties, especially from USSR, was more than just a warning about the outside world, but was directed just as much towards the Romanian people.

In reality, the Romanian leader was speaking to Romanians as well, and equating any breach of the Party discipline with betrayal of the Romanian nations. This was a tactic that Ceausescu would use repeatedly: To disagree with him was to be a traitor to Romania. His implications made it very difficult for anyone to oppose Ceausescu... (Fischer, 1989).

During the Ceausescu years, nationalism became a powerful politically tool. Ceausescu was the favorite son of Romania, and with his rewriting of history, he became the savior of Romania. Making the "opposing Ceausescu is opposing Romania" tactic even more powerful; if you challenged Ceausescu, you challenged Romania and everything she stood for!

After Ceausescu's visit to the People's Republic of China and North Korea in 1971, significant changes took place in his leadership style. "North Korea was the perfect model of an absolute totalitarianism" (N. Ratesh, 1991). Having observed the personality cult of Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung, Ceausescu would attempt to replicate it in Romania. His wife Elena would see an increase in her political role as well, after she had seen the political role played by Madam Zedong. The early 1970s marked significant changes in time to come in Romania. Ceausescu would back off the liberal policies and turn to the old Stalinist ways, both in terms of personality cult and in terms of his politics

and economics. “In the Stalinist tradition, he emphasized huge prestige-brining projects, mostly in the steel and petrochemical industries” (Georgescu, 1985, p. 6). This, as we have seen, would destroy the Romanian economy. Ceausescu’s following of Stalin was not something that only happened in the 1970s, it continued throughout the 1980s as well, even as the other communist countries, including the USSR began to back off from those practices. “While other Eastern European countries experimented with limited reforms, Ceausescu emulated the methods of Stalin, whom he revered” (Kligman, 1998, p.134).

The Ceausescu personality cult was far-reaching and probably an adequate rival to Stalin’s personality cult. There is a lot of irony in the fact that when Ceausescu came to power he began to distance himself from Gheorghiu-Dej, accusing him of being a Stalinist, Ceausescu condemned the abuse of the Securitate and their methods against political prisoners. Romania, which never underwent de-Stalinization like the other East-bloc nations, looked forward to a future of de-Stalinization under Ceausescu (Tismaneanu, 1990, p. 220). Yet, throughout the Ceausescu years, Romanian prisons were filled with political prisoners and the Securitate was present more than ever. It is said that one in four Romanians was an agent for the Securitate, other argue that it was actually one in three. Either way, the Securitate had a great presence and more than ever imposed on people’s lives. The Securitate is also said to have placed microphones in every single telephone in Communist Romania, however, in his 1992 book, *The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu*, Mark Almond suggests that this is not true, simply because the inefficient Romanian government would not have been capable of carrying out such operation. It seems irrelevant whether there were microphones in the telephones or not; the fear of their presence was enough to control the Romanian people.

Ceausescu's personality cult extended to his wife Elena (born Petrescu) as well. She was given much power within the party and was second in command. Some of Romania's most outrageous policies during the 1970s and 1980s were actually thought up by Elena. Elena was not the only family member who held power in the PCR, many Ceausescu relatives held key positions as well; "[b]y the late 1970s, Romanians talked about their Party, 'PCR', as 'Petrescu - Ceausescu - and Relations'" (Almond, 1992, p. 75). It appeared that the Ceausescus were grooming their youngest son, Nicu, to take over the leadership; they were trying to create a dynasty of Socialism. "The most famous joke was 'In the Soviet Union under Stalin, they achieved "Socialism in One Country," but in Romania under Ceausescu we have achieved "Socialism in One Family"!"' (Almond, 1992, p. 75).

Portraits of the First Couple were everywhere. Ceausescu's mere wish became law. Tales are told of a village painting the leaves on their trees green to prepare for a fall visit by the Ceausescus, or when Ceausescu left for a trip during the winter and said he did not want to see any more snow when he returned, the party cleared Bucharest of snow from the airport to the palace. Scornicesti, where Ceausescu was born, had been turned into a national memorial; in fact, it has been given historic significance.

It is written in Romanian history books that this is the place, or the general neighborhood, where man first lived in Europe. No matter that history books elsewhere in the world disagree; such things rarely matter in Romania. What matters is that Nicolae Ceausescu, the president of Romania and would-be hero of Romanian heroes, was born here. That his hometown – through a revision here, a sleight of hand there – has also been made the hometown of the first European man follows naturally. For in the Romania of Ceausescu – an autocratic ruler who demands unceasing adulation – the large gap between what is written and what is experienced, between ideals and reality, is growing ever larger (Thurow, 1986, p. 4).

This gap between ideal and reality also shows in Romanians being told their living during the “Time of Light,” “the Golden Age of Romania,” when in fact most of them are starving and cannot heat their homes. Or the gap between Elena’s actual academic abilities and her academic achievements: it has been said that she was illiterate, or at least did not have the patience to read anything lengthy, yet she held an array of academic titles, honorary degrees from foreign universities, and she was an alleged scientist with volumes of work published. The reality is that a team of Romanian scientists wrote her work, not Elena herself. The Ceausescus have collected titles from abroad and felt best in the constant adulation especially from the West. If they did not get the recognition from abroad, they made it up. In 1989 for Ceausescu’s birthday, the Romanians published a birthday greeting from Queen Elizabeth, praising the dictator. The greeting was actually never sent, or even written. Romanian propaganda officials had pieced the greeting together from old tributes. The British government was not amused!

As mentioned earlier, the recognition from Western leaders was important for Ceausescu to legitimize his rule. “...Ceausescu continued to receive a daily deluge of congratulatory telegrams from tinpot rulers the world over until the last days of his rule, the reprinting of old praise from the Queen shows how desperate he was to present his people with evidence that he was acceptable to the West” (Almond, 1992, p. 143). If the West accepted him, then his people would see him important he was to the country and he could continue to keep Romania in a tight grip, with no freedom for independent thought.

Since 1965, Ceausescu has been the absolute proprietor of Romania. His portrait is on display everywhere, more than those of Hitler and Stalin in their day. Ceausescu’s will becomes law at the mere scrawl of his pen...all the domestic media from children’s magazines to television stations,

belong to Ceausescu more than the Hearst newspapers ever belonged to William Randolph Hearst (Pacepa, 1987).

Supporters who allowed him and Elena to continue their atrocities against the Romanian people surrounded Ceausescu. No one dared opposing him and his followers allowed him to continue living in the illusion that he, in fact, was “The Chosen One.” The fact that he was allowed to believe this had grave consequence for the country and the Romanians. The Ceausescus were all-knowing and their followers treated them as such, with detrimental long-lasting effects. “Their insistence on providing answers for everything usually leads to mistaken strategies and wrong decisions” (Georgescu, 1985, p. 7). The devastated economy was a product of Ceausescu’s decision-making, had he had strong economic advisors, they would have prevented his irrational economic policies. However, no one dared to say anything or advise Ceausescu. In fact, no one even dared to do their job without specific directions from the all-knowing Ceausescu:

President Ceausescu has been led to believe that he knows how to build dams, harvest fields, dig canals, and write history books; specialists are reluctant to do their jobs until they know what the ‘precious directives’ are (Georgescu, 1985, p. 7-8).

Ceausescu completely lost touch with reality because the people surrounding him allowed him to. Kirk and Raceanu (1994) gave several examples of messages from the US administration that had been softened in tone before they reached Ceausescu, simply because no Romanian official dared bringing Ceausescu bad news. He may never have fully realized just how unpopular his regime was. He lived in the illusion that his people adored him. Even as his reign ended and the revolution broke out, the Ceausescu propaganda machine continued its job: uphold the illusion that Ceausescu is unopposed. After violent confrontation during the first days of the revolution, “[w]orkmen were

dispatched to paint out the anti-Ceausescu slogans which demonstrators had scrawled on the walls of the university buildings” (Almond, 1992, p. 9). The same propaganda machine that had credited Ceausescu for Romania’s prosperity in the late 1960s and made Ceausescu seem as if he was Romania’s Savior, now attempted to deny that the revolution ever started. “Even today, neat blocks of green paint can be seen where the diligent rewriting of history had started. Removing the signs of discontent was always the first step to denying that it had ever existed” (Almond, 1992, p. 9). When Ceausescu left for his visit to Iran in December 1989, he had been told that the uprising in Timisoara had been crushed. Needless to say, when he returned and the uprisings had spread to Bucharest he was shocked! He attempted to call a rally in Bucharest, promising the people a few extra pennies in pensions, to salvage the discontent. The hired party members clapped and cheered as usually, but the workers called in for the rally did not. Instead, they began to boo him. He was confused and shocked. Watching the tape of the Bucharest rally, one gets the impression that Ceausescu is merely an old, disorientated man with absolutely no comprehension of how unpopular his policies had been. No one had told him how hated he was. No one dared to. Everyone who surrounded him had allowed him to live in the illusion created by his personally cult. When Ceausescu finally got a glimpse of the disgruntlement of his people, he was paralyzed by confusion.

“...When his moment of clarity came – when an angry crowd did the unthinkable and shouted him down during another cliché-ridden speech in Bucharest... - all he could do was stare slack-jawed, a bewildered old man about to run” (D. Fisher & H. Trimborn, 1989, p.13). As the Ceausescu fled, Manea Manescu, a high-ranking party member, would show the devotion of those closet to him a final time. “When they parted, Manescu

knelt to kiss his master's hands, making the gesture of oriental servility for the last time" (Almond, 1992, p. 15).

Ceausescu disillusionments are even cleared during his so-called trial (see Appendix B). When confronted by the prosecutor about the starving Romanians, Ceausescu responds "...For the first time I guaranteed that every peasant received 200 kilograms of wheat per person, nor per family, and that he is entitled to more. It is a lie that I made the people starve. A lie, a lie in my face. This shows how little patriotism there is, how many treasonable offenses were committed." As so many times before, Ceausescu plays on nationalism and the notion that he *is* Romania; to challenge him is to challenge Romania, a grave offense of treason. Ceausescu was obviously out of touch with reality and continued saying, "I guaranteed that every village has its schools, hospitals and doctors. I have done everything to create a decent and rich life for the people in the country, like in no other country in the world." Ceausescu, in fact, did create conditions for his people like no other country in the world. The problem was that Ceausescu seemed convinced that the conditions he had created were better than those of other countries, not worse which was the reality.

It was thought that the Ceausescus had billions of dollars hidden away in foreign bank accounts; the speculation still exists. However, there is no evidence that the Ceausescus put any money in Swiss bank accounts, or anywhere else for that matter. "...[N]either Nicolae nor Elena Ceausescu felt under any compulsion to insure themselves against a rainy day. They were confident that they were on the winning side of history and did not need to take precautions against exile in the autumn of their lives" (Almond, 1992, p. 80). They simply did not believe that there was any discontent among

their people; the thought of a revolution did not appear to ever have entered their minds. “Their chaotic flight in 22 December revealed their complete lack of serious contingency plans for the eventuality of a *coup*, let alone a popular revolution” (Almond, 1992, p. 81). The Ceausescus had been alienated by their personality cult and were completely out of touch with reality.

After his execution on Christmas morning, 1989, the world woke up to images of the dictator’s “trial” and dead body. How the Ceausescu had been perceived was quite obvious. It is said that for every bullet Ceausescu himself got, ten were fired at Elena. Her political role had earned her a reputation that would follow her to her death. In response to the overthrow, *The Independent* wrote, “‘the legendary mother of the fairytales of our childhood’ was seen for what she is - the evil witch” (1989, December 23). The views on Ceausescu were summed up perfectly by a Bucharest Radio announcer: “Oh What wonderful news! The Anti-Christ died on Christmas Day!” (Fisher and Trimborn, 1989, p. 13).

## **CHAPTER IX**

### **GHEORGHIU-DEJ VERSUS CEAUSESCU**

Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu had very similar political careers in Romania; both strived for an independent Romania, both at one point followed Stalin's methods and at one point put himself at a distance to Stalin. Both men were feared, though with Gheorghiu-Dej it was genuine fear of a terrorizing regime, where the fear of Ceausescu was somewhat softened by the absurdity of his regime. Under Ceausescu, people joked and were sarcastic about their hated leadership, under Gheorghiu-Dej, no one dared crack a joke about him, only the rivaling Pauker. There is no doubt that Gheorghiu-Dej had a tremendous impact on young Ceausescu from the moment they met in a Romanian prison. Although, serving as a mentor, Gheorghiu-Dej did not plan on Ceausescu taking his place. The story of their political leadership is very similar, however (see table 3).

Gheorghiu-Dej started out being dependent on the USSR for his power, he needed to Soviets to impose his Communist rule on Romania, much like Ceausescu started out being dependent on Gheorghiu-Dej. Ceausescu needed Gheorghiu-Dej, his mentoring and his friendship to gain a position of power within the PCR. Once Gheorghiu-Dej felt secure enough that he could control the Romanians, he distanced himself from the USSR. Ceausescu followed Gheorghiu-Dej like a puppy-dog, was his servant although their prison time together, but once Gheorghiu-Dej had passed away and Ceausescu had taken

power, the PCR was in his control, he, too, would distance himself from his source of power. In Gheorghiu-Dej's case the source was the USSR, in Ceausescu's the source was Gheorghiu-Dej.

**Table 3. Contrasts between Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu**

	<b>1944-1950* Gheorghiu-Dej</b>	<b>1950-1965* Gheorghiu-Dej</b>	<b>1965-1970* Ceausescu</b>	<b>1970-1989* Ceausescu</b>
<b>USSR</b>	Dependent upon for power	Strive for independence	Independence, own policies	Dependent, alienated
<b>Military Alliances</b>	--	Useful for manipulation	Threat to world peace, security	Threat, but, necessary
<b>Personality Cult</b>	Built own, small	Denounced Stalin's, built own	Denounced that of Stalin & Gheorghiu-Dej	Extreme, not even rivaled by Stalin's
<b>Securitate</b>	Used	Widely Used	Denounced methods	Extensive use of Securitate
<b>Abortion</b>	Illegal	Legalized mid-1950s	1966: Illegal by decree	Extreme fertility policy & anti-abortion
<b>Economics</b>	Few private enterprises	No private enterprise	Allowed private enterprise	No private enterprise
<b>Collectivization</b>	Slow	Rapid & brutal	Denounced Gheorghiu-Dej's brutality	Blow harder by systematization
<b>Human Rights</b>	No regards, arrests and harsh penalties common	Mass arrests & long prison sentences w/o trial	Improved conditions, initially	Blatant violations, physical and psychological
<b>Stalin</b>	Devout Stalinist	Denounced Stalin	Denounced Stalin & Gheorghiu-Dej	Re-introduced to the extreme

*\*All years are approximate*

The break from the USSR came under Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceausescu carried it out and like Gheorghiu-Dej, he attempted to fill the vacuum with stronger relationship with the Western world. Both of them saw the need for Romania to have allies, only Ceausescu's grotesque policies would eventually leave Romania alienated from the world, with nowhere else to turn, but to the Soviets. The independence that Romania had fought to hard for, was taken away in the 1980s, when Romania's economy was in such shambles that she would not be able to operate without Soviet assistance. Communist Romania had come full circle: She had started out needing the USSR for power, after three decades of striving for independence, she once again found herself dependent on the USSR for survival, this time for economic reasons rather than political.

There is also a similar trend between the two leaders in denouncing those before them, just to take up the same policies they had denounced, Gheorghiu-Dej condemned the harsh methods taking against the peasants in the USSR while implementing collectivization, however, he himself impose extreme brutality upon the peasantry in Romania. Ceausescu harshly criticized Gheorghiu-Dej's use of the Securitate and the mass arrests, however, Ceausescu did not only fail to release Gheorghiu-Dej's political prisoners after taking power, he would also eventually - with Elena's help - use the Securitate much more extensive that Gheorghiu-Dej ever did. While Gheorghiu-Dej may have been harsh in his penalties against his opponents, at least he never imposed death sentences on desperate people for stealing meat, an occurrence in 1984 under Ceausescu.

While Gheorghiu-Dej had used the Securitate and Romania intelligence service for economic gains, such as with the Jacober-Marcu gentleman's agreement, where Ceausescu's usage of intelligence services was for political gain, typically to further his

standing as the mediator of the modern world. Ceausescu seem to have been motivated by a need for approval from everyone, Gheorghiu-Dej was in constant strive for complete power over the Romanian people.

Women played an important part in the leadership for both of them. Gheorghiu-Dej was in rivalry with Pauker for years, many viewed him as a mere figurehead while Pauker was seen as the true behind-the-scenes mastermind of the PCR. Gheorghiu-Dej and Pauker were constantly at each other's throats, causing much friction and fighting within the Party. In many ways, Pauker became Gheorghiu-Dej's nemesis, and as a result, he probably would not have been in favor of women in the PCR leadership. The story was different with Ceausescu; the woman playing a detrimental role in his government was his wife, Elena. Changes are that Elena for years have influenced Ceausescu working behind the scenes, it was not until after the China visit in the early 1970s, however, that Elena would be given a visible leadership role of her own. Much of it was pure coincident. The PCR wanted at the time to portray a party in favor of women's rights - perhaps the soften the absurd fertility policies - and by mere association, Elena was put in a power position.

As with Gheorghiu-Dej and Pauker, Elena would cause tension in the Party, not because she rivaled Ceausescu, but because the two of them became to removed from reality that the party became the Ceausescu. Together they ruled their two-headed tyranny. Elena became a bigger joke within the party than her husband. Many of the most outrageous policies were her creations, such as the decree to ban privately owned typewriters. While Gheorghiu-Dej and Pauker almost destroyed the PCR with their constant bickering, Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu did manage to destroy the party by

distancing themselves from everyone else and allowing for no other party base. The Ceausescu managed to turn the PCR into a mockery of a party. The PCR existed merely as an empty shell, while the Ceausescu ran Romania into the ground.

Women played an important role in politics in Communist Romania, as did women's rights. Under Gheorghiu-Dej, abortion was legalized, giving women the right to choose. Gheorghiu-Dej, however, was not known as a women's rights advocate. It is an issue he rarely addressed. In contrast, Ceausescu spoke highly of the importance of women's role in Communist Romania, underlining the significance of Romania's women as workers, mothers, and by the statute of Elena, party members. Ironically, Ceausescu who spoke favorable on women's rights and through Elena made it seem as if he truly believed in women playing an imperative role, would be the leader to not only outlaw abortion, but also impose some of the most restrictive fertility policies on the Romanians. Sadly, when Ceausescu spoke of the important role of motherhood he believed he had liberalized Romanian women, when in reality he oppressed them more than Gheorghiu-Dej had ever done.

Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu had many similar views, although for Ceausescu the views did not emerge until later in his dictatorship after failed attempts to distance himself from his mentor, Gheorghiu-Dej. With the leadership of these two men, Communism in Romania came full circle: it ended up as fragile and dependent upon Moscow as it had started out to be. Years of Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu struggling for an independent position for Romania had failed and the only thing the Romanians had to show for it was a ruined economy and a society so oppressed that the mere mentioning of the secret police was enough to stir emotions of fear.

## **CHAPTER X**

### **POSTSCRIPT: ROMANIA AFTER THE REVOLUTION**

On December 25, 1989, the world watched as Ceausescu was tried and executed on TV. Days of bloody fighting culminated in the fall of the tyrant and his much hated wife. The Romanians - like the East Germans, the Czechs and the Slovaks - were for the first time in decades able to experience the same freedom enjoyed by their neighbors in West Europe. Images of an old and confused Ceausescu on trial are still in the minds of many of us who watched from the outside. For nearly a quarter of a decade, Romanians had lived under the two-headed tyranny of the Ceausescus. Their suffering at the hands of the dictator had finally come to an end and they could start to look to a new future. A future without Ceausescu. However, as the revolutionary dust settled, it became clear that the ghost of Ceausescu, the legacy of his wrongdoings would be with the Romanians for time to come.

The first obstacle the Romanians faced was the skepticism surrounding their revolution. More than a decade after, questions still linger whether the December 1989 events were popular uprising or a coup d'etat. It seems conspiracy theories generally evolve to explain revolutions; there are theories linking the Illuminati to the French Revolution in 1789, the Jews to the Russian Revolution in 1917, and there are theories explaining the involvement of everyone from the Russian KGB and the American CIA to

the Hungarians and the Romanian Communists in the Romanian Revolution of 1989.

Perhaps these alternative explanations are caused by an inability to understand how people spontaneously organize and mobilize their revolutionary efforts. Through Western eyes, the apparent lack of reform and a sort of unwillingness to let go of the old communist ways (and people!) in the time after the revolution would make it seem as if there was never a revolution. From the West, it looks as if it was merely the Romanian Communist Party disposing of an unpopular leader to remain in power under more likeable leadership. On December 26, 1989, the Toronto Star and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch both picked up a story on the AP wire, linking new Romanian leader, Ion Iliescu with both Ceausescu and Gorbachev. Iliescu remained the leader of Romania well into the 1990s and was re-elected in 2000. Iliescu had served in high-ranking positions under Ceausescu, but had fallen victim to Ceausescu's political game of musical chairs and was demoted. Iliescu's Communist past quickly tied the Romanian party into the conspiracy to overthrow Ceausescu. His friendship with Gorbachev helped fuel the theory that the Soviet leadership had orchestrated the removal of Ceausescu. In the mid to late 1980s it was clear that Gorbachev was embarrassed, if not annoyed, by Ceausescu, his cult of personality, and his unwillingness to fall into line with the Glasnost policies. Conspiracy theorists will have us believe that Gorbachev, who argued for openness and reform, returned to basic-Stalin like principals and purged Ceausescu from the party. Theories connecting the Hungarians, the West, and everyone else to the Romanian revolution are just as ludicrous as attempting to put Gorbachev in a Stalinist frame of mind.

Granted, the new government in Romania was mainly populated by former communists. However, in the context of the Communist party having been the sole party for nearly fifty years, there would be no other ideology to get politicians from. In his 1994 article, *The Romanian Revolution from a Theoretical Perspective*, Steven Roper distinguishes between communist individuals and the communist party being in power in post-revolution Romania. "This is an important distinction when one considers that in the short-term so-called 'communist expertise' will be needed in running industries and conducting domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, communist political leadership is not in and of itself an indication of a failed revolution" (Roper, 1994, p. 105).

In 1990, the Romanians overwhelmingly elected Iliescu as their president. It was probably more difficult to understand the election of a Communist for Westerners than it was for the Romanians. For the West it seems strange that the Romanians would overthrow a Communist dictator, just to replace him with another Communist, but taking the circumstances of Romania it is likely that the Romanians simply did not know of Iliescu's past with the Ceausescu regime. After all, the personality cult surrounding Ceausescu made it seem as if the Ceausescus were the Communist Party. News was devoted to the Ceausescus, without any publicity given to other officials within the party. Second, there is the argument put forth by Nestor Ratesh, a senior correspondent in Washington for the Romanian Service of Radio Free Europe, who believes "...most Romanians were inclined to view Iliescu less as a Communist and more as one who freed the country of Ceausescu and made quick and major improvements in their every day life" (Ratesh, 1991). Iliescu and the FSN (National Salvation Front) came in and put food on the shelves again (at least temporarily). To the starving Romanians, whether the

Iliescu Front was Communist was simply not an issue. The issue at hand was that they were free from the tyranny of Ceausescu and they had food to eat again.

Ratesh also raises the question of whether the Romanians even knew what the word, 'democracy' meant. For a people as repressed as the Romanians under Ceausescu it is difficult to suddenly turn to free elections and democracy without any form of training or education in the concept. "...[T]he people were confused, hardly able to distinguish between different options, totally inexperienced in democracy, and fearful of the future" (Ratesh, 1991). Romania had spent decades under authoritarian rule, a quarter of a decade under a regime where you could not own a typewriter, not decide how many children to have without governmental interference. In that context, it is really no wonder the new Romania had such a hard struggle and that they went with what was familiar: Communism.

From the standpoint of the Romanians, gaining recognition and assistance from the West would be important aspects of the new developing democracy in Romania and membership in NATO has been of top priority of the post-revolution government in Romania, even as it shifted leadership from Iliescu to Emil Constantinescu in 1996. Joining NATO and the EU have been of especial importance to the Romanian government for economic, political, as well as historical reasons. Historically, Romanians have seen themselves as "an island of Romans in the sea of Slavs." They feel little, if any, commonalities with their Slavic neighbors. They have emphasized their strong ties to the Romans, simply by the spelling of the name of their country, Romania (as opposed to earlier acceptable spellings, Rumania and Roumania). Their language is Roman based, and to the untrained ear sounds somewhat similar to Italian when spoken. By joining an

organization, like NATO or EU, organizations that symbolizes the cultural values and traditions of the West, Romania can bridge some of the geographical distance between her and her Roman relatives in Europe.

Romania's reasons for wishing to join [NATO] appear to be based more on political and economic considerations than on security concerns. Romanians tend to regard NATO membership as an important symbolic recognition of their country's commitment to western values and institutions. Romanians believe that membership in NATO and the European Union will assist them as they modernize and adopt Western political and economic systems (C. Ek, 1997, p.8).

One of the most detrimental issues facing modern day Romania is that of acceptance by the international community, especially the West. During the mid-1990's it looked as if the West was welcoming Romania, promises of NATO and EU membership were made. Romania was embracing the West as well. In 1997, when U.S. President Clinton visited Romania, a large enthusiastic crowd met him. "Clinton's visit symbolized nothing less than the closing of that dark historical chapter, which continued beyond the fall of the Berlin Wall" (Kaplan, 1998). During the 1997 visit, both Clinton and the Romanians expressed positive attitudes regarding Romania's potential membership in NATO.

Although, Romanian NATO membership was rejected at the 1997 Madrid Summit, at the time her chances of joining NATO looked promising, it now becomes clear when looking at the "application requirements" that Romanian NATO membership is highly unlikely in the near future. "[T]he applicants were measured by their democratic experience, settlement of boundary and ethnic (including religious) disputes and the status of their free market economies" (T.M. Leonard, 2000, p. 517).

Romania, enthusiastic about the possibility of becoming a NATO member, has actively resolved “local” conflicts. According to the 1999 CIA World Fact Book, she has settled disputes with Ukraine. Treaties have also been signed with neighboring Hungary, Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia, Slovakia, and agreements have been made – or are being negotiated – with Moldova, Turkey, Greece, “and other countries in the region on matters affecting trade, security, the environment, and law enforcement” (Ek, 1999, p. 3). In addition to her peaceful relations with countries in the region, Romania has also shown initiative and desire in being a part of the international community. Romanians can take pride in “being the first East European country to formally join the Partnership for Peace program and that its troops participated in the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Iraq/Kuwait and in Albania” (Leonard, 2000, p. 525).

One of the largest hurdles Romania has to conquer is her economic problem. The Romanian economy was devastated coming out of the Ceausescu Regime. Inflation and instability constantly threaten economic growth, the economic instability in turn may cause political instability as well. The price tag on NATO membership may be more than what the Romanian economy can bear. “...Romanians will have to dig deep into their meager pockets to find the huge sums needed to upgrade their army to NATO standards” (T. Gallagher, 1999). Romania simply does not meet the standards.

Romania has attempted to update her military forces to become compatible with NATO, however, “Romania lags behind Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary” (Ek, 1999, p. 3). According to Ek, Specialist in International Relations for the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the U.S. Congressional Research Service, Romania spent the first half of the 1990s reorganizing the structure of her military to meet the

military standards of the West and creating – or at least, plan to create, a “rapid reaction force” (1999). In terms of actual equipment improvements, the U.S. Government reports:

The country is upgrading its fighter aircraft, armor, naval vessels, communications facilities, and missile launching system. In addition, Romania has acquired four U.S. C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, and has contracted to purchase, with Ex-Im Bank assistance, five Lockheed-Martin long-range surveillance radar systems (Ek, 1999, pp.3-4).

However, Romania still has a long way to go in terms of military upgrades before being able to measure up to NATO - and Western - standards.

Another issue that currently prevents Romania from obtaining NATO membership is the issue of military control. NATO requires civilian control of military and intelligence agencies, and as of now, Romania has not been able to meet that requirement. Like the U.S., the Romanian president is the Commander-in-Chief (Romanian Constitution, Title III, Chapter II, article 92, subsection 1, adopted on November 21, 1991, and approved by national referendum on December 8, 1991) and the minister of defense is a civilian as well. “Some observers, however, argue that having civilians in a few of the top spots does not alone constitute full civilian control; they add that, in the past, parliament exercised limited control and oversight over the military” (Ek, 1999, pp. 4-5). A final blow to the civilian control of Romanian military and intelligence is the shadow of the old Securitate still lingering around. In fact, former members of the Securitate still held high positions within the Romanian intelligence community years into the 1990s, the decade that was supposed to be a decade of freedom and reform.

Supporters of Romanian NATO membership argue that Romania is in fact prepared, that she does in fact meet the admissions criteria, that she had proven her

transition to democracy when the Romanians elected Constantinescu in 1996 and thereby ended – at least temporarily – the reign of the old Communist Party and its affiliates. It was also argued that for the time being, Romania's economy seemed to be improving, this however, did not last long.

In Romania's favor is geography. Kaplan points out that Romania is strategically located for NATO, being an addition to Turkey in bordering the Black Sea (1998). Others have made the same argument as well. "The Bosnian conflict highlighted the importance of controlling the Danube River. Without the ability to block the river, it would have been impossible to block Serbia. The international community's base for policing the river traffic was in Romania" (Leonard, 2000, p. 524).

"The Romanian claims for preparedness to enter NATO impressed only the organization's southern tier members...but its case was sufficiently strong to prompt President Clinton to assure that Romania would receive primary consideration in the next round of expansion, presumably in April 1999. Events in Romania since the Madrid Summit, however, have weakened its case" (Leonard, 2000, p.525). There is no doubt that the Romanians were disappointed in the results of the 1997 Madrid Summit. They held high hopes and were positive about NATO membership. It is heartbreaking that now, five years later, Romania is even further away from becoming part of NATO, due to the continuing crumbling of her economy, and with the 2000 reelection of Iliescu being seen as a step back for democracy in Romania. In his 2000 article, Leonard quotes Bogdan Mazaru, a political counselor at Romania's Embassy in the United States as saying: "Whereas the Romanian people thought that economic reforms would come with admission to NATO, they now see that reforms must come as a prerequisite for

admission to NATO” (p. 252). The task that lies ahead for Romania in restructuring her economy is one of overwhelming magnitude.

The second large Western organization that Romania is eager to join is the European Union. As with NATO, there are an array of problems that Romania has to resolve before feeling warm greetings and open arms from West Europe. Currently, Romania is considered last in the line of countries looking to join the EU. This is partly because Romania, the second largest former East-bloc country after Poland, is also the poorest former East-bloc nation.

Romania is trying her hardest, putting on her Sunday best, in attempt to please the wealthy nations to the West. BBC News reported on June 5, 2000 that Romania along with Bulgaria is trying to tighten border control for illegal immigrants using Romania as a gateway to asylum in the EU. Immigration, especially illegal immigration, has become a hot topic on the political scene of Europe. Obviously, as a united Europe opens borders among member states, the responsibility of keeping illegals out of the EU fall upon those countries with borders to the “outside world”. Currently, Romania is on the outside, but wants to be inside and the restricted border control is her way of showing the EU, that if made a member, Romania will be able to do her part in the attempt of restricting immigration flow to the wealthy nations of the EU, which are currently being overwhelmed by the stream of immigrants. Romanians would also like to see visa requirements for Romanians removed by the EU. Currently, most EU countries – like the U.S. – allow for visa-free tourist travel for stays up to three months for citizens of certain countries (based on diplomatic relationships). The visa-free travel does not, however,

apply to Romanians, partly because of the migrants from Asia, Africa, and the Middle East that use Romania as a gateway to Western Europe (BBC News, 2000).

The EU is considering expanding the membership to include some of the former East-bloc nations. Countries like Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Malta, and Poland are in the “forerunner” group, meaning the group containing the most qualified candidates. This group could be admitted already in 2004. The second group, where Romania falls and which also includes Bulgaria, Latvia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey, does not currently have a target date for membership. These countries all have various internal problems that will need to be resolved before they will achieve possible candidacy for membership. Turkey, for example, has been criticized for its human rights violations, whereas the other nations in the second group mainly are being held back by economic problems.

There are internal issues among current members of the EU in terms of just how much the EU should be expanded. Some present members fear that they would lose current EU subsidies; others fear how the Eastern workers will affect the job market in countries like Germany and Austria. “The European Commission estimates that admitting 10 East European nations to the EU could result in a migration to the more prosperous west of 3.9 million people over 30 years. Most are expected to go to Germany and Austria” (CNN Worldnews, May 2001). To alleviate this, it has been suggested that a waiting period be imposed on the new member states. That is, workers from the former East-bloc nations should be kept out of the current member states for seven years after their respective countries have joined the EU. This strategy has been used in the past,

after all, this is not the first time that the wealthy, established members of the EU have had fears about admitting countries with less sound economies.

As mentioned, most of the “group 2” nations are being held back in the admission process due to financial instability or human rights abuses. Romania has problems with both; her economy is shattered and she has been in recent spotlight due to the conditions under which Romanian children live. Romania has been largely criticized by the EU for her international adoptions as well as the conditions under which children live. Romanian adoption agencies operated largely without regulation and were free to set their own prices for the cost of children adopted. This exploitation, not only of the children up for adoption, but also of the couples of the West looking to adopt, severely damaged Romania’s standing with the EU. To better her image and increase chances of membership, Romania banned international adoptions in 2001. (CNN Worldnews). EU only admits nations with democratic systems where human rights are not violated. The conditions under which Romania’s children are living is seen as a grave human rights violation by West Europeans, this will therefore need to be resolved before Romania will be seriously considered as a candidate for EU membership.

Romania has also kept her strong ties with China, established under the years of communism. In 1999, the Romanian Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, Ion Diaconescu, visited China and at the time was interviewed by Beijing Review. Amongst other things, he made it clear that Romania does not recognize Taiwan and never has. Romania believes in the “One China” policy and by that differ in foreign policy from the U.S. This is not the only issue where the Romanians have disagreed with the U.S. For

instance, when asked about the bombing of Serbia and the accidental attack on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Diaconescu had the following reply:

I consider that NATO's action is regretful. The Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia is part of Chinese territory. The bombing of the embassy is actually an aggressive action. At that moment, the Romanian people stood on the side of the Chinese people. Romania rapidly agreed to the demand from China for its relief airplane to pass our territory and made preparations for supporting the Chinese people. We have noticed that the US Government made an apology to the Chinese Government and people over this event. At present, to guarantee the stability and security of the country, Romania has a foreign policy goal to join NATO and the European Union. However, we and the Serbian people are friends. The target of our foreign policy will not prevent Romanian and Serbian peoples from remaining friends (Beijing Review, August 1999, p.23).

The time since the December 1989 Revolution has proven a trying time for Romania. Coming out of the 1980's with Ceausescu's economic reform policy (or lack thereof!), which had left the Romanian economy devastated, Romania and her people have been struggling to get afloat. She is not only struggling with economic transitions, but with political transition as well. Romania is trying to define her role as a democracy, find her place in the international community, and desperately attempting to revive her once prosperous economy.

Ceausescu's plans of paying off the Romanian debt had caused great imbalance in Romanian import versus export and had devastating effects on her economy. "In 1989 the Romanian economy was one of the most isolated, tightly controlled, and centralized in Eastern Europe, with a highly distorted economic structure which included fixed assets, low managerial skills, and declining economic competitiveness" (L. Stan, 1995, p. 428). While everything was being exported, hardly anything was imported, denying Romania of Western technology and equipment, furthermore the psychological effects on the

population would have lasting effects, causing little social preparedness for transition.

“Thus, Romania not only had one of the longest ways to go toward a market economy, but was also the least equipped to get there” (Stan, 1995, p. 428).

One of the most difficult issues that Romania today is faced with is getting foreign investment in. It will be impossible for her economy to recover and to achieve her goals of privatization. Foreign investment is difficult to achieve, especially being that Western countries and business remain skeptical about Romania. The shadow of the old Communist Regime, which remains in government has caused some investors to put on the brakes in terms of investments in Romania. “Romania’s image in the international arena is unsatisfactory and needs a radical boost if more significant foreign investment is to be attracted” (Stan, 1995, p. 433). The 2000 re-election of Iliescu may have caused even more of a slow down in foreign investments, but only time will tell.

During the first nine years after the Revolution, the total foreign investment in Romania has been roughly \$3 billion (Kaplan, 1998). In 1998, the foreign direct investment per capita was \$91, according to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This is reflected upon the country; there is “...a near absence of significant foreign investment outside of Bucharest and Timisoara, and a monstrosly wasteful and environmentally destructive Communist-era infrastructure” (Kaplan, 1998). It should be noted that the Romanian government has attempted to attract foreign investors with an array of benefits:

Foreign investors receive substantial tax holidays and releases from custom duties on their in-kind capital contributions and imports of raw materials. They are also granted profit tax holidays for up to five years, and further substantial tax reductions are available for investments that increase exports, create jobs, or develop new technologies (Stan, 1995, p. 432).

**Table 4. Romanian Inflation Rate, 1993-1998**


	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Inflation Rate	300%	62%	25%	45%	Not available	59.1%

*Source* USAID SEED Report (1996) & USAID Romania Country Profile (2000)

Yet, Romania continues to lack behind the other former East-bloc countries in terms of foreign investment, partly due to political instability, corruption, and red-tape. According to USAID it is simply too costly to do business in Romania: “changing laws and regulations discourage efficiency and expediency; foreigners may lease, but not own land; business contracts are often not enforceable; and, income and social benefits tax rates are too high” (USAID, 1998).

From an economic perspective, the revolution has been an extreme disappointment for the common Romanian. The transition to a more capitalist oriented economy has brought more difficulty to the average Romanian. During the Ceausescu years, people were starving due to the food rationing and the lack of food. Today, people are still starving, but for other reasons. “More people are eating less now, although the shops are full, but they simply cannot afford the food they need” (Pasti, 1997, p. 33). Prices have increased and people’s wages have not followed. Based on numbers from 1998, USAID calculated the per capita income in Romania to be \$1,390 a year. In addition, Romania is experiencing huge difficulties with inflation. The USAID estimated the 1998 annual inflation rate to be 59.1%, though this sounds large, it is actually a more controlled inflation rate than what Romania experienced in the early 1990s. For instance, in 1993, the Romania inflation rate was in the area of 300% (see Table 4)! Romania is also facing devastating devaluation of her currency. Within a four-year period, the

**Figure 2. Exchange Rates: Romanian Lei vs. U.S. Dollar\***



*\* Exchange rate numbers are based on the 2000 CIA World Factbook.*

currency dropped significantly in value, especially compared to the strong U.S. dollar (see Figure 2).

As mentioned earlier, Romania has had trouble getting the much needed foreign investment to the country. This lack of foreign investment is influenced by several factors. First of, the political instability surrounding the newly formed Romanian democracy makes foreign investors apprehensive about investing; secondly, Romania is faced with a difficult task of dealing with corruption. "Corruption with the administration and economic managers has grown to the point of turning from an exception into the golden rule of business success" (V. Pasti, 1997, p. 33).

Romania is attempting to tackle the corruption problem with help from USAID. The USAID has provided resources, financial as well as educational, for Romanian media

to turn the media into the kind of watchdog of government as we know it from the United States. According to the USAID, “Romanian media has evolved into an important political force giving voice to citizen concerns and exposing corruption which continues to hamper economic growth and public trust in government” (2000). Anti-corruption measures have also been introduced by the Romanian government. In November 1999, BBC World News reported that the Romanian Prime Minister, Radu Vasile, had introduced an anti-corruption law in the parliament. The law “forces officials to declare their assets” (BBC World News, 29 November, 1999).

The international community has extended some assistance to Romania and her economy. In the 1997 Congressional Research Issue Brief on Recent Developments in Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, it is stated that “the United States since 1990 has obligated \$179 million under the SEED [(Support for East European Democracy)] program, including \$29 million in FY1996” (Kim & Ek, 1997, p. 7). This money has been contingent upon Romania making progress towards democracy. The U.S. has also reinstated Romania’s MFN privileges and went as far as granting permanent MFN status to Romania in 1997. Romania has also gotten loans from the World Bank and IMF, however, poor fiscal management on behalf of the Romanian government has meant that this money did not provide long term economic relief. The Romanian government “primarily directed the scarce external credit that were obtained toward consumption and not investment” (Stan, 1995, p. 429). In 1995, Romania owed approximately \$3.3 billion, out of which “only \$10.7 millions were oriented toward investment” (Stan, 1995, p. 429). Romania may have gotten a temporary relief and had been able to bring food in the stores

initially, but in the long run, the government's failure to direct foreign loans towards investment has dug an even deeper hole for the Romanians.

Romania is attempting to move towards a market economy, but to successfully do so; privatization will have to be priority. According to the 1995 article, *Romanian Privatization: Assessment of the First Five Years*, privatization is “the ‘backbone of the transformation process’ from a command to a market economy” (Stan, 1995, p. 427). This is a difficult task for a country where people in the past in often times were not even allowed to own their own homes! Many communist countries used state-owned housing for the population, most often apartments. This was especially true in Romania as a product of Ceausescu's plans of systematization. The vast majority of the Romanian population lived in state-owned apartments, usually at a fairly low cost. According to Stan, there was also some private ownership, “restricted to only one housing unit per family” (Stan, 1995, p. 429). However, for the most part, owning your own home was a luxury not afforded to the Romanians. In 1990, the Romanian government adopted a resolution that allowed Romanians living in state-owned apartments to purchase their housing unit.

The state set relatively low prices, especially for those apartments with extensive depreciation. This together with the possibility of paying by installments at a negative real estate rate, resulted in two million apartments being bought by their tenants by May, 1992. It is estimated that since 1992 most of the rest of the state-owned apartments, amounting to some 2.3 million, have shifted into private hands (Stan, 1995, p. 430).

However, there are still unresolved issues regarding property that the state overlooked during the Communist Regime, in terms of who should have control of it now. As well as the many people whom lost property due to Ceausescu's building projects. These are

issues that need to be addressed before Romanian can claim to truly have privatized housing.

Agriculture was another aspect of the Romanian economy which was greatly affected by Communist policies. During the years of Communism, agricultural land was to a great extent controlled by government. According to Stan, only 28.3% of Romanian agriculture was owned by individual farmers prior to 1989 (1995, p. 430). It must be mentioned that most of the privately owned agricultural land was in the hills and mountain areas and not exactly suited for significant production of grain. The remainder of Romanian agriculture was either state-owned or part of a large Agricultural Production Cooperative. The Romanian government has attempted to privatize Romanian agriculture. “The 1991 Land Law coordinated the decollectivization of agriculture with an emphasis on restitution; it allowed for the breakup of the agricultural cooperatives and returned up to 10 hectares of land per family” (Stan, 1995, p. 430). The land that was returned equaled nearly 75% of Romania’s agricultural land.

However, this may not have solved the agricultural privatization problem. There was a lack of funding for agriculture and also various issues with the conflicts between distributing land and issuing ownership titles. People were given land that they did not have ownership titles for. It was not until recently that “the Romanian Ministry of Agriculture has addressed the issue of ownership rights and has issued ownership certificates to 1.57 million persons” (Stan, 1995, p. 430). Another criticism is that the distribution of land failed to recreate “a class of smallholding peasants since many people continued to keep their jobs in town and practiced ‘weekend’ agriculture” (Stan, 1995, p. 430). Furthermore, in today’s Europe, farming cannot remain in business on a small

level. Many farmers in West Europe are currently undergoing the challenges of either expanding, or selling their farms, because the international economy simply is not in favor of small farming. Hence, the small Romanian farms of 10 hectares are having difficulties in actually producing an output, but there are other factors as well:

The fragmentation of land, coupled with the delay in the establishment of ownership rights, with lack of funding and with disputes over the privatization of the former cooperatives' facilities, caused a huge decline in agricultural output which turned Romania from an exporter to a net importer of grain in 1992 (Stan, 1995, p. 430).

As mentioned earlier, political instability has affected the rates of foreign investment, but it has also had an impact on the domestic economy. In May 1990, the newly formed Iliescu-led government faced opposition from student and intellectual protestors. President Iliescu crushed the opposition, but it would have an affect on the economics. "The disastrous domestic economic situation inherited from Ceausescu worsened markedly after 20 May [1990] and widespread rationing of sugar and other basic items as well as acute shortages of petrol combined with inflation to produce labour unrest..." (M. Almond, 1990, p. 486). The energy problem of the 1980s "still exist" although it is no longer in the form of abrupt shut-offs or rationing. Now, it is "in the new form of very high cost of energy" (Pasti, 1997, p. 37). As with everything else, the price of electricity has increased drastically during the 1990s, making it almost impossible for the Romanians to purchase or for the industries to sell.

The economic problems in Romania are also affecting the society in other ways, than "just" whether or not they can afford the goods available. In the midst of Romania's transition of a market economy, social polarization is occurring. According to Pasti, the Romanians looked to the Western capitalist ideas of a society with a small wealthy elite

and an equally small group of disadvantaged poor, but with a large middle-class in between, making up the vast majority of the population. However, this has not happened in Romania. “The population is increasingly losing power and, above all, it gets poorer at the same speed at which the elite gets richer” (Pasti, 1997, p. 42). A small, wealthy elite has emerged, but Romania is yet to develop a true middle-class. What should be making up her middle-class resembles more the poor and disadvantaged. “There is no sign, no tendency and no process to justify the hopes associated with the emergence of this middle class” (Pasti, 1997, p. 43).

Economic crisis continue to plague Romania. As recent as May 2000, the largest state-owned bank in Romanian, Commercial Bank, nearly collapsed when thousands of Romanians rushed to withdraw their savings from the Commercial Bank. According to BBC World News, the Romanian government blamed the rush on “an orchestrated conspiracy to undermine Romania’s economic and political stability” (BBC World News, 31 May, 2000). Also, according to BBC World News, Romanian newspapers blamed the former Securitate for spreading rumors that the bank was on the verge of a collapse. The bank was slated for privatization, and one can imagine that the former communist still attempt to keep as many business state-owned as possible.

The bank crisis had consequences for Romania on the international scene. At the time this event happened, Romania had a decision pending with the IMF for a \$110 million loan. In response to the bank crisis, the IMF decided to delay making any decisions on Romania’s loan future. BBC World News reported that the delay had been put in place to give the Romanian government a change to respond to its financial turmoil, hopefully in form of policy. Unfortunately, this incident also happened right as

the Romanian Prime Minister, Mugur Isarescu, had returned from the U.S. where he was on a trip, attempting to spark more confidence in the Romanian economy and thus, generate more international investment. However, the lack of confidence in the economic structures on behalf of the Romanians themselves, did not exactly help Romania's image in the eyes of the world.

In terms of economics, Romanians are about as well off today as they were in 1989. Although, economic reform has been attempted, when looking at standards of living, not a whole lot has changed since 1989. The 1989 revolution was supposed to be the new beginning, the start of the transition. However, the Romanian economy has been off to a slow start. No major improvements followed the revolution; as frozen in time, Romanians are still starving. "And, as a symbol of it all, the buildings under construction in 1989 have not been finished to this day" (Pasti, 1997, p. 34).

## **CHAPTER XI**

### **CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF ROMANIA**

Romania endured nearly half a decade under two brutal communist regimes. Both have had a tremendous influence on Romania's future. Gheorghiu-Dej shaped Ceausescu, he was his mentor and laid the groundwork for Ceausescu's policies. Ceausescu, in turn, would leave a legacy even longer lasting than that of Gheorghiu-Dej. Ceausescu's policies have greatly undermined the Romanian economy and have isolated Romania from the Western world. Ironically, Ceausescu set out to build a relationship with the United States and Europe, instead he managed to create a regime so absurd that even after its fall, Westerners remained skeptical of Romania.

It is uncertain what the future will bring for Romania. Economic conditions in the country seem as unstable as they did in 1989 when Ceausescu was overthrown. Romania needs assistance from the West. The internal problems in Romania are greater than what the Romanian government is capable of handling. A major problem facing Romania is that many of the people, intellectuals, who could have had a positive impact on building the new Romania, have fled the country. Romania will not only have to restructure her economy, but also prove that she is in fact capable of exercising pure democracy before the West will let her in. Problems with treatment of minorities and children, plague Romania's reputation. These are problems that are greatly the product of Ceausescu's

policies. The Communist regime was based on the strong sentiment of nationalism. It is this same nationalism that today is making the Romanians seem intolerant in the eyes of the EU.

Gheorghiu-Dej was probably the true tyrant. He was a Stalinist, he was cold and calculating. If Romania had only experience communism under Gheorghiu-Dej, they would have lived life in fear, constantly terrorized, under constant threat of arrest, but at least under Gheorghiu-Dej, Romania's economic policies made sense. He was bordering on evil, but at least he listened to his advisors and exercised common sense when it came to policymaking. He would have left the Romanians with enough dignity to rebuild their country. He left Ceausescu with the tools to make the 1960s and early 1970s prosperous years. Unfortunately, however, the Romanians not only experience Communism under Gheorghiu-Dej, but under Ceausescu as well. As absurd as Ceausescu's policies were, their long lasting effect is not only serious, it is tragic. Ceausescu build a regime where he would eventually isolate himself and Elena from everyone else. In turn, he managed to isolate Romania from the world even a decade after his fall.

Romania has many problems that will need to be solved. Economic reform is needed, as well as political reform. The re-election of Iliescu in 2000 does not necessarily show a breakdown of Romania's democracy, after all, his opponent was an extremist who would have isolated Romania even further if elected. The 2000 election does show, however, a need for people. A need for new ideas, freedom of thought. The greatest damage caused by the Communists in Romania was not the destruction of the infrastructure, it was the destruction of individual thought. The ability to express oneself, the ability to question the system, the essence of human existence. Those were luxuries

not afforded to Romanians under the Ceausescu's regime, perhaps that is why so many intellectuals have left Romania. Ceausescu's greatest crime was his attempt at crushing the spirit of the Romanians, his attempts at controlling their thoughts. The effects have been far reaching: in 2000, more than ten years after his fall, the election (and thereby the government) still did not reflect any ingenuity, no one new, just the same old rhetoric, same old people. Perhaps that is the true devastation of Romania, she is left with one regime after another that merely reflects the regime it succeeds because the resource most desperately needed in Romania is people with new ideas. The future of Romania lies in her youth, in the education system. The question remains whether or not the Romanians will be able to overcome half a century of misinformation and mistrust.

## APPENDIX A

### ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERSHIP

November 1979				
Name	Born	Date Elected	Party Office	Government or Other Position
<b>Permanent Bureau of the Political Executive Committee</b>				
Stefan Andrei	1931	November 1974		Minister of Foreign Affairs
Iosif Bane	1921	March 1978	CC Secretary	Chairman, Central Council of Workers' Control of Economic and Social Activities
Emil Bobu	1927	November 1979		Minister of Labor and Chairman, Trade Union Confederation
Cornel Burtica	1931	January 1977		Minister of Foreign Trade and International Economic Cooperation
Virgil Cazacu	1927	November 1979	CC Secretary	
Elena Ceausescu	1919	January 1977		Chairman, National Council of Science and Technology
Nicolae Ceausescu	1918	November 1974	Secretary General	President of Romania; Chairman, Front of Socialist Unity
Nicolae Constantin	n.a.	November 1979		Chairman, State Planning Committee
Constantin	Ca.	November 1979	CC Secretary	Chairman, Council on Problems of Social and Economic Organization
Dascalescu	1920			Minister of Finance and Comecon Representative
Paul Niculescu	1923	March 1978		
Gheorghe Oprea	1927	November 1974		First Deputy Prime Minister
Ion Patan	1926	November 1974		Minister of Technical-Material Supply and Control of Fixed Assets
Dumitru Popescu	1928	November 1979	CC Secretary	Chairman, Council for Radio and Television
Gheorghe Radulescu	1910	January 1977		Chairman, Higher Court for Financial Control
Ilie Verdet	1925	January 1977		Prime Minister
<b>(Central Committee Secretaries not members of the Permanent Bureau)</b>				
Ludovic Fazekas	1920	November 1979	CC Secretary	Ministry of Forestry and Construction Materials; Chairman, Council for Workers of Hungarian Nationality
Dumitru Popa	1925	March 1979	CC Secretary	Minister of State Secretary of the Chemical Industry
Ilie Radulescu	1926	March 1979	CC Secretary	
Marin Vasile	1929	March 1978	CC Secretary	Chairman, National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives

*Source: Personnel Files of the Research and Analysis Department of Radio Free Europe as published in King, 1980, p. ix.*

## APPENDIX B

### TRANSCRIPT OF THE TRIAL OF NICOLAE AND ELENA CEAUSESCU Military base Tirgoviste - December 25th 1989

The following is a transcript of the closed trial of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu as shown on Romanian and Austrian television. The English translation is by the US government's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Sections in italics are from the Austrian television commentary:

A voice: A glass of water !

NICOLAE CEAUSESCU: I only recognize the Grand National Assembly. I will only speak in front of it.

PROSECUTOR: In the same way he refused to hold a dialogue with the people, now he also refuses to speak with us. He always claimed to act and speak on behalf of the people, to be a beloved son of the people, but he only tyrannized the people all the time. You are faced with charges that you held really sumptuous celebrations on all holidays at your house. The details are known. These two defendants procured the most luxurious foodstuffs and clothes from abroad. They were even worse than the king, the former king of Romania. The people only received 200 grams per day, against an identity card. These two defendants have robbed the people, and not even today do they want to talk. They are cowards. We have data concerning both of them. I ask the chairman of the prosecutor's office to read the bill of indictment.

CHIEF PROSECUTOR: Esteemed chairman of the court, today we have to pass a verdict on the defendants Nicolae Ceausescu and Elena Ceausescu who have committed the following offenses: Crimes against the people. They carried out acts that are incompatible with human dignity and social thinking; they acted in a despotic and criminal way; they destroyed the people whose leaders they claimed to be. Because of the crimes they committed against the people, I plead, on behalf of the victims of these two tyrants, for the death sentence for the two defendants. The bill of indictment contains the following points: Genocide, in accordance with Article 356 of the penal code. Two: Armed attack on the people and the state power, in accordance with Article 163 of the penal code. The destruction of buildings and state institutions, undermining of the national economy, in

accordance with Articles 165 and 145 of the penal code. They obstructed the normal process of the economy.

PROSECUTOR: Did you hear the charges? Have you understood them?

CEAUSESCU: I do not answer, I will only answer questions before the Grand National Assembly. I do not recognize this court. The charges are incorrect, and I will not answer a single question here.

PROSECUTOR: Note: He does not recognize the points mentioned in the bill of indictment.

CEAUSESCU: I will not sign anything.

PROSECUTOR: This situation is known. The catastrophic situation of the country is known all over the world. Every honest citizen who worked hard here until 22 December knows that we do not have medicines, that you two have killed children and other people in this way, that there is nothing to eat, no heating, no electricity.

*Elena and Nicolae reject this. Another question to Ceausescu: Who ordered the bloodbath in Timisoara. Ceausescu refused to answer.*

PROSECUTOR: Who gave the order to shoot in Bucharest, for instance?

CEAUSESCU: I do not answer.

PROSECUTOR: Who ordered shooting into the crowd? Tell us!

*At that moment Elena says to Nicolae: Forget about them. You see, there is no use in talking to these people.*

PROSECUTOR: Do you not know anything about the order to shoot?

*Nicolae reacts with astonishment.*

*There is still shooting going on, the prosecutor says. Fanatics, whom you are paying. They are shooting at children; they are shooting arbitrarily into the apartments. Who are these fanatics? Are they the people, or are you paying them?*

CEAUSESCU: I will not answer. I will not answer any question. Not a single shot was fired in Palace Square. Not a single shot. No one was shot.

PROSECUTOR: By now, there have been 34 casualties.

*Elena says: Look, and that they are calling genocide.*

PROSECUTOR: In all district capitals, which you grandly called municipalities, there is shooting going on. The people were slaves. The entire intelligentsia of the country ran away. No one wanted to do anything for you anymore.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Mr. President, I would like to know something: The accused should tell us who the mercenaries are. Who pays them? And who brought them into the country?

PROSECUTOR: Yes. Accused, answer.

CEAUSESCU: I will not say anything more. I will only speak at the Grand National Assembly.

*Elena keeps whispering to him. As a result, the prosecutor says: Elena has always been talkative, but otherwise she does not know much. I have observed that she is not even able to read correctly, but she calls herself an university graduate. Elena answers: The intellectuals of this country should hear you, you and your colleagues.*

*The prosecutor cites all academic titles she had always claimed to have.*

ELENA CEAUSESCU: The intelligentsia of the country will hear what you are accusing us of.

PROSECUTOR: Nicolae Ceausescu should tell us why he does not answer our questions. What prevents him from doing so?

CEAUSESCU: I will answer any question, but only at the Grand National Assembly, before the representatives of the working class. Tell the people that I will answer all their questions. All the world should know what is going on here. I only recognize the working class and the Grand National Assembly -- no one else.

*The prosecutor says: The world already knows what has happened here.*

*I will not answer you putschists, Ceausescu says.*

PROSECUTOR: The Grand National Assembly has been dissolved.

CEAUSESCU: This is not possible at all. No one can dissolve the National Assembly.

PROSECUTOR: We now have another leading organ. The National Salvation Front is now our supreme body.

CEAUSESCU: No one recognizes that. That is why the people are fighting all over the country. This gang will be destroyed. They organized the putsch.

PROSECUTOR: The people are fighting against you, not against the new forum.

CEAUSESCU: No, the people are fighting for freedom and against the new forum. I do not recognize the court.

PROSECUTOR: Why do you think that people are fighting today? What do you think?

*Ceausescu answers: As I said before, the people are fighting for their freedom and against this putsch, against this usurpation. Ceausescu claims that the putsch was organized from abroad.*

CEAUSESCU: I do not recognize this court. I will not answer any more. I am now talking to you as simple citizens, and I hope that you will tell the truth. I hope that you do not also work for the foreigners and for the destruction of Romania.

*The prosecutor asks the counsel for the defense to ask Ceausescu whether he knows that he is no longer president of the country, that Elena Ceausescu has also lost all her official state functions and that the government has been dissolved.*

*The prosecutor wants to find out on which basis the trial can be continued. It must be cleared up whether Ceausescu wants to, should, must or can answer at all. At the moment the situation is rather uncertain.*

*Now the counsel for the defense, who was appointed by the court, asks whether Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu know the aforementioned facts -- that he is no longer president, that she has lost all official functions. He answers: I am the president of Romania, and I am the commander in chief of the Romanian army. No one can deprive me of these functions.*

PROSECUTOR: But not of our army, you are not the commander in chief of our army.

CEAUSESCU: I do not recognize you. I am talking to you as simple citizens at the least, as simple citizens, and I tell you: I am the president of Romania.

PROSECUTOR: What are you really?

CEAUSESCU: I repeat: I am the president of Romania and the commander in chief of the Romanian army. I am the president of the people. I will not speak with you provocateurs anymore, and I will not speak with the organizers of the putsch and with the mercenaries. I have nothing to do with them.

PROSECUTOR: Yes, but you are paying the mercenaries.

*No, no, he says. And Elena says: It is incredible what they are inventing, incredible.*

PROSECUTOR: Please, make a note: Ceausescu does not recognize the new legal structures of power of the country. He still considers himself to be the country's president and the commander in chief of the army. Why did you ruin the country so much: Why did you export everything? Why did you make the peasants starve? The produce which the peasants grew was exported, and the peasants came from the most remote provinces to Bucharest and to the other cities in order to buy bread. They cultivated the soil in line with your orders and had nothing to eat. Why did you starve the people?

CEAUSESCU: I will not answer this question. As a simple citizen, I tell you the following: For the first time I guaranteed that every peasant received 200 kilograms of wheat per person, not per family, and that he is entitled to more. It is a lie that I made the people starve. A lie, a lie in my face. This shows how little patriotism there is, how many treasonable offenses were committed.

PROSECUTOR: You claim to have taken measures so that every peasant is entitled to 200 kilograms of wheat. Why do the peasants then buy their bread in Bucharest?

*The prosecutor quotes Ceausescu, Ceausescu's program.*

PROSECUTOR: We have wonderful programs. Paper is patient. However, why are your programs not implemented? You have destroyed the Romanian villages and the Romanian soil. What do you say as a citizen?

CEAUSESCU: As a citizen, as a simple citizen, I tell you the following: At no point was there such an upswing, so much construction, so much consolidation in the Romanian provinces. I guaranteed that every village has its schools, hospitals and doctors. I have done everything to create a decent and rich life for the people in the country, like in no other country in the world.

PROSECUTOR: We have always spoken of equality. We are all equal. Everybody should be paid according to his performance. Now we finally saw your villa on television, the golden plates from which you ate, the foodstuffs that you had imported, the luxurious celebrations, pictures from your luxurious celebrations.

ELENA CEAUSESCU: Incredible. We live in a normal apartment, just like every other citizen. We have ensured an apartment for every citizen through corresponding laws.

PROSECUTOR: You had palaces.

CEAUSESCU: No, we had no palaces. The palaces belong to the people.

*The prosecutor agrees, but stresses that they lived in them while the people suffered.*

PROSECUTOR: Children cannot even buy plain candy, and you are living in the palaces

of the people.

CEAUSESCU: Is it possible that we are facing such charges?

PROSECUTOR: Let us now talk about the accounts in Switzerland, Mr. Ceausescu.  
What about the accounts?

ELENA CEAUSESCU: Accounts in Switzerland? Furnish proof!

CEAUSESCU: We had no account in Switzerland. Nobody has opened an account. This shows again how false the charges are. What defamation, what provocations! This was a coup d'etat.

PROSECUTOR: Well, Mr. Defendant, if you had no accounts in Switzerland, will you sign a statement confirming that the money that may be in Switzerland should be transferred to the Romanian state, the State Bank.

CEAUSESCU: We will discuss this before the Grand National Assembly. I will not say anything here. This is a vulgar provocation.

PROSECUTOR: Will you sign the statement now or not?

CEAUSESCU: No, no. I have no statement to make, and I will not sign one.

PROSECUTOR: Note the following: The defendant refuses to sign this statement. The defendant has not recognized us. He also refuses to recognize the new forum.

CEAUSESCU: I do not recognize this new forum.

PROSECUTOR: So you know the new forum. You have information about it.

*Elena and Nicolae Ceasescu state: Well, you told us about it. You told us about it here.*

CEAUSESCU: Nobody can change the state structures. This is not possible. Usurpers have been punished severely during the past centuries in Romania's history. Nobody has the right to abolish the Grand National Assembly.

*The prosecutor turns to Elena: You have always been wiser and more ready to talk, a scientist. You were the most important aide, the number two in the cabinet, in the government.*

PROSECUTOR: Did you know about the genocide in Timisoara?

ELENA CEAUSESCU: What genocide? By the way, I will not answer any more

questions.

PROSECUTOR: Did you know about the genocide or did you, as a chemist, only deal with polymers? You, as a scientist, did you know about it?

*Here Nicolae Ceausescu steps in and defends her.*

CEAUSESCU: Her scientific papers were published abroad!

PROSECUTOR: And who wrote the papers for you, Elena?

ELENA CEAUSESCU: Such impudence! I am a member and the chairwoman of the Academy of Sciences. You cannot talk to me in such a way!

PROSECUTOR: That is to say, as a deputy prime minister you did not know about the genocide? This is how you worked with the people and exercised your functions! But who gave the order to shoot? Answer this question!

ELENA CEAUSESCU: I will not answer. I told you right at the beginning that I will not answer a single question.

CEAUSESCU: You as officers should know that the government cannot give the order to shoot. But those who shot at the young people were the security men, the terrorists.

ELENA CEAUSESCU: The terrorists are from Securitate.

PROSECUTOR: The terrorists are from Securitate?

ELENA CEAUSESCU: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: And who heads Securitate? Another question . . . .

ELENA CEAUSESCU: No, I have not given an answer. This was only information for you as citizens.

CEAUSESCU: I want to tell you as citizens that in Bucharest . . . .

PROSECUTOR: We are finished with you. You need not say anything else. The next question is: How did Gen. Milea {Vasile Milea, Ceausescu's defense minister} die? Was he shot? And by whom?

ELENA CEAUSESCU: Ask the doctors and the people, but not me!

CEAUSESCU: I will ask you a counterquestion. Why do you not put the question like this: Why did Gen. Milea commit suicide?

PROSECUTOR: What induced him to commit suicide? You called him a traitor. This was the reason for his suicide.

CEAUSESCU: The traitor Milea committed suicide.

PROSECUTOR: Why did you not bring him to trial and have him sentenced?

CEAUSESCU: His criminal acts were only discovered after he had committed suicide.

PROSECUTOR: What were his criminal acts?

CEAUSESCU: He did not urge his unit to do their patriotic duty.

*Ceausescu explains in detail that he only learned from his officers that Gen. Milea had committed suicide. The prosecutor interrupts him.*

PROSECUTOR: You have always been more talkative than your colleague. However, she has always been at your side and apparently provided you with the necessary information. However, we should talk here openly and sincerely, as befits intellectuals. For, after all, both of you are members of the Academy of Sciences. Now tell us, please, what money was used to pay for your publications abroad -- the selected works of Nicolae Ceausescu and the scientific works of the so-called Academician Elena Ceausescu.

*Elena says: So-called, so-called. Now they have even taken away all our titles.*

PROSECUTOR: Once again, back to Gen. Milea. You said that he had not obeyed your orders. What orders?

CEAUSESCU: I will only answer to the Grand National Assembly. There I will say in which way he betrayed his fatherland.

PROSECUTOR: Please, ask Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu whether they have ever had a mental illness.

CEAUSESCU: What? What should he ask us?

PROSECUTOR: Whether you have ever had a mental illness.

CEAUSESCU: What an obscene provocation.

PROSECUTOR: This would serve your defense. If you had had a mental illness and admitted this, you would not be responsible for your acts.

ELENA CEAUSESCU: How can one tell us something like this? How can one say something like this?

CEAUSESCU: I do not recognize this court.

PROSECUTOR: You have never been able to hold a dialogue with the people. You were not used to talking to the people. You held monologues and the people had to applaud, like in the rituals of tribal people. And today you are acting in the same megalomaniac way. Now we are making a last attempt. Do you want to sign this statement?

CEAUSESCU: No, we will not sign. And I also do not recognize the counsel for the defense.

PROSECUTOR: Please, make a note: Nicolae Ceausescu refuses to cooperate with the court-appointed counsel for the defense.

ELENA CEAUSESCU: We will not sign any statement. We will speak only at the National Assembly, because we have worked hard for the people all our lives. We have sacrificed all our lives to the people. And we will not betray our people here.

*The court notes that the investigations have been concluded. Then follows the reading of the indictment.*

PROSECUTOR: Mr. Chairman, we find the two accused guilty of having committed criminal actions according to the following articles of the penal code: Articles 162, 163, 165 and 357. Because of this indictment, I call for the death sentence and the impounding of the entire property of the two accused.

*The counsel for the defense now takes the floor and instructs the Ceausescus once again that they have the right to defense and that they should accept this right.*

COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE: Even though he -- like her -- committed insane acts, we want to defend them. We want a legal trial. Only a president who is still confirmed in his position can demand to speak at the Grand National Assembly. If he no longer has a certain function, he cannot demand anything at all. Then he is treated like a normal citizen. Since the old government has been dissolved and Ceausescu has lost his functions, he no longer has the right to be treated as the president. Please make a note that here it has been stated that all legal regulations have been observed, that this is a legal trial. Therefore, it is a mistake for the two accused to refuse to cooperate with us. This is a legal trial, and I honor them by defending them.

At the beginning, Ceausescu claimed that it is a provocation to be asked whether he was sick. He refused to undergo a psychiatric examination. However, there is a difference between real sickness that must be treated and mental insanity which

leads to corresponding actions, but which is denied by the person in question. You have acted in a very irresponsible manner; you led the country to the verge of ruin and you will be convicted on the basis of the points contained in the bill of indictment. You are guilty of these offenses even if you do not want to admit it. Despite this, I ask the court to make a decision which we will be able to justify later as well. We must not allow the slightest impression of illegality to emerge. Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu should be punished in a really legal trial.

The two defendants should also know that they are entitled to a counsel for defense, even if they reject this. It should be stated once and for all that this military court is absolutely legal and that the former positions of the two Ceausescus are no longer valid. However, they will be indicted, and a sentence will be passed on the basis of the new legal system. They are not only accused of offenses committed during the past few days, but of offenses committed during the past 25 years. We have sufficient data on this period. I ask the court, as the plaintiff, to take note that proof has been furnished for all these points, that the two have committed the offenses mentioned. Finally, I would like to refer once more to the genocide, the numerous killings carried out during the past few days. Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu must be held fully responsible for this. I now ask the court to pass a verdict on the basis of the law, because everybody must receive due punishment for the offenses he has committed.

*The final speech of the prosecutor follows:*

PROSECUTOR: It is very difficult for us to act, to pass a verdict on people who even now do not want to admit to the criminal offenses that they have committed during 25 years and admit to the genocide, not only in Timisoara and Bucharest, but primarily also to the criminal offenses committed during the past 25 years. This demonstrates their lack of understanding. They not only deprived the people of heating, electricity, and foodstuffs, they also tyrannized the soul of the Romanian people. They not only killed children, young people and adults in Timisoara and Bucharest; they allowed Securitate members to wear military uniforms to create the impression among the people that the army is against them. They wanted to separate the people from the army. They used to fetch people from orphans' homes or from abroad whom they trained in special institutions to become murderers of their own people. You were so impertinent as to cut off oxygen lines in hospitals and to shoot people in their hospital beds. The Securitate had hidden food reserves on which Bucharest could have survived for months, the whole of Bucharest.

*Whom are they talking about, Elena asks.*

PROSECUTOR: So far, they have always claimed that we have built this country, we have paid our debts, but with this they bled the country to death and have hoarded enough money to ensure their escape. You need not admit your mistakes, mister. In 1947, we assumed power, but under completely different circumstances. In

1947, King Michael showed more dignity than you. And you might perhaps have achieved the understanding of the Romanian people if you had now admitted your guilt. You should have stayed in Iran where you had flown to.

*In response, the two laugh, and she says: We do not stay abroad. This is our home.*

PROSECUTOR: Esteemed Mr. Chairman, I have been one of those who, as a lawyer, would have liked to oppose the death sentence, because it is inhuman. But we are not talking about people. I would not call for the death sentence, but it would be incomprehensible for the Romanian people to have to go on suffering this great misery and not to have it ended by sentencing the two Ceausescus to death. The crimes against the people grew year by year. They were only busy enslaving the people and building up an apparatus of power. They were not really interested in the people.[Picture is cut off]

*After an outage of transmission of Romanian television, the speaker announces that the verdict of the trial of Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu is the death sentence. All their property will be impounded.*

## **APPENDIX C**

### **LETTER FROM CEAUSESCU TO REAGAN**

**FEBRUARY 12, 1988**

**Department of State  
Division of Language Services  
(Translation) – LS No 125333 JS/Rumanian**

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with your letter sent by Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead, I wish to acquaint you with the following facts:

Rumania has always acted in conformance with the Rumanian-American agreement of 1975. Although it has opposed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment from the onset, Rumania, in the spirit of its humanitarian policy, has always given exit visas to persons who have requested them for reunification of their families or for other justified reasons. You yourself have stated on several occasions, including in the message you sent me recently, that Rumania has acted responsibly in satisfying requests for family reunification.

I was surprised that in your message you also referred to some so-called economic, humanitarian, religious, and other problems in Rumania. In my discussions with Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead, I dealt with all these problems in detail, thus I shall touch upon them only briefly here.

I wish to say first of all that all these problems concern the domestic policy of our country and cannot under any circumstances be the subject of discussions between Rumania and the United States. If we were to discuss them, we would have to point out that the United States has many economic and social problems, including that of democracy, with which we do not agree. But we believe that they are your affair and that it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to resolve them.

In regard to economic problems, I should like to mention that in the international economic conditions of the last few years the Rumanian economy has continued to develop at an annual rate of 5 to 6 percent. We have ensured a continual growth of the national revenue and of workers' incomes, as well as a rise in the financial and spiritual well-being of our entire people. We have eliminated to a great extent the country's

foreign debt, even paying it off in advance. Therefore, on the basis of these facts, we do not understand where you obtain your information about Rumania's so-called economic problems to which you refer in your letter. One might well speak, however, of the difficulties in the U.S. economy that have a serious effect upon international economic relations, as well as the economic and financial relations of the United States with other countries, particularly the developing countries. Many political figures, economists, and scientists, as well as institutes specializing in the United States, speak openly about the great deficiencies in the American economy and their effect upon U.S. relations with other countries.

As regards problems of democracy, we have created in Rumania a unique broad-based democratic system that ensures the effective, direct participation of the entire people in the governmental process, a system incomparably superior to many other democratic systems, including that of the United States.

I was particularly surprised that you referred in your letter to the so-called problems of nationalities, which allegedly do not enjoy full rights in Rumania. I think you are well aware that Rumania is a unitary national state in which a limited number of citizens of non-Rumanian nationality have been living alongside the Rumanian population for many centuries. The laws of the country ensure equal rights and obligations: there is no discrimination or restriction of any kind. Only former, Horthyists, nationalists, and Hungarian irredentists speak of the so-called nationality problem in Rumania, thereby calling into question the current borders and seeking the revision of international treaties. I believe that you are familiar with the Trianon Peace Treaty - signed by the United States in 1920 - and the Paris Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947, to which the United States is also a signatory. Both treaties recognize the international borders of Rumania.

We want the traditional relations between the United States and Rumania to develop according to the principles of international law - complete equality in rights, respect for independence and national sovereignty, noninterference in international affairs, and mutual advantage. I think I should emphasize that Rumania strongly adheres to its traditional policy of independence and adamantly rejects any encroachment upon its national independence and sovereignty.

As regards your reference to the difficulties involved in approving the most-favored-nation clause, I should like to inform you that we have decided to reject extension of this clause under the conditions set forth by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. It is our view that approval of this clause should be based on the existing trade agreement, renouncing any preconditions. In this connection, we propose that representatives of our government and of the U.S. administration discuss the modalities of developing economic relations between our countries, in accordance with the provisions of the current trade agreement and renouncing any preconditions.

We realize that it is in the interest of our peoples that the presidents of the two countries not undertake anything which would impair the traditional relations of friendship between them, but that everything be done to develop these relations and to strengthen cooperation throughout the world in support of a policy of peace and international collaboration.

Sincerely yours,  
Nicolae Ceausescu

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Almond, M. (1990). Romania since the Revolution. Government and Opposition, 25, pp. 484-496.

Almond, M. (1992). The Rise and Fall of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. London: Chapman Publishers Ltd.

Amnesty International. (1987). Romania: Human Rights Violations in the Eighties. London: Amnesty International Publications.

Baleanu, V.G. (1995). The Enemy Within: The Romanian Intelligence Service in Transition. Camberley, Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre for the UK Ministry of Defence.

Bank Crisis 'Threat' to Romania (200, May 31). BBC World News.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk>

Bassett, R. (1987, May 25). Gorbachev visit to Romania: Ceausescu poses a test for Glasnost. The Times (London).

Baylis, T. A. (1994). The West and Eastern Europe: Economic Statecraft and Political Change. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.

Behr, E. (1991). Kiss the Hand You Cannot Bite: The Rise and Fall of the Ceausescus. New York: Villard Books.

Bohlen, C. (1987, May 26). Gorbachev Begins Talks in Romania; Soviet Leader Hints a Dissatisfaction with Bilateral Relations. The Washington Post, A15

Bohlen, C. (1987, May 27). Romanians Get Glimpse of Gorbachev's Glasnost: Openness 'About Shortcomings' Urged. The Washington Post, p. A15.

Botar, I. (1975). Romania: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. Bucharest: Romanian Institute for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

Braun, A. (1978). Romanian Foreign Policy since 1965: The Political and Military Limits of Autonomy. New York: Praeger Publishers.

- Brown, J.F. (1988). Eastern Europe and Communist Rule. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Byrnes, R. (Ed.). (1967). The United States and Eastern Europe. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Calinescu, M. & Tismaneeanu, V. (1991) The 1989 Revolution and Romania's Future. Problems of Communism, 40, pp.42-59.
- Campbell, J. (1965). American Policy Toward Communist Eastern Europe: The Choices Ahead. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.
- Campeanu, P. (1990). The Comfort of Despair. Social Research, 57(3), 719-732.
- Campeanu, P. & Steriade, S. (1993). The Revolution: The Beginning of the Transition. Social Research, 60(4), 915-932.
- Carothers, T. (1996). Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania. Washington: Carnegie Endowment.
- Catto, H. (1997). Free at last? American Journalism Review, 19, 40-43.
- Ceausescu, I. (Ed.). (1983). War, Revolution, and Society in Romania: The Road to Independence. Boulder: Social Science Monographs.
- Ceausescu, N. (1969a). Romania: Achievements and Prospects (Reports, Speeches, Articles, July 1965 – February 1969, Selected Texts). Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing House.
- Ceausescu, N. (1969b). Romania on the way of Completing Socialist Construction (Vol. I-III). Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing House.
- Ceausescu, N. (1987). An Independent Foreign Policy for Peace and Cooperation. Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books Ltd.
- Chaplin, A. (1983). The "Popular War" Doctrine in Romanian Defense Policy. East European Quarterly, 17(3), 267-282.
- Codrescu, A. (1991) The Hole in the Flag: A Romanian Exile's Story of Return and Revolution. New York: Avon Books.
- Corley, F. & Eibner, J. (1992). In the Eye of the Romanian Storm. New York: Revell.
- Crowther, W. (1984). Romanian Politics and the International Economy. Orbis, 28, 553-574.

The Dark Before the Real Dawn. (1990, December 22). The Independent (London), p. 12.

Deletant, D. (1995). Ceausescu and the Securitate: Coercion and Dissent in Romania, 1965-1989. London: Hurst & Company.

Deletant, D. (1999a). Communist Terror in Romania: Gheorghiu-Dej and the Police State 1948-1965. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Deletant, D. (1999b). Romania under Communist Rule (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). Portland: The Center for Romanian Studies.

Dima, N. (1989). Journey to Freedom. Washington: Selous Foundation Press.

Dobbs, M. (1988, October 6). Gorbachev Warns Romanian Leader; Ceausescu Cautioned on Maverick Policies. The Washington Post, p. A39.

Ek, C. (1997). CRS Report for Congress, Romania's New Government: Politics, Policies, and Relations with the United States. Washington, D.C.: Penny Hill Press for the Congressional Research Service.

Ek, C. (1998). CRS Report for Congress, Romania: Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, D.C.: Penny Hill Press for the Congressional Research Service.

Ek, C. (1999). Romania's Qualifications for NATO. Washington, D.C.: Penny Hill Press for the Congressional Research Service.

Ek, C. (2001). CRS Report for Congress, Romania After the 2000 Elections: Background and Issues for Congress. Washington D.C.: Penny Hills Press for the Congressional Research Service.

Enlargement Row Splits EU Summit. (2001, May 6). CNN Woldnews. <http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/05/06/sweden.eu.summit/index.html>

EU pulls up Romania over Corruption, Economy. (2001, February 20). Agence France Presse. <http://www.centraleurope.com>.

Fisher, M. E. (1989). Nicolae Ceausescu: A Study in Political Leadership. Boulder: Lynne Reiner Publishers.

Fischer-Galati, S. (1967). The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to Socialist Republic. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press.

Fischer-Galati, S. (1969). The Socialist Republic of Rumania. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press.

Fischer-Galati, S. (1970). Twentieth Century Rumania. New York: Columbia University Press.

Fischer-Galati, S., Florescu, R. R., & Ursul, G. R. (Eds.), (1982). Romania Between East and West: Historical Essays in Memory of Constantin C. Giurescu (pp. 385-414). New York: Columbia University Press.

Fisher, D. & Trimborn, H. (1989, December 26). Romania: Death of a Dictator; Ceausescu: Tyrant who Posed as a Statesman. Los Angeles Times, A13.

Floyd, D. (1965). Rumania: Russia's Dissident Ally. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Friedman, T.L. (1989, December 20). Upheaval in the East; Rumania's Suppression of Protest Condemned by the U.S. as 'Brutal.' The New York Times, p. A1.

Funderburk, D.B. (1989). Pinstripes and Reds: An American Ambassador Caught Between the State Department and the Romanian Communists, 1981-1985 (Revised Ed.). Washington, DC: Selous Foundation Press.

Gallagher, T. (1995). Romania after Ceausescu: The Politics of Intolerance. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Gallagher, T. (1999). Ceausescu's legacy. National Interest, 56, 107-111.

Galloway, G., & Wylie, B. (1991). Downfall: The Ceausescus and the Romanian Revolution. London: Futura Publications.

Georgescu, V. (Ed.). (1985). Romania: 40 Years (1944-1984). New York: Praeger Publications with The Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Georgescu, V. (1991). The Romanians: A History (Bley-Vroman, A., Trans.). Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

Gilberg, T. (1975). Modernization on Romania since World War II. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Giurescu, D.C. (1994). Romania's Communist Takeover: The Radescu Government. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.

Gorbachev to visit Romania. (1987, May 25). St. Petersburg Times, p. A12.

Gorbachev's Pal Ion Iliescu, 59 Emerges as Head of New Romania. (1989, December 26). The Toronto Star, p. A3.

Graham, L.S. (1982). Romania: A Developing Socialist State. Boulder: Westview Press.

Hall, R. A. (1999). The uses of absurdity: The staged war theory and the Romanian Revolution of December 1989. East European Politics and Societies, 13(3), 501-42.

Harrington, J. & Courtney, B. (1988). Romanian-American Relations During the Johnson Administration. East European Quarterly, 22(2), 213-232.

Hilton, I. (1990, May 17). Romanians Still in Thrall to Their Idols of the Past. The Independent (London), p. 11.

IMF Delays Romanian Loan (2000, May 31). BBC World News.  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk>

Ion Gheorghe Maurer: Diplomatic skills which helped to extent Romania's independence from the Soviet Union. (2000, February 10). The Times (London), Features.

Ionescu, G. (1964). Communism in Rumania: 1944-1962. Westport: Greenwood Press.

Ionescu, G. (1967). The Politics of the European Communist States. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Ionescu, M.E., & Treptow, K.W. (Eds.). (1999). Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Portland: The Center for Romanian Studies.

Jowitt, K. (1971). Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kaplan, R.D. (1998). The Fulcrum of Europe. Atlantic Monthly, 9, p.28.

Keil, T. J. & Andreescu, V. (1999). Fertility policy in Ceausescu's Romania. Journal of Family History, 24(4), 478-492.

Keylor, W. R. (1996). The Twentieth-Century World: An International History. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kim, J. & Ek, C. (1997). CRS Issues Brief, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania: Recent Developments. Washington, D.C.: Penny Hill Press for the Congressional Research Service.

King, R. R. (1980). A History of the Romanian Communist Party. Stanford University, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Kirk, R. & Raceanu, M. (1994). Romania versus the United States: Diplomacy of the Absurd, 1985-1989. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Kligman, G. (1998). The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu's Romania. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Laustsen, A.W. (2000). Romania: The Creation of a European Third World Country. Unpublished.

Leonard, T. M. (2000). NATO expansion: Romania and Bulgaria within the larger context. East European Quarterly, 33(4), 517-44.

Levy, R. (2001). Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Lewis, P. (1989, August 30). Smuggled Rights Report Indicts Ceausescu. The New York Times, p. A13.

Linden, R.H. (2000) Putting on Their Sunday Best: Romania, Hungary, and the the Puzzle of Peace. International Studies Quarterly, 44(1), 121-145.

Ludanyi, A. & Rudolf, J. (Eds.). (1994). The Hungarian Minority's Situation in Ceausescu's Romania. (Tennant, C., Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.

Lukacs, J.A. (1953). The Great Powers & Eastern Europe. New York: American Book Company.

Machiavelli, N. (1952 version). The Prince. (Revised Ed.) New York: Penguin Group.

Markham, R. H. (1949). Rumania under the Soviet Yoke. Boston: Meador Publishing Company.

Matley, I. M. (1970). Romania: A Profile. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Maxwell, R. (Ed.). (1983). Nicolae Ceausescu: Builder of Modern Romania and International Statesman. New York: Pergamon Press.

Mihut, L. (1994). The Emergence of Political Pluralism in Romania. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 27(4), 411-422.

Nelson, D.N. (1980). Democratic Centralism in Romania: A Study of Local Communist Politics. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs.

Nelson, D.N. (Ed.). (1981). Romania in the 1980s. Boulder: Westview Press.

Nelson, D.N. (1988). Romanian Politics in the Ceausescu Era. New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers.

Nelson, D.N. (Ed.). (1992). Romania after Tyranny. Boulder: Westview Press.

New Leader had Ties to Ceausescu; Iliescu, Gorbachev Said to be Friends. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, p. B1.

Newens, S. (1972). Nicolae Ceausescu: The Man, his Ideas, and his Socialist Achievements. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.

Pacepa, I. M. (1987). Red Horizons: The True Story of Nicolae & Elena Ceausescu's Crimes, Lifestyle, and Corruption. Washington: Regency Gateway.

Patterson, W. (1994). Rebuilding Romania: Energy, Efficiency and the Economic Transition. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd.

Pilon, J.G. (1992). The Bloody Flag: Post-Communist Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Spotlight on Romania. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers

Profile: Comrade, engineer, savage: Elena Ceausescu, deposed First Lady. (1989, December 23). The Independent.

Ratesh, N. (1985). The American Connection. In V. Georgescu (Ed.), Romania: 40 Years (1944-1984) (pp. 61-78). New York: Praeger Publishers with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Ratesh, N. (1991). Romania: The Entangled Revolution. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Razi, G.M. (1987). Early American-Romanian Relations. East European Quarterly, 21(1), 35-65.

Remnick, D. (1989, December 23). Soviets Welcome Ceausescu's Fall; Legislators Cheer Gorbachev's Announcement of Dictator's Ouster. The Washington Post, p. A14.

Retegan, M. (2000). In the Shadow of the Prague Spring: Romanian Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Czechoslovakia, 1968. Portland, OR: The Center for Romanian Studies.

Romania: An Encyclopaedic Guidebook (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.). (1971). Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing House.

Romania and Non-Aligned States (Vol. 3). (1976). Bucharest: Agerpres, Romanian News Agency.

Romania, Once Pet of U.S., Now Pariah. (1989, September 13). The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, p. A11.

Romania: Government frees prices, Unions close ranks. (1993). International Labour Review, 132(3), 285-286.

Romania-China Relations Further Develop. (1999, August 9). Beijing Review, 42(32), p23.

Romania Introduces Anti-Corruption Measures. United Kingdom: BBC News, BBC World Service, November 29, 1999.

Romania to Tighten Border Control. United Kingdom: BBC News, BBC World Service, June 5, 2000.

Roper, S.D. (1994). The Romanian Revolution from a Theoretical Perspective. Communist and Post -Communist Studies, 27, 401-410.

Roper, S.D. (2000). Romania: The Unfinished Revolution. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.

Rothschild, J. (1964). Communist Eastern Europe. New York: Walker and Company.

Seton-Watson, H. (1951). The East European Revolution. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Shafir, M. (1985). Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner Publishers, Inc.

Shanor, D. R. (1975). Soviet Europe. New York: Harper & Row Publishers.

Shen, R. (1997). The Restructuring of Romania's Economy : A Paradigm of Flexibility and Adaptability. New York: Praeger Publishers.

Siani-Davies, P. (1996). Romanian Revolution or Coup d'état? A Theoretical View of the Events of December 1989. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 29(4), 453-465.

Siani-Davies, P. & Siani-Davies, M. (Eds.). (1998). Romania (Revised Ed.). Oxford: Clio Press.

Sislin, J. (1991). Revolution Betrayed? Romania and the National Salvation Front. Studies in Comparative Communism, 24(4), 395-411.

Stan, L. (1995). Romanian: Privatization: Assessment of the First Five Years. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 28(4), 427-435.

Stokes, G. (1993). The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.

Toma, P.A. (Ed.). (1970). The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe. Tucson: University of Arizona Press.

Thurow, R. (1986, March 9). Ceausescu Cult Enters Twilight as Romania Slips. The Toronto Star, H4.

Tismaneanu, V. (1987). Ceausescu Against Glasnost. World Affairs, 150(3), 199-203.

Tismaneanu, V. (1990). In Romania: Between Euphoria and Rage. Dissent, 219-223.

Tismaneanu, V. (1995). Democracy, Romanian Style. Dissent, 42, 318-320.

United States Agency for International Development (1996). Fiscal Year 1996 SEED Report (Romania). <http://www.usaid.gov/countries/ro/romseed.htm>

United States Agency for International Development (1998). The USAID FY 1998 Congressional Presentation. <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cp98/eni/countries/ro/htm>

United States Agency for International Development (2000). USAID: Romania Country Profile. <http://www.usaid.gov/countries/ro/rom.htm>

U.S. Department of State (1995). Environmental Cooperation GLOBE Program: Agreement between the United States of America and Romania (TIAS Publication No. 12653). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs. (2000). Background Notes: Romania. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Verdery, K. (1991). National Ideology Under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Verdery, K. (1995). Faith, hope, and Caritas in the land of the pyramids: Romania, 1990-1994. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 37, 625-69.

## VITA

Anne-Marie Wulff Laustsen was born in Frederikssund, Denmark, on April 26, 1977, the daughter of Conny and Alex Peder Laustsen. After completing her work at Kingoskolen, Slangerup, Denmark, she attended James Madison High School in San Antonio, Texas, from where she graduated in 1995. In the fall of 1995, she entered Southwest Texas State University in San Marcos, Texas. She received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Psychology in 1999, after which she entered the Graduate College of Southwest Texas State University.

Permanent Address:           Manderupvej 2  
                                      DK-3550 Slangerup, Denmark

This thesis was typed by Anne-Marie Wulff Laustsen