

THE DEMISE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC:

An Examination Employing
the Relative Deprivation Theory of Revolution

BY

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I

INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

To understand a process, it is sometimes useful to examine a particular instance of that process. Such an examination can provide information or conclusions that may contribute to a better understanding of the process that is studied. Of interest to both political and social scientists is the process of revolution (radical change within a given delimited environment). This paper concerns itself with political revolution, examining a single country's change. It is intended to contribute to a broader theoretical understanding of the processes at work in an intra-national political revolution.

This paper examines the fall of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany, GDR). This examination is done through the case study approach, addressing the research question: Did repressive policy choices by the East German government tend to aggravate popular protest during the revolution of 1988-89? The historical background of events surrounding the revolution in the German Democratic Republic is presented in Chapter II. The chapter provides a basic understanding of the events and processes of East Germany's demise. The chapter that follows (Chapter III) examines theoretical literature pertaining to revolutions. Theories of revolution are illustrated through interpretation of events and processes presented in Chapter II, and the relative deprivation theory of revolution is selected for study in this

chapter. Key terms and concepts to be employed in this study are defined in Chapter III, as well.

Chapter IV discusses the case study methodology and time-series analysis used in this analysis. It also addresses how the variables for this study are operationalized. In Chapter V, data are comparatively examined to ascertain if interrelationships exist between government acts of repression and emigration, and between government acts of repression and popular protest. A summary of the findings of this case study is presented in Chapter VI. In Chapter VII, the results of the study are presented, and the internal validity of this study is critiqued. Chapter VIII proposes topics for further research that have developed from the results of this study and from the validity issues raised by this study's methodology.

In a very limited manner, this study supports the relative deprivation theory of revolution for the demise of East Germany. This study reveals that quantitative attempts to support relative deprivation theory can not be conducted through simple trend line comparison, but require more detailed analysis. Conceptualization and operationalization of variables are additional considerations whose importance are reflected in the study's outcome and internal validity.

The way in which this study was conducted contributes significantly to setting criteria for indexing acts of government repression. The lessons learned from the the index of repression in this paper provide useful lessons for the development of such an index.

II

RESEARCH SETTING AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

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This chapter will present the historical background of the demise of the German Democratic Republic. An understanding of the historical background is necessary before this case study can be undertaken, and before its results can be meaningfully evaluated.

Information presented in this chapter will be used to illustrate the theories of revolution that are presented in Chapter III. In addition, this chapter presents historical peculiarities that exist in this case. These peculiarities helped determine the methodology that was used in this study (Chapter IV).

AN INTRODUCTORY CHRONOLOGY

In 1989, Europe underwent a surprising transformation. This transformation involved the erosion of Eastern European socialism, which could be attributed to assorted causes, not the least of which were four decades of political and economic isolation. Specifically, the two Germanies (the former Federal Republic of Germany or West Germany, and the former German Democratic Republic or East Germany) underwent changes that forty years of Cold War, détente, and negotiations could not bring about.

To begin examining the demise of the German Democratic

Republic, one must understand the historical developments that led up to it. Compiling information from periodical sources listed in the historical bibliography at the end of this study, the following chronology is offered:

- February 1945 Yalta Conference, attended by U.S., British, and Soviet heads of state, the result being that the former German Reich would be divided into occupation zones, the Western Allies presiding over the western areas, and the Soviet Union presiding over the eastern areas, with Berlin being divided as well.
- 1948-1949 Soviet blockade of western sectors of Berlin prompts U.S. airlift of humanitarian supplies into West Berlin. Soviet blockade is in response to West German unitary currency reform, which lays groundwork for establishment of separate West German state.
- 1949-1961 Approximately 3,700,000 East Germans emigrate to the West.
- May 26, 1952 Initial construction of borders between East and West Germany that physically prevented passage from one side to the other.
- June 17, 1953 Disgruntled East Berliners march through Brandenburg Gate to protest socialist government in East Germany.
- Aug 12, 1961 2,500 Germans cross the border from East Berlin to West Berlin.
- Aug 13, 1961 East German engineering crews, overnight, construct a barbed wire fence separating East Berlin from West Berlin, effectively "walling off" one city and one country from the other.
- At least 50 known deaths are reported during the following year in conjunction with attempted border crossings.
- Oct 27, 1961 U.S. and Soviet tanks face off across the 100-yard divide at Checkpoint Charlie, Berlin.
- 1961-1989 5,000 East Germans attempt to cross "the Wall" without permission of the East German government, of which 191 are killed in the attempt; an additional 5,000 tunnel, fly, or drive their way to West Germany.

- 1983 East German government relaxes emigration to West Germany to allow 6,000 persons (mostly old-age pensioners) to leave permanently.
- Jan-Apr 1984 In an effort to improve relations with West Germany and to secure loans from the FRG, East German President Erich Honecker allows 16,000 refugees to leave East Germany for resettlement camps in West Germany. Projected East German emigration to West Germany by year's end is 50,000 persons. West German officials fear the flood of refugees will prompt East German officials to close the border, which is undergoing extensive upgrading (automatically fired machine guns being replaced by 10-ft high razored metal walls). Approximately 400,000 East Germans (more than 2% of the country's population) officially apply to leave the GDR.
- March 1988 After increasingly vocal opposition to the government, approximately 100 emigration applicants are arrested. After having tried to "exile" dissidents to West Germany, GDR officials discovered that this course of action merely served to encourage an estimated 50,000 emigrants to intensify their efforts to leave.
- May 1989 As Hungary tears down its border fence that separates it from Austria, East Germans begin crossing the Austro-Hungarian border illegally and presenting themselves to the FRG embassy in Vienna. Hungarian border guards rarely capture escapees, and never shoot at them. If captured, the prison term for attempting to escape can be up to two years.
- June 1989 140 East Germans survive mine fields and concertina wire to escape across the Austro-Hungarian border during this month alone.
- July-Sept 1989 GDR hard-line Communist leader Erich Honecker falls ill and is absent from GDR politics.
- Aug 19, 1989 In one day, close to 700 East Germans cross the Austro-Hungarian border at Sopron, as Hungarian leaders, in an effort to rid themselves of GDR refugees and despite a 1969 agreement with the GDR, facilitate the crossing (known as the "Pan-European Picnic") with assistance from Austrian and West German officials.

Sept 1989 Approximately 6,500 GDR refugees wait in Hungarian camps for an opportunity to cross into Austria. At the same time, approximately 300 refugees from the GDR demanding asylum wait in FRG embassies in Prague and Warsaw.

Toward the end of September, Hungarian officials allow approximately 14,000 East Germans to cross the Hungarian border into Austria in one week, marking the single largest mass exodus since the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Hungarian authorities defend their actions by stating that it was more important to meet international obligations (1975 Helsinki agreements and U.N. convention on refugees) than to honor agreements with single states.

Shops, offices, factories are forced to close, buses and trains stand idle, and medical care in hospitals comes to a standstill in East Germany for want of persons trained in these professions, many of them having left the country via Hungary.

In an effort to slow the flood of refugees, the GDR cuts back on its exit visas to Hungary. This prompts East Germans by the thousands to plant themselves in the FRG embassies in Prague and Warsaw. (The streets of Prague become so congested with abandoned Trabants and Wartburgs, that the Czech police begin indiscriminately towing ALL vehicles with East German license plates, under the assumption that they were abandoned by refugees seeking asylum at the West German embassy.)

40,000 East Germans leave during this month.

Oct 1, 1989 Special trains, routed through East Germany, carry Prague and Warsaw embassy refugees to West Germany as per GDR/FRG agreement. This routing was intended as a propaganda tool to show East Germans the "exiles" that were being deported, but this ploy backfired and these trains are mobbed as East German pedestrians try to climb aboard the moving west-bound trains as they pass through the GDR.

In Dresden, 15,000 citizens besiege the city's main train station, only to be driven back by police wielding clubs and water cannons. In retaliation, the crowd overturned police vehicles and pelted police with rocks.

- Oct 2, 1989 At least 10,000 protesters march through the streets of Leipzig (second largest city in the GDR), demanding political reforms similar to other Eastern Bloc countries. This illegal march, organized by the New Forum, is the largest since 1953, and is the first sign of open defiance within the country.

Stasi (secret state police) members are tasked with operating buses and streetcars and performing other similar civil tasks, as the usual persons assigned these tasks are often absent, having fled to the West.

- Oct 3, 1989 Visa-free travel to Czechoslovakia by East Germans is suspended by East German government.
- Oct 5, 1989 FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl indicates that the West German government will provide more financial support for the failing East German economy if GDR leaders work toward political and social reform.
- Oct 6, 1989 Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev arrives in Berlin for the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the GDR's founding as a separate socialist state. 100,000 young East Germans march down Unter den Linden boulevard (Berlin) in a torchlight parade of celebration.
- Oct 7, 1989 Police arrest 7 members of New Forum (to date, no fewer than 10,000 New Forum members have been jailed).

Approximately 3,000 persons gather in Alexanderplatz (Berlin) to demand government reform. Violent clashes with the police continue throughout the weekend in Dresden and Leipzig.

After 40 years of Marxism-Leninism, Hungary votes overwhelmingly to transform its socialist party to pursue a Western-style parliamentary democracy.

Oct 10, 1989 Honecker orders the Czech-East German border closed in an effort to halt refugee escapes.

Since Jan 1989, approximately 110,000 East Germans have fled their country, and 1.8 million more (10% of the population) have applied to leave, even at risk of job and educational discrimination.

Illegal emigration from the GDR via Hungary continues at a rate of 200-500 per day, despite tighter East German controls along its borders.

Oct 16, 1989 100,000 protesters march in Leipzig, peacefully chanting "We are the people" and "Gorbi! Gorbi!"

The Politburo votes to oust Honecker from the position of President, installing Egon Krenz in his stead.

Nov 16, 1989 After a month of growing protests, growing numbers of refugees to the West, and growing impotence of the government of the German Democratic Republic, the physical barrier is removed that separates the two Germanies. "The Wall is Gone". Both nations come to a standstill, as celebration of the tearing down of the Wall paralyzes the two Germanies.

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

In the 1980s, the Soviet Union and its East Bloc allies found themselves in both economic and social upheaval, brought about by citizen unrest in response to food shortages and restrictions on personal freedoms. Notably, Poland's move toward free, democratic elections, Gorbachev's policies of *perestroika* and *glasnost* in the U.S.S.R., and Hungary's loosening of travel restrictions for its citizens desiring to visit the West were all closely watched by the citizens of other East Bloc nations. The governments of East Germany and Czechoslovakia openly insisted that their policies of socialism were functioning without fault.

At the same time, however, they tightened control on their citizens, hoping to quash increasing dissent.

In examining the outlined chronology of events, one notices that emigrants from East Germany increased dramatically until the fortified border with the West was eliminated. This elimination came largely as a result of the flow of emigrants that fled in ever-increasing numbers. As the flow of refugees increased, the government of the GDR initially attempted to inflict even tighter control over its citizens. This may have accelerated the flow of refugees out of East Germany. (Doerner, 16 Oct 1989, pp. 39-40)

As the East German government tightened its controls, the government of the FRG cautiously observed this increasing repression. Although the West German government was prepared to spur or reward East German reforms by a generous aid plan, it was not engaged in a deliberate effort to depopulate or destabilize the GDR. (Sommer, 1989, p. 39)

The East German economy, the strongest economy of all of the Soviet Bloc nations, was still not as strong as that of West Germany. The total annual amount of West German assistance to East Germany was DM 5 billion for the year 1989 alone. (*Economist*, 7 Oct 1989, p. 56) It was not financial difficulties, however, that induced East Germans to leave their country. The GDR could no longer maintain that its Marxist-Leninist rhetoric was true. West German media presented clearly contradictory evidence. East German families were able to watch the mass exodus take place courtesy of West German television each night. The East German government, however, remained silent on the matter:

Every night West German TV brings East Germans the latest episode in the "refugee story": films of emigrés flocking across the open border between Hungary and Austria; would-be emigrés occupying West Germany's missions in several East European capitals in the hope of forcing through exit visas; reports of deteriorating relations between the GDR and Hungary; and interviews with tired East German youths explaining why they cannot bear socialism in the GDR a moment longer.(N)ow it is headline news and the daily reports on West German TV are creating an atmosphere of crisis in the GDR. This in turn encourages more to leave.The state-run media discuss none of the urgent issues that the country now faces. From the politicians there has been no public reaction to the extreme changes of the time, except implausible denials that they are taking place. Official silence, or repetition of tired Stalinist formulae is increasing the angst and uncertainty that underlie the exodus. (*New Statesman & Society*, 15 Sept 1989)

The more the East German public called for reform within a socialist framework (as was then taking place in the Soviet Union), the more strict the government control over them seemed to become. Some West German officials, alarmed by East Germany's message of congratulation to the People's Republic of China after that government violently quashed dissent in Beijing early in 1989, even feared armed and bloody massacres on the streets of Leipzig and Berlin. (*Economist*, 7 Oct 1989, p. 55) The call for reform by East Germans was repeatedly met by the official answer that no reforms were needed. (Anderson, 1989, p. 27) The more urgent the call, the more adamant the answer by President Honecker.

Honecker was at that time 77 years old. He had spent 10 years in a Nazi prison camp while a young man, and had been the General Secretary of East Germany's Socialist Unity Party since 1971. As the Central Committee member responsible for state

security, Honecker had overseen the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. His reaction to the fleeing refugees was (predictably) to dismiss them as traitors and defectors. At the same time, he praised those who remained behind to support Communist ideals. All the while, he carefully attempted to close off all escape routes from his country. (*Maclean's*, 16 Oct 1989, p. 39) No longer trusted by the general population, his failing health may have contributed to his inability to deal effectively with the domestic unrest in the GDR. It is often held, though, that his inadequate and improper response is to be blamed on his personal political orientation and that of the reigning 26-member Politburo. Like Honecker, the Politburo (average member age: 68) also tended to choose a hard-line approach for government policy. (*Time*, 25 Sept 1989, p. 33)

The East German government attempted to blame Hungary's removal of its fortified border with Austria for the masses of refugees that were fleeing in that direction. Although the removal of this barrier may have eased East Germans' flight, it can hardly be blamed for it. (*Commonweal*, 3 Nov 1989, p. 508) "Hungary's open border is the occasion, not the cause [for the emigration]...." (*The Economist*, 9 Sept 1989, p. 56)

Although long sought and much desired in the West, as the East German political system crumbled and droves of disillusioned East Germans made their way to West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany's leaders reacted with a "What do we do next?" stance. (Sullivan, 1989, p.41) German reunification aside, inter-German relations became the hot topic:

A new German-German relationship in a context of reduced East-West tension must evolve in the larger framework of ending the cold war and making Europe whole and free again. Three historical processes will determine the future order: the progressive integration of Western Europe before and after 1992; the progressive emancipation of Eastern Europe from both Soviet domination and the shackles of Marxism-Leninism, and the progressive re-establishment of their former closeness between the two halves of Europe. (Sommer, 1989, p. 39)

The West German government was having difficulty dealing with the refugee problem. In accordance with West German law, the Federal Republic of Germany did not recognize the GDR as a separate, legitimate state. This meant that East Germans were automatically granted West German citizenship upon their arrival in West Germany. East Germans arriving in the FRG immediately received a West German passport, the approximate equivalent of (U.S.) \$125, full unemployment and health benefits, low-interest loans of up to \$5,000, and free meals and temporary lodging, in an effort to assist them in resettling. (*Time*, 25 Sept 1989, p. 31)

In addition to the above-listed government assistance, potential employers (initially) would descend on the refugee camps, seeking to hire the former East Germans. In Schöppinghausen, for example, 5,000 job proposals met a mere 1,500 refugees. As the West German unemployment rate was at that time around 7 per cent (2 million), there was no little resentment among many West Germans. The explanation for the clamor for East German employees was that East German immigrants worked 60-70 hours per week (West Germans only worked an average of 37), they worked harder for lower pay, were not choosy about the jobs

they accepted, and were not afraid to get their hands dirty. (*Time*, 25 Sept 1989, pp. 31-32) Information concerning employment opportunities and government aid filtered back into the GDR. This only reinforced potential emigrants' perceptions of an easy transition to life in West Germany.

More than half of the refugees were under 30 years of age, and only 17 per cent of them were over 40 years old. Surveys indicated that approximately 86 per cent of the refugees had vocational or professional training, and an equal per cent had held professional jobs in the GDR. All of the refugees polled had owned television sets back home, almost two thirds owned private cars, and 15 per cent had weekend homes. (Smolowe, 1989, p. 32)

Almost three quarters of the refugees polled indicated that they were driven by the lack of freedom of expression and travel. Almost as many said they wanted more personal responsibility for their own destiny. (Smolowe, 1989, p. 32) Some refugees indicated that their decision to leave was the first decision of their lives that was made without government assistance. (Sullivan, 1989, p. 27)

Not having anticipated such a large influx of refugees, West Germany's already crowded housing market became overburdened with the new refugees. This was especially true in Berlin, where officials ordered an emergency program to build 70,000 new housing units. They estimated, however, that this figure would still fall short of the needed number by 30,000 units. (Phillips, 1989, p. 37)

As the refugees, now safely in the West, began coping with the culture shock of their new country, the government of East Germany, headed by Honecker's replacement President Egon Krenz, was crumbling. The refugees, having drained many vital industries (transportation, for example) had partially crippled the nation in their flight. They left behind those who began to question the validity of the way their government operated. With the GDR in fear of losing a full 20 per cent of its work force, a national "economic implosion" seemed forthcoming. By October 1989, the Socialist Unity Party hoped to begin managing major reforms under the guidelines set by Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika*. By the time it began to realistically push for reform, the party itself was too weak to actually initiate those reforms. (Watson, et. al., 1989, pp. 31-34)

During this time of turmoil in the GDR and the overwhelming influx of refugees into the FRG, the rest of the world assumed a "wait and see" posture of non-interference in what was perceived as inter-German relations. East Germans automatically became West Germans upon their arrival in the FRG and could therefore not be considered refugees once they had reached West Germany. This unusual circumstance precluded international assistance in conjunction with the westward emigration. The internal economic and social collapse of the GDR as a result of its citizens leaving was a purely internal problem for that country. Even if a desire for the international community to take a more active role in the situation had arisen, any actions from outside either of the two Germanies could be perceived as interference

in the internal affairs of those nations. (Sullivan, 1989, pp. 41-45)

Weakened by the departure of so many of its citizens, and under pressure from the increasingly disgruntled citizens left behind, the government of the German Democratic Republic had no choice but to remove the physical barrier that had separated the two Germanies for almost 40 years. The fortified border dividing the two Germanies and the wall that surrounded West Berlin were formally opened on November 16, 1989. Unrestricted travel was again permitted across what had once been the most fortified international border in the world.

Amid growing economic crisis, the East German government was subsequently forced to adopt a unitary currency with the FRG. Failing to maintain its autonomy, the government of the GDR was politically absorbed by the FRG. With that absorption, East Germany ceased to exist as a nation on October 3, 1990.

Having presented the historical background of this case, presentation of the theoretical background will follow. This presentation will be accomplished through a review of the literature addressing theories of revolution. In the chapter that follows, theoretical aspects of this study will be presented, and a theory of revolution will be selected for application to this case study.

III

LITERATURE REVIEW

III. LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Before an analysis of the contributors to dramatic social change or revolution from within any country can be undertaken, it is beneficial to be familiar with the various theories of revolutions. These theories are drawn from the various social sciences. (Goldstone, 1986, p.5; Landes and Tilly, 1971, p. 71) Revolution theories fall into the category of "collective history", which is defined as "history directly linking the recorded experiences of large numbers of persons or social units to patterns of behavior or change." (Landes and Tilly, 1971, p. 71) Approaches can be both psychological and political in nature. In the current literature, three primary theories of explaining revolutions come to the fore: institutional imbalance theory, resource mobilization theory, and relative deprivation theory.

INSTITUTIONAL IMBALANCE THEORY

Institutional imbalance theory stresses that when subsystems of society (the economy, political system, etc.) experience changes that are not at a uniform rate, the resulting imbalance will disorient the populace and foster the search for new values, leading to social change. (Smelser, 1963, p. 325; Goldstone,

1986, p. 5) As refined by Jessop (1972), social change is the result of imbalances within four functional areas:

1. pattern maintenance - "the need to maintain and reinforce the basic values of the social system and to resolve tensions that emerge from continuing commitment to these values."
2. integration - "the allocation of rights and obligations, rewards and facilities, to ensure the harmony of relations between members of the social system."
3. goal attainment - "the necessity of mobilising actors and resources in organised ways for the attainment of specific goals."
4. adaptation - "the need for the production or acquisitions of generalised facilities or resources that can be employed in the attainment of various specific goals." (Jessop, 1972, p. 16)

Social change results from disturbances in the operation of social institutions. These disturbances, in turn, derive from imbalances in the relation between the social system and factors from outside the system, or from imbalances between two or more units within the social system. (Jessop, 1972, p. 17) This, in turn, causes stress in the system, which causes the search for new values.

The search for new values and the resultant social change *is* revolution, which is defined as not only "challenges to the legitimacy of a ruling power, but also to rapid social change of any sort...." (Smelser, 1963, p. 318) It is further posited by this theory that "(v)irtually every major ideological revolution in the West has been preceded by a period of governmental inflexibility in the face of rapid social change...." (Smelser, 1963, p. 330)

Applying the institutional imbalance theory to the events

surrounding the collapse of the East German state in the late 1980s, one would view the cause of the revolution to be disturbances in the East German social and political systems. These disturbances were results of the changing political circumstances in the U.S.S.R. and in the surrounding East Bloc countries at that time, as well as by economic, social, ideological, etc., imbalances. These imbalances caused the East German people to search for new values. This search for new values in the face of government inflexibility resulted in revolution.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

Resource mobilization theory (though in actuality built upon theories set forth by Alexis de Tocqueville and Mao Zedong) was first clearly stated by Charles Tilly (1975), who posited:

People get their work done by accumulating and employing a great variety of resources to influence one another and to transform the world around them. The resources include loyalties, knowledge, wealth, machines, communication lines, and any number of other things. We can conveniently group them into three categories: normative, coercive, and utilitarian....

When a group increases its collective control over any of these three varieties of resources, we say the group is *mobilizing*,.... (Tilly, 1975, p. 503)

Resource mobilization theory states that variations in discontent are related to collective political action, and that groups will mobilize themselves in attempts to gain those resources they do not possess. The deprived groups will only mobilize themselves as they think the potential gains are worth the inherent risks in attaining them. Only when resources are scarce does violence have a strong chance of resulting from these mobilizations. (Snyder, 1978, p. 504) Resources may assume the

form of material resources, or they may include political prestige. Challengers to resource possession are stressed in this theory. (Goldstone, 1986, p. 6)

The theory goes on to state that there are four proximate conditions for revolutions:

(1) the emergence of coalitions of contenders making exclusive alternative claims to control of the government; (2) the expansion of commitment to those claims by members of the population under control of that government; (3) the formation of coalitions between members of the polity and members of the revolutionary bloc; (4) repressive incapacity of the new government's agents. A revolutionary strategy is therefore to mobilize new contenders with exclusive claims to control of the government, encourage acceptance of those claims by people outside the contenders, form coalitions with established members of the polity, and neutralize the government's repressive capacity. (Tilly, 1975, pp. 546-547)

Again drawing on the case of East Germany's collapse, one might employ resource mobilization theory by viewing the larger picture of what was happening in that country and in the countries around East Germany. Though East Germans had mobilized to protest in the past (most notably in 1953), this time the circumstances were different. The East German government was allowing more and more travel visas to the west to be issued (as a result of its increasing dependence upon West German loans and the associated pressures for emigration liberalization). Most East Bloc countries were becoming more liberal in their interpretations of Communist doctrine, and this was known to the East German public. The citizens of East Germany were getting a better picture of what life in the West entailed, reducing the legitimacy of their government.

East German reform-seekers increased the resource of popular

support while seeking the resource of political influence to reform. The greater the proportion of these resources the reform-seekers gained, the less likely the tendency to violent confrontation with the contending coalition (e.g., the government) under this theory.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY

Also called "frustration-aggression-deprivation" theory, this theory is built upon the frustration-aggression theory outlined in 1939 by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears. Before discussing relative deprivation theory, it is useful to become familiar with frustration-aggression theory.

Frustration-aggression theory draws upon the principles that when actors require something, they engage in a specific response that is designed to illicit a specific reaction. If that actor's action does not illicit that reaction, that actor suffers a frustration from not achieving his/her goal. As a result "the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, ... the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression." (Dollard, et. al., 1939, p. 166) It is further stated that "the strength of instigation to aggression varies directly with the amount of frustration." (Dollard, et. al., 1939, p. 173) Marxian doctrine depends to some extent on the psychology of frustration-aggression principle, especially in respect to class struggle and its root causes. (Dollard et. al., 1939, p. 172) Frustration-aggression theory has been included as an aspect of institutional

imbalance theory (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1971, pp. 230-231) and resource mobilization theory (Snyder, 1978, p. 504), as well.

As developed by Davies (1962) and refined by Gurr (1968), relative deprivation theory posits that revolutions are caused by actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations (the goods and conditions of the life to which they believe they are justifiably entitled) and their value capabilities (the amounts of those goods and conditions that they think they are able to get and keep). (Gurr, 1968, p. 294)

Gurr further posits that relative deprivation is the basic precondition for civil strife of any sort, and that strife varies directly in magnitude with the intensity of relative deprivation. (Gurr, 1968, p. 294, 312) That is not to say that all "civil strife" is violent in nature. Gurr continues to say:

Deprivation-induced discontent is a general spur to action. Psychological theory and group conflict theory both suggest that the greater the intensity of discontent, the more likely is violence. The specificity of this impulse to action is determined by men's beliefs about the sources of deprivation, and about *the normative and utilitarian justifiability for violent action directed at the agents responsible for it* (emphasis added). (Gurr, 1970, p. 13)

The relative deprivation theory can also be applied to the case of East Germany. This theory suggests that the revolution in 1988-1989 had its roots in the failure of the government to provide its citizens with the standard of living and degree of freedom they believed themselves entitled to. Pressure for liberal reform was frustrated by government response that reinforced its hard-line stance. (It is relative deprivation theory that is of particular interest to the purpose of this paper.)

NO THEORY IS UNIVERSALLY APPLICABLE

Although greatly oversimplified, viewing the collapse of East Germany from each of the three theoretical perspectives provides an important caveat when selecting a theory of revolution for study. As stated by Snyder (1978), "most quantitative analyses of collective violence do not adequately address the relevant substantive arguments." (Snyder, 1978, p. 500) The above theories can not be applied universally, but are valid to varying degrees according to structural variations in different settings. "Attempting to fit all results within one or another of the major arguments (relative deprivation theory and resource mobilization theory) is not a tractable endeavor." (Snyder, 1978, p. 527) The same conclusion may also be drawn for the institutional imbalance approach.

While all sets of circumstances cannot be placed solely within the framework of a single theoretical approach, there may be instances where sets of circumstances can be placed into all three (four, if frustration-aggression theory is considered separately) theories. The theories are not mutually exclusive. Huntington (1968) has married the theories as follows:

Revolution requires not only political institutions which resist the expansion of participation [institutional imbalance approach] but also social groups which demand that expansion [relative deprivation].... At some point, the group begins to develop aspirations which lead it to make symbolic or material demands on the political system. To achieve its goals, the group's leaders soon realize that they must find avenues of access to the political leaders and means of participation in the political system [resource mobilization]. If these do not exist and are not forthcoming, the group and its leaders become frustrated and alienated [cyclic reinitiation of frustration-aggression]. [bracketed observations added] (Huntington, 1968, p. 267)

SELECTING A THEORY

For the purposes of this paper, relative deprivation theory has been selected for examination. The choice was partly due to this theory's wide acceptance in the popular literature. As stated by Perry and Pugh (1978), relative deprivation theory "has been extremely popular and has in some quarters approached consideration as a fundamental social law." (Perry and Pugh, 1978, p. 146) Now that a specific theory has been selected for examination, a presentation of peripheral aspects and implications of that theory must be undertaken.

INDICATORS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Many authors have attempted to delineate indicators that are conducive for the onset of political violence, social upheaval, and revolution. As stated by Huntington (1968), a revolution

is not something which can occur in any type of society at any period in its history. It is not a universal category, but rather an historically limited phenomenon.... Like other forms of violence and instability, it is most likely to occur where the processes of political modernization and political development have lagged behind the processes of social and economic change. (Huntington, 1968, p. 265)

Although this statement on its face supports the institutional imbalance approach, within this framework it is further posited that "(f)rustration of its demands and denial of the opportunity to participate in the political system may make a group revolutionary," (Huntington, 1968, pp. 267-268), indicating support for the frustration-aggression and (by implication) relative deprivation theories (e.g., deprivation of the perceived deserved share of political enfranchisement).

GOVERNMENT REPRESSION AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

An often-cited multi-formula analysis by Hibbs (1973) tentatively concluded, "Communist societies have considerably less violence than non-Communist societies, and this deterrence effect of 'totalitarianism' is more effective vis á vis organized Internal War than it is for spontaneous Collective Protest." (Hibbs, 1973, p. 130)

Hibbs further concluded that government coercion has an immediately strong negative effect upon both collective protest and internal war (a more organized, violent, and long-term form of collective protest). It could not be concluded, however, that (although it may curb internal war in the future) government repression could be used to halt future spontaneous collective protest (Hibbs, 1973, p. 113)

Indicating that there was no overwhelming evidence for either hypothesis, Zimmermann (1983) stated:

There are two alternative hypotheses as to the effects of coercive means. Firstly, coercion will act as a *deterrent* to the use of means of political violence. Secondly, coercive means will be an *instigation* to use violent means of protest. All the other relationships theoretically postulated or empirically found are interpreted as combinations of these two basic possibilities. (Zimmermann, 1983, p. 119)

Politicized discontent, while a necessary precondition, is only a partial determinant for the occurrence of political violence within a system. The actualization of political violence as a result of relative deprivation is strongly influenced by:

the patterns of coercive control and institutional support in the political community.... The coercive capacities of a regime and the uses to which they are put are crucial variables, affecting the forms and extent of political violence in both the short and long run. (Gurr, 1970, p. 14)

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Psychologically-based relative deprivation theory, in addition to drawing from frustration-aggression theory, draws upon (sociological) theories of collective behavior. A direct correlation between relative deprivation theory and collective behavior is made by Perry and Pugh (1978), who state that "(g)roups can define a *desired* standard of living by comparing their current living conditions against either the social conditions of their recent past or the standard of living enjoyed by some comparison group." (Perry and Pugh, 1978, pp. 148-149)

When two or more individuals interact in a situation of social unrest, a type of interstimulation results, which causes mutual and cyclical reinforcement of restlessness. This cyclical reaction increases with intensity with each cycle. (Blumer, 1957, pp. 170-171.) As stated by Blumer (1957):

(I)n the instance of social unrest, restlessness has a reciprocal character, i.e., its display awakens a similar condition of restlessness on the part of others, and there occurs mutual reinforcement of this state as the individuals interact with each other. It follows that social unrest is most likely to exist where people are sensitized to one another, or prepared to enter readily into rapport, and also where they undergo together the derangement of their routines of living. (Blumer, 1957, p. 172)

THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Crowds resultant of social unrest are self-sustaining. This is due to the reciprocal character of restlessness. (Blumer, 1957, p. 172) Rioters are "conjoined not because they know where they want to go but because they do not like where they have been." (Wada and Davies, 1957, p. 57)

Wada and Davies (1957) further observed that individuals in crowds behave differently than when alone:

An individual in a crowd loses perhaps most of the identity and uniqueness that make him an individual. His role as crowd member provides a protective mask behind which he can join in action he would scarcely perform in a gathering of known friends and acquaintances. Losing a measure of identity, a person in a crowd loses a sense of individuality and at the same time gains a sense of power, in the expression of feelings he shares with others present but which he would not express - or express effectively by himself. (Wada and Davies, 1957, p. 57)

Collective behavior, therefore, can explain why masses of persons will mobilize to attain a goal, when an individual (though he wants that goal just as much) might not mobilize to attain it.

Collective behavior, as per Smelser (1963) is determined by six factors:

1. Structural conduciveness (the permissibility of a given type of behavior)
2. Structural strain (real or anticipated economic deprivation, as relevant to relative deprivation theory, is an example)
3. Growth and spread of a generalized belief (specifically, that a source of strain or deprivation has come to be commonly recognized)
4. Precipitating factors (the concrete setting toward which collective action can be directed)

5. Mobilization of participants for action
6. The operation of social control (preventative and reactive measures by the group in power to suppress collective action)

(Smelser, 1963, pp. 15-17)

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Some types of economic change create an increase in persons who consider themselves poorer than before. This type of change tends to create domestic instability. This type of change includes rapid economic growth, as "the number getting poorer will increase with rapid economic growth." (Olson, 1971, p. 216, 219) As posited by Flanigan and Fogelman (1970), no matter what type of regime a country has, "domestic violence becomes more severe with each declining level of economic development." (Flanigan and Fogelman, 1970, p. 19) By implication, support is lent to relative deprivation theory, since declining economic development allows for circumstances in which a group feels relatively deprived in comparison to their prior perceived conditions. (Perry and Pugh, 1978, p. 149)

In specific cases, economic structures play an important part in the perception of a populace of its level of relative deprivation. The attempt to compete with western nations on the world market may have undermined economic stability of the Comecon countries prior to the collapse of European Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Chilcote and Johnson (1983) observed:

(t)he socialist East is also caught up in ... (t)he world capitalist crisis, and provided another cause for concern. There is a process of increasing rapid reintegration or relinking into the capitalist international division of labor, not only through trade, but also through production. There is also an increasing productive crisis throughout the Comecon countries in general; each of them separately and all of the together had achieved only half or less than half of their growth targets for the 1976-80 five-year plan. (Chilcote and Johnson, 1983, p. 197)

This observation concerning the special issues that may play a role in the economic demise of individual Comecon countries has also been addressed in the literature concerning frustration-aggression and relative deprivation theories.

CASE-SPECIFIC FACTORS

In choosing a set of circumstances with which to test the relative deprivation theory, data concerning the demise (1988-1990) of the German Democratic Republic provide an interesting case-study. Some unusual observations concerning this country were made by Huntington (1968), who stated that Communist legitimacy was weaker in East Germany than in other places where it had resulted from popular revolution. In East Germany, Communism was imposed from the outside. Less identity existed between Communism and nationalism in the GDR than in, for example, the Soviet Union. (Huntington, 1968, p. 335) Gurr (1968) stated that regime legitimacy had no consequential mediating effect upon deprivation, but that relative illegitimacy

acted (within a relative deprivation framework) much as deprivation itself. (Gurr, 1968, p. 313) Huntington (1968) further observed:

Sustained modernization, however, poses problems for the stability of one-party systems. The strength of the party derives from its struggle for power. Once in power, what incentives does it have to maintain a high level of mobilization and organization?...By its very nature, however, it lacks the stimulus to struggle which provides a continuing basis for political stability. For a while this impetus may come from the gap between the party and society. The ideology of the party leaders usually commits them to a thoroughgoing reconstruction of the society....If...its ideological drive falters and it comes to terms with the society it governs, then it is likewise deprived of a *raison d'être*. (Huntington, 1968, p. 426)

In a strangely prophetic vein, Dollard, et. al. (1939), observed that Marxian theory assumes the existence of frustration in each member of the proletariat. The frustrations are derived from the destruction of his pride by being forced to work at a machine and by being treated as another commodity, by exploitation by his employers, by economic crisis, by state repression. "These frustrations lead inevitably to aggression and eventually, according to the Marxian prediction, to the triumph of the oppressed class." (Dollard, et. al., 1939, p. 173) Paradoxically, this description of the oppressed working class outlined from Marxian doctrine in 1939 by Dollard and colleagues describes the real and perceived problems facing East German workers in 1988.

The East German government's manner of operationalizing Marxism led to the downfall of the country according to Marxian principles in respect to frustration-aggression theory. This statement is further reinforced through frustration-aggression theory by Davies (1962):

The notions that revolutions need both a period of rising expectations and a succeeding period in which they are frustrated qualifies substantially the main Marxian notion that revolutions occur after progressive degradation and the de Tocqueville notion that they occur when conditions are improving. (Davies, 1962, p. 146)

FORMING AN HYPOTHESIS

Preliminary examination of the case of the German Democratic Republic's decline from 1988-1989 seems to indicate that repressive policy choices by the leadership of that country aggravated popular protest. This seems especially true since popular protest at that time was striving for liberalization of the government.

Hypothesizing that repressive policy choices by the government of the German Democratic Republic aggravated popular protest in that country from 1988-1989, one must examine whether those policy choices tended to suppress, appease, or strengthen the solidarity of popular protest.

DEFINITIONS

Several additional terms must be defined before proceeding any further with this analysis. Relative deprivation theory has already been defined, but definitions are still needed for popular protest, acts of the government, and revolution. Since the relative deprivation theory applies to "revolutions", this definition will be examined first, in order to show that this theory is applicable to this specific case.

"Revolution" is a central concept in research concerning the demise of a government. Perhaps one of the best definitions of revolution applicable to this research is that offered by Schwartz (1970). Schwartz defines a revolution as "a mass-linked social movement oriented to the acquisition of political power through the use of social disruption and/or violence - including insurgencies, civil wars, nationalist movements, but excluding most *coups*." (Schwartz, 1970, p. 112) This definition embraces disruption, non-violence and nationalist orientation to the concept of revolution.

"Popular protest" is a bit more difficult to define. The definition of "popular protest" applicable to this research is case specific. This definition incorporates the above-stated definition of "revolution" and the definition of "political violence" offered by Gurr (1970). The Gurr definition of political violence states that political violence consists of "all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - including competing political groups as well as incumbents - or its policies." (Gurr, 1970, pp. 3-4) "All collective attacks" can be both physically violent and physically passive "attacks", as well as including (in this case) the abandonment of the society (to include emigration). Synthesizing the two definitions to create a case-specific third definition, this author defined "popular protest" as:

a mass-linked social movement (consisting of collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors, or its policies) using social disruption, and/or violence - including insurgencies, civil wars, nationalist movements, and even the complete abandonment of the society, to include emigration by dissidents.

"Acts of the government" is to be understood as being those actions (overt military oppression, overt legislative repression, clandestine repressive operations, simple repressive rhetoric and threats, and - indeed - even *non-action* or failure to act) that might be perceived to be in response to public demands. These acts of the government may also be those actions which are designed to induce a (governmentally) desired pattern of behavior from the public.

CONCLUSIONS

There are three basic theories of revolutions that are currently considered valid by social science researchers: (1) institutional imbalance theory, (2) resource mobilization theory, and (3) relative deprivation theory. While not universally applicable, the theories are also not mutually exclusive in their applications.

Relative deprivation theory is psychological in nature, yet it draws upon and is enhanced by sociological collective behavior theories. Government repression may have an immediately negative effect upon political violence, though it does not reduce the likelihood of spontaneous protest. Economic decline or rapid economic growth may have an adverse effect upon domestic stability, in turn leading to political violence.

The case of the fall of the German Democratic Republic, would provide for an interesting test of relative deprivation theory. Having selected a test of relative deprivation theory

to examine the fall of the GDR, a research methodology for this study must be developed. Chapter IV will define the parameters for the research and will operationalize variables to be used in the analysis.

IV

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Thus far, the historical background of the fall of the GDR has been presented (Chapter II). The literature concerning revolution theories have also been presented, and a theory of revolution has been selected for study (Chapter III). This chapter will develop the research methodology with which this case will be analyzed in conjunction with the selected theory of revolution.

DEFINING "CASE STUDY"

First, the choice of "case study" must be evaluated as a research methodology. A single-case study design can be used to confirm, challenge, or extend a theory, or where the case represents an extreme or unique case. (Yin, 1989, pp. 47-48) Case studies are empirical inquiries that investigate contemporary phenomena within their real-life contexts when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. (Yin, 1989, p. 23) Case studies also require multiple sources of evidence to be used. (Yin, 1989, p. 23) This research was designed to utilize documentary information from multiple sources; "documentary information" (vis á vis "archival records") includes newsclippings and other articles appearing in the mass media. (Yin, 1989, p. 85)

TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS

Examining data for a discernible pattern over a period of time involves time-series pattern techniques. Time-series pattern is described as "a way of relating the data to the propositions, even though the entire study consists of only a single case." (Yin, 1989, p. 35) In certain time-series patterns, statistical comparison of data is not needed to confirm the results, as the results are so obvious to the naked eye that they confirm or refute the trend without requiring statistical analysis (Yin, 1989, p. 117):

For case study analysis, one of the most desirable strategies is the use of a pattern-matching logic. Such a logic compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one If the patterns coincide, the results can help a case study to strengthen its *internal validity*.

If the case study is an explanatory one, the patterns may be related to the dependent or the independent variables or study (or both). (Yin, 1989, p. 109)

RESEARCH DESIGN

When stating the research design for a particular research problem, the following guidelines are given by Yin (1989):

A research design should include five components. Although the current state of the art does not provide detailed guidance on the last two, the complete research design should not only indicate what data are to be collected - as indicated by (1) a study's questions, (2) its propositions, and (3) its unit of analysis. The design also should tell you what is to be done after the data have been collected - as indicated by (4) the logic linking the data to the propositions and (5) the criteria for interpreting the findings. (Yin, 1989, p. 35)

These issues can be addressed in the following manner:

(1) a study's questions

Why did the German Democratic Republic suffer socio-political collapse in the late 1980s (through 1990)?

(2) its propositions

The relative deprivation theory of revolution is substantiated by information relative to the demise of the German Democratic Republic from the mid-1980s through 1990. (E.g. the real and perceived deprivation of the East Germans caused popular protest, which, in turn, led to the demise of the government.)

(3) its unit of analysis

The unit of analysis for this study is one country: The German Democratic Republic.

(4) the logic linking the data to the proposition

The real and perceived deprivation of individuals can be measured through protest against the power that is perceived to be the cause of the deprivation. In this case, protest of two types arise: (a) the emigration of citizens, and (b) popular mobilization to public politically-motivated demonstration within the country.

(5) the criteria for interpreting the findings

For the relative deprivation theory to be substantiated by this individual case, an increase in the incidence and magnitude of popular protest must be observed prior to the dissolution of the East German state. This increase in popular protest must be attributable to acts of the government (or lack of desired government action) contrary to popular demands. Failure to observe an increase in the incidence and magnitude of popular protest prior to the dissolution of the East German state, or popular protest that is not resultant of undesired government action (or lack of desired government action) will indicate a failure of this individual case to substantiate relative deprivation theory.

PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

This research project is explanatory in purpose, focusing on a specified case study, attempting to offer a partial explanation of why the East German state ceased to exist. This partial explanation takes the form of substantiation or rejection of relative deprivation theory of revolution. (The explanation will be considered a "partial" one, since there are systemic, economic, societal and other factors that played crucial roles in the demise of this nation.)

JUSTIFYING THE CHOICE OF CASE STUDY

As previously stated, case studies are empirical enquiries investigating contemporary phenomena within their real-life contexts when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. (Yin, 1989, p. 23) This methodology seemed particularly suited to the anomaly of the fall of East Germany, once the showplace of Communist eastern Europe.

At the time of the GDR's demise, there was a systemic disintegration of Comecon governments in Eastern Europe. There is some difficulty in determining what portion of the GDR's demise is a result of this systemic disintegration and what portion of it is a result of that country's internal problems. East Germany seemed to have collapsed from within, largely as a result of a mass exodus of its citizens and the nation's inability to cope with shortages of workers. East Germany was considered one of the more rigidly socialistic eastern European nations, but with

other eastern European Communist governments liberalizing around it, it is difficult to divorce the East German phenomenon from regional events.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

This research drew upon documentary information from the daily *New York Times* from January 1, 1988, through November 30, 1989. This sources was augmented and verified through contemporary periodicals (*Time*, *Newsweek*, *Macleans*, etc) reporting on events in East Germany.

OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES

After data was gathered, time-series pattern techniques were employed to examine interrelationships between data types (as suggested by Yin, 1989, p. 109). Since this analysis was intended to examine daily occurrences over a given time period, a day-by-day calendar for the period representing January 1988 through November 1989 was constructed (see APPENDIX 1). Prior to gathering data that would be recorded on this calendar, though, it was necessary to decide the manner in which this data would be examined and how data types would be operationalized for examination.

Data concerning three types of events were operationalized for analysis. They were gathered from the above-indicated sources and were noted on the calendar. Operationalization of data took the following form:

A. Emigrants from East Germany to Other Countries

Estimated numbers of emigrants were noted on a day-by-day basis when possible, variable "X" representing each individual person who had emigrated. When this was not possible, often due to a lack of systematic treatment of data reported, special notation was made, as in the statement "By the end of March, 'X' number of persons had left the country." Using the last previously reported number of emigrants as a starting point for plotting on this line graph, the number that was reported as a sum total "by" a certain date was then plotted on the x-coordinate for that date; for lack of comprehensively reported data, a *uniform* rate of emigration (straight line) was plotted between the two dates. Hence it was possible to plot such information as completely as was available and to extrapolate lines between dates on the graph for emigration flow purposes.

As previously indicated, this set of data's graph was designed to take the form of a line graph plotted over time. Emigration is a cumulative activity; once a person has emigrated, he/she becomes *added* to the number of persons that have already emigrated for a total emigration count. Once a person had left the country in protest, that person would remain a part of a cumulative total of individuals that had left. Each day of absence from the country is a continued day of protest against

the government, the protest manifesting itself in the form of emigration. Such a person could only be subtracted from the aggregate total of emigrants upon his/her return to the country he/she had fled.

As the research project developed, it became evident that merely being outside East Germany's political boundaries was not enough for an individual to be tallied as an emigrant. At the time of the mass exoduses, many East German citizens found themselves on vacation in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia. These people often had no intention of emigrating to the West and returned home to the GDR upon completion of their vacations. Obviously, returning vacationers can not be considered emigrants.

An additional problem arose from those persons who, with intent to emigrate, had managed to reach West German embassies in Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague. Although intending to emigrate, these individuals had not managed to leave Comecon territory and were in danger of deportation back to East Germany. If deported to East Germany, they naturally would not be considered emigrants. Logically, these persons who were seeking emigration through embassy channels were engaged in protest against the GDR government, and were counted as protesters until they managed to reach non-Comecon soil.

B. Mass Political Protest

Actual numbers or estimates of individual persons engaged in mobilizations to political protest within the country are represented the variable "X". They were recorded for each day. This data's graph took the form of a point graph plotted over time.

Since protests are *individual incidents*, an actor that was engaged in one protest in a given city at a given time over a given issue may not necessarily be engaged in a subsequent protest. For this reason, plotting was not done cumulatively for this variable. All locations and numbers of protesters for each day were aggregated for a total number of persons protesting in the GDR. The aggregate variable "X" for any given day was plotted as an individual point on the time-series graph for this data.

One group of individuals represented possibility for being double counted. Intended emigrants who had managed to seek shelter in West German embassies while awaiting permission to emigrate to non-Comecon soil had to be treated separately. Although each day spent in an embassy with intent to emigrate could be considered an act of protest, these "protests" were only counted for the first day. The *arrival* at the embassies was considered the act of protest, not the failure to leave the embassies once there. Counts of persons attempting to

emigrate through West German embassies were, therefore, only tallied for the day of arrival.

Since "protesters" at West German embassies in Warsaw, Budapest, and Prague generally did, eventually, emigrate, their numbers were easily transferred to the "Emigrants" data column. Acts of protest were examined as individual events and plotted as points on a time-series graph. Hence, there was no need to subtract these individual "protesters" from any cumulative tally.

C. Acts of Political Repression

Indexing acts of government repression in this set of data on the calendar was designed to yield a measure of repression. Acts of political repression were scored cumulatively, since one act of repression followed by a subsequent act of repression logically yields a condition that is more repressive than the single act of repression would have initially created. By the same reasoning, a relaxation of repression would subtract from the cumulative repression that had been imposed upon the populace being repressed. Examining repression by this reasoning provided a means with which to estimate an increase, a decrease, or a condition of no appreciable change in repression over time. Repression was measured using an index, developed by this author for the purpose of this research. Since repression and repressive measures are the object of study (as opposed

to relaxation of repression), repressive measures were operationalized as positive values. The index was delineated as follows:

- 3 removal from office of government officials responsible for repressive measures, abolishment of political and/or social institutions enforcing repressive measures
- 2 an act that amounts to loosening of regulations that were the object of discontent by the country's residents/citizens
- 1 "friendly" rhetoric by government officials, designed to pacify discontented residents/citizens
- 0 no change in the repression immediately prior to instance of measurement
- +1 "hostile" rhetoric by government officials, designed to restrain or repress discontented residents/citizens
- +2 an overt act amounting to the tightening of regulations, designed to suppress discontent and/or control acts of protest
- +3 an act of government terrorism, to include imprisonment of dissidents, government-sanctioned killing of dissidents, etc.

This author found it necessary to develop this index in the absence of a standard index for acts of government repression. Though such an index may indeed exist, this author reviewed the literature extensively and failed to discover anything of the sort, though a cross-national index of civil and political rights was located. (Taylor & Jodice, 1983, pp. 58-65)

At this point it should be made clear that the index developed by this author is not designed to be a definitive index of acts of government repression. It is proposed for use in this study only, and may not be suitable or adequate for use in other case-specific studies where more detail is required and available. This index was developed for relatively easy numerical indexing of acts of government repression. Its purpose is comparative study, not for cataloging acts of government repression for future analysis. (Problems inherent in this index of repression are discussed in Chapter VIII.)

Though seemingly complicated, the coding methodology can be clarified by Table 4-1. This format shows each variable, the coding procedure used for each, and the data source.

Table 4-1

CODING METHODOLOGY

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>CODING PROCEDURE</u>	<u>DATA SOURCE</u>
Emigrants	actual number of emigrants; tabulated cumulatively over time	<i>New York Times</i>
Protesters	actual number of persons mobilizing to protest in the GDR; tabulated non-cumulatively by individual date, participants in each incident tabulated independently of incidents on other dates	<i>New York Times</i>
Repression	acts of government repression are assigned values, max. is +3 and min. is -3; tabulated cumulatively over time	<i>New York Times</i>

After the manner of delineation and operationalization of data was decided upon, data were gathered and noted on the 23-month calendar for the purpose of analysis. Analysis of these data is discussed in Chapter V.

V

ANALYSIS

V. ANALYSIS

As stated in the previous section, this research used documentary information from the daily *New York Times*, augmented by other contemporary periodicals (*Time*, *Newsweek*, *Macleans*, etc). Once these data were gathered and noted on the 23-month calendar for this study (APPENDIX 1), they could be further examined for interrelated trends over time. The 23-month calendar in and of itself, though, was not in the most easily usable form for the proposed research. Modifications were made to this calendar in order for the data to be more easily examined.

First, the calendar was changed from a standard calendar format to an ordinal one, with each day having its month-day designation changed to an ordinal number. January 1, 1988, became Day 1; January 2, 1988, became Day 2; January 3, 1988, became Day 3, etc., through November 30, 1989, which became Day 700 (1988 was a leap year).

Second, it became apparent that the majority of the days on the calendar had no data reported. This left the calendar with a great number of empty spaces, which encumbered analysis of the data. Retaining the ordinal day assignment for each day, all days for which no data were reported were deleted from the calendar. This streamlined the appearance of the calendar for ease of analysis, while preserving the integrity of the data within

the time-series. Data for "Emigrants" was changed to "Cumulative Emigrants" and cumulative records were transferred to this calendar in hopes of further facilitating later analysis. This modified calendar format appears at APPENDIX 2.

After this modified calendar was prepared, data were analyzed with the aid of IBM-compatible Harvard Graphics® 3.0 software. The initial step was entering the data, and all data were entered "as is". Data from the "Government Repression" column were also entered as they appear in APPENDIX 2. These data, however, were handled cumulatively through execution of the proper command within the computer software. Data were specified to be plotted on 2-dimensional x-/y-axis charts, and it was discovered that the data recorded in the early phases of the revolution (e.g. prior to July 31, 1989) were so intermittently reported as to be negligible. These data were not plotted on the charts, as plotting them would so elongate the x-axis as to hamper analysis of the rapidly changing data for events after July 31, 1989. Thus, although data from January 1, 1988, through November 30, 1989, were collected as data integral to this study, only data from July 31, 1989, through November 30, 1989, were plotted for quantitative analysis.

EAST GERMANS EMIGRATING


The first trend analyzed was that of persons emigrating from East Germany from July 31, 1989, through November 30, 1989. This analysis was performed relatively easily through computer-executed trend analysis. Emigration was presented as a line

graph, as emigration took the form of a steady stream of emigrants throughout this time period. The continuous flow of emigrants was extrapolated between data points. The results of this analysis appear at Fig. 5-1 and at APPENDIX 3. It was readily apparent that emigration increased over time, jumping markedly upward toward the end of the period examined. The trend line for analysis of this set of data has an easily discernible positive slope.

Fig. 5-1

East Germans Emigrating

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989




EAST GERMANS PROTESTING

Next, an examination of East Germans engaged in active protest was conducted. (This data set was plotted as individual points, as it could not be assured that each protester at a given event would attend all subsequent protest events. Each protest was seen as a separate and distinct event.) Collected data was plotted on a point graph and a trend line was drawn. The trend line indicated that there also was an increase over time in the number of persons engaged in active protest. This increase is represented by the trend line for this data set also having a positive slope. The graph for this data set and its analysis is found at Fig. 5-2 and APPENDIX 4.

Fig. 5-2

East Germans Protesting 31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989




COMPOSITE OF EMIGRANTS AND PROTESTERS

Looking at both Fig. 5-1 and Fig. 5-2, one sees that the trends (e.g. the trend to emigrate and the trend to protest) show an increase over time, manifesting themselves in a positively-sloped trend line. That is not to say, though, that the two data sets are at this point quantitatively comparable. Closer inspection of the y-axes of both graphs reveals that they are not the same, the axis for the graphic representation of emigrants having a maximum y-value almost four times smaller than that for protesters. This results in a graphic representation that has visual increments four times larger those for protesters. Before the two can be compared, the y-axes must be standardized.

Fig. 5-3

East Germans Emigrating 31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989




Utilizing the Harvard Graphics® software, this was accomplished by specifying a maximum y-axis value of 600,000 for graphic representation of emigration data, thereby putting the graph for emigration data on the same y-scale as the graph for protest data (Fig. 5-3 and APPENDIX 5).

As one can see from Fig. 5-3, this alteration to the y-axis "squashes" the plotted data, reducing the positive value of the slope, though not altering its positive slope. Now that the two sets of data have been plotted on the same y-scale, they can be compared to one another to see if there is any internal validity to the increase in expression-of-discontent-through-emigration and expression-of-discontent-through-protest. This comparison is performed in Fig. 5-4 and APPENDIX 6, and one observes that the trend lines for both data sets are nearly parallel.

Fig. 5-4

Composite of Emigrants and Protesters

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989



PREPARING FOR PATTERN-MATCHING

Both emigration and internal protest were manifestations of citizen desires for increased personal freedom. By plotting the data for emigration, internal protest, and acts of government repression as data on separate graphs and overlaying those graphs (utilizing pattern-matching logic), one should be able to determine if relative deprivation theory can be supported. This is done by checking for (1) corresponding trends between emigration and acts of government repression, and (2) corresponding trends between internal protest and acts of government repression. An increase in government repression and an increase in emigration (indicated by positively-sloped trend lines for both) would tend to support relative deprivation theory. By the same logic, an increase in government repression and an increase in political protest (indicated by positively-sloped trend lines for both) would also tend to support relative deprivation theory.

Should the trend lines for both emigration and protest have negative slopes, then relative deprivation theory can not be supported. This is because popular discontent (as indicated through the selected indicators) will appear to be on the decline. This would mean that there is a decrease in feelings of relative deprivation. Should the trend line for one of these two variables have a negative slope and the other have a positive slope, then the results of the study will be inconclusive.

Should the trend line for government repression have a negative slope, then relative deprivation theory can not be

supported if either of the other two indicators have positively-sloped trend lines. In this eventuality, government repression will be on the decline overall. This would indicate that relative deprivation theory does not apply to this case, or that there is a problem with the methodology or with the execution of the analysis.

The hypothesis as presented in Chapter III stated repressive policy choices by the government of the German Democratic Republic aggravated popular protest in that country from 1988-1989. Since relative deprivation theory is an integral part of this hypothesis (that is, popular protest is a manifestation of popular discontent), relative deprivation theory must be supported - or the hypothesis will be rejected. If both pattern-matching tests support relative deprivation theory, then the hypothesis will not be rejected. Barring any extraordinary circumstances, the interpretation could then follow that poor policy choices by the leadership of the GDR contributed to the revolution which destroyed its government (through application of relative deprivation theory).


If one or both pattern-matching tests fail to substantiate relative deprivation theory, however, then the hypothesis should be rejected. The interpretation could then follow that poor policy choices on the part of the leadership of the GDR did not necessarily contribute to the fall of its government (through nonapplicability of relative deprivation theory).

GDR GOVERNMENT REPRESSION

Logically, the next step in this analysis was to plot data for government repression on a 2-dimensional graph for the purposes of comparison. Surprisingly, when plotted this data showed a marked rise in repression, followed by a steep succession of relaxation of repression, rather than any continuous, long-range rise or fall in repression. The plotting of the trend line for this data set revealed that the trend line has a negative slope (Fig. 5-5 and APPENDIX 7). (Conceptual problems inherent in this trend line will be discussed in Chapter VII.)

Fig. 5-5

GDR Government Repression 31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989



COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EMIGRATION AND REPRESSION


Although it is by this time evident what the outcome of this comparative analysis will be, the analysis was carried to completion. Each of the data for repression was multiplied by ten thousand (10,000) in order to facilitate analysis of the data in comparison to the two other data sets. This multiplication did not alter the outcome of the analysis of repression, as all of the data in the data set were treated in the same manner.

After all of the repression data were multiplied by ten thousand, they were plotted on a graph along with the data for emigration during the same time period. As can be seen in Fig. 5-6 and APPENDIX 8, the slope for the emigration data trend line

Fig. 5-6

Comparative Analysis of Emigration and Repression

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989



is positive and the slope for the repression data trend line is negative, indicating that this comparative analysis fails to support relative deprivation theory.


COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROTEST AND REPRESSION

As was expected after performing the above comparative analysis, the same result was obtained when the protest (positively-sloped trend line) and repression (negatively-sloped trend line) data were compared on the same graph (Fig. 5-7 and APPENDIX 9). This comparative analysis between protest and repression data also fails to support relative deprivation theory.

Fig. 5-7

Comparative Analysis of Protest and Repression

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989



RESULTS

Not one, but both of the comparisons resulted in a failure to support relative deprivation theory for this case. It therefore appears that relative deprivation theory must be rejected as a possible explanation for the demise of the German Democratic Republic from 1988 through 1989. An important discussion of this finding is found in the chapters that follow.

VI

SUMMARY

VI. SUMMARY

In an effort to examine the effect of policy decisions by a government on its citizens, this study selected the case of the fall of the East German state for examination. The history of the GDR was presented in order to give the reader an overview of events leading up to the demise of this country. Since this can be partially attributed to citizen action against the government, different theories of revolution were examined. Examples of these theoretical perspectives were presented drawing upon the history of East Germany.

A discussion of the case study methodology followed, and this case study then attempted to examine the fall of the East German state through quantitative analysis. The author developed his own measuring device for quantifying the variables of government repression. This quantitative study took the form of comparative time-series analysis using pattern matching techniques. These techniques were designed to show whether corresponding increases existed between (1) emigration and government repression, and (2) popular protest and government repression.

In order for relative deprivation theory to have been supported, two different types of protest would have had to show corresponding increases with government repression. Upon examination, *both* of the types of protest showed increases over time. Government repression, however, did not. Relative deprivation

theory could, therefore, not be supported by this case study in the manner in which it was conducted. Since relative deprivation theory could not be supported, the hypothesis (that repressive policy choices by government in face of citizen calls for liberalization aggravated popular protest) also could not be supported. Based upon the results of this study, this seems - at least at first glance - to be verifiably true.

Reading through the chronology (Chapter II) and reading through contemporary news articles, one discovers that the foremost-cited reason for this revolution in the GDR was citizen discontent with the government. How does one account for the discrepancy between the findings of this study and the reality of the events that transpired? This question will be addressed in the following chapter.

VII

CONCLUSIONS

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The puzzling results of this study leave many unaddressed or unanswered questions. The first of these questions ties back into the purpose of the research paper, namely: Do repressive policy choices by a government tend to aggravate popular protest or to quash it? Based upon the findings of this research, one would tend to believe that repressive policy choices - at least in this case - have little or no direct bearing on popular protest. A review of Chapter II and of the contemporary accounts of events, however, would indicate that repressive policy choices by the East German government were the *primary* motivation for its citizens to mobilize to protest. This dichotomy poses several interesting questions, questions that for this researcher were as interesting (if not more so) than the original proposed research.

FINDINGS CONFLICT WITH CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE

Why would a quantitative case study analysis indicate that there is no support for a theory, when the qualitative literature is emphatic that this theory explains the events of the case? Inspection of contemporary accounts of events leading up to and during the protests generally cite citizen discontent as the primary causal factor. This discontent is generally attributed to the increased flow of information into East Germany. This flow of information was facilitated by television and radio

broadcasts received from the West. The the refusal of national leaders to liberalize restrictions on individual freedoms (as was being done in the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Poland) was another cause of discontent. The government's general unresponsiveness to the will of the people it governed further added to citizen discontent and weakened the government's legitimacy.

Again, a more descriptive analysis of the events surrounding the fall of the East German state would have improved the internal validity of this study. As indicated in Chapter II, almost three quarters of the refugees polled indicated that they were driven by the lack of freedom of expression and travel. Almost as many said they wanted more personal responsibility for their own destiny. (Smolowe, 1989, p. 32) If the results of this poll accurately reflect a larger pattern among the refugees, it would seem that this case study does not reflect the reality of the situation very well. *New York Times* reports from the period - the primary source of data for this study - also indicate that citizen discontent was the main force behind emigration and protest. With all qualitative sources contradicting the results of this study, the study must therefore be considered invalid on its face.

METHODOLOGICAL AND PROCEDURAL WEAKNESSES

One of the questions that arose concerned the validity of the manner in which the research was conducted. If the research indicated findings contrary to what was observed, then (1) either the "facts" must be wrong, or (2) the research must be faulty.

Operating from the premise that history was fairly accurately reported, this author must examine why the research was faulty.

A return to the literature concerning the selected methodology was made in an attempt to explain why the analysis resulted in the outcome it did. Yin (1989) recommends two types of strategies for completing the analytic phase of case study research:

The first and more preferred strategy is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to the case study. The original objectives and design of the case study presumably were based on such propositions, which in turn reflect a set of research questions, reviews of the literature, and new insights. (Yin, 1989, p. 100)

A second general analytic strategy is to develop a descriptive framework for organizing the case study. This strategy is less preferable than the use of theoretical propositions but serves as an alternative when theoretical propositions are absent.

Sometimes, the original purpose of the case study may have been a descriptive one. (Yin, 1989, p. 101)

Yin goes on to state:

... the original objective of the case study may not have been a descriptive one, but a descriptive approach may help to identify the appropriate causal links to be analyzed - even quantitatively. (Yin, 1989, p. 102)

In deciding upon the approach for analysis of events surrounding the fall of the East German state, this researcher paid little or no attention to descriptive (qualitative) aspects, instead endeavoring to quantify all data for analysis. In light of this case - and especially in light of the outcome of the purely quantitative approach to analysis - either a meshing of qualitative and quantitative data should have been employed, or a purely descriptive approach should have been used. This

conclusion provides food for further research and will be addressed at more length in Chapter VIII.


THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK MAY NEED MODIFICATION

Another possible explanation of why analysis of the data does not seem to represent the reality of the situation may lie in theoretical considerations. Referring to Fig. 5-5 and APPENDIX 7, one observes that government repression experiences a marked peak prior to declining (APPENDIX 1 reveals that this peak occurred on October 12, 1989).

Fig. 5-5

GDR Government Repression

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989



Up to this point, the slope of the trend line for government repression would have to be positive, supporting relative deprivation theory within criteria set forth in this paper. It is only due to the sharp and progressive relaxations of government repression after October 12, 1989, that the overall trend of repression takes on a negative slope.

The resulting question is this: By the time the government began relaxing its repressive policies, had popular protest reached a point of self-sustainment? (By this is meant that any government action short of abdication would have no effect on popular protest, as this protest would occur regardless.) In other words, did government action play no significant role in whether or not emigration and internal protest occurred after October 12, 1989, as these would have occurred anyway? If this is the case, the trend line for government repression plays no role in this analysis. (This aspect is lent credence by the fact that protests against the government of the GDR continued long after November 1989. Some protests even continued after the reunification of the two Germanies in 1990, individuals mobilizing to protest over remnant institutions and former GDR political officials.)

Without being able to quantitatively determine the point where popular protest becomes self-sustaining, this alternative explanation becomes largely subjective. In conducting an examination of where this point would lie, one must also take qualitative aspects into account, however this endeavor does not lie within the scope of this paper.

ALTERNATE CONCEPTUALIZATIONS

Relative deprivation theory is only supported through the repression data prior to October 12, 1989. Thereafter data indicate a marked relaxation of government repression. It may have been necessary to divide repression into ascending and descending trends for the purpose of analysis.

It may have also been sensible to have ended analysis of all data on the date that relaxation of government repression began (since that was the date that initiated the measures sought by those protesting). These alternatives indicate that there may have been more effective conceptualizations available to the purpose of this research.

AN ALTERNATE METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The use of the trend line on the graph of government repression played a major role in results of this study in Chapter V. As stated on previous pages, this trend line served to distort the government repression data. Another look at this graph in conjunction with graphs of comparison data may provide a more meaningful method of analysis - and certainly one that more realistically reflects what occurred.


A re-examination of Figure 5-6 and APPENDIX 8 will be useful for devising an alternate method of analysis. (Although the trend lines have been left in this figure as reproduced in this chapter, they will not play a role in the treatment that follows.) Looking at Figure 5-6, one observes that the data for

government repression shows three peaks: September 25, 1989 (Day 634), October 12, 1989 (Day 651), and October 25, 1989 (Day 664). There are marked rises in emigration after two of the major peaks in government repression (September 25 and October 25, 1989). (The repression that peaked on October 12, 1989, involved sealing off emigration routes, so a rise in emigration following this peak could not be expected. This is especially true given the extensive fortification of East Germany's borders.) Naturally, a peak on such a graph indicates two things: (1) that the data has reached a maximum point as compared to the data that immediately precedes it, and (2) that the data that immediately follows the high point will indicate a decline in whatever is being measured. In this case, repression is being measured.

Fig. 5-6

Comparative Analysis of Emigration and Repression

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989



The significant rises in emigration as reported begin on September 30 and November 4, 1989. This indicates a time lag between peak in repression and increase in emigration. The first time lag is 5 days, the second is 10 days. (For the latter date, emigration began on the first day after travel restrictions were rescinded.) In turn, this time lag may be used to infer a cause-and-effect relationship. Without examination of the nature of the individual acts of repression and their direct effect on emigration, establishment of a cause-and-effect relationship between repression and emigration can only be tentative.

Examination of the individual acts of repression in conjunction with the emigration data can also provide useful divisions of the collected data for specific study. Referring again to Figure 5-6 and APPENDIX 8, one may make divisions in the collected data to facilitate study and analysis. Three distinct phases come to the fore:

Early Phase - between August 25 and September 25, 1989. These dates represent the time span between the first increases in government repression in direct response to increased emigration, and the government's first relaxation of repression.

Active Phase - between September 25 and October 25, 1989. These dates represent a period of sharp increases and decreases in government repression prior to government relaxation of emigration restrictions. Based upon repression data, this phase can be divided into three phases:

1. period of increasing repression: September 25 to October 12, 1989.
2. period of initial relaxation of repression: October 12 to October 24, 1989.
3. period of inconsistent policy: October 25 to November 4, 1989.

Collapse phase - all dates after November 4, 1989. These dates represent the effective lifting of travel restrictions on East Germans wanting to go west. After November 4, 1989, the government of the GDR repeatedly relaxed repressive policies toward its citizens in an attempt to appease them.

Again, though not within the scope of this paper, this method would have provided a much more meaningful and realistic means of analyzing and comparing data for emigration and government repression. Similar approaches could be employed in the comparison of popular protest and government repression, also adding to the internal validity of the study, as well as to the validity of the its findings.

DATA WAS NOT SYSTEMATICALLY REPORTED

Data concerning emigration, protest, and acts of government repression were not systematically reported by the sources selected for examination. Initial reporting of data was sketchy, and media coverage improved only as the situation progressed, especially once it had reached crisis proportions and became "newsworthy."

Attempts to obtain more accurate and specific data were unsuccessful. Information requested from the German Information Service was even less informative than that gleaned from the media coverage, plotted on an annual basis only. (German Information Service, 1991, p. 5) Another German source plotted emigration data on a monthly basis. (Wendt, 1991, pp. 386-394) Amnesty International provided no data at all, preferring to deal

with the emigrations and protests in descriptive fashion. (*Amnesty International Report*, 1988 and 1989)

Often, this researcher was forced to deal with data reported with qualifiers such as "as many as", "by the end of last month", "to date no fewer than", etc., which further limited the accuracy of data to be plotted, as well as the plotting the date of occurrence. A more systematic gathering and recording of data on a day-to-day basis at the time of occurrence would have greatly improved the reliability of this study.

SUBJECTIVITY OF QUANTIFICATION

As the proposed index of repression that was developed by this author was used, it became apparent to this researcher that this index was subject to a great deal of subjectivity. For example, the replacement of Erich Honecker by Egon Krenz as President of the GDR was intended by the Politburo to be perceived as an act of conciliation. Given the power of the President of the GDR, should this act be seen as a changing of the government (receiving a rating of -3), as an active relaxation of repression (-2), or merely as a symbolic (but meaningless) gesture on the part of the Politburo, since Krenz was the protégé of the individual he replaced (-1)? Given Honecker's ill health at the time, could this replacement of him by a healthy "hard-liner" even be perceived as a precursor to active strengthening of repression by a President physically more capable of quashing dissent (+1)? The subjectivity of the researcher in assigning values to such actions plays a major role in the magnitude of the

repression data that are recorded. (For closure, the replacement of Honecker with Krenz was given a rating of -1, as it was perceived as a general relaxation of repression at the rhetorical level only.) Additional problems inherent in the index of repression provide topic for further research and are addressed in Chapter VIII.

CHOICE OF ATTACK

The method of comparing data was to plot the data on graphs and compare trend lines between them. This may not have been the most meaningful way in looking at the data for the purposes of this study. Visual comparison of data *without* using trend lines would have eliminated the distortion of data as seen in this research. Multivariate analysis, χ^2 , or other forms of statistical analysis with different emphases may have provided different insights into the collected data. In addition to possibly supporting relative deprivation theory, these statistical methods when applied to these data should be able to provide other interesting aspects of this case that are not within the scope of this paper.

SUMMATION

In this study, the results of the comparative analyses between emigration and government repression and between protest and government repression did not to unambiguously substantiate relative deprivation theory. This result seems to contradict the contemporary literature's positing of relative deprivation (citi-

zen discontent) as the major cause of East German popular revolt.

Possible explanations for this difference lie in the methodological and procedural weaknesses of the research conducted. Another possible explanation may lie in the need to modify the theoretical framework as presented in this paper. The lack of a systematic reporting of data at time of occurrence and the conceptualization and operationalization of this researcher's proposed index of repression also play a significant role in the findings of this study. Unfortunately, due to the multiplicity of problems and inconsistencies found in this research, no generalizations concerning implications of policy choices can be made based upon this research.

Although the results of analysis when compared to real-life events may invalidate this study, they provide interesting topics for further research. These topics are addressed in the following chapter.

VIII

RELATED TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

VIII. RELATED TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In evaluating this time-series analysis case study, this author was confronted by two immediately pertinent issues that make prime topics for further research. These issues do not involve historical data or occurrences, but rather theoretical and methodological aspects of this case study. Unfortunately, each of issues in their unresolved form serve to reduce the validity of this case study as conducted. These issues are addressed in the following pages.

CAN AN INDEX OF REPRESSION BE DEVELOPED?

While searching the literature for an established index of repression, this author found it odd that (1) such an index either did not exist or was not commonly used, and (2) that the lack of such an index did not appear to have been addressed in the popular literature. During the implementation of the author-developed index of repression, this author discovered that the lack of such an index may not be without grounds.

As the author used the index of repression that was developed out of necessity to this research, he discovered an inherent flaw in his index. Given that one act of repression coupled with another act of repression results in a situation more repressive than would have existed under only the first act

of repression, one can easily agree that repressive acts are a cumulative (and lagged) activity. Utilizing the system developed by this author, the following theoretical case will serve to illustrate a serious problem with this index of repression:

A population consists of ten (10) individuals. The government controlling that population, engages in repressive rhetoric against that population on thirty-one (31) successive days. Without prior incidence of repressive rhetoric or active repression, this yields a cumulative index of repression of +31.

A second population, controlled by a different government, also consists of ten (10) persons. Without prior repressive rhetoric or action, the government controlling that population kills all ten persons, one on each successive day, yielding a cumulative index of repression of +30.

It then follows that it is more repressive to talk repressively about ten persons thirty-one times than it is to kill them.

Naturally, this line of reasoning makes little sense in practice, and therefore invalidates the index of repression proposed by this author. Changing the scale to -10/+10 or -100/+100 does not alter this, but merely extends the number of days that a government must engage in a repressive rhetoric in order to be more repressive than a murderous one. It may be that incidences of repression are not quantifiable, however this author found no evidence in the literature to support nor to refute their quantifiability.

The additional question arises whether there is "a maximum level of repression that is a function of a given population 'n'?" Can a population only endure so much repression, and can this limit of endurance be predicted? Upon initial consideration, one could compare the People's Republic of China to the

United States of America and arrive at the conclusion popular tolerance of repression varies between states. A population's ability to endure a maximum level of repression may be resultant more of political culture or of historical, social, or other factors than of any universal statistical principle.

Is this to say that the maximum level of repression may reach an infinite level for a given population? This author has no evidence to present in conjunction with this question. He does not, however, believe that a population can endure prolonged repression without initiating revolution against its repressor.

If this line of reasoning is thus far valid, it stands to reason that if each population can only endure a certain level of repression before conditions become intolerable enough to cause revolution, this level may - somehow - be quantifiable for each population. Economic, systemic, ethnic, international, social, geographic, and historical factors must be taken into account for each population. If quantification of a maximum tolerable level of repression can be accomplished, then revolutions that result from elite repression can be predicted, meaning that:

- (1) elites can gauge their repressive actions so as not to violate the maximum acceptable level of repression,
- (2) anti-elite forces can engage in activities that cause the population to perceive that elites have overstepped the maximum allowable level of repression, and
- (3) other nations can better predict impending revolutions.

Development of an index of repression would, therefore, be a worthwhile endeavor - if, indeed, such an endeavor can be accomplished. Perhaps comprehensive cross-national data could be

employed to this end. This author feels that data used to develop such an index may be adversely affected by the degree of subjectivity used by the individual(s) quantifying the data. Such an index may suffer from severe external validity problems.

It became quickly evident to this author during the compilation of collected data that assigning qualitative information to a given index number was a subjective task. In many instances, a more holistic approach had to be taken to a particular occurrence in order to come up with an index of repression value. If this study were to be repeated, a different researcher might come up with other values for incidences of repression, which (on the cumulative graph of repression over time) could significantly alter the results of this study. The subjectivity of a quantified repression value could threaten the reliability the index as a measurement tool.

CAN EXAMINATION OF A REVOLUTION BE CONDUCTED WITHOUT EXAMINING QUALITATIVE ASPECTS?

While gathering and sorting data for the analysis portion of this case study, this author came to a realization. This realization was that a purely quantitative approach to analyze this case was not the best approach that could have been taken. The quantitative approach ignored many important factors that kept popping up in the texts from which empirical data were gleaned. Many of these factors had a direct bearing upon events, perceptions, processes, and outcomes integral to the case that was selected for study.

As the research progressed, it became clear that several

descriptive factors should have been taken into account. Among these factors was the illness of President Honecker and his absence from power as the emigrations and protests were beginning. The appointment of Krenz as new President and the perceived lack of difference between him and his predecessor also played a role in the public's reaction to government action. Other important factors that played a direct bearing on the case included the liberalization of internal and external policies in Poland and Hungary. The aspect of a guaranteed reception of East Germans in West Germany played a role in the emigration. Liberalization in the U.S.S.R., also had its effect on the attitudes of East Germans. Foreign media coverage (available to East Germans) of an event that the East German government denied or ignored in its media coverage increased the flow of information to the East. These aspects of the case studied could not be quantified under the quantitative framework established for this case study analysis. Without examination of them, however, one cannot get a clear and accurate picture of the events and processes at work in East Germany during this time period. (Further research could include plotting changes in these influences on the time line to see if they correspond with changes in emigration, protest, or government repression.)

Coupling the above aspects with systemic, economic, sociological, ethnic, geographic, and other aspects of this revolution, the questions arise:

Can the relative deprivation theory of revolution (or, indeed, any of the theories of revolution) be quantitatively substantiated without examination of non-quantitative factors?

Is an attempt to substantiate a theory of revolution only valid when it includes descriptive and qualitative aspects, as well as quantitative ones?

Examination of a revolution should take into account as many factors as possible, if one is to have a firm basis to judge the processes at work in that revolution. Limiting a study of a revolution to the easily quantifiable factors does not provide an accurate picture of what caused the revolution, what contributed to it, or what resolved it. Additionally, such a delimitation restricts possible outcomes to a set of parameters that would only benefit quantitative input data.

In retrospect, this author recalls no instance in the literature reviewed when any of the theories of revolution were treated quantitatively. Each discussion of the theories of revolution consisted of theoretical or descriptive treatments of these theories. While there was no specific denial of the applicability of a purely quantitative treatment of revolutions, there was also no championing of it. This issue did not appear to have been addressed at all, and may - after a more exhaustive search of the literature - provide a stimulating topic for further research.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

JANUARY 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17		100	+2	100+ arrested
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
29				
30				
31		2,000		prayer services

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST, AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

FEBRUARY 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1	4		-2	20 released from prison, 4 forced to emigrate
2				
3				
4			+1	rhetoric against dissidents
5				
6				
7				
8				
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APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

MARCH 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15		300		
16				
17				
18				
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31				

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

APRIL 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
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1
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NO DATA FOUND FOR THIS MONTH

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

MAY 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
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31				

NO DATA FOUND FOR THIS MONTH

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

JUNE 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
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11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26			+1	letter to Gobrachev
27				
28			+1	Honecker's address
29				
30				

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

JULY 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
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27				
28				
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31				

NO DATA FOUND FOR THIS MONTH

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

AUGUST 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
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11				
12				
13				
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27				
28				
29				
30				
31				

NO DATA FOUND FOR THIS MONTH

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

SEPTEMBER 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
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17				
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29				
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NO DATA FOUND FOR THIS MONTH

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

OCTOBER 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
29			+1	perestroika rejected
30				
31				

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

NOVEMBER 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
*18			+1	Soviet publications banned
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
29				
30				

*date estimated - actual date unavailable from sources at
hand

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

DECEMBER 1988

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
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11				
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27				
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29				
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31				

NO DATA FOUND FOR THIS MONTH

APPENDIX 1TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTHJANUARY 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15		80	+2	80 protesters arrested
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
29				
30				
31				

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

FEBRUARY 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27			+1	firm rejection of perestroika and glasnost
28				

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

MARCH 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8			+1	anti-perestroika rhetoric
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
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22				
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31				

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

APRIL 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6			+2	shoot to kill orders
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
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29				
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APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

MAY 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
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13				
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27				
28				
29				
30				
31				

NO DATA FOUND FOR THIS MONTH

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

JUNE 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
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29				
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NO DATA FOUND FOR THIS MONTH

APPENDIX 1

TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTH

JULY 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
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16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
26				
27				
28				
29				
30				
31	11,707			number of emigrants to date in 1989 - this is the first emigrant figure given for the time period studied

APPENDIX 1TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTHAUGUST 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1				
2				
3				
4	72	250		in BRD embasies
5				
6				
7			+1	
8		330	-1	DDR agrees not to prosecute
9				
10				
11				
12			-2	shoot-to-kill orders rescinded
13		-10		
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20	1400			in last 2 weeks
21				
22	2763			total since Aug 4
23				
24	408			
25			+1	
26				
27				
28				
29				
30				
31		2000		refuse to leave Hungary

APPENDIX 1TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTHSEPTEMBER 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1		3,600		in BRD embassies in Hungary, ČSSR, and Poland
2				
3				
4				
5		1,400		in Hungary
6			-1	amnesty is promised
7				
8		1,116		in Hungary and GDR
9				
10				
11	7,516		+1	
12	1,100	16,000	+1	
13	1,900		+1	
14			+1	
15				
16				
17				
18			+2	seizure of passports
19	6,500	1,500		increase by 6,500 occurred between 0913-091989
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25	3,000	13,400	+1	increase by 3,000 occurred between 0919-092589
26	-60		-1	
27				
28		1,200		
29	-270	500	-1	
30	13,500			increase by 10,000 occurred in Hungary between 0925-093089; increase by 3,500 occurred in ČSSR.

APPENDIX 1TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTHOCTOBER 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1		250	+1	
2	2,800	12,600	+1	10,000 of these are protesters in Leip- zig, remainder are at embassies outside GDR.
3			+2	GDR closes borders
4		12,950		
5	8,000	14,018	+1	
6			+1	
7		25,000	+2	overt police action
8		2,000	+2	overt police action
9		52,000	+1	
10			+1	
11			+1	
12	10,000°		+1	
13			-1	
14		950	-1	
15		18,000		
16		100,000	-1	Leipzig
17			-1	
18			-1	Honecker ousted*
19			-1	
20		50,000	-1	Dresden
21				
22				
23		150,000		Leipzig
24		5,000	+1	Berlin
25		3,000	+1	Berlin
26			-1	
27		47,500	-1	amnesty for emigrants
28				
29			-1	
30		300,000		Leipzig
31		6,000		Wittenberg

° Over previous 6 days

* Honecker's replacement was Honecker's protégée, not seen
as a positive step toward reform (hence not rated "-2")

APPENDIX 1TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY MONTHNOVEMBER 1989

<u>Date</u>	<u>Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
1		500	-2	travel restr. lifted
2	60	800	-1	
3		2,700	-2	dismissal of Politburo members
4	5,600	500,000	-2	free passage to West via CSSR
5	10,000		-1	
6	7,900			
7	9,500	3,000	-2	cabinet resigns
8	17,000	5,000	-2	most of govt resigns
9	6,000		-2	Berlin Wall opened
10	1,500		-2	
11	2,866			
12			-1	
13		200,000	-1	protest in Leipzig, GDR leadership assumes blame for socioeconomic chaos
14				
15				
16			-1	
17		2,000	-1	proposed openness to West
18			-2	reform of state police
19		135,000		
20				
21				
22				
23	(300,000)			(total since June - includes legal and illegal emigrants)
24				
25				
26			-2	
27				
28				
29				
30				

APPENDIX 2TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY DAY1988

<u>Day</u>	<u>Cumulative Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
17		100	+2	100+ arrested
31		2,000		prayer services
32	4		-2	20 released from prison, 4 forced to emigrate
35			+1	rhetoric against dissidents
75		300		
178			+1	letter to Gorbachev
180			+1	Honecker's address
303			+1	perestroika rejected
323			+1	Soviet publications banned

1989 (01 Jan 1989 = Day 367)

381		80	+2	80 protesters arrested
424			+1	firm rejection of perestroika and glasnost
433			+1	anti-perestroika rhetoric
462			+2	shoot to kill orders
578	11,707			number of emigrants to date in 1989 - this is the first emigrant figure given for the time period studied

APPENDIX 2TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY DAY

<u>Day</u>	<u>Cumulative Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
582	11,779	250		in BRD embasies
585			+1	
586		330	-1	DDR agrees not to prosecute
590			-2	shoot-to-kill orders rescinded
591		-10		
598	13,179			in last 2 weeks
600	15,942			total since Aug 4
602	16,350			
603			+1	
609		2000		refuse to leave Hungary
610		3,600		in BRD embassies in Hungary, ĆSSR, and Poland
614		1,400		in Hungary
615			-1	amnesty is promised
617		1,116		in Hungary and GDR
620	23,866		+1	
621	24,966	16,000	+1	
622	26,866		+1	
623			+1	
627			+2	seizure of passports

APPENDIX 2TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY DAY

<u>Day</u>	<u>Cumulative Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
628	33,366	1,500		increase by 6,500 occurred between 0913-091989
634	36,366	13,400	+1	increase by 3,000 occurred between 0919-092589
635	36,306		-1	
637		1,200		
638	36,036	500	-1	
639	49,536			increase by 10,000 occurred in Hungary between 0925-093089; increase by 3,500 occurred in ĀSSR.
640		250	+1	
641	52,336	12,600	+1	10,000 of these are protesters in Leip- zig, remainder are at embassies outside GDR.
642			+2	GDR closes borders
643		12,950		
644	60,336	14,018	+1	
645			+1	
646		25,000	+2	overt police action
647		2,000	+2	overt police action
648		52,000	+1	
649			+1	

APPENDIX 2TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY DAY

<u>Day</u>	<u>Cumulative Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
650			+1	
651	70,336		+1	
652			-1	
653		950	-1	
654		18,000		
655		100,000	-1	Leipzig
656			-1	
657			-1	Honecker ousted*
658			-1	
659		50,000	-1	Dresden
660				
662		150,000		Leipzig
663		5,000	+1	Berlin
664		3,000	+1	Berlin
665			-1	
666		47,500	-1	amnesty for emigrants
668			-1	
669		300,000		Leipzig
670		6,000		Wittenberg
671		500	-2	travel restr. lifted


* Honecker's replacement was Honecker's protégée, not seen as a positive step toward reform (hence not rated "-2")

APPENDIX 2TABULAR REPRESENTATION OF EMIGRATION, PROTEST,
AND INDEX OF GOVERNMENT REPRESSION DATA BY DAY

<u>Day</u>	<u>Cumulative Emigrants</u>	<u>Protesters</u>	<u>Government Repression</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
672	70,396	800	-1	
673		2,700	-2	dismissal of Polithuro members
674	75,996	500,000	-2	free passage to West via ĀSSR
675	85,996		-1	
676	93,896			
677	103,396	3,000	-2	cabinet resigns
678	120,396	5,000	-2	most of govt resigns
679	126,396		-2	Berlin Wall opened
680	127,896		-2	
681	130,762			
682			-1	
683		200,000	-1	protest in Leipzig, GDR leadership assumes blame for socioeconomic chaos
686			-1	
687		2,000	-1	proposed openness to West
688			-2	reform of state police
689		135,000		
696			-2	


East Germans Emigrating

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989




East Germans Protesting

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989




East Germans Emigrating

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989




Composite of Emigrants and Protesters

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989




GDR Government Repression

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989




Comparative Analysis of Emigration and Repression

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989



Comparative Analysis of Protest and Repression

31 July 1989 through 30 November 1989



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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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