

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND
AN INTROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF ADMIRALS
SIR JOHN JELlicoe AND
SIR DAVID BEATTY, MAY 31, 1916

THESIS

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By

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2000

Dedication

To my parents, brother, sister, abuelita, tías Maru y Tere. Without whose sacrifices, love, and support I would not be here.

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There are so many people who have made this Thesis possible. Dr. James Pohl, for being an outstanding Mentor, and a man who I can only hope to emulate one day as a teacher. Dr. Mary Brennan and Dr. Gregg Andrews for agreeing to be Readers for my Thesis. The faculty and my fellow Graduate Students at Southwest Texas State University, who have helped in more ways than I could have ever imagined. Thank You. August 11, 2000

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CHAPTER I

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Complete victory would not improve decisively an already favorable naval situation,... a total defeat would lose the war. Winston Churchill, 1923¹

The battle of Jutland, a naval conflict that occurred off the West Coast of Denmark on May 31, 1916, resulted in numerous controversies. Its history is extremely complex, and should not be judged without extensive consideration. The battle's official casualty rate and the amount of tonnage sunk are easier to understand than the battle's perceived outcome. This difficulty has not prevented past and modern scholars from analyzing and then identifying the various problems surrounding the battle. Results from the controversies surrounding the battle have led to some consensus and serious debate among historians and military analysts.

Few modern battles have been surrounded by as much controversy as Jutland. Countless studies, lectures, and books have been devoted to analyzing just about every aspect of it; however, to analyze a specific aspect of the

¹ Sir Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 106. This quote was in reference to the precarious situation in which the Royal Navy found itself prior to engaging the German High Seas Fleet on May 31, 1916.

battle, one must first examine a summary of actions that took place during the two-day engagement.

The purpose of this thesis will be to provide a critical analysis of the two principal British characters that were most responsible for the battle's outcome, Admirals Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David Beatty of the Royal Navy. The first chapter is designed to provide a detailed account of the events that transpired during the naval engagements between the British Grand Fleet and Germany's Admiral Reinhard Scheer's High Seas Fleet between May 31 and June 1, 1916. Further, this chapter will discuss some of the more notable controversies that exist. The battle will be divided into five phases, battle cruiser action; first encounter; second encounter; night action; and escape.² Chapter Two will provide an interpretive analysis of Beatty's account of the battle against the British Admiralty's *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland*³ and *Battle of Jutland Official Despatches*⁴, in conjunction with other primary and secondary sources. Chapter Three will provide an interpretive analysis of Jellicoe's account

² John Keegan, *The Price of Admiralty The Evolution of Naval Warfare* (New York: Viking Press, 1989), 124.

³ British Admiralty, *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1924).

⁴ British Admiralty, *Battle of Jutland Official Despatches* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1920).

published in his autobiography, *The Grand Fleet*, against the Admiralty sources and other additional sources.⁵

On May 30, 1916, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, Admiral Viscount John Jellicoe of Scapa Grand G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O. was stationed with the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow, Scotland. Jellicoe's battle fleet consisted of twenty-four first line battleships and cruisers along with eight second line battle ships and a number of support vessels.⁶ His second in command, Admiral Earl David Beatty of Wexford O.B., O.M. was stationed in Edinburgh, Scotland with the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which consisted of twenty-one vessels.⁷ These two fleets were designed and positioned to prevent the Imperial German Navy from attacking the British Isles and to stop the German sinking of allied merchant ships that were supplying the British war machine.

Unbeknownst to the German High Command, the British Admiralty had in its possession a copy of all of the signal orders by which the High Seas Fleet operated. This crucial source of information allowed British Intelligence the ability to produce advance intelligence reports concerning

⁵ Sir John Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 Its Creation, Development, and Work* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1919).

⁶ Holloway Halstead Frost, *The Battle of Jutland* (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 6. See appendix A.

⁷ See appendix B.

positions and battle orders of the High Seas Fleet. The Admiralty, in turn, could deploy its fleet to counter any German offense and also could allow the Royal Navy opportunities to pursue offensive measures of their own.⁸ On May 30, 1916, with considerable foreknowledge in hand, British Intelligence forwarded classified material to the Admiralty that indicated that the High Seas Fleet was set to sail early on May 31, 1916. The report detailed that the High Seas Fleet would be in position to move into the North Sea in approximately two days unless it was engaged or repulsed immediately.⁹

Prior to the High Seas Fleet's setting sail from Wilhelmshaven, the Imperial German Navy had a change in its high command when Admiral Reinhard Scheer replaced Admiral Hugo von Pohl on January 18, 1916.¹⁰ Scheer, a strong advocate of unrestricted submarine warfare, was also interested in changing the doctrine of the High Seas Fleet from a passive policy to an active one of engagement that would seek out and engage the Grand Fleet. With this policy, Scheer hoped to lead his fleet to a German naval

⁸ Churchill, *The World Crisis*, 112; Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*, 85; Andrew Gordon, *The Rules of the Game Jutland and British Naval Command* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 59.

⁹ Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*, 31.

¹⁰ Ibid., 30; V.E. Tarrant, *Jutland, the German Perspective. A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May, 1916* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 44-46.

victory. This change of command together with Scheer's new determination, led to a battle between Scheer's fleet and Jellicoe's Grand Fleet in May 1916, one of the first major naval engagements of the First World War.

It is important to note that Jellicoe and Scheer understood that they were about to engage in a new method of naval warfare. Within a fifty-year period, five-hundred ton wooden warships had been replaced with twenty thousand ton steel battleships. Neither the British nor the German navies had ever engaged in a large-scale battle with their relatively new fleets. The days when navies could engage one another as they had done at the battle of Trafalgar in 1805 were over. New developments in technologies such as submarines, torpedoes, airplanes, rifled cannon, and exploding shells had created new scenarios for navies in which all actions were subject to trial and error.¹¹ A further difficulty encountered by both admirals was that the speed of naval warfare had increased exponentially within the last twenty-five years. A hundred years before the Battle of Jutland, Horatio Nelson could spend approximately five hours at a speed of one to three knots before a sighted enemy force presented itself ready for

¹¹ Bernard D. Claxton, *Trafalgar and Jutland. A Study in the Principles of War* (Montgomery: Air Command and Staff College Maxwell Air Force Base, 1985), 33.

battle. Nelson would then have to get within one hundred feet of his enemy before he could fire his cannons. By comparison, the dreadnoughts of 1916 could reach approximately twenty knots and find their adversary within twenty minutes. Once found, they could engage their enemy as far away as twenty-thousand yards.¹² As a result of the innovations that had occurred in the Royal Navy, Jellicoe decided that he would consolidate command within his fleet and that the Grand Fleet would use its strength defensively rather than offensively.

Historian Richard Hough criticizes Jellicoe for his authoritative manner of command and argues that the restrictive command style limited the initiative of his ship commanders. Hough argues that Jellicoe wanted his subordinates dependent on the Grand Fleet Battle Orders that he, alone, issued from his command ship *H.M.S. Ironduke*.¹³ Not all historians share Hough's opinion. Steven Roskill, on the other hand, argues that it was logical for Jellicoe to want to centralize authority within his command. Jellicoe was about to engage in a battle where the rewards and losses following the battle could

¹² Richard Alexander Hough, *The Great War at Sea, 1914-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 267.

¹³ Hough, *The Great War at Sea*, 268.

immediately affect the survival of the British people.¹⁴
Roskill's defense of Jellicoe does not seem unwarranted.

Following the transmission from the Admiralty, Jellicoe, following orders, proceeded with all due haste with his Grand Fleet and Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet toward the German advance. (See figure 1) At 0500, Jellicoe sent the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron ahead of his fleet to screen for possible submarines.¹⁵ Beatty, in conjunction with the Battle Cruiser Fleet, steamed off from Edinburgh and headed east. It is important to note that Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet included some of the newest battleships that were available to the British Navy, the *Queen Elizabeth* class. It was Beatty's bad luck that Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, commander of the 5th Battle Squadron, missed a signal from Beatty's command ship *H.M.S. Lion* and turned North-east. In so doing, Evan-Thomas would steam ten miles northwest of Beatty's fleet.¹⁶ Furthermore, Evan-Thomas's ships were not as fast as the rest of Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet. Thus he began trailing

¹⁴ Stephen Wentworth Roskill, *The Strategy of Sea Power: Its Development and Application Based on the Lees-Knowles Lectures Delivered in the University of Cambridge* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1962), 120.

¹⁵ Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*, 47; Viscount Sir John Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916: Its Creation, Development, and Work* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1919), 468. See Appendix C.

¹⁶ Claxton, *Trafalgar and Jutland*, 39. The ten miles mentioned in the sentence do not refer to nautical miles.

two possibilities. One, that Beatty's fleet was not in a prepared position to leave when ordered. The other possibility was that the Admiralty failed to furnish realistic timetables for Jellicoe and Beatty to set sail.¹⁸ In either case, Beatty tardily left Edinburgh with his fleet, hours behind schedule.

Admiral Scheer, at this time, did not know that the British fleet was aware of his whereabouts in the North Sea. He set sail with his fleet at 0800 May 31. (See figure 1)

Scheer's plan prior to the battle was, as follows:

1. Vice Admiral Hipper would proceed north and stay in position off the Norwegian coast.
2. The submarines of the High Seas Fleet were to attack the British forces off of Scapa, Cromarty, Rosyth, and the Humber, reporting the enemy's strength and positions.
3. Vice Admiral Scheer, with Battle Squadrons I and III, Scouting Group IV, and Flotillas I, III, V, and VII, would arrive in a support position 45 miles to the southward of Lindesnaes at 5:00PM June 1.

¹⁸ Ibid., 61-65.

4. Submarines of the Flanders U-Flotilla were to perform similar duties off Harwich, the Thames, and Dover.
5. Airplanes would search as far as possible for signs of the Grand Fleet, then report in.
6. Battle Squadron II, assisted by seaplanes from Heligoland along with submarines were to guard the approaches to German bases.¹⁹

It was Scheer's plan to identify and isolate small portions of the Grand Fleet before he engaged the enemy. Scheer, alert to the principles of concentration and the economy of force, understood that his fleet stood no chance of defeating the Grand Fleet in a collective single action.²⁰ Thus, by limiting his attacks to small portions of the Grand Fleet, Scheer believed that he could defeat the Grand Fleet through a series of limited engagements.

As the afternoon of May 31, 1916 passed, Beatty's and Hipper's fleets were steering courses nearly at right angles toward each other. At 1440, the British light cruiser *H.M.S. Galatea* sighted Hipper's fleet.²¹ It was at

¹⁹ Ibid., 121.

²⁰ See Appendix C.

²¹ Stephen Wentworth Roskill, *Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty: The Last Naval Hero An Intimate Biography* (New York: Atheneum, 1980), 156.

this point, that a problem occurred. Beatty, in response to the sighting from *H.M.S. Galatea*, did not steer toward the sighted fleet. Stephen Wentworth questions why Beatty failed to move toward *H.M.S. Galatea's* sighting of Hipper's fleet. Alongside Wentworth, many naval historians have wondered why Beatty failed to turn toward *H.M.S. Galatea*. Due to a lack of credible information, this question remains unsolved today. The result of Beatty's failure to move toward the battle was further compounded by the fact that Evan-Thomas's 5th Battle Squadron did move toward the sighting, and thus increased its separation from Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet to over ten miles.²² This action would leave Beatty without the support of his most powerful battle squadron when he met Hipper's attack. (See figures 2&3)

At 1548, both sides began to attack (See figure 4). On the British side, there was some confusion concerning which ships were supposed to engage the enemy; the result for Beatty was that Hipper's forces were able to destroy *H.M.S. Indefatigable* at 1603 and *H.M.S. Queen Mary* at 1626.²³ Even with the loss of these two valuable ships, Beatty was able to counter-attack Hipper with his remaining

²² The aforementioned are not nautical miles, they are land miles.

²³ Roskill, *Admiral of the Fleet*, 160.

ships and the additional support of a destroyer flotilla. Beatty engaged Hipper's forces with torpedoes, causing damage to some of Hipper's smaller craft.


Jellicoe was notified via electric cable of Beatty's engagement with Hipper at 1543. Prior to this notification, he had been under the assumption that Beatty would not be engaged with the enemy until 1615. However, upon receiving confirmation that Beatty was under attack, Jellicoe ordered full steam South-southeast to Horns Reef to provide assistance to Beatty's undermanned fleet and to reinforce the numerical edge in capital ships that the Grand Fleet possessed over the High Seas Fleet.²⁴

Despite all of the previous mistakes that Beatty committed, he is often partly associated to the British success during the battle of Jutland by forcing Hipper's fleet toward Jellicoe's fleet. (See figure 5) Beatty understood as well as Scheer and Hipper that in a large naval engagement, the Royal Navy was superior in both men and ships to the High Seas Fleet. Historians are almost unanimous in their support of Beatty's decision to force Hipper north toward Jellicoe.²⁵

²⁴ Tarrant, *Jutland, The German Perspective*, 72-73.

²⁵ Hough, *The Great War at Sea*, 271; Roskill, *Admiral of the Fleet*, 163.

With Beatty driving Hipper's forces north, Jellicoe positioned his fleet to engage Scheer. (See figure 5) At 1630, destroyers from both navies began to engage one another.²⁶ This destroyer engagement lasted until 1643 when both admirals recalled their destroyers, which were providing screening for the larger battleships so that the larger ships could engage one another in a grand melee without endangering the smaller craft.²⁷ (See below)



Sketch VIII. Fire distribution at 4:58 P.M. Not to scale.

²⁶ Frost, *Battle of Jutland*, 231-232.

²⁷ Jellicoe. *Grand Fleet* 471.

Reprinted from Halstead H. Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*. (New York: Arno Press, 1980) 244.

During this destroyer engagement, Scheer began the process of preparing his whole fleet for battle by signaling General Quarters at 1640.²⁸ (See figure 5)

At the conclusion of the destroyer attack, at approximately 1643, Scheer ordered six of his divisions to move two points closer toward Jellicoe's fleet. Following their commander's order, Scheer's entire fleet turned Northwest 302° while cruising at maximum speed.²⁹ (See figure 7) This movement set the stage for the main engagement.

It is significant to point out that Jellicoe was unsure of the High Seas Fleet position, or of the exact point of engagement between the Germans and the Grand Fleet. Favoring prudence over recklessness, Jellicoe placed his Battle Fleet to port, hoping it would prevent Scheer from attacking his flanks. (See figure 5) Herbert Wilson argues that Jellicoe's decision to wait and position his fleet properly was not only the safest course of action but also that this course of action gave Jellicoe a better

²⁸ Tarrant, *Jutland, The German Perspective*, 75.

²⁹ Frost, *Battle of Jutland*. 245.

understanding of exactly where his ships were located, because he could actually see where they were.³⁰

As the evening grew darker, the Grand Fleet reached a favorable position for attack. At 1755, the 3rd Battle Squadron opened fire on Hipper's Scouting Group II. (See figure 14) Unfortunately for the British, Scouting Group II understood that they were overmatched and retreated successfully under an artificial screen of smoke. As the British began to counter-attack Hipper, the British lost one of their most competent and loved commanders. Admiral H.L.A. Hood, Commander of the 3rd Battle Squadron, thinking that he was about to rejoin Beatty's command ship *H.M.S. Lion* found himself alone amongst the German Navy. He and his ship *H.M.S. Invincible* were destroyed at close range by enemy torpedoes at approximately 1833.³¹ Upon hearing of the loss of such a valued commander, Beatty reported to Jellicoe of Hood by saying, "Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors."³²

³⁰ Herbert Wrigley Wilson, *Battleships in Action* (London: Little, Brown, and Company, 1926), 151-153.

³¹ Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*, 289-295.

³² Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet*, 474.

With the death of Hood and the loss of his command ship *H.M. Invincible*, command of the 3rd Battle Squadron fell to Captain E.H.F. Heaton-Ellis and his ship *H.M.S. Inflexible*. Before Hood's death, Jellicoe, informed of the location of the High Seas Fleet, which was at South-southwest 189°, immediately signaled his fleet to prepare to attack.

With Jellicoe, Beatty, Hipper, and Scheer in position, the battle began in earnest. There are numerous accounts of personal bravery and extraordinary examples of self-sacrifice throughout this main engagement. Unfortunately for the Royal Navy, the British lost another cruiser, the *H.M.S. Defence*, at 1820.³³ Even while inflicting damage to the Grand Fleet, the High Seas Fleet was not without injury. The battleship *Wiesbaden* was critically damaged by the Royal Navy's 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron. Further, four of Hipper's bigger dreadnoughts were in a terrible state because of shell damage. Hipper's flagship, *Lutzow*, had undergone so much damage that she had a heavy list; and her bow was very deep in the water. The only ship that Hipper possessed that was still fit for further action was *Moltke*. Thus, when one analyzes the percent ratio of damage

³³ Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*, 310.

inflicted during this grand melee, the Royal Navy was able to score more critical damage to the High Seas Fleet than that which they sustained.³⁴

Historians have provided numerous conflicting accounts and analyses of what occurred throughout this main engagement, which began around 1800 and ended at 1835; however, they are almost universally in agreement that Scheer was the better of the two commanding admirals that day. They argue that Scheer had fewer ships with less room to navigate yet provided his commanders with leeway when the battle began. Holloway Frost argues that, "his reactions were essentially direct and simple."³⁵

Reaction to Jellicoe's conduct during the battle has not been as congratulatory as Scheer's. A number of distinguished historians and politicians are actually very critical of Jellicoe's actions at this time. They argue that Jellicoe's command methods, which limited personal initiative, as well as his strict reliance on the Grand Fleet Battle Orders, prevented individual squadron commanders from inflicting more damage on the High Seas

³⁴ Claxton, *Trafalgar and Jutland*, 47.

³⁵ Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*, 312.

Fleet.³⁶ There are others, however, who do not fault Jellicoe's caution. Lt. Col. Bernard Claxton, Chief of Military History and Theory at the Air Command and Staff College (U.S. Air Force), argues that if Jellicoe had made an error in deploying his forces, it could have been disastrous for the Grand Fleet. Further, Claxton argues that Jellicoe's deployment turned out to be correct, because he was able to cross the T of the German fleet and force Scheer to retire his fleet from the engagement.³⁷

At this critical junction, when Scheer wanted to retreat, a controversy developed. Scheer is credited with executing a flawless battle-turn. At 1845, Scheer ordered all two-hundred and fifty of his ships to create a coal smoke cloud to retreat under. (See figure 7) It was so successfully done that by 1850 there was silence; the Grand Fleet had lost sight of the High Seas Fleet, and did not know to where it had escaped.³⁸ It is interesting to note that as soon as Scheer was able to extricate his fleet from Jellicoe's, he decided at 1855 to make another battle-turn,

³⁶ Churchill, *The World Crisis*, 132; Hough, *The Great War at Sea*, 269; Keegan, *The Price of Admiralty*, 108; Roskill, *Admiral of the Fleet Beatty*, 173.

³⁷ Claxton, *Trafalgar and Jutland*, 45.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 48.

which put the High Seas Fleet headed directly in line with the Grand Fleet. Robert Frost argued that:

They were in the most unfavorable and dangerous situation imaginable. Jellicoe enjoyed the overwhelming advantages of position, visibility and numbers... No commander in chief of history could have been under such compressed tension as was Scheer during those few minutes when the fate of the world hung in the balance.³⁹

When Scheer discovered that he had put his fleet in an inoperable position, at 1918, he ordered his third battle-turn.⁴⁰

It was at this critical junction, when Jellicoe had Scheer on the run, that the British Admiralty failed Jellicoe completely. British Intelligence discovered transmissions between commanders of the High Seas Fleet around 1935 (See figure 9) at which they could locate the fleets' communications signals. Unfortunately, there were a number of confusing reports throughout the many transmissions; the result was that Jellicoe found himself delivered twelve miles away from the High Seas Fleet because of faulty intelligence.⁴¹ This critical omission, is characterized by Longhorne Gibson and John Harper:

³⁹ Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*, 351-355.

⁴⁰ Claxton, *Trafalgar and Jutland*, 48.

⁴¹ Ibid., 52; Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*, 385; Sir Henry John Newbolt, *A Naval History of the War* (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1928), 329; Roskill, *Strategy of Sea Power*, 120; Tarrant, *The Battle of Jutland, The German Perspective*, 189; E.L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918* (London: Methuen and Company, 1967), 182.

But for the failure at the Admiralty to transmit to Jellicoe, instantly and without recommendation, the wireless intelligence which had reached Whitehall from the direction-finding stations of the course Scheer was taking, his retreat would almost certainly have been cut off.⁴²

Following the many events of May 31, 1916, night finally came. (See figure 11) Jellicoe had decided even before the day's battle that he would not engage the enemy at night, should the battle last that long. He reasoned that the High Seas Fleet had better night fighting abilities than his own Grand Fleet. Further, Jellicoe knew that the better German searchlights could locate the Grand Fleet and conceivably produce a disadvantageous engagement. With this important information in hand, Jellicoe understood that his best opportunities to engage the enemy would be when the sun rose in five hours rather than risk his fleet during the night.⁴³

Historians are divided as to Jellicoe's decision not to pursue the High Seas Fleet during the night. Some historians such as Robert Frost, Richard Hough, and E.L. Woodward argue that Jellicoe wasted an opportune moment to engage Scheer's forces. They concluded that Scheer's fleet

⁴² Longhorne Gibson and John E. Harper, *The Riddle of Jutland An Authentic History* (New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1934), x.

⁴³ Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet*, 370-372.

was demoralized and spent as a result of the day's fighting. Further, they argue that Jellicoe had to understand that Scheer would try to flee to the safety of a home port following the damage inflicted on so many of his ships rather than risk the total destruction of his crippled fleet.⁴⁴ Other historians such as Sir Winston Churchill, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Claxton, John Keegan, Sir Henry Newbolt, J. Holland Rose, Stephen Roskill, and Herbert Wilson argue that Jellicoe made the correct tactical decision not to engage Scheer at night. They all maintain that Jellicoe had much more to lose by engaging his fleet in an operation in which his forces would be at a tactical disadvantage. Also, they argue that Jellicoe only had to wait approximately five hours for daylight. Finally, they maintain that the British mine field strewn across northern France all the way to southern Denmark left only two ways for Scheer to get his fleet to safety. (See figure 10) With Jellicoe understanding that the High Seas Fleet had only two ways to get home, he could make an educated guess as to which route Scheer would take, the quickest route around the Horn Reef.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*, 417; Hough, *The Great War at Sea*, 291; Woodward, *Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918*, 182.

⁴⁵ Churchill, *The World Crisis*, 153; Claxton, *Trafalgar and Jutland*, 50; Keegan, *The Price of Admiralty*, 129; Newbolt, *Naval History of the War 1914-1918*, 336; J. Holland Rose, *The Indecisiveness of*

When dawn finally approached, Jellicoe was informed that the High Seas Fleet was near Horn Reef, Denmark. (See figures 10&12), he understood that it was not possible to maneuver his fleet safely with enough time first to engage and then destroy Scheer's fleet. The battle was over.⁴⁶

When analyzing the final results from the battle of Jutland, the immediate results of the battle did not look promising for the British. They had lost three battle cruisers, three armored cruisers, eight destroyers, and 6,097 men. The Germans lost one battleship, one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, five torpedo boats, and 2,551 men. In tonnage, 99 German ships had sunk 112,000 British tons, while the 151 Royal Naval ships sank 62,000 German tons.⁴⁷ These numbers were delivered to the British public just as soon as the battle was over. On returning home, Beatty's flagship *H.M.S. Lion* was booed and jeered by many as it sailed back into its home port.⁴⁸ However, the results of the battle need to be inspected in more detail in order for one to come to a fair-minded conclusion.

Modern War and Other Essays (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1927), 14; Roskill, *Strategy of Sea Power*, 120; Wilson, *Battleships in Action*, 162.

⁴⁶ Claxton, *Trafalgar and Jutland*, 52.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁴⁸ Captain Royal Navy Donald Macintyre, *Jutland* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1958), 250.

Following the battle, the High Seas Fleet never again attempted to leave port and engage the Grand Fleet throughout the remainder of the war. Further, the High Seas Fleet could not return to sea for at least six months because so many of its ships suffered serious damage. Jellicoe's fleet, in comparison, after returning home to Scapa Flow, being rearmed and refueled was set to sail the very next day, June 2, 1916.⁴⁹ In retrospect, the Grand Fleet found itself in an advantageous position following the battle. German Korvetten Kapitän Friedrich Forstmeier maintained:

The greatness of personality of a Jellicoe perhaps rests in the very fact that he did not yield to fighting impulse, but evinced a statesmanlike mind... To him it was more important to keep his country's fleet intact at all costs for the main strategic task - remote blockade of the German Bight. A total victory over the High Seas Fleet might well have hastened the defeat of Germany...but the risk inherent in such an attempt was not justified when the blockade, slowly but with deadly certainty, achieved the same end. (Marine Rundschau, June 1966)⁵⁰

Did Jellicoe and Beatty make the right decisions during the battle? In 1916, the British public and its government could rightly claim they lost the battle, but looking at the battle today and knowing what we know

⁴⁹ Claxton, *Trafalgar and Jutland*, 53; Gordon, *The Rules of the Game*, 566-571.

⁵⁰ Hough, *The Great War at Sea 1914-1918*, 290.

happened to the High Seas Fleet, it should be maintained that the British did win the battle of Jutland in a strategic sense. British mastery of the seas was left unchallenged for the remainder of the war.

CHAPTER II

ADMIRAL SIR DAVID BEATTY

We have returned disappointed beyond measure. These constant and continual disappointments are wearing to a degree, but they were not made use of, and the opportunity passed away never to return again. Admiral Sir David Beatty¹

There are debates today within academe and the military as to the level of responsibility that should be attributed to Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, during the battle of Jutland on May 31, 1916. (See Appendix B) As second in command to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Beatty was entrusted with an enormous amount of responsibility from which it was expected that he would act with a precision to detail and adherence to Jellicoe's orders. To examine Beatty's role at all stages during pre-engagement, engagement, and post-engagement it is necessary to examine the British Admiralty's official publications that deal with these matters; they include *Battle of Jutland Official Despatches* and *Narrative of the*

¹ Brian McL. Ranft, *The Beatty Papers Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence and Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty Vol 2. 1916-1927* (Brooksfield: Scholar Press for the Naval Records Society, 1993), 309. (Hereafter cited as "Beatty Papers" with volume, page number.) This quote was cited from a letter Admiral Beatty wrote to his wife who was staying Hanover Lodge, July 5, 1916. [BTY/17/ 35/11]. Admiral Beatty joined the Royal Navy in January 1884; attained Captain's rank in November 1900; Rear-Admiral and Naval Secretary to First Sea Lord Sir Winston Churchill 1912&1913; Acting Vice-Admiral Battle Cruiser Fleet 1913-1916; Acting Admiral of the Grand Fleet 1916-1918; Admiral 1919; Admiral of the Fleet 1919; First Sea Lord 1919-1927.

Battle of Jutland,² and the individual writings of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Admiral Sir David Beatty, Sir Winston Churchill, and Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas.

Before the battle, there were any number of individual factors that contributed to the battle's outcome. As Commander-in-Chief of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, prior to and during the battle, Beatty understood that when he eventually engaged the German High Seas Fleet, his ships' safety was in direct proportion to the number of naval destroyers available to provide screening protection for his fleet. Modern warfare [1916] required significant escort protection to provide shielding from enemy torpedoes and light escort vessels, which was not necessary fifty years prior to Jutland. *Webster's Encyclopedia* defines a destroyer as "a fast, relatively small, warship armed with five-inch guns, originally designed to destroy torpedo boats, now used as an escort in convoys, in antisubmarine duties."³

As early as February 3, 1916, Beatty wrote to British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, citing the lack of light cruisers and destroyers that were attached to Jellicoe and

² British Admiralty, *Battle of Jutland Official Despatches* (London: His Majesties Stationary Office, 1920); British Admiralty, *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland* (His Majesties Stationary Office, 1924).

³ *Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* (1983).

Beatty's respective fleets. Beatty understood that screening vessels were absolutely necessary to provide protection from submarines and enemy mine fields that could stealthily inflict significant damage to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and that the Prime Minister could help expedite these matters.⁴

Beatty did not limit his search to augment the size of his fleet solely with Prime Minister Asquith. On February 21, 1916, four months prior to the battle of Jutland, Beatty formally requested from Jellicoe the transfer of the 5th Battle Squadron from the Grand Fleet to the Battle Cruiser Fleet. Beatty argued that he was requesting the additional reinforcements because the *Queen Elizabeth* class of battleship was the only battleship, which could sail alongside battle cruisers steaming at twenty-five knots. Additionally, he petitioned Jellicoe to re-examine a prior request to increase the size of his destroyer and flotilla squadrons, and ended his letter by writing that he was forwarding a copy of his request to the Admiralty for further possible consideration.⁵

⁴ Ranft, *Beatty Papers*, Vol. II, 282-264. A private letter written to Prime Minister Asquith. February 3, 1916. [BTY/5/2/2].

⁵ Ibid., 294-295. Admiral Sir David Beatty to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, February 21, 1916. *Reinforcement of the Battle-Cruiser Fleet*. [BTY/5/2/3].

Jellicoe responded to Beatty's letter on February 24, 1916, denying his formal request for the transfer of the 5th Battle Squadron. Jellicoe argued that Beatty misunderstood the speed of the *Queen Elizabeth* class, which he argued could not exceed twenty-three and a half knots. Thus, the 5th Battle Squadron's potential contributions to the Battle Cruiser Fleet would be limited to defensive rather than offensive operations. With regard to the request for additional destroyers and flotilla support, Jellicoe indicated that the 13th Flotilla would be based with the Battle Cruiser Fleet as soon as the 12th Flotilla was completed. Included in this letter was the indication that a copy would go to the Admiralty.⁶

Following the refusal, Beatty on March 3, 1916, again repeated his request for additional reinforcements with another accompanying letter to the Admiralty.⁷ To the consternation of Jellicoe, the Admiralty responded to this disagreement between the two admirals by sending the 5th Battle Squadron to Beatty.⁸ One can postulate a possible pattern of favoritism or political expediency between

⁶ Ibid., 295-297. Admiral Jellicoe's response to Admiral Beatty February 24, 1916. [BTY/5/2/3].

⁷ Ibid., 297-298. A letter classified as SECRET to Admiral Jellicoe March 3, 1916. [BTY/5/2/3].

⁸ Stephen Wentworth Roskill, *Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty. The Last Naval Hero: An Intimate Biography* (New York: Atheneum, 1980), 140.

Beatty and Jellicoe in regard to the Admiralty's decision going in Beatty's favor.

Relations between Jellicoe and Beatty were not always adversarial. On numerous occasions prior to the battle Jellicoe asked Beatty's advice on strategy and potential battle scenarios. On April 14, 1916, Beatty responded to a potential scenario forward by Jellicoe in which the latter asked what could bring the German High Seas fleet out of its home waters in Wilhelmshaven to engage the Grand Fleet. Beatty responded that the Germans would come out to fight, "only on its own initiative when the right time occurs."⁹

Battle Scenarios and Dispatches

On May 30, 1916 Beatty and Jellicoe were ordered by the Admiralty to set sail for the North Sea;¹⁰ (See figure 2) however, the Grand Fleet was instructed to await British oil vessels and supporting neutral trawlers so that in the event of real combat operations, vital fighting ships would not have to return to base because of a lack of fuel.¹¹ The

⁹ Ranft, *Beatty Papers*, Vol. 2, 303-306. Admiral Beatty's letter to Admiral Jellicoe April 14, 1916. [BTY/13/22/10].

¹⁰ British Admiralty, *Battle of Jutland Official Despatches* (London: His Majesties Stationary Office, 1920), 398. Admiralty telegram number 434, May 30, 1916.

¹¹ British Admiralty, *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland* (London: His Majesties Stationary Office, 1924), 60. Position at 1935 p.m.

Signal Officer of the Battle Cruiser Fleet reported to the Admiralty at 1807:

5th Battle Squadron to proceed at 9.40 p.m.,
 1st Battle-Cruiser Squadron to proceed 8.45
 p.m., 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron will be ready
 to proceed at 9 p.m., 1st Light Cruiser Squadron
 ready to proceed at 8.23 p.m., 2nd Light Cruiser
 Squadron ready to proceed at 9 p.m., 3rd Light
 Cruiser Squadron ready to proceed 8 p.m., 9th
 Flotilla 9 p.m., Engadine 9.45 p.m.¹²

Reading this telegraph, one must ask why the 5th Battle Squadron launched at 2100 and not earlier? Beatty had been informed prior to launch by Jellicoe and other naval officials that the *Queen Elizabeth* class battleship could not sail at twenty-six knots as the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron could. Beatty's insistence in regard to the maximum sailing speed of the 5th Battle Squadron would result in future problems for Beatty and the actual existence of the British Battle Cruiser as a class in the Royal Navy. When Beatty set sail for the North Sea on May 30, 1916, he was in overall command of over forty British warships. Thirty-seven of those ships would return to Britain and of those, a significant number would return with serious damage.¹³

¹² British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 399. Flag signal sent out as a general message at 1807. Appendix II.

¹³ British Admiralty, *Narrative* (London: His Majesties Stationary Office, 1924), 9, 93. Beatty sailed on May 30, 1916, with a fleet including the 1st Battle Squadron, 2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Light

As Beatty set sail for the North Sea on May 31, 1916, he was, as Royal Navy regulations stated, obliged to report regularly to Jellicoe and the Admiralty about his fleet's course and position. Beatty's Signal Officer encountered a number of problems on May 31 as he began sending incorrect positions as to the exact location of the Battle Cruiser Fleet. Beginning at 1200, (See figure 13) Beatty's command ship *H.M.S. Lion* signaled that she was positioned at Lat. $56^{\circ}46'$ N, Long. $3^{\circ}45'$ E, when in fact the Admiralty correctly determined that the Battle Cruiser Fleet was actually five and half miles away from that position and located at Lat. $56^{\circ}46'$ N, Long. $3^{\circ}36.5'$ E..¹⁴ This misrepresentation of position would begin to haunt both Jellicoe and Beatty in the near future, because neither would know exactly where the other was located.

As May 30 turned into May 31, Beatty ordered the Battle Cruiser Fleet to turn South-southeast at 1432. (See figure 14) Considerable debate arises among Beatty, Jellicoe, and Sir Winston Churchill as to whether Beatty actually insured that the order to turn South-southeast was

Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, 1st Flotilla, 13th Flotilla, 9th Flotilla (part), 10th Flotilla (part), 5th Battle Squadron and *H M Engadine* (aircraft carrier).

¹⁴ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 439. Appendix II; British Admiralty, *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland*, 10. The Enemy in Sight. The measurement of five miles is not in nautical miles, but in land miles.

sent to the 5th Battle Squadron. Jellicoe argues that Beatty did not verify that Evan-Thomas received the order to turn south, because the 5th Battle Squadron never turned south until 1440, eight minutes after the order was sent. Churchill argued that the Signal Officer from the 5th Battle Squadron had not acknowledged the order until 1440, so no blame should have been accorded to Beatty because his order had apparently been sent and received.¹⁵ In his defense, Beatty countered that the Admiralty's *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland*, showed that an order to turn South-southeast had been sent by the Battle Cruiser Fleet's Signal Officer at 1432.¹⁶ From this precarious moment, the apportionment of blame as to whether Beatty did or did not issue correct information during the battle of Jutland commenced.

At 1410 on May 31, *H.M.S. Galatea* signaled to Beatty, "Two-funnelled ship has stopped steamer bearing E.S.E., eight miles, am closing."¹⁷ With *H.M.S. Galatea's* sighting the battle of Jutland began. At 1428, *H.M.S. Galatea* started to open fire, and Beatty ordered his Battle Cruiser

¹⁵ British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence. The Battle of Jutland* (London: His Majesties Stationary Office, 1923), 11. Official Correspondence from Admiral Sir John Jellicoe; Sir Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis. Volume III* (New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1923), 118.

¹⁶ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 444. Appendix II. At 1432, the B.C.F. Signal Officer sent: "Alter course two points to port."

¹⁷ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 443. Appendix II

Fleet to close in on *H.M.S. Galatea's* sighting and proceed at twenty-two knots.¹⁸ There is some dispute as to what Beatty exactly did next. At 1437 Beatty argued that his ship, *H.M.S. Lion*, was at Lat.56°47' N, Long.4°59' E. and proceeding north as Jellicoe had ordered at 1435. There are no records in the Admiralty's *Official Despatches* or *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland* to support Beatty's claim.¹⁹ Further, Jellicoe criticizes Beatty's handling of the Battle Cruiser Fleet's first engagement of the High Seas Fleet by stating that the signals sent at 1439 and 1451 by *H.M.S. Galatea* were important and needed immediate actions by all of Beatty's ships, and as such insured that all ships were steaming toward *H.M.S. Galatea*. Jellicoe proposes that Beatty should have understood the significance of what was happening and that the latter should have understood that the German High Seas Fleet was in sight, and that the 5th Battle Squadron could and should have been moved in to help engage the enemy at the earliest possible moment.²⁰ When looking at the initial moments of the Battle of Jutland there appear to be moments of

¹⁸ Ibid., 443-444. Appendix II; British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 10. Enemy in Sight.

¹⁹ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 444. Appendix II; British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 10. Enemy in Sight; Ranft, *Beatty Papers* Vol. 2, 323. A SECRET document sent by Beatty from *H M S. Lion* on June 2, 1916. [BTY/6/1/3].

²⁰ British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence*, 62. Jellicoe's reflections of the Battle of Jutland.

confusion resulting in misunderstanding for Jellicoe's and Beatty's subordinates.

During the initial scenario between Beatty and the High Seas Fleet, Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas, commander of the 5th Battle Squadron proceeded at nineteen and a half knots to support *H.M.S. Galatea*.²¹ At 1423, he signaled that his squadron was positioned at Lat.57° N, Long. 4°45'30''E..²² Evan-Thomas's position put the 5th Battle Squadron approximately five miles away from Beatty.²³ That distant position rendered the 5th Battle Squadron unusable to Beatty until 1608, a full hour and a half later. Jellicoe is very forgiving to Evan-Thomas by writing that the late arrival of the 5th Battle Squadron was the fault of Beatty and not its commander. Further, Jellicoe praises Evan-Thomas for his adherence to following orders and not turning his ships until he had received orders to do so.²⁴

Throughout the initial engagement with the High Seas Fleet, Beatty did accomplish some noteworthy actions. At 1445, Beatty ordered the aircraft ship *H.M.S. Engadine* to

²¹ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 443. Appendix II.

²² Ibid., 192. Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas's Post-Jutland Report

²³ Ranft, *Beatty Papers* Vol.2, 323. SECRET document sent by Beatty to the Admiralty on June 12, 1916. [BTY/6/1/3].

²⁴ British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence*, 61. Jellicoe's reflections of the Battle of Jutland.

send a seaplane to investigate the *H.M.S. Galatea's* sighting.²⁵ At 1531, the crew of the seaplane reported to Beatty that they found three enemy cruisers and five destroyers heading Northwest.²⁶ At 1545, (See figure 4) another report indicated a sighting of three more enemy cruisers accompanied by ten destroyers.²⁷ These sightings greatly influenced what Beatty did as the battle progressed, because Beatty deployed his fleet to accommodate these new threats.

As the preliminary engagement between Beatty and Vice-Admiral Hipper developed, *H.M.S. Lion* reported at 1530, "The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind S.E.." ²⁸ Jellicoe has some disagreement with Beatty's account of what the weather conditions were like when Beatty first engaged Hipper's ships. Jellicoe wrote that at 1530, the horizon to the east was entirely obscured by haze. These statements contradict each other, because

²⁵ Ranft, *Beatty Papers* Vol. 2, 323. SECRET document sent by Beatty to the Admiralty on June 12, 1916.

²⁶ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 448. Appendix II.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 450. Appendix II; British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 13.

²⁸ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 132. Vice-Admiral's Report, Battle Cruiser Fleet. Enclosure No. 9 to Submission No. 1415/0022 of 20/6/16 from C-in-C Home Fleets. B.C.F.01.

there are noticeable differences between clear and hazy weather.²⁹

At 1530, Beatty wrote that the 5th Battle Squadron was ten thousand yards away from *H.M.S. Lion* with the sun at its back. At 1548 Beatty's flagship *H.M.S. Lion* opened fire on Hipper's forces, at a range of eighteen thousand five hundred yards, but unfortunately for Beatty the 5th Battle Squadron was too far away to augment fire support for the Battle Cruiser Fleet.³⁰ Beatty's claims are supported by the Admiralty's *Official Despatches* which confirmed the fleet movements that Beatty described on June 12, 1916 in a message to Jellicoe.³¹

Nevertheless, the Admiralty criticized Beatty for engaging the High Seas Fleet without the support of the 5th Battle Squadron and further pointed out that the Battle Cruiser Fleet sailed at approximately twenty-five to twenty-six knots, a speed which the *Queen Elizabeth* class ships could not attain even at maximum power. Further, the Admiralty stated that Beatty would be engaging an enemy force with the potential to do critical harm to his Battle

²⁹ British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence*, 12. Jellicoe's account of the Battle of Jutland.

³⁰ Ranft, *Beatty Papers* Vol. II, 323-326. SECRET document by Beatty, which was sent to the Admiralty on June 12, 1916. [BTY/6/1/3].

³¹ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 447-448. Appendix II.

Cruiser Fleet, because of the lack of necessary fire support which was to be provided by the 5th Battle Squadron.³²

As Beatty's ships began to approach Hipper's Scouting Forces Fleet, Beatty's flagship *H.M.S. Lion* received its first hit from the enemy.³³ Unfortunately for Beatty, this successful incoming fire was only the beginning. At 1600, Beatty's command ship almost sank when it was hit in the aft Q turret with all hands killed.³⁴ As events progressed, the Admiralty's official publications of the Battle of Jutland agreed with Beatty's narrative description. This agreement is evident when the Admiralty's *Official Despatches* match exactly what Beatty wrote, word for word, when he mentioned that at 1608, Admiral Evan-Thomas's 5th Battle Squadron opened fire at twenty thousand yards.³⁵

It should be noted that there are numerous other events on which the Admiralty and Beatty agree and

³² British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 15. The Battle Cruiser Action. From 1550 to 1640.

³³ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 132. Vice-Admiral's Report, Battle Cruiser Fleet. Enclosure No.9 to Submission No. 1415/0022 of 20/6/16 from C.-in-C. Home Fleets; British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 15. The "Galatea" in Touch (2.30-3.30 p.m.); Ranft, *Beatty Papers* Vol. II, Beatty's SECRET letter to Jellicoe on June 12, 1916. [BTY/6/1/3].

³⁴ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 130. Vice-Admiral's Report, Battle Cruiser Fleet. Enclosure No.9 to Submission No. 1415/0022 of 20/6/16 from C.-in-C. Home Fleets

³⁵ Ibid., 132. Enclosure No.9 to Submission No. 1415/0022 of 20/6/16, 451 Appendix II; Ranft, *Beatty Papers* Vol. II, 323. [BTY/6/1/3].

disagree. When Beatty lost three of his battle cruisers to enemy fire, there were no disagreements as to when these ships were sunk.³⁶ However, upon further examination of Beatty's account of the events that transpired on May 31, 1916, Beatty and the Admiralty differ most on the reporting of the positioning of the Battle Cruiser Fleet. At 1645, Beatty reported to Jellicoe and the Admiralty that Hipper's High Seas Fleet was bearing Southeast toward Jellicoe, and that his fleet's position was at Lat.56°36' N, Long.6°04' E.³⁷ Beatty's bearing was of course wrong, because Jellicoe was actually northwest of Beatty throughout the initial engagements. Consequently, Jellicoe was repeatedly forced to recheck Beatty's signaling positions; an error in fleet movement could be quite fatal to the British Grand Fleet, because of its exposed flanks.

As daylight passed on May 31, 1916, (See figure 12) Beatty believed that night operations against the German High Seas Fleet were inadvisable. In Beatty's personal letters, he writes that in the growing darkness of May 31, 1916 the following are explanations as to why he agreed

³⁶ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 131, 135-136, Beatty's Battle-Cruiser Fleet Report, 452, 460, Appendix II; British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 45; Ranft, *Beatty Papers* Vol. II, 324. [BTY/6/1/3]

³⁷ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 24. Course at 1645 to join the Commander-in-Chief.

with Jellicoe's decision and did not want to engage the enemy under cover of darkness:

1. Distance of the Battle Cruiser Fleet from the Grand Fleet.
2. The damaged condition of *H.M.S. Lion* and *Princess Royal*. The sinking of *H.M.S. Queen Mary*, *Indefatigable*, and *Invincible*.
3. The enemy being concentrated.
4. The enemy being accompanied by numerous destroyers.
5. The strategical position being such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under favourable circumstances.³⁸

When substantiating this letter against the Admiralty's publications, one finds the exact text and language in the *Official Despatches*.³⁹ One might surmise that the Admiralty concurred with Beatty's acceptance of Jellicoe's decision not to pursue the High Seas Fleet at night.

Post Jutland Reactions

When day broke on June 1, 1916, the High Seas Fleet was not present, having successfully sailed to Germany,

³⁸ Ranft, *Beatty Papers*, Vol. II, 333. Beatty to Jellicoe (Beatty's original Jutland dispatch). June 12, 1916. [BTY/6/1/3].

³⁹ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 138. Vice-Admiral's Report, Battle-Cruiser Fleet. Enclosure No. 9 to Submission No. 1415/0022 of 20/6/16 from C.-in-C. Home Fleets. B.C.F.01. "Lion".

thus denying the Royal Navy continuation of the previous day's events. Beatty in his post-Jutland report to Jellicoe wrote that his Battle Cruiser Fleet successfully sank three enemy battle cruisers, two battleships (*König* or *Kaiser* class), one *Pommern* class frigate, and three light destroyers. Additionally, Beatty's task force had severely damaged two battle cruisers and a number of light cruisers and destroyers.⁴⁰

The Admiralty's responses to Beatty's claims are confusing. In the *Official Despatches*, the Admiralty does not comment on Beatty's kill claims, but rather publishes them verbatim.⁴¹ However, upon close examination of the Admiralty's *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland*, the Admiralty claimed that there was no conclusive evidence as to the extent of damage that Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet inflicted on the High Seas Fleet.⁴² It is difficult to ascertain a definite conclusion when analyzing the

⁴⁰ Ranft, *Beatty Papers*, Vol. II, 335. A letter from Beatty to Jellicoe, SECRET, June 12, 1916. [BTY/6/1/3].

⁴¹ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 140. Vice-Admiral's Report, Battle-Cruiser Fleet. Enclosure No.9 to Submission No. 1415/0022 of 20/6/16 from C.-in-C. Home Fleets.

⁴² British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 21. Note: "The damage done to the German battle cruisers in this phase of the action was considerable, but German information on the point is not conclusive. The *Lutzow* was badly hit and on fire about 4.30 p.m.; von Hase distinctly mentions three hits on the *Derfflinger* and says that the enemy (the *Queen Mary*) shot splendidly. The *Moltke* had only four hits, and all of these were on the starboard side. At least two out of the *Von der Tann*'s four hits were also on the starboard side. Five or six of the hits on the *Seydlitz* were on the starboard side, one of which was a hit on No.4 turret by a 13.5 shell at about 15,310 yards which necessitated the turret being abandoned, and which was possibly *Queen Mary*'s about 4 p.m. Finally, this ship had been hit by a torpedo.

aforementioned facts. Who correctly wrote what happened during the Battle of Jutland, Beatty or the Admiralty? Are Beatty's kills accurate? Scholars are left with an inconclusive answer. Further, why is Beatty not criticized for his personal and subcommanders' conduct and actions during the battle? There are a number of possible reasons, the most glaring of which is that during the compilation and publishing of the Admiralty's *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland* and *The Official Despatches*, Beatty was serving as the First Sea Lord in the Royal Navy.⁴³ Beatty's position as head of the Royal Navy leads one to suspect the Admiralty's reliability and objectivity. There are numerous instances when a Commander Alex Flint, R.N. edited copies of the *Narrative* and in pen and wrote his objections to certain inferences of Beatty made by the Admiralty.

Flint began his critique of the Admiralty's publications of the battle of Jutland by observing how the Admiralty advised Jellicoe that as supreme commander during battle, Jellicoe was going to insert a preface into the government's official report. Prior to the publication of the *Narrative*, the high command of the Admiralty made clear they intended to make subsequent alterations and deletions

⁴³ British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence*, Letter from Alex Flint, February 1919. 53. Flint was commander of the *H M.S. New Zealand*.

to the official record of the battle of Jutland, in part censoring portions of what Jellicoe wrote.⁴⁴ Flint does not limit his criticism to the censoring of Jellicoe. He continues his criticism of Beatty and the Admiralty by asserting that the official history was done in collusion with Beatty, who was First Sea Lord, and his staff. It was Flint's opinion that Beatty's staff wanted to glorify the Battle Cruiser Fleet and belittle Jellicoe's Battle Fleet. Flint did argue that Jellicoe was correct in sending a letter to the Admiralty to suggest that the Admiralty's official account should have been written without being seen or commented on by any of the senior officers who took part in the battle.⁴⁵

Commander Flint is not the only Royal Naval officer who possessed criticisms of the Admiralty's publications of the battle of Jutland. Jellicoe charged that there were a number of problems with the Admiralty's account of the battle of Jutland. Jellicoe began his criticisms arguing that the Admiralty's selection of the authors was improper. The Admiralty selected two naval officers to write the *Narrative* and *The Official Despatches*. These officers were

⁴⁴ Ibid., 11. Jellicoe's letter [unknown recipient], 1919.

⁴⁵ Ibid. Jellicoe's preliminary remarks to the Admiralty's *Narrative*, 1919. These remarks were never published in the Admiralty's official *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland*, 1924.

a Captain Dewer and his younger brother Lieutenant Dewer. Jellicoe argues that neither officer had ever commanded a ship at sea, and that Lieutenant Dewer, who was a writer in the Press on naval matters, possessed little sea experience. Jellicoe punctuates his objections by writing:

None of my critics, nor those responsible for the compilation of the Admiralty narrative of the battle, nor the Naval Staff which attempted to reply to my observations on that narrative, appear to have realised in the least degree the extent to which factors mentioned above affected my handling of the fleet....⁴⁶

Upon examination of the documents, letters, and signals, the Admiralty made one significant declaration into Beatty's official accounts of the Battle of Jutland. In the third paragraph of the second page of the *Narrative*, the Admiralty wrote that during the battle, after Beatty's command ship *H.M.S. Lion* was hit and a fire had started aboard ship, a significant number of original forms aboard ship were destroyed. Accordingly, the destroyed documents had to be re-created.⁴⁷ Depending on whose position one took, Beatty's or Jellicoe's, there is reason for concern as to the authenticity and objectivity of all the

⁴⁶ Ibid., 1-3. Jellicoe's preliminary remarks to the Admiralty's *Narrative*, 1919.

⁴⁷ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 2. The Admiralty wrote, "In the case of the *Lion*, a fire apparently destroyed a number of the original forms. A careful compilation of material from the ship's logs, signal logs, and reports of all ships which embodies all the relevant information they contain was made by Captain J.E.T. Harper's Committee, and a complete compilation of all the material in ships' logs has also been made by Lieutenant-Commander J.F.H. Pollen (Historical Section, C.I.D.)."

Admiralty's published accounts of Beatty's actions throughout the battle.

As examinations of the battle of Jutland passed from personal into technical, Beatty should be commended for the work he did in as much as he suggested a number of important changes that future battle cruisers would need to possess in order to survive modern naval warfare. These recommendations include reworking the ladder system inside the firing turret to ensure that safety and the integrity of the ship could be maintained.⁴⁸ Further, Beatty was not above reporting that his own battle cruiser Fleet or others in construction were unequal to the duties assigned to them. He also reported that future Royal Naval ships had to be fast battleships rather than purely battle cruisers, a position he earlier did not espouse. Modern naval ships required at least a nine-inch armor belt, which was too heavy for a pre 1919 battle cruiser to maintain.⁴⁹

There are and will continue to be controversies surrounding Beatty and his involvement during the battle of Jutland. Some can appear sinister or misleading, but in this writer's opinion, there is enough reason to be

⁴⁸ Ranft, *Beatty Papers* Vol. II, 346-353. Advance Report of Gunnery Committee. June 22, 1916. [BTY/6/17/5].

⁴⁹ Ibid., 358-359. . Interim report of Committee on Construction to Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle-Cruiser Fleet. June 23, 1916. SECRET. [BTY/6/17/4]

suspicious of Beatty's reports to the Admiralty and what it in turn published as fact. This criticism is not say that Beatty intentionally meant to deceive or influence reports that came out immediately following Jutland or when he served as First Sea Lord; however, there is little doubt that the Admiralty accepted Beatty's accounts with less reluctance than Jellicoe's.

CHAPTER III

ADMIRAL SIR JOHN JELlicoe

May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious
victory resulting in a just and lasting peace!
J.R. Jellicoe, Admiral.¹

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Viscount of Scapa, G.C.B.,
O.M., G.C.V.O., Commander in Chief of the Grand Fleet, has
been the subject of numerous studies, debates, and lectures
concerning his actions during the battle of Jutland, May 31
- June 1, 1916. As supreme commander of the British naval
forces assembled off the coast of Jutland, the greatest
apportionment of blame and praise assigned after the battle
has been bestowed on Jellicoe. Why then, has there been so
much debate within both scholarly and military circles as
to Jellicoe's leadership and command actions during the
battle of Jutland? ²

Sir Winston Churchill, First Sea Lord, 1917, described
Jellicoe:

¹ Viscount Sir John Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 Its Creation, Development, and Work* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1919), 461. This quote ends Admiral Jellicoe's book *The Grand Fleet*.

² Brian McL. Ranft, *The Beatty Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence and Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty. Vol. 2. 1916-1927* (Brooksfield: Scholar Press for the Naval Records Society, 1993), 54. Admiral of the Fleet Earl Jellicoe (1859-1935): entered Royal Navy 1872; as a Captain, DNO and member of Fisher's Committee on Designs 1905; Rear-Admiral 1907; Controller & 3rd Sea Lord 1908; Vice-Admiral commanding Atlantic Fleet 1910; 2nd Sea Lord 1912; Acting Admiral and CinC Home Fleets August 1914; (the designation Grand Fleet not adopted until September); 1st Sea Lord 1916; dismissed by 1st Lord December 1917; Empire Mission on Naval defence and Admiral of the Fleet 1919; Governor-General New Zealand 1920-1924; earldom 1925.

The standpoint of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Grand Fleet was unique. His responsibilities were on a different scale from all others. It might fall to him as to no other man, Sovereign, Statesman, Admiral or General to issue orders which in the space of two or three hours might nakedly decide who won the war. The destruction of the British Battle Fleet was final. Jellicoe was the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon.²

One can understand the immense pressures and problems that Jellicoe encountered as supreme commander on May 31, 1916. Some critics of Jellicoe have argued that he missed numerous opportunities to destroy the enemy during the battle, failed to pursue a retreating High Seas Fleet, centralization of command, and battle tactics.³

Jellicoe is not without his supporters, who have praised him for outstanding leadership during the battle of Jutland. A number of scholars and even Admiral Sir David Beatty supported Jellicoe's decisions and actions that throughout the multiple engagements with Admiral Reinhard Scheer's High Seas Fleet.⁴ When beginning an analysis of

² Sir Winston Churchill, *The World Crisis*, Vol. III (New York: Charles Scriber's Sons, 1923), 105.

³ Ibid., 131; Holloway Halsead Frost, *The Battle of Jutland* (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 417; Richard Alexander Hough, *The Great War at Sea, 1914-1918* (New York: Oxford Press, 1983), 272; John Keegan, *The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare* (New York: Viking Press, 1989), 108; Stephen Wentworth Roskill, *The Strategy of Sea Power: Its Development and Application Based on the Lees-Knowles Lectures Delivered in the University of Cambridge* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1962), 118; E.L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918* (London: Methuen and Company, 1967), 182.

⁴ Sir Henry John Newbolt, *A Naval History of the War* (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 1928), 336; J. Holland Rose, *The Indecisiveness of Modern War & Other Essays* (Port Washington, New York: Kennikat Press, 1927), 12; V.E. Tarrant, *Jutland, the German Perspective: A New*

Jellicoe, one should bear in mind the amount of disparity that exists within academe, military journals, and the Admiralty.

In 1919, Jellicoe's personal account of Jutland appeared.⁵ Jellicoe wrote that prior to the battle of Jutland, he had a number of lingering concerns regarding the German High Seas Fleet's battleships' fighting capabilities compared with those of the Royal Navy's battleships. Jellicoe's concerns stemmed from classified intelligence reports he received from the Admiralty, which stated:

1. German ships of any particular period were of considerable greater displacement as compared with contemporary British ships.
2. The German ships carried a much greater weight of armour than their British contemporaries.
3. All German Dreadnoughts were provided with side armour to the upper deck, whilst nine of the earliest British Dreadnoughts were provided with armour protection to the main deck only, thus rendering them far more open to artillery attack. The "Orion" class of battleship and the "Lion" class of battleship, designed during my service at the Admiralty as Controller, were the first of our Dreadnoughts armoured to the upper decks.

View of the Great Battle, 31 May, 1916 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 123; Wolfgang Wegener, *The Naval Strategy of the World War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989), 88.

⁵ Viscount Sir John Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916. Its Creation, Development, and Work* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1919) The British Admiralty counters Jellicoe's arguments by inserting a footnote in its *Narrative*, "This publication is an official Narrative, and not a Staff Appreciation," 106.

4. The main belt and upper belt armour of the German ships was in nearly all cases thicker than in their British contemporaries, whilst the protection at the bow and stern was in *all cases* considerably greater in the German ships.
5. The deck protection in the German ships was usually greater than in the British vessels and the watertight subdivisions more complete.
6. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged torpedo tubes than the British vessels.⁶

Jellicoe's battle plans and actions throughout the Jutland engagements were at least designed to reduce the number of advantages the Germans possessed all the while applying the Royal Navy's numerical supremacy wherever possible.

Jellicoe's adversary during the battle of Jutland, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, following the war wrote that he agreed with the preparations that Jellicoe made, in as much as the High Seas Fleet was preparing its fleets along the same lines.⁷

Jellicoe did not limit his concerns merely to German battleships as he felt the Admiralty had done. With the advent of torpedo warfare, which radically changed past naval needs for support ships such as frigates, destroyers, and submarines, Jellicoe began in 1911 new practical

⁶ Ibid., 307-312.

⁷ Wegener, *Naval Strategy of the World War*, 64. Wegener wrote, "A fleet-in-being can only impair the enemy, and in light of existing conditions, a disparity exists between the risk and the useful effect of preparation."

exercises that emphasized actions between the Battle Fleet and the Grand Fleet.⁸ Jellicoe wanted to make sure that the British Navy was well versed in the intricacies of large-scale destroyer warfare. To his consternation, Jellicoe's preparations for the Grand Fleet were inserted into the Admiralty's *Narrative* as a footnote rather than as part of the text. Jellicoe complained that his preparations prior to Jutland should have been more forcefully presented, because of the direct impact on the success of the Grand Fleet over the High Seas Fleet during the battle.⁹

Jellicoe's complaint of the Admiralty's slight became even more apparent throughout the many publications of the Admiralty's studies of the battle of Jutland that followed. In those, the Admiralty either refuted or rejected a number of Jellicoe's observations.

Jellicoe's criticisms of the Admiralty's publications, however, were not always accurate or fair. For example, he believed that the Admiralty during the publication of the *Official Despatches and Narrative*, failed to give an accurate explanation of the battle because the majority of naval staff at the Admiralty were all officers who served

⁸ Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet* 391.

⁹ British Admiralty, *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland* (London: His Majesties Stationary Office, 1924), 2. Jellicoe's introduction to the *Narrative*.

in Admiral David Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet during the battle of Jutland.¹⁰ In this respect, his concerns seemed justified, for the Admiralty made note that Jellicoe did not always agree with everything it found. The Admiralty, in its official narrative, acknowledged in a footnote:

Since the publication of the Command Papers in 1920, Lord Jellicoe has since expressed the opinion that while he does not consider either plan to be completely accurate, the later plan of August 29, 1916, is the more correct of the two. The note on page 51 of the Jutland Papers is, therefore, not correct.¹¹

Furthermore, in another footnote the Admiralty wrote, "Grand Fleet [Jellicoe's autobiography, 1919] has been used to supplement the despatches."¹² The Admiralty also included in an appendix at the end of its publication

Narrative:

This Appendix has been added to the Admiralty Narrative, to meet the wishes of Admiral of the Fleet, Viscount Jellicoe. Where, however, the Appendix differs from the Admiralty Narrative, Their Lordships are satisfied that the Narrative is more in accordance with the evidence available. Notes have been added, where necessary, mainly in amplification or elucidation of the text criticised in the Appendix.¹³

¹⁰ British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence. The Battle of Jutland* (London: His Majesties Stationary Office, 1923), 2. Official correspondence from Jellicoe to an unknown recipient.

¹¹ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 2. Introduction.

¹² *Ibid.*, 4. Introduction.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 106. Appendix G. This quotation is located as the Preface, in bold print, to the appendix.

From the omnibus suggestions made above by both the Admiralty and Jellicoe, one can understand the tension that existed between the two.

Battle Scenarios and Dispatches

On May 30, 1916, Jellicoe was ordered by the Admiralty to prepare to set sail immediately for Jutland Bank, Denmark¹⁴. (See figure 1) With the Grand Fleet distributed between Scapa Flow, Invergorden, and Rosyth, Scotland, it was necessary for Jellicoe to signal Beatty to launch. At 1937, Jellicoe signaled to his vice-commander, Beatty, that he [Jellicoe] was going to proceed to a rendezvous at Lat. 57°45' N., Long. 4°15', which was two hundred and forty miles from Scapa Flow, Scotland. Beatty was ordered to go to Lat. 56°40' N., Long. 56° E. He was also instructed that if there was no news of the enemy by 1400 on May 31, 1916, that he was to steer to Horn Reef and head toward Jellicoe.¹⁵ (See figure 2) Jellicoe's signal to Beatty is found verbatim in the Admiralty's *Official Despatches*, however *H.M.S. Lion*, Beatty's command ship, did not log

¹⁴ A bank, which is south of Skagerrak, a sea that separates Norway from Denmark. It is due North of Horn Reef.

¹⁵ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 6-7. Preliminary Movements. May 28th-30th.

Jellicoe's signal until 2015, a discrepancy of forty-eight minutes.

As Jellicoe and Beatty set sail for their appointed positions, a debate on weather conditions began amongst the Admiralty, Beatty, and Jellicoe. On May 30, Jellicoe signaled the Senior Officer Sweepers at 2115, "Is the weather clear?"¹⁶ Jellicoe did not receive a reply until 2150, at which time *H.M.S. Broughness* signaled to Jellicoe that visibility was limited to three miles.¹⁷ On May 31, Jellicoe received his first weather report of the day at 1122, in which *H.M.S. St. Vincent* reported, "Clouds are numerous and rather low. The W.L. [water level] by station test is 425 metres."¹⁸ The Admiralty sent word to Jellicoe at 1314:

Weather reports based on observations at 7 a.m. Anticyclone over England, depression approaching N.W. coast. Rain Ireland. Fog, Straits of Dover. Forecast-Districts J, H, G and East Scotland: wind at surface moderate or fresh, between S. and W., some rain and mist, fair intervals. England S. and East Coast: wind surface moderate, W., fair generally.¹⁹

¹⁶ British Admiralty, *Despatches*, 406. Appendix II.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 408. Appendix II.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 437. Appendix II.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 441. Appendix II.

The Admiralty sent another weather report to Jellicoe at 1530, which stated:

For C.-in-C. Weather report from Rosyth, Immingham and Harwich respectively. Wind S.E. 1-3, dull, c. and o., misty, rain 29.98. Based on observation at 1 p.m.: wind S.W., fine, b. and be., barometer 30.19. Based on observations at 1 p.m.: barometer 30.25, rising, temperature 64, wind E.S.E., light.²⁰

Examination of the reports from the Admiralty shows that they do not match Jellicoe's consistent reference to terrible weather conditions early on May 31. The Admiralty's rebuttal includes the view that weather conditions had improved throughout the day until nightfall when the weather finally changed for the worse.

As May 31 progressed into the evening, the battle had been underway for a number of hours. One can find interesting personal accounts concerning the weather conditions throughout the day. In a letter to Beatty, Jellicoe wrote that after talking with Admiral Sir Hugh Evan-Thomas, Beatty must have endured adverse light and weather conditions.²¹ Jellicoe also wrote in a letter [unknown recipient], post-Jutland, that visibility was

²⁰ Ibid., 447. Appendix II.

²¹ Ranft, *Beatty Papers*, Vol. II, 319. Letter from Jellicoe to Beatty on June 4, 1916. [BTY/13/22/13]. Jellicoe mentions that Evan-Thomas could see for twelve miles on the disengaged side and on the engaged side, all he could see were flashes of gunfire, which were approximately twenty thousand yards away. Further Jellicoe mentions that the weather conditions made signaling difficult.

limited to twelve thousand yards at 1855, and that light conditions were abominable.²² In Jellicoe's autobiography, he wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty that from 1500 on, weather conditions were terrible.²³

Beatty's responses to the weather conditions of May 31 are extremely brief, but at 1700 he indicated that weather conditions were becoming unfavorable.²⁴ Beatty also reported that at 1850, he could only see for four miles.²⁵ Upon close examination of Beatty's weather reports, they do not match what Jellicoe reported, that weather conditions were becoming extremely adversarial for the Grand Fleet all day. Thus, when analyzing Jellicoe, Beatty, and the Admiralty's responses to the weather on May 30-31, there are a number of noticeable differences, the Admiralty and Beatty's claimed weather conditions gradually became worse as the day progressed, while Jellicoe countered that the weather he encountered on May 31 was bad throughout the day.

²² British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence*, 73.

²³ Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, 472. Appendix. A letter to the Secretary of the Admiralty. No. 1395 H.F. 0022, The Sec. of the Admiralty. *HMS Iron Duke*. June 18, 1916.

²⁴ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 134-135. Vice-Admiral's Report, Battle Cruiser Fleet. Enclosure No.9 to Submission No. 1415/0022 of 20/6/16 from C.-in-C. Home Fleets. B.C.F. 01. *HMS Lion*.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 139. Vice-Admiral's Report, Battle Cruiser Fleet. Enclosure No.9 to Submission No. 1415/0022 of 20/6/16 from C.-in-C. Home Fleets. B.C.F. 01. *HMS Lion*.

Jellicoe's autobiography, *The Grand Fleet*, describes the battle of Jutland in a chronological manner as does the Admiralty's *Official Despatches and Narrative of the Battle of Jutland*. Both the Admiralty and Jellicoe wrote that on May 31, as *H.M.S. Galatea* signaled, at 1435, that it had spotted the High Seas Fleet, and that Jellicoe immediately set sail at full steam for Lat. 56°50' N., Long. 4°0' E.²⁶ (See figure 14) When comparing Jellicoe's and the Admiralty's notes, *H.M.S. Galatea's* sighting[time] and reported position, are written exactly alike by both Jellicoe and the Admiralty.

When continuing to analyze Jellicoe's writings and those of the Admiralty, one will find that there are a number of discrepancies as to when events actually occurred. Jellicoe reports that at 1548, Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet began engaging the enemy.²⁷ (See figure 4) The Admiralty wrote that at 1547, *H.M.S. Lion* reported that she opened fire.²⁸ Jellicoe also wrote that at 1606, *H.M.S. Indefatigable* was mortally hit and sunk, at 1608, Evan-Thomas's 5th Battle Squadron opened fire on the enemy, at

²⁶ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 30. Commander-in-Chief's View of the Situation; British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 444. Appendix II; Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, 317.

²⁷ Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, 322.

²⁸ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 450. Appendix II.

1626, *H.M.S. Queen Mary* was hit and sunk, and at 1834, *H.M.S. Invincible* was sunk.²⁹ The Admiralty's official publications do not match any of Jellicoe's timetables when they wrote that *H.M.S. Indefatigable* was hit and sunk at 1601, the 5th Battle Squadron opened fire at 1600, *H.M.S. Queen Mary* was hit and sunk at 1620, and *H.M.S. Invincible* was destroyed at 1830.³⁰ It is clear from analyzing the timetable involved at the initial stages of the battle that Jellicoe and the Admiralty quite often contradict and occasionally match each other. However, available evidence fails to prove which party was correct.

As the battle developed, Jellicoe felt that he was left at a tactical disadvantage with the High Seas Fleet because of a lack of timely and accurate intelligence forwarded on by Beatty and the Admiralty. Jellicoe wrote that from 1600 until 1645, he did not receive any news of Beatty's situation against the High Seas Fleet. At 1615, Jellicoe signaled Evan-Thomas of the 5th Battle Squadron, asking if he was in company with Beatty. Evan-Thomas signaled back to Jellicoe at 1617 in the affirmative that

²⁹ Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, 322-323, 325.

³⁰ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 450-452. Appendix II.

he was alongside Beatty.³¹ When Jellicoe received a signal from Beatty at 1645 with his position, Jellicoe wrote that he doubted the reported position relayed to him, for the Battle Cruiser Fleet had been in action against the High Seas Fleet for over two hours. During that time, Jellicoe concluded that Beatty's ships must have changed position a number of times by making radical movements to avoid being hit by the enemy's long range cannons.³²

When analyzing the Admiralty's reports from 1600 to 1645, one finds some glaring contradictions between the *Official Despatches* and *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland*. The Admiralty does publish in *Narrative* Jellicoe's report that he had not received any messages concerning Beatty's engagement with the High Seas Fleet from 1600 to 1645.³³ However, based on the Admiralty's *Official Despatches*, there appear to be a number of signals in Appendix II from ships of the Grand Fleet sending information concerning the Battle Cruiser Fleet's position and the composition of the enemy fleet.³⁴

³¹ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 32. Commander-in-Chief's View of the Situation. 2.0 P.M. to 5.0 P.M. British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 451. Appendix II.

³² Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, 341

³³ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 32.

³⁴ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 17, 451-453. Appendix II. At 1630 *H.M.S. Southampton* reports to Jellicoe and Beatty: "Urgent. One enemy cruiser bearing S.E., steering N.E. (My position Lat. 56°38' N., Long. 6°07' E.)" At 1638 *H.M.S. Southampton* reported: "Urgent. Priority. Have

As Beatty was engaging the High Seas Fleet between 1600 and 1700, Jellicoe became very concerned as to how the British battle cruiser would compare to the German battle cruiser. As mentioned before, Jellicoe signaled Evan-Thomas, commander of the 5th Battle Squadron, because Jellicoe always believed that the Germans had developed a better battle cruiser and Beatty would need the additional fire support of the 5th Battle Squadron if he wanted the Battle Cruiser Fleet to achieve victory. Jellicoe wrote that his worries included:

1. Indifferent armor protection of the British Battle Cruiser.
2. The disadvantages under which the British labored in when engaging the enemy. [British had to fight with their ships silhouetted against the sun.]
3. The High Seas Fleets gunnery skills at long range. [Jellicoe recognized the superiority of German optics.]³⁵

As Beatty began to engage the High Seas Fleet, at 1548 Jellicoe was informed and understood that the 5th Battle Squadron and its needed firepower would not be available to Beatty and his ships for at least thirty minutes after

sighted enemy battlefleet bearing approximately S.E., course of enemy N. My position Lat. 56°34' N. Long. 6°20' E."

³⁵ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 2-3. Commander-in-Chief's Letter. No. 1396/0022. June 18, 1916.

opening fire on the High Seas Fleet. The loss of the 5th Battle Squadron meant that five High Seas Fleet battle cruisers would be fighting six British battle cruisers. An engagement, which Jellicoe historically had always wanted to avoid at all costs.³⁶ Jellicoe, in his book *Grand Fleet*, wrote that when he was informed that the 5th Battle Squadron would not be fighting the enemy at the same time as the Battle Cruiser Fleet [1548], his fears for transferring the 5th Battle Squadron to Beatty were justified.³⁷ It is significant to note that Jellicoe did not blame Evan-Thomas for the late arrival of the 5th Battle Squadron. On a number of occasions, Jellicoe defended and praised Evan-Thomas's actions as those worthy of a great naval officer.³⁸

Jellicoe and the Admiralty did not limit their differences solely to weather conditions. Significant debate exists as to official positioning reports. Jellicoe wrote that on May 31 at 1813, he signaled to the Signal Officer, Battle Cruiser Fleet, that his position was Lat. 57°25' N., Long. 5°12' E., and that he was steering

³⁶ Ibid., 3. Commander-in-Chief's Letter. No. 1396/0022. June 18, 1916.

³⁷ Ranft, *Beatty Papers*, Vol. II, 295-297. A letter from Jellicoe to Beatty, February 23, 1916. [BTY/5/2/3]. In this letter, Jellicoe denied Beatty's formal request for the transfer of the 5th Battle Squadron. Jellicoe argued that the Evan-Thomas's battleships could not sail as fast as Beatty's battle cruisers and thus would limit the use of the requested battleships to a defensive rather than offensive use.

³⁸ Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, 107.

Southeast-south at twenty knots.³⁹ The Admiralty disputes Jellicoe's timing of his dispatch, by pointing out that Jellicoe's command ship *H.M.S. Iron Duke's* signal book cited that the exact position at 1700 was, Lat. 57°25' N., Long. 5°12' E., not at 1813 as Jellicoe suggests.⁴⁰ As mentioned before, it remains debatable as to whether Jellicoe or the Admiralty possessed the correct time. However, with the confusion that was occurring within the Grand Fleet, the High Seas Fleet was able to escape and attempted to steer for home port in Wilhelmshaven.

As daylight ended on May 31, 1916, Jellicoe signaled his fleet to turn south and take formation for the night. (See figure 15) It was Jellicoe's plan that he would arrange his fleet so that the retreating High Seas Fleet could not pass through the English Channel and escape into the Atlantic Ocean.⁴¹ At 2132, Jellicoe signaled to Captain Berwick Curtis of *H.M.S. Abdiel* (mine-laying flotilla leader) to lay a minefield in a defined area some fifteen miles from the Vyl Lightship (Holland), over which the High Seas Fleet was expected to pass.⁴² (See figure 10) Beatty

³⁹ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 33. Commander-in-Chief hears of Enemy Battle Fleet; British Admiralty, *Despatches*, 12. Enclosure No. 1 in H.F. letter No. 1,396, dated 18th June 1916.

⁴⁰ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 454. Appendix II.

⁴¹ Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, 372; British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence*, 161.

⁴² Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, 373.

signaled Jellicoe at 2158 with the location of the retreating High Seas Fleet , which was nine miles ahead of him steaming due south, steering Southwest at Lat. 56°40' N, Long. 5°50' E, course Southwest, at seventeen knots.⁴³ Jellicoe later wrote [unknown recipient] that he did not receive the dispatch from the Beatty until 2223.⁴⁴ With the delayed intelligence forwarded to Jellicoe twenty-five minutes later, there was cause for Jellicoe to become concerned as to the exact location of the High Seas Fleet at 2223.

Before daylight disappeared, Jellicoe had already made a decision not to pursue the enemy and engage in night operations, because, "night actions had been predetermined earlier as events of the night influenced the morning movements."⁴⁵ Jellicoe's decision was based on a number of factors:

1. The presence of enemy torpedo craft, which existed in large number.
2. The impossibility of distinguishing between friendly and enemy vessels.
3. Night actions under modern conditions of war must always be very largely a matter of chance.

⁴³ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 471. Appendix II.

⁴⁴ British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence*, 88.

⁴⁵ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 106. Appendix G.

4. Attacking at night would lead the Grand Fleet into a destroyer engagement in which they would be outnumbered.
5. British searchlights were not of the best type, and that could lead to friendly fire.⁴⁶

The Admiralty responded positively toward Jellicoe's decision to forego night operations. The Admiralty can be quoted as saying, "The Commander-in-Chief decided very rightly not to fight a night action."⁴⁷ Beatty was in complete agreement with the Admiralty's assessment of Jellicoe's decision to assume a defensive position throughout the night. In a letter to Jellicoe, dated June 12, 1916, Beatty wholeheartedly supported Jellicoe and offered his own reasons as to why night operations should have been abandoned.⁴⁸ Sir Winston Churchill also praised Jellicoe for not risking the Grand Fleet in questionable night operations, because as he stated, "Jellicoe made the right decision not to attack at night, because by 2:30 a.m. daylight would start and give him eighteen hours of attack time."⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, 370-371; British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 21. Enclosure No. 1 in H.F. letter No. 1,396, dated 18th June, 1916.

⁴⁷ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 69. The Problem before the Commander-in-Chief.

⁴⁸ Ranft, *Beatty Papers*, Vol. II, 333. Beatty's letter to Jellicoe. [BTY/6/1/3]. Beatty's reasons for not wanting to pursue the enemy at night are listed in Chapter II pages 37-38.

⁴⁹ Churchill, *World Crisis*, 153.

As Jellicoe and the Grand Fleet assumed defensive positions for the night, the Admiralty intercepted a number of transmissions from the High Seas Fleet. (See figure 11&12) On June 1, 1916, at 0312, the Admiralty sent a message to Jellicoe that there was a damaged enemy destroyer at Lat. 55°45' N., Long. 6°25' E. with an escort ship to take it home. At 0329 the Admiralty sent another message that it had intercepted at 0230 in which the High Seas Fleet was at Lat. 55°36' N., Long. 6°50' E..⁵⁰ Jellicoe understood that the High Seas Fleet had been steaming at sixteen knots for at least an hour, and at that speed, it was effectively out of range from the Grand Fleet. With the enemy too far to engage, at 0440 on June 1, Jellicoe signaled, "Enemy fleet has returned to harbour."⁵¹ The battle of Jutland was over. Jellicoe then proceeded to steam for Scotland. As Jellicoe steamed back into his home port in Northern Scotland on June 2, 1916, he reported at 2145 that he and the Grand Fleet were ready to report back to sea in four hours notice.⁵²

Post Jutland Reaction

⁵⁰ British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence*, 91.

⁵¹ British Admiralty, *Official Despatches*, 488. Appendix II.

⁵² Jellicoe, *Grand Fleet*, 387.

When the battle of Jutland ended on June 1, 1916, many already began to question the successes and failures of the Grand Fleet. Jellicoe was the first among many who examined the available evidence. He concluded that there were a number of problems, which the Royal Navy would have to rise above, or it would languish into mediocrity. Jellicoe began his study by apologizing that there might be some errors, [in his book, *The Grand Fleet* and his dispatches] but that he and his staff were fully occupied at the time with the arrangements concerning the repair and preparation of his damaged ships on June 1, 1916.⁵³

Jellicoe begins his post Jutland narrative by submitting to the Admiralty the damage the Grand Fleet inflicted onto the High Seas Fleet:

Battleships or Battle Cruisers

2 Battleships, *Dreadnought* type (certain)
 1 Battleship, *Deutschland* type (certain)
 1 Battleship or Battle Cruiser (probable)
 1 Battleship, *Dreadnought* type (probable)

Light Cruisers

4 Light Cruisers (certain)
 1 Heavy ship or a Light Cruiser (certain)

⁵³ Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet*, 388.

Torpedo Boats

6 Torpedo Boats or Destroyers (certain)
3 Torpedo Boats or Destroyers (probable)

Submarines

1 Submarine (certain)
3 Submarines (probable)⁵⁴

As mentioned in Chapter II, the Admiralty accepted Jellicoe's report but published that it was not exactly sure what enemy ships were destroyed or damaged.⁵⁵

As Jellicoe constructed his report of the battle for the Admiralty, he included a number of criticisms, which he felt would exonerate him from any blame. In a letter to the Admiralty, 1916, Jellicoe began his case by stating that during the battle, he encountered two main difficulties. The first was that there was an absence of timely or accurate information from Beatty and the Admiralty. Second, that the lack of visibility through mist and smoke hampered his ability to correctly ascertain every movement made by the enemy and his own forces.⁵⁶

With regard to the writing of the Admiralty's publications of the battle, Jellicoe laid criticism on the

⁵⁴ Ibid., 489. Appendix, Battle of Jutland Despatch. Enclosure in Home Fleets Letter No. 1395, H.F. 0022 dated June 18, 1916. List of Enemy Vessels Considered Sunk, 31 May – 1st June, 1916.

⁵⁵ British Admiralty, *Narrative*, 21.

⁵⁶ British Admiralty, *Papers and Correspondence*, 1-2. Jellicoe's letter to the Admiralty.

Admiralty for choosing in his words, "two inexperienced naval officers" to co-author the Admiralty's version of the battle. Jellicoe argued, as Beatty had done, that it was inappropriate to have men who never commanded man of war ships in peace or war time to write a narrative of what occurred during the most important naval battle of the Great War.⁵⁷ However, Jellicoe wrote that he forgave the writers of the *Narrative* for their ignorance of naval tactics, but he stated that the professional naval officers of the Admiralty should have understood some of the difficulties the writers would encounter.⁵⁸ The Admiralty published in *Narrative* that they did not agree with Jellicoe's assessment of its writers, because they were responsible to compile a narrative of the battle, not to fight one.⁵⁹

Not limiting himself to purely Jutland actions, Jellicoe proceeded on the offensive to protect his name and naval reputation by adding other important information pertinent to the battle. He submitted that prior to the

⁵⁷ Ibid., 1. As mentioned in Chapter II, Jellicoe and Beatty argued that the Admiralty's choosing of a retired naval Lieutenant with little sea experience and a recently promoted Post Captain who had never handled a ship at sea were unacceptable choices to relate a battle as important as Jutland.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 3. Jellicoe's letter to the Admiralty.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 52. The Admiralty wrote, "This Narrative was compiled by two officers attached to the Admiralty for the purpose. Neither of them were officers of great experience. One, a recently promoted Captain (Captain Dewar) had never as yet commanded a ship at sea; other, his brother, was a retired Lieutenant of but little sea experience, but a writer in the Press on naval matters."

battle, he was concerned that the United States would enter the war on the side of Germany because of the British naval policy of bringing "neutral" vessels [U.S.] into British harbors before they could arrive to the Continent.⁶⁰ Thus, defeat of the High Seas Fleet was important to him.

Jellicoe's assertion counters arguments from those who claim that Jellicoe favored a status quo with the German Navy. Jellicoe further cited that the German official history of the battle:

One must agree with the British Leader that had he acted this way (i.e. deployed on the starboard wing column) he would in fact led his ships into a position, which would have been only too welcome to the German Fleet... this incident is proof of the situation in which the British Fleet would have been placed had Admiral Jellicoe deployed into a single line from the Western wing division almost within range of the German torpedo armaments.⁶¹

As Jellicoe and the Admiralty argued over the more accurate English account of the battle, historians are just as divided over the loss of the four battle cruisers and question Jellicoe's actions. J. Holland Rose, author of *The Indecisiveness of Modern War*, praises Jellicoe and his staff for their unceasing vigilance during the battle, in that they were not worn down to the extent the Germans

⁶⁰ Ibid., 73. Jellicoe's letter to the Admiralty, June 1916.

⁶¹ Ibid., 71. Jellicoe's letter to the Admiralty; Tarrant, *Jutland, the German Perspective*, 123.

hoped for, so errors in judgment were thus avoided.⁶²

German Admiral Wolfgang Wegener states that he understood Jellicoe's method of command and supported it, because it won the war for the British.⁶³ Sir Winston Churchill also praises Jellicoe:

Sir John Jellicoe was in experience and administration capacity unquestionably superior to any British Admiral. He knew every aspect and detail of his profession. Afloat or at the Admiralty his intellect, energy, and efficiency won equal confidence from those he served and those he led. ... When at the outbreak he assumed this great duty, his appointment was acclaimed alike by the nation and the Navy.⁶⁴

In contrast to those who supported Jellicoe, Holloway Frost wrote that Jellicoe's lack of aggressiveness during the battle forced the British into a forced status quo with the Germans.⁶⁵ Frost is not the only one who had problems with Jellicoe's actions during the battle. Richard Hough argues that Jellicoe should be criticized for his Grand Fleet Battle Orders. The Battle Orders posted by Jellicoe reflected that he presumed the Germans would want to force the Grand Fleet in a full scale attack, which they didn't, and that the Battle Orders were too detailed and failed to

⁶² Rose, *Indecisiveness of Modern War*, 3.

⁶³ Wegener, *Naval Strategy*, 88.

⁶⁴ Churchill, *The World Crisis*, Vol. III, 105.

⁶⁵ Frost, *Jutland*, 104.

allow individual commanders any latitude when engaging the enemy.⁶⁶ Additionally, Hough argues that Jellicoe did not encourage consultation and did not care for any questioning of what he laid down.⁶⁷ Stephen Roskill adds to the debate by suggesting that the command problems that the commanders encountered by the individual ship captains during the battle were due not to personal failings, but rather to the tactical situation that Jellicoe forced upon them through overly detailed Battle Orders.⁶⁸

Jellicoe rebuffed suggestions that his style of command was too centralized and that his manner of command allowed no questioning. He wrote that the Grand Fleet Battle Orders provided for considerable decentralization of command, and that great stress was laid on this point [decentralization] in the general instructions for Battle Tactics.⁶⁹

Regardless of Jellicoe's actions, following the battle of Jutland, Jellicoe decided after an Admiralty conference that, "The fleet ought not to operate south of Lat. 55°0'

⁶⁶ Hough, *The Great War at Sea*, 271.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 272.

⁶⁸ Roskill, *Strategy of Sea Power*, 120.

⁶⁹ Jellicoe, *The Grand Fleet*, 405.

CONCLUSION

As the British Navy steamed home on June 1, 1916, a number of important questions arose. Why did the Royal Navy lose so many battle cruisers, while in turn failing to destroy the supposedly weaker High Seas Fleet? The British commanders of the battle, Admirals Sir John Jellicoe, Sir David Beatty, and the Admiralty each wrote their own individual accounts of what occurred in the North Sea on May 31, 1916.

Beatty is one of the few individuals associated with the battle of Jutland who actually gained stature after the battle. Jellicoe was sent to London and then soon after retired from active duty by order of His Majesty's government, but Beatty was subsequently given command of the Grand Fleet and then promoted to First Sea Lord. He never published an autobiography, but his official correspondence and private letters were compiled by the Navy Records Society and published in two volumes. Beatty's accounts of the battle are subject to controversy, as they became the British government's official version of events while he was First Sea Lord.

Jellicoe, as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet during the battle, was not immediately hounded out of Navy

life following the battle. In late 1916, he was promoted to First Sea Lord of the Royal Navy, but in 1917 while the British were sustaining terrible losses on the Continent, he was dismissed from active duty as proof the government would not accept failures. Jellicoe's account of the battle of Jutland was published in 1919 and was regarded by some as a true account of what actually happened prior to and during the battle. Others viewed Jellicoe's book as a way to avoid personal blame for the heavy losses the Royal Navy sustained on May 31, 1916.

The Admiralty following the war was beset with problems as it set to explain to the general public how the smaller German Navy humiliated their vaunted Navy. In 1920, the Admiralty had its first official account published, *Battle of Jutland Official Despatches*. This publication was a collection of notes, ship logs, official correspondence, and appendices. However, the *Official Despatches* were not the last account of the battle published by the Admiralty. In 1924, it released *Narrative of the Battle of Jutland*. The Admiralty's *Narrative* has been subject to an enormous amount of controversy. Jellicoe and others argued that it was designed to protect Beatty and his fellow officers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet while highlighting the problems Jellicoe's Grand Fleet

encountered. At its publication, the British government proclaimed its *Narrative* as the final testament to the Royal Navy's involvement against the High Seas Fleet.

When one analyzes the aforementioned works and men, a number of discrepancies appear. These discrepancies are still debated today, and a number of them are still unanswered. Did the Admiralty, Beatty, or Jellicoe document the correct times in their respective logs? Inconclusive evidence supports none of them, however further research into the personal papers of the officers serving with Jellicoe and Beatty could potentially dispel some of the unanswered questions.

Other questions still remain unanswered to this day. For example, were Beatty or his supporters actively involved in the publication of the *Narrative*? Why did Jellicoe believe he needed such detailed Battle Orders? These unanswered questions can leave future historians opportunities to delve deeper into the subject and keep the battle of Jutland circulating as a popular topic for historians and military specialists.

APPENDIX A

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's Grand Fleet
Scapa Flow, Scotland

Battle Fleet
Admiral Sir J.R. Jellicoe, Commander in Chief
Iron Duke

4th Battle Squadron
Vice Admiral Sir D. Sturdee, Commander of Squadron
Benbow

4th Division (Vice Admiral Sir D. Sturdee)
Benbow (Capt. W. Parker)
Bellerophon (Capt. E. Bruen)
Temeraire (Capt. E. Underhill)
Vanguard (Capt. J. Dick)

3rd Division (Rear Admiral A.L. Duff)
Superb (Capt. E. Hyde-Parker)
Royal Oak (Capt. C. Maclachlan)
Canada (Capt. W. Nicholson)

1st Battle Squadron
Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Second in Command, Grand
Fleet, *Marlborough*

6th Division (Vice Admiral Sir Cecil Burney)
Marlborough (Capt. G. Ross)
Revenge (Capt. E. Kiddle)
Hercules (Capt. L. Clinton-Baker)
Agincourt (Capt. H. Doughty)

5th Division (Rear Admiral E. Gaunt)
Colossus (Capt. A Pound)
Collingwood (Capt. J. Ley)
Neptune (Capt. V. Bernard)
St. Vincent (Capt. W. Fisher)

2nd Battle Squadron
Vice Admiral Sir T.H.M. Jerram, Commander of Squadron
King George V

1st Division (Vice Admiral Sir T.H.M. Jerram)

King George V (Capt. F. Field)

Ajax (Capt. G. Baird)

Centurion (Capt. M Culme-Seymour)

Erin (Capt. The Hon. V. Stanley)

2nd Division (Rear Admiral A.C. Leveson)

Orion (Capt. O. Backhouse)

Monarch (Capt. G. Borrett)

Conqueror (Capt. H. Tothill)

Thunderer (Capt. J. Fergusson)

3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron (Rear Admiral The Hon. H.L.A.

Hood, Commander of Squadron, *Invincible*

Indomitable (Capt. F. Kennedy)

Inflexible (Capt. E. Heaton-Ellis)

APPENDIX B

Admiral Earl David Beatty's Battle Cruiser Fleet
Edinburgh, Scotland

Battle Cruiser Fleet
Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander in Chief
Lion

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron
Rear Admiral O. de B. Brock, Squadron Commander
Burham (Captain W. Cowan)
Queen Mary (Captain C. Prowse)
Tiger (Captain H. Pelly)

2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron
Rear Admiral W.C. Pakenham, Squadron Commander
New Zealand (Captain J. Green)
Indefatigable (Captain C. Sowerby)

5th Battle Squadron
Rear Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, Commander of Squadron
Barham (Captain A. Craig)
Warspite (Captain E. Phillpotts)
Valiant (Captain M. Woollcombe)
Malaya (Captain A. Boyle)

1st Light Cruiser Squadron
Commodore E. Alexander-Sinclair, Commander of Squadron
Galatea
Inconstrant (Captain B. Thesiger)
Phaeton (Captain J. Cameron)
Cordelia (Captain T. Beamish)

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron
Commodore W. Goodenough, Commander of Squadron
Southampton
Nottingham (Captain C. Miller)
Birmingham (Captain A. Duff)
Dublin (Captain A. Scott)

3rd Light Cruiser Squadron
Rear Admiral T. Napier, Commander of Squadron
Falmouth (Captain J. Edwards)
Birkenhead (Captain E. Reeves)
Yarmouth (Captain T. Pratt)
Gloucester (Captain W. Blunt)

Appendix C

Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's Grand Fleet
Scapa Flow, Scotland

Destroyer Flotillas

Admiral Sir J.R. Jellicoe, Commander in Chief
Iron Duke

12th Flotilla

Flotilla Leaders Captain A. Stirling & Commander N. Sullivan
*Obedient, Maenad, Opal, Mary Rose, Marvel, Nessus, Narwhal,
Mindful, Onslaught, Munster, Nonsuch, Noble, Mischief*

11th Flotilla

Flotilla Leader Commander H. Sullivan
*Ossory, Mystic, Moon, Morning Star, Magic, Mounsey,
Mandate, Marne, Minion, Manners, Michael, Mons, Martial,
Milbrook*

4th Flotilla

Flotilla Leaders Captain C. Wintour & Commander W. Allen
*Achates, Porpoise, Spitfire, Unity, Garland, Ambuscade,
Ardent, Fortune, Sparrowhawk, Contest, Shark, Acasta,
Christopher, Owl, Hardy, Midge, Ophelia*

APPENDIX D

Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer's High Seas Fleet

Battle Fleet

Vice Admiral Reinhard Scheer, Chief of the Fleet
Friedrich der Grosse

Squadron III

Rear Admiral Behncke, Chief of Squadron

Division V, Rear Admiral Behncke
König (Captain Bruninghus)
Grosser Kurfürst (Captain E. Goette)
Markgraf (Captain Seiferling)
Kronprinz (Captain C. Feldt)
Kaiser (Captain F. von Kayserling)
Prinz Regent Luitpold (Captain K. Heuser)
Kaiserin (Captain Sievers)

Squadron I

Vice Admiral Ehrhard Schmidt, Chief of Squadron

Division I, Vice Admiral Schmidt
Ostfriesland (Captain von Natzmer)
Thüringen (Captain H. Kusel)
Helgoland (Captain von Kameke)
Oldenburg (Captain Hopfner)

Division II, Rear Admiral Engelhardt

Posen (Captain Lange)
Rheinland (Captain Rohardt)
Nassau (Captain H. Klappenbach)
Westfalen (Captain Redlich)

Squadron II

Rear Admiral Mauve, Chief of Squadron

Division III, Rear Admiral Mauve
Deutschland (Captain Meurer)
Pommern (Captain Bolken)
Schlesien (Captain Behncke)

Division IV, Rear Admiral F. von Dalwigk zu Lichtenfels

Hannover (Captain W. Heine)
Schleswig-Holstein (Captain Barrentrapp)
Hessen (Captain R. Bartels)




FIG. 16. Movements from 8:00 A.M. to midnight, May 30. Positions of submarines are approximate only

Figure 1. Movements of the Grand Fleet and the High Seas Fleet from 0800 to 0000, May 30. Reprinted from Holloway Halstaad Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*. (New York: Arno Press, 1980) 118.




FIG. 17. The High Seas Fleet puts to sea. Midnight to 8:00 A.M., May 31, showing positions of all forces at the latter time.

Figure 2. Reprinted from Holloway H. Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*. (New York: Arno Press, 1980) 128.




Figure 3. Reprinted from Halsead H. Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*. (New York: Arno Press, 1980) 140.




FIG. 25. 3:30-3:48 P.M.

Figure 4. Reprinted from Halstead H. Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*. (New York: Arno Press, 1980) 174.





Figure 5. Reprinted from V.E. Tarrant, *Jutland, The German Perspective: A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May, 1916*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995) 76.



SKETCH VIII. Fire distribution at 4:58 P.M. Not to scale.

Figure 6. Battle Cruiser Fleet Engages Scheer 1658, May 31. Reprinted from Holloway Halstaad Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*. (New York: Arno Press, 1980) 244.




FIG 44. 7:00-7:15 P.M.

Figure 8. Reprinted from Halstead H. Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*. (New York: Arno Press, 1980) 349.




Figure 10. Scheer's Retreat May 31 - June 1, 1916. Reprinted from V.E. Tarrant, *Jutland, The German Perspective: A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May, 1916*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995) 188.




FIG. 18. 11:00 A.M. to noon. JUNE 1.

Figure 12. Night Action of the Grand Fleet and the High Seas Fleet. Reprinted from Hasteed H. Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*. (New York: Arno Press, 1980) 498.





FIG. 18. The fleets approach, 8:00 A.M. to 2:15 P.M., May 31. Position of submarines approximate only.

Figure 13. Reprinted from Halstead H. Frost, *The Battle of Jutland*. (New York: Arno Press, 1980) 505.



Prepared by Air University Graphics.

Figure 14. Reprinted from Bernard D Claxton, *Trafalgar and Jutland: A Study in the Principles of War*. (Montgomery: Air Command and Staff College Maxwell Air Force Base, 1985) 58.




Figure 15. Night Formation on May 31-June 1, 1916.
 Reprinted from V.E. Tarrant, *Jutland, The German
 Perspective: A New View of the Great Battle, 31 May, 1916.*
 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995) 97.

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