

HOLY WAR: MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

GIA= Armed Islamic Group

DFLP= Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Islamic Group or IC= al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya

Hamas= Islamic Resistance Movement

PIJ= The Palestine Islamic Jihad

PLF= Palestine Liberation Front

PFLP= Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

PFLP-GC= Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General
Command

Hizballah= Party of God

Jihad= Holy War

PGM= Precision-Guided Munitions

Allah= God

NIF= National Islamic Front (Sudan)

NDA= National Democratic Alliance (Sudan)

ICAO= International Civil Aviation Organization

UNCLOS= United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea

Interpol= International Police

Navy SEAL / NSWDC / DEVGRU= Naval Special Warfare Development
Group

SAS= British Special Air Services Regiment

CHAPTER I

HOLY WAR: MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM

A bright early November morning in Luxor, Egypt became a terrifying encounter for tourists from all over the world. While gazing at the spectacular ruins left by the pharaohs in the Hathor section of an ancient ruin, the tourists hear gun fire which seems to be moving in all directions. Suddenly, a man screaming, "Allah Akbar" (God is great) comes running by with a sub-machine gun and begins to open fire indiscriminately at the tourists. The only tourists to survive were the ones either hidden so well that they could not be seen or buried deeply under dying bodies giving the illusion that they were also dead. While lying there still under two dead bodies, a tourist can hear the terrorists checking with one another verifying their assignment done. The violence left 58 tourists dead and many wounded (Kelley, 1). Why did this act of violence take place? What did the terrorist groups want to achieve? Who or what did the terrorists want to influence?

Terrorism in the world today is usually motivated by some political end. You could almost say that political terrorism is like theater with a lot more violence. Political terrorism uses violence, death, intimidation, and fear as its main ingredients. The typical way a terrorists exhibits violence is through guerrilla tactics. The actors are the terrorists, governments, and the possible hostages. The audience is made up of the people who are citizens and politicians. However, the politicians and citizens usually play a role later by the inevitable way they react to a terrorist event.

In the Middle East, terrorism is usually focused within two states, Lebanon and Israel. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War in which the Arabs lost territory to the Israelis, terrorism has become common place in the Middle East.

Since Palestinian terrorists in the Middle East have no state of their own and no way of standing on equal ground against legitimate nation-states to achieve their political objectives and goals, they resorted to terrorism.

The object of this research is to describe and explain the phenomenon of terrorism, particularly in its Middle East context. We begin with a definition of terrorism. Next, the different theories of terrorism are introduced to provide a basis for understanding why terrorism occurs. The various types of terrorists, their training, their weapons, and their methods will be discussed. We will consider state terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism and the legal aspects of terrorism. The focus will then move exclusively to the Middle East, counter-terrorism, and efforts by the international community to fight terrorism. Finally, we shall consider whether terrorism in the Middle East can be completely eradicated.

Terrorism is a phenomenon which has political, legal, religious, and military roots. To understand terrorism, one must examine it with regards to past occurrences as well as foreshadowing future acts. Also, the actors involved in terrorism include different categories such as individuals, groups, nations, and nation-states. Terrorism may be defined as “the purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat” (Stohl, 3). However, almost all terrorist acts are political by nature, thus one must see terrorism as a means which may have some political end. Therefore, one may define terrorism as “a synthesis of war and theater, a dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence that which is perpetrated on innocent victims, played before an audience in hoping of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes” (Combs, 8). With regards to Middle Eastern terrorism or “holy terrorism”, some people argue that these types of terrorists do not care if the acts have an effect on any audience. They argue that since “holy terrorism” is done in the name of God, these terrorists are not

trying to coerce any group, individuals, or state, but to destroy or obliterate those who they believe are in conflict with their God and religion. Although, it is true that their ultimate audience is God in which these terrorists believe no mortal man can deny or prevent, terrorism in the Middle East is a means in achieving a particular end as well as influencing other audiences. For example, the terrorist group Hamas is trying to disrupt the Arab-Israeli peace process by inflicting harm upon the Israeli people. Thus, we can identify at least one audience Hamas is trying to affect which also happens to be the players in the Arab-Israeli peace process. In addition, religious terrorists have an audience in which no nation-state in the world can do anything about: God. Religious terrorists believe that they have a holy mission which no man can deny and no man can stop. Terrorism is done with purposeful religious intent.

The ultimate purpose of terrorism is either to maintain a regime or create the conditions for a new regime. However, there are many tactical considerations for which individuals, groups, or states use terror. The first goal of terrorism is to advertise the cause (Stohl, 5). The intention of a terrorist act is not simply to destroy but to be heard. For example, in the Middle East insurgent groups in Israel use terrorism to send a message that “we exist, we must be heard, and you may choose not to listen only at great risk” (Stohl, 5). The tool of violence is used to send a message to a particular audience. The more the message has an effect, the more successful the act of terror.

A second purpose of terrorism is the achievement of specific concessions through coercive bargaining (Stohl, 5). Some consider the use of terror as the “diplomacy of violence” (Stohl, 5). The theory behind this idea is to make the possibility of non capitulation “terrible beyond endurance” (Stohl, 5). Insurgent groups use kidnapping, bomb threats, and other types of violence to get an advantage with regard to different concessions like recognition of their group and cause, release of prisoners, and capitulation of a regime.

A third purpose of terrorism is to enforce obedience. If some citizens of a state, for example, resist the current regime with specific forms of action, that state may employ some form of terrorism to enforce obedience. A case in point is when Josef Stalin employed terror to obliterate any resistance toward the Soviet Government.

A fourth purpose is the provoking of indiscriminate reactions to expose the true nature of the regime or insurgent (Stohl, 6). By provoking overreactions, regimes or insurgents may succeed in depopularizing and demoralizing their opposition.

Recent Statistics on Terrorism Around the World

In 1997, there were approximately 304 international terrorist acts which was a slight increase over 1996 (Patterns, 1997). A total of 221 people died while 693 were wounded because of international terrorism in 1997. Although these numbers decreased from 1996 in which 314 people were killed and 2912 were wounded, the 1997 numbers are still alarmingly high.

In 1997 a high number of terrorist attacks occurred with bombing as the main tactic (Patterns, 1997). The following is a list of some of terrorist attacks which occurred as well as current situations in different states during the year of 1997 in the Middle East:

- Algeria throughout the year experienced random violent and killings by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The GIA would kill innocent citizens at highway checkpoints and in towns throughout Algeria.
- In Egypt, on November 17th, 1997, six terrorist entered a ruin in Luxor and for thirty minutes the members of the al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya gunned down fifty-eight tourists along with three Egyptian police officers and one Egyptian tour guide. Egyptian forces met up with the gunmen and killed all six.
- On September 18th, 1997 in Cairo, Egypt unknown terrorists attacked a

tour bus while parked outside of one of Egypt's museums with grenades. Nine German tourists and the Egyptian bus driver were killed.

- In Israel, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) remained active in Israel in 1997. On March 21st, the Hamas exploded a bomb from a "satchel" at the Apropos Cafe in Tel Aviv, killing three people and injuring 48 (Patterns, 1997). On July 30th, two Hamas terrorists blew themselves up in the middle of Jerusalem's Mahane Yehuda market, killing 16 people and wounding 178. And lastly, on September 4th, three Hamas terrorists blew themselves up in Jerusalem's Ben Yehuda mall, killing five and injuring approximately 181 people (Patterns, 1997).

- Israel and the occupied territories continued to face terrorist attacks by Palestinian groups like Hamas and Hizballah. Palestinians were also subject to a terrorist attack by off-duty Israeli soldiers when they fired into a crowded market wounding seven people (Patterns, 1997).

- In Jordan, on September 22, 1997, a drive-by shooting occurred while two Israeli security guards were working at the embassy. The Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad, Abu Nidal Organization, and the Popular and Democratic Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine maintain a considerable force in Jordan (Patterns, 1997).

- In Lebanon, the political and economic situation became a little more stable in 1997. In addition, Secretary of State Albright lifted the travel ban to Lebanon in 1997 (Patterns, 1997). However, the Lebanese Government still does not control the Bekaa Valley which is under Syrian control and many areas in southern Lebanon which is under the control of Israel which continually fights the Hizballah guerrillas.

Lebanon currently is home to many terrorist groups like Hizballah, Hamas, the ANO, the PIJ, and the PFLP-GC (Patterns, 1997).

- In Saudi Arabia on June of 1996, a bomb exploded in the Khobar

Towers near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (Patterns, 1997). This incident killed 19 U.S. citizens and wounded 500 more (Patterns, 1997). The U.S. tried to prosecute Hani al-Sayegh, a member of the Saudi Arabian Hizballah, who was arrested by Canadian authorities in March of 1997 (Patterns, 1997). Presently, no one has yet been convicted of this terrorist incident (Patterns, 1997).

As one can see terrorist incidents have been common throughout the Middle East.

CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTICS OF A TERRORIST

One might ask, what is a typical terrorist? However, there is no way to generalize since there are different forms of terrorism. It is almost impossible to find that common denominator which can be used to identify a consistent characteristic or trait. According to Edgar O'Ballance there are several essential characteristics of the "successful" terrorist. These characteristics are: dedication, personal bravery, without the human emotion of pity or remorse, fairly high standard of intelligence, fairly high degree of sophistication, and be reasonably well educated and possess a fair share of general knowledge (Combs, 59). O'Ballance states that "all terrorists do not measure up to these high standards, but the leaders, planners, couriers, liaison officers, and activists must" (Combs,59).

One characteristic that stands out with regard to terrorists in the Middle East is dedication. This high form of dedication is usually termed "fanaticism", and since it is done in the name of God or "Allah" it is termed "religious fanaticism". The Islamic Jihad or the "holy war" has shown the world the destructive power of a commitment by the fundamentalist in waging "holy war" based on violent religious principles. Airplanes are sabotaged, temples invaded, and guerrilla warfare waged, all in the name of religion. Islamic militants, assuming they know the will of God, believe that no mortal man can deny the will of "Allah". Fanatical Muslims who are responsible for most of the

Jihad occurrences in the Middle East, wage war against Sunni Muslims, Christians, Jews, and other religious groups. Religious fanaticism and martyrdom go hand in hand. Although not all religious fanatics participate in terrorism, martyrdom is a strong lure for young fanatics who want to help their cause in the name of God. In the name of God or Allah, blood continues to flow today. Most of the action performed by these religious fanatics involve the Palestinians against the Jews and the Zionist Movement.

Training Sites of Terrorists

Before the 1990s, there were a number of countries around the world that offered training facilities for terrorists within the structure of their own military installations. These included: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, The Peoples Republic of China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Cuba. However, the 1990s have shown to be less fruitful as far as support to terrorist organizations goes. Only a few of these states now offer training, arms, and other forms of support. Iran remains a major supporter providing weapons, funds, and training for such organizations such as Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation (Combs, 122). Iraq, defying the United Nations resolutions and the Gulf War, continues to support terrorist groups such as the Palestine Liberation Front and the Arab Liberation Front.

Nations such as North Korea are unable to support terrorists today. Since the Russian's are no longer a hegemonic power, Syria and North Korea can no longer depend on the old Soviet Union for financial support. Syria with the help of other non-secular Arab states still contributes to various organizations around the globe, but not as substantially as it once did with the aid of Soviet subsidies.

Probably the most dramatic event which portrays this diminishing role of

states occurred when the Sudanese Government handed over the terrorist Illyeh Ramirez or a.k.a. "Carlos the Jackal" to French authorities in August, 1994 (Combs, 123).

Although the role of states in terrorism has decreased in the 1990s, prudence demands that victory not yet be claimed. Syria still shelters terrorist organizations which are dedicated to ridding the Jews from the Middle East. Syria now keeps a lower profile since other groups such as Hizballah and Hamas are already doing the job.

Case Study: Iranian School of Terrorism

According to intelligence information, in 1996 Iran had approximately eleven terrorist training camps (Macko, 1). As a matter of fact, intelligence reports that the terrorists who conducted the attacks on U.S. military installations in Saudi Arabia in November of 1995 and June of 1996 were trained at some of these camps (Macko, 1). Today, it is believed that the number of camps in Iran hovers around the twenty mark.

The biggest camp in Iran is believed to be located just east of Tehran. This camp is called the Iman Ali Camp (Macko, 1). Other camps are located Northeast of Tehran, and southwest of Tehran in Hamadan (Macko, 1). All of these camps are designed and built to mirror a small village so as to deter satellite observations (Macko, 1). They have mosques, homes, and shops to make the illusion complete. However, a satellite did in fact detect the camps and the National Security Agency has identified them (Macko,1).

The United States intelligence community believes that the majority of Iran's terrorists use this camp, Imam Ali, to plan terrorist attacks (Macko,1). The Imam Ali is also believed to be the camp responsible for giving the Organization of Islam Revolution and the Hizballah bombing training. Not only do these camps train terrorists to ignite bombs, but also to carry out assassinations and

suicide attacks. It is believed that five-thousand men and women have been trained at these camps, five-hundred of which have been trained to carry out suicide bombings (Macko, 1).

Living up to the label as a state-sponsoring country, the Iranian President Haslimi Rafsanjani was responsible for establishing the camps in 1994 (Macko, 2). In addition, all the terrorist attacks are said to be approved by the Supreme Council of Iran, while all instructions from the camp come from Iran's Revolutionary Guard (Macko, 2). The indoctrination of the fundamental Iranian goals, agenda, and beliefs seem to include the planning, training, and funding of terrorist missions. The main goal of these terrorists is the annihilation of Israel and the United States.

Methods and Tactics of Terrorists

Although terrorists go to training camps to gather arms, intelligence information, and funding, they also undergo a tough program of activities to obtain a variety of skills. Understanding what is taught at these training camps will give us an idea of the types of tactics terrorists embrace.

Fifty percent of all terrorist tactics involve bombs (Combs, 124). Terrorists are first taught how to make two different kinds of bombs: explosive and incendiary. Explosive bombs are generally of either fragmentation or blast type. The most common type of fragmentation bomb is a pipe bomb usually made with explosive gunpowder (Combs, 124). Commercial or military dynamite are also used with a blasting cap for detonation to create a blast type effect.

Incendiary bombs are simply fire bombs and can be quickly and easily constructed. Terrorists are taught how to make a fire bomb which sometimes only consists of a glass bottle filled with a flammable liquid and a fused attached. However, incendiary bombs can be very sophisticated such as those

which use time-delay fuses and barometric fuses. A bomb can even be made with fertilizer. For example, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 was made with a mixture of fertilizer and fuel oil. This was indeed a blast-type explosive bomb, simple but destructive. History proves that terrorists have relied on the use of bombs to achieve their objectives. In 1993 alone bombings accounted for 32.3% of all terrorist tactics (Combs, 231).

The following cases illustrate the extensive use of bombs by terrorists within this decade:

- In March of 1991, State Minister for Defense, Wijeratne was killed in a car bombing in Colombo, Sri Lanka along with 50 other victims. LTTE is responsible.
- In June, 1991, the Morazanist Patriotic Front launched an RPG-7 rocket at the U.N. Observer Group headquarters in Tegucigalpa, Honduras.
- In February, 1993, explosion of a massive bomb in a van parked in an underground garage below the World Trade Center. The explosion killed six and wounded over 1,000. Islamic extremists convicted.
- In June, 1993, a bomb exploded underneath an overpass as a tour bus was traveling to the Giza pyramids. The explosion killed two Egyptians and injured six British tourists, as well as nine Egyptians and Syrians.
- In October, 1994, the SL exploded a large bomb under a minibus in the parking lot near the departure terminal at Lima's international airport. The driver of a hotel shuttle bus was killed and about 20 others were injured.

- In January, 1996, suicide bombers continued to cause civilian deaths in Jerusalem and the West Bank. Hamas extremists took responsibility, claiming the bombings were efforts to stop the peace process.

(All case examples are reported in Cindy Combs, *Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century*, 137)

Aerial and ship hijacking are methods of terrorism used to obtain and maximize the attention of the whole world. With the hijacking of an airplane, media all over the world will help to give these terrorists a means of delivering their message to anybody anywhere. Although the passengers of hijacked aircraft and ships do suffer emotional stress, the loss of lives over the years has been very low. In 1985, Shiite gunmen hijacked TWA Flight 847 in Athens, Greece. The hijackers killed one U.S Navy diver and dispersed the remaining hostage throughout Beirut, Lebanon (Combs, 140). The terrorists separated the hostages and held them in many different locations in Beirut to create confusion against potential retaliation.

Hostage-taking and kidnapping is a tactic which also allows terrorists to maximize publicity. In this situation, the terrorists can control the length of the event and the media coverage which helps to deliver their message to an audience which is essential in hostage-taking or kidnapping. For example, in October 1986, Edward Austin Tracy, an American living in west Beirut was kidnapped by a group calling themselves the Revolutionary Justice Organization (Combs, 138). In October of 1993, terrorists kidnapped three individuals of various nationalities (Combs, 138). Two days later the three individuals kidnapped were found dead with their throats cut (Combs, 138). The Armed Islamic Group claimed responsibility for this attack.

Assassinations and ambush techniques are another tactic taught to terrorists while at camp. Terrorists are trained to evade personal security

systems in order to kill at close range. In addition, terrorists are taught how to use silencers, disguise, and escape to help them get closer to the designated target. The old ways of a gunman in a crowd technique is no longer favored by today's terrorist. However they are now utilizing the flamboyant "in your face" execution style of assassinations. For example, west Beirut 1996, Malcom Kerr, President of the American University of Beirut, was shot and killed as he stepped off the elevator to his office. The Islamic Jihad was responsible (Combs,138). Also, In 1995 Yitzak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, was assassinated by a Jewish student in Israel. The Jewish student claimed that the Prime Minister had given away too much of Israel in the peace process with the PLO. This assassination by the Jewish student is different than an insane fanatic since the Jewish student acted based on political beliefs.

Today, terrorists are mirroring the same tactics as the counterintelligence services of different countries. Disguise techniques, clandestine travel, recruitment and communications are today key tactics of terrorists all over the world. Contrary to what many think, an Arab terrorist does not commonly wear a burnous and wear a robe. Communication today is a vital tool. Terrorists groups can deliver their message over the internet and can communicate via electronic mail.

Recruitment is an important factor for terrorists in the Middle East. Young Muslims who have seen their future as being limited are promised a guaranteed trip to heaven. These young martyrs are promised rivers of sweet honey and holy wine, 72 virgin brides and free passes to paradise for 70 of their friends and relatives (Bartholet, 1). The latest bombing which occurred in Jerusalem's crowded fruit and vegetable market occurred in August, 1997 (Cooperin, 1). This suicide attack was believed to be done by young Palestinian recruits belonging to Hamas.

Intelligence gathering is another learned skill taught to most of the higher

ranking terrorists. This skill allows a person to infiltrate specific target areas, gather data, and then return that information to headquarters. Terrorists are usually taught specific codes which allows the individual to code specific data which can latter be translated into comprehensible information. Thus, this allows the individual a way out if caught with coded information.

Not only are terrorists learning intelligence tactics, they are also learning the art of counterintelligence. Terrorists are learning how to disseminate misinformation created to confuse their enemies. This information usually includes data on how to protect the organization from infiltration by police, military, and governmental intelligence operatives (Combs, 126). Not all terrorists are trained in intelligence and counter-intelligence but the capability of most terrorist organizations to have at least a few recruits skilled in these types of techniques are becoming necessary for survival.

Weapons and Armament

The weaponry terrorists rely on can vary from a pistol with a silencer to a Soviet made RPG-7 (Combs, 127). Automatic weapons seem to be the weapon of choice. Regular training on machine guns and pistol handling is ongoing. The majority of the automatic weaponry comes from Russia as well as several other countries like Poland and the Czech Republic (Combs, 127). The automatic weapon is an antipersonnel weapon used to assault people, airplanes, and automobiles. There are two basic types of automatic weapons, the assault rifle and the submachine gun. The Soviet made AK-47 is one of the most accessible weapons which makes it a popular assault rifle among the terrorist groups.

With the advent of new technology, terrorists have been trained to use precision-guided munitions(PGMs). A PGM is a device which can launch

missiles whose trajectories can be corrected in flight (Combs, 130). These types of weapons are designed to take down tanks and aircraft. In 1973, a Palestinian group had planned to use a PGM to shoot down an El Al aircraft near Rome, Italy but this plan failed (Combs, 130).

One of terrorists' greatest ally and forceful weapon is the free press. Terrorists want free publicity that a group normally could not afford. Any publicity forwarded by the press alerts the world community a problem exists and cannot be ignored. Terrorists want favorable understanding of their cause and to elicit sympathy of their suffering from the world. The press also acts as a communication link to organizations around the world who may be able to provide further funding and new recruits for terrorists organizations.

As we discussed before, terrorists need an audience to listen and react to their message. Today, terrorist have learned that television news organizations can be forced into becoming the link between the terrorist and an audience and potentially a terrorist's greatest weapon. According to Brian Jenkins, a Rand Corporation terrorism expert, "terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening, not a lot of people dead. I see terrorism as violence for effect. Terrorists choreograph dramatic incidents to achieve maximum publicity, and in that sense, terrorism is theater" (Combs, 143). Terrorists benefit from what is called the "amplification effect". This effect happens when the activities by the terrorists are broadcast through the media to a much larger audience than would be available on the spot where the action occurs (Combs, 143). For example, when a group of Palestinians, thought to be Hamas, carried their warfare into the urban centers of Europe and the Middle East, their actions and their causes became casual conversation for TV audiences around the world (Combs, 143). This has raised questions about the media's role in today's terrorism. Terrorists consider the press one of their greatest weapons.

USA TODAY foreign correspondent Jack Kelley was allowed to interview

members of Al Gama'a Al Islamiya, an extremist group in Egypt who have claimed responsibility for the attack on tourists in Luxor, Egypt. The radical group allowed Mr. Kelley to interview members in order to find out the who, what, and whys relating to the Luxor incident.

According to Mahmoud Antar, a member of the group's military wing, Gama'a accused Egypt of failing to negotiate a peace settlement and imprisoning some of their members by conviction in a military court. Antar states, "we are ready to carry out more military operations. These operations will be firm. They will be decisive. They will send a message. The blood of the tourists is on Mubarak's hand, not on the Gama'a" (Kelley, 1). The Gama'a also claim that their crusade to end the reign of the Egyptian secular government was inspired by Rahman. Ahmad Salima, another member of Gama'a, continues the conversation by stating, "America sends ships to punish Saddam Hussein for breaking U.N. resolutions but closes its eyes when Israel breaks U.N. resolutions by building on Palestinian land. Is that fair? Is that right? This is why we hate America. This is why Mubarak's regime that loves America must fall"(Kelley, 1).

And finally, an angry man approaches Mr. Kelley yelling, "you will never find these things (drugs and crime) where true Islam exists. Islam is the only answer, not Christianity, not Judaism, not Buddha. Without it, America is going to hell" (USA TODAY, Kelley). In short, these people look determined to achieve their goal at any cost, including their own lives.

As mentioned, religious terrorists groups do have an audience to entertain. In the case of Gama'a, the first audience is Allah (God). They believe it is God's will that justifies the actions they do in his name. Also, the Gama'a would like to deter any foreign visitors in coming to Egypt especially U.S. or Jewish citizens. The audience in this case would be the non-Islamic world with the messenger being the free press. In addition, the secular government in

Egypt led by Mubarak was a key target audience which imposed the sentencing on their members who are now imprisoned. They profess that their members were unjustly convicted in a military court when in fact they should have been tried in a civil court (Kelley, 1). In addition, by hurting Egypt's main source of revenue, tourism, the terrorists have undermined the Egyptian Government. Lack of revenue coming in may effect the social economic stability of Egypt and its people. Thus, Mubarak may have an uphill climb with satisfying the people of Egypt in the coming years.

CHAPTER III

STATE TERRORISM AND STATE SPONSORED TERRORISM

There are two major forms of state terrorism, state terrorism and state sponsored terrorism. Throughout history we have observed state terrorism in which a country may use terrorism as a vehicle for instilling fear among its countrymen and abroad. State sponsored terrorism is the support in any manner by a state for a terrorist organization. Without information, weapons, training sites, and economic aid terrorist groups cannot effectively fight for their cause. Therefore, most terrorists groups seek state sponsorship. In addition, some states seek terrorism as a means of indirectly fighting a proxy war on many different regions on the globe. For example, as mentioned earlier, Syria provides aide to the terrorist group Hizballah who fight a proxy war for Syria against Israel. Iran funds terrorist organizations in hopes that the Shi'i movement and Islamic ideology will spread through the world.

A definition of terrorism which is applicable to state terrorism can be defined as a "deliberate coercion and violence directed at some victim, with the intention of inducing extreme fear in some victim, with the intention of inducing extreme fear in some target observers who identify with that potential future victims...they are forced to consider altering their behavior in some manner desired by the actor" (Mitchell et. al., 4). For example, actor **A** will strike at victim **B** as a means towards affecting the emotional state of target **C** to a degree that target **C** alters its behavior (Mitchell et. al., 4). In short, state terrorism exist when

the following are present: 1) an actor intends to influence the behavior of a target population, 2) the means of influence involve the act or threat of violence on some victims with whom the target will identify 3) the deliberate effects of such actions are to induce a condition of extreme fear or terror in the target population 4) the actor is the state, its agents, or someone approved by state (Mitchell et al., 14). Thus, states use violence as a means or an instrument designed to have a wider effect on an audience. In addition, fear or the threat of violence alone does not constitute “terror”. Terror presupposes a pattern of violence which recurs enough times to establish a fear or a threat of future violence which ultimately effects an outcome.

Some have argued that some form of violence by states is acceptable to the degree that the violence is relative to the needs of state. In short they argue that state terrorism is a relative “bad” rather an absolute “bad”. This leads us to explore the “proportionality principle”. Understandably, states cannot sit back and allow violent uprisings and opposition to reign within their borders. It is a notion agreed upon throughout the world, in any style of government. As a standard agreed upon within the definition of sovereignty, states are free to use coercive means to maintain internal control (Mitchell et. al., 6). Although, we do have treaties and other forms of international law preventing states from using violence on its people for religious or ethnic reasons, such as the United Nations 1948 Genocide Convention, states still can eliminate political opponents as they see fit. The proportionality principle allows regimes to respond with whatever coercive measures deemed necessary to suppress oppositional violence when these political opponents initiate a drive toward revolution against a state. However, if a state continues to violate human rights and fails to neutralize the threat by its opponents, the state may forfeit its sovereign right to use coercion. Thus, states must take into consideration the internal and international standards which, if violated, may cost the regime its

sovereign control. In the past, we have seen cases where states used terrorism as a means to protect their interest. In Algeria, the French used terrorist tactics to neutralize the Muslim revolutionaries during the late 1950s (Gurr, 4).

Furthermore, to get a complete understanding of the different forms of state terrorism we must make the distinction between “situationally specific state terrorism” and “institutionalized state terrorism”. Situationally specific state terrorism is a means used by the state in response to a open challenge on the current regime but the tactic stops when the threat to the state regime is gone. An example of this form of state terrorism can be illustrated when the U.S. Government had the Federal Bureau of Investigation and local law enforcement actively search out and campaign against the Black Panthers during the late 1960s. Institutionalized state terrorism relies on ongoing terror as a tool of its domestic policy. As a matter of fact, some states form agencies to carry out this tactic which would be categorized as institutionalized state terrorism. An example of this form of state terrorism is evident through the activities of the Soviet KGB (secret service) and the Israeli Massad. On October 26, 1995, the Israeli Massad assassinated Palestinian leader Dr. Fathi Shirqaqi (Burston, 1). Shirqaqi was shot in broad daylight in Malta (Burston, 1). The police in Malta said that this assassination was a professional job. Dr. Shirqaqi just walked out of his hotel when he was approached by two men riding a motorcycle and was shot five times in the head with a gun assembled with a silencer. While Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin claims to know nothing about the killing of Dr. Shirqaqi, when asked if he would express remorse over his government’s policy of state-sponsored assassinations including the murder of Dr. Shirqaqi, the Prime Minister replied, “I won’t be sorry” (Burston,1). In addition, the Israeli newspaper rejoiced over the “long arm” of Israel and praised Israel’s thirst to “smash the Palestinian viper’s head” (Burston,1).

Sometimes the distinction between “situational” and “institutional” state

terrorism is grey. Although the policy of a state may be to use state terrorism to respond to a specific situation, it easily can spiral into a self-perpetuating momentum which could develop into a permanent part of state policy. States that use state terrorism to neutralize revolutionary opponents find this form of counter-measure necessary to conduct increasingly tougher political revolutionaries. Thus, the “situational” becomes “institutionalized” and the people of state become increasingly intolerant of this form of state policy. An example of this very situation is illustrated when the Shah of Iran regime adapted institutional state terrorism which ultimately propelled the end of the Shah’s reign during the 1970s. In addition, “institutionalized” state terrorism as seen during the Ayatollah Khomeini may have had a purposeful indirect affect of instilling fear in its enemies such as the United States and Israel. When protests began against the United States by Iranian students on the streets of Iran in the late 1970s and early 80s, the newly religious based government in Iran was supporting the violent marches in hopes to instill fear in the U.S Government and people .

We know that the necessary condition of state terrorism within its borders is the existence of a group, party, or class who is seen as by the ruling elites as a threat to their continued rule. But what are those challenges that invoke the use of terrorism by a state within its borders? First, the greater the threat by the challengers, the greater the chance the elite regime will respond with violence (Gurr, 31). The threat to a regime is considered great when the challenger’s objective is to dispose of the incumbents or the challengers are of a large number, or if the challengers rely on violent disruptive tactics (Gurr,31). Second, the greater the support for the challengers from the general public, the greater the chance that a regime will respond with terrorism (Gurr, 32). A regime may see the use of terrorism as a cost-effective way of dulling the public support for the challengers. Third, revolutionaries who use terrorists tactics against a

regime will likely be countered with state terrorism. Since most revolutionaries use guerrilla warfare where conventional warfare is usually ineffective, the only logical reaction by a state is also to use a form of guerrilla tactic called terrorism. For example, when Fidel Castro challenged the reigning government of Fulgencia Batista, this regime used terrorism against Castro's urban middle-class supporters and peasants in the military controlled areas because Castro and his supporters would never engage in a direct military conflict (Gurr, 52). Fourth, regimes are less likely to use terrorism against challengers that have a strong influence among the elites while states are more likely to utilize terrorism against marginal groups. Thus, revolutionary groups which have weak political ties can be subjected to terrorism by a state with minimal political cost. Thus, it is illustrated how, why, and when, a state will use terrorism within its borders. But how about terrorist groups who seek support to carry out terrorist acts around the world?

State sponsored terrorism is clearly illustrated by groups like Hizballah who receive financial, military, and material backing from Iran. Thus, state sponsored terrorism can be defined as any support by a state of a terrorist group. States are motivated toward sponsoring terrorist organizations for various reasons. One reason a state may sponsor a terrorist group could be so the state can fight a proxy war through the terrorist group against a common enemy. Another reason a state may provide support for a fanatical group maybe to spread its ideology and political agenda without the threat of recourse and at little or no expense politically.

The Middle East is considered a gold mine of state-sponsored terrorism. Out of the seven states in the Middle East, five states have been labeled by the United States Government as sponsoring terrorism (Phillips, 6). These five states are Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria (Phillips, 6). In addition, twenty-three out of forty-one global major terrorist groups are based in the Middle East

(Phillips, 6). Also, these terrorist groups in the Middle East subscribe to the widest range of ideologies and causes, from Marxism to secular Arab, Armenian, Kurdish, and Palestinian nationalism to radical Islamic fundamentalism (Phillips, 6). Every year the Middle East maintains itself as the greatest exporter of terrorism to the world. Between 1980 and 1989 over 400 terrorist actions from the Middle East have spilled over to other regions (Phillips, 6). In fact, eighty-seven percent of those actions occurred in Western Europe (Phillips, 6).

Before 1970, terrorist organizations were autonomous groups that pursued their own goals and agendas without any state support. However, during the 1970s the Soviet Union and its supporting states around the world expanded their support for terrorist groups. Early on, the Soviet Union used its Middle Eastern client states such as Iraq, Libya, and Syria as intermediaries to mask Soviet support such as arms, logistics, and intelligence for a wide range of terrorists organizations. Arab states which use terrorism as a form of repression against internal opposition sought their own terrorists to work as weapons against Israel, other Middle Eastern states, and Western powers. With many different Palestinian groups searching for financial backing, states such as Syria, Libya, and Iraq court these Palestinian groups or help the Palestinians create a new group to help stake their claim to Arab leadership. These puppet terrorist groups sponsored by Arab states are used as a proxy army who, if caught, would not elicit retaliation against the sponsoring state. There are only a few instances in history that prove otherwise, such as the Lockerbie attack. However, terrorist groups like Hizballah have proven to the international community that sponsoring states like Iran who supply Hizballah with the majority of its resources, go unpunished.

The Iranian case

Iran jumped into the international terrorism scene after its 1979 revolution. Iran began to organize, train, equip, and finance Shiite revolutionary movements such as Hizballah in Lebanon. With Iranian support and supervision, Hizballah began a lethal terrorist campaign in 1983 to drive the western peacekeeping forces out of Lebanon which led to the bombing of the United States Embassy in Beirut in April and the Marine Barracks in October (Phillips, 6).

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, President of Iran, created the so called charitable foundation which supplements terrorists groups like Hizballah. As a matter of fact, one of those “charitable foundations”, the Fifteenth of Khordad Foundation put a two million dollar bounty on the head of a writer named Salman Rushdie who was condemned to death by the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 (Philips, 6).

Without support from Iran and Syria, Hizballah’s battle on Lebanon’s southern border against Israel, could not have been sustained. According to the *Intelligence Newsletter* between three and five shipments of weapons every month for Hizballah are flown into Damascus by Iranian aircraft. These weapons supplied to Hizballah are Sagger missiles, long-range Katyusha rockets, anti-mines, and night-vision sights for rifles (Hizballah, 1997). According to the *Intelligence Newsletter*, the Supreme Iranian Council for National Security granted an increase raising the aid to Hizballah from eight million dollars in 1996 to one-hundred million dollars in 1997 (Hizballah, 1997). Matter of fact, the Hizballah secretary-general took part in many meetings with the Supreme Iranian Council at the beginning of December 1996, following the decision in April to increase aid to the terrorist group Hizballah (Hizballah, 1997). According to Hizballah, the supplies coming from Iran were so frequent that a special runway was created at the Damascus Airport to deal with

increased air-traffic (Hizballah, 1997).

Iran and Hamas

As mentioned before, after the 1979 revolution, Iran restricted its Shiite movement to only Iraq, Lebanon, and the Gulf Emirates (Rekhess, 1). However, the Shiite movement was not effective in the Sunni-dominated areas of the Middle East. Also, in the late seventies the Palestinian Islamic Jihad emerged in the Gaza Strip as a militant Sunni movement focused on Sunni tradition. During the 1980s, Iran paid little attention to the Palestinian movement (Rekhess, 1). After the Iran-Iraq War, Iran opened its Shiite movement to Sunni-populated states like Algeria, Sudan, Egypt, and the Palestinian area (Rekhess, 1). With the Intifada growing in Israel, Iran made extensive efforts to widen its influence to the Palestinian sector by seeking a relationship with Hamas (Rekhess, 1). This marriage of interest between Iran and Hamas was symbiotic. Hamas offered another means to demonstrate Iran's Islamic leadership as well as another direct link to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. Iran offered Hamas the financial and military backing to continue its crusade against Israel.

Indeed, Iran's Shiite Revolution is being well preserved through groups like Hamas and Hizballah who all find a mutual enemy in Israel. As long as financial support and a safe-haven are being offered by Iran to groups like Hamas, the temptation and drive towards a more fundamental ideology embedded in the Shiite revolution will continue and Iran will continue to support a proxy war against pro-western Israel through Hizballah and Hamas.

The Syrian Case

Syria is one of the original states that were placed on the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1979 in Section 6 of the Export Administration Act (Wilcox, 1). Syria was designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor

by meeting all of the U.S. State Department's criteria. These criterias include providing terrorists sanctuary from extradition or prosecution, providing arms, explosives, and other lethal material, giving logistical support to terrorists groups, providing safe housing or a site for a headquarters, training terrorists, and direct or indirect financial backing (Wilcox, 1).

Syria currently provides safe haven and support to a wide variety of terrorist groups. Many of these terrorist organizations maintain a presence in Damascus as well as training facilities throughout Syria. Terrorist groups also take advantage of Syrian controlled areas of Lebanon by installing bases to serve as a forward front against some of these terrorist groups greatest enemy, Israel. In addition, Syria allows certain terrorist groups free passage without any restrictions.

The terrorist group Hamas freely operates a political office in Damascus, where it keeps close contacts with Iranian officials. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad goes as far as taking residence in Syria as a permanent home (Wilcox, 1). Also, the Syrian Government allows the Iranian backed Hizballah to operate at will from locations in Lebanon under Syrian control. In addition, Iran can freely resupply Hizballah through the Damascus Airport.

Although Syria has not been directly involved in a terrorist attack since 1986, Syrian influence over the terrorist groups is strong and powerful. Syria, in the past has used its influence periodically to restrain Hizballah rocket attacks against Israeli targets. In addition, Syria has proved that it can use its influence to deter Palestinian terrorist groups resident in Syria from committing acts of international terrorism in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (Wilcox, 2).

It is true the state can play a devastating role in terrorism. The state given the correct formula and real threat to its control may use a policy internally which condones and operationalizes terrorism. In addition, a state like Iran and Syria may sponsor terrorism abroad to serve as a sort of proxy army used to

voice its political agenda on many different fronts. It is also true that there is a correlation between states who use terrorism in their internal policy and states who sponsor terrorism. As we have observed, Iraq and Sudan are classic examples of states who both use terrorism as a tactic to secure its internal peace and states who sponsor terrorism internationally.

Connection Between Internal and International Terrorism

There seems to be a significant correlation between a state that uses terrorism internally and a state participating in international terrorism. Out of the seven states currently on the U.S. State Department's list of states who sponsor state terrorism, all seven have been guilty of practicing state terrorism within their borders. After Desert Storm in the early 90s, Iraq began to use state terrorism within its border against the Kurdish people in the north. Saddam Hussein ordered the killing of hundreds of Kurds in an effort to try to wipe out any threat to his regime and a race of people in its entirety. On March 16th 1988, Saddam Hussein launched a death campaign against the Kurds, which included a gas attack against a major Kurdish city (Squitieri, 3). Many thousands of people were killed. After Iraq's defeat in the Gulf War, in March, 1991, Kurdish rebels seized several Iraqi towns in the north. Thus, Saddam Hussein sent troops to those northern towns causing more than two million Kurds to flee into Turkey and Iran (Squitieri, 1).

Iraq is also a major sponsor of terrorism internationally. Although the Gulf War took its toll on Iraq's international terrorist capabilities, it continues to provide a safe haven and a training center to Palestinian extremist groups. Some of the terrorist groups who seek support from Iraq are Hizballah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Macko, 1).

Iraq's use of terrorism within its border support and identify with Ted Gurr's theory of the type of regimes who participate in state terrorism. As a

result, many Iraqi citizens were killed for suspected opposition of Hussein's regime.

The Case of Sudan

Sudan is the largest country in Africa housing twenty-seven million people belonging to numerous ethnic and religious groups. According to the Department of State, Sudan is considered a major supporter of international terrorism. The State Department in 1996 stated that Sudan is serving as a "sanctuary and training center for several international terrorist groups" (Macko, 1). Sudan is also known to provide safe-haven for Hamas and Hizballah throughout their ongoing Jihad. In addition, Sudan is sought to house the very terrorists who conjured the June 1995 assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak. However, what is confusing is the fact that Sudan willingly gave up Ilich Ramirez Sanchez to French authorities but will not surrender President Mubarak's attackers to the international community. It is possible that Sudan was seeking some form of political concession from the international community by giving up Sanchez alias "The Jackal". By not surrendering Mubarak's attackers may prove to the Arab world Sudan's faithfulness toward working for an Islamic-Arab community.

Sudan is a country divided between a predominately Arab-Muslim north in Khartoum and a predominately non-Arab/non Muslim south. A desire exists among the predominate southerners for greater autonomy and liberation from the Islamic law. Since Sudan's independence in 1956, Sudan has been in a civil strife which has claimed about one and a half million lives (Moose, 1). In 1989, military officer's aligned themselves with the National Islamic Front (NIF) and overthrew Sudan's last democratically elected government. Since then, this new government initiated many different policies which have alienated its citizens and the international community. On top of the civil war, Sudan is guilty

of gross violations of human rights against its citizens. The current government in Khartoum has one of the worst human rights records in the world. Indeed, slavery has been allowed to continue in certain parts of the country (Moose, 3). In April, 1997 the United States and other states who are part of the UN Human Rights Commission passed a resolution which identified the ongoing abuses by Sudan's Government, including arbitrary arrests without charge, detentions, massive killings, involuntary slavery, systematic torture, denial of freedoms of expression and religion, and disappearances (Moose, 3). In addition, Sudan has prevented the delivery of humanitarian assistance to war-affected civilians.

Since 1995, Sudan has failed to comply with the international community and extradite to Ethiopia three suspects in the assassination attempt against Egyptian President Mubarak. In 1996, the organization of African Unity and the United States sought the adoption of three U.N. Security Council resolutions (Moose, 2). One of these resolutions, Resolution 1044 required Sudan to "extradite to Ethiopia for prosecution the three suspects and that Sudan cease from "activities of assisting, supporting, and facilitating terrorist activities and from giving shelter or sanctuary to terrorist elements" (Moose, 3).

Since Sudan has not complied with Resolution 1044, the U.N. Council adopted Resolution 1054 and 1070 (Moose,3). Resolution 1054 called on all member states of the U.N. to adopt travel restrictions on Sudanese Government officials (Moose, 2). Resolution 1070 banned all flights by Sudanese Government-controlled aircraft (Moose, 2).

Sudan is a classic example of why a regime institutionalizes terrorism. First, the threat to the NIF is real and great. According to Gurr's analysis, "the greater the political threat posed by challengers, the greater the likelihood that a regime will respond with violence" (Gurr, 51). Second, the NIF considered support for the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) and the SPLA very strong. Strong enough to allow the combined forces of the NDA and SPLA to control

some of Sudan's southern towns. Therefore, Sudan's action also parallels Gurr's second assumption that "the greater the latent support for revolutionary challengers in a population, the greater the likelihood that a regime will respond with terrorism (Gurr, 52). And third, political elites who have secured their regime and maintained their positions by violent means are likely to choose violent responses to future challengers (Gurr, 54). In addition, the first generation of leaders who have seized power by violence are likely to repeat its use to maintain power and to illustrate a perception that if potential challenges come forward, they will be met with further violent action by the state. This supports my assumption that there is a correlation between states who use state terrorism as internal policy with states who sponsor terrorism.

CHAPTER IV

LEGAL PERSPECTIVES OF TERRORISM

International and transnational terrorism are nothing more nor less than the wanton and willful taking of human lives, the purposeful commission of bodily harm, and the intentional infliction of severe mental distress by force or threat of force....(Combs, 148).

This definition of terrorism by Dr. Robert Friedlander illustrates the nature of terrorism as a criminal act. However, most experts consider people as a major catalyst in producing a reaction to achieve some political end. For example, former Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead states, "terrorism is a sophisticated form of political violence. It is neither random nor without purpose...it is a strategy and tool of those who reject the norms and values of civilized people everywhere" (Von Glahn, 276). These different definitions highlight the ongoing controversy in the international community. What one person may consider a criminal act, another may consider a political act with purpose. This is one of the major problems of international law with regard to the legal aspects and definitions of what is terrorism. Thus, attempts by the international community and legal scholars to construct treaties and other forms of international law dealing with terrorism have been unsuccessful. However, treaties and conventions which deal with specific aspects of terrorism such as air and sea piracy and the killing of innocent people have had much better success through history because most states can agree on some of these basic

aspects. Most states agree that the killing of a non-combatant as a means to an end or the hijacking of an airplane is wrong. In addition, no state is immune to such acts like air hijacking or terrorist acts against innocent bystanders which means the threat of violence was real for all in the international community. Therefore, an overview of the existing international law dealing with terrorism should be discussed to identify the international community's efforts to combat such acts.

One of the earliest known treaties to combat terrorism is the 1937 League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (Von Glahn, 280). This treaty came about as a result of King Alexander of Yugoslavia's assassination. Some years later, treaties to deal with terrorist's methods or tactics began to bloom. In Tokyo in 1963, the ICAO Convention on Offenses and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft was drafted (ICAO, 1969). This led to the ICAO Convention to Discourage Acts of Violence Against Civil Aviation in 1971 and to the ICAO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft in 1970 which all relate to hijacking. As we know hijacking is a favorite tactic by Middle Eastern terrorists. Following suit were treaties aimed at protecting the innocent and diplomatic agents. In 1971, the OAS (Organization of American States) adopted the Convention to Prevent and Punish the acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance. Later, in 1973 this convention became law by full consensus (Von Glahn, 280). In 1979, two other multilateral conventions were signed to help combat terrorism. The convention signed in October of 1979 was the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Major Conventions, 1). This treaty proclaims and discusses the unlawful taking and use of nuclear material. In December of 1979, the International Convention Against the taking of Hostages was signed to protect innocent civilians from the clutches of terrorists (Major Conventions, 1). Later, in

1988, the IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation was passed further setting the legal standards on maritime law. Some of these tactics and treaties by the international community need further discussion, therefore the bulk of this chapter will be dedicated in analyzing these terrorists acts with regard to international law. In addition, we will discuss more recent attempts by the international community to counter terrorism by analyzing treaties and declarations like the G-7 Declaration on Terrorism and the Ottawa Ministerial Declaration on Countering Terrorism. And last, we will discuss the United States' recent efforts in combating terrorism internally and around the world.

Laws of War

Although the rules of state behavior change during war, this doesn't mean that virtually anything goes. Although, it is quite fair to say that during times of war, more and different types of violence may be employed against a wider range of targets with much less safeguarding for human rights, nonetheless, certain kinds of terrorist actions are prohibited by international law.

We need to understand thoroughly the Laws of War since most terrorists justify their actions as acts of war and consider themselves "freedom fighters". Accepting, for a moment, the terrorist's claim to be freedom fighters towards a revolutionary movement, such groups must still conform to the Geneva Convention and abide by the rules of engagement or the laws of war. Rules of engagement as established with the Geneva Convention regulate the treatment of "innocent people". The term "innocent" as described by the Geneva Convention is "persons taking no active part in the hostilities" (Geneva Convention 1933). A person must only be innocent of participation in the war to be protected by the convention. Just because a person is a member of a nation against which a group is waging war is insufficient reason, according to the

Geneva Convention, to consider a person guilty. The Geneva Convention states that innocent people, “shall in all circumstances be treated humanely” and prohibits acts toward these protected persons from “violence to life and person, in particular murders of all kinds, mutilations, cruel treatment and torture....” (Geneva Convention 1933). In addition, Article 33 of the Geneva Convention states, “no protected person may be punished for an offense he or she had not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited. Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are prohibited” (Geneva Convention 1933). The “protected people” the Geneva Conventions mentions are the people who have the misfortune to be living in a combat zone or occupied territory. The Geneva Convention also states in Article 34 that taking of hostages of any sort is prohibited. In addition, Control Council Law number 10 states that neither side in a war may engage in warfare against the civilian population (Combs, 154).

If a state commits terrorist acts against innocent people, this act is just as illegal as if the act were committed by a nonstate group. The laws of war do not justify the killing of innocent civilians. Even if the state claims to be using terrorism to protect the reigning regime, the violent act is still illegal. Also, terrorists are not justified in committing acts against the laws of war for political reasons. If a terrorist act involves victimizing an innocent third party, in order to achieve a political goal or to induce some form of emotional response in an audience, terrorism is illegal under the laws of war.

Some terrorist groups claim that they are waging a war for political reasons, therefore the loss of civilian life is a casualty of war. Article 46 of Protocol 1 states, “acts or threats of violence which have the primary object of spreading terror among the civilian population are prohibited” (Geneva Convention 1933). However, terrorists sometimes refer to the “rule of

proportionality” in the Geneva Convention which states that those who decide to attack must....refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life...which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” (Geneva Convention 1933). It is true that this provision recognizes that innocent people may be indirectly affected which is a basic fact of life during war. However, there are two points made which are presupposed. The first point which the Geneva Convention assumes is that the primary target is a military not a civilian target. And second, civilians within the target are to be protected against the effects of that attack as far as it is militarily possible. Also, a military target cannot be considered a military target if the target included civilians. The terrorists miss the point completely which is that the laws of war protect civilians regardless of the cause or end. Terrorists furthermore utilize civilians as a means to an end which clearly proves that they are targeting the protected under the laws of war.

The Geneva Convention normally prohibit strikes against civilian settlements, even if there are terrorists taking refuge or making their headquarters within the settlement. A strike must be a military target with safeguards taken to protect the surrounding civilians. For example, Israel cannot justify its bombings in retaliation against Hizballah guerrillas who are hiding and seeking refuge in southern Lebanese villages. Many more civilians were killed than “suspected” Hizballah agent. Therefore, according to the Geneva Convention, this retaliation against the Hizballah was illegal. Of course, Israel does argue that guerrilla fighters or terrorists do not wear uniforms or have an established military base, therefore it is almost impossible to retaliate against terrorists since most find refuge within the civilian population. Although Israel’s claims or assumptions are accurate about terrorists, utilizing illegal means to retaliate or seek retribution does not make the Jewish state’s acts any different from the terrorists acts. A lack of solutions does not mean you resort to

illegal means, you create new solutions.

Laws of the Sea and Air

Terrorists often use the tactics of air and sea piracy as a means of accomplishing their goals. Piracy is considered a “crime against humanity”. Sir Edward Coke, a jurist during King James First’s reign, described pirates as the “common enemies of mankind” or “hostis humanis generis” (Combs, 157). In 1820, Justice Joseph Story declared piracy “an offense against the law of nations” in the case of *United States v. Smith* (Combs, 157). Later in 1856, the Paris Declaration was a starting point of the codification of international law with regard to piracy.

Piracy maybe defined as, “any armed violence at sea which is not a lawful act of war” (Von Glahn, 259). The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and later the 1982 United Nations Convention on the law of the sea specify exactly what piracy consists of including aircraft which broadens the definition. According to Article 101 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea:

piracy consists of any of the following acts: a) any illegal act of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state; b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph A or subparagraph B of this article (UNCLOS III).

Within this definition it is clear that terrorism includes any and all acts of piracy. The Achille Lauro incident truly captures this concept that hijacking a ship of the high seas is considered an act of terrorism while also being defined as illegal and an act of piracy. The Achille Lauro was an Italian cruise ship which on October 7, 1985 was hijacked by five Palestinian terrorists (Von

Glahn, 277). The Palestinian terrorists demanded the release of fifty Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and if attacked, the Achille Lauro would be destroyed. During to hijacking, one of the ship's passengers, a handicapped American, was shot. Later, on October 9th, the Achille Lauro, its crew, and passengers were released to a Palestinian Liberation Organization representative at Cairo, Egypt (Von Glahn, 278). Soon the situation got a little sticky. The prisoners were placed aboard an Egyptian Airliner but were diverted to land at a NATO airbase in Sicily by U.S. Navy planes who met the Egyptian airliner over international waters. This situation turned into a dispute between U.S. and Italy. Both countries wanted to hold the hijackers in their own court. However, after a few months of legal debate, the Palestinian hijackers were to stay in Italy (Von Glahn, 278). After a judge issued an arrest warrant for Muhammed Abbas for hostage taking, conspiracy, and piracy on October 11, 1985, the Italian officials believed the U.S. Court lacked evidence to arrest Abbas (Von Glahn, 278). Therefore, on July 11th 1986 the Italian Courts convicted Abbas and of the hijackers for killing the handicapped American while the rest were given prison sentences (Von Glahn, 278). International law was on Italy's side. The 1963 U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty first dictated that convicted offenders could not be tried again in the U.S. (Von Glahn, 278). In addition, Article 7 states that the extradition could be refused if the authorities of the state who were holding the accused for the same offense for which extradition was requested by the other state (Von Glahn, 278). And last, since the act was considered piracy, and is a crime against all states, any country could militarily force the accused Palestinian terrorist to any country.

Terrorists who incorporate piracy/hijacking as a tactic are greatly despised. Terrorists are considered criminal outlaws by law-making states. In addition, the decisions and results of the legal tug-of-war will and can set precedence for future cases or situations that arise.

Skyjacking is a fairly new form of terrorism but has seemed to be a favorite tactic of Middle Eastern terrorists. Skyjacking or “air piracy” is seen by most legal scholars as legally no different than piracy of the sea. This interpretation by legal scholars would provide a feasible connection to the legal restrictions and penalties imposed on crimes committed on the high seas with that of crimes committed in the air. Therefore, aerial hijackers would assume the legal obligations of sea pirates under international law. This is usually referred to as “novation” in the legal community. Although “novation” allows for one form of criminal activity to be included and covered under treaties and laws designed to cover another form of criminal activity, the international community still needed a more adequate and exact set of rules against air piracy. Thus, four major forms of law have been created to shed some light on the state of international law with regard to this form of piracy.

Although one of the most successful treaties signed was one which dealt with two states, the United States and Cuba called the Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and other Offenses signed on February 15, 1973, the three treaties signed in Tokyo, the Hague, and Montreal are major multilateral treaties which set the boundaries within which the world operates.

It all began when on November 1, 1944, fifty-two nations met in Chicago to develop a framework for world civil aviation (ICAO 1982). Although this assembly later called the Chicago Convention did not result in a generally accepted agreement multilaterally, it did ignite a forum in which states could build upon which lead to the Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions.

In Tokyo on September 14, 1963, The Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft was signed which provided general ground work for the establishment of jurisdiction or legal authority to exercise control. When a terrorist hijacks an aircraft, it usually takes place when

the plane is in flight between countries carrying citizens of many countries. In addition, the airplane may be registered in a third country which compounds the difficulty of deciding legally who has the right to bring a hijacker to justice. In the Tokyo Convention, Article 3 states that the country of registration is the one which has the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over any encounter (Tokyo Convention 1963). At the same time, this treaty does not place on any signatory nation the responsibility to make sure all alleged offenders will be prosecuted. Therefore, a nation may accept jurisdiction and then refuse to bring the terrorist to justice.

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft was signed at The Hague on December 16, 1970 which dealt with the extradition and prosecution of offenders. The Hague Convention makes hijacking aircraft punishable by severe penalties (The Hague 1970). In addition Article 1 defines actions which may constitute the offense of skyjacking by stating that “any person commits an offense who, on board an aircraft in flight: 1) Unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other means of intimidation, seizes, or exercise control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act: or, 2) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such” (The Hague 1970). This convention provides a legal basis for prosecution of an offense in legal terms which are directly applicable in the legal systems of many states. Also, provisions for jurisdiction were extensively covered. Three states were given the responsibility for jurisdiction, in the following order of precedence, “ 1) the state of registration, 2) the state of first landing and, 3) the state in which the lessee has principal place of business or permanent residence” (The Hague 1970). In addition, the Hague Convention requires each state to take measures to create jurisdiction, if the hijacker is within its territory and is not to be extradited. If the offender is to be extradited then the convention obliges each contracting state to either extradite or to submit the case “without

exception whatsoever to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution" (The Hague 1970).

One thing missing, however, was more detail to the description of the offense committed on aircraft and affecting air navigation. Thus, another treaty was introduced in Montreal, Canada in September of 1971 called The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. This convention specifically outlines the offenses that are prohibited which includes:

- 1) Acts of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if the act is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or
- 2) Destruction of an aircraft in service or damage to such an aircraft which renders it incapable of flight, or which is likely to endanger its safety of flight; or
- 3) Placing or causing to be placed on an aircraft in service by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft or to cause damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in flight; or
- 4) Destruction or damage of navigation facilities or interference with their operation, if any such act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft in flight; or
- 5) Communication of information which is known to be false, thereby endangering the safety of the aircraft in flight (Montreal Convention 1984).

In 1970, an assembly met to discuss annexes to the Chicago Convention which as earlier mentioned did not result in a generally accepted multilateral agreement. The assembly focused on unlawful seizure of aircraft which led to the publication of Annex 17 in 1974. Annex 17 is concerned with the technical aspects regarding the protection of the security of international air transport, requiring each signatory state to establish its own civil aviation security program (ICAO 1969). One of the most important mandates Annex 17 had to offer was the security procedure with regards to inspection/screening of people and baggage at international airports (ICAO 1969). This is very important with regard to the terrorists' ability to board an airplane with weapons enabling them to perpetrate a hijacking. If the states can effectively inspect/screen passengers before boarding aircraft, then this lessens the chance of a terrorist incident. In addition, the increased security gives the public a feeling of safety, thus

increasing travel via airplane. However, unique scenarios seem to keep presenting itself posing new problems in international law.

On June 28th 1976, an Air France aircraft while in flight from Israel to France was hijacked by a group of PLO terrorists after the plane left Greece (Von Glahn, 268). This incident was referred to as the Entebbe Raid. The airplane was diverted to the Entebbe Airport in Uganda by the PLO terrorists. These terrorists demanded the release of over 150 of their fellow terrorists imprisoned in Europe, Israel, and Kenya (Von Glahn, 268). Although the PLO terrorists released 164 passengers, many passengers were still being held hostage. However, on July 3rd, a group of Israeli commandos freed the hostages (Von Glahn, 268). The rescue operation mounted by the Israeli commandos resulted in one Israeli soldier, seven terrorists, and some Ugandan military lives as well as destroying most of the Entebbe Airport (Von Glahn, 268). Although the Uganda Government drafted and unsuccessfully passed a resolution against the actions taken by Israel with regard to lack of respect for Uganda's sovereignty, the legal scholars have indeed justified a state to intervene and use force when the host state is unable and/ or unwilling to protect the lives and property of the citizens of the host state. In addition, through the observance of precedence set many times by the U.S., the act by Israel is seen as justified to many in the international community. For example, on May 14, 1975 the U.S. sent a rescue party to Tang Island off of Cambodia made up of two-hundred marines to rescue the crew of the American ship Mayaguez which was seized by the infamous Khmer Rouge while in Cambodian waters (Von Glahn, 269). The U.S.'s response was considered legitimate since Cambodia's act was considered one of piracy.

Diplomatic Personnel and Heads of State

One of the biggest problems in international law is how to prosecute individuals or groups and how to enforce the laws to protect diplomatic personnel and heads of state. Today laws do exist that protect diplomats and heads of states. However, the biggest problem with these laws is the unwillingness of some states to punish those guilty of attacks on these so called “protected people”. Belgium, in 1833, passed a law allowing for non extradition of political offenders which was also included into the Franco-Belgium Treaty of 1834 (Combs, 160). Later however, treaties signed by these states started to include an “atentat clause” which observed the murder or attempted murder of any head of state or his/her immediate family as a crime not protected as a political crime. In 1957 European states met to construct the European Convention on Extradition which affirmed the “atentat clause” by making assaults on heads of state and their immediate families nonpolitical offenses (Combs, 160). In fact the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations made it the responsibility of the states to prevent attacks on diplomatic agent’s freedom, or dignity (Vienna Convention 1961). In 1980, the seven summit countries met in Venice to construct The Venice Statement on Taking of Diplomatic Hostages (Combs, 161). This document called on states to ratify the earlier convention titled Convention Against the Taking of Hostages adopted by the United Nations Assembly on December 17th, 1979 (Combs, 161). This convention takes hostage taking a step further by making it a crime to take anybody as a hostage. Now, regardless of his/her position, international law protects every individual with the exception of military personnel in combat.

Case Study: The Iran Hostage Crisis

The Iran hostage situation was probably the most exploited and publicized hostage event in history. As mentioned, according to international

law, taking hostages, regardless of who they are excluding military soldiers in combat, is illegal and thus considered a crime. In addition, not only were hostages taken but a sovereign government office of the U.S. was seized. In effect, one could say the sovereign soil of the U.S. was compromised. This crisis in Iran and the court proceedings following illustrates how effective or ineffective international law has been in the past to deter and enforce these types of terrorist acts.

On November 4, 1979 the United States Embassy in Tehran, Iran was seized by Iranian students who were opposed to U.S. policy and western ideas. About fifty American Embassy employees were kept as hostages while other non-Americans were released. These students, who can now be considered terrorists in every sense of the term, wanted to use the hostages as leverage on getting the Shah to stand trial in Iran. In addition, the government in control at the time did nothing to help the hostages and even went as far as to approve the actions by the radical students.

On November 29, 1979, the United States filed with the International Court of Justice in the United States v. Iran (Von Glahn, 272). The United States wanted an Order of Interim Measures for the students seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran and the hostage situation. In short, the United States charged Iran with breaking Articles 22 and 29 of the 1961 Vienna Convention which dealt with immunity of diplomatic soil and the protection of diplomatic personnel and Articles 2,4, and 7 of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (Von Glahn, 272). Since Iran and the U.S. were signatories to these treaties, the court saw fit to issue this Order for Interim Measures in December, 1979 (Von Glahn, 272). This order by the courts paralleled the treaties by ordering Iran to give all U.S. Government personnel full protection, immunities, and privileges by releasing the hostages and not allowing these

hostages to go to trial (Von Glahn, 272). With Iran refusing to abide by international law and ignoring the court order, the United States in March of 1980 presented its case to the court. On May 24th, 1980 the court revealed its judgment reiterating that Iranian governmental responsibility was created when the Iranian Government approved of the hostage taking and seizure of the embassy. In addition, the court stated, "the militants, authors of the invasion and jailers of the hostages, had now become agents of the Iranian state for whose acts the state was internationally responsible" (Von Glahn, 273). In addition, the court stated, "the facts of the present case, viewed in light of the applicable rules of law, thus speak loudly and clearly of successive and still continuing breaches by Iran of its obligations to the United States under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 as well as under the U.S.-Iran Treaty of 1955" (Von Glahn, 2). In addition, the court stated that the U.S. Embassy must be returned to the U.S. Government and the hostages to be released without standing trial (Von Glahn, 273).

The court believed that Iran failed to uphold the international agreements it was a signatory to including the treaty Iran signed with the United States. Algeria stepped in and acted as an intermediary to help resolve the crisis. With Algeria's influence, the United States released the frozen assets of Iran less one billion dollars to satisfy awards against Iran by special arbitration tribunal (Von Glahn, 273). Shortly after, on January 20, 1981 the Iranian Government allowed the hostages to return home.

In short, Iran violated signed treaties as well as customary international law which forbids encroachment illegally onto the sovereign soil of another state. Both crimes committed, the hostage taking and the seizure of the U.S. Embassy, are indeed acts of terrorism. First, the intent of the students were to use the hostages and the embassy as a pawn for a political end. Second, the hostages were innocent government employees who were protected by

international law. And third, the students used the seizure and hostage taking to influence an audience, the U.S. Government.

The 1990s and Terrorism Law

The 1990s has so far been a decade of continuing turmoil with regard to terrorism. The Tokyo subway attacks, the Oklahoma City bombing, the Trade Center bombing, and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin are just some of the terrorism incidents which have negatively affected the world in the most recent years.

What has been done to combat some of the latest incidents around the world? How about the terrorism incidents within the United States? What has the United States done internally to combat terrorism? These questions need to be explored to understand how states today are reacting to terrorism.

On December 12 1995 the G-7 partners and Russia met to discuss cooperative measures to deter, prevent, and investigate terrorist acts. This meeting of the Summit partners was sparked by a recent trend which included an increase in domestic terrorism and hostage taking, indiscriminate violence by religious fundamentalists and radical cult groups which practice terrorism (G-7 Declaration 1996). In addition, terrorist are increasing the use of conventional weapons as well as non-conventional weapons like chemical weapons. Thus, this meeting was to offer a dialogue for states who were wanting to proactively counter terrorism.

The Ottawa Summit called for all states to work in all organizations within the United Nations. This summit also calls for Interpol, a law enforcement agency created to assist the law enforcement community to step forward and assist in combating terrorism. The Summit members went on record as stating, "we will work bilaterally and multilaterally, taking full advantage of such organizations as Interpol, to improve measures against terrorism" (Ottawa

Ministerial, 1995). However, Interpol's constitution "forbids it to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious, or racial character" (Interpol-USNCB). Thus, this aspect of the Ottawa Ministerial Declaration conflicts with the character of Interpol. We will discuss this issue further in a later chapter.

The summit also discusses ways the G-7 members and Russia could work collectively to prevent terrorist acts. In short, in order for international law to work states must cooperate to the highest degree in order for the legal, preventative, and enforcement mechanisms to work. The declaration states:

Increasing the sharing of expertise, information, and intelligence between our countries and among the international community, is essential for countering terrorism. With an aim to preventing terrorist acts we propose to:

- share our technical knowledge, intelligence, forecasts of threats and activities and information on different tactics and methods, means of terrorists through closer bilateral and other forms of co-operation among police and security agencies and other relevant authorities;
- share more widely information, including consular travel advisories, on countries where there is a threat to our citizens abroad;
- share expertise on the protection of public buildings and facilities;
- share information on fanatical and apocalyptic terrorist groups;
- increase counter-terrorism training and assistance;
- improve procedures for the tracing and tracking of suspected terrorists; and
- enhance information sharing on major terrorist incidents in a timely fashion (Ottawa Ministerial 1995).

These are truly necessary aims if these acts are to be enforced.

The Ottawa Convention covers hostage taking by reemploying the idea that states must adhere to the 1979 treaty called the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. States must work together to enforce this treaty collectively to achieve the end result of bringing the terrorist to justice (Ottawa Convention 1995).

The Ottawa Convention also recommends that states must adopt national legislation in line with the Chemical Weapons and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to implement measures to deter and respond to chemical and biological terrorist threats as well as investigate and prevent the production, movement, and possession and use of such substances. The Ottawa

Declaration reiterates a concern for such chemical gas attacks by terrorists like the Tokyo subway incident.

One of the reasons terrorists can move so easily from state to state and board ships and planes is their ability to falsify travel documents. The Ottawa Convention dictates that states must work together to develop travel documents which are much more difficult to falsify as well as increase training to customs and immigration officials to identify fraudulent travel documents (Ottawa Convention 1995). Relating to the movement of terrorists is security of transportation. The Ottawa Convention calls for the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization to create standards for security procedures in the aviation and maritime fields (Ottawa Convention 1995). Thus, the Ottawa Ministerial Declaration on Countering Terrorism reemphasizes the fact that states need to work together on the goals mentioned to have any hope of deterring, prosecuting, and preventing terrorism globally.

G-7 Declaration on Terrorism

On June 27, 1996 at the G-7 Economic Summit in Lyon, France the G-7 released a Declaration on Terrorism. This declaration came after the Dhahran terrorist attack which took many innocent American lives. Therefore, this declaration was to pay tribute to the memory of the victims and to reiterate the G-7's absolute condemnation of terrorism in all forms. The G-7 declared and stated, "we consider the fight against terrorism to be our absolute priority, and reiterate the necessity for all states to adhere to the relevant international conventions. And we are resolved to do more to examine and implement, in cooperation with all states, all measures liable to strengthen the capacity of the international community to defeat terrorism" (G-7 Declaration 1996).

The Oslo Peace Accords

The Oslo Peace Accords called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the creation of self-government by the Palestinian people represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Oslo Accords 1994). The agreement also called for the recognition of both Israel and the PLO to “live in peaceful coexistence, mutual dignity and security, while recognizing their mutual legitimate and political rights...” (Oslo Accords 1993). This peace agreement would lead to the ultimate implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (Oslo Accords 1993). Article II states clearly what is expected of Israel and the PLO as well as capturing the spirit of this agreement . For Example Article II, Section 1 titled, “Scheduled Withdrawal of Israeli Military Forces” states:

1. Israel shall implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and from the Jericho Area to begin immediately with the signing of this Agreement. Israel shall complete such withdrawal within three weeks from this date.
2. Subject to the arrangements included in the Protocol Concerning Withdrawal of Israeli Military Forces and Security Arrangements attached as Annex 1 , the Israeli withdrawal shall include evacuating all military bases and other fixed installations to be handed over to the Palestinian Police, to be established pursuant to Article IX below (hereinafter the Palestinian Police") (Oslo Accords 1993).

This agreement leaves little doubt in anybody’s mind of what is expected on either side. Keep in mind however that what is expected and what is actually implemented are two different things. In short, the Oslo Accords represent the rebirth of a Palestinian state, self-determination of a nation, and hopefully a growing peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Today, Israel is under a new Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, who is himself a conservative and is caught between his party and the United Nations. As a matter of fact, the fundamentalist Islamic terrorist were hoping Netanyahu would come to power. Although these two groups, the conservative Israelis and

the fundamental Islamics are on opposite sides, organizations like Hamas believe they still can agree on one thing. This “one thing” is to not negotiate parts or pieces of an area they believe belongs to themselves only. Israel and the PLO have still not finalized their commitments to the Oslo Accords. However, they hope that pressure from the international community will push Israel back to the negotiating table.

The United States’ Efforts to Counter Terrorism

As one of the G-7 members, the United States has acted, participated, and supported all United Nations efforts in fighting terrorism. In 1986 the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act allowed the United States to have jurisdiction over crime committed by terrorists against U.S. citizens abroad as well as established a counter-terrorism witness protection program to financially reimburse other states for protection for those who testify against terrorists (Von Glahn, 281). This protection incentive offered by the United States also includes the increased protection and security of U.S. diplomats and embassies against terrorism (Von Glahn, 281).

In 1993, the U.S. Secretary of State recognized six states as sponsors of terrorism. These states were Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, and Sudan. However, North Korea is today believed to be the seventh state guilty of sponsoring terrorism. North Korea has been positively linked to the South Korean Airliner bombing on November 29, 1987 (Von Glahn, 281).

With regard to more recent action by the United States prompted by the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombing, the United States enacted two pieces of legislation called the Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995 and the Antiterrorism Amendments Act of 1995 (White House Press 1996). These two pieces of legislation have been effectively roled into one law, S.735, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (White House Press

1996). This law provides many new tools to help combat terrorism. First, this new legislation offers new federal jurisdiction to prosecute anyone who commits a terrorist act in the United States or who uses the United States as a planning ground for attacks overseas (White House Press 1996). Second, this law bans fundraising in the United States that supports terrorist organizations (White House Press 1996). Third, it allows U.S. officials to deport terrorists from the U.S. without having to disclose classified information as well as having terrorists from entering the United States to begin in the first place (White House Press 1996). Fourth, in order for the users of chemical weapons to be tracked, this law requires plastic explosives to contain markers (White House Press 1996). And Fifth, this law bans the sale of defense material and services to states who do not comply with the U.S. antiterrorism efforts (White House Press, 1996). Although this is a step in the right direction, more action by the leading nation-state in the world is required in order to set a rippling effect throughout all nations of the world. But how can the U.S. effect states who condone and support terrorism internally and abroad? The answer may be through an economic strangle-hold.

In August, 1996, President Clinton imposed sanctions against Iran and Libya. These sanctions are imposed on foreign companies who engage in specified economic transactions with Libya and Iran. The purpose of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 is to deny Libya and Iran revenues used to finance international terrorism, limit the flow of resources needed to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and apply pressure on Libya to comply with U.N. resolutions which call for Libya to release the accused terrorists to the proper authorities who were responsible for the Pan Am 103 bombing (Iran-Libya Sanction Act 1996).

The sanctions are imposed on foreign companies that give financial investments over forty million dollars for the production of petroleum in Iran or

Libya (Iran-Libya Sanction Act 1996). This bill also prohibits foreign companies to trade with Libya for arms, oil resources, and civil aviation supplies and services (Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 1996). According to the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 if any company violates this sanction, then the President of the United States is to set in motion two of the seven sanctions against the company which are:

- denial of export-import Bank assistance;
- denial of export licenses for exports to the violating company;
- prohibition on loans or credits from U.S. financial institutions of over \$10 million in any 12 month period;
- prohibition on designation as a primary dealer for U.S. Government debt instruments;
- prohibition on serving as an agent of the U.S. or as a repository for U.S. Government funds;
- denial of U.S. government procurement opportunities;
- a ban on all or some imports of the violating company (Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 1996).

The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 is a definite step in the right direction for combating states which support terrorism. By cutting these states economic growth by deterring foreign investment, the international community if united against such states, can motivate these states to abolish their support externally and internally for terrorism. The idea is that the people of these states like Iran will eventually feel the pressure brought on by the economic sanctions and will force the government in power to either comply with the internal community or be overthrown peacefully or violently.

U.S. Policy and Legal Efforts to Combat Terrorism

The United States of course consider all acts of terrorism as criminal acts not protected by any form of law. Therefore the United States Department of State issued a statement before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, and State on March 12, 1997 to ask for further resources in

combating terrorism abroad. This statement by Ambassador Phillip C. Wilcox, Jr. and Ambassador Eric Boswell details the U.S. policy against terrorism and how these events have created new needs and focus. In addition, this statement documents how the United States viewed the motivation of terrorism as changing and evolving and where the greatest threat is today: "today, elements who claim religious motivation....especially Islamic extremists...are a dynamic factor in international terrorism, whereas in recent decades, most terrorists represented secular causes. Some Islamic extremists are in organized groups like Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Lebanese Hizballah, and the Egyptian Gama'at. Others are ad hoc Islamic extremist elements, such as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef's gang, many of whom received training in Afghanistan" (Ambassador Wilcox 1997).

Basic Policies

According to Ambassador Wilcox, the U.S. counterterrorism efforts are based on these specific policies:

- 1) The U.S. will not concede to terrorist demands because any concession given will lead to more terrorism.
- 2) The U.S. Department of State is determined to seek out and punish terrorists guilty of terrorism acts by utilizing U.S. law enforcement, diplomacy, intelligence, and the U.S. military.
- 3) The Department of State reiterates that the act of terrorism is an "unmitigated crime" regardless of its cause. Therefore, terrorists should not be subject to asylum or viewed as a political offender but only as an offender against the good of all states.
- 4) The U.S. has designated certain states as sponsoring terrorism and have imposed sanctions like the Iran-Libya Sanction Act of 1996.
- 5) The U.S. also identify that as terrorism increases internationally, international cooperation is vital (Ambassador Wilcox 1997).

U.S. Implementation of Paris Recommendations

The Paris Terrorism Ministerial of June 20 1996 dictated twenty-five recommendations to the attending states. The United States responded with an action plan which addressed each recommendation made by the Paris

Ministerial. These recommendations and subsequent actions by the United States gives a clear picture and summary of U.S. actions to prevent, deter, and punish all involved in terrorism which forms the backbone of U.S. Policy.

The first subject negotiated for recommendation discusses cooperation and capabilities between states. One recommendation by the ministerial is to strengthen internal cooperation among government agencies which deal with different aspects of counterterrorism (Paris Ministerial 1997). The corrective action implemented by the United States was to strengthen its internal approach to counterterrorism, which combines diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, and other U.S. assets. This team approach was effective in responding to the Lima hostage crisis, the Kansi case, and other contingencies (Paris Ministerial 1997). Another recommendation was to expand training of counterterrorism personnel for all states (Paris Ministerial 1997). The United State's response was to allocate two million dollars in additional funds to the Department of State to expand its Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program in FY 1997 (Paris Ministerial 1997). The funding even allowed for six new training programs for such areas like the Middle East (Paris Ministerial 1997). A third recommendation was to ask the states to work on accelerating research, development, and consultations on ways of detecting explosives and for tracing where the terrorists obtained the ingredients (Paris Ministerial 1997). The U.S. answered by increasing funding for explosives detection methods as well as also actively creating a scientific study to experiment with marker agents so to enact regulations making manufacturers use markers as a standard (Paris Ministerial 1997).

The second subject covered by the Paris Ministerial deals with recommendations toward prosecution, deterrence, and punishment of terrorists. An initial recommendation under this topic was to proactively move against terrorist organizations (Paris Ministerial 1997). The action taken by the U.S. to

fulfill this request led the Secretary of State to designate thirty groups as foreign terrorist organizations on October 8, 1997 (Paris Ministerial 1997). What this means is that U.S. citizens are prohibited from providing any kind of support, the terrorists' assets in the United States were frozen, and any supporters or representations were to be removed from U.S. soil (Paris Ministerial 1997). Another recommendation by the ministerial was to strengthen punishments for terrorists and their acts (Paris Ministerial 1997). The United States responded by passing the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act signed into law in April 1996 which called for stiffer penalties and sentencings toward terrorist crimes and cracked down on individuals on groups providing funding for terrorist organizations (Paris Ministerial 1997). The ministerial also recommended increasing the frequency of prosecutions of terrorists and their supporters (Paris Ministerial 1997). The United States has convicted three individuals responsible for three major incidents in the recent years; Ramzi Yousef was convicted for planning the World Trade Center bombing, Timothy McVeigh was convicted for the Oklahoma City bombing in June of 1997, and Mir Aimal Kansai was captured and convicted for slaying two CIA agents (Paris Ministerial 1997).

Another major point which encompasses much of the ministerial recommendations were the ratifications and implementations of international treaties and pertinent agreements (Paris Ministerial 1997). Under this subject, the Paris Ministerial pushed for the ratification of international conventions and the development and enhancement of mutual legal assistance procedures (Paris Ministerial 1997). The United States has ratified all ten anti-terrorism treaties and went forward and took the lead in the international effort of the big eight to challenge other states to become parties to these conventions by the change of the century (Paris Ministerial 1997). In addition, the G-7 and Russia recommended expanding extradition arrangements (Paris Ministerial 1997). In

response, the United States has maintained extradition treaties with over one-hundred different states (Paris Ministerial 1997). Another recommendation by the Paris Ministerial was to set in motion biological weapons controls (Paris Ministerial 1997). The United States and the Big Eight reaffirmed their commitment to outlaw the possession, development, and use of biological toxins by terrorist.

The last important recommendation set by the Big Eight was to “intensify exchange of basic information on persons and groups suspected of terrorist-linked activities” and “intensify the exchange of operational information on suspect persons and groups”(Paris Ministerial 1997). As the leader of the free world, the United States had the Coordinator of Counterterrorism and law enforcement and intelligent agencies conducted consultations with other Eight members discussing the current terrorist trends, terrorist organization activities, and communications systems. Also, the United States invited the Eight members who were planning to host an international event to a conference in September of 1997. In this conference, states discussed ways of safeguarding major events such as the Olympic Games.

Executive Order 12947

The Middle East Peace Process is riding a fragile line and is always in jeopardy when there are external events countering every step forward. Therefore, the U.S. President signed into action Executive Order 12947, which prohibits transactions with terrorists organization who threaten to disrupt the Middle East Peace Process (12947, E. O. 1998). This order proves that the U.S. is determined to confront and combat those, organizations or individuals, who would seek to destroy the Middle East Peace Process (12947, E. O. 1998).

This executive order spells out its intentions clearly. First, the order “blocks property subject to U.S. jurisdiction in which there is any interest of

twelve terrorist organizations that threaten the Middle East peace process as identified in an annex to the order” (12947, E. O. 1998). Second, the executive order blocks the property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of people designated by the Secretary of State who are “to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of violence that have the purpose or effect of disrupting the Middle East peace process, or to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or services in support of, such acts of violence” (12947, E. O. 1998). Third, this order freezes all property/interest in property that is believed to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of, any other person designated as a terrorists (12947, E. O. 1998).

The annex of this executive order refers to Middle East terrorist groups which have been labeled as “Specially Designated Terrorists” (SDTs) (12947, E. O. 1998). If any person or organization in the U.S. acts on behalf of or in support of these groups designated as a SDT will be properly prosecuted and all assets will be blocked.

An executive order is decreed by the President of the United States in the event of an emergency or urgent need which could affect have a direct affect of the United States.

What are the costs involved in implementing executive power? The cost incurred by the U.S. Government in the period between July 22, 1997 to January 22, 1998 were estimated at \$165, 000. This cost is directly associated to the exercise or power and authorities allowed by the declaration of a national emergency with respect to terrorist groups that negatively impact the Middle East peace process (12947, E. O. 1998).

How much will it cost the U.S to fight terrorism in the future? In order for the United States to achieve their policy goals effectively and enforce laws against terrorism, maintain a dynamic research and development team and

effectively enforce its policy the fiscal year budget for 1998 is \$235.2 million dollars (Wilcox, 6). This is the amount requested by the U.S Ambassadors to the House Appropriation Subcommittee.

In short, Executive Order 12947 is a vital piece of policy which proactively combats fundraising in the United States on behalf of terrorist groups who are determined to stop the Middle East peace process. In addition, this order seeks out to stop charitable contributions to organizations and certain individuals who are convicted to SDT's and launder these contributions to these SDT's.

CHAPTER V

THE MIDDLE EAST

The rest of this paper will be dedicated to analyzing and understanding terrorism in the Middle East. Why focus on the Middle East? In the last three years, the Middle East has developed into an epidemic of terrorism. The Middle East has sparked the greatest growth in terrorism activity since 1968. Including Algeria and Turkey, the Middle East has recently developed as the most dangerous source of terrorism, accounting for over twenty-one percent of all international terrorism incidents worldwide in 1992 and over twenty-three percent in 1993 (C.S.I.S. 1995). Within the last year, terrorism in the Middle East has increased so dramatically that much due attention is needed to understand who, why, and how. In 1996, Dhahran, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem were targets of bombings by terrorists. Terrorists activities in 1996 nearly doubled as well as the number of terrorists casualties to 837 from 445 in 1995 (Phillips, 1).

The Middle East is a hotbed of terrorism. Five of the seven Middle Eastern states have been tagged by the U.S. Government as sponsors of international terrorism. These states are Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria. In addition, twenty-two of the forty-one major international terrorist groups described in the State Department's annual report on global terrorism are in the Middle East (Phillips, 6). The Middle East is not only infested with more terrorist groups than any other region, but these terrorists groups subscribe to a wide

variety of ideologies and causes, ranging from Marxism to secular Arab, Palestinian nationalism to radical Islamic fundamentalism. Also, each year the Middle East is the world's greatest exporter of terrorism around the world. For example, between 1980 and 1989 over four hundred terrorist activities spilled over from the Middle East to other regions with eighty-seven percent of these terrorists actions occurring in Western Europe (Phillips, 6).

Motivations Behind Terrorism in the Middle East

Terrorists are motivated by many different causes or events. The motive of violence for terrorists can be anything from a rejection of a current regime to the liberation of some fellow nationalist through hijacking or terror. In the Middle East today, there are four basic motives for terrorism which should be discussed.

Some Palestinian groups are motivated because they object to and are in great opposition to the agreement between Mr. Arafat and the Israeli Government. The Palestinian groups in opposition to this peace agreement view Yasir Arafat as a traitor who has betrayed the Palestinian cause of self-governance and self-determination. Three of the Palestinian organizations leading this hard-line opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process are the Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and Hizballah. These radical Palestinian groups are intensifying their use of terrorism against Israeli targets within Israel's own borders while the peace process attempts to move forward at the hand of Arafat. Although most of the terrorism inflicted by these Palestinian groups was well within Israel and the West Bank, the recent bombings in Buenos Aires and London indicate that these Palestinian groups are well funded by such countries like Iran and Syria and are willing to wage terrorism around the world in an effort to destroy the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process.

Another motivation for terrorism in the Middle East is that every Moslem

country has extreme Islamic fundamentalists who are actively encouraged and inspired by the Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran. This Iranian regime is actively waging a holy war or Jihad against all pro-western Arab governments hoping to set up Islamic republics in their place. For example, the Iranian Salvation Front (FIS) and the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) hope to overthrow the current regime in Algeria while the Islamic group in Egypt hope to get rid of the moderate ruler Mubarak.

A third motivation for terrorists is their want to eliminate western ideology within the Middle East and around the world. Middle Eastern radicals are not limited to carrying out their acts of terror against incumbent regimes in the Moslem world. Targets by Middle Eastern terrorists often include westerners within their own country. For example, the GIA have targeted French citizens in Algeria since September 1993 (C.S.I.S. 1995). The GIA allege that France is providing covert intelligence and assistance to the unpopular Algerian military regime and is blamed for the current situation in Algeria (C.S.I.S.1995). The GIA have proved to the world that it will fight these westerners who they believe Algeria by hijacking the Air France Airliner A300 on December 24th, 1994 (C.S.I.S. 1995). In addition, Middle Eastern terrorists are beginning to bring their violent acts within the borders of pro-western states. The judiciary and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States indicate that the terrorist group responsible for the World Trade Center Bombing in February, 1993 was an independent group of Islamic fundamentalists who were not directly controlled by a state sponsor or any other known major terrorist organization (C.S.I.S.1995). These Islamic fundamentalists were believed to be inspired and encouraged by a spiritual leader named Sheik Oman Abdel-Raharan (C.S.I.S.1995). These types of Middle East "freelance" terrorists groups willing to take their fight to their pro-westerner enemies expose a difficult problem for the intelligence and police agencies. According to the intelligence

community, these so called “freelance” terrorist groups have no known political identity, no identifiable organizational and communications infrastructure, and no past track record. In addition, with these “amateur” terrorist organizations running loose within the borders of pro-western states, the ability to recruit fanatical Muslims within such countries as, the United States, Canada, and Great Britain is a growing threat which today continues to baffle the security and enforcement agencies of these states.

A fourth motivation for the Islamic terrorists to exploit their will is the endless amount of support they can rely on from sympathetic Middle East States. The Middle East is also the major region of state sponsors of terrorism. The major state supporters in the Middle East are Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and Libya (C.S.I.S.1995). Syria, however, has reduced its support for terrorists groups because of Syrian President Assad’s desire to improve relations with America to gain greater diplomatic leverage against Israel in the Middle East peace process. However, Syria still provides support to such groups like Hizballah to fight a proxy war for Syria against Israel. In addition, Syria provides a safe-haven for many different terrorist organizations. Iran is considered the greatest sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East. Some foreign policy analyst have compared Iran’s reliability of support for Islamic terrorists to a state supporting its own troops. Iran also is not bound by its borders. Iran has been extremely active in Pakistan and Turkey. For example, Iran has been linked to the bombing of a car belonging to the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires on March 17, 1992 (C.S.I.S.1995). In the incident, twenty-nine people were killed and 242 people were injured (C.S.I.S.1995). In addition, the Iranian government is still active in its quest for the death of Salman Rushdie. In 1989, the Ayatollah Khomeini offered a reward of two million dollars for killing of Rushdie. Salman Rushdie wrote a book called, “The Satanic Verses” which sparked a uprising of anger from Shiite Muslims believing his book was

blasphemy against Islam. In addition, attacks on publishers, translators, and book shops involved in the distribution of Rushdie's book continue to today. Not even today's new moderate ruler of Iran can call off the radical Islamics from searching out Salman Rushdie.

Indeed, by understanding what motivates Middle East terrorists in doing what they do, the world community can then concentrate on diffusing this drive.

Most of the activity and the highest amount of frequency of terrorism in the Middle East in the 1990s has been centralized mainly to two specific areas, Israel and Lebanon. In Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, suicide bombs in 1996 killed sixty-five people (Cooperman, 1). In April of 1983, the radical Shiite group Hizballah destroyed the American Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon (Adler, 1). The radical group Hamas alone was responsible for three of the bombings in 1996 (Cooperman, 1). In December 1996, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility, for the shooting of an Israeli woman and her son (Cooperman, 1). On August 4th, 1997, two Palestinian men disguised as orthodox Jews had taken up positions in Jerusalem's crowded fruit and vegetable market, Mahane Yehuda. At 1:15pm, each men pulled a rip cord and exploded a brief case full of screws and nails. The result was thirteen people dead and well over one hundred and fifty people were wounded (Cooperman,1).

Most experts pinpoint the seed of terror in the Middle East to 1947. After the partition of Palestine in 1947, and the creation of Israel in 1948, Palestinians found themselves homeless in their land and refugees in neighboring countries. The Zionist movement was successful in establishing Israel, but at the same time created a problem for the Palestinians. Since the end of the First World War, Palestine was under the British mandate and in 1917 the British allowed Jewish immigration to Palestine in what was known as the Balfour Declaration (Idinopulos,1). Thus, the Palestinians resisted the attempts to bring thousands

of Jews to their homeland and in 1936 the Palestinians declared a rebellion against the British, whom the Palestinians viewed as partners in the settlement of Jews in Palestine (Idinopulos,1). The British fell short on their promises to grant full independence to Arab countries which included Palestine but instead, in 1948, the British withdrew unexpectedly from the Palestine, leaving the door open for the well-equipped Jewish armed militias to defend against Palestinians and other Arab armies (Idinopulos,1). Later, during the 1967 War, Israel launched a lightning attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and eventually occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan (Idinopulos,1). Israel defied the international community and the United Nations and repeatedly refused to withdraw from the occupied Arab and Palestinian lands (Idinopulos,1). This was a huge wound to Arab pride.

The hate and frustration was beginning to build and was indeed captured on television by showing young Palestinians throwing rocks at the occupying forces of Israel. Then in 1987, the Palestinian Intifada began which was answered with a huge deployment of Israelis troops in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Idinopulos,1).

Being a democracy, the Israeli Government, of course, was allied with the United States and other western states. This gave Palestinians and all Muslims a reason to hate the Americans, for anyone who supports the Israeli state is a natural enemy.

Although Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) are in the process of negotiating peace for land, the radical terrorist groups like Hamas and Hizballah reject the peace process altogether and want an end to Israel. The Oslo Accords, which in September 1993 was signed and made official with the famous handshake between Arafat and Shimon Perez on the Whitehouse lawn, gave concessions to the Palestinians like PLO recognition, PLO control of all Palestinian cities, the removal of Israeli occupation, the first

free elections in Palestinian history, and international aid (Phillips, 1). This agreement is based on the trade of land for peace. However, one fact remains. Arafat can't control groups who oppose any agreement or negotiation with Israel. Yet the violence continues with two main terrorists organizations spearheading their goals of destroying the peace process with Israel. In short, over ninety percent of all terrorist acts in Israel are done by either Hizballah or Hamas (U.S.Dept. Global Terrorism, 1966). Thus, the direction of this paper will focus mainly on these two terrorist groups since the majority of the most recent acts of violence in the Middle East were caused by Hamas and Hizballah.

Hizballah and Hamas are both religious-based terrorist organizations that base their beliefs in Islam. The use of violence by religious terrorists is a divine duty. Religious terrorists view such violence as both morally justified and necessary. In addition, these religious terrorist groups have a strong feeling of alienation which only helps to justify any violence used to achieve their goal. The bus bombing by Hamas in Jerusalem in February 1996 and the outbreak of artillery fire into Israel from Lebanon by Hizballah in April 1996 has focused the world's attention to the Middle East and how terrorism plays a role in their politics (Cohen, 1).

Three questions must be addressed. Why do these groups oppose the peace process which grant certain concessions to the Palestinian people? What is their history? What are their beliefs? We have to look deeper to find out what motivates these terrorist groups.

Hamas and Hizballah, like other Islamic Organizations, are gravely opposed to any peace plan that acknowledges the legitimacy of an Israeli state. As the peace talks progress, Hamas and Hizballah have "raised the ante" by increasing their attacks which are intended to derail the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

The Islamic political movements have been a long time force in the

history of the Middle East. Since Islam does not recognize the separation of church and state, dissatisfaction with government and politics are often expressed by a call for government based on Islam similar to the 1979 Iranian revolution. Although both Hamas and Hizballah cooperate to some degree, they have different agendas and they as compete for leadership, attention, and resources. Many people claim that Hizballah and Hamas are violent careless terrorist organizations. However, members of these groups and their sympathizers see them as working toward legitimate causes. We turn in the next chapter to a more detailed analysis of these groups.

Chapter VI

Religious Terrorists

Hamas

As mentioned earlier, Hamas terrorists have been busy in 1997. To recap, the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) remained active in Israel in 1997. On March 21, the Hamas exploded a bomb from a “satchel” at the Apropos Cafe in Tel Aviv, killing three and injuring forty-eight people. On July 30, two Hamas terrorists blew themselves up in the middle of Jerusalem’s Mahane Yehuda market, killing 16 people and wounding 178. And lastly, on September 4, three Hamas terrorists blew themselves up in Jerusalem’s Ben Yehuda mall, killing five and injuring approximately 181 people (Patterns, 1997).

The Harakat al-Muqowama al-Islamiya or Hamas has its roots in the Muslim Brotherhood which was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna (Cohen,2). The ideas and goals of Hasan al Bana’s movement was to restore Islamic rule to areas inhabited by Muslims and establish governments modeled after the early Islamic history. In the beginning Hamas focused primarily on education and social works but sporadically became involved in politics. The Muslim Brotherhood operates as a quasi-secret society in many countries. Even as far back as 1945, the Brotherhood organized a branch in Jerusalem.

During the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel captured and occupied the West Bank, which had been part of Jordan, and the Gaza Strip, which was a part of Egypt. This conquest and occupation generated a rise in anti-Israel militancy among the Palestinian population in the now occupied areas. Thus, the Islamic

groups like the Muslim Brotherhood began to respond to these anti-Israel sentiments.

Much to the world's concern, Israel at one point encouraged the growing influence of religious authorities in the occupied areas to counterbalance the influence of the PLO. During the 1970s and the 1980s the Muslim Brotherhood concentrated their efforts on promoting Islamic education, rather than resisting the Israeli occupation. This policy of non-violence by the Muslim Brotherhood led to some friction among Islamic groups and some Brotherhood members formed a breakaway organization known as the Islamic Jihad. This organization made armed movements against Israel its primary task from the mid-1980s onward. The Islamic Jihad and the PLO formed an alliance which resulted in tension between these two groups and the Muslim Brotherhood. After the spark of the Palestinian uprising or Intifada, violent resistance to Israel became the measure of leadership and legitimacy in Palestinian society.

The Muslim Brotherhood responded to this internal struggle for power by creating the Hamas movement which issued its charter on August 18, 1988 (Cohen, 3). The Hamas charter contains quotations from the Koran which contains the scriptures of Islam and also details its purpose, part of which contains statements directed against the West and anti-Semitic language. For example, the beginning paragraphs of the Charter of Hamas state that: "Israel will rise and will remain erect until Islam eliminates it as it had eliminated its predecessors (Hamas:Charter of Allah). In addition, Hamas has a social welfare program. This program receives popular support as a direct result of its success on providing education, vocational training, health care, jobs, and other services to a desperate population. People often ask the question whether terrorist groups like Hamas will eventually stop the violence. Article 11 of the Hamas charter states, "the Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Trust upon all Muslim generations....it is not right to

give it up nor any part of it. Neither a single Arab state nor all the Arab states....or any organization, Palestinian or Arab have any such authority” (Cohen, 4). Thus, it seems as if the peace process will not be enough. This charter puts Hamas in direct opposition to the peace process between the PLO and Israel. The peace agreement requires Israel to compromise its territorial claims in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while the PLO must formally recognize the state of Israel. In addition, Article 13 of the Hamas charter states, “there is no solution to the Palestinian problem except by Jihad (Holy War). The initiatives, options, and international conferences are a waste of time and a kind of child’s play” (Cohen, 5).

The Intifada

The intifada operated by using the surrounding mosques as its headquarters (Hamas....Movement, 4). Because a mosque is a spiritual center, it enjoys immunity from the Israeli security forces. In addition, the Hamas agents usually have a connection to the mosque by serving as religious functionaries (Hamas...Movement, 4). The Hamas has been known to use the mosque as a recruiting center, a planning/staging area for its attacks, and a center for its distribution of leaflets (Hamas...Movement, 4).

The intifada contains many subgroups which all have a part to play. One such group is the “Al-Suad Al-Ramaya” or “shock troops” which carry out boycotts of Israeli goods, enforcing strikes, and preventing Palestinian workers from the territories from going to work in Israel (Hamas...Movement, 4).

Hamas operatives began to escalate intifada activities during the latter parts of the 1980s. During 1989, the Hamas was responsible for the death of two Israeli soldiers (Hamas...Movement, 4). In 1990, three Israeli citizens were killed while working in a factory (Hamas...Movement, 4). And in 1992, the Hamas’s “Iz Al-Din Al-Kassam” squad was responsible for the deaths of four

Israeli Nationals (Hamas....Movement, 4).

Hamas, as mentioned earlier, has been responsible for many suicide bombings. Hamas finds many of its suicide bombers among the “Izz al-din al-Qassam” brigades (Grossman,1). Qassam Brigade members obey the fine line of the Hamas motto which states, “Death for the sake of Allah is its most coveted desire” (Cohen, 5). We also know that Hamas is usually successful in recruiting young Islamic students who understand their fate on Earth to be limited. These new recruits are promised seventy-two virgin brides and seventy free passes for their closest friends and relatives to paradise. This is what young Palestinians are promised by Hamas through their recruitment strategy. In addition, the young Palestinians will be held as a martyr and hero to the Palestinian people.

Although there is substantial popular support for Hamas, donor aid has begun to flow into the occupied territories, allowing Arafat’s groups to compete effectively with Hamas in terms of social welfare programs. Peace with Israel represents defeat and the Hamas movement will do whatever it takes to prevent peace and continue the conflict that sustains the Islamic resistance movement. Indeed Hamas preferred the victory by Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu over Israelis Prime Minister Shimon Perez who was seen as pro-peace movement leader at almost any cost, while Benjamin Netanyahu was seen as a person opposed to compromising a part of Israel for peace.

The structure of Hamas is organized into four functional pieces. One piece of the framework is the infrastructure or “Dawa” (Hamas...Movement, 2). This is a critical part of the framework since it engages in the recruitment, appointments, and distribution of funds (Hamas...Movement, 2). A second movement or part of the structure of Hamas and the most obvious is the “intifada”. “Intifada” means uprising and is the violent means the Hamas is using to achieve its goals of eliminating Israel and other western influences. A third functional part of Hamas is Security or “Aman” (Hamas...Movement, 2). The

organization gathers information on suspected collaborators with the authorities. This type of information is passed on to the “shock committees” who interrogate and sometimes, when they deem necessary, kill their suspects (Hamas...Movement, 2). The fourth part of Hamas organizes publication or “A-’ Alam” (Hamas...Movement,2). This organization distributes propaganda sympathetic to Hamas such as leaflets and newsletters (Hamas...Movement, 2).

These parts of the Hamas are also segmented into two interdependent overall spheres, the overt operations which is responsible for the infrastructure and the publications, and the covert which is responsible for the security and intifada. The overt operations are maintained by the many charity committees and ideologically through instruction, propaganda, and inspiration by the mosques and through leaflets (Hamas...Movement, 3). This part of Hamas is also responsible for the recruitments of members who eventually engage in demonstrations and rioting. Furthermore, those who distinguish themselves in these demonstrations and riots soon get drafted into the military-covert division of Hamas (Hamas...Movement, 3).

Funding

The Hamas receives strong backing funneled through their charity organizations. These charity organizations collect money in Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, and Iran (Hamas...Movement, 4). Recently, Iran seems to be helpful in the area of contributions to Hamas. The funding Hamas receives annually is estimated at over one million dollars (Hamas...Movement, 4). The funds are funneled through the various charity groups and then filtered down to the operatives in the field (Hamas...Movement, 4).

The “Jamayath Hiriya” or charity organizations operate in the occupied territories and back up their claim to operate on the Jordanian statutes: the Charity Association and Social Institutions Law (Hamas...Movement). The

charity organizations use the movement's ideology which is claimed to be parallel to the Islamic faith, "giving charity can serve to bring the people closer to Islam" (Hamas...Movement, 4). Therefore, with Islam behind them, these charity organizations are successful in channeling of funds into the region. It is believed that most of the funds are funneled from the overt to the covert activities of Hamas (Hamas...Movement, 4). In addition, the charity organizations also distributes money to pay for fines and assist the families of the covert operatives who are arrested as well as the operatives themselves.

The method which is used to transfer the money from charity organizations to Hamas are through money changers, foreign business accounts of economic concerns in the territories, and checks drawn on accounts of covert agents and firms abroad (Hamas...Movement, 4).

Leader of Hamas

The name Dr. Mousa Abu Marzook, a legal U.S. citizen since 1982, one day appeared on the Immigration and Naturalization Service's watch list. In July, 1995, Dr. Mousa Abu Marzook was taken into custody at the Kennedy Airport in New York (Gaess, 1). Israel tried to have him extradited. However, Marzook was deported to Jordan by the U.S State Department instead (Gaess,1).

Between September and February of 1996, a New York journalist named Roger Gaess interviewed Dr. Abu Marzook during his stay in the U.S. prison. This interview creates a good picture on how the internal structure of the Hamas operates. In addition, it provides insight on how international justice works. Roger Gaess asked some very direct questions and in return received very direct answers.

The first substantial question asked Dr. Marzook centered on the Israeli

extradition petition that states that Marzook's activities as a key member within Hamas' political bureau ties him to many military operations that have killed Israelis. In short, the petition states Marzook was involved in fund-raising, planning, and recruitment to promote the military division of the Hamas (Gaess,2). Marzook responded openly denying he had anything to do with these acts. He claimed that the extradition requirements of the treaty signed between Israel and the United States requires there to be specific charges presented in order for extradition to be considered. Marzook claimed Israel originally submitted a petition vaguely written and was rejected four times by the United States because of its ambiguity (Gaess, 2). However, Marzook goes on to state, "It is very difficult for the accused to win an extradition case in the United States. In the 150 years of the extradition law's existence, it's been extremely rare for anyone to win a case in front of the courts" (Gaess, 3). Thus, Marzook understood his slim chances of winning an appeal in the United States.

When Marzook was asked how much of the funds received by the Hamas was contributed by U.S. donors, he replied that although Americans donate money to the Palestinian cause, the Hamas has never collected or received contributions from the United States or any other country. This information conflicts with every piece of intelligence gathered between the United States and Israel. It is well known around the world that the Hamas receive much of their support from sympathetic Islamic states. So when Mr. Gaess asked how the Hamas received their funding, Dr. Abu Marzook replied, "A lieutenant of the Israeli Shin Bet said, 'give me \$5000 and I can run all of these kinds of operations'" (Gaess, 4). Marzook failed to answer Gaess's questions directly when it came to funding.

Mr Gaess asked an important question which gives shape to why and how the Palestinians, at least from the Hamas point of view, interpret their

situation in the occupied territories. Mr Gaess asked Marzook if he thought the ongoing violence in the Israel was an appropriate tactic for inducing change. He first responded to the February, 1994 incident when Baruch Goldstein killed twenty-nine Palestinians in a mosque in the town of Hebron. He stated that after this incident, which was compounded when Israeli soldiers killed an additional twenty-four Palestinians while they were demonstrating in the streets, the Palestinian people took it upon themselves to revenge the killings. Marzook stated:

there may be one difference in perspective between Palestinians and Israelis in that Hamas has always considered Israeli settlers as part of the military occupation, rather than as civilians, because the settlers carry arms and have arrested and killed people, and confiscated Palestinian land and homes in order to build settlements...In any case, people under occupation have a right to resist that occupation. The Palestinians have had their land occupied for approximately 30 years. They have the right to be free like other people so that they can determine their own future without foreign interference. If there was no occupation, there would be no resistance(Gaess,5).

From this statement, it is obvious that the Hamas does not have any plans of stopping its aggression toward a people and government who occupy land believed Palestinian.

Gaess inquired about the Oslo Accords. Marzook stated that the Hamas is opposed to the Oslo accords for various reasons. First, he claimed that negotiating an agreement means that decisions will be made by the stronger party, which in this case is Israel. Second, Marzook claims that Israel has no intention of withdrawing from all areas mentioned in the Oslo Accords. Third, he states that Israel opened a new tunnel in Jerusalem to retain control over the city (Gaess, 6). And fourth, he pointed out the Oslo Accords were implemented by outside forces such as Israel, Egypt, and the United States, not by the Palestinians regardless of the Palestinian Liberation Organization claims. Marzook also states that the international community should let the Palestinian people vote to either accept or reject the Oslo Accords (Gaess, 7).

Mr. Gaess next asked Marzook if he could suggest an alternative to the Oslo Agreement. Marzook responded without hesitation that the Israelis should and must withdraw from the Gaza Strip and West Bank and leave the Palestinians alone to self-rule (Gaess, 7). Marzook reminded Mr. Gaess that three million Palestinians who want freedom live in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He also mentioned that the Israelis would like to have the land (West Bank and Gaza Strip) without the people, leaving the Palestinians without land or government. However, when asked if Hamas would enter in negotiations with Israel, Dr. Abu Marzook responded, "Hamas has no interest in any kind of dialogue with Israel right now." Dr. Abu Marzook mentioned first that the Hamas must create a dialogue with the Palestinian authority. Second, the Hamas, if successful in communicating with the Palestinian authority, would not need to have a direct line with Israel and would fully rely on this authority therefore establishing one voice who can speak for all of Palestine (Gaess, 8).

Mr. Gaess mentioned that comparisons have been made between Marzook's role and the role of the leader of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams. Sinn Féin is the political wing of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Marzook stated there are many similarities. First, Marzook is the leader of the Hamas and Gerry Adams is the leader of Sinn Féin. Second, the United Kingdom views Gerry Adams Sinn Féin as a terrorist group while Israel views Hamas as a terrorist organization. And third, Marzook states the UK Government views Gerry Adams as a politician just as Israel views the Hamas political wing as a political voice. However, Marzook ends with pointing out a big difference between himself and Gerry Adams. As he puts it: "The difference is that when Gerry Adams comes to the United States, they welcome him at the White House. In contrast, they put me in prison" (Gaess, 14).

Hizballah

Another powerful terrorist organization, Hizballah, also has a powerful Islamic agenda. Hizballah, which in Arabic means “Party of God”, was founded by Lebanon Shiite Arabs allied with the Shiite power, Iran (Nelan, 1). Although Hizballah has a strong agenda towards removing non-Muslim forces from Lebanon, they are currently targeting Israel as the main enemy. Hizballah began with its roots in the 1970 Lebanon Amad Party which was formed by a Shiite Cleric, Musa al-Sadr (Usher, 3). The goal of Amad was to represent the Shiite Muslims in Lebanese politics who were Lebanon’s underclass society. After the 1979 Iranian Revolution a more militant faction formed Hizballah under the leadership of Hussein Musawi (Cohen, 6). This decision to split was later fortified by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 which attempted to expel the PLO from the area. When it became clear that Israel was not going to leave Lebanon, the Shiite community began to view the Israelis as an unwelcome occupying enemy force. During the mid-1980s, Sheikh Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah took control of Hizballah (Cohen, 5). Even when Israel left Lebanon in 1985, Hizballah continued its attacks against Israelis forces in Southern part of Lebanon. In addition, Hizballah forces struck villages in northern Israel. The Israeli armed forces and secret service, Massad, have tried to combat Hizballah but with limited success. Hizballah has been very active in fighting a proxy war against the Israelis and was seen as a logical choice for Iranian and Syrian support.

Iran viewed the new alignment as a good way to keep contact with the Shiite world outside of Iran and of enabling and influencing a base in Southern Lebanon. With Iran’s spiritual and political backings, the Hizballah had become a very effective Arab guerrilla force against the Israel state. Although Iran provided guidance and direction, Syria gave more practical support like money,

arms, and training for Hizballah fighters.

Through Hizballah, Syria can wage a proxy war against Israel in the occupied south Lebanon as well as serving as a counter against Israel's own proxy war waged with the help of the South Lebanese Army. According to Nizar Hamzeb, ninety percent of all armed actions since 1984 have been waged by the terrorist organization Hizballah (Usher, 3). Hizballah uses its southern occupation of Lebanon as a launching point for its "katyusha rockets".

The latest controversial incident was in April, 1996 when Israel counter attacked positions believed held by Hizballah in retaliation for a barrage of katyusha rockets fired upon Israeli military positions in northern Israel. Israel claimed they were successful in surgically bombarding southern Lebanon using 155-mm Howitzer shells. However, the truth of the damage came to light (Nelan, 1). In the first seven days, two ambulances had been hit, three power plants destroyed, and several hundred Lebanese citizens were killed. On the eighth day, Israel shelled southern Lebanon hoping to catch the Hizballah at home but, in fact, a U.N. post was destroyed and one-hundred Lebanese refugees were killed (Nelan,1). This grave Israeli error was used as a weapon by Hizballah in exploiting the Israelis as the real terrorists. In addition, Hizballah claimed all their targets were combatants while accusing Israel of not differentiating between civilian and combatant targets.

Ideology of Hizballah

The ideology behind Hizballah is based on Khomeinism and Hizballah's absolute goal is the creation of an Islamic republic lead by the clerics (Hizballah 1996). The first publication of Hizballah's view of an ideal world was presented in 1985:

The solution to Lebanon's problems is the establishment of an Islamic republic as only this type of regime can secure justice and equality for all of Lebanon's citizen's. The Hizballah organization views as an important goal the fight against

western imperialism and its eradication from Lebanon. The group strives for complete American and French withdrawal from Lebanon, including all their institutions. The conflict with Israel is viewed as a central concern. This is not only limited to the IDF presence in Lebanon. Rather, the complete destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of Islamic rule over Jerusalem is an expressed goal (Hizballah 1996).

Hizballah, being no different than any other Mid-East terrorist group, uses terror as a means of attaining its goals. Hizballah believes in the elimination of Israel or “the little Satan” because it constitutes a danger to Islam and all of its followers. Hizballah also believes that it has a religious obligation to destroy Israel and liberate Jerusalem. Not only are Hizballah terrorists active in Israel but also in Lebanon against the SLA (Southern Lebanese Army).

The Ta’if Agreement signed in 1989 allowed for a special relationship between Lebanon and Syria. The Syrian movement towards the continuation of terrorism in South Lebanon allows the Hizballah to maintain its unique status in Lebanon as a major military force. The Syrians have inhibited the Lebanese government from interfering with the Hizballah operations while also forcing the Syrian edict over Hizballah to relax tensions sometimes. For example, when Assad and Clinton met in January 1994, Syria called on Hizballah to relax its terrorist actions (Hizballah 1996).

Chronology of Hizballah Activity

Hizballah has been very active in the 1990’s. In 1991, Hizballah was responsible for 52 attacks, which is a major increase when comparing this number to 19 attacks from the Hizballah in 1990 (Hizballah 1996). In 1992, the terrorist attacks by Hizballah increased to 63 and again in 1993 to 158 attacks including Katyusha rocket attacks (Hizballah 1996). In 1994, the number of attacks reached 187, including 119 artillery attacks, 31 explosive detonations, and two frontal assaults (Hizballah 1996). In 1995, 344 Hizballah attacks were recorded against Israeli troops in which 270 of the attacks were artillery, 64

were explosive, and two were frontal assaults (Hizballah 1996). In 1996, the terrorist activity by Hizballah increased dramatically. The following is a list of Hizballah terrorist activity for a two month period in 1996:

- On February 28, 1996- Hizballah attempt to infiltrate northern Israel utilizing ultra-lite aircraft.
- On March 4, 1996, Hizballah detonated explosive charges near Kibbutz Manara where four Israeli soldiers were killed.
- On March 10, 1996, Hizballah detonated an explosive charge in southern Lebanon killing one Israeli soldier.
- On March 14, 1996, Hizballah ambushed a convoy of Israeli soldiers on the Reihan-Aiyeshia road wounding eight Israeli soldiers.
- On March 20, 1996, Hizballah suicide bombers detonate in front of an Israeli convoy.
- On March 30, 1996, two Katyusha rockets were fired by Hizballah at the Galilee (Hizballah 1996).

This information provided gives a good account of what type of terrorist activity the Hizballah organization has orchestrated.

Hizballah Financing from Iran via Syria

The French "Intelligence Newsletter" published in January, 1997 stated each month between three and five shipments of weapons are shipped into Damascus, Syria by Iranian airplanes (Hizballah 1997). The Supreme Iranian Council for National Security decided to raise their financial contributions toward political and military aid from 80 million to 100 million dollars in 1997 (Hizballah 1997). Hizballah, bragging over the fact that a special runway was built at the Damascus airport to handle the Iranian shipments of military aid toward Hizballah, believes it has the best chance of spreading Islam and eliminating Israel (Hizballah 1997).

Middle Eastern Terrorism Outside the Middle East

Middle Eastern terrorists are not confined to just creating havoc in the Middle East. On July 18, 1994, a car bomb destroyed a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires which killed ninety-six people and wounded at least two-hundred more (Phillips, 3). The following day a bomb exploded killing twenty-one Jewish businessmen on a commuter plane in Panama (Phillips, 3). The Ansarallah group, a subsidiary of Hizballah, was to blame for these incidents (Phillips, 3). The attack was sought to derail the Arab-Israeli Peace negotiations as well as to delay King Hussein's July trip to the United States to sign a non-belligerency accord with Israel (Phillips, 3). It goes to show that wherever aims and goals conflict with Middle Eastern Islamic organizations, these areas come into reach and are not safe. This series of terrorist attacks by the Hizballah organization proved to the United States counterterrorism officials that these type of terrorists are well-organized and can effectively coordinate campaigns against targets all over the world.

For instance let us examine the February 26th, 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. So far all evidence points to some form of Iranian involvement. According to the former head of the Central Intelligence Agency counter terrorism operations, Vincent Cannistrano, Sheik Omar Abdul Rahmar, a radical Egyptian Cleric, has long been on the Iranian payroll and was believed to be the one who inspired and possibly directed the bombers (Phillips, 4). In addition, the U.S. government investigators discovered that one hundred thousand dollars was transferred to the suspects before the World Trade Center bombing from a few foreign countries including Iran. In short, most experts agree that the World Trade Center bombing was definitely done by a Middle Eastern Islamic terrorist organization and that the group responsible was

without a doubt state sponsored.

Radical Islamic movements have also spread to the Muslim immigrants in the West. All suspects of the World Trade Center incident were either immigrants or illegal aliens. Many Islamic immigrants arriving in the United States reject all of America's values and consider the people of the United States to be materialistic. Not wanting to assimilate, the Islamic immigrants find enlightenment in Sheik Omar. In addition, Israeli officials claim that Hamas is actually headquartered in the United States (Phillips, 5). Fortunately, most Islamic terrorists refrain from attacking Americans on American soil. It is believed that the Islamic terrorists want to influence American public opinion to change U.S. Foreign policy and to drive a wedge between Israel and the United States.

Germany is another country which has been used by Muslim extremists as a home base (Phillips, 5). According to German intelligence officials about seven-hundred Arab extremists live in Germany (Phillips, 5).

Since the Islamic radicals are decentralized and spread out all over the Western world, it makes it difficult for host governments to detect, defend against, or arrest terrorists which is imperative to stopping the Islamic movement.

CHAPTER VII

COUNTERTERRORISM'S EFFECT ON MIDDLE EASTERN TERRORISM

Since there is no effective world government to prevent terrorism, this job is left to the individual state governments to regulate and prevent it. A lot of people can still remember the photos of the hooded Black September terrorists on the balcony of a building who massacred Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich, Germany in 1972 (Combs, 170). The world watched helplessly as five German sharpshooters successfully killed five of the terrorists, but not before the terrorists had killed all nine hostages. This sent a clear message that state governments need to reevaluate their counter terrorism tactics. Today many states have counter terrorism strike forces which are used as a first line of defense.

Israel's Sarayat Matkal

Israel has attempted to fight terrorism since its inception. Israel's history of combating terrorism can serve as an interesting case in determining the strengths and weakness of this tactic of counterterrorism by strike force.

Many of the assault operations by the Sarayat Matkal were successful. In 1972, the Sarayat Matkal successfully ended the hijacking of a Sabena Boeing 707 jetliner Flight 517 from Brussels to Tel Aviv (Combs, 174). Four members of the Black September Palestinian group hijacked this plane and forced it to land

at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv. The terrorists group announced that they would blow up the plane with its ninety passengers and ten crew members unless the government of Israel released the three hundred plus Arab prisoners. In response, the Israeli Government ordered the Sarayat Matkal to storm the plane and free the hostages. The Sarayat Matkal did just that with the cost of only one hostage and two terrorist lives (Combs, 174).

Another successful assault by the Sarayat Matkal was in June 1977 called the Entebbe Raid. Air France Flight 139 in route from Tel Aviv to Paris was hijacked by a terrorist group (Combs, 174). The plane carrying 248 passengers and crew members was to land in Entebbe, Uganda. At the Entebbe Airport the Sarayat Matkal was waiting for the arrival of this flight. When the plane landed at Entebbe, 106 hostages were released, only the Jewish members were kept aboard. These passengers were kept to increase pressure on Israel to agree to the release fifty-three “freedom fighters” imprisoned in Israeli prisons (Combs, 175). The commandos attacked the plane rescuing all but three hostages who apparently did not respond to the commandos request to lie down. All seven terrorists were killed by the Sarayat Matkal, five which were believed to be members of the PLFP.

While some of these tactical assaults by the Sarayat were successful militarily, their repercussions had negative affects throughout the world community. For example, the Sarayat Matkal assaulted the Beirut International Airport destroying a French jetliner. Led by President De Gaulle, the French condemned the raid as a violation of the sovereignty of a nation-state which resulted in France cutting its supply of arms to Israel. Although international opinion seemed favorable towards the Israeli government for its invasion of Uganda sovereignty for “humanitarian” reasons, it did raise a question to the world about national boundaries with regards to international law. Most press reports do not emphasize the fact that the Sarayat Matkal killed a number of

Ugandans who were trying to stop the Israeli Commandos from escaping.

The British SAS

On May 5, 1980, the Iranian embassy was a site of a hostage situation (Combs, 176). The British Special Air Services Regiment carried out “Operation Nimrod” which was the assault on the Iranian embassy. Wearing gas masks, the black suited SAS swung by ropes into the building’s windows. As the SAS moved through the building, they identified the terrorists, shot them and removed the hostages.

While the SAS have mainly focused on works within Great Britain, the SAS has also seen overseas service in Aden, Oman and Borneo (Combs, 177). The SAS has been in service for forty years and is considered the best counter terrorist group in the world. While relations between the SAS and the German GSG9 (German Counter terrorist Strike Force) are very cordial, the relationship between the SAS and Sarayat Matkal are far less amiable. Ever since the British formed the “Q Squads” on SAS principles in Palestine to put down Jewish terrorists like the “Stern Gang”, there has been bad blood between the two groups.

The U.S. Counter Terrorist Organization

The “Joint Operations Command” at Fort Bragg, North Carolina houses units that might be used to repel terrorists or to rescue Americans held hostage. One such unit is the U.S. Army’s Delta Force which is made up of selected soldiers stationed at Fort Bragg (Combs, 179). Delta Force has been deployed many times, some successfully and some unsuccessfully. One such unsuccessful mission was called “Operation Eagle’s Claw” which was the abortive attempt to send a strike team into Iran to free Americans held hostage

in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. This mission was plagued with many problems like confusion of command, insufficient training, and critical equipment failure (Combs, 180).

Another group who could possibly include the best the United States had to offer is “SEAL Team Six”. The name “SEAL Team Six” is a creative way of trying to keep the adversaries of the United States confused on just how many SEAL Teams are in operation. The Navy SEALs or the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (NSWDG), a.k.a. “DEVGRU” is an elite military group specializing in air, sea, and land combat. SEAL Team Six was formed in 1980 after the failure of “Operation Eagle’s Claw”. SEAL Team Six was also reported as being authorized to conduct preemptive actions against terrorists, their hide-outs, and training facilities (SEAL Team Six 1997).

The following section below is a list of SEAL Team Six operations chronologically:

1985-Six SEALs deployed to the site of the Achille Lauro hijacking in anticipation of a possible assault on the vessel.

1985-SEAL Team Six were responsible for the rescue and evacuation of Governor Sir Paul Scoon from Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury.

1989-SEAL Team Six took part in Operation Just Cause as part of Task Force White, which included SEAL Team Two. This task force along with Delta Force, was the location and securing of Manuel Noriega.

1990- SEAL Team Six operated in Panama in operation Pokeweed which was designed to apprehend Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar.

1991- The SEALs recovered Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide under the cover of darkness following the coup.

1991-SEAL Team Six was said to be part of a plan to shoot down Saddam Hussein’s personal helicopter with Stinger Missiles (SEAL Team Six 1997).

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The Shortcomings of The International Community on Deterring and Preventing Terrorism and Enforcing International Law

There are certain evils in this world which force states to act. Some such evils are poverty, unemployment, discrimination, and, of course, terrorism. As many states work very hard to rid of these evils, they still exist. The international community, for the most part, tries to eliminate terrorism through enforcement of law, deterrence mechanisms, and prevention strategies. If we were to develop a report card on how effective the international community of states have performed in combating terrorism, where would they rank? What are the shortcomings of the international laws created to fight terrorism?

The first problem is that there is no international level government with the enforcement mechanism which overrides a state's sovereignty. The United Nations was created not to rule but to offer a forum for states to discuss issues. Not only are there no enforcement powers or executive branch which can compromise a state's sovereignty, there is also no branch to create the laws. In addition, there is no judicial system which can force states to comply with its rulings. Today, the International Court of Justice depends on the willingness of the states to comply and depends on their willingness to submit their differences to the International Court for Adjudication. The U.N. Security Council is a means by which states try to enforce resolutions created by the United Nations.

However, we can see that this enforcement body has had little success in forcing states to comply. For example, Israel has still not complied with U.N. Resolutions 191 or 242 (Gaess, 13). These resolutions give the Palestinian refugees the right to return to their homes in Israel or be compensated for their losses (Gaess, 13). In short, compliance with international law by states is voluntary.

Most states cannot be forced to bring a dispute for adjudication. The international legal system made up of common law and treaty law is based on a voluntary legal system which can neither bring an offender to justice, nor enforce its judgments. Thus, since states cannot look forward to having the judicial system offer recourse or retribution, then many states see no point in pursuing their claims.

The international courts cannot force states to comply with their rulings. In addition, the courts cannot bring states or organizations to justice without an enforcement agency. There is no international law enforcement agency that can cross state boundaries to search and bring individuals or groups suspected or proven guilty to justice. Interpol (International Police), which is strictly prohibited from intervening in political crimes, cannot enforce the treaties or the judicial rulings made by the International Court of Justice.

Some conventions, like the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, offer a case for adherence and extradition of offenders to the state seeking to prosecute. These agreements or treaties are subject to the “gentlemen’s agreements” where states that are seeking justice are dependent for their enforcement on the willingness of the contracting states.

Enforcing the laws of the sea is another dilemma facing the signatory nations who denounce piracy and sea-hijacking. In addition, piracy is regarded as a crime against all nations. According to Article 101, “definition of piracy”, piracy consists of any one of the following acts:

A) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ships or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, person or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state;

B) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

C) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (A) or (B) (UNCLOS 1982).

No doubt the international community understands what defines piracy.

However, what states can do to protect their waters against piracy or sea-hijacking thus enforcing the will of the treaty and protecting the good of all nations, is little or nothing. The United States has the resources, unlike many countries, to protect its waters against piracy. The U.S. Coast Guard is a division of the U.S. Armed Forces dedicated to protecting the waters of the United States. Part of its responsibility is to enforce the laws against piracy in U.S. waters. While the United States has this luxury of an another force other than its navy to protect its waters, the majority of other nations do not. Therefore, it is logical to assume that the laws of the sea are not enforced to the point where piracy is eliminated. In short, another downfall of the international community's efforts to enforce and interpret the laws against terrorists who use piracy is whether a group who commits an act of piracy for private ends is considered a political offender or just an ordinary criminal? The majority of states consider the act of piracy an act against all states. In addition, President Kennedy in 1961 passed a law declaring hijacking an act of piracy (Von Glahn, 262). However, some states would not consider a pirate a political offender if the act was committed for material gain or for personal resources. Other states do consider a pirate for whatever reason a political offender since this act is an evil against all nations. So, the chief dilemma or shortfall is that many states indeed interpret international law differently. When is an offender a political offender? A case in point is the Santa Maria Case of January, 1961. A Portuguese vessel in the

Caribbean was seized at gunpoint by ‘patriot pirates’ (Von Glahn, 262). This group of pirates were lead by Henrique Galvao who at one point was an army captain in Portugal (Von Glahn, 262).

The reason why these “patriot pirates” seized the vessel was to call attention of the world to the dictatorial nature of the Government of Portugal (Von Glahn, 262). This created a legal dilemma. Captain Galvao claimed he was not a pirate and that the seizure of the vessel was not done for private ends. Captain Galvao also claimed he was attempting to overthrow the Portuguese Government. However, no state except for Brazil, considered Galvao’s group an insurgent group. Thus, Captain Galvao could not lay claim as an “insurgent group” and receive any privileges occurring to the leader and armed forces of a belligerent community.

The international community concluded that Brazil’s interpretation of a political offender and granting political asylum for Captain Galvao’s group was mistake since the actions were of a criminal nature. Even though the majority of states concluded this, the state which made a difference was a state who saw the interpretation of international law differently, Brazil.

Let us now turn to the protection of diplomatic personnel. While it is true that treaties have been signed by states to respect and protect diplomats against terrorist acts, there still remain many flaws in actual protection given to diplomatic agents. Sometimes there is a conflict between the agent the state represents and the state itself. Over time the world has seen when a government of a state will itself become a party to taking of diplomatic hostages. How can a government be expected to protect a diplomat and prosecute offenders who state actively or indirectly approves and supports their crime? This would mean that the state would have to eventually prosecute itself for committing an act which it sees as not illegal.

Earlier in this chapter, we noted that states have different interpretations

of international law. However, one of the biggest problems that most states see eye to eye on is the fact that when an offender is deemed by the international community as a political offender, these offenders can escape extradition and/or punishment. This “loophole” allows some terrorists to commit crime for political motives and escape punishment. Even though the international community has made attempts to create an international criminal court and an international criminal code, the international community has not been able to resolve the legal and political problem between states.

Now let's focus back on the Oslo Peace Accords which was the United Nations attempt at bringing everlasting peace to Israel. The Oslo Accords represents many things to many people. To the Israeli conservatives, it represents a surrender of territory it believed it rightfully gained during one of the many Arab-Israeli Wars. It represents to some of the Israeli people a chance to live in peace without fear of random attacks by fundamental Islamic terrorists. To the people who support the Palestinian Liberation Organization efforts at peace, the Accords represent a chance of living under a government which can recognize their needs and give the Palestinian people pride. To the fundamental Islamic terrorist, it represents blasphemy by conceding to the Israeli Government and recognizing its legitimate existence. These terrorists believe that peace for pieces is impossible since they cannot agree or support any organization who does not support their beliefs in part which calls for the complete annihilation of Israel.

In short, international law today lacks the mechanisms to interpret and enforce the laws made by the international community. Even the law making capabilities of states is always “on the bubble” since international community relations are always dynamic. A treaty state “A” agrees to today, thus becoming a signatory state to the treaty, tomorrow may renounce and ignore it. Thus, there is no enforcement or compliance mechanisms in place forcing a state to

continue to support a treaty.

I guess if I had to give the international community a grade on its progress of protecting, deterring, enforcing, and prosecuting terrorist around the world, I would give the international community an “E” for “effort”, not “excellence”. The majority of the states of the world are indeed trying to get a handle on terrorism. However, there are lots of issues to contend with that makes fighting terrorism evasive and elusive.

A Prescription for Combating Middle Eastern Terrorism

Religious terrorism, which dominates the Middle East may never be stopped completely but that doesn't mean the United States or any other nation should not take any means necessary to prevent terrorism. Therefore, there are certain steps that should be taken by a government as well the rest of the world's governments to help deter the threat of terrorism.

With the end of the Cold War and the failure of the Soviet Empire, the West now has more influence and leverage over states in the Middle East. In addition, the United States and other western states gain potential leverage by supporting or threatening to support opposition groups hostile to terrorist regimes.

Experienced terrorist states and groups are often successful in concealing their responsibility to avoid military reprisals. So what should states do? The United States must convince its allies and other states to increase the diplomatic, economic, military, and political costs of state supported terrorism. Today, the United States has a great chance of curtailing terrorism around the world with its hegemonic power. The Clinton Administration passed legislation on February 10th to bolster United States deterrence of terrorism and punish those who aid and abet terrorist activities (Phillips, 1). The Omnibus

Counterterrorism Act of 1995 outlaws fund raising in the United States in support of terrorist activities overseas, expedites the deportation of alien terrorists, and declares international terrorism committed in the United States a federal crime (Phillips, 1). Is this enough to help deter terrorism or should Congress strengthen U.S. Counter terrorist policy beyond this legislative act?

Since the U.S. is seen as the dominate power in the world, it should lead the way in fighting terrorism. In order to effectively fight terrorism, the United States should embrace the following prescription towards a functional counter terrorism policy.

First order of business is for the United States to make counter terrorism a top foreign policy priority. Congress and the Clinton Administration should maintain the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism. In addition, the U.S. should strive to make the issue of terrorism appear automatically on the agenda for the G-7 Summit. Also, the Coordinator for Counterterrorism should be a permanent presence at these G-7 Summits.

Secondly, we should tackle international terrorism as a type of low-intensity warfare. Today, most terrorism is treated as a law enforcement issue. Since approximately eighty percent of all terrorism in the Middle East is state sponsored, the U.S. should treat these acts as an act of war and should approach every situation with the premise that the act was a form of surrogate warfare. In addition, since most terrorism in the Middle East can be seen as a proxy war for some states, the U.S. should allow counter terrorist strike forces the freedom of action as it sees fit without the threat of domestic courtroom standards regulating their actions. These counter terrorists strike forces should be allowed to use any force necessary without strings attached. Also, the United States should make use of its full arsenal of weapons against international terrorism and relax its own restrictions on special operations. One way of relaxing the internal restrictions would be to reevaluate the 9176 Executive

Order No.11905 which prohibits commando assaults on terrorist groups (Phillips, 8). In addition, the U.S. should make use of non-violent operations such as dissemination of false information to create a type of psychological warfare within the terrorist organizations which could promote a sense of vulnerability. Also, sabotage operations should be launched against terrorists to destroy storage depots, logistics networks, and financial assets. The U.S. must neutralize and disrupt any line of supply working its way to terrorists.

The third step towards an effective counterterrorism strategy is to punish any state which sponsors terrorism. The U.S. should collaborate with its allies to raise the diplomatic, economic, political, and military costs of supporting terrorism so high it outweighs the benefits.

The western nations of the world should impose as many diplomatic sanctions as possible. The U.S. should initiate a proposal among the G-7 and NATO that would require all of the member states to expel large numbers of diplomats with states that support terrorist attacks. In addition, the state's diplomatic personnel should be expelled for each documented terrorist attack by a surrogate terrorist organization. By reducing the diplomatic presence of terrorist supporting states will make it harder for them to sponsor terrorists out of their embassies. When the diplomats of Iraq were expelled from their embassies it made it harder for them to export terrorism during the 1991 Gulf War (Phillips, 9). In addition, the international community should treat any and all who are involved in terrorism as war criminals and should not be allowed asylum. Furthermore, these criminals should be brought to the International Court of Justice for a fair trial in the hopes of setting a major precedence and creating a deterrence.

Another sanction which would help strangle the supportive states of terrorism is to impose economic sanctions. If the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan became a united front threatening to impose sanctions, it could have a

leveling effect on Middle Eastern terrorist states. Remember, Iran already has a financial burden of a thirty billion dollar foreign debt (Phillips, 9). Iraq owes more than fourteenth billion dollars and Syria owes more than sixteen and a half billion to foreign creditors (Phillips, 9). With the break up of the Soviet Union disrupting cash flow to many Middle Eastern states, the U.S. should convince it's allies to take advantage of their financial leverage and elevate counter terrorism to the forefront of economic aid. Trade sanctions or embargoes should be pressed against all terrorist sponsoring states as we do Iraq. Although it is difficult to convince Western European states to impose trade sanctions on Iran, Iraq, and Libya, which are seen as lucrative export markets and important sources of oil, the United States can use the United Nations Security Council to impose an oil export act which could utilize any profits made by oil sales to benefit states that have suffered terrorist hits.

Fourthly, the U.S. should maintain the option to retaliate unilaterally for terrorist attacks. A quick and sharp military reprisal not only has a deterring effect on a terrorist state but it can also serve as an example to other terrorist states of what could happen. For example, according to the State Department, Libya reduced its involvement in international terrorism from nineteen incidents in 1986 to six in 1987 and Syrian terrorism fell from thirty-four incidents in 1985 to six in 1986 when the U.S. launched an air strike in April 1986 against Libya (Phillips, 12). Thus, we see the positive effect of a quick and decisive strike on another state, Syria, which promotes the use of terrorism.

A fifth recommendation is for the United States and other states to stand firmly behind states threatened by Middle Eastern terrorism. Terrorists have been the catalyst of the Islamic revolutionary movements seeking to destroy the Israeli state and other states that do not share the fundamental assumptions of the Islamic faith. The U.S. government should never publicly meet with radical Islamic leaders which could be interpreted as undermining a friendly

government like the ones in Egypt and Algeria. Also, the United States should share and accommodate any intelligence with governments fighting revolutionary terrorists. In addition, the United States should support an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement which should include guarantees by either state that they will cease to promote and support any terrorist activities.

Another recommendation would be for all states to improve internal security. The United States, Congress should reform our immigration laws to quicken deportation and simplify the hearings and appeal system that permit illegal aliens to surpass immigration controls.

A sixth recommendation would be to restore government control over anarchic areas where Middle Eastern terrorists train and live. For example, the U.S. should help the Afghan provisional government financially so the moderate Afghan Militias can defeat terrorist groups like the Hezbi Islamic who are training militants to fight pro-western governments inside of Afghanistan's borders.

The last recommendation is one that will no doubt be seen as quite controversial, but effective. I propose that the United States support the PLO movement financially. By providing economic aid to the PLO, it can promote the socioeconomic situation for the Palestinian people. Thus, the people will turn away from the fundamental Islamic terrorists organizations and give their support to the PLO. I believe that the power of a leader is only as strong as his or her support by the people. In order to get support from the people, you must promote their well being, socially and economically. This will allow the PLO to negotiate effectively peace for pieces with the Israeli Government.

Although international terrorism and especially religious terrorism is not likely to end, it can be weakened tremendously if this prescription of counterterrorism is followed. The United States must lead the fight against terrorism as well as convince its allies that they should follow suite in an

international war against terrorism.

Summary

To reflect back on this research we must analyze and summarize the underlying concepts of each chapter.

First, we defined terrorism in a few different ways in order to capture the different interpretations prevalent around the world. Terrorism has been defined as “the purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat” (Stohl, 3). However, almost all terrorist acts are political by nature, thus one must see terrorism as a means which may have some political end. Therefore, one may define terrorism as “a synthesis of war and theater, a dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence that which is perpetrated on innocent victims, played before an audience in hoping of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes” (Combs, 8). Middle Eastern terrorism puts a spin on any definition of terrorism by proving to the world over again that there is more than one audience. Religious terrorists have an audience in which no nation-state in the world can do anything about, God. Religious terrorists believe that they have a holy mission which no man can deny and no man can stop.

As mentioned before, terrorism is intentional and deliberate. The ultimate purpose of terrorism is either to maintain a regime or create the conditions for a new regime. The first goal of terrorism is to advertise the cause (Stohl, 5). A second purpose of terrorism is the achievements of specific concessions through coercive bargaining (Stohl, 5). A third purpose of terrorism is to enforce obedience. If some citizens of a state, for example, resist the current regime with specific forms of action, that state may employ some form of terrorism to enforce obedience. A fourth purpose is the provoking of indiscriminate reactions to

expose the true nature of the regime or insurgent (Stohl, 6).

Terrorists do not have any characteristics which we can generalize. However Middle Eastern terrorists have an extreme dedication to their religion which is usually labeled “religious fanaticism”. These fanatical terrorists train in many different states, all which are also considered to sponsor terrorism. These states are Algeria, Iran, Iraq, China, Cuba, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan. At these training sites, terrorists are trained to use many techniques involving kidnapping and hostage-taking, weaponry such as bombs and katyusha rockets, intelligence gathering, recruiting, and assassinations.

State terrorism and state-sponsored terrorism are also discussed in detail. Middle Eastern terrorists rely on states to supply them with recruits, financing, weaponry, and training sites. States that sponsor terrorism also benefit by being able to hold a proxy war indirectly through the terrorists without suffering too much political consequences. Terrorism by the state is different because the state is directly involved whether it be situational or institutional. Terrorism by the state can be defined as a “deliberate coercion and violence directed at some victim, with the intention of inducing extreme fear in some target observers who identify with that potential future victims...they are forced to consider altering their behavior in some manner desired by the actor” (Mitchell et. al., 4).

The legal aspects of terrorism are made up of multilateral, bilateral, internal legal agreements. One of the main problems with the legal definition of terrorism is whether terrorism is considered political or criminal violence. Although attempts by the international community and legal scholars to construct treaties and other forms of international law dealing with terrorism have been unsuccessful. However, treaties and conventions which deal with specific aspects of terrorism like air and sea piracy and the killing of innocent people have had much better success through history because most states can

agree on some of these basic aspects. Therefore, the international communities have agreed to certain guidelines like the laws of war, laws of the sea and air, and the protection of diplomatic personnel and heads of state. The 1990s have seen an increase in the efforts by the international community to combat terrorism. For example, the Ottawa Ministerial of 1995, The Paris Terrorism Ministerial, and The G-7 Declaration on Terrorism are all efforts to combat terrorism by the international community. These gatherings of states allows for a forum to discuss ways for states to deter and prevent terrorism as well as share information on the newest weapons, tactics, motives, and training sites utilized by terrorists. As mentioned previously, some of these new weapons being sought out by terrorists are chemical and biological weaponry as provened with the Tokyo subway incident.

In addition, we discussed U.S. Government efforts to combat terrorism in the wake of the World Trade Center bombing and the Oklahoma City bombing. The United States responded to terrorism by implementing the Paris recommendations and Executive Order 12947. The United States does a good job of understanding what tactic could really hurt the terrorist. The United States went for the jugular by hitting at their pocket books. The United States, as a capitalist democracy, understands that without funding or resources, terrorism have a much harder time buying explosive ordinances and information. For example, Executive Order 12947 blocks the property and interests in property subject to U.S. jurisdiction of people designated by the Secretary of State (Executive Order 12947).

However dedicated and aggressive the international community is at combating terrorism, there are still many shortcomings to deterring and preventing terrorism. One of the biggest shortcomings of the international efforts is that there is no international level government which can enforce, create, and interpret international law. In addition, today all international law compliance is

voluntary. Also, even if a state is brought to trial and found guilty by the International Court of Justice, there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure the courts judgment is followed and the state complies. To further complicate matters, states around the world can even agree as to how to treat a terrorist; as a political offender or a criminal offender.

Middle Eastern terrorists have been described by discussing their motivations and political agenda. We understand that most if not all Middle Eastern terrorists are motivated first by God and second by politics, both which play hand in hand. In addition, two terrorist groups, Hamas and Hizballah were described by discussing their financing, activities, motives, and ideology. In short, based on Islam, Middle Eastern terrorists are dedicated to overthrow the Israeli Government as well as anything which represents western ideology. The Hamas organization has a closer tie to the Palestinian people of Israel and take orders directly from the ranks within while the Hizballah are aiming at destroying Israel at any cost but are deeply depended on Iran and Syria who govern most of Hizballah's actions.

The counter-terrorist organizations were discussed as having responded to terrorist activities not proactively preventing terrorism. For example, the British SAS, Israel's Saryat Matkal, and the United State's Delta Force and Seal Team Six are considered the best the world has as far as combating terrorism by using the best equipment and getting the best intelligence. However, for these groups to stay effective, they must proactively attack terrorist by striking before they can strike.

There are indeed certain steps that should be taken by governments of the world to deter, prevent, and combat terrorism. The United States must take many measures in order to stay on top of this dilemma. First, the United States must address terrorism at every gathering by the G-7 states. Second, the United States should treat terrorism as a type of low-intensity warfare. Third, punish

any state who sponsors terrorism by economically “tightening the noose” on these states. In addition, states should expel any state who sponsors terrorism or practices terrorism internally out of the United Nations. Another suggestion for the United States is to act quickly and unilaterally against terrorists. Also, the United States should take measures to tighten the internal security of the United States and work to support the PLO movement financially. I believe all of these measures are important. However the most important recommendation is the economic sanctions which should be imposed right away. Nothing greater can affect these groups which are going to continue to follow their agenda parallel to their religious beliefs than economically strangling each terrorist group independently.

Terrorism can be modified if states around the globe use the preceding prescription. However, I do not believe terrorism can ever be completely prevented. Even if you take away the audiences, the funding, the training and training camps, you cannot stop ideology or religion.

Middle Eastern terrorism, as we already know, is driven by religion. The religion which motivates these young fundamentalist is one that worships martyrs who die in the name of God. Islam is a religion which is by far the predominating religion in the Middle East. These extremists believe that a government cannot be separated from religion in order for the government to have just actions and goals. These Islamic militants also believe that states in the Middle East which contain Arab citizens, who are Muslims, should only be ruled by an Islamic based government.

In short, religious terrorism, performing for its greatest audience and director, God, will never stop. However, the world’s governments should make every effort to minimize the punch delivered by these religious terrorists with a political and economic agenda.

Appendix

Background Information on Middle Eastern Terrorist Organizations

Abu Nidal Organization

Description: International terrorist organization led by Sabri Al-Banna. Split from the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1971.

Activities: Has carried out terrorist attacks in twenty countries, killing or wounding almost nine-hundred people. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Some major attacks included the Rome and Vienna Airports in December 1985, the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul, the PAN AM Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in September 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in July 1988 in Greece. Suspected of assassinating PLO Deputy Chief Abu Lyad and PLO Security Chief Abu Hul in Tunis in January 1991. The ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in January 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there.

Strength: Several hundred plus militia in Lebanon and overseas support structure.

Location/Area of Operation: Headquartered in Libya with a presence in the Al Biqa' (Bekaa Valley) and Sudan.

External Aid: Currently only receives aid such as safehavens, training, logistic assistance, and financial aid from Libya.

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

Description: An Islamic extremist group, the goal of the GIA is to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activities in early 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).

Activities: Frequent attacks against regime targets like security personnel and government officials, civilians, journalists, teachers, and foreign residents. Since announcing its terrorist campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in September 1993, the GIA has killed about 100 expatriates. This group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and its know to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats. The GIA hijacked an Air France flight to Algiers in December 1994.

Strength: Unknown

Location/Area of Operation: Algeria

External Aid: Algerian expatriates, many of whom reside in Western Europe, provide some financial and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian Government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists, and severed diplomatic relations with Iran in March 1993.

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)

Description: Marxist group that split from the PLFP in 1969. Believes

Palestinian national goals can be achieved only through revolution of the masses. In early 1980s , the DFLP occupied political stance midway between Arafat and the rejectionists. Split ¹ into two factions in 1991, one pro-Arafat and another more hard line faction head by Nayif Hawatmah.

Activities: In the 1970s carried out numerous small bombings and minor assaults and other operations in Israel and the occupied territories. Opposes the Israel-PLO peace agreement.

Strength: Estimated at 500

Location/Area of Operation: Syria, Lebanon, and the Israeli-occupied territories.

External Aid: Receives financial and military aid from Syria and Libya.

al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IC)

Description: An indigenous Egyptian Islamic extremist group active since the late 1970's. Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman is the preeminent spiritual leader. Their goal is to overthrow the government of President Hosni Mubarak and replace it with an Islamic state.

Activities: Responsible for the terrorist attack at the ruins in Luxor, Egypt which took the lives of many innocent tourist. This attacked was aimed to undermine the Mubarak Government. Armed attacks against opponents of Islamic extremism, Egyptian security, and Coptic Christians. The group also attacks tourists in Egypt .Attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak in 1995

in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Strength: Unknown, but probably a thousand strong.

Location/Area of Operation: Al Minya, Asyut, and Qina Governorates of southern Egypt. Known to have supporters in Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt.

External Aid: Egyptian Government believes that Iran, Sudan, and Afghan militant Islamic groups give financial aid.

Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Description: Hamas was formed in the late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hamas has used political and violent means such as terrorism to pursue the goals of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. Military elements of Hamas, operating clandestinely, have advocated and used violence to advance their goals. Hamas's strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and a few areas of the West Bank.

Activities: Hamas have conducted many attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets, suspected Palestinian collaborators, and Fatah rivals.

Strength: Tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers.

Location/Area of Operation: Occupied territories, Israel, and Jordan.

External Aid: Receives aid from Palestinian, Iran, and other Arab states.

Hizballah (Party of God)

Description: Radical Shia group formed in Lebanon; dedicated to the creation of an Iranian-style Islamic Republic in Lebanon and the removal of non-ic influences from the area; anti-West and anti-Israel. Closely allied with Iran.

Activities: Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-U.S. terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombing of the U.S.Embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October of 1983. Responsible for the kidnapping and detention of U.S.and other Western hostages in Lebanon as well as the attack on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992.

Strength: Several thousand.

Location/Area of Operation: The Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, southern areas of Beirut and Lebanon. Also, has suffuses in Europe, Africa, South America, and North America.

External Aid: Receives substantial amounts of financial, training, weapons, political, and diplomatic aid from Iran.

al-Jihad

Description: An Egyptian Islamic extremist group active in the late 1970s. The Jihad regard Sheikh Umar Abd-al Rahman as their spiritual leader. The goal of all Jihad factions is to overthrow the government of President Hosni Mubarak and change the Egyptian government to an Islamic state. The al-Jihad is divided into at least two separate factions: remnants of the original Jihad led by Abbud al-Zumar and a faction calling itself Vanguard of Conquest (Talaa' al-Fateh) led by Dr.Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Activities: The original Jihad was responsible for the assassination in 1981 of President Anwar Sadat. Al-Jihad appears to concentrate primarily on Egyptian Government officials. Also, claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993.

Strength: Several thousand members and several thousand sympathizers.

Location/Area of Operation: Operate mainly in Cairo, Egypt; possibly Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan.

External Aid: According to the Egyptian Government support for the Jihad comes from Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan.

Kach and Kahane Chai

Description: States goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kach which was founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane was declared to be terrorist organizations in March 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet under the 1948 Terrorism Law.

Activities: Organize protests against the Israeli Government; threatens Palestinians in the occupied territories. They also claimed responsibility for several shooting attacks on West Bank Palestinians in which four persons were killed and two were wounded in 1993.

Strength: Unknown

External Aid: Receives support from sympathizers in Europe and the United States.

The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Description: Originated in the Gaza Strip during the 1970's, the PIJ is a series of loosely affiliated factions. The PIJ is committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through holy war. The United States, because of its strong support for Israel, has been identified as an enemy of the PIJ.

Activities: PIJ has threatened to retaliate against Israel and the U.S. for the murder of PIJ leader Fathi Shaqaqi in Malta in October 1995. Has attacked Israeli targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel.

Strength: Unknown

Location/Area of Operation: Israel and other parts of the Middle East including Jordan and Lebanon. The largest faction is based in Syria.

External Aid: Receives assistance from Iran and Syria.

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Description: Terrorist group that broke away from the PFLP-GC in mid-1970s. The Pro-PLO faction led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), who became member of PLO Executive Committee in 1984 but left it in 1991.

Activities: Abbas's group was also responsible for the attack in 1985 on the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of US citizen Leon Klinghoffer.

Strength: Approximately 50.

Location/Area of Operation: Based in Iraq.

External Aid: Receives support from the PLO, Libya, and Iraq.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Description: Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash as a member of the PLO. Opposes the Declaration of Principles signed in 1993 and has suspended participation in the PLO.

Activities: Many attacks during the 1970s; Since 1978 PFLP has carried out numerous attacks against Israeli or moderate Arabs.

Strength: Approximately 800

Location/Area of Operation: Syria, Lebanon, and Israel.

External Aid: Financial and military assistance received from Syria and Libya.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
(PFLP-GC)

Description: Split from the PFLP in 1968; less politics more fighting. Violently opposed to Arafat's PLO. Led by Ahman Jibril who receives support from Syria.

Activities: Carried out numerous cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using methods like hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders.

Strength: Several hundred.

Location/Area of Operation: Headquartered in Damascus but has bases in Lebanon and Europe.

External Aid: Receives military support from Syria, financial support from Libya and Iran, and refuge in Syria.

(All the statistics regarding terrorist organizations were taken directly from the Patterns of Global Terrorism:1996 by the United States Department of State, release date April 1997)

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