

U.S. NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF THE AFGHANISTAN AND CHECHEN
CONFLICTS: THE FRAMING OF RUSSIA IN CHANGING TIMES

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of
Southwest Texas State University
In Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements

For the Degree

Master of ARTS

By

James V. Brzozowski, Jr., B.F.A.

San Marcos, Texas
August, 2001

COPYRIGHT

by

James V. Brzozowski, Jr.

2001

This thesis is dedicated to my parents,
Jim and Leona Brzozowski,
and to the memory of August Brzozowski (1906-1999),
who taught many in our family to think about the world beyond their horizons.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my parents, Jim and Leona Brzozowski, and my sisters, Lisa and Lynn, for supporting me throughout my academic endeavors. I would also like to thank all my friends and relatives, especially my brothers in Lambda Omega Alpha, for helping me during my time at Southwest Texas State University. I cannot adequately express my appreciation and gratitude for all they have done for me.

I would like to thank my thesis committee Dr. Sandhya Rao, Dr. Kate Peirce, and Dr. Theodore Hindson for their guidance, expertise and hard work in help shaping this thesis. I would especially like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Rao, for her tireless efforts and patience. She persevered through many meetings, drafts, rewrites, and questions. She was always there to help me keep focused on the goal and on schedule, even on those days when I was “running a little late.”

This manuscript was submitted on June 18, 2001.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
LIST OF TABLES	viii
LIST OF FIGURES	ix
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. LITERATURE REVIEW.....	21
III. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES	28
IV. METHODOLOGY	43
V. FINDINGS	49
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION	52
APPENDIX	59
REFERENCES	61

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
5.1 Chi-square for Differences between Prominence of Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage	49
5.2 T-test for Differences between Length of Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage	50
5.3 Chi-square for Differences between Bylines in the Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage	50
5.4 Chi-square for Differences between Datelines in Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage	51
5.5 T-test for Differences between Tone of Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage	51
5.6 Chi-square for Differences between Sources in Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage	51
6.1 Summary of Hypotheses	52

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1.1 Map of present-day Afghanistan and bordering countries	5
1.2 Map of Chechnya	11

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Two distinct conflicts involving the Russian state occurred during the last twenty-five years of the twentieth century. The invasion of Afghanistan and the current and ongoing conflict with Chechnya have had a great effect on Russia regarding diplomatic relations with and public opinion within other countries. This is especially true of Russia's diplomatic relations with the West.

These two events represent actions that occurred in vastly different political climates. The invasion of Afghanistan occurred within the Cold War paradigm that long dominated the political and social agendas for both the United States and the former Soviet Union. This paradigm, which simplified international struggles as a United States-Russian rivalry with the remaining countries of the world choosing sides, occurred in various forms from the end of World War II until the dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Norris, 1995). It also provided a relatively clear definition of an East-West struggle in order to assimilate news about the Soviet Union (Seib, 1997). The current conflict in Chechnya has occurred in a time of relative confusion concerning the United States' relationship with Russia. Therefore, it can be suggested that coverage of these events has occurred within a news frame that is different from the news frame used during the Cold War. It is not clear whether Russia is viewed under a new news frame that is exclusive to that state or whether the country has been assimilated into a news standard used to cover

other countries, particularly the developing countries of the world. If Russia's newsworthiness has been grouped with the world's other countries, it would lose its status as a primary focal point or staple of U.S. media coverage of international news, as identified by Larson (Larson, 1984). Another possibility is that the Cold War frame remains even as the politics, persons, and events that created it fade away. Siebers (1993) suggested that the countries that were once situated in the Cold War scenario would sometimes still be placed in this frame, especially during times of crisis.

Objectives

This study hopes to discover:

- (a) Whether the so-called Cold War frame (Blumer, 1992, Grunwald, 1993, Hoge, 1993, Norris, 1995, Seib, 1997) and its subsequent demise has altered the news coverage of Russia and the former Soviet Union during times of military conflict.
- (b) Particularly, has the absence of the Cold War news frame resulted in a change in the coverage in U.S. newspapers of the Chechen conflict compared with the Afghanistan conflict?
- (c) If so, does this change indicate a decrease in Russia's saliency as a news topic by American media?

To answer such questions this study must investigate the concepts of media framing and newsworthiness, how they contribute to the narrative of the issue presented, and how political, social, and economic changes have resulted in the possible creation of new media frames and the obsolescence of others.

Background

Cold War

The Cold War was used to describe the adversarial relationship that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union, as both countries sought to extend their influence over the other countries of the world. The Cold War defined the foreign policy, military, strategy, culture, and domestic affairs of much of the world (Sibley, 1998).

No one point in history is agreed upon by scholars as the beginning of the Cold War. The term itself is attributed to Walter Lippman in a 1947 critique of the U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union. Many scholars point to the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the Yalta conference in 1945 or the Truman Doctrine in 1947 as the beginning of the Cold War (Sibley, 1998). The latter two dates certainly signify the increasing tension between the two countries as the conclusion of World War II resulted in the two countries being the world's dominant military powers.


As stated earlier, the Cold War dominated every facet of military and political life in the United States and the Soviet Union from the end of World War II until the dismantling of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The Cold War did not exist in a constant state, as there were periods of détente under different administrations. Some scholars view the Cold War as having two parts, the first ending with the Cuban missile crisis and not resuming until the Carter Administration (Friedman 2000) when human rights was emphasized. Regardless of whether the Cold War is considered as one continuous period or as a series of incidents, the concepts, ideology and rhetoric that were borne of the Cold War have shaped both countries' identities of themselves, the world and their opposing superpower.

Afghanistan

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred in 1979 when members of the Marxist Afghanistan government supposedly were dissatisfied with the leadership of President Haffizullah Amin. Soviet leaders insisted that supporters of Babrak Karmal, former vice-president of the Afghanistan communist party, solicited their aid in a coup in order to establish stable leadership. Russian troops first appeared in the country on Christmas day of 1979. This aid escalated into a military intervention that eventually intensified into a war with Islamic rebels. The rebels received economic and military assistance from abroad, ensuring a prolonged battle (Kakar, 1995). The results of this war included substantial deaths on both sides (Malinkina & McLeod, 2000). Also, it strained U.S.-Soviet relations, resulting in the United States enacting a grain embargo and boycotting the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics (Krishnaiah, Signorielli, and McLeod, 1993). The fighting between coalition forces of Soviet and Afghanistan pro-government forces and Afghanistan rebels lasted from the initial Soviet intervention until the eventual withdrawal nearly ten years later. Moscow began a nine-month withdrawal process between May 15, 1988 and March 15, 1989, to end the Soviet Union's longest external military conflict.

The modern history of Afghanistan as a state occurred in 1919 with the Treaty of Rawalpindi, which declared that Afghanistan was free from British influence and responsible for its own foreign affairs. Contact between the new government and the newly formed Soviet state was almost immediate through an exchange of missions. The result was a Treaty of Friendship signed 1921 (Marsden, 1998).

Figure 1.1: Map of present-day Afghanistan and bordering countries



Source: Map of Afghanistan courtesy of the CIA World Factbook online at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.

The relationship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union was fostered during the 1950's because of increased tensions between Afghanistan and its newly created neighbor Pakistan. The principal disagreement was the status of the Pushtun tribal area that exists along the border of the two countries. The Durand line, which forms the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, divides this ethnic group between the two states. This disagreement has been a divisive issue between the two states. Afghanistan has long called for the independence of these areas, at least those that exist in Pakistan (Marsden, 1998). The status of these areas and their inhabitants is important to Afghanistan because Pushtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and have played the dominant role in politics (Kakar, 1995).

A combination of events in 1949 incited bitterness between the Pakistani and Afghanistan governments. An Afghanistan border village was bombed by the Pakistani air force during a crackdown of the Pushtuns in Pakistan. The Afghanistan response of supporting an initiative of a Pushtun assembly in Pakistan cooled relations between the two countries. Pakistan blockaded petroleum products from traveling between the two countries. The two countries became increasingly antagonistic towards each other, eventually resulting in a complete termination of diplomatic relations in 1961.

Because of these conflicts Afghanistan was forced to look for trade partners elsewhere. The government of King Zahir Shah looked for economic and military support from the world's two superpowers during the 1950's. The Soviet Union, because of its proximity, seemed the more suitable partner. In July 1950 a barter agreement was signed with the Soviet Union to exchange Afghanistan wool and cotton for Russian

petroleum products and other vital commodities. The arrival of a 100 million-dollar loan occurred in 1955. The Soviet Union also became involved in military matters as Afghanistan obtained arms from the latter in 1956 and assisted in the development of three military airfields (Marsden, 1998).

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed in 1965 by educated elite of the country who were frustrated by the slow pace of change by the constitutional monarchy of King Zahir (Urban, 1990). The constituents of this Marxist party were the country's civil servants, teachers and army officers, many of whom had been trained in the Soviet Union. The party tasted immediate success when four members were elected to the national assembly in 1965, including Barbrak Karmal who represented Kabul, the capital city of Afghanistan.

The party developed divisions, especially along two groups, the Khalqis and the Parchamis. These names were derived from the name of each groups' newspapers. The names reflected the ideology of the group, with "Khalq" meaning masses and "Parcham" meaning flag. The Khalqis were largely poor, rural Pushtuns and were led by Nur Mohammed Taraki, the first leader of the party upon its ascension to power. They favored more radical change. Although the Khalqis were ideologically aligned with the plight of the rural Afghans, they did not represent the beliefs nor did they have the support of a majority of the masses. They were, however, the larger of the two factions.

In contrast, the Parchamis consisted mostly of the wealthier urban Kabul Pushtuns who favored more conservative change. They were led by Barbrak Karmal. The Khalqis accused the Parchamis of being overly cooperative with the government of

Zahir and later of Daoud. They agreed in 1977 to a truce. Some have suggested that this truce was facilitated by Soviet influence (Rogers, 1992).

The PDPA seized power in April of 1978 from the government headed by Sardar Mohammad Daoud. Though its leaders were jailed at the time, pro-leftist officers in the army enacted military action against the Daoud regime. The coup lasted one day and the president, several government officials, and most of the loyalist soldiers who guarded the presidential palace were killed. The party installed a communist system of government with Nur Mohammed Taraki as president and Barbrak Karmal as vice president. The division of the two men among rival factions would soon exhibit itself as Karmal was reassigned as ambassador to Czechoslovakia. (Khan, 1991).

The Soviet Union recognized the new government almost immediately (Urban, 1990). Some analysts have suggested that as many as 350 Soviet advisors were in the country during the April 1978 revolution (Rogers, 1992). On December 4th of that same year the Taraki government and the Soviet Union signed a friendship treaty.

The year 1979 proved to be the pivotal year that would define the leadership of the Afghanistan government and the Russian role within it. On February 14 U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs was kidnapped by the minority leftist group Sitam-I Milli (Against National Oppression), who demanded the return of their jailed leader (Magnus & Naby, 1998). Dubs was later killed when Afghanistan and Russian security forces stormed the hotel where he was being held. This led to U.S. accusations of Russian involvement in the decision and soured relations between the Afghanistan government and Washington (Urban, 1990). Meanwhile, resistance among conservative guerrilla forces escalated as attacks by rebels were taken against the city of Herat, where a number

of Soviets were killed. The army that was supposed to defend the government within Herat joined the rebel forces. This incident instigated a popular rebellion against communist reforms all over the country (Rogers, 1992).

Because of the increasing resistance of rebels and the cleansing of many Parchami members from the party, a power struggle within the party occurred. Hafizullah Amin, a hard-line Khalqi, gained control of the government but remained in power for only a few months. Amin was not trusted by the Soviets and they began taking steps to insure his replacement (Urban, 1990). The Soviet Union prepared to invade in late December 1979 in order to replace Amin with leadership they felt would bring more stability to the country and region in accordance with Soviet expectations. The Soviets entered Afghanistan on December 26, 1979 and attacked Kabul. Amin was killed and Karmal, who had been the ambassador to Czechoslovakia, was installed as president (Rogers, 1992).

The installation of the communist government with Soviet help caused widespread distrust and rebellion, especially among the rural and conservative peoples of Afghanistan. Various factions of rebels vowed to fight the combined forces of the Soviet and Afghanistan armies, using guerrilla tactics. These skirmishes continued for the next eight years and eventually the will to fight was drained from the Soviet army. Moscow's nine-month withdrawal process began on May 15, 1988.

Chechnya

The Chechen conflict is somewhat more difficult to comprehend. The recent series of events in Chechnya are the fruition of several centuries of mistrust and

intermittent armed conflict between the Russians and Chechens. The current fighting is actually a two-part conflict. The initial hostilities began in December of 1994 and concluded in August of 1996 with the official signing of a peace agreement that provided Chechnya some degree of independence for a five-year period. The renewal of hostilities began in June 1999 and has not ceased as of June 2001.

The Chechen point of view posits Russia as an outside aggressor that is invading its independent republic. This independence was declared in 1991. The Russian point of view is that Chechnya is a rebellious part of the Russian Federation. The Russian belief is that maintaining control of the area is vital for strategic and economic reasons and to prevent conflict within other areas of the Russian Federation (Malinkina & McLeod, 2000).

Chechnya has been fighting Russian domination for more than 250 years as Tsarist, Bolshevik, and Soviet forces have all put down Chechen revolts (Edwards, 2000). Chechen see Moscow's intervention as a threat to their freedom, a freedom that is worth fighting for until death. Russia has traditionally seen Chechnya as an unruly people who only respond to violence (Gall & de Waal, 1998). In traditional Russian folklore images of the Chechen people lean towards the barbaric and criminal. The poet Lermontov's Cossack Lullaby reflects this attitude:

“The Terek streams over the boulders,
the murky waves splash;
a wicked Chechen crawls on to the bank
and sharpens his kinzhal...” (Gall & de Waal, 1998, p. 31).

Figure 1.2 Map of Chechnya

Chechnya



Source: Map of Chechnya courtesy of the [CIA World Factbook](http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/) online at <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>.

In the 1700s Russia embarked on expansion into the Caucasus that included the area occupied by the Chechen people. The first organized conflict between the Russians and Chechens occurred in 1785. Sheikh Mansur, who preached the Naqshbandi form of Sufism Islam, and called for a holy war against the Russians, led the Chechen forces. Mansur is a pivotal figure in Chechen history because of both his militaristic prowess and his religious teachings, a precedent that would be handed down to future Chechen leadership (Gall & de Waal, 1998). The Russian army was sent to the area to capture the rebel but instead lost more than 600 men in the resulting battle. Six years of resistance ensued before he was captured and imprisoned by the Russians in 1791. He is still a symbolic leader for the Chechens with his name appearing on streets, banknotes and Grozny's civilian airport (Gall & de Waal, 1998).

The Russians tried to wrest control of the entire Caucas region through numerous wars in the areas that lasted through the entire first half of the 19th century. These actions set off the next great wave of resistance that began in the 1830's and continued for nearly thirty years. A great leader, Imam Shamil, once again inspired the Chechens. Shamil managed to mobilize Chechnya on several different occasions. In 1839 Shamil's entire fighting force was slaughtered by the Russians deep within the mountains. The Russians celebrated their apparent victory but as would happen in the current conflict, Shamil merely regrouped and within three years was able to mount more resistance. It was not until 1859 that Shamil was surrounded and forced to surrender.

Shamil's surrender marked the conflict's resolution for a brief period of time. The region was subject to unrest every few years. In 1877 the Chechen nation rose up against the Russians in response to the Russo-Turkish war. Other conflicts included

fighting against the pro-Tsarist General Denikin in 1919, fighting against the Bolshevik army in 1920 and resistance against Stalin's collectivization of agriculture in 1929.

The incident that defines most modern Chechens' assessment of the Russian people is the deportation of the Chechens in the early months of 1944. Many of the leaders of the Chechen conflict in the nineties were born at the time these events were taking place. Nearly half a million Chechens were forced to northern Kazakhstan and at least 100,000 died of sickness and starvation during the three-week transport or within the first two years of settling (Gall & de Waal, 1998). The deportations were explained by the Soviets as punishment for collaboration against the Soviet army and government. The Chechens were allowed to return home in 1957 only to find their former properties occupied by Russians. This meant that ethnic Russians made up a large portion of the population within Chechnya, especially in the urban areas.

Chechen war, 1994-1996.

In 1990 leaders of the Republic of Chechnya declared the republic to be sovereign. Such a demand was commonplace at the time and not to be taken at face value. Boris Yeltsin had said during his tours of Russia in 1990 and 1991, "Take as much sovereignty as you can swallow," which as authors Gall & de Waal (1998) said incited similar declarations by Russia's other autonomous republics (p.83).

In 1991 the Republic of Chechnya declared independence and held elections for an independent government. Russia condemned the elections as illegal. Jokhar Dudayev, a former colonel in the Soviet Air Force, won the presidency and became not only the head of the new government but also a heroic figure to the Chechen people.

During the next three years little was done by the newly formed Russian Federation to deter the independence movement within Chechnya. This was in part because of the weakness of the Federation itself and because other matters seemed more important (Gall and de Wall, 1998).

In 1993 Dudayev dissolved the Chechen parliament and violence ensued between rival factions within the government. The Russians tried covertly to support Dudayev's political opposition but the measure was exposed (Edwards, 2000). The Russians sent in troops in December of 1994.

The battle for the capital city of Grozny became the main focus of the war. Russia mounted an attack on the city on New Year's Eve 1994. The first few days of fighting saw devastating losses for the Russian army; as much as ninety percent of their losses occurred in the first three days (Edwards, 2000). By February the Chechens were pushed back into the mountainous areas and remote cities of the country.

A cease-fire in the latter half of 1995 allowed the Chechens to regroup in the mountainous areas. Then, when the resistance seemed to be faltering, the Chechens launched a surprise counter-offensive on Grozny in August of 1996. By the end of August Russian forces were ordered to evacuate and Chechens were granted an agreement that would delay the Chechen status of independence for five years.

Chechen war, 1999-present.

The beginnings of the second Chechen conflict followed an intriguing plot that seemed strangely commonplace for the many battles of the North Caucasus. While there was no violent infighting going on between the Chechens, there was clearly division

between the government and the military leaders of the guerilla bands that had successfully won the war against the Russians. An example of this tension occurred during the early days of the fighting in Dagestan. Chechen president Aslan Mashkadov dismissed Movladi Ugudov from Chechnya's National Security Council because of his role as a spokesperson for the guerilla leader Basayev.

The government had little control over the actions of the guerillas, as would soon be illustrated. The second Chechen conflict began in August of 1999 after militant Chechens, led by Shamil Basayev, invaded the neighboring Botilkh region of Dagestan with a force of approximately 1000 fighters. Intent on founding what they label as an "Independent Islamic Dagestan," the group declared a holy war on Russia. The president of Chechnya, Aslan Mashkadov, denied that neither this action nor its perpetrators had any ties to the Chechen government. The Russians requested assistance from the Chechens in putting down the insurrection, but the Chechens refused to send in troops.

Tensions escalated as Russian troops and air strikes were conducted in Dagestan. Chechen president Maskhadov declared a state of emergency in Chechnya and mobilized its reservists and veterans from the previous conflict. During the fighting in Dagestan some air raids were conducted on two targets near the border, within Chechnya. The Chechens saw these attacks as proof that Russia would not be against extending the war to include Chechnya.

The first in a series of terrorist bomb explosions occurred on August 31st in a Moscow shopping mall. The explosions are linked to Chechen separatists. The explosions seemed to galvanize the Russian public support for action, something that had

been sorely lacking in the previous conflict. It also gave some measure of credibility in the statement that the Russians were in the area to combat terrorists.

The Chechen rebels within Dagestan announced their withdrawal in late August, only return two weeks later after Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin declared victory in the area. Russia subsequently bombed areas within Chechnya that they suspected were rebel bases. Maskhadov called this an act of aggression and vowed to ready his country for defense. By September of 1999 the Russian military intervened in Chechnya and the fight for the control of the country continues to the present.

American policy

Afghanistan.

American response to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan came quickly after troops entered the country on Christmas Day, 1979. On December 28, 1979 President Carter called the invasion a “grave threat to peace” (Rogers, p. 63, 1992). President Carter announced the Carter Doctrine in January of 1980 declaring that any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf was subject to U.S. intervention. Sanctions against the Soviets were initiated including a grain embargo. That same month the president authorized the supply of weapons to the Afghanistan resistance through Pakistan. On January 14 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution for “immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops” from Afghanistan (Khan, 1991, p. 15). A similar resolution was adopted in November, which again called for the

immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. This resolution was repeated and passed annually through 1987.

The remainder of 1980 saw the United States make various public displays of protest against the conflict in Afghanistan. One such protest was before the UN Human Rights Commission. The United States accused the Soviets of using poison gas in the conflict, an accusation that would be levied throughout the entirety of the war. In April the television show *60 Minutes* showcased the Afghanistan struggle, creating public sentiment in support of the rebels. The biggest display of dissent came as the United States boycotted the Summer Olympic Games of 1980, which were held in Moscow. Sixty countries joined this boycott. Opinion of this decision was greatly divided as some experts saw it as a public relations setback for the Soviet Union while others saw it as “a feeble substitute” for concrete policy by the United States (Rogers, p. 64, 1992).

Public policy initiatives towards Afghanistan seemed to wane during the early months of the Reagan administration. Shortly after taking office Reagan lifted the fifteen-month old grain embargo. Interest in supporting the rebels seemed to rise, as it became apparent that the Afghanistan resistance was standing up to the Soviet military. In 1982 the U.S Congress formed the Afghanistan Task Force under Paul Tsongas in order to push for effective aid to the Afghanistan rebels. This led to a series of measures that intensified U.S involvement in supplying the rebels.

In 1984, the U.S Congress passed the Tsongas-Ritter resolution calling for United States to render effective military aid to the freedom fighters. This resolution declared that “it should be the policy of the United States to encourage and support the people of Afghanistan to continue their struggle to be free of foreign domination”(Rogers, p. 66,

1992). In March of 1985 President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 166, increasing aid to Afghanistan resistance with goal of forcing Soviet withdrawal and allowing self-determination of the Afghanistan people. American assistance continued until the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. The funding continued to increase throughout the conflict until it reached a ceiling of \$630 million in aid appropriated in 1987 (Magnus & Naby, 1998).

Perhaps the biggest public display of American intention was in 1986 when the United States supplied the Afghanistan resistance with Stingers. Stingers were hand-held radio controlled ground-to-air missiles. Many experts claim that the Stingers were key in turning the tide against the Russians because it enabled the rebels to counteract the helicopters and low-flying aircraft that had been so successful for the Soviets (Marsden, 1998). The toll on Soviet aircraft was substantial and the Stingers were relatively inexpensive to supply to the resistance (Rogers, 1992). Also, the introduction of the Stinger program showed that the United States was no longer averse to sending advance weaponry that was obviously supplied by America (Urban, 1990).

Chechnya.

The reaction of the United States to the initial military action in Chechnya was nondescript. Most experts saw the situation as an internal matter of Russia (Gall & de Waal, 1998). The first publicly reported phone call between President Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin did not take place until the conflict was two months old. In the phone call Clinton stated that Chechnya was a part of Russia, but he expressed concern regarding the loss of human life in the conflict.

It became apparent that the most important diplomatic matter for the United States was to get Yeltsin re-elected during the June elections of 1996. The Clinton administration tried to walk a fine line of condoning actions in Chechnya while maintaining support for the regime it felt was best suited to American interests for Russia's stability. President Clinton was asked whether the U.S should take a more critical stance towards Chechnya. The president replied by comparing the conflict to the U.S Civil War. This depicted the Chechen war as a battle to keep Russia together, a comment that angered many in the State Department (Gall & de Waal, 1998).

The background of the two conflicts presents similarities and differences between them. Both conflicts involved a military intervention by the Soviet Union/Russia that met with unexpected and prolonged resistance from rebel forces. In both conflicts the Russian military was humbled by its inability to resolve the conflicts quickly and successfully. However, there are differences in that the military conflicts occur in different time periods, political orientations, and met with different commentary from the West. The Afghanistan war was depicted as a grave threat to worldwide peace. The Chechen conflict was seen as internal matter of Russia, in which the West eventually came to oppose because of humanitarian interests.

Organization of Thesis

The thesis had been organized into six chapters. The first chapter introduces the objectives of the study and provides the background material on the Afghanistan and Chechen conflicts. It also discusses U.S. policy response to the two conflicts.

Chapter 2 looks at the past literature written on the topic of international news. This section includes information on the determining factors on which stories are selected, the relationship of international news coverage and U.S. foreign policy, the study of international news on television and other studies that have compared the differences in pre and post Cold war coverage.

Chapter 3 establishes the theoretical grounding of the study. The theory of framing is discussed. The many levels of framing are reviewed and the concept of the Cold War frame and its importance to international news is explained. The hypotheses of the study are presented at the end of the chapter, along with a definition of terms used within the study.

Chapter 4 discusses the methodology of the study. The timeframe for the study, how the sample was collected and issues of coding are clarified here. Also, explanation of the validity of the data is discussed here.

Chapter 5 presents the finding of the statistical analysis of the data. The results are presented in table format.

Chapter 6 provides an overview of the study. A summary of the hypotheses and some suggestions as to the results of the data are presented. Conclusions drawn from the findings are offered. Also, weaknesses of the study and suggestions for further research are discussed.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

International News Coverage

Determining Factors

Chang, Shoemaker and Brendlinger (1987) studied the determining factors of international news stories covered in newspapers and network television news. They showed that four variables contribute significantly to whether an event was covered: (1) normative deviance of the event, (2) relevance to the United States, (3) potential for social change, and (4) geographic distance. Additional research by Shoemaker, Danielian and Brendlinger (1991) concurred with previous results that an international event was most likely to make news if it contained acts that were contrary to U.S. values and occurred in nations of political and economic significance to the United States.

Cohen (1995) looked at the newsworthiness of foreign countries by examining the geographic distribution of the foreign press corps. He concluded that two factors, elitism and proximity, determined where the press corps was located. Elitism reflected the reality that most of the foreign press corps operated within the United States or Western Europe. Proximity could meet a number of criteria including geographic, cultural, political or economic definitions.

Johnson (1997) examined the role of geographic proximity, cultural proximity and organization factors on the quantity of U.S newspaper coverage of Mexico. A

content analysis of 34 newspapers concluded that cultural and newspaper organization factors were more influential than geographic proximity to Mexico.

International News and Policy

Research by Riffe, et al. (1993) showed that international news coverage has declined in the *New York Times* during the last twenty years. Weaver, Porter and Evans (1984) proposed the concept that foreign news is “actually U.S news from a foreign dateline” (p.362).

Eribo (1993) conducted a content analysis of four Russian newspapers to look at coverage of Africa. Eribo found that the Russian papers had a bias towards countries that could be considered “pro-Soviet.” Russian newspapers showed similarities to other papers by focusing on politics and crisis news. The Russian dailies did report more positive news than their western counterparts.

Cassara (1998) looked at the Carter Administration’s agenda building efforts in human rights coverage of Latin America. She looked at four major U.S. newspapers before, during and after the Carter Administration to see the agenda building effect. She concluded that the influence of organizational routines was emphasized as more stories were written in conjunction with more resources being devoted to Latin America.

Caliendo, Gibney and Payne (1999) investigated the *New York Times* coverage of human-rights investigation. The authors found that overall coverage of this issue was lacking. The study did find some correlation between the extent of terror and the number of stories from a particular country. As in other studies, the news coverage focused on

countries that were strategically important during the cold war and in countries where the U.S. is evidently involved in now.

McCoy (1992) found that *New York Times*' coverage did seem to reflect policy interests: As policy was shifted away from Central America, coverage of the region became more vague and accepting of official government opinion on events in the region.

Lee (2000) studied the reporting of mainstream U.S. media in pre-war crisis periods by looking at the U.S. and North Korean standoff over nuclear weapons. U.S. news reports tended to be negative toward North Korea and suggest that diplomatic solutions or negotiation would be unlikely. They also negatively characterized the North Korean leader as comparable to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Lee also found that U.S. media depend more on official U.S. government sources than any other source.

Soderlund (1993) studied the Nicaraguan Revolution in the Canadian and American press. He found that both countries reported the revolution in a predominantly negative fashion. The Canadian press was more likely to offer opinions, whether critical or supportive, than their American counterpart. Soderlund also found that early coverage of the revolution was event driven. Following the installation of a communist government, U.S. coverage tended to focus more on the revolution's role within international politics while Canadian coverage focused more on the domestic issues within Nicaragua. This may be explained because of a greater amount of the Canadian coverage originating from Nicaragua itself.

International News on Television

A few studies of international news on television are included because much of the research on framing has been conducted in this medium. Lefever (1974) conducted a content analysis of international news coverage on network television news. His study addressed the question of whether network TV provided adequate and balanced coverage so that citizens could form responsible opinions on issues important to the United States. He found coverage to be lacking in the presentation of opposing viewpoints and the depth of discussion regarding security issues.

Larson (1982) concluded that international news held a prominent position in the coverage presented by network news, and that it tended to be crisis-oriented, though some areas seemed to receive sustained coverage. These areas received this coverage because of U.S. involvement and interests and because of established newsgathering practices.

Kitagawa, Salwen, and Driscoll (1994) compared network television news coverage of international events on Japanese and American television. The authors found that both countries carried more national than international news. However, the authors found that neither nation devoted more attention to conflict-oriented themes in their international news and did not report more conflict-oriented themes when covering developing countries. This is in stark contrast to findings of other scholars who suggest that developing countries generally receive coverage when the story is conflict oriented.

Studies Comparing Pre and Post Cold War Coverage

The topic of foreign news with the absence of the Cold War as a variable has been studied pursuing many different angles including U.S. media coverage of, source selection, media structure within the main participants, and general conclusions and predictions about the direction of international news without such a dominant paradigm. A few studies that have laid the foundation for this work are discussed.

Several researchers sought to define newspaper coverage of international events through comparison of Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Malinkina and McLeod (2000) studied news coverage differences within *Izvestia* and the *New York Times* regarding the conflicts in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Their content analysis found that changes to the Russian media system had a profound effect on *Izvestia*'s coverage, but political and policy changes had little effect on the *New York Times*. The authors suggested that the change in U.S. policy towards Russia had little effect on the coverage of the *New York Times*. Also, "the factors that shape news production" remained relatively constant in the United States while the Russian media system underwent great changes between the two conflicts (p. 47).

An earlier study by Wang (1995) on the *New York Times* showed that the post-Cold War construction of Russia within the *Times* has changed very little from the representation of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Story frames and language used within the articles presented events as "rivalry between hard-core communists and reformers, and between state-controlled and free market economy (Wang, 1995, p. 227).

Krishnaiah, Signorielli, and McLeod (1993) found somewhat different results in their study on the *Times*' coverage of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. They noted a

change in the tone of coverage that reflected a change in the political cues given by Washington during this time of easing tensions.

Govea (1992) found that East-West themes were not more likely to exhibit themselves more frequently during periods of US-Soviet conflict and less frequently during times of cooperation as suggested. Govea studied the use of East-West themes on coverage of African violence in official and popular media through content analysis of the State Department's *Bulletin* and the popular magazine *Newsweek*. The study also found that Cold War themes are becoming less prevalent in popular media. Fair (1992) investigated the coverage of food aid to African countries in the *New York Times*. Her conclusion was that the news coverage revealed four news discourses of crisis, aid givers, aid recipients and the people. Fair concluded that these discourses were part of a larger Cold War framework that placed food aid to Africa within the superpower conflict. The United States was a hero, doing what was morally right.

Post-Cold War television coverage of international news has also been investigated. Chang, Wang, and Chen (1998) investigated the social construction of international imagery on U.S. and Chinese national television news. They found that the imagery selected was less dependent on the event itself and more dependent on the network's position with each society. Soderlund, Wagenberg, and Surlin (1998) found in their study of Canadian and U.S. television coverage of Cuba that both countries continued to depict Cuba much as they had during the Cold War. They stated that Cuba is most often set within a "conflict and confrontation" frame. Norris' (1995) study on the framing of the post-Cold War World suggested a drop in the saliency of international news without the Cold War frame because of several changes in the way international

news was reported. In regards to television news, fewer international news stories were reported, they were shorter in length, and they were further down the running order.

Russia saw the most substantial decline among individual countries. Also, Norris noted that the growth of 'parachute' journalism may provide views "with a more confusing, disjointed, and violent image of the world, rather than an informed and balanced understanding of international events" (p.268).

CHAPTER III

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Theoretical Framework

Framing

Framing is a difficult paradigm to define. As a theoretical concept, it has been used for understanding and investigating communication and related behavior in a wide range of disciplines. These include psychology, speech communication (especially discourse analysis and negotiation), organizational decision making, economics, health, communication, media studies, and political communication (Hallahan, 1999). Coles (1998) depicted framing as a term burdened with a great variety of meaning and responsibility. Entman (1993) referred to framing as a “scattered conceptualization” (p. 51). Entman also noted that framing was defined more in content-specific terms to particular research rather than as a clear concept, a characteristic that was brought forth by Scheufele (1999) in arguing for a more complete conceptualization of the topic.

Exactly what is framing? At its most basic level, framing is a cognitive feature. According to Durham (1998) “frames make the world more knowable and understandable” (p. 100). Goffman (1974) contributed some of the earliest definitions of framing within research literature by defining frames as the principles of organization that govern events. Edelman (1993) stated that “what we know about the social world depends upon how we frame and interpret the cues we receive about that world” (p. 231).

Proposed as sole explanations, frames serve as unifying social devices by making some meanings more salient than others (Entman, 1993, p. 53). Information-processing research implies that people have cognitive schema that organize their thinking, linking substantive beliefs, attitudes, and values (Gamson, 1991). Frames direct the selection, interpretation, and evaluation of new information by slotting them into familiar categories (Norris, 1995).

Association between framing and agenda setting.

The theoretical framework for this study begins with agenda setting, a concept in which the term “framing” is often associated. Cohen (1963) presented the idea that media do not tell the audience what to think but rather what to think about. Agenda setting explains why the public assigns certain value to issues while seemingly ignoring others in the mediated environment. McCombs and Shaw (1972) first set forth the agenda-setting hypothesis in their study of political issues in the 1968 presidential campaign. They suggested that the media had the power to determine which issues were considered salient. In regards to journalistic processes, the “agenda-setting function of the media refers to the media’s capability, through repeated news coverage, of raising the importance of an issue in the public’s mind” (Severin & Tankard, 1997, p.249).

The relationship between framing and agenda setting has been debated. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) operationalized framing in combination with other communication concepts such as agenda setting or priming. McCombs, Shaw, and Weaver (1997) suggested that framing is an extension of agenda setting. Identified as “second-level agenda setting,” they describe the impact of salience of characteristics in media coverage

and the audiences' subsequent interpretation of these news stories. Thus, second-level agenda setting can be described as the transmission of attribute saliency rather the transmission of object saliency as first-level agenda-setting illustrated (McCombs & Estrada, 1997). Jasperson et al. (1998) defined attribute saliency as the “multitude of ways political elites or media sources can choose to shape the presentation of framing”(p. 206).

Other conceptualizations of framing.

The definition of ‘framing’ is rendered complex because of the existence of several closely related definitions put forth by researchers. Other terms that could be associated with framing add to confusion considering the vagueness and similarities of their definitions. Some examples include media templates and narrative theory. Kitzinger (2000) studies the idea of “media templates,” which are “dominant analogies” that are used as a reference point on issues. The author argues that if frames are “maps,” as described by Graber, then the template is more of a cookie cutter. Other researchers such as McComas and Shanahan (1999) compared narrative theory to framing by saying that the difference is “narratives use a specific temporal order of events to construct meanings” (p.37). In this study the focus will be on comprehending frames in their relation to news content.

Types of Frames

The term media frame or news frame, as some scholars designate it, refers to an interpretative structure that sets particular events within a broader context. Norris (1995)

stated “news frames bundle key concepts, stock phrases, and stereotyped images to reinforce certain common ways of interpreting developments” (p. 358). The nature of framing is to prioritize some facts, events, or developments over others, thereby promoting a particular interpretation (Entman, 1993).

According to Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (2000), the first application of a framing concept to news was proposed by Tuchman in *Making News* (1978). Tuchman explained that journalists worked under organizational routines rather than making independent decisions regarding the importance of individual stories. One of these routines is the use of pre-existing frames to cover events (Tuchman, 1978). Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (2000) evaluated Tuchman’s work by pointing out that the Tuchman definition of framing “emphasized the role of the routine procedures of newswork in the creation of news frames” (p. 46). These procedures highlight certain places and ideas while “consistently closing off and blocking inquiry into others” (p. 46). Gitlin (1980) concurred with Tuchman that journalistic routines facilitated and justified framing.

Framing can be considered to have a dual role in the communicative process. Framing deals with both the way the news is presented and the way it is comprehended by the audience member. Thus there are two major concepts of framing: (a) media frames and (b) individual frames (Scheufele, 1999).

Media frames.

Media frames, also stated as news frames, can be defined as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events...The frame

suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p.143). Tuchman (1978) defined media frames saying that it “organizes everyday reality and the news frame is part and parcel of everyday reality” (p. 193).

Framing, selection and highlighting of certain story elements, makes the manufacture and packaging of news efficient and the results digestible for the audience (Rhodes, 1999). Citing Gitlin (1980), Rhodes (1999) noted that when news frames become entrenched they are “fixed in the repertoire of both news producers and consumers, and they are heavily laden with ideological potential” (p.103). Hendrickson and Tankard (1997) discussed how the journalistic processes of newsgathering to publication “result in an inevitable narrowing of the news frame, and ultimately of readers’ views of events and issues” (p. 37).

Under the hierarchy of media framing, the term framing can also be used as nomenclature to broadly characterize types of coverage. The two dominant examples of this type of frame are the (a) episodic frame and (b) the thematic frame (Iyengar, 1991). The episodic frame treats events as “discrete news stories,” while the thematic frame provides a broader interpretation of the news. Iyengar contends that the episodic frame appears far more often in news coverage than the thematic frame.

Norris (1995) provided many common examples of media frames. These included the horse race frame, the victim-perpetrator frame, and the racial conflict frame. Other frameworks include how developing countries are framed in Western news (Mowlana, 1985), how social movements are framed (Creedon, 1993) and how government responsibility is framed (Iyengar, 1991).

Although frames could be created to fit any number of story scenarios, as evident by those mentioned in the previous paragraph, Valenkeburg, Semetko, and De Vresse (1999) contend that a review of the literature on this topic tends to uncover four commonly used frames. These frames are (a) the conflict frame, (b) the human-interest frame, (c) the responsibility frame and (d) the economic consequence frame. The conflict frame emphasizes conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions. The human-interest frame focuses on an individual as an example or emphasizes emotions. The responsibility frame attributes responsibility by crediting or blaming certain political institutions or individuals. The economic consequence frame focuses on an event, problem, or issue in terms of its economic consequence to the audience.

Frames such as those mentioned above become so routine that they come to be seen “as natural and inevitable” (Norris, 1995, p. 358). Norris also says that when information that is contrary to these frames is encountered it is often discounted. She stated that “Frames represent stereotypes, which slot particular events into broader interpretive categories that may or may not be appropriate” (p. 358).

Individual frames.

Individual frames are defined as “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals' processing of information” (Entman, 1993 p. 65). Thus this type of framing is concerned with how the individuals may see a story on unemployment and then use their prior representations and experience with the issue to interpret its meaning. McLeod, et al. (1987) use the concept of individual frames to describe how audiences make sense of political news. They defined these frames as cognitive devices that

“operate as non-hierarchical categories that serve as forms of major headings into which any future news content can be filed” (p.10).

Valkenburg, Semetko, and De Vreese (1999) studied the effects of news frames on individuals’ thought and recall, which deals with both the construction of frames by the media and within the individual. They found that frames had a definite role in how the stories were interpreted and how readers voiced their opinions on issues. This concurs with comments by Pan & Kosicki (1993) that framing “may be studied as a strategy of constructing and processing news discourse or as a characteristic of the discourse itself” (p.57).

Frames in International News Coverage

Frames are important in all news coverage because of how they affect interpretation by the audience. A news frame suggests how readers and viewers should view events and issues (Hendrickson & Tankard, 1997). This is especially important with regard to international news. It has been stated that the less direct exposure an individual has to an issue, the more that individual must rely on news media for information on and interpretation of the issue (Zucker, 1978). Since the U.S. public lacks personal contact with foreign events, it is dependent on the news media’s presentation of world events (Krishnaiah, Signorielli & McLeod, 1993).

Media coverage of international or foreign events tends to reflect the political ethos and foreign policy of the country in which the media originate. That is, the *Times of London* will reflect a British perspective, the *Times of India* will reflect an Indian perspective and so on. A pattern can often be observed that as the leadership of a

particular country sets platforms and agendas that the journalistic community will often follow in-step. Thus, as Chan (1994) stated research has indicated that “media coverage of international and foreign affairs and government foreign policy often showed that media tend to cover international affairs from the government’s point of view, and that if the home government is involved, media would adopt a ‘pro-government’ stance (p. 135).

This reflection is most likely to occur in mainstream media, as alternative sources will inherently offer dissenting opinions. In countries with repressive governments mainstream media often reflect a direct party line through their essential control by that government. Adherence to the norm or status quo also occurs in democratic countries through various aspects within the journalistic process such as the predominate use of government sources when discussing news about other countries or journalistic pressures of timeliness. Curry and Dassin (1982) affirmed that some sort of press control exists in every political system and that the characteristics of this system depend on the security of the country’s leadership. This is because of the political potential inherent in the press. Tichnor, Donohue and Olien (1980) explained this by pointing out that as mass media are prominent channels of influencing public opinion and setting the public agenda, a government will attempt to influence the press in ways society allows.

Thus one can delineate that American media coverage of foreign events reflects U.S. policy interests as proposed by Herman and Chomsky in their propaganda model (1988). This model states that U.S. news media’s role is to “inculcate and defend the economic, social and political agenda of the privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state” (p. 298). A major assertion of this model is that “media coverage

has been heavily influenced by an anticommunist ideology braced by the potential Soviet threat to American society” (Krishnaiah, Signorielli, and McLeod, 1993). The former Soviet Union was depicted by the American media as an evil empire, a secret society and an ultimate enemy (Wang, 1995). Such representations were evident not only in news coverage but also in entertainment and in sports coverage.

Cold War Frame

Norris (1995) stated that “The Cold War frame highlighted certain events as international problems, identified their sources, offered normative judgments, and recommended particular policy solutions” (p.358). It could be argued the Cold War frame had an agenda-setting effect by prioritizing the selection of certain events and countries and making them newsworthy (Norris, 1995). This meant that not only was there an inherent rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States but nearly all of the remaining countries in the world were arranged on ‘sides.’ Norris (1995) illustrated how events such as the wars in Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, or Afghanistan could have been interpreted as internal strife if framed as individual events. However, within the Cold War framework these wars became international incidents and are part of a greater global struggle.

The Cold War frame or paradigm not only defined the adversarial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union but also offered a good-versus-evil script that was adapted in other international news reporting that did not concern the Soviet Union. Govea (1983) and Fair (1992) found that an East-West frame was used to simplify events in Africa even when those events had little to do with the Cold War. Fair’s 1992

study on the *New York Times*' coverage of U.S. food aid to Ethiopia suggested that the kindness of the West saved the nation from complete destruction. Stuckey (1995) asserted that the Cold War frame "offered a compelling combination of pragmatism and moralism: both enemies and the actions required against them are clear" (p. 215). Thus in any news 'tale' operating under this frame the villain is any enemy of democracy such as Saddam Hussein or Usama Bin Ladin. The United States, personified by the president, is always the hero (Stuckey, 1995).

Post-Cold War Frames

The Cold War provided a simplifying mechanism, or "orientation metaphor" that organized "a whole system of concepts with respect to one another" (Lakoff & Johnson, 1988, p. 14), and allowed American interests to be easily communicated to and understood by the mass public (Hinds & Windt, 1991). Stuckey (1995) contends that because of a lack of such an "orientation metaphor" events are interpreted on an individual basis rather than as a "cohesive and stable pattern." If such an assertion is correct then it would seem that most international news coverage has become victim of sporadic, conflict-oriented, hot-point coverage. Researchers who studied news coverage of Third-World countries often leveled this criticism. However, with the supposed disappearance of this frame it would seem that even news on Western or First World countries would suffer. In fact, without the Cold War paradigm it would seem that labels such as First, Second and Third World are themselves all but obsolete.

Whether the Cold War has ended is still up for debate. According to Siebers (1993) the Cold War is a "history of false endings" (p.29). He explains that factors such

as a fear of hard-line communists returning to power, growing nationalism and the stockpile of weapons that remain in the country cause periodic distress among American journalists. Siebers concluded that the Cold War itself is “the story of people’s skepticism about endings, intentions, interpretations, and calculations” (p. 29). Thus we can expect there to be both residual effects in reporting nations that were once so dominantly situated in the Cold War scenario and for there to be occasional pendulum swings toward the Cold War frame in times of crisis.

Support for this concept can be found in Wang’s (1995) discourse analysis of the *New York Times*’ coverage of the Russian Parliament crisis of 1993 and the failed Soviet coup of 1991. The author concluded that a “Cold War mentality” still remains in the coverage of Russia. Wang concluded that “it still has a crisis-ridden system, an unworkable economy, a cynical and apathetic society, and, most of all, a paralyzed leadership” (Wang, p.246). This concurred with research conducted by Cohen (1985) during a period in which media were most definitely working under a Cold War paradigm in regards to coverage of the then Soviet Union. Wang also noted a condescending victor’s tone in the coverage of Russia.

As discussed earlier, most scholars agree that media portrayals of foreign countries are linked to a country’s public policy and popular opinion among the constituency (Dennis, 1991). However, our vision of Russia remains cloudy even though the great changes that occurred in that country transpired nearly a decade ago. During the Cold War the U.S. had a consistent policy toward the Soviet Union that pursued the containment of Soviet political and ideological interests and the halt of its nuclear ones (Brzezinski, 1994). Today that role remains a mystery. Is Russia an ally or adversary, or

perhaps something else altogether? Even with the passage of nearly ten years it appears that no framework, at least not one as clear-cut as the Cold War paradigm has emerged. Lule (1998) stated as much saying “no dominant framework—or metanarrative—stands ready to replace the organizing and authorizing powers of the Cold War model” (p.170).

As the changes that occurred in Eastern Europe and Russia became evident, calls for changes in the way media covered the global structure were made. Such statements as “the goal is to catch up with the world’s changes and to develop a new overarching structure for covering the news after the Cold War” were reiterated in scholarly journals in the early ‘90s. Many predicted that a lack of framework would make international news less salient. Hoge (1993, p.2) stated as much, saying the “absence of clear, steady cues from Washington” makes defining news and reporting it more difficult. This would make it possible to apply new interpretations of world issues. Wuthnow (1987) stated that once a variable of uncertainty has been “introduced to the status quo,” such as new players, rules or changed resources of circumstances, a battle of interpretations could erupt. However, research and anecdotal evidence suggest that there is more questioning than battle over terms, themes and frames when discussing international news with a post-Cold War atmosphere.

Some have argued that this would make reporting more event centered or sporadic, while others say that it has offered the news media the freedom to broaden their perspective on the worldview they present. Chang, Wang, and Chen (1998) in their comparative analysis of U.S. and Chinese National TV news concluded that the media have taken advantage. They concluded that in their study “American and Chinese national TV news networks have indeed offered their respective audiences a world view

that has attempted to capture the larger picture through a variety of international images within and across national borders” (p.293).

Significance

The passage of time since the political upheaval during the early nineties allows for comparative analysis of news coverage before and after events. The political instability that occurred during the early nineties throughout Russia and the European world caused many authors to speculate that international news coverage was heading for uncharted territory. It has also been suggested that the importance of Russia as a news item has decreased during the latter years of the because of an absence of the Cold War backdrop that was prevalent in most foreign news coverage by the U.S. news media. This study would help establish whether Russia is losing its saliency as a news item and whether a predictable framework has been established to decide whether certain stories about Russia are still considered newsworthy by journalists.

The ability to articulate the possible effects of the disintegration or replacement of a formerly dominant news frame such as the Cold War can contribute to the body of work that seeks to determine why particular places or events receive coverage. Research on this topic helps indicate which topics are considered important enough by those in the news media to disseminate to the public. This insight has broad social and political ramifications regarding public policy and the audience’s understanding of the world and its position within it. This may have even larger implications if one adheres to the idea that U.S. media occupy a leadership role among Western media (Chang, Shoemaker, Brendlinger, 1987).

This study hopes to add to the literature discussing Russia's role in international news in the post-Cold War era. Research in this area is important because the previous literature has not been able to establish dominant trends regarding Russia's saliency as a news topic and the frames used to cover Russia. Previous studies have provided opposing results. Some researchers found little change in coverage of Russia (for example, see Malinkina and McLeod, 2000 & Wang, 1995) while others suggest some change has occurred (see Govea, 1992, Krishnaiah, Signorielli, and McLeod, 1993). Thus, more research is required.

Hypotheses

This study will look into the roles of the concepts of news frames and newsworthiness and their effect on the news coverage of Russia during these two distinct conflicts. Based upon the theoretical framework on news frames and findings of previous studies the following hypotheses have been formed.

- H₁: The percentage of front-page stories to the total number of stories will be greater for the Afghanistan conflict than for the Chechen conflict.
- H₂: Articles on the Afghanistan conflict will be greater in length than articles on the Chechen conflict.
- H₃: Articles on the Afghanistan conflict are more likely to have staff-credit bylines than those of the Chechen conflict.
- H₄: Articles on the Afghanistan conflict are more likely to have datelines from U.S cities than those of the Chechen conflict.

- H₅: Articles published on the Afghanistan conflict will be more critical of the Soviet Union than articles published on the Chechen conflict will be of Russia.
- H₆: Articles on the Afghanistan conflict will be more reliant on U.S. official sources than articles on the Chechen conflict.

CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

Sample Time Period

The study investigates two distinct conflicts. These events occur in two distinct time periods for the Russian State. The Afghanistan conflict occurred within the Cold War time frame under communist leadership. Soviet troops were first deployed in Afghanistan on Christmas morning 1979 to support a coup led by Babrak Karmal. Soviet troops formally withdrew from the country in February 15, 1989 (Arnold, 1993). The methodological time frame from which the sample size was constructed is 1980-1988. The years 1979 and 1989 are omitted because the event occurred in only the fringe months of those years and their inclusion might have skewed the population sampled for the study.

The second, Russia's conflict with the breakaway republic of Chechnya, is an ongoing dispute that is occurring under democratic leadership and a time frame that can be defined as post-Cold War. This dispute has occurred in two sequences. The first began in December of 1994 and concluded in August of 1996 with the official signing of the peace agreement. The second sequence of the conflict began in June 1999 and continues in sporadic forms through the present. The methodological time, for the purposes of content analysis is 1995-1996, and 1999-2000. The year 1994 will be omitted in order to remain consistent with the standard set in the previous paragraph.

Newspapers

Data was collected through analysis of two major American newspapers, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. The *New York Times* was chosen because of its role as leader among American newspapers and its consistent use in newspaper research. Also, it is considered the premier source on international news among American dailies (Acosta-Alzuru & Lester-Roushanzamir, 1998). The *Washington Post* was chosen because of its proximity to those who have direct political influence on the United States's diplomatic relationship with Russia.

Initially a third newspaper, the *Los Angeles Times*, was to be part of the sample. Satisfactory amounts of data were not obtainable, particularly on the Chechen conflict, which yielded only one possible article within the four-year time period in which a constructed week was created. If used, the *Los Angeles Times* would have rendered 18 possible articles within the nine-year period of the sample for the Afghanistan conflict.

Sample Selection

Each newspaper was analyzed for news stories that contained references to the subject matter within each particular conflict's established methodological time period. To qualify, an article had to be listed in the respective paper's index and have a reference to Afghanistan within the first three paragraphs. Opinion and editorial pieces were excluded. This analysis consisted of one constructed week per year in both newspapers during the previously established sampled time periods of both conflicts, resulting in a total of 182 possible individual issues. Each constructed week was created by randomly selecting dates within each year of the sample years of each conflict until a proper

constructed week had been completed. Selection of dates was conducted by using a computer program to randomly select numbers between 1 and 365. Each number in this range corresponded with a particular day of the year. Numbers were generated until a day representing each day of the week was obtained. This was done for each year of the two samples, resulting in a total of 13 constructed weeks. After the selection process was complete, a total of 90 possible articles for the Afghanistan conflict and 29 possible articles for the Chechen sample were obtained. Upon applying the criteria described above, the usable sample became 69 articles for Afghanistan conflict and 24 for Chechen conflict.

Coders

The researcher obtained data for placement of articles, column length, dateline and byline since the data was free from value judgments. Coders were used to supply data for the tone of the articles and to find attributions to U.S. sources within the articles. Graduate students from a research methods class coded the articles. Coders were given two sample articles and asked to practice with the instructor to achieve an understanding of how to code for the study. Also, an explanation sheet detailing the procedure and defining relevant terms was provided to each student (See Appendix A). Eleven coders divided into four groups of two and one group of three coded approximately fifteen to twenty articles that were randomly placed into folders until the entire sample was exhausted. All coders received articles from both sample papers and both sample time periods.

Investigation of an article's tone required coders to assign a value to whether an article depicted Russia in either a positive, neutral or negative tone. A three-point scale was used, which assigned the value of 1 for positive, 2 for neutral and 3 for negative. Inter-coder reliability was calculated using Holsti. The inter-coder reliability for this hypothesis was 60.22%.

Because of the low inter-coder reliability addressing the article tone, additional coding was done by 26 undergraduate students in a research methods class. This additional coding supplemented the previous coders' information by serving as tiebreaker when there was a disagreement between the initial coders. Students were asked to code five articles each from the sample of disputed articles. This provided at least three coding decisions per article. This information was used to confidently assign a value to an article so that it could be used in statistical analysis.

Hypothesis 6 asked coders to determine whether an article referenced American sources. The instructional sheet provided asked the coders to identify these sources by circling "any information that was quoted from a U.S. official or from any individual that you feel could represent the United States." An example within the sample of text was given along with a list of other possible examples (see Appendix A). Holsti's inter-coder reliability for hypothesis 6 was 90.33%

Timeframe

The sample selection and analysis of data for hypotheses 1-4 was conducted during fall 2000. The coding for hypotheses 5 and 6 and the statistical analysis for all hypotheses were done during spring 2001.

Definition of Terms

Placement of articles: Article placement was analyzed by determining whether an article or its headline appeared on the front page. Placement of articles referred to where articles are placed within the newspaper. Articles were classified according to whether they garnered front-page headlines or not. If only a headline or photo appeared for an article on the front page to direct the reader to the article within the paper, the article was classified as having front-page status. This classification helped the researcher determine the saliency of Soviet Union/Russia and these conflicts. It also addressed whether these conflicts remain salient to the news media as it helped determine the amount of space dedicated to these stories.

Length: Length was analyzed by measuring each article in total column inches. Headlines and pictures that accompanied an article and well as any headline or picture that was placed on a separate page to direct a reader to an article was measured along with the written text.

Staff-generated articles vs. wire-service bylines: Hypothesis 3 was analyzed by determining whether the author of an article was a member of the staff of a respective paper or whether the article came from an outside source or from a wire service. Wire service bylines referred to those articles credited to major news agencies such as the Associated Press, United Press International, and Reuters. Articles that were attributed by authors from papers other than the paper the article appeared in were included in the wire-service/others category. The author theorized that if an event were considered important enough a newspaper would assign a staff writer to cover the area consistently.

Dateline: Datelines were quantified to determine whether the dateline was either U.S. in origin or from a location involved in the conflict or independent of the conflict. It was suggested that if the conflict were seen as important to the United States then more articles would be written with an U.S. dateline. This concurs with findings by Weaver, Porter, and Evans (1984).

Article tone: Article tone was addressed by having coders assign an article as having either a negative, neutral or positive tone in regards to the respective governments and military. A scale of 1 for negative, 2 for neutral and 3 for positive was assessed. Malinkina and McLeod (2000) used such a scale. This helps determine whether the changing political landscape from Cold War to post-Cold War altered the depiction of Russia by the media.

Reliance on Official Sources: The variable 'Reliance on Official Sources' is concerned with whether any sources with U.S. ties were quoted within the articles. Articles were analyzed for references to individuals involved in United States politics, government, national security and military affairs. Analysis of this variable helped determine whether an event was a major foreign-policy issue. Keywords within the text that make reference to the United States were quantified. Words such as "Washington, the President, the Pentagon, and the United States" were coded. Analysis of these variables helped determine whether the event was being framed in an East-West conflict.

CHAPTER V

FINDINGS

Hypotheses investigating placement, byline, dateline and official sources were tested using Chi-square analysis. Hypotheses researching length and article tone were tested using t-tests for independent samples. All statistics were computed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). H_1 suggested that the Afghanistan conflict would contain more front-page articles on average than the Chechen conflict. The opposite of what was predicted occurred, with the Chechen conflict having a greater percentage of front-page stories. The hypothesis was not supported. The p value was .261 (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1

Chi-square for Differences between Prominence of Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage.

	Front Page		Non-Front Page		Pearson Chi-square
	%	n	%	n	
Afghanistan	11.5	8	88.4	61	$p = .261$
Chechnya	20.8	5	79.2	19	

H_2 stated that articles on Afghanistan would be greater in length. As in the first hypothesis, the opposite proved true and the stories on Chechnya were greater in length. The mean for Afghanistan stories was 16.48 while the mean for stories on Chechnya was 32.72. The data was statistically significant, but in the opposite direction from what was

predicted. The p value was .000 (Table 5.2). H_2 was not supported by the data.

Table 5.2

T-test for Differences between Length of Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage.

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	df	t-value	p
Afghanistan	69	16.48	13.23	91	-3.98	.000
Chechnya	24	32.72	25.55			

H_3 , which stated that articles on the Afghanistan conflict were more likely to have staff credited bylines and that articles on Chechnya would rely more on wire services and on borrowed correspondence was not supported. There was a significant difference but the Chechen conflict proved to have a much higher percentage of stories written by staff members than the Afghanistan conflict. There was a statistically significant difference between the percentages, however in the opposite direction than predicted. The data showed to be significant with a p value of .017 (Table 5.3). H_3 was not supported.

Table 5.3

Chi-square for Differences between Bylines in Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage

	Staff		Wire-S/Other		Pearson Chi-square
	%	n	%	n	
Afghanistan	66.6	46	33.3	23	$p = .017$
Chechnya	91.6	22	8.3	2	

H_4 stated that articles from the Afghanistan conflict were more likely to have U.S. datelines than their Chechen counterparts. The hypothesis was strongly supported with a p value .007 (Table 5.4). Articles on Afghanistan with U.S. datelines accounted for 37.6 percent of the sample as opposed to only 8.3 percent of articles on the Chechen conflict. H_4 was accepted.

Table 5.4

Chi-square for Differences between Datelines in Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage.

	U.S.		Non-U.S.		Pearson Chi-square
	%	n	%	n	
Afghanistan	37.6	26	62.3	43	$p = .007^*$
Chechnya	8.3	2	91.6	22	

* $p < .01$

H_5 stated that articles published during the Afghanistan conflict would be more critical of the Soviet Union than their counterparts in the Chechen conflict. Results indicated the opposite to be true. The mean value for the Afghanistan conflict was 2.46 compared to 2.79 for the Chechen conflict. The p value was .024 (Table 5.5). H_5 was not accepted.

Table 5.5

T-test for Differences between Tone of Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage.

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	df	t-value	p
Afghanistan	69	2.46	.65	91	-2.29	.024
Chechnya	24	2.79	.41			

Scale: 1 = positive
2 = neutral
3 = negative

H_6 suggested that articles on the Afghanistan conflict would contain more references to U.S. sources than its Chechen counterpart. H_6 was not accepted (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6

Chi-square for Differences between Prominence of Afghanistan and Chechen Coverage.

	U.S. Source		No U.S. Source		Pearson Chi-square
	%	n	%	n	
Afghanistan	55.1.	38	44.9	31	$p = .138$
Chechnya	37.5	9	62.5	15	

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION

This study hoped to discover: (a) Whether the so-called Cold War frame (Blumer, 1992, Grunwald, 1993, Hoge, 1993, Norris, 1995, Seib, 1997) and its subsequent demise has altered the news coverage of Russia and the former Soviet Union during times of military conflict; (b) whether the absence of the Cold War news frame resulted in a change in the coverage of the Chechen conflict compared with the Afghanistan conflict and (c) whether this change indicates a decrease in Russia's saliency as a news topic by American media. The following table provides a summary of the hypotheses tested.

Table 6.1

Summary of Hypotheses.

H ₁ :	The percentage of front-page stories to the total number of stories will be greater for the Afghanistan conflict than for the Chechen conflict.	Not Supported
H ₂ :	Articles on the Afghanistan conflict will be greater in length than articles on the Chechen conflict.	Not Supported
H ₃ :	Articles on the Afghanistan conflict are more likely to have staff-credit bylines than those of the Chechen conflict.	Not Supported
H ₄ :	Articles on the Afghanistan conflict are more likely to have datelines from U.S cities than those of the Chechen conflict.	Supported
H ₅ :	Articles published on the Afghanistan conflict will be more critical of the Soviet Union than articles published on the Chechen conflict will be of Russia.	Not Supported
H ₆ :	Articles on the Afghanistan conflict will be more reliant on U.S. official sources than articles on the Chechen conflict.	Not Supported

Discussion

This study hoped to discover whether Russia had retained its saliency as a news topic. It was suggested that because of the lack of a clear news frame the coverage of Russia in the latter half of the nineties would not be as complete as the Soviet Union's a decade before. The hypotheses suggested that the coverage of the Afghanistan War would exhibit characteristics that would render it as more salient than the war in Chechnya. These assumptions were based on the idea that the lack of the Cold War frame would result in sporadic coverage of the Chechen War. However, the findings seem to support that Russia remains an important subject in international news. Most of the hypotheses were not supported, suggesting that newspaper coverage on Russia has remained either relatively unchanged or has changed in ways not predicted by the researcher.

As expected there were significantly more datelines of U.S cities in the Afghanistan conflict than the Chechen conflict. The results further confirm that the Afghanistan War was indeed a more salient news item because of the amount of political discussion it received. This suggests that the more important an event or conflict was to U.S. interests the more coverage it would receive from an U.S. perspective. Chang, Shoemaker and Brendlinger (1987) found that relevance to the United States was an important determining factor in international news coverage. In nearly all occurrences the articles with U.S. datelines were from Washington or New York, suggesting an U.S. government or United Nations affiliation.

Various factors may explain why the other hypotheses were rejected. For example, communication technologies have advanced rapidly since the beginning of the

Afghanistan War and allow for more rapid communication. It is now feasible to send a reporter to once-remote locations because the computer, the Internet and satellite technology also allows for reporting from the field even as events occur. Technology also allows for greater access to actual battle sites and to areas previously restricted due to either military or government constraints or terrain and time issues.

Another factor is the relative ease with which journalists can cover Russia compared with their counterparts in the Cold War. The easing of tensions between the West and Russia has resulted in greater freedom in covering stories within Russia. Also since Russian media no longer operate under a communist model credibility of information provided by the Russian press had increased dramatically. Particularly important to this study is that control of the press during the Chechen War is non-existent. Journalists have virtually free movement within the country and to the actual battle sites in the Chechen War. Lieven (1998) stated that it “was the great drive-in war” in which journalists could find quiet areas and drive main roads straight to the conflict (p.119). The Russian government and military seem to have no plans to deal with the media. This stands in contrast to the Soviet Union, which tried to restrict information regarding the conflict in Afghanistan.

Another reason for the lack of significant difference in coverage of the two conflicts may be because the focus or framing of the articles may have been altered. The Cold War frame used to cover the Afghanistan conflict may have depicted the conflict in a more politically charged manner. Whereas the stories on the Chechen conflict seemed to be grounded more in human-interest and conflict themes rather than political ramifications. This would reflect a change in the framing of the stories from a political

frame (e.g. Cold War) to a simple conflict frame and/or human-interest frame. Perhaps without a dominant political frame the situation is harder to frame as a political issue than one of human conflict. However, conclusive evidence in a shift in the frames used in covering Russia cannot be made without more detailed analysis of the composition of the stories from each conflict.

Is the Cold War frame dead? This researcher concludes that remnants of the Cold War frame, as suggested by Siebers (1993), continue to paint an adversarial picture of Russia. This may be because many in politics and society still view Russia as an enemy. However, beyond this adversarial view of direct competition, other aspects of the Cold War frame seem to have disappeared. The Cold War as an orientation metaphor that can explain policy decisions (Lakoff & Johnson, 1988) seems to be decreasing in use. No outwardly visible frame has taken its place in regards to U.S. coverage of Russia. Lule (1998) stated as much saying “no dominant framework—or metanarrative—stands ready to replace the organizing and authorizing powers of the Cold War model” (p.170).

There seems to be reliance upon the frames used to depict developing countries. Perhaps this is because Russia and several other Eastern European countries are still undergoing a great deal of political and economic transition. The emphasis on reporting that shows conflict but not perspective seems to be increasing. This could be visible in all aspects of international news coverage, regardless of the country reported. The “deviance” (Chang, Shoemaker, Brendlinger, 1987) of an event may be an increasingly important factor on whether a story is newsworthy and may be the dominant frame of international news of the future. This would suggest that the world outside U.S. borders is a violent place and little more.

Weaknesses

This study has some inherent weaknesses. This study may not be truly representative of the overall perception that has been created for Russia by the media as a whole since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The average citizen tends to get his/her news of foreign countries from television. It could be argued that those who read an elite newspaper such as the *New York Times* or *Washington Post* do not represent the average news consumer. The *New York Times* may be doing credible work in covering Russia, but this may not have a great effect on the perception or knowledge of the country for the average news consumer. Newspaper articles on the Russian and Chechen conflicts were units of analysis. Perhaps if research was conducted on network television news the results might be different. Scholars who conducted research on television seemed to report more differences in U.S. media coverage of Russia (for example, see Norris, 1995) than their counterparts who looked at newspapers (Malinkina & McLeod, 2000). Also, research in framing topics appears to be better suited to television than print media because of television's unique storytelling capabilities.

However, it can be argued that while the readership of the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* do not represent the average news consumer, they do represent those with ability to alter political policy. The elite status of the papers has been reached because of the fact that they are read by both U.S. and worldwide leadership. Thus, the use of these papers in content analysis may be very appropriate when researching how news affects political policy.

Another weakness might be the time frame of the sample. This is due to the complex and sporadic nature of the Chechen War. The differences in the lengths of the two conflicts may cause some difficulties in drawing conclusions in the variation of the coverage of the two conflicts.

Another problem with the sample is comparing an ongoing event with a completed one. The Afghanistan War has a relatively clear beginning and end. This is important because coverage of that war appeared to be greatest at the beginning and end of the conflict. For example, the *Washington Post*'s coverage of the Afghanistan War yielded 24 stories for analysis. Thirteen of those stories occurred in either the first or last year of the sample. This indicates that attention to the Afghanistan War, and perhaps wars in general, is greatest at their beginnings and conclusions. Since the conflict in Chechnya has not been resolved the amount of coverage it has received so far may not be indicative of how the conflict may be covered in its entirety.

Recommendations

More research needs to be conducted to determine the news frames used to cover Russia, and it needs to consider not only newspapers, but television, magazines, and Internet news sites. Each of these media contributes to the overall perception of Russia as country. Future research may also want to distinguish between the importance of the frame(s) used to depict Russia and its effect on the perceptions of the general public and the policy makers. If Russia is viewed in the same frame as developing countries, that may suggest the United States has become more isolationist in its worldview.

The comparison of the coverage of the Afghanistan War and the Chechen conflict should continue in the future. The resolution of the Chechen conflict may help establish a more comparable sample. Other comparisons of coverage of Russia during the Cold War and post-Cold war eras would be beneficial to establishing Russia's newsworthiness in the post-Cold War era and the news frames used to create the context of the news stories. As the worldwide political landscape continues to change, similar studies are needed to compare the differences of news coverage of other countries. Frames other than the developmental frame need to be discovered so that international news does not become totally reliant on conflict and disaster themes. With additional research, more succinct news frames can be created that help portray a more accurate depiction of the world.

APPENDIX A: Instructions to Coding Sheet

Each article has a label that identifies the newspaper, the date of the article and the page the article is on. The label also has a red number. Write the red number on the coding sheet.

Read the article. Circle any time that information is quoted from a U.S. official or from an individual you feel represent the United States. A U.S. office holder such as the President, or a member of the House of Representatives or Senate would qualify as an official. Other examples would be military officials, advisors, diplomats, or any reference you feel can be attributed to someone representing the United States.

For example, "In a briefing yesterday, U.S. officials said that for the past few months the situation has remained largely a stalemate, with the Soviets in control of the territory they occupy but unable to end the widespread resistance...."

Other examples might include:

"officials said"

"an aide said"

"military officials reported that"

"a specialist on the area"

"a state department official said"

"the Clinton or Reagan administration stated"

"a western diplomat said"

"a retired military general said"

"military analysts stated"

After reading the article please determine how you feel the Soviet Union/Russia is depicted by the article. You have one of five choices. If you do not feel that the Soviet Union/Russia is depicted in the article please choose neutral.

APPENDIX B: Coding Sheet

Name _____

Article Number _____

How would you rate the depiction of the Soviet Union/Russia in this article? (Please circle only one)

Highly Positive Somewhat Positive Neutral Somewhat Negative Highly Negative

Does the article quote sources from United States officials? Y / N

If so please identify (Name, Title, Organization)

Article Number _____

How would you rate the depiction of the Soviet Union/Russia in this article? (Please circle only one)

Highly Positive Somewhat Positive Neutral Somewhat Negative Highly Negative

Does the article quote sources from United States officials? Y / N

If so please identify (Name, Title, Organization)

Article Number _____

How would you rate the depiction of the Soviet Union/Russia in this article? (Please circle only one)

Highly Positive Somewhat Positive Neutral Somewhat Negative Highly Negative

Does the article quote sources from United States officials? Y / N

If so please identify (Name, Title, Organization)

REFERENCES

- Acosta-Alzuru, C. & Lester-Roushanzamir, E.P. (1998). All you will see is the one you once knew: Portrayals from the Falklands/Maldivas war in U.S. and Latin American newspapers. Journalism & Communications Monographs 1(4) 303-345.
- Akhavan-Majid, R. & Ramaprasad, J. (2000). Framing Beijing Gazette 62(1) 45-59.
- Arnold, A. (1993). The fateful pebble: Afghanistan's role in the fall of the soviet empire Novato, CA: Presidio Press.
- Blumler, J. G. (1992). News media in flux: An analytical afterword. Journal of Communication, 42(3) 100-107.
- Brzezinski, Z. (1994). The premature partnership. Foreign Affairs 73(2) 67-82.
- Caliendo, S.M., Gibney, M.P., & Payne A. (1999). All the news that's fit to print: *New York Times* coverage of human-rights violations. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 4(4) 48-69.
- Cassara, C. (1998). U.S. newspaper coverage of human right in Latin America, 1975-1982: Exploring President Carter's agenda-building influence. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 75(3) 478-486.
- Chan, S. (1994). State-press relationship revisited: A comparison of foreign policy: coverage on the Hong Kong 1997 issue by there newspapers. Gazette 53(1/2) 135-145.
- Chang, T., Shoemaker, P. & Brendlinger, N. (1987). Determinants of international news coverage in the U.S. media. Communication Research 14(4) 396-414.

- Chang, T., Wang, J. & Chen, C. (1998). The social construction of international imagery in the post-cold war era: A comparative analysis of U.S. and Chinese nation tv news. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media 42(3) 277-296.
- Cohen, B. (1963). The press and foreign policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cohen, S. (1985). Sovieticus: American perspectives and Soviet realities. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Cohen, Y. (1995). Foreign press corps as an indicator of international news interest. Gazette 56(1) 89-101.
- Coles, R. (1998). Peaceniks and warmongers' framing fracas on the home front: dominant and opposition discourse interaction during the Persian gulf crisis. The Sociological Quarterly 39(3) 369-391.
- Creedon, P. (1993). Framing feminism: A feminist primer for the mass media. Media Studies Journal 7(1) 68-81.
- Curry, J.L. & Dassin, J.R. (1982). Press control around the world. New York: Praeger.
- Dennis, E. (1991). Images of the Soviet Union in the United States: Some impressions and an agenda for research. In E. Dennis, G. Gerbner & Y. N. Zassoursky (Eds.), Beyond the cold war: Soviet and American media images. Newbury Park CA: Sage
- Durham, F. (1998). News frames as social narratives: TWA flight 800 Journal of Communication 48(4) 100-117.
- Edelman, M.J. (1993). Contestable categories and public opinion. Political Communication 10(3) 231-242.

- Edwards, S.J.A. (2000). Mars unmasked: The changing face of urban operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Entman, R. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication 43(4) 51-58.
- Eribo, F. (1993). Coverage of Africa south of the Sahara by Pravda, Izvestia, Trud and Selskaya Zhizn, 1979-1987: A content analysis. Journalism Quarterly 70(1) 51-57.
- Fair, J. E. (1992) Are we the world? In B. Hawk (Ed.) Africa's media image. 109-120
New York: Praeger.
- Friedman, N. (2000). The fifty year war: Conflict and strategy in the cold war. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
- Gall, C. & de Waal, T. (1998). Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus. New York: New York University Press.
- Gamson, W. (1991). Talking politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gamson, W.A. & Modigliani, A. (1987). The changing culture of affirmative action. In R.G. Braungart & M.M. Braungart (Eds.), Research in political sociology Vol 3 137-177. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Gitlin, T. (1980). The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the new left. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Govea, R. (1983). East-West themes in the reporting of African violence. Social Science Quarterly 64(1) 193-199.

Govea, R. (1992). Reporting African violence: Can America media forget the cold war?

In B. Hawk (Ed.) Africa's media image. 94-108 New York: Praeger.

Grunwald, H. (1993). The post-cold war press. Foreign Affairs, 72(3) 12-16.

Hallahan, K. (1999). Seven models of framing: Implications for public relations Journal of Public Relations Research 11(3) 205-242.

Hendrickson, L. & Tankard J. (1997). Expanding the news frame: The systems theory perspective. Journalism and Mass Communication Educator 51(4) 39-46.

Herman E.S. & Chomsky, N. (1988). Manufacturing consent: The political economy of the mass media. New York: Pantheon Books.

Hinds, L., & Windt, T. (1991). The cold war as rhetoric: The beginnings, 1945-1950. New York: Praeger.

Hoge, J. F. (1993). The end of predictability. Media Studies Journal, 7(4) 1-9.

Iyengar, S. & Kinder, D. (1987). News that matters: television and American opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Jasperson, A., et al. (1998). Framing and the public agenda: Media effects on the importance of the federal budget deficit. Political Communication 15(2) 205-224.

Johnson, M.A. (1997). Predicting news flow from Mexico. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 74(2) 315-330.

Kakar, H. (1995). Afghanistan: The Soviet invasion and the Afghanistan response, 1979-1982. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

- Khan, R.M. (1991). Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Kitagawa, Y., Salwen, M. & Driscoll, P. (1994). International news on Japanese and American network television: Regionalism and conflict. Gazette 54(1) 87-93.
- Kitzinger, J. (2000). Media templates: Patterns of association and the reconstruction of meaning over time. Media Culture and Society 22(1) 61-84.
- Krishnaiah, J., Signorielli, N. & McLeod, D. (1993). The evil empire revisited: *New York Times* coverage of the Soviet intervention in and withdrawal from Afghanistan. Journalism Quarterly 70(3) 647-655.
- Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. (1988). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Larson, J.F. (1982). International affairs coverage on U.S evening network news, 1972-1979. In W.C. Adams (Ed.), Television coverage of international affairs. (pp. 15-39). Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Co.
- Larson, J.F. (1984). Television's window on the world: International affairs coverage on the U.S. networks. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Co.
- Lee, O. (2000, August). Manufacturing consent of 'crisis': A content analysis of the *New York Times*' reporting on the issue of North Korean nuclear weapon. Paper presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Phoenix, AZ.
- Lefever, E.W. (1974). TV and national defense. Boston, VA: Institute for American Strategy Press.

- Lieven, A. (1998). Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian power. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Lule, J. (1998). News values and social justice: U.S. news and the Brazilian street children. Howard Journal of Communications 9(3)169-186.
- Malinkina, O. & McLeod, D. (2000). From Afghanistan to Chechnya: News coverage by Izvestia and the *New York Times*. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 77(1) 37-49.
- Magnus, R.H. & Naby, E. (1998). Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Marsden, P. (1998). *The Taliban: War, religion and the new order in Afghanistan*. London: Oxford University Press.
- McComas, K. & Shanahan, J. (1999). Impact of narratives. Communication Research 26(1) 30-57.
- McCombs, M.E. & Estrada, G. (1997). The news media and the pictures in our heads. In S. Iyengar & R. Reeves (Eds.), Do the media govern?: Politicians, voters and reporters in America. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- McCombs, M.E. & Shaw, D.L (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly 36(2) 176-187.
- McCombs, M.E., Shaw, D.L. & Weaver, D. (1997). Communication and democracy: Exploring the intellectual frontiers in agenda-setting theory. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- McCoy, T. (1992). *The New York Times'* coverage of El Salvador. Newspaper Research Journal 13(3) 67-84.

- McLeod, J.M, Kosicki, G.M., Pan, Z., & Allen, S.G. (1987). Audience perspectives on the news: Assessing their complexity and conceptual frames. Paper presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, San Antonio, TX.
- Mowlana, H. (1985). International flow of information: Global report and analysis. Paris: UNESCO.
- Norris, P. (1995). The restless searchlight: Network news framing of the post-cold war world. Political Communication 12(4) 357-370.
- Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G.M. (1993). Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse. Political Communication 10(1) 55-73.
- Rhodes, J. (1999). Fanning the flames of racial discord. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 4(4) 95-118.
- Riffe, A., Aust, C.F., Gibson, R.J., Viall, E.K. & Yi, H. (1993). International news and borrowed news in the New York Times: An update. Journalism Quarterly 70(3) 639-646.
- Rogers, T. (1992). The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan: Analysis and chronology. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Scheufele, D. (1999). Framing as a theory of media effects. Journal of Communication 103-122.
- Seib, P. (1997). Headline diplomacy: How news coverage affects foreign policy. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Severin, W.J. & Tankard, J.W. (1997). Communication theories: origins, methods, and uses in the mass media. New York: Longman Publishers.

- Shoemaker, P.J., Danielian, L.H. & Brendlinger, N. (1991) Deviant acts, risky business and U.S. interests: The newsworthiness of world events. Journalism Quarterly 68(4) 781-795.
- Sibley, K.A.S. (1998). The cold war. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Siebers, T. (1993). Cold war criticism and the politics of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Soderlund, W.C. (1993). The Nicaraguan revolution in the Canadian and American press. Mass Comm Review 20(1/2) 86-98.
- Soderlund, W., Wagenberg, R., & Surlin, S. (1998). The impact of the end of the cold war on Canadian and American tv news coverage of Cuba: Image consistency or image change. Canadian Journal of Communication 23(2) 217-231.
- Stuckey, M. (1995). Competing foreign policy visions: Rhetorical hybrids after the cold war. Western Journal of Communication 59(3) 214-227.
- Tichenor, Donohue & Olien (1980). Community conflict and the press. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Tuchman, G. (1978). Making news: A study in the construction of reality. New York: Free Press.
- Urban, M. (1990). War in Afghanistan. London: Macmillan Press.
- Valkenburg, P., Semetko, H., & De Vreese, C. (1999). The effects of news frames on readers' thoughts and recall. Communication Research 26(5) 550-569.
- Wang, S. (1995). The *New York Times*' construction of post-cold war Russia: More "false endings." Gazette 54(3) 227-248.

- Weaver, J.B., Porter, C.J. & Evans M.E. (1984). Patterns in foreign news coverage on U.S. network TV: A 10-year analysis. Journalism Quarterly 61(2) 356-363.
- Wuthnow, R. (1987). Meaning and moral order: Explorations in cultural analysis. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Zucker, H.G. (1978). The variable nature of news media influence. In B. Ruben (Ed.), Communication Year book 2. 255-240 New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

VITA

James Victor Brzozowski, Jr. was born in Houston, Texas, on December 22, 1974, to Leona Korenek Brzozowski and James Victor Brzozowski. James grew up in Garwood, Texas, a rural town approximately an hour west of Houston. He graduated from Rice Consolidated High School in Altair, Texas, in 1993. James attended Sam Houston State University, earning a Bachelor of Fine Arts in Radio-Television-Film on December 20, 1997.

James began his graduate work at Southwest Texas State University in August of 1998. He served as student representative on the Mass Communication Graduate Program Committee. He presented papers at the Southwest Conference on Asian Studies, the Southwest Symposium of the Southwest Education Council for Journalism and Mass Communication, and the Southwest Texas State University Communication Week 2000. James also served as a guest speaker on the topic of broadcast news for Mass Communication classes such as Visual Communications and International Communications. He also contributed time to Lambda Omega Alpha service fraternity serving terms as Secretary and Recruitment Coordinator.

Permanent Address: 8108 HWY 71
 Garwood, Texas 77442

This thesis was typed by James Victor Brzozowski, Jr.