

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN ECONOMICS SANCTIONS
IMPOSED ON IRAQ

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by

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate my thesis to my late father who encouraged me when I was fifteen to write a book about Iraq and its people.

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I would like to thank my mother, Nawal Maraqa, for giving me the courage and strength I needed to complete my goals.

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ABSTRACT

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Economic sanctions have become a common tool of coercive foreign policy, as a prelude or an alternative to warfare. In the case of Iraq, economic sanctions were largely ineffective in achieving the UN resolutions they were designed to implement. The UN sanctions were not successful in achieving the complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. It took military intervention to restore a credible, independent government in Kuwait. Neither did the economic sanctions de-stabilize Saddam Hussein's regime or ensure the complete destruction of all of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction. As a political tool, comprehensive economic sanctions harmed Iraqi civilians instead of punishing the Iraqi regime for its irresponsible behavior.

The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq hurt every aspect in the Iraqi society and the country's infrastructure. The suffering of the Iraqi people cannot be attributed solely to the economic sanctions, since the Iraqi regime continued to divert essential resources from civilian needs to building presidential palaces and fortifying its own security services. By almost every measure - such as malnutrition, child mortality and overall morbidity - the situation of most Iraqi civilians deteriorated during the period that the economic sanctions have been imposed upon Iraq.

The economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq for twelve years and persisted because the complete disarmament of Iraq was not achieved. Throughout the past decade the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein has continually evaded and deceived the UN inspectors about its nuclear, chemical and biological weapon capabilities.

The UN economic sanctions were not successful in implementing the UN resolutions as they were designed to enforce, owing to a number of political, economic and regional factors. The purpose of this thesis is to assess the economic and political factors that led to the dismal failure of the UN economic sanctions in this case.

INTRODUCTION

In modern times economic sanctions have become a common tool of coercive foreign policy, as a prelude or an alternative to warfare. Economic sanctions have gained popularity in the twentieth century as the preferable tool for successfully achieving certain foreign policy goals. Economic sanctions could be defined as the "...deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations." (Hufbauer 3) Historically, economic sanctions have been deployed internationally by the UN and by one nation against another to either force the target country to withdraw its troops from border skirmishes, to abandon plans of territorial acquisition, or to prevent any other military aggression. Sanctions have also been used to help destabilize hostile foreign governments, to protect human rights, to halt nuclear proliferation, to settle land disputes among countries, to express rejection and condemnation of a country's domestic foreign policy and to halt international terrorism. This weapon of international diplomacy has been popular based on the belief that economic sanctions are effective in promoting the goals mentioned above, without resorting to the need to launch a full-scale war.

The United Nations has defined in its charter the conditions under which economic sanctions could be placed upon a country. The UN Charter, Article 39, provides that if Security Council determines the existence of a "threat to the peace," it can seek to alter the status quo, not merely restore it. (Doxey 1971, 84) More specifically, Article 41 of the UN Charter states:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations, and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 41 gives the Security Council great flexibility in the choice of means to pursue the implementation of any Security Council resolution it has voted upon.

Economic sanctions have been perceived as an “economic weapon” with less dire consequences than the use of force. They do not promote the loss of countless lives in combat, or the destruction of a country’s infrastructure, starvation, or the loss of civilian lives, and they are not accompanied with any heavy material losses for the country launching them. They provide a middle road between launching a full-scale war and inaction to a certain country’s unfavorable activities. Theoretically, economic sanctions act as a deterrent insofar as they signal to the targeted country that their objectionable activities will evoke strict economic restrictions.

This is at least the theory. However, in the case of Iraq, economic sanctions have proven to be a policy with dire humanitarian consequences, additionally they have been largely ineffective in achieving the UN resolutions they were designed to implement. The United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Iraq in response to its invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August of 1990. Full economic sanctions were imposed on Iraq for twelve years and they persisted because the complete disarmament of Iraq was not achieved.

The UN trade sanctions against Iraq were regarded as the most stringent economic sanctions imposed on any single country in peace-time due to Iraq’s heavy dependency

on its imports of food and medicine, paid for by its oil exports. The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq hurt the country, targeting every aspect in the Iraqi society and the country's infrastructure. The policies that were applied by the UN towards Iraq were influenced by questions about the humanitarian and economic impact of the economic embargo. Denis Halliday, the former UN Assistant Secretary-General and Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, stated, "We are in the process of destroying an entire society. It is as simple and terrifying as that. It is illegal and immoral". (The Independent, October 15, 1998)

The UN sanctions affected nearly every sphere of economic activity within Iraq. Oil exports fell from estimated 2.3-m barrels in 1989 to 1.6 m barrels in 1990. New investment virtually ceased. Inflation plagued the Iraqi economy and caused the collapse of the Iraqi dinar. Consequentially, the Iraqi government in September 1994 decided to halve the basic ration issued to all Iraqis. By 1995, an average monthly salary of 5000 dinars would buy only two chickens. Begging and criminal activity, as a result, became widespread within Iraq.

The policies of the Iraqi government supporting large military and internal security forces and allocating resources to key supporters of the regime have also hurt the Iraqi economy. The regime led by Saddam Hussein continued to divert essential resources to the building of presidential palaces and to its own internal security forces. Consequently, the corruption of the Iraqi regime and the economic sanctions made life quite a struggle for the average citizen.

Beginning in December 1996, the Oil-For Food program helped improve conditions. In December 1996, the UN passed Resolution 986, which created the "oil-for-food" sales agreement, which has been governed by stringent restrictions, and was

launched to alleviate the suffering of the people. It allowed Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil to buy food and medicine. Two-thirds of the revenue raised by the sale of this oil was allocated to buy food and medicine. The other third paid partially for the expenses of the UNSCOM weapons inspection program and was also paid to Kuwait in reparations for the damage caused by the Gulf War. However, the Oil-For Food program did not solve the pressing humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. The distribution of supplies and food was uneven and aid agencies argued that the amount of oil that could be sold by Iraq to buy food and medicine should be increased. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, also called for restrictions to be eased.

The regime of Saddam Hussein did not alleviate the suffering of its own people by fully cooperating in the distribution of food provided by the oil-for-food program. "Over the past five years, 400,000 Iraqi children under the age of five died of malnutrition and disease, preventively, but died because of the nature of the regime under which they are living." (Prime Minister Tony Blair, *BBC*, March 27, 2003) Under the oil-for-food program, the international community sought to make available to the Iraqi people adequate supplies of food and medicine, but the regime blocked sufficient access for international workers to ensure proper distribution of these supplies. Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, coalition forces have discovered military warehouses filled with food supplies meant for the Iraqi people that had been diverted by Iraqi military forces. (Iraq: Special Report, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, April 4, 2003)

During 1997, the economic sanctions began to lose the support of three permanent members of the Security Council: China, France and Russia. The UN economic sanctions lost importance in contrast to the economic interests of countries wishing to profit from

the Oil-for-Food program. France, Russia and China were allocated \$5.4 billion of the \$18.29 billion in contracts approved by the U.N. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 171). Paris and Moscow began to argue that the sanctions should be eased as a reward for instances of Iraqi cooperation during UNSCOM's inspections. Between 1997 and 2001, the political support by the Arab community for the economic sanctions also began to fade. "By 2001, sanctions were crumbling around the edges. Most of Iraq's neighbors, including its adversary Syria, and countries friendly to the West, like Turkey, Jordan and some Gulf states, were involved in sanctions-busting trade with Baghdad... Illicit trade- especially oil smuggling-also forged economic ties of mutual advantage which made Iraq's neighbors resistant to U.S. and British schemes for 'enhanced containment'." (Graham-Brown & Toensing 171) The UN economic sanctions were strongly enforced by U.S. and Britain militarily and politically as a method to ensure the containment of Saddam Hussein and to severely limit his ability to acquire weapons of mass destructions. The U.S. and Britain insisted that the removal of the economic sanctions was dependent on Iraq's destruction and removal of all its weapons of mass destruction and its compliance with other terms of the UN resolutions.

The disarmament of Iraq has been an elusive task for the United Nations. Throughout the past decade the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein has continually evaded & deceived the UN inspectors about its possession of chemical & biological weapons. Concerns persist regarding Iraq's probable stocks of chemical and biological weapons, and concrete evidence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development programs remains unattainable. Some progress in the Iraqi disarmament has been achieved and a large cache of the weapons that Iraq had previously possessed have been recovered and destroyed. The actual quantity of weapons of mass destruction that

Iraqi regime had in its possession is still unknown. The complete disarmament of Iraq has still not been achieved.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Iraq Action Team was actively engaged in uncovering Iraq's past nuclear program and Iraq's capability of developing nuclear weapons. The IAEA discovered that in 1991, Iraq was within 6 to 24 months of building a nuclear explosive device. According to Khidir Hamza, who spent twenty years developing Iraq's atomic weapon before defecting in 1994, Saddam was quite ambitious in his pursuit of acquiring a nuclear weapon, "He set a production target of six bombs a year, which meant that Iraq would have surpassed China as a nuclear power by the end of the 1990s, and possibly sooner, had he not invaded Kuwait and triggered Desert Storm." (Hamza 333) The IAEA and UNSCOM warned in 1997 that it was still unearthing major components from Iraq's nuclear program. (Cordesman 384) Hans Blix, then head of the IAEA, stated that he had evidence that Iraq had still not reported all outside assistance for its nuclear weapons program. (Transcript of Hans Blix interview, *Reuters*, 16 October 1997, 1928) The IAEA pulled out of Iraq on October 29, 1997 when Iraq banned American UNSCOM inspectors from returning. On December 2, 1997, Mohammed Al Baradei, head of the IAEA as Hans Blix's replacement, issued a statement that he saw no signs the Iraq had resumed a nuclear program during the temporary absence of the inspectors and that the IAEA had destroyed, removed or placed under monitoring all of Iraq's known nuclear-related facilities and materials. (*Reuters*, 2 December 1997, 0800) Nevertheless, the IAEA warned that this did not mean that Iraq was not retaining significant equipment or did not still have a covert nuclear program. (Cordesman 384) How close Iraq came to acquiring a nuclear weapon is still unknown as this was dependent on its acquisition of nuclear weapons-grade fissile material. (Sifry & Cerf 194)

The likelihood of Saddam using his nuclear weapons irresponsibly was a frightening prospect, but a real possibility based on his use of chemical weapons against the Kurds and the Iranians in the past. A nuclear-armed Iraq would have also triggered a new arms race in the Middle East. Israel already possesses nuclear weapons, Iran is in a hot pursuit of them, and Egypt, Syria and Turkey would have followed the same path to nuclear weaponization, once an Iraqi nuclear power emerged.

Although the economic sanctions did not succeed in disarming Iraq, they probably limited Saddam Hussein's regime from acquiring additional weapons of mass destruction. The Gulf War and the UN economic sanctions frustrated Saddam Hussein's aspirations of regional dominance as his ability to threaten neighboring Gulf countries diminished and his capacity to acquire additional arms to boost his military strength was weakened. The presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as a result of the Gulf War and Saddam's aggression towards Kuwait ensured the safety of the region from the threat of an Iraqi invasion and ensured a greater degree of political stability within the Middle East.

This stability was not achieved without a humanitarian cost to the Iraqi people. The economic sanctions isolated Iraq from the global community. It transformed an oil-rich country into a dismally poor country where malnutrition, poverty and food shortages prospered. It anchored a ruthless regime in place that controlled its people through fear and brutal oppression. Internal opposition to the Iraqi regime was completely suppressed in the south. The insurgency the Shiite Iraqis mounted in 1991 was brutally quelled. While the Kurds in the north remain quasi-independent, Saddam's political control throughout Iraq was complete and was enforced by brutal methods that instilled fear in the Iraqi people of this regime.

Overall, the UN economic sanctions were not successful in implementing the UN resolutions as they were designed to because of a number of political, economical and regional factors. In fact, the economic sanctions failed so dismally that another war erupted due to their failure in remedying the Iraqi situation. In the following chapters, I will examine the prevailing economic and political climate that led to the dismal failure of the UN economic sanctions. In this process, I shall further assess the effectiveness of the economic sanctions. Furthermore, in an attempt to discuss the overall effectiveness of this political remedy, I will discuss the different cases in which the UN imposed economic sanctions against other nations. I will outline the success and failure of the economic sanctions in rectifying each instance of belligerency. I will compare the political and economic conditions of each nation in comparison to Iraq. Conclusively, I will try to establish the level of effectiveness economic sanctions have retained throughout history in implementing the UN resolutions they were designed to enforce, precisely in the case of Iraq.

The Political Evolution of Iraq

The U.S. State Department once described the Middle East as "a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history...probably the richest economic prize in the world in the field of foreign investment." (*Foreign Relations of the United States*, vol. 8, p. 45) This statement has described generally the interest of U.S. foreign policy in the region since World War II. US policymakers also perceived the danger that lingered within such a rich economic region that provided most of the energy sources for the world, "Threats to the continuous

flow of oil through the Gulf would so endanger the Western and Japanese economies as to be grounds for general war.” (U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and National Resources, *Access To Oil-The United States Relationship with Saudi Arabia and Washington*) Sixty-five percent of proven oil reserves lie in the Middle East with no other region in the world commanding more than nine percent of the other oil reserves. Any country that can maintain political control of the Middle East has enormous strategic political and economic which would become a factor in world leadership.

The economic importance of the Middle East began to emerge only after the discovery of large oil reserves just prior to World War I. The British initially established a permanent presence in the Persian Gulf in the middle of the nineteenth century to secure communication and trade links to India. (Cottrell 84) In 1908, British Petroleum, owned partially by the British government, began pumping oil at Masjid-i-Salaman in Iran’s Zagros Mountains. (Knightley, *Desert Warriors, M Inc.*, Nov. 1990) During World War I, the importance of oil emerged when the German oil-fired navy had been immobilized in the Battle of Jutland in May 1916, largely because the British blockade caused a shortage of fuel. German industrial production was hindered and its civilian transport came to a halt due to the lack of oil. Although, the automobile had not yet emerged as the primary form of transportation, as far back as the peace conference in 1919 after World War I, private oil companies lobbied their governments to retain control of territories in the region. By 1920, according to the Sykes-Picot agreement at a conference in San Remo, Italy, the whole Arabian Peninsula lying between the Mediterranean and the Persian frontier was placed under Class A mandates to be ruled by Britain and France. (Knightley, *Desert Warriors, M Inc.*, Nov. 1990) In Iraq in 1925, production and exploration of oil was granted to the Turkish Petroleum Company, which

was later re-named the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) for a period of seventy-five years. Oil was first struck in commercial quantities in 1927. Two affiliates of IPC, Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC) and Basra Petroleum Company (BPC) were each awarded contracts for seventy-five years in 1932 and 1938. The three contracts covered the total area of Iraq and these three companies were owned in equal shares of 23.75 percent by British Petroleum (BP), Shell Petroleum, Compagnie Francais des Petroles (CFP), and the Near Eastern Development Corporation, which was owned equally by Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon) and Mobil. The remaining 5 percent was owned by the Participation and Exploration Company. (Alnasrawi 3)

Iraq's Arab military and political figures felt that following World War I Britain and France betrayed the "Arab revolt". In the area that we know today as Iraq, Britain's occupation of Turkish Mesopotamia in 1918 was followed by growing tension between Britain and the native Arab population, the killing of British officers, and a full-scale tribal revolt in June, 1920. This revolt lasted until 1921 and cost Britain 450 dead and over 1,500 wounded. (Fromkin 449-462)

Britain acquired a mandate over Iraq in 1920 after the Ottoman Sultan was deposed in November 1922. Britain did not create borders that suited the ambitions of either Iraqi nationalists or the surrounding states. (Cordesman 16) Iraq did not achieve independence until Britain and Iraq signed a treaty ending the British mandate in 1929 and Iraq was not admitted to the League of Nations until 1932. A monarchy was installed in Iraq. King Faisal ruled until his death in 1933. He was succeeded by his son Ghazi who reigned until his death in 1939. Prince Abdel-Ilah acted as a regent from 1939 to 1953, while King Faisal II was a minor. (Alnasrawi 128) The monarchy was seen by many as proxy British rule which caused conflicts with the Iraqi military on a number of

occasions. This led to military coups d'etat, beginning in 1936, and a split between pro-British Iraqis, which reached the crisis point in 1939. In 1942, British forces intervened to overthrow the pro-German nationalist government of Rashid Ali and restore the monarchy. Britain effectively dominated Iraqi politics until 1958, often causing the removal of hostile or nationalist Iraqi officials and military officers and exploiting Iraq's oil interests to serve British interests. (Knightley 15)

In 1958, a coup by nationalist army officers led by General Abdul Karim Qassim, succeeded in overthrowing the monarchy and slaughtered Prince Abdel-Ilah and King Faisal II on July 14, 1958. Qassim ruled till 1963. The new Iraqi regime turned to Russia and China and began arms imports from Moscow in 1959 that helped institutionalize a continuing arms race between Iraq and Iran. It supported radical political movements that threatened the ruling regimes of virtually all of its neighbors, and made new claims to Kuwait and part of Iran's border area. In fact, Qassim's failure to make good on his attempt to claim Kuwait in 1961 and Britain's successful deterrence of an Iraqi invasion was one of the major reasons for his eventual fall. (Miller 38)

The Rise of Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein

Ba'athist Party officers killed Qassim on February 8, 1963. Of Qassim, Hanna Bantu, the author of an authoritative history of Iraq has written, "The people had more genuine affection for him than for any other ruler in the modern history of Iraq." Many people refused to believe that Qassim was dead. It was rumored that he went into hiding and would soon come back. The Ba'athist leaders displayed his bullet ridden body on television, every night. As Samir al-Khalil, in *Republic of Fear*, explains, "The whole

macabre sequence closes with a scene that must forever remain etched on the memory of all those who saw it: the soldier grabbing the lolling head by the hair, came right up close, an spat full face into it.” This genre of violent activities would pave the way for the future ruthless activities of the Ba’athist leadership in Iraq. The leaders of the coup were soon replaced by a new group under Abd al-Salam Arif, which came to power in November of 1963. (Miller & Mylorie 45)

Saddam quickly found his place under this new regime. He became an interrogator and torturer in the Qasr-al-Nihayyah or the “Palace of the End,” as it was re-named due to King Faisal II and his family being gunned down there in 1958. Under the Baath party, the palace was used as a torture chamber. When the Ba’ath Party, torn apart by internal rifts, was ousted nine months later in November of 1963, a grisly discovery was made, “In the cellars of al-Nihayyah Palace,” according to Haana Bantu, whose account is based on official government sources, “were found all sorts of loathsome instruments of torture, including electric wires with pincers, pointed iron stakes on which prisoners were made to sit, and a machine which still bore traces of chopped off fingers. Small heaps of bloodied clothing were scattered about, and there were pools on the floor and stains over the walls.” (Miller & Mylorie 54) This loathsome and ruthless beginning of the torture of any opposition of the Ba’ath Party would continue after the party regained power in 1968.

A new Ba’ath coup succeeded on July 17, 1968, bringing General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr to power. This regime ruled through a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) of which Saddam Hussein became the deputy chairman. Saddam was responsible of the internal security forces, which he used to strengthen his power and execute ruthlessly all those who opposed the Ba’ath Party and its rule. (Cordesman 12)

Nationalization of Iraq's oil industry was inevitable considering the state-dominated economic system advocated by the socialist Ba'ath party. In December of 1972, the Iraqi government took over the northern oilfields around Kirkuk; Mosul Petroleum Company was nationalized in March 1973; and the nationalization of the Basra Petroleum Company's southern oilfields was completed in December of 1975. The Iraqi government continued to allow foreign companies to assist in the exploration and production of oil. In 1968, the French company, Elf, signed an agreement with the Iraqi government that led to three discoveries. In 1972, Braspetro of Brazil signed a contract for exploration and development. In 1973, a Japanese consortium, including Sumitomo, Mitsubishi and Idemitsu Kosan, bought into the Elf-Iraq joint venture. Several thousand workers from the Soviet Union were employed until 1990 on different oil projects throughout Iraq. (Henderson 43-45)

Iraq also increased its arms imports and military ties to the Soviet Union precisely at the same time the United States made Iran the major 'pillar' of its policy in the Gulf. Nixon's "Twin Pillar" policy, was described by Howard Teicher, a former staff member of the State Department, as relying on "Iran and Saudi Arabia to serve as the two key protectors of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf." Iran was more important because of its "geo-strategic location adjacent to the Soviet Union, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan; its physical control of the Strait of Hormuz; its proven oil reserves, daily production...and the stated willingness of the shah to act aggressively on behalf of American interests whenever they might be threatened." (Teichner & Radley 29) During the Nixon administration, Iran acted as a major American ally in the Middle East, with its arms purchases increasing from \$500 million in 1972 to \$4.3 billion in 1974. Between 1970 and 1978, the Shah ordered \$20 billion worth of military equipment accounting for 25

percent of U.S. arms sales for the period. (Pythian 10-12) This policy reinforced by the rivalries of the Cold War, led to a massive acceleration in the Iraqi-Iranian arms race. Further, during the early 1970s, the Shah exploited an uprising of Iraqi Kurds with the covert support of the CIA. This led to a proxy border war between Iran and Iraq that forced Iraq to concede to Iran partial control of the Shatt al-Arab, its main shipping channel to the Gulf. Iraq also had to make a number of other territorial concessions in its border area with Iran. Saddam Hussein was the main negotiator of the Algiers Accord that ratified these agreements in 1975. He saw both the extent of the CIA support of the Kurds before the accord, and the way in which the CIA suddenly abandoned them at the Shah's direction within days of signing the accord. (Cordesman 12) The Shah was overthrown in 1979 by an orchestrated coup by the Ayatollah Khomeini. The overthrow of the shah converted Iran to an Islamic country. Most importantly, the conversion of power left a regime hostile to the US sitting on an arsenal of high tech weapons.

In 1978, Iraq and Syria, ruled by murderously rival Ba'ath parties, suddenly announced that they were considering unification. Saddam was the architect of that policy. He wanted the Arab states to break their ties with Egypt, for it was about to sign a peace treaty with Israel. If the Arabs ostracized Egypt, the most important and populous Arab state, then Iraq's dominance of the Arab world could be secured. At the November 1978 Arab summit in Baghdad, Saddam threatened to attack Kuwait, while Syrian president Hafez al-Assad warned the Saudis, "I will transfer the battle to your bedrooms." The Arab states agreed to break all ties with Egypt. However, the unity with Syria, threatened to undermine Saddam's power within Iraq. It soon became apparent that Bakr could become president of a Syrian-Iraqi federation, Assad could be vice president, and Saddam would be third in line. Saddam became increasingly apprehensive that they

might succeed and decided to force Al-Bakr to resign with help of increased pressure from his clan. (Miller & Mylorie 60)

On July 16, 1979, President Bakr's resignation was announced, officially for health reasons. Saddam Hussein became the president, as well as secretary-general of the Baath party, commander in chief, head of the government, and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council. (Cordesman 12)

The Iran-Iraq War

Initially, Saddam Hussein supported the Iranian revolution and attempted to reach an agreement with Khomeini. The Ayatollah rejected Saddam's overtures and called for the overthrow of the secular regime in Iraq. He also sent religious "messengers" to the Shiites of Iraq, who attempted to provoke an Islamic revolution. During 1980, Iran and Iraq engaged in a steadily escalating series of border clashes and military incidents. (Cordesman 13)

Saddam rejected the Algiers Accord, and invaded Iran on September 22, 1980. Between 1981 and 1982, Iraq was forced to use virtually all of its capital reserves to pay for the war and the massive arms imports it needed to compensate for its military incompetence. By 1982, Iranian forces had advanced within 70 kilometers of Basra, and had begun to actively threaten Iraq's control of its Shiite south. Iran was also supported by key factions of the Iraqi Kurds in their revolt against Saddam. Iranian forces began to advance to areas that could threaten Baghdad. Iran attempted to improve its methods of attack, exploit surprise, infiltration, night warfare, and attacks through mountain and marsh areas where Iraq could not bring its superiority in arms to bear. Iran continued to

dominate the war against Iraq from 1982 to early 1988. (Cordesman 13-14)

On the other hand, Iraq survived near bankruptcy and the loss of most of its oil-export capabilities due to the massive aid and loans it received from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and its purchases of military equipment from Europe and the Soviet Union. Iraq purchased \$29.7 billion worth of military equipment from 1984 to 1988. These purchases included \$15.4 billion from the Soviet Union, \$3.1 billion from France and \$2.8 billion from China. (Cordesman 46) Iraq bought weapons also from West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Italy and the United Kingdom. In 1988, Iraq was the largest importer of arms in the Arab region, acquiring almost three times as much military equipment as Iran did for the same period of time. Iraq made up its often lackluster military performance with its superiority in weapons. (Henderson 143)

By late 1987 Iran appeared to be winning. The Iranian forces had managed to seize the Fao Peninsula in spite of massive Iraqi counter-attacks, threatened to capture Basra, and began to make steady advances in Iraq's northern areas. (Cordesman 14) To quell a persistent Kurdish rebellion, Saddam's regime repeatedly spread poisonous gases on Kurdish villages in 1987 and 1988. The biggest attack was against the town of Halabja in March 1988. According to local organizations providing relief to the survivors around 6,800 Kurds were killed, the vast majority of them were civilians. (Hiltermann 41)

During the spring of 1988, Iraq began to gain the upper hand in the war against when it secured long-range missiles that allowed it to strike at Iran's cities and to undercut Iranian morale. Beginning in 1984, Iraq had slowly developed the capability to conduct massive chemical warfare attacks. By 1987 these chemical attacks inflicted many casualties, paralyzed Iranian offensive action and steadily undercut Iranian morale. (Cordesman 15) Its wholesale use of poisonous gas against Iranian troops and Iranian

Kurdish towns, and its threat to place chemical warheads on the missiles it was attacking Tehran with, brought Iran to its knees. (Hiltermann 42)

Iran was decisively defeated during May-July, 1988. Iraq advanced deep into Iran's border area, Iran suffered massive new casualties, and Iran's land forces lost nearly half of their equipment. Khomeini announced his "poison pill" acceptance of UN resolutions calling for a cease-fire on July 18, 1988, which came into effect in August. Saddam had won the Iran-Iraq War to the point that he had forced Iran to accept a cease-fire, although he had no real gains to show for eight years of war, had bankrupted Iraq, and had nearly \$80 billion worth of debt to his neighbors and the West. He had, however, emerged from the Iran-Iraq War with a large and well-equipped military which was the most effective and experienced force in the Gulf region. (Cordesman 15)

The Iran-Iraq War lasted just short of eight years and resulted in the catastrophic destruction in both countries. Estimates vary, but the war's total cost, including military supplies and civilian damages, probably exceeded \$500 billion for each side. (Cordesman 16) Both Iran and Iraq sacrificed their considerable oil wealth to the war for nearly a decade, and Iraq was forced to borrow heavily, especially from its allies on the Arabian Peninsula. At the end of the war, Iraq's economy was in shambles. In some ways the Iran-Iraq War contributed to the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. It left Iraq with a strong army, a large supply of weapons and large debts to its neighboring Arab nations, including Kuwait. Iraq's debtors started to demand re-payment of the loans that they had made with Iraq during the Iraq-Iran War. Kuwait's demand for the re-payment of the loans it granted Iraq instigated the conflict between it and Iraq and the consequent outbreak of the Gulf War.

The Gulf War

The Gulf Crisis began to take shape when on 17th of July, 1990, in a dramatic political statement Iraqi President Saddam Hussein denounced the Persian Gulf oil-producing countries that exceeded their OPEC (Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries) quotas. The demand by Iraq's government to raise the oil price was based on its suspicions that Kuwait had drilled into Iraqi land, violating a Middle East oil agreement. Simultaneously, Kuwait decreased the price of oil by selling an amount that exceeded its OPEC quota. At that time, Iraq was attempting to repay its war loans to Kuwait and the Iraqi government felt cheated since the price of oil dropped. (*Financial Times*; [London], 28 July 1990, 1) On 18 July 1990, Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, formally accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil from disputed Rumaila oil field, and claimed that Kuwait had built military posts on Iraqi land. (*Wall Street Journal*, 3 August 1990, A4) (*Wall Street Journal*, 1 August 1990, A4) Consequently, due to these allegations, throughout 24th to 25th of July, Iraq deployed thousands of troops on the Kuwaiti border. (*Wall Street Journal*, 3 August 1990, A4)

On August 1, 1990, to try and keep the peace between these two neighboring countries, Saudi Arabia mediated talks between Iraq and Kuwait at Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi demands were: a reduction in Kuwaiti oil production; the compensation of \$2.5 billion for oil produced in the disputed territory; the forgiveness of Kuwait of about \$20 billion in Iraqi debts, accumulated during war with Iran; and the control of Bubiyan and Warba islands (giving Iraq direct access to Persian Gulf). However, these negotiations collapsed when Kuwait refused the demands of the Iraqi government. (*Financial Times*, 2 August 1990, 1; *Wall Street Journal*, 3 August 1990, A4)

Consequently, on August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Hundreds of Kuwaiti citizens and soldiers were killed and thousands were taken prisoner. Iraq seized and confiscated billions of dollars worth of Kuwaiti property. [Note: Today more than 600 political and opposition leaders as well as military POWs are still counted missing.]

In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. President George Bush declared, "Appeasement does not work... As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein as an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors ... If history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms ... Standing up for our principles is an American tradition." (NYT 8.9.90) Consequently, President Bush invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, froze all Iraqi & Kuwaiti asset and banned all trade and financial links with Iraq. Donations of medical supplies and food for humanitarian purposes were exempt from this trade embargo.

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq embarked the emergence of economic sanctions imposed by the UN on Iraq and the conditions for their removal. On August 6, 1990, UN Security Council approved Resolution 661. This resolution condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, demanded that Iraq withdrawal of its forces and prohibited UN members from recognizing any provisional Kuwaiti government established by Iraq. (*New York Times*, 7 August 1990, A1) The resolution also imposed comprehensive trade and financial sanctions against Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Medical supplies and humanitarian food shipments were excluded from the embargo. The UN resolution was met by unforeseen international support and was enforced by most of all the member states of the UN.

The international community joined in condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and economically severing ties with Iraq. The US and USSR issued a joint statement in Moscow condemning Iraq, "Calling upon the rest of the international community to join

with us in an international cutoff of all arms supplies to Iraq." The USSR suspended all its exports of military equipment to Iraq. . China joined in the arms embargo against Iraq. The Arab League also issued a declaration denouncing the invasion and called for immediate troop withdrawal, with Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) abstaining and Libya, not being present. The Gulf Cooperation Council also condemned the attack. France, UK, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Norway froze Kuwaiti assets. (*Washington Post*, 4 August 1990, A1; 5 August 1990, A21) The European Community imposed broad sanctions against Iraq, and called for the "immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces" from Kuwait. The EC implemented an embargo on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait; placed a freeze on Iraqi assets in its member countries; issued a ban on the sale of arms and military equipment to Iraq; suspended all military, technical and scientific cooperation with Iraq; and suspended Iraq's preferred trade status with the Community. (*Washington Post*, 5 August 1990, A21; *New York Times*, 5 August 1990, A1) Japan also placed an embargo on oil imports from Iraq and Kuwait, halted all its exports to the two states and froze economic aid to Iraq. As a myriad of countries joined in implementing a comprehensive trade and financial embargo upon Iraq, the Bush administration tightened its financial restrictions, by allowing Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil shipped before invasion to unload, but required any payment due to be placed in escrow. (*Washington Post*, 6 August 1990, A13; *New York Times*, 6 August 1990, A1; *Wall Street Journal*, 6 August 1990, A9)

Simultaneously, a multitude of international forces from a variety of countries began to arrive in the Persian Gulf. Canada, France and Australia sent ships to the Gulf area. (*New York Times*, 11 August 1990, A1; *Washington Post*, 11 August 1990, A1; 12 August 1990, A22) On August 11, 1990, several thousand Egyptian troops arrived in

Saudi Arabia. Morocco and Syria promised to send similar number to join the Arab effort. Pakistan agreed to send troops to join the multi-national force defending Saudi Arabia.

On August 12, 1990, following a formal Kuwaiti request under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which permits any state under attack to seek collective help in its self-defense, the Bush administration adopted a policy of "interdiction", which included the use of force to stop ships attempting to circumvent the UN embargo. President Bush reiterated by declaring, "'Our action in the Gulf is not about religion, greed or cultural differences . . . [at stake is] access to energy resources that are key, not just to the functioning of this country, but to the entire world. Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would all suffer if control of the world's greatest oil reserves fell into the hands of that one man-Saddam Hussein.'" (*Washington Post*, 16 August 1990, A31)

However, as the economic embargo by the UN was imposed, it began to receive criticism. Most notably, France and USSR had previous economic ties to Iraq and were at least hoping to acquire some of their foreign debt. Iraq owed France around \$5.5 billion mostly for military equipment. (Henderson 178) Iraq owed the USSR around \$8 billion in foreign debt. (Solomon & Erlich 109) On August 13, 1990, USSR, France and Canada criticized Bush administration's unilateral policy of interdiction. The Western European countries stated, "[There is] a growing dichotomy between what from here appears to be the predominant view in Washington that force is inevitable and perhaps even desirable to rid the world of the menace of Saddam Hussein and the European view that the crisis may be manageable diplomatically and that a military confrontation could wreak profound damage." (*Washington Post*, 26 August 1990, A21) From the Soviet Union,

Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuri Gremitskikh agreed, as he declared, "Such events totally contradict the interests of Arab states, create new additional obstacles to the settlement of conflicts in the Middle East and run counter to the positive tendencies of improvement in international life." (By communication from Soviet embassy in Washington) (*Washington Post*, 7 August 1990, A 15)

The economic embargo against Iraq continued to be strongly enforced by the U.S. and the United Kingdom. Following a US interdiction, the US Navy fired warning shots across the bow of two Iraqi oil tankers. (*Washington Post*, 14 August 1990, A1; *New York Times*, 14 August 1990, A1; *Wall Street Journal*, 14 August 1990, A7) Consequently, the British Foreign Secretary William Waldegrave declared, "If there is evidence of sanctions busting, the Navy will take the necessary steps. It is obvious that the economic weapon, which is the principal weapon being used by the world community to restore the independence of Kuwait . . . should work." (*Financial Times*, 14 August 1990, 1)

The Iraqi government from the beginning of the implementation of economic sanctions against it tried to use any means possible at their disposal to disrupt the collective enforcement of the economic sanctions, without any regard to human rights or to international law. In retaliation, declaring that the U.S.-led naval blockade as "an act of war," the Iraqi government stated that foreign nationals, some of whom are being held at military and strategic civilian sites will act as "shields" against any U.S.-led attack and will suffer, along with Iraqis, from any food and medicine shortages. There were reports from Baghdad of panic and a severe shortage of cooking oil, soap and sugar. Consequently, on August 18, 1990, the UN Security Council voted 15 to 0 to demand that Iraq release all detained foreigners. (*Washington Post*, 19 August 1990, A31)

On August 19, U.K. and U.S. rejected an offer from Saddam Hussein to release

Westerners in exchange for the withdrawal of the US troops from Saudi Arabia and the lift of the trade embargo. To this decline, the Iraqi Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs stated, "America and its allies have gone beyond an economic boycott which in essence means only a non-exchange of goods. They embarked on the implementation of an economic blockade by force of arms against Iraq, including food and medicines, and this is an act of war under world norms and international law." (*Washington Post*, 19 August 1990, A31)

The international community supported and enforced the embargo placed on Iraq relentlessly, despite criticisms that arose among its members. The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain allowed the deployment of Arab, "friendly" (including U.S.) forces on their territory. (*Washington Post*, 21 August 1990, A1; *IMF Morning Press*, 21 August 1990) The nine-member Western European Union decided to expand and coordinate a naval enforcement in the Persian Gulf. Thirty-two naval vessels that included eight French and three British warships were mobilized by the European countries. Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Spain pledged to send ships to enforce the embargo. (*New York Times*, 22 August 1990, A1; *Financial Times*, 22 August 1990, 2; *Washington Post*, 22 August 1990, A1)

The UN Security Council approved a resolution authorizing countries, "Deploying maritime forces to the area [to] use such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary . . . to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping." The UN Security Council imposed strict controls on humanitarian food aid to Iraq and Kuwait, and declared that shipments must be channeled through the UN or other international agencies. With only Cuba opposed, UN Security Council imposed an air embargo against Iraq, cutting off all air traffic to and from Iraq and Kuwait. UN members

were asked to prevent Iraq-bound flights from taking off from their territory and using their airspace. Flights carrying food "in humanitarian circumstances" were excluded from embargo. The resolution did not allow planes to be shot down, but allowed Iraqi ships which violated the embargo to be detained. It provided for the imposition of trade sanctions on any country that defies the UN embargo. (*New York Times*, 26 September 1990, A1)

The UN economic sanctions were not implemented multilaterally. As Iraq limited its consumer purchases of basic foods, Libya declared that it would not obey the UN embargo on food shipments to Iraq, and continue to supply Iraq with food and medicine. (*Washington Post*, 3 September 1990, A1; *New York Times*, 3 September 1990, A1)

The Iraqi regime tried to create further opposition for the economic sanctions by offering an economic incentive, free oil, to any country that wished to break the economic embargo. Saddam Hussein offered free oil to any Third World nation that can collect it; he stated this would not violate the embargo since the oil is free. (*Financial Times*, 16 August, 1990)

Saddam Hussein increasingly tried to divide the international support for the sanctions by offering a peace proposal to Iran that included: the resolution of their dispute over Shatt al-Arab waterway on Iranian terms; the release of all Iranian prisoners of war; and the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iranian territory. (*Washington Post*, 16 August 1990, A1; *Financial Times*, 16 August, 1990) Despite Iraq's peace offer, Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, reiterated his demand for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. (*Washington Post*, 17 August 1990, A1) The Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati explained, "We cannot accept any change in Kuwaiti borders, neither in land nor in water." (*Washington Post*, 8 August 1990, A1) Iran stated it would abide by UN

sanctions despite the peace initiative from Iraq. However, Iran and Iraq resumed diplomatic ties.

To the rest of the international community's disgust, on August 28, 1990, in another dramatic political statement, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared Kuwait to be the 19th province of Iraq and renamed its capital, Kadhima, its pre-World War I name. The disputed Rumaila oil field, the Bubiyan and Warba islands were incorporated into Iraq's Basra province, and the rest of Kuwait remained as a separate province.

(*Washington Post*, 29 August 1990, A1) This flagrant violation of international law was met by flat opposition by the world community. It showed that the Iraqi regime had no plans of relinquishing its control of Kuwait, under the strict economic sanctions imposed against it.

As Saddam's other tactics of holding foreigners in Iraq hostage or trying to tempt the international community by free oil or a peace offering to uplift the economic sanctions or weaken them failed, he resorted to force. Saddam Hussein threatened to attack the Saudi oil fields, other Arab countries, and Israel, if Iraq is "strangled" by the economic embargo. (*New York Times*, 24 September 1990, A1) He declared, "We would not allow whoever it is to strangle the people of Iraq without strangling him in return. If we feel the Iraqi people are choking and someone is dealing them a bloody blow, we will strangle all the perpetrators . . . all oil installations will be incapacitated." (*Washington Post*, 24 September 1990, A 1)

As the economic embargo prolonged and its effects began to harm the Iraqi civilian population, Arab leaders feared the harsh retaliation of Saddam Hussein. Egyptian and Syrian commanders of troops in Saudi Arabia reiterated that their troops were there solely for defense of Saudi Arabia and will not engage in any offensive

operation. (*Washington Post*, 9 October 1990, A 12)

On November 29, with coalition forces massing in Saudi Arabia and Iraq showing no signs of retreat, the UN Security Council passed resolution which allowed member states to "use all necessary means" to force Iraq from Kuwait if Iraq remained in the country after January 15, 1991. The Iraqis rejected this ultimatum. Consequently, the United States agreed to a direct meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraq's foreign minister. The two sides met on January 9 but neither offered to compromise. The United States refused to withdraw the ultimatum, and the Iraqis refused to comply with it, even threatening to attack Israel. (*Washington Post*, 10 January 1990, A 1)

On January 12, 1991, the U.S. Congress narrowly passed a resolution authorizing the president to use force against the Iraqi aggression. (*Washington Post*, 13 January 1990, A1) After the UN deadline of January 15 passed without an Iraqi withdrawal, a vast majority of coalition members joined in the decision to attack Iraq. A few members, such as Morocco, elected not to take part in the military strikes. In the early morning of January 17, 1991, coalition forces began a massive air attack on Iraqi targets. (*Washington Post*, 16 January 1990, A1)

The air assault had three goals: to attack Iraqi air defenses, to disrupt command and control, and to weaken ground forces in and around Kuwait. The coalition made swift progress against Iraq's air defenses, giving the coalition almost uncontested control of the skies over Iraq and Kuwait. The second task, disrupting command and control, was more difficult. It required attacks on the Iraqi electrical system, communications centers, roads and bridges, and other military and government targets. These targets were often located in civilian areas and were typically used by both civilians and the military. Although the

coalition air forces often used very precise weapons, the attacks caused civilian casualties and completely disrupted Iraqi civilian life. The third task, to weaken Iraq's ground forces, the coalition used less sophisticated weaponry to strike Iraqi defensive positions in both Iraq and Kuwait, to destroy their equipment, and to undermine morale. The coalition air campaign had effectively shut down Iraq's logistical system in Kuwait and was demoralizing the army leading to widespread desertions. After five and a half weeks of intense bombing and more than 100,000 flights by coalition planes, Iraq's forces were severely damaged. The Iraqi forces in Kuwait had decreased from around 550,000 to around 350,000. (Pollack 237)

In an attempt to pry the coalition apart, Iraq fired Scud missiles at both Saudi Arabia and Israel, which especially disrupted Israeli civilian life. Iraq tried to portray its Arab adversaries as fighting on the side of Israel. The strategy failed to split the coalition, in part because the Israeli government did not retaliate. Iraq also issued thinly veiled threats that it would use chemical and biological weapons. The United States hinted in return that such an attack might provoke a massive response, possibly including the use of nuclear weapons. Iraqi ground forces also initiated a limited amount of ground fighting, occupying the Saudi border town of Khafji on January 30th before being driven back. (Pollack 248-255)

One month into the air war, the Iraqi regime tried to negotiate its way out of Kuwait, using Russian intermediaries. Although, if this initiative emerged before the start of the coalition's attack, it might have split the coalition; now it simply seemed a sign that the war was weighing quite heavily on Iraq. It seemed that Saddam was convinced that his army was melting away and a coalition ground offensive could destroy it altogether. He thought that it would be a catastrophe that would almost certainly produce challenges

to his rule. He feared that if the army and the Republican Guard were destroyed, he might not have enough strength to defend himself against any internal opposition. The war made diplomacy difficult for Iraq: officials had to travel over and to Iran and then fly to Moscow to ferry messages back and forth. Sensing victory, the coalition united behind a demand for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. (Pollack 266)

On February 24 the coalition launched its long-anticipated land offensive. The bulk of the attack was in southwestern Iraq, where coalition forces first moved north, then turned east toward the Iraqi port of Al Basra. This maneuver surrounded Kuwait, encircling the Iraqi forces there and in southern Iraq, and allowed coalition forces (mainly Arab) to move up the coast and take Kuwait city. Some Iraqi units resisted, but the coalition offensive advanced more quickly than anticipated. Thousands of Iraqi troops surrendered. Others deserted. Iraq then focused its efforts on withdrawing its Republican Guard units and sabotaging Kuwaiti infrastructure and industry. Many oil wells were set on fire, creating huge oil lakes, thick black smoke, and other environmental damage. Two days after the ground war started, Iraq announced it was leaving Kuwait. (Pollack 281)

On February 28, with the collapse of Iraqi resistance and the recapture of Kuwait, thereby fulfilling the coalition's stated goals, the coalition declared a cease-fire. The land offensive had lasted precisely 100 hours. The cease-fire was declared shortly before the coalition forces surrounded the Iraqi forces. On March 2nd, the UN Security Council issued a resolution stating the conditions for the cease-fire, which were accepted by Iraq in a meeting of military commanders on March 3rd. More extensive aims, such as the overthrowing of the Iraqi government or destroying Iraqi forces, did not have the support of all coalition members. Most Arab members, for example, believed the war was fought to restore one Arab country and not to destroy another. The United States also worried

that extending the goal would have involved the US forces in an endless war, similar to the Vietnam War. (Pollack 285)

The Iraqi government did not achieve any of its initial objectives. Rather than enhancing the economic, military, and political position of Iraq, the country was economically devastated, militarily defeated, and politically isolated. Yet due to the sustainability of the government and many of the military forces, the Iraqi government could claim their mere survival as a victory. The surviving military forces were used a short time later to suppress two postwar rebellions: one involving the Shiite Muslims in southern Iraq and one involving the Kurds in the north.

Almost all of the casualties of the Gulf War occurred on the Iraqi side. While estimates during the war had ranged from 10,000 to 100,000 Iraqis killed, Western military experts now agree that Iraq sustained between 20,000 and 35,000 casualties. The coalition losses were extremely light in comparison: 240 were killed, 148 were American soldiers. The number of wounded soldiers totaled: 776, of whom 458 were American. (Sloyan 129)

The end of the war left some key issues unresolved, including the UN sanctions against Iraq, which did not dissipate with the end of the war. On April 2, 1991, the Security Council laid out strict demands for the suspension of the sanctions: Iraq would have to accept liability for damages, destroy its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles, forego any nuclear weapons programs, and accept international inspection to ensure these conditions were met. Only if Iraq complied with these and other resolutions, the UN would discuss removing the sanctions. Iraq resisted, claiming that its withdrawal from Kuwait was sufficient compliance. (*Washington Post*, 3 April 1991, A12)

The victory of the Gulf War by the coalition forces seemed hollow due to Saddam Hussein's retention of the presidency within Iraq. Initially, when the Iraqi forces were greatly defeated many Arab and American political leaders and analysts believed a rebellion within Iraq might succeed in overthrowing the Saddam regime. As it was noted in *A World Transformed* by George Bush and Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft,

We were disappointed that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect. The abortive uprising of the Shi'ites in the south and the Kurds in the north did not spread to the Sunni population of central Iraq, and the Iraqi military remained loyal. Critics claim that we encouraged the separatist Shi'ites and Kurds to rebel and then reneged on a promise to aid them if they did so. President Bush declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that the removal of Saddam would be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise to aid an uprising. While we hoped that a popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam neither the United States nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of this state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Breaking up the Iraqi state would pose its own destabilizing problems. (Bush & Scowcroft 102)

Therefore, neither of the Shiite or the Kurdish uprisings received any international assistance.

When the Shiite population of southern Iraq rebelled shortly after the cease-fire, they were met with the Iraqi military forces returning to quash the rebellion from the southern front. Spontaneous and loosely organized, the rebellion was crushed almost as quickly as it arose. Shortly after, the Kurds in the north of the Iraq staged their own rebellion. The Kurdish rebels were able to withstand the Iraqi forces longer than the Shiites, in part due to their history of an organized and armed resistance. Ultimately, the Kurdish rebellion only achieved a modest success: a haven guaranteed by the UN- in the north of Iraq. (Jabar 103-113)

The effects of the war everywhere else had a less dramatic outcome. In Kuwait,

the pre-war regime was restored to power and in 1992 the Emir, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, honored his pledge in exile to reconvene the country's parliament.

(New York Times, 4 April 1992, A1)

After the Gulf War, the UN maintained an economic embargo on Iraq and American and British coalition forces continued to enforce other sanctions such as the no-fly zones. As hardships to the Iraqis mounted, the consensus on maintaining the economic sanctions slowly began to dissipate. However, the United States and the United Kingdom insisted on upholding the economic embargo, arguing that many of the hardships that the Iraqi people encountered were the fault of the Iraqi regime. For example, under the Oil-for-Food agreement Iraq was allowed to sell limited amounts of oil for food and medicine and designate some of the revenue to pay for damages caused by the war. Until December 1996, Iraq rejected this deal as an infringement on its sovereignty. The economic sanctions were maintained due to the Iraqi regime's history of blocking UN inspectors from discovering and destroying its weapons of mass destruction. Due to concerns that Iraq could possess weapons of mass destruction and pose as a threat to its neighbors and the world, on 20 March 2003 the U.S. and U.K. led a "coalition of the willing" on an invasion of Iraq, to remove Saddam Hussein's regime from power.

THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF THE UN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

The economic sanctions against Iraq contributed to falling living standards and life expectancy of the Iraqi population. By almost every measure - such as malnutrition, child mortality and overall morbidity - the situation of most Iraqi civilians deteriorated during the period that the economic sanctions were imposed upon Iraq. Death, disease and malnutrition became widely spread within Iraq. The food production and availability decreased substantially for the Iraqi population. Food became a rare commodity that was exchanged for goods and services. Families were selling most of their valuable possessions to obtain cash for food. (Cockburn & Cockburn 110)

Since the implementation of the sanctions, various UN officials warned about a serious humanitarian catastrophe occurring in Iraq as a result of the economic sanctions. In March 1991, Secretary General Martti Ahtisaari stated that, directly after the massive bombing of the Gulf War, the situation was especially troubling in Iraq: "Most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependency on an intensive use of energy and technology". (UN document S/22366, 20/3/91, paragraph 8) Ahtisaari stressed that Iraq was in need of more than just an emergency relief of food and medicine. The power grid and the communications system had been badly damaged, he said, and needed repair. "The far-reaching implications of this energy and communications vacuum as regards to urgent humanitarian support is of crucial significance for the nature and effectiveness of the international response".

(Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the immediate post-crisis environment by a mission to the area led by Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for Administration and Management, March 20, 1991, paragraph 9). The Gulf War bombing had inflicted extensive infrastructural damage, depriving the Iraqi population of clean water, electrical power and a working sewage system. The consequences were an emerging public health emergency and the drastic deterioration of the living standards and health of many of the Iraqi people. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 169)

In July of 1991, the Secretary General's Executive Delegate, Sadruddin Aga Khan, submitted a comprehensive report based on an assessment of conditions of Iraq. The report stated the need for immediate reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, setting the cost of restoring pre-war conditions at \$22 billion. Calculating only the most urgently-needed initial reconstruction costs, Khan estimated that Iraq would require \$6.8 billion in the first year, for which substantial quantities of Iraqi oil would have to be sold. (UN document S/22799, July 17, 1991, paragraph 29) He declared, "Our aim has been to be sober, measured and accurate. We are neither crying wolf nor playing politics. But it is evident that for large numbers of the people of Iraq, every passing month brings them closer to the brink of calamity. As usual, it is the poor, the children, the widowed and the elderly, the most vulnerable amongst the population, who are the first to suffer. The report concluded, "It remains a cardinal humanitarian principle that innocent civilians – and above all the most vulnerable – should not be held hostage to events beyond their control. Those already afflicted by war's devastation cannot continue to pay the price of a bitter peace. It is a peace that will also prove to be tenuous if unmet needs breed growing desperation". *(Report to the Secretary-General dated July 15, 1991 on humanitarian*

needs in Iraq prepared by a mission led by the Executive Delegate of the Secretary-General for humanitarian assistance in Iraq, S/22799, July 17, 1991)

The Iraqi government placed military and security concerns over civilian needs. The Iraqi government placed suppressing the Shiite and Kurdish rebellions over the essential needs of its people. The Iraqi government's determination to spend freely on its security organizations and the armed forces diverted the country's scarce resources from the essential needs of the civilian population to non-productive and destructive forms of spending. (Alnasrawi 162)

The Iraqi government initiated a reconstruction effort to rebuild the infrastructure of Iraq which it called "Hujoum Al Mudhad" or "the Counterattack". The reconstruction effort was led by a British-trained technocrat named Saad Al-Zubaidi. (Cockburn & Cockburn 126) The United Nations and other international aid agencies helped in the reconstruction effort. Most of the Iraqi reconstruction effort was concentrated in Baghdad, at the expense of the other cities. Spare parts were removed from one plant to another to repair the most essential facilities. The limited and discriminatory nature of the Iraqi regime's effort to repair the infrastructure and other facilities could be seen by what was taking place in Basra, Iraq's second largest city:

Basra is short of everything. The families drink polluted water, there is not money for spare parts, no possibility, apart from minimal United Nations aid and the voluntary agencies' brave but limited efforts, to rebuild proper sewage and supply lines, pipes and pumping stations... They are... in Basra aggressed by both sides-by the West's imposition on ordinary families, stopping trade and therefore drugs, syringes, medicine, medical equipment, food spare parts, school books, journals, information and, in the end, hope. And on the other by Himself, in Baghdad, who is happy to have reasserted his power and control yet see the West blamed for a policy of oppression against his people in which he is the arch-collaborator. (Tim Llewellyn, "Letter from Basra," *Middle East International*, June 25, 1993, p.24)

The reconstruction effort led to some improvement and repair of Iraq's badly

damaged infrastructure. The Jumhuriya Bridge that linked the center of Baghdad across the Tigris, which was damaged during the Gulf War, was rebuilt within a year. All Iraqi governorates were reconnected again to the national electricity grid. The huge power station that supplied the bulk of Baghdad's power was reverted back into working order by using parts from other power plants. In over a year, Al-Hartha, the main power station for Basra was producing power again. (Cockburn & Cockburn 126-127) The reconstruction efforts were modest in comparison to the vast repair that Iraq's infrastructure needed. Iraq only generated 40 percent of the electricity in 1991 that it had generated the previous year. The most basic requirement of clean water was not achieved. Members of a Harvard School of Public Health team who reported on the breakdown of the water and sewage treatment system in late 1991 found that almost nothing had changed when they returned in 1996. "Water plants through Iraq are now operating at extremely limited capacity," they reported after the second trip, "and the sewage system has virtually ceased to function." From 1991 to 1999, the Shatt Al Arab water treatment plant operated at twenty percent of its capacity. Only in 1999, with the help of Bridges to Baghdad, engineers found spare parts inside of Iraq and managed to repair the plant. At the end of 2000, the facility ran at seventy percent of its capacity. (Solomon & Elrich 94-95, 131-132)

Shortages of trained personnel in Iraq caused by the catastrophic decline of real wages in the public sector exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. Wages fell by ninety percent in the first year under the sanctions, and then by another forty percent over the next four years. Monthly earnings for Iraqis employed by the government declined to five dollars a month. Government officials became corrupt and so desperate that they extracted meager payments, even in food, in exchange for routine services. "Nuha al-

Radi, the leading Iraqi ceramicist, who kept a diary of the war and its aftermath, records the payment of the equivalent of five dollars and a bucket of yogurt for the renewal of the license on a car.” (Cockburn & Cockburn 122)

A basic ration of food was supplied to Iraqi citizens by their government. These meager rations only lasted only about one-third to half a month. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 169) Iraqi citizens registered at the fifty thousand shops that acted as agents for the Iraqi government. An Iraqi citizen could buy for a nominal sum of money, seventeen pounds of wheat flour, three pounds of rice, half a pound of cooking oil, three pounds of sugar, two ounces of tea and three pounds of baby milk, when needed. There were allowances for soap and washing powder, as well. This ration was further reduced in 1994. It only provided fifty-three percent of the minimum food needed for an Iraqi adult to survive. The dependence of these food rations by the Iraqi people strengthened the government’s control over the population. The Iraqi people became dependent on their government for their survival. (Cockburn & Cockburn 123)

The financing of supplying the Iraqi people with these rations occurred by the blatant disregard for the economic sanctions by the Iraqi regime. The Jordanian capital, Amman, became the roaring trade center with Iraq. Iraqi officials offered gold ingots, scrap metal and industrial machinery for sale in exchange for goods and food. Iran also became a favorable trade partner where a large amount of Iraqi industrial goods were bought in exchange for dollars. Around \$400 billion of oil was smuggled abroad in Turkish trucks in defiance of the mandated sanctions. (Cockburn & Cockburn 115, 124)

For the Iraqi poor who could not afford the prices of the spiraling goods on the open market, the sanctions were still devastating. The overall two thousand percent increase in food prices within a year of the Iraqi invasion was catastrophic. In 1990, one

Iraqi dinar was worth \$3.20. In 1995, 2,550 dinars were worth one dollar. Eventually, the dollar replaced the Iraqi dinar as the predominant form of monetary payment in business transactions. Food became a commodity that was exchanged for goods and services in Iraq. “Nuha al-Radi recorded one person renting a room for two trays of eggs a year, but she notes that another family was so poor that they could not afford the annual rent demanded for a house: one chicken.” (Cockburn & Cockburn 115-123)

Throughout the 1990s, various surveys compiled by the Food and Agriculture Organization/World Food Program documented the lack of food in Iraq and its effect on vulnerable groups. In 1996 the World Health Organization stated on health, morbidity and mortality data for 1989-1994, “Comparing levels of the infant mortality rate (IMR) and the mortality of children under 5 years old during the pre war period (1988-1989) with that during the period of the sanctions (since 1990), it is clear that the IMR has doubled and the mortality rate for children under 5 years old has increased six times”. (WHO, March 1996, *The Health conditions of the population in Iraq since the Gulf Crisis*: Section 4, Impact on Child Malnutrition)

In 1991, under pressure from U.N. agencies reporting acute humanitarian needs in Iraq, the Security Council passed Resolutions 706 and 712 (August 15 and September 19, 1991) which placed a low cap on Iraq’s allowed oil sales and deducted about a third of the oil revenues to pay for war reparations, weapons inspectors and UN administrative expenses. The oil sales ceiling would have yielded (after deductions) about \$1.1 billion every six months for Iraq’s humanitarian needs, a fraction of Sadruddin Aga Khan’s estimate for essential spending. Despite the suffering of the Iraqi people, following prolonged negotiations, the Iraqi government rejected these resolutions, claiming that the cap on its oil sales were too stringent. (Johnstone, Ian, *Aftermath of the Gulf War: An*

Assessment of UN Action. Occasional Paper of the International Peace Academy, Boulder, 1994)

To further alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Iraq, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 986 as a “temporary” measure on April 12, 1995. As Iraq faced a humanitarian crisis of large magnitude, the Iraqi government accepted the resolution in 1996. The start of the program was then delayed even further, for seven months until December 1996, while the Iraqi government haggled over the terms of its implementation. Under SCR 986, Iraq was permitted to export up to \$2,000 million worth of oil over a six month period. The program has since been renewed for four further periods of six months under SCRs 1111, 1143, 1153 and 1210. Under SCR 1153, adopted in February 1998, the value of oil Iraq was permitted to export over a six-month period was increased to \$5,300 million. The proceeds from the sale of oil under "oil for food" were paid into a UN account. Under the terms of SCR 986, the UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) was allocated thirty percent, and sixty-six percent went to the UN humanitarian program in Iraq, of which fifty-three percent is allocated to Baghdad-controlled Iraq and thirteen percent to the three northern governorates. The remaining four percent was allocated to the operating costs and administration of the oil-for-food program, UNSCOM and the Iraq/Kuwait Observation mission (UNIKOM), which supervises the border between Iraq and Kuwait. (These and subsequent data on sanctions trade are from the Office of the Iraq Programme web site (www.un.org/Depts/oip). See “Weekly Update,” 13-19 July, 2002).

Under the Oil-for-Food program, Iraq was allowed to purchase and import foodstuffs, medicine and medical equipment and other goods for essential civilian needs. It was also allowed to import spare parts, equipment and materials for use in the water and

sanitation, education, electricity, agricultural and de-mining sectors. SCR 1153 expanded the humanitarian program to allow a certain amount of repair to the infrastructure and some upgrading of Iraq's oil infrastructure to enable it to pump the increased \$5,300 million worth of oil as permitted under this resolution. Supplies that were provided under the humanitarian program were strictly monitored by the UN. The international community insisted on such safeguards to ensure that this scheme would benefit the Iraqi people, not the Iraqi regime, which has misused Iraq's scarce resources in the past. (These and subsequent data on sanctions trade are from the Office of the Iraq Programme web site (www.un.org/Depts/oip). See "Weekly Update," 13-19 July, 2002).

In the three northern governorates, the UN was entirely responsible for distribution. The humanitarian program was structured around a "Distribution Plan" drawn up by the government of Iraq, which details all the goods that Iraq wishes to import for each six month period of the program. The UN Secretary General had to approve the plan, and Iraq was not automatically entitled to import all the goods on the list. They must be approved by the Sanctions Committee (also known as the 661 Committee) on a case-by-case basis. This was to ensure that the export of all goods to Iraq was consistent with the terms of the UN resolutions. Since the program was implemented, the Sanctions Committee approved 96 percent of all applications submitted for funding under the program. (These and subsequent data on sanctions trade are from the Office of the Iraq Programme web site (www.un.org/Depts/oip). "Weekly Update," 13-19 July, 2002).

Under the Oil-for-Food program, conditions in Iraq slightly improved. In central and southern Iraq, there was an increase in the size and caloric value of the monthly rations which improved nutrition, especially among young children. In the Kurdish controlled areas of the north, food imports helped the urban population survive. A survey

by Save the Children-U.K. found that up to sixty percent of the Kurdish population had nothing to fall back on should the Oil-for Food program stop. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 170-171) Most critics of the easing of the economic sanctions argued that the dire humanitarian crisis in Iraq was a result of the Iraqi government's failure to adequately deliver food and medicine provided by the Oil-for-Food program to its people. The World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Food Program (WFP) have carefully monitored Iraqi distribution of all food and medicine purchased under Resolution 986. In 1998, interviewed officials from the WHO and the WFP gave an "A" rating to the Iraqi government distribution of food and medicine throughout every governorate.

The Oil-for Food Program was never intended to replenish Iraq's needs of essential goods on a long-term basis. In November 2000, the UN Secretariat reported to the Security Council that, "the humanitarian programme was never intended to meet all the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population or to be a substitute for normal economic activity. Also the programme is not geared to address the longer term deterioration of living standards or to remedy declining health standards and infrastructure". (UN report S/2000/1132, page 2, point 5)

The Gulf War bombing had inflicted extensive infrastructural damage, compromising the provision of clean water, sanitation and electrical power to the Iraqi population. The resulting public health emergency, rather than the lack of food, continued to be the primary cause of increased mortality, especially among children under five. UNICEF estimated in 2002 that seventy percent of child deaths resulted from diarrhea and acute respiratory infections. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 169) The low mortality of children was due to the acute need of building Iraq's infrastructure and the scarce

availability of medical supplies.

Most of the Iraqi population still did not have access to clean water. A Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) document dated January 22, 1991 noted that Iraq's water treatment plants depend on "importing specialized equipment...to purify its water supply." Without such parts and chemicals, "incidences of disease, including possible epidemics, will become probable." (*Iraq Water Treatment Vulnerabilities*"; [http: www.gulflink.osd.mil/declass-docs/dia/19950901/950901_511rept_91.html](http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/declass-docs/dia/19950901/950901_511rept_91.html)) The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs reported that "Fifty percent of the rural population has no access to portable water and waste water treatment facilities have stopped functioning in most urban areas." The economic sanctions inhibited the importation of spare parts, chemicals, and the means of transportation required to provide water and sanitation services to the civilian population of Iraq, as some materials were seen as having dual-use capabilities. For example, chlorine, vital for water purification, was seen to have a dual use capability, as it could be used to make chlorine gas. (Solomon & Erlich 94) Sanitization of Iraq's water plants was dependent on importing items such as chlorine. As a result, "In marked contrast to the prevailing situation prior to the events of 1990-91, the infant mortality rates in Iraq today are among the highest in the world." (UN Report on the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq submitted to the Security Council, March 1999)

The scarcity of medicine and medical equipment also contributed to the increased mortality of children, diseases that became extinct in other parts of the world appeared in Iraq. The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs reported that "public health services are near total collapse - basic medicine life-saving drugs and essential medical supplies are lacking throughout the country." In Iraq, during the economic sanctions government

drug warehouses and pharmacies had few stocks of medicines and medical supplies. The consequences of this situation were causing a near-breakdown of the health care system, which was reeling under the pressure of being deprived of medicine, other basic supplies and spare parts. (World Health Organization, 1997) "There has been a resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases, including polio, diphtheria and measles." (UNICEF, 1993)

The amount of oil Iraq was allowed to sell under Resolution 986 did not enable the Iraqi government to meet the population's need for medicine and medical relief due to the precarious condition of Iraq's infrastructure. Dr. Habib Rejeb, head of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Iraq, stated that such revenue would meet Iraqi needs in terms of purchasing medicine:

But you would be providing this in a vacuum because you don't have the equipment. If you buy laboratory materials and you don't have the equipment it's useless...you give antibiotics but because of the poor hygiene in hospitals it's unlikely that you can prevent cross-infections. If you don't provide the proper food in hospitals then you can't enhance recovery. You can't really work without electricity, you can't really work without water, and you can't work safely while stepping on sewage which comes out often. To improve the health situation you don't only need drugs because this is the tip of the iceberg. ... If you want to provide the proper care to the population then you have to rehabilitate the infrastructure.

Although, the Oil-for-Food program met the urgent need of the Iraqi people and prevented a humanitarian crisis, it did not provide a comprehensive solution that addressed the source of the problems the Iraqi population was facing or provided for the complete rehabilitation of Iraq's infrastructure.

The educational system in Iraq also deteriorated quite drastically. "Iraqi school buildings are falling apart, and there is no money for school books or other materials. A generation of Iraqi children faces the threat of growing up with adequate education."

(*Chicago Tribune*, March 24, 1998) Due to the poor economic state of Iraq, one quarter of

primary school age children were not attending school at all. (UNICEF, 1997) A side effect of sanctions was the intellectual isolation in the scientific and medical community. That was due, in part, to the non-availability of journals, periodicals, and textbooks. (FAO 1993) The sanctions prohibited textbooks, paper, pencils, pens, ink, chairs and desks from reaching Iraq.

The Iraqi people were squeezed into a precarious position by a combination of hyperinflation and collapse of household incomes. "The sanctions are turning the social structure upside down -- the middle-class is every day more impoverished." "Baghdad's unemployment rate is more than 50 percent; in the second-largest city, Basra, unemployment hovers around 75 percent. Out-of-work engineers drive taxis, and doctors take second jobs to supplement a salary that, because of inflation, now averages only about \$3 to \$5 per month." As a consequence, the number of beggars and street children have increased enormously (UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 1995) Emigration was sapping away many of the best and brightest. Workers' skills were disappearing after years of mass unemployment. Women had lost jobs disproportionately in the shrunken workforce. Stress and psychiatric illnesses had ravaged families. Social cohesion had steadily unraveled. ("Special Topics on Social Conditions in Iraq: An Overview Submitted By the UN System to the Security Council Panel on Humanitarian Issues," Baghdad, March 24, 1999) The Security Council became increasingly aware of these broader issues. Its humanitarian panel spoke of such effects in 1999, noting that observers often reported alarming signs such as: "Increase in juvenile delinquency, begging and prostitution, anxiety about the future and lack of motivation, a rising sense of isolation bred by absence of contact with the outside world, the development of a parallel economy replete with profiteering and criminality, cultural and scientific impoverishment,

disruption of family life. WHO points out that the number of mental health patients attending health facilities rose by 157 percent from 1990 to 1998.” (UN document S/1999/356, Annex II, “Report of the second panel established pursuant to the note by the president of the Security Council of January 30, 1999 (S/1999/100), concerning the current humanitarian situation in Iraq”, March 30, 1999, paragraph 25)

As the living of standard collapsed for most of the people in Iraq, many of them took refuge in religion. Attendance at prayers in the venerable mosques of the city soared. A secular society was slowly transformed into an Islamic society. As Islamic fervor circulated around Iraq, Saddam noted the trend and shrewdly moved to capitalize on it. He increasingly began to cast his regime as “Islamic” although the Ba’athist Party is secular. The Iraqi government became astute in banning the sale of alcohol. Restaurants were no longer allowed to serve alcohol. However, Iraqis could still purchase alcohol and beer from Christian-owned shops, which were specially licensed. By 1995, nightclubs and discotheques were closed. The Iraqi regime began to punish crimes quite savagely in an effort to curtail the spread of crime around the country. The Revolutionary Command Council decreed that anyone convicted of robbery or car theft would have their right hand amputated at the wrist, in accordance with Islamic law. A repeated offense would exact the punishment of amputating the left foot. By 1994, Saddam in an effort to lavishly display his Islamic affirmations to the public, he decreed that the largest mosque in the world would be built in Baghdad.(Cockburn & Cockburn 128-130) The Grand Saddam Mosque acted as a metaphor to the state that the Iraqi society was within. As the Iraqi people suffered under the economic sanctions, the Iraqi regime seemed unaffected by the suffering of its people and undeterred in its efforts to display its defiance to the economic sanctions by displaying its grandeur and power in continuing to build presidential palaces

throughout Iraq and buildings of great extravagance. The economic sanctions were successful in deterring the Iraqi regime from achieving its status of hollow grandeur. During the first year of building the Grand Saddam Mosque, it could be only partially completed as Iraq could not import the materials or equipment needed to build it. An Iraqi engineer, Jawad, reminisced, "We do not have high-tensile steel, pile drivers, reinforcement bars, or additives for the cement. The only part of the mosque that was completed was an elegant pavilion from which the chief engineer could gaze on his barren site." (Cockburn & Cockburn 30)

As a UN Security Council panel reported, "Even if not all suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external factors, especially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of war". The suffering of the Iraqi people continued under the economic sanctions, as the Iraqi government continued to divert essential resources to meet its own needs. The economic sanctions, the lack of resources to rebuild Iraq's infrastructure and the irresponsible behavior of the Iraqi regime contributed to the deterioration of living standards and declining health standards of the Iraqi people.

Due to the acute humanitarian crisis that developed in Iraq and the waning political support for sanctions, the chairman of the Security Council's Iraq Sanctions Committee, Ambassador António Monteiro of Portugal, convened a series of meetings with Council colleagues during 1998. On October 30, 1998 the group circulated a paper to the whole Council, setting forth its concerns with a series of reform proposals. The reformers noted that sanctions, "Often produce undesired side effects for the civilian population, including children. The decisions of the Security Council to impose sanctions imply the Council's obligation to ensure that proper implementation of sanctions does not

result in violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and its responsibility to do all within its power for the respect of the basic economic, social and cultural rights, and other human rights of the affected population.” The paper insisted on the Council’s responsibility to monitor the impact of its sanctions, the need for clear criteria for lifting of sanctions, and the need to move towards “targeted” sanctions that would impact on top leaders, not the general population of the offending state. (This text, known as a “non-paper,” was never issued as a publication of the Security Council. For the full text see <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/committee-chairs/1998/1030papr.htm>.)

Though the Security Council’s membership changed in 1999, momentum for sanctions reform continued. Elected members of the Security Council persuaded the Council to establish three assessment “panels” on Iraq under the chairmanship of Ambassador Celso Amorim of Brazil. One panel discussed arms control issues, a second panel looked at prisoners of war and other issues, while a third focused on the humanitarian situation in Iraq. In its report of March 1999, the humanitarian panel set forth the alarming decline in living standards in Iraq, including health, food, infrastructure and education. The report concluded with an implicit call for re-development and normalization of the Iraqi economy: “In presenting the above recommendations to the Security Council, the panel reiterates its understanding that the humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi economy, which in turn cannot be achieved solely through remedial humanitarian efforts.” (Report of the second panel established pursuant to the note by the president of the Security Council S/1999/100 concerning the current humanitarian situation in Iraq, UN document S/1999/356, 15, para 58)

Increasingly, in 1999, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, Hans von Sponeck, raised his concerns. His predecessor, Dennis Halliday, had resigned in the summer of 1999, in protest against the sanctions. Now von Sponeck himself was shocked by what he discovered and was voiced his concerns to UN officials and others. A visiting delegation reported on this conversation: “The oil for food program provides him with \$177 per person per year – 50 cents a day – for all of the needs of each Iraqi citizen. He said, “Now I ask you, \$180 per year? That’s not a per capita income figure. This is a figure out of which everything has to be financed, from electrical service to water and sewage, to food, to health – the lot . . . that is obviously a totally, totally inadequate figure.” (From a report on a meeting with a delegation from Physicians for Social Responsibility on April 5, 1999, www.scn.org/ccpi/UNandUSreports.html)

Many of the Security Council members hoped that the panel reports would lead to remedial action and that the Council would eventually lift the comprehensive sanctions, moving towards sanctions targeted at Saddam Hussein and his inner circle. Negotiations began towards a comprehensive new resolution, but the United States held firm against substantive change and the UK, unable to persuade the US to adopt a more reform-oriented policy, chose to maintain the status quo posture as well.

Due to the deep internal differences within the Security Council did not adopt a new resolution until the end of 1999. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1284 was passed on 17th of December, 2000, with abstentions by three Permanent Members: Russia, China and France. It fell far below the earlier hopes of sanction reformers such as Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and Slovenia, though it did incorporate a few of the moderate panel suggestions. It lifted the cap on oil sales completely and it marginally relaxed the system of goods review. It also set forth rules

for an improved system of weapons inspection. It did not propose any change in the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq or any humanitarian monitoring procedures. The resolution specified that it would partially suspend sanctions if Iraq cooperates with a new weapons inspection regime for 120 days. The suspension of sanctions will be for renewable terms of 120 days, meaning that when one term expires, sanctions will be re-imposed by default unless the Security Council votes unanimously to continue the suspension. Three of the five permanent members of the Security Council abstained, objecting to the 120-day waiting period and the ambiguity of what "cooperation" meant. (United Nations Report on the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq, 30 March, 1999)

Although this new resolution was designed to improve the Oil-for-Food Program, it fell short of the recommendations made by the UN's Humanitarian Panel that reported to the United Nations Security Council in 1999. In particular, the resolution ignored the key recommendations that would improve the import of materials needed for the repair of water and sanitation facilities and other critical sectors of infrastructure. Furthermore, without the spare parts and investment needed to modernize and repair Iraqis dilapidated oil wells, Iraq remained limited in how much oil revenue it could generate. Thus, the lifting of the cap on the Oil-for-Food program under this new resolution was virtually meaningless. Without the "suspension of sanctions," the Iraqi people lived under a virtual revenue cap. When oil prices dropped, Iraqis oil revenues would have run disastrously low. During the 1997/8 oil slump, for example, Iraq could not pump enough oil to meet the previous \$5.2 billion Oil-for-Food ceiling.

If "the fundamental objective" of suspending sanctions was to "[improve] the humanitarian situation," as acknowledged by UNSC Resolution 1284, then it should not be linked to Iraq's cooperation with weapons inspections. By linking measures intended

to ease the suffering of the Iraqi people to Iraq's international obligations, the Security Council was collectively punishing the people of Iraq for Saddam Hussein's irresponsible behavior. Steps should have been taken to de-politicize the humanitarian crisis, de-linking it from issues of compliance & weapons inspections.

By 2001, the economic sanctions were quickly losing political support. Most of Iraq's neighbors, including Syria, Turkey, Jordan and some Gulf states were involved in trade with Iraq in defiance of the economic sanctions. The resulting revenues were sufficient to keep the Iraqi regime well-financed despite the economic sanctions imposed upon Iraq. Illicit trade, especially oil smuggling, forged economic ties between Iraq and its neighbors, which became resistant to the U.S. and British efforts of "enhanced containment" of the Iraqi regime. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 172) Since 1997, illicit revenues amounting to roughly \$2 billion have been accrued by the Iraqi regime. A recent report from the Coalition of International Justice, which advocates the trial of Iraqi leaders for crimes against humanity, states that the source of 90 percent of the Iraqi regime's acquired wealth came from oil smuggling. The most remunerative oil smuggling route ran through Syria's pipeline to the oilfields in northern Iraq, which was reopened on November 6, 2000. The oil pipeline was closed since 1982, when Hafiz al-Asad's regime in Syria backed Iran in the Iraq-Iran War. As many as 150,000 barrels of discounted Iraqi crude oil per day passed through the pipeline, enabling Syria to export more of its own oil. Another third of Iraq's contraband oil found its way to the Iranian ports, where it was reportedly mixed with the exports of Iranian oil. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 172) The Kurdish enclave bordering Turkey benefited enormously from imposing exit taxes on diesel and crude oil smuggled into Turkey. However, Turkey took steps to curtail this illegal trade beginning in March 2002, as some of the smuggled revenue was being

diverted to the Iraq-based militia units of the Worker's Party of Kurdistan (PKK), which fought a separatist war against Turkey in the 1990s. Officially, Iraq exported 110,000 barrels per day of oil to Jordan with the tacit approval of the Security Council, in return for preferential prices on Jordanian consumer goods. Jordan's economy was particularly dependent on the Iraqi market and the free Iraqi oil that it received. Turkey and Jordan were allowed to break sanctions with impunity, arguing that their fragile economies could not afford to lose Iraqi trade. Syria rebuffed U.S. demands that called for the closure of Syria's oil pipeline to Iraq, without any penalty. Only Iran has received harsh criticism from the Security Council for its trade with Iraq. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 172-173)

Generally, the Arab countries started to openly defy any of the U.S. and British attempts to seal the pockets of defiance to the economic sanctions.

The Arab Summit of March 2002 marked the formal end of the Arab consensus behind economic sanctions and the containment policies of the UN towards Iraq. At the Arab Summit, Iraq recognized the sovereignty of Iraq for the first time, and both countries issued a pledge to resolve the issue of Kuwaiti missing personnel and stolen property claims from the Gulf War. The summit also produced an unprecedented agreement among all Arab countries, including Iraq, to recognize the state of Israel inside its pre-1967 borders. Arab diplomats sought to persuade the Iraqi regime to accept the return of the UN weapons inspectors. The summit concluded with a unified call to lift the UN sanctions. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 173)

By 2001, the economic sanctions against Iraq were loosely enforced by many of the member states that initially supported them. The Arab countries refused to continue their support for the UN economic sanctions. Within the Security Council, deep divisions among its members for the support of the economic sanctions began to emerge. France,

China and Russia wanted to implement the concept of certifying Iraqi compliance with inspections and the subsequent lifting of the sanctions as a reward for Iraqi compliance. The U.S. and the U.K. firmly argued that Iraq had not sufficiently complied by all of the U.N. resolutions. Therefore, the economic sanctions against Iraq could not be lifted.

As the political support for the economic sanctions began to fade, the policy of forcible “regime change” in Iraq was presented by the U.K. and the U.S. as another option to induce the disarmament of Iraq. The Arab governments became anxious about their own stability in the event of a war and maintained vocal public opposition to military intervention in Iraq, as the intention of the U.S. and the U.K. to topple Saddam Hussein by force became clear. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 173) France, Russia and China also maintained strong opposition to any UN or Security Council resolution that would implement any forcible regime change within Iraq.

As seen by the Operation of Iraqi Freedom, the failure of the UN sanctions to implement the full disarmament of Iraq has contributed to the decision of the U.S. and Britain to remove Saddam from power, in an effort to demilitarize Iraq & give the Iraqi people the freedom & prosperity that they lacked under Saddam Hussein’s oppressive regime. The removal of Saddam’s regime and the freedom of the Iraqis came with a further price of human casualties on both sides, the further destruction of Iraq’s infrastructure and the lack of basic essential needs such as water and electricity to the majority of the Iraqi population, but it also freed the country from a repressive regime, brought an end to the sanctions and enabled the country to embark on the process of reconstruction and greater national prosperity.

THE ELUSIVE TASK OF IRAQ'S DISARMAMENT

“The greatest threat to life on earth is weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, chemical and biological...The community of nations has recognized this threat; indeed perhaps its most important achievement in the second half of the twentieth century was the weaving of a tapestry of treaties designed to contain and the eliminate it. This work was never easy, and its implementation has been challenged repeatedly. The most determined and diabolical of such challenges has been that mounted by the dictator of Iraq-Saddam Hussein.” (Butler xv) To disarm the Iraqi regime of its chemical, biological and nuclear capabilities, the United Nations enforced economic sanctions against Iraq and imposed stringent requirements for the removal of its weapons of mass destruction.

On April 3, 1991, United Nations Security Resolution 687 specified cease-fire conditions of the Gulf War. The resolution mandated that Iraq respect the sovereignty of Kuwait; declare and destroy, remove, or render harmless all ballistic missile systems with a range of more than 150 kilometers; confirmed that Iraq must repatriate all Kuwaiti and third-state nationals and extend complete cooperation to the Red Cross in these efforts; and created a compensation fund, financed by Iraq, to meet its liability for losses, damages, and injuries related to its unlawful occupation of Kuwait. On 6th of April, 1991, Iraq accepted this resolution.

To monitor Iraqi disarmament and verify Iraq's compliance with the weapons provisions of UNSC 687, on June 17, 1991, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established, “which shall carry out immediate on-site inspections of

Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the Special Commission itself." (UNSC, S/RES/986 1995) The UNSCOM team entered Iraq in 1991 and continued their inspections till December of 1998. Although UNSCOM succeeded in locating and destroying many of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction sites, its inspections were frequently contested by the Iraqi regime, which restricted access to certain sites and withheld pertaining documents to its stock of weapons of mass destruction. Saddam Hussein regarded the inspections only as a temporary inconvenience that could easily be avoided, as he stated at a private meeting in the presidential palace, "The Special Commission is a temporary measure. We will fool them and we will bribe them and the matter will be over in a few months." (Cockburn & Cockburn 96) It was a flagrant miscalculation.

Between 1991 till December of 1998, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Iraq Action Team carried out inspections in Iraq in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions and with the assistance of UNSCOM. The IAEA was substantial in uncovering Iraq's past nuclear program and Iraq's capability of developing nuclear weapons. The IAEA discovered that in 1991, Iraq was within 6 to 24 months of building a nuclear explosive device. The prospect of the Iraqi regime possessing a nuclear weapon was a horrific reality for the rest of the world due to Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds, in the past. Iraq was quite close in achieving its possession of a nuclear device. According to Khidir Hamza, who spent twenty years developing Iraq's atomic weapon before defecting in 1994, Saddam was quite ambitious in his pursuit and ruthless in his ambitions for the use of a nuclear weapon:

In 1971, on the orders of Saddam Hussein, we set out to build a nuclear bomb. Our goal was to construct a device roughly equivalent to the bomb

the United States dropped on Hiroshima in 1945...The first one would be a crude device, a sphere about four feet in diameter too big and heavy for a missile warhead but suitable for a demonstration test or, as we discovered, to our horror, Saddam's plan to drop one unannounced on Israel. The crash program to build the first bomb came to an abrupt halt with the looming Allied campaign to take back Kuwait and invade Iraq. All the evidence indicates, however that Saddam has not forsworn his goal to make Iraq a nuclear-armed power." (Hamza 333)

The IAEA and UNSCOM warned in 1997 that it was still unearthing major components from Iraq's nuclear program. Hans Blix, then head of the IAEA, stated that he had evidence that Iraq had still not reported all outside assistance for its nuclear weapons program. (Transcript of Hans Blix interview, *Reuters*, 16 October 1997, 1928) On December 2, 1997, Mohammed Al Baradei, head of the IAEA as Hans Blix's replacement, issued a statement that he saw no signs the Iraq had resumed a nuclear program during the temporary absence of the inspectors. Nevertheless, the IAEA warned that this did not mean that Iraq was not retaining significant equipment or did not still have a covert nuclear program. (Cordesman 384) How quickly Iraq could have obtained its first nuclear weapon was dependent on its acquisition of nuclear weapons-grade fissile material. (Sifry & Cerf 194) Once the Iraqi regime obtained sufficient weapons-grade fissile material from abroad, it could have made a nuclear weapon within a year. (CIA report, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," October 2002) The prospect of how close Iraq came to acquiring a nuclear weapon is still unknown. The containment of Iraq's nuclear program and its destruction was as a vital task that had to be completed to ensure the safety of the entire world community.

From the beginning of the inspections by UNSCOM in 1991, Iraq has used measures to prevent the UN inspectors from finding the full range and extent of its proscribed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missile programs. Despite Iraq's incursions of deception, some of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction have been recovered

by UNSCOM and have been destroyed on several occasions. From June 23-28, 1991, Iraq violated the cease-fire agreements and UN Resolution 687. Iraqi troops fired shots to prevent UNSCOM/ IAEA inspectors from intercepting Iraqi vehicles carrying nuclear-related equipment. The nuclear-related equipment was later found and destroyed under the cease-fire rules. From July 18-20 1991, the Iraqi ballistic missile concealment was revealed. UNSCOM discovered and destroyed undeclared decoy missiles and launch support equipment. During August 2-8, 1991, the Iraqi biological program was revealed. UNSCOM uncovered a major biological program, including seed stocks of three biological warfare agents and three potential warfare strains. (Cordesman 552, 583-597)

The United Nations has continually condemned the refusal of Iraq to reveal the full extent of its weapons of mass destruction by issuing a series of resolutions that have mandated Iraqi cooperation and enforcing the role of the UN inspectors to freely inspect & destroy Iraq's weapons in accordance with Resolution 687. On October 11, 1991, UN issued Resolution 715 which approved plans for on-going monitoring and verification of Iraqi weapons program. This resolution established that Iraq must cooperate fully with the UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors. Throughout 1991 till 1993, the Security Council concluded that Iraq was in material breach on seven occasions. On most occasions, Iraq eventually ceased its objectionable activities without a resort to the use of force by United Nations Security Council members. On November 1993, Iraq finally accepted the UN Resolution 715. (United Nations S/RES/715 1991)

In 1994, after the United Nations passed the Oil-for-Food program under Resolution 986, the Iraqi regime tried to gain international support for modifying or lifting of the economic sanctions in exchange for oil. Security Council members that were more sympathetic to the modification of the sanctions, France, Russia and China,

received around thirty percent of the contracts approved by the U.N. for the export of Iraqi oil in exchange of imports of food & other “humanitarian goods”. Firms that were located in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, whose governments became more sympathetic to the Iraqi regime, were also awarded 30 percent of Iraq’s import contacts under the Oil-for-Food program in 2000. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 171)

From 1994, a clear rift appeared among the Permanent Five members of the Security Council, over the progress of the inspections. France and Russia wanted to reward the specific instances of Iraqi cooperation with gradual amelioration of the country’s economic isolation, including a “road map” towards the lifting of the economic sanctions, while the U.S. and Britain refused to consider such measures. (Graham-Brown & Toensing 171) The dispute between the Permanent Five members revolved around the ambiguity in the wording of the conditions required in lifting the economic sanctions set in UNSC 687, especially in paragraphs 21 and 22. Paragraph 22 seems to allow the sanctions on imports from Iraq, especially oil, to be lifted once Iraq has complied with all the conditions set concerning its weapons of mass destruction. Paragraph 21 sets out a much broader scope of compliance, it stated that imports from Iraq could resume only when Iraq has complied with “all relevant UN resolutions.” The U.S. and Britain argued that the economic sanctions could only be lifted when Iraq complied with UNSC 688 which include Iraq’s treatment of its Kurdish and Shiite population, and that the economic sanctions should be sustained and remain a priority till the complete disarmament of Iraq has been achieved. (Cockburn & Cockburn 95) The inspections and economic sanctions were retained despite the grievances of France and Russia.

Only after four years of inspections in 1995, the full extent of Iraq’s program of cultivating chemical and biological weapons was uncovered. Following the defection of

Wafiq al-Sammari, formerly the chief of Iraqi military intelligence, an incredulous UNSCOM official was informed by al-Sammari that Iraq had not only succeeded in manufacturing VX, the most deadly of chemical nerve agents, but had actually loaded it into warheads. Furthermore, al-Sammari revealed, the Iraqi biological warfare effort was advanced and intact. He reported the Iraq retained a number of operational missiles with biological and chemical warheads. (Cockburn & Cockburn 111) During April 6-7, 1995, a seminar of international biological weapons experts convened by UNSCOM concluded that Iraq had an undeclared full-scale biological weapons program. As a result of UNSCOM's investigations, Iraq admitted for the first time the existence of an offensive biological weapons program, but denied weaponization. (Cockburn & Cockburn 110-112) Throughout May 1-3, 1995, a seminar of international chemical weapons experts convened by UNSCOM concluded also that Iraq has not adequately disclosed its past chemical weapons programs.

The infiltration of another key political figure & Saddam Hussein's brother-in-law led to the acquisition of more information about the full scale of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. On August 8, 1995, General Hussein Kamel left Iraq and infiltrated to Jordan. General Kamel was the Minister of Industry and Minerals and former Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation, he was responsible for all of Iraq's weapons programs. Iraq blamed its previous concealment of its weapons of mass destruction on General Kamel. After being confronted by its deceptive behavior, on August 17, 1985, the Iraqi regime admitted having a far more extensive prohibited biological weapons program than it had previously admitted, including its weaponization. The Iraqi regime withdrew its third Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure for revision. It also admitted to having achieved greater progress in its efforts to indigenously produce long-range

missiles than had previously been declared. (Cordesman 583)

On August 20, 1995, Iraq provided to UNSCOM and the IAEA previously concealed information: 680,000 pages of documents, computer disks, videotapes, and microfilm, related to its prohibited weapons programs which subsequently lead to further disclosures by Iraq concerning the production of the nerve agent VX (the most advanced, deadly, and long-lasting chemical agent) and Iraq's development of a nuclear weapon. Throughout May-June, UNSCOM supervised the destruction of Al-Hakam, Iraq's main facility for the production of biological warfare agents. (United Nations Special Commission, *Main Achievements*, March 1998)

Due to Iraq's deceptive behavior, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus strengthened the UNSCOM team by seeking intelligence assistance from UN member states. Iraq responded to this effort by increasing its interference with the UNSCOM inspections. (Butler 176) In March of 1996, the UNSCOM teams were denied immediate access to five sites designated for inspection. The teams entered the sites after delays of up to 17 hours. United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1060 that stated that Iraq's actions were a clear violation of the provisions of UNSC Resolutions. On June 18, 1997 UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus briefed the UN Security Council that the team witnessed Iraqis burning, shredding, and fleeing with stacks of documents while the team was blocked, part of an overall pattern of obstruction. (United Nations, Note by the Secretary-General, S/1997/301, April 11, 1997) Therefore, on June 21, 1997, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1115: "Condemning Iraq's refusal of access as 'clear and flagrant violation' of relevant resolutions, suspending sanctions reviews until after UNSCOM's October six-month report to the Council, and expressing the 'firm intention ... to impose additional measures' if Iraq does not comply." (United Nations

S/RES/1115 (1997) After this confrontation, tensions mounted between UNSCOM team and the Iraqi regime. In June 1996, Ekeus met with Tariq Aziz, Iraq's Deputy Foreign Minister. An agreement was reached that Iraq would be permitted to severely restrict UNSCOM's access to any site that the Iraqi government deemed "sensitive" for national security reasons. Although, this agreement was in direct violation of a Security Council resolution that decreed that the UNSCOM team should be able to go anywhere, at anytime, with the experts it deemed necessary to complete its task. (Butler 185)

After reaching such an agreement, Iraq resumed its cooperation with the inspectors from UNSCOM. The Iraqi cooperation did not mean its full compliance with the UN resolutions. UNSCOM insisted on the removal of ballistic missiles ranging longer than 150km from Iraq's cache of weapons. Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus of Sweden signed a joint statement in Baghdad witnessing Iraq's agreement to removal from Iraq remnants of some 134 SCUD long-range missile motors (with key components stripped by Iraq and still unaccounted for). The Ekeus-Aziz letter stated UNSCOM's concerns that "Iraq still possesses a force of operational missiles proscribed by Security Council resolution 687". (Cordesman 585) Iraq continued to try and retain as many of its weapons, as possible, in defiance to the UN resolutions.

On July 1, 1997, Richard Butler of Australia replaced Rolf Ekeus as Executive Chairman of UNSCOM. Iraq's deceptive behavior continued. As Richard Butler stated, "Before long, I had my first taste of Iraqi defiance. During a routine in September 1997 at what Iraq had described as a food-testing lab, the chief of our biological team glimpsed two Iraqi officials trying to run out the back door. She seized a briefcase from one, inside were biological test equipment and documents linking the headquarters of the Iraqi

Special Security Organization to what appeared to be a biological weapons program.” (Butler 177) Deceptive behavior by Iraqi officials continued such as vehicle movements inside a site while an UNSCOM team was blocked outside, in-flight manhandling of an UNSCOM photographer and two incidents on September 15 outside a Republican Guard base, including vehicle movements inside while a team was delayed for 3 hours. Additionally, on September 27 & 29, and October 1, the UNSCOM-207 team was blocked at three security-service/concealment-mechanism sites termed by Iraq as "presidential/residential." Access was gained to sites declared "sensitive" by Iraq under the Ekeus modalities, but the team found clear evidence of recent sanitizing and a lot of obvious lying by Iraqi spokesmen. (Cordeman 208-209)

Richard Butler reported these incidents to the Security Council in October and asked the UN to rescind the agreement between Ekeus and Aziz on the sensitive sites. As Richard Butler stated, “But by then UNSCOM’S political support was beginning to collapse. Russia, China and France refused to vote for a resolution supporting the conclusions of my report of UNSCOM’s work—a resolution that threatened new sanctions against Iraq unless Iraq cooperated with the inspectors. The Iraqis seized on these divisions within the Security Council, formally affirming the existence of the so-called presidential sites and declaring them off-limits to UNSCOM’s investigators. Eight areas covering a total of thirty square miles—including 1,100 buildings, many of them warehouses and garages ideal for storage, were designated as presidential sites.” (Butler 190)

On October 23, 1997 another UNSCR 1134 was adopted (10-0-5, with abstention by China, Egypt, France, Kenya, and Russia). It condemned the repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow access to sites designated by the Special Commission and

decides that such refusals to cooperate constitute a flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions. (United Nations S/RES/1134 (1997))

In a rebuttal, in a letter dated October 29, 1997 Tariq Aziz informed the president of the Security Council that beginning on October 30 Iraq was "not to deal with Americans working with the Special Commission. We also demand that all the aforementioned persons leave Iraq within seven days from that date." In the following days, Iraq in fact refused to allow UNSCOM inspectors of American nationality to either inspect or arrive in Iraq on UNSCOM aircraft, then delayed the expulsion order while a 3-member UN delegation sent by the Secretary-General visited Baghdad for talks. The Americans were then forced by Iraq, during the night of November 12, 1997 to drive overland to Amman. UNSCOM/ IAEA immediately drew down to caretaker status. Iraq called for cessation of all UNSSCOM U2 surveillance flights. On November 13, 1997 UNSCOM Executive Chairman, Richard Butler, withdrew the majority of UNSCOM personnel, leaving no inspection team or monitoring capability other than remote cameras inside Iraq. (Cordesman 225)

Throughout this defiance by Iraq, Russia was acting as an advocate for the Iraqi regime in the Security Council. As Richard Butler stated, "Russia's ambassador to the UN, Sergei Larov, stopped by my office regularly to take me through the latest concessions Iraq wanted from the Security Council and UNSCOM." (Butler 195) The reason for the Russian advocacy for Iraq was purely materialistic. As Richard Butler explains, in his book *The Greatest Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Crisis of Global Security*, "Yevgeny Primakov, Russia's foreign minister, proceeded to point out that these presidential sites were deeply important to the dignity of the regime and thus should be kept out of UNSCOM's reach Then he told me it was in Russia's

interest for sanctions against Iraq to be lifted so that Iraq would again be free to sell oil for profit...Iraq owed Moscow some \$7 billion (for Russian tanks, helicopters and other weapons dating back to the Iraq-Iran War) and Russia wanted the money. UNSCOM must be more 'flexible'," Primakov stated. "If you can't find something, weapons, during your inspections, you should accept that it is because they don't exist.".... I received intelligence reports from an outstanding source that the Russian foreign minister had been getting personal payments from Iraq." It is among this corrupt and confusing political environment that the work of UNSCOM was conducted.

To avert a political crisis, Kofi Annan met with Saddam. On November 20, 1997, Iraq accepted the return of UNSCOM personnel and promised full compliance. The inspectors had to be accompanied by diplomatic observers. Nevertheless on December 12-16, Iraq refused to allow inspections for a new category of sites they defined as "Presidential and Sovereign". Therefore, on December 22, the Council's presidential statement "stresses that failure by the Government of Iraq to provide the Special Commission with immediate, unconditional access to any site or category of sites is unacceptable and a clear violation of the relevant resolutions." (United Nations, Note by the Secretary-General S/1997/7774, December 22, 1997) In January 1998, Iraq continued to refuse access to eight so-called 'presidential sites'. UNSCOM Executive Chairman, Richard Butler, visited Iraq to seek compliance. The U.S. led a coalition effort to prepare a military strike on Iraq. On February 23, 1998 to avert a crisis, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan visited Iraq. The UN and Iraq signed a Memorandum Of Understanding in which Iraq reconfirmed its acceptance of all relevant UNSC resolutions and its intention to allow full access to sites by UNSCOM and IAEA. (Cordesman 253)

However, on July 18, 1998 during the UNSCOM-244 sensitive-site inspection at

Iraqi air force headquarters, Iraq refused to let UNSCOM chief inspector obtain a copy of a list of chemical munitions expended during the Iran-Iraq War. Later, Tariq Aziz informed Richard Butler, "That Iraq will never let UNSCOM have that document." On August 5, Iraq suspended its cooperation with the Special Commission in its current form and with the International Atomic Energy Agency, but it allowed monitoring to continue. Subsequently, concerning Iraq's demands, on August 6 in a statement to the Security Council, before its own statement to the media, Kofi Annan declared, "Iraqi demands for restructuring of UNSCOM are unacceptable...The Iraqi government's position is clearly in violation of the resolutions of the Security Council and of the Annan-Aziz Memorandum of Understanding." (Cordesman 320)

Consequently, on September 9, 1998, Security Council unanimously passed UNSCR 1194, which: "Express[es] its readiness to consider, in a comprehensive review, Iraq's compliance with its obligations...condemns the decision by Iraq of 5 August 1998...decides not to conduct the (sanctions) review scheduled for October 1998...and not to conduct any further such reviews until Iraq rescinds its above-mentioned decision of 5 August 1998." (United Nations S/RES/1194 (1998))

On October 26, 1998, Richard Butler's letter to UNSC president reported the unanimous results of the Oct 22-23 meeting on VX of 21 experts from 7 countries (China, France, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., U.S.) which stated: "All analytical data provided by the three laboratories (U.S., French, Swiss) were again considered as conclusive and valid...the existence of VX degradation products conflicts with Iraqi declarations that the unilaterally destroyed special warheads had never been filled with CW agents." Iraq is asked "to explain the presence of a compound known as VX stabilizer and its degradation product." (Butler 204)

In response to Iraq being confronted about its lack of accountability concerning its chemical weapons, on October 31, Iraq unilaterally decided that all UNSCOM activities would cease. IAEA was allowed to continue its monitoring activities, provided that they were independent from UNSCOM. On November 6, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1205, condemning the Iraqi decision, and reaffirming the Council's willingness to conduct a comprehensive review once Iraq complied with Resolution 687. Nevertheless, from November 9-12, 1998 UNSCOM weapons inspectors departed Iraq. (Cordesman 349)

The U.S-led coalition subsequently began to build its military force in the Gulf. A military strike against Saddam was threatened. Four days later, the Security Council convened an emergency meeting. The Permanent members received a pledge from Tariq Aziz of cooperation with the UNSCOM inspectors, to avert the scheduled attack. The United States and the United Kingdom refused to accept the letter, noting that its wording was ambiguous. Lavrov, the Russian ambassador, suggested that the Security Council ask for another letter. As Richard Butler observed, "As I walked out of the chamber I saw two diplomats, one Russian, one Iraqi, urgently crafting a second letter in Arabic. It was presented to the Council, but was again found deficient. Lavrov promised a third, which was also hastily drafted in the adjoining hallway." (Butler 206) President Clinton announced that the bombers had been called back. A U.S. led coalition promised unannounced military strikes if Saddam violated his pledge to cooperate fully with UNSCOM inspectors. On November 18, UN weapons inspections resumed.

Despite the threat of military force, Iraq's deceptive behavior continued throughout 1999. On November 20, however, Iraq objected to UNSCOM Executive Chairman Butler's demand for documents on the chemical and biological weapons

programs. On November 23, Iraqi helicopter buzzed the inspectors from less than 10 meters above ground. On November 26, Iraq blocked access to a facility controlled by the People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), which has acknowledged in principle UNSCOM's right to inspect. On December 4, the UNSCOM inspection team was delayed from commencing its inspections because they wanted to begin on a Friday. On December 9, Iraq barred inspectors from entering the Baath Party regional headquarters office. Iraq removed files and equipment from the office. On December 11, an UNSCOM chemical team was denied access to another site. The Iraqis claimed the Muslim Sabbath as its justification. (Cordesman 377)

On December 15, 1998 Executive Chairman Butler issued a report that stated that Iraq had not met its promises of cooperation. UNSCOM's report concluded that Iraq was continued to block inspections which prompted the United States and Britain to launch Operation Desert Fox, a four-day series of air strikes on Iraqi military and industrial targets in December of 1998. As this operation ended, the US strategy towards Iraq began to slowly shift from a strategy of containment to a strategy of containment plus replacement of the Iraqi regime. President Clinton stated, "I am confident we have achieved our mission. We have inflicted significant damage on Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs...So long as Saddam remains in power, he will remain a threat to his own people, his region and the world. With our allies we must pursue a strategy to contain him and constrain his weapons of mass destruction." (Cordesman 17)

In response, Iraq declared that it would no longer comply with UN inspection teams, called for an end to the sanctions, and threatened to fire on aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones. Since December 1998 till November 27, 2002, no inspections either by UNSCOM or IAEA occurred in Iraq. Throughout 1999, Iraq continued to challenge the

coalition troops. In response, British and U.S. planes struck Iraqi missile launch sites and other targets. (Brown 115)

On 17 December, 1999, one year after UNSCOM left, Security Council adopted resolution 1284 replacing UNSCOM by the United Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). UNMOVIC was to replace the former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and continue with the latter's mandate to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological weapons and missiles with a range of more than 150 km), and to operate a system of ongoing monitoring and verification to check Iraq's compliance with its obligations not to reacquire the same weapons prohibited to it by the Security Council. Iraq rejected Resolution 1284 on the grounds that it did not set a clear timetable or criteria for lifting sanctions. (United Nations S/RES/1284 1999)

In early 2002, the Bush administration began to publicly define its strategy towards Iraq as a "regime change". President Bush stated to the United Nations General Assembly that Iraq is a "grave and gathering danger" and that the US "will not allow any terrorist or tyrant to threaten civilization with weapons of mass murder". In response, after weeks of negotiation, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1441 in November 2002 which was designed to force Iraq to give up all weapons of mass destruction and threatening "serious consequences" if it did not comply. Iraq accepted the terms of the resolution and weapons inspections resumed. (BBC News, *Buildup to the Second War*, 2002)

The Security Council voted unanimously to return United Nations weapons inspectors to Iraq, offering Baghdad a last chance to comply with its disarmament obligations and recalling previous warnings of "serious consequences" in case of non-

compliance by issuing Resolution 1441. The resolution also obliged Iraq to cooperate "immediately, unconditionally, and actively" with the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). General Kofi Annan urged Baghdad "to seize this opportunity," and warned that if its defiance continued, "the Security Council must face its responsibilities." Finding that Iraq "has been and remains" in material breach of its obligations, as spelled out in previous Council resolutions, the resolution called on Iraq to provide the UN's two inspection bodies a full accounting of its weapons programs within 30 days. According to the resolution, false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq, as well as its failure to comply at any time with the implementation of the measure, would constitute a "further material breach" of its obligations. The heads of UNMOVIC and IAEA were directed to report immediately such violations to the Council for further assessment. The Security Council agreed to convene immediately upon receipt of any such report in order to consider the need for full compliance with all of its resolutions "in order to secure international peace and security." To help UNMOVIC and the IAEA conduct their work, the resolution stated that Iraq shall provide them with "immediate, unimpeded, unconditional, and unrestricted" access to any and all areas they wished to inspect, including Presidential Sites, as well as to all officials they wanted to interview. The resolution also spelled out "revised or additional authorities" binding on Iraq to facilitate the two bodies' work, including unrestricted rights of entry into and out of the country and the right to "free, unrestricted, and immediate" movement to and from inspection sites. UNMOVIC and the IAEA will also have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones in which Iraq will have to suspend ground and air movement so that nothing could be changed in or taken out of a

potential site. In addition, inspectors were empowered to "remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof." Member States were called on to give full support to the two inspection bodies, including by providing any information related to prohibited programs and by recommending sites to be inspected. Inspections by UNMOVIC resumed in Iraq on November 27, 2002. On 7 December, 2002 Iraq provided a declaration of its weapons programs to UNMOVIC and the IAEA in Baghdad, which was a requirement of the Security Council resolution 1441. (United Nations S/RES/ 1441 2002)

In early February 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell informed the UN that inspections were not achieving the disarmament of Iraq. The U.S. and U.K. pressed for a new resolution authorizing military action against Iraq. France and Russia opposed this resolution, and threatened to veto it. The resolution never came to the vote. U.K. and U.S. argued that previous Security Council resolutions on Iraq provided authority for the use of military force to disarm Iraq. On 20 March 2003 the U.S. and U.K. led a "coalition of the willing" on an invasion of Iraq. (BBC News, *Buildup to the Second War*, 21 March 2003)

The long history of the Iraqi regime's avoidance of disarmament in a series of deceptive measures prompted the U.S. and U.K. to launch a full-scale invasion to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein and to ensure the demilitarization of Iraq. This should not imply that the work of UNSCOM/UNMOVIC or IAEA/INVO was as a complete failure. Both these agencies uncovered and destroyed a large cache of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and its nuclear capabilities. The Iraqi regime's efforts to rebuild or retain any of its weapons of mass destruction or nuclear programs were severely restricted due to

the extensive inspections conducted by these UNSCOM and IAEA. The ambitions of any territorial acquisition or military dominance by Saddam Hussein were strictly contained and restricted.

The experience of disarming Iraq by UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and IAEA/INVO displayed that it was difficult to completely disarm a regime that was determined to retain at least part of its military means in the absence of a strong international will to do so. The full disarmament of Iraq proved to be more difficult in a political climate where individual nations took unilateral steps which they hoped will assure their own economic security, although such actions resulted in the weakening of the international disarmament effort and greater insecurity.

The full extent of Iraq's WMD and its past nuclear ambitions remains unknown to the international community. Information on Iraqi stocks of chemical and biological weapons and Iraqi WMD development programs remains unattainable. While there is no evidence that Iraq resumed production of chemical weapons (CW) agents since the departure of UN weapons inspectors in 1998 and their return on 27 November, 2002, there was a concern that Iraq had rebuilt the infrastructure it would need to do so. There was also a high probability that Iraq retained small quantities of biological weapons (BW) agents or weapons. While there is no evidence that Iraq resumed production of BW agents since 1998, it could have done so without being detected. As the Iraqi government has used chemical and possibly biological weapons in the past, continued possession of any CW or BW capability was also a matter of grave concern to the international community.

AN OVERVIEW OF OTHER UN ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

The economic sanctions in the case of Iraq have been modestly successful. They achieved in limiting the purchasing power and acquisition of any military means by the Iraqi regime. The threat that Saddam Hussein posed to his neighbors and the world through his acquisition and retention of weapons of mass destruction was contained and monitored through the activities of UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and IAEA/INVO. The economic sanctions also isolated Iraq from the global community and contributed to the spread of malnutrition, poverty and disease among the Iraqi people. The economic embargo gradually lost political support from the world community and its implementation became increasingly difficult and sporadic. The success and failure of the economic sanctions in Iraq needs to be examined in a comparative light to the achievement and ineffectiveness of economic sanctions throughout history. By comparing the case of Iraq to other cases where the UN has implemented this coercive method of punitive diplomacy, the reasons for its inefficiencies and its accomplishments can be deducted on a broader scale. By comparing and contrasting the different cases, a deeper understanding of economic sanctions, the different situations in which they can be enforced and their expected level of success can be extracted.

Economic sanctions in the past have been deployed by the United Nations for numerous reasons: to force a target country to abandon plans of territorial acquisition, as in the case of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the North Korean invasion

of South Korea, or to desist from military adventures, as in the case of the South African military attacks on the bases of ANC in Zimbabwe. Economic sanctions were implemented to impair the economic capability of the target country, therefore limiting its potential for military activity, as it affected the ability of Smith's government to fight against the liberation struggle that erupted in Rhodesia and it limited Saddam Hussein's regime from acquiring and retaining its weapons of mass destruction. Economic sanctions were resorted to in an effort to destabilize oppressive governments, as in the case of the apartheid regime of South Africa, of the Portuguese government in the African colonies and Smith's government in Rhodesia. Economic sanctions have also been enforced to protect human rights as in Haiti, to halt nuclear proliferation as in the case of Iraq, to settle exportation claims and to combat international terrorism, as in the case of Libya. However, this tool of international diplomacy has enjoyed only moderate success and has failed to achieve all that it was meant to effect.

The case of UN v. North Korea (1950-1953) was the first instance that the United Nations acted as an international organization that monitors its members and reacts to activities of aggression by calling upon its member states for assistance in placing an economic and arms embargo upon the aggressive nation. Economic sanctions were enforced to achieve the withdrawal of the North Korean forces from South Korea. They seemed inadequate in achieving their goal, for rather, the military intervention by U.S. led UN forces accomplished the withdrawal of North Korean forces and an eventual armistice. The success of the economic sanctions to stop aggression was futile, as the case in the removal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The economic embargo against North Korea has had a considerable economic impact upon the country. "During the Korean War...normal foreign trade activities

either nearly ceased or slowed down considerably...” (Chung 104) Impact of war on the North Korean economy is illustrated by the fact that the end of the conflict “the output of steel and rolled steel was only 2.5 and 3.0 percent, respectively, that of 1949.” (Chung 106)

The economic sanctions were not supported multilaterally by all the member nations of the UN. The USSR and China continued to support North Korea financially and provide it with the military support it needed. The economic sanctions against North Korea provided only to emphasize its dependency upon other countries with a socialist or communist ideology during the war. The economic sanctions also proved to seclude North Korea from the rest of the world and reinforce its Communist regime and socialist culture that now defines the country. North Korea, since 1949 to 1962, received a total of \$1.37 billion in grants and loans. It received from the USSR a total of \$557 billion, from China \$517 million and from the other Communist countries \$296 million. (Chung 142)

The only obstacle that the embargo caused was that of hampering North Korea’s trade with non-communist countries. “The trade embargo imposed by the United States and other Western nations which went into effect during the Korean War had severely curtailed North Korean trade with some of the important potential trade nations of the non-Communist world including Japan.” (Chung 109)

However, international trade with North Korea has grown dramatically since the end of the Korean War. North Korea resumed its trade with Europe and Japan after an armistice was reached in 1953. Until the mid-1960’s, USSR and China were North Korea’s principal trading partners, accounting for 90% of total trade. “Since the mid-1960’s the proportion has been gradually declining owing to expanding North Korean trade with the non-Communist world, especially with Japan and Western Europe.”

(Chung 108) After the breakdown of the Soviet Union and Russia's move towards capitalism, the desire of China to join the World Trade Organization and establish some economic reforms, North Korea has also proved its willingness to initiate a peaceful diplomatic dialogue with South Korea and open its borders to the rest of the world. Just recently, the US has lifted the economic embargo that it has harbored against North Korea for over 50 years due to President's Kim Jong-il's willingness to initiate a diplomatic dialogue with South Korea during the historical North-South summit held at in Pyongyang on June 12-14. After the end of the Cold War, many countries which had depended on the USSR for economic support have slowly altered their economic policies and political ideals towards a more conclusive ideology that supports trade and a peaceful diplomatic dialogue with capitalist and democratic nations more than ever before.

Similarly, under the economic sanctions Iraq conducted illicit trade activities only with its neighbors. Hopefully, with the removal of Saddam Hussein from power and the subsequent end of the economic sanctions, international trade with Iraq would once again be revived.

In the case of UN v. South Africa (1962-1994), the goals of the UN General Assembly resolutions imposed on South Africa by the United Nations were to end apartheid, possibly leading to black majority rule and to terminate South African presence in Namibia. (Doxey 1980, 60-65) To succeed in implementing the goals mentioned above, the United Nations, on 30 January 1970, ended South Africa's trusteeship of Namibia with Resolution 276 and in 1977 adopted Resolution 418 which made trading arms with South Africa 'illegal'. Although, the members of the Security Council and the General Assembly were united in their dislike for apartheid, their means of ending racial inequality in South Africa were frequently fragmented and lenient.

Economic sanctions were applied sporadically and enforced unevenly by the members of the Security Council, especially Great Britain and the United States, leading to minimal effects upon the apartheid regime of South Africa. This led to the prolonged application of apartheid regulations by the South African government, without any substantial hindrance or pressure from any of the major Western powers. The Western nations and Japan placed their economic interests ahead of any substantive economic sanctions on South Africa. Only due to the foreign banks refusal to grant South Africa extended credit terms on their loans, did the South African regime feel pressured by the financial crisis it faced, and thus felt the need to make political reforms. This led to the election of de Klerk, who campaigned on a reformist platform. After the Nelson Mandela's release from jail, after long exploratory talks between the ANC and the government of de Klerk, an end to apartheid in South Africa emerged and was seen as a realistic and obtainable goal. (Baker 90) The case of South Africa shows how the sporadic and reluctant enforcement of economic sanctions can prolong oppression and discrimination of the majority of the population and allow a government that enforces regulations that cause this oppression, to rule unhindered.

As an economic embargo was placed on South Africa, "The South Africans pursued a number of strategies designed to heighten their ability to withstand potential economic pressures: (1) establishment of intense economic ties in other directions as with Taiwan and Israel; (2) the pursuit of technological self-sufficiency; (3) maximizing the value of exports and capitalizing on good fortune like the skyrocketing price of gold in 1979-1980; and (4) pointing out to the US and others the collateral damage that sanctions would wreak on nearby black states in southern Africa." (Bissell 93) Other tools that South Africa resorted to were: "Import substitution (partly through technological

licensing); 'sanctions busting' (transshipment, false labeling); adjustments in macroeconomic policies (exchange controls, dual exchange rate system)". (Leiss 75) The post -1985 sanctions against South Africa cost it less than 1 percent of GNP. Moreover, the "sanctions" that appear to have had the greatest impact in this period-the freeze on new lending to and substantial capital outflows from South Africa- were imposed by financial institutions, not governments. Thus, the government -imposed economic sanctions could only be attributed to having a modest role in achieving the success of achieving black majority rule and ending apartheid in South Africa.

An effective arms embargo imposed upon that country limited the South African army from its aggressive military adventures upon its opposition in Namibia and upon the bases of the ANC in neighboring countries, which led to the eventual independence of Namibia. The financial crisis imposed upon South Africa by the refusal of foreign banks to extend its loans led the South African government down the road to political reform. The sporadic enforcement of economic sanctions against South Africa only had a minimal effect upon the successful achievement of the UN goals which were to end apartheid, possibly leading to black majority rule and to terminate South African presence in Namibia. (Doxey 1980, 60-65)

South African history has shown how effectively a democratic system can pressure the government to reform its policies. Unlike Iraq, although the economic sanctions affected the Iraqi people drastically, the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein was not subject to any internal opposition and consequently continued to deceive the UN inspectors about its possession of weapons of mass destruction which prolonged the enforcement of the economic sanctions against Iraq and its people. The South African case also shows how a determined opposition, such as the ANC, even outside the

legalized structures, can challenge that power, if it can operate from a secure base and receive support from outside. In contrast, the Shiites and Kurds which rebelled against the Iraqi regime did not receive any international support. Both Iraq and South Africa engaged in sanctions-busting trade in defiance of UN economic sanctions. Due to the sporadic implementation of the UN sanctions, apartheid and the brutal and oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein survived for a period of time because certain countries placed their economic interests above their implementation of UN sanctions. They rendered any type of sanctions applied to correct the situation as futile and indispensable.

The case of UN and Organization of African Unity v. Portugal (1963-74), similarly shows how the lack of comprehensive and multilateral enforcement of economic sanctions by all members of the United Nations can lead to their negligible effect upon the success of any UN resolution. It seems that the liberation movements within each of these colonies and the consequent army coup that overthrew the Portuguese administration within these colonies achieved the desirable outcome of independence for these African colonies from Portugal. The UN policy against Portugal and its African colonies was not instrumental in achieving the independence of the African colonies from Portugal. Initially, there was no direct evidence that the UN resolutions, or an economic embargo against Portugal, were carried out by members of the UN, or that the Portuguese policy was modified because of them. (Doxey 60) The U.K. and U.S. veto to the Security Council resolution, to extend trade sanctions to the Portuguese territories in Africa, prevented a large-scale trade embargo from being imposed on the African colonies. The economic impact of the embargo placed by the Organization of African Unity did not hurt Portugal significantly. Countries, such as France and West Germany, continued to support the Portuguese regime in its African

colonies. Therefore, the UN resolution towards Portugal was unenforceable and hence unsuccessful, due to the lack of support for it by the major Western powers. In essence, an economic embargo against Portugal was not achieved due to the lack of its uniform enforcement.

Independence was only granted to the African Colonies, after dissent from within the colonies and within Portugal reached such an extent that it created a liberation struggle against the Portuguese government that ousted the former government and instilled a new liberal government open to reform. The international condemnation of Portugal's colonial policies could have contributed slightly to the dissent created within Portugal, though not significantly enough to grant independence to the African colonies. The oil embargo against Portugal was the most significant factor that led to great financial pressure within the country, which led to an increased amount of dissent within Portugal which eventually led to the army coup that ousted the former government and instilled a new liberal government open to reform. The liberation struggle contributed significantly to the independence of these colonies and the willingness of the liberal government of Portugal to grant them independence. Therefore, an oil embargo and a liberation struggle (national aggression against a government which tries to maintain the rule of the minority and the political oppression of the majority) is what led to the successful achievement of one of the UN goals which was to achieve independence of the Portuguese colonies.

In contrast to Iraq, economic sanctions did not oust the Iraqi regime which was of a Sunni minority ruling a largely Shiite and Kurdish population. This was due to the effectiveness that the regime of Saddam Hussein quelled any internal opposition through oppressive and brutal means.

In the case of UN v. Rhodesia (1965-70), it was “Rhodesia's inability to raise long-term credit on the international capital market that put the biggest economic strain on its resources and this, together with the civil war, brought its recalcitrant politicians to the negotiating table.” (*The Economist* [London], 19 July, 1980, 16) Overall, the sanctions against Rhodesia exerted some pressure for a negotiated solution, though they did so at the considerable political cost of tending to increase rather than diminish white support for the regime. They had reverse effects on the Rhodesian economy, encouraging self-reliance and diversification. However, in the long run, the economic sanctions limited the expansion of the Rhodesian economy and weakened the power of its regime. Again a financial crisis, Ian Smith’s government’s inability to raise long-term credit, and a liberation struggle within the country that prompted a civil war is what established political reform and eventually achieved majority rule for Rhodesia. An arms embargo which limited the government’s ability to fight the civil war, an oil price hike and the inability to find an alternate economic and military provider, is what diminished the support for Ian Smith’s government and led to the negotiated solution of political equality for the black inhabitants of Rhodesia. The full success of the UN resolutions which was to immediately establish black majority rule within Rhodesia, was not established.

The economic sanctions were not sufficient to unsettle the government of Ian Smith initially, partly because both the Republic of South Africa and the other white settler regimes in what were then the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique came to the assistance of South Rhodesia’s white regime. Although, throughout August and September of 1976, South African Prime Minister B. J. Vorster imposed severe economic sanctions on Rhodesia to compel the South Rhodesian government to accept the proposed plan of U.S. Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger. Overall, the economic

sanctions were not imposed comprehensively by all UN members, thus did not apply enough pressure on the government of Rhodesia to abide by the UN resolutions. (Anglin 26)

During the economic embargo, "In the decade from 1965 to 1975 the Rhodesian economy was transformed from virtually total dependence on the importation of manufactured goods in exchange for raw materials to a remarkable degree of self-sufficiency in most areas except oil and industrial plant and machinery." (Renwick 85)

Trade between Rhodesia and Germany, France U.K. and the United States, dropped from forty-five percent to seventy percent in 1960s because of the sanctions. Generally, sanctions applied only to new contracts. (Grieve 438; Losman 95) However, Portugal and South Africa actively opposed the sanctions and become major conduits for Rhodesian imports and exports. (Grieve 438)

Overall, the economic sanctions were not the only factor that led to the alteration of the leadership of Rhodesia. Demographically, the political climate and economic sanctions altered the composition of Rhodesia's population. In 1965, five percent of the total population was white. During the UDI period, 133,000 whites settled in Rhodesia, 121,000 people, mostly white settlers, abandoned the country. (Anglin 36) More importantly another factor contributed to the change in government and the establishment of black majority rule in Rhodesia. This decisive factor was the black freedom fighters who wanted to rule the country, and establish their own liberation in a manner which was no longer under UK-White Rhodesian terms. The freedom fighters put up their own fight rather than waiting for the economic sanctions to induce reform. The result was a violent guerilla struggle, which caused a civil war to erupt in Rhodesia.

British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, predicted in January of 1966: the fall of

Smith government "within weeks, not months." (Anglin 23) The government of Ian Smith stayed in power for 13 years, following that prediction. The British Prime Minister was not the only person to have such an inaccurate prediction. The Minister of Commonwealth Affairs, Ernest Bowden, on 21 March 1967, stated, "Given a little time—and it is not very much more than six weeks—I think you will be quite happy with the results of selective mandatory sanctions." (Grieve 435) The predictions of these men were sorely inaccurate. The sanctions, I believe, did not have the effective or rapid desired outcome that was hoped of them. More realistically, a survey of experienced international traders in 1969 elicited this response from an anonymous trader, "I have worked 63 years in export/import and have never seen a boycott which was really effective! [For instance] the present boycott of Rhodesia is a farce." (Losman 98)

Conclusively, the implementation of sanctions against Rhodesia was full of weaknesses. The Security Council Committee set up to supervise the program emphasized in its report that "It is virtually impossible to operate an effective control system, or to verify the true source and destination of goods, suspected of being part of continuing Rhodesian trade." (Doxey 544) "The ineffectiveness of the oil embargo showed the way in which the powerful international oil companies frustrated the attempt to crush the Smith regime by sanctions. This obviously had a profound effect on political developments in Rhodesia, and in Southern Africa as a whole." (Bailey 264)

Initially, the economic sanctions imposed on Rhodesia had the effect of uniting the white population behind the government and of promoting self-sufficiency in Rhodesia. As the government of Ian Smith found it hard to gain long-term credit on the international market, the effect of the sanctions began to emerge. The oil price hike and the reluctance of South Africa to continue its support of Rhodesia, the civil war that

ravaged the country affected the harsh stance of Ian Smith's government. The extended economic and moral weight of the sanctions increased the pressure on Smith's government and, hence, contributed to a negotiated settlement, but not a successful and complete achievement of the resolutions set by the UN.

The case of Rhodesia shows how once again an oil embargo coupled with a liberation struggle within a country that is supported by outside forces can lead to the independence of a nation from an oppressive regime. In Iraq, both of these decisive factors were missing. Oil is abundant in Iraq. The Shiite and Kurdish rebellion against Saddam Hussein did not receive any international assistance due to fears of political instability in the Middle East.

In the case of UN v. Libya (1992-99), the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Libya in an effort to put pressure on the Libyan government to free the two suspected terrorists involved in the bombing of a plane over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Economically, the "UN sanctions imposed in April 1992 did not have a major impact on the economy because Libya's oil revenues generate sufficient foreign exchange that, along with Libya's large currency reserves, sustain food and consumer goods imports as well as equipment for the oil industry and ongoing development projects. In 1994, Libya's imports totaled \$6.9 billion, compared to exports of \$7.2 billion (f.o.b. estimated). However, the sanctions had an effect in painting Libya as a rogue state." (US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 1997, Annual Report, III-224)

In January of 1986, U.S. imposed sanctions against Libya. All the U.S. oil companies, but one, temporarily suspended exports of Libyan crude oil. However, the level of production was reportedly maintained by European oil companies in Libya. (*New*

York Times, 29 January 1986, A16; *Washington Post*, 30 January 1986, A1) As of May 1987, "Production levels of Libyan crude oil have remained about the same as they were before the imposition of the sanctions. ... In addition, the extensive foreign availability of oil field equipment, supplies, and services allowed Libya to meet its oil industry needs without having to rely on U.S. oil equipment, supplies, and servicing companies." (GAO 1987, 2-3) Libya received 98 percent of its foreign income from oil sales. Germany, Spain, and Italy were the largest destination for Libyan crude oil. (*New York Times*, 12 November 1993, A10)

Shrinking oil receipts put pressure on Libya's budget and reduced its military expenditures as was the case in Iraq. The budget squeeze in 1985 caused the cancellation of the \$4.2 billion Soviet nuclear power plant, more than \$1 billion in housing, road projects costs, and \$700 million in military construction projects. (Schumacher 344, 337) "The years of sanctions have diminished Libya's conventional military capability, grounded its air force, and crimped its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. All this has substantially reduced the threat Gadhafi poses to his neighbors and the world at large, at least compared to what would have been the case had he been allowed to carry on business as usual." (Rose 145-46)

The role of the UN sanctions allowed a larger governmental role to evolve in the Libyan economy. "Sanctions have also put an effective stop to privatization and to any liberalization of the economy and trade. Privatization Law No. 9, of September 2, 1992, has not been implemented because the state has tightened its control over the economy to deal with the sanctions." (Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report-Libya, 2nd quarter 1995, 18) As a result, Libya evolved to be a socialist state dictated by the "Green Book" of Gadhafi, rather than a country driven by a capitalist economy based on natural

competition.

"To judge the wisdom of employing sanctions in any particular case, one must answer two separate questions: How effective particular sanctions are likely to be in these circumstances and how they compare to other potential policy options. The sanctions against Libya fare poorly on the first count but well on the second. ... [In this case,] limited sanctions have represented an acceptable middle course, one yielding modest benefits for a modest price. They have helped to manage a difficult foreign policy challenge if not to master it." (Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report-Libya, 2nd quarter 1995, 18)

The targeted but multilateral UN sanctions against Libya were partly successful, contributing at least modestly to Gadhafi's decision to surrender the two suspects in the Pan Am 103 bombing. The compromise agreement called for the trial to take place in a neutral country, the Netherlands, rather than in the U.K. or the U.S., as those countries would have preferred. In addition to the role played by economic sanctions in this outcome, intense diplomacy on the part of South African President Nelson Mandela, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and others was important, as was the additional pressure imposed by low oil prices. Low oil prices and intensive international diplomacy led to the negotiated settlement and agreement of Gadhafi to surrender the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects to be tried in the Netherlands. An arms embargo limited Libya's desire to engage in international terrorism.

In the case of Iraq, international diplomacy failed to achieve any of the UN resolutions which led to the removal of Saddam Hussein from power to ensure that he no longer posed as a threat to rest of the international community.

Conclusively, a contemporary view of 'economic sanctions' can be extracted,

from their history of their deployment by the United Nations upon various countries. Ultimately, economic sanctions often did not solely succeed in changing the behavior of the targeted countries. One reason for their failure is that the sanctions imposed were inadequate or their means of enforcement were not comprehensive. As in the case of North Korea, South Africa, Portugal Rhodesia and Iraq, the lack of rigid and uniform enforcement of economic sanctions against the targeted governments caused their failure. Their second reason for failure is that sanctions caused the government of the targeted country to look for alternative methods of economic support. In the case of UN v. North Korea, the implementation of economic sanctions against North Korea pushed the country to rely on economic and arms support from China and USSR.

In the era of the Cold War, targeted countries often used the tension between USSR and U.S. to their favor, choosing one powerful country over another, as their ally and economic provider. The third reason for the failure of economic sanctions is that they served to unify the national support for the government of the targeted country, as the “hero” that is willing to stand against oppressive foreign forces. In the case of Libya, economic sanctions only led to a negotiated settlement, which was initially proposed by Gadhafi before the economic embargo against Libya was launched. Years of a prolonged economic embargo led only to a negotiated solution that could have been achieved diplomatically earlier, if the U.S. and U.K. were willing to initially compromise their demands. The economic embargo against Libya unified national support within Libya for the Gadhafi regime, as the U.S. and its allies were blamed for the poor economic condition of Libya and the bombing of its infrastructure and the killing of innocent civilians.

In my opinion, economic sanctions are unreliable as a tool of international

diplomacy, the hope that these will provide a middle road between a full-scale war and a passive stance against the unacceptable behavior of governments is often misplaced.

Economic sanctions provide a way to declare displeasure from the international community about a particular situation and the ability to act upon such a stance. I believe economic sanctions are partially ineffective due to their lack of uniform and multilateral enforcement. In the cases above, the international community has never been able fully to enforce a multilateral economic embargo upon a country. The economic interests of each country seemed to displace the need for the enforcement of these punitive sanctions.

Throughout history, comprehensive economic sanctions have not achieved the success of the UN resolutions that they were meant to implement. Other decisive factors, such as military aggression (within the country in form of a civil war, a liberation struggle or from an outside force) or targeted punitive sanctions such as financial pressure or an oil embargo and intensive international diplomacy have sometimes achieved the desired outcome.

Comprehensive economic sanctions are not effective enough to solely illicit compliance by the targeted government. They have created obstacles to the effective implementation of the targeted government's policies. They have contributed effectively to creating a political climate of dissent, together with a liberation movement, that has induced change and pressured the regime in power to change their policies in accordance with UN resolutions. In the case of South Africa, the Portuguese African colonies and Rhodesia, economic pressure has induced the targeted government to create greater political equality within each nation, in partial accordance with the UN resolutions. In the case of Iraq, economic sanctions with the monitoring activities of UNSCOM/UNMOVIC and IAEA/INVO have resulted in the monitoring and destruction of some of Iraq's

weapons of mass destruction and nuclear capabilities. Although, economic sanctions have not achieved complete success, their success has been of varying degrees.

CONCLUSION

The economic sanctions against Iraq were not successful in implementing all of the UN resolutions. They did not succeed in achieving the complete withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the restoration of a credible, independent government there, nor did they de-stabilize Saddam Hussein's regime or ensure the complete destruction of all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Comprehensive economic sanctions have been seen, in the case of Iraq, to harm civilians instead of punishing the Iraqi government. The economic sanctions exacerbated a humanitarian crisis in Iraq, rather than weakening the regime.

Sanctions contributed to falling living standards and life expectancy. By almost every measure - such as malnutrition, child mortality and overall morbidity - the situation of most Iraqi civilians deteriorated during the period that the economic sanctions were imposed. A UNICEF survey of infant and maternal mortality showed marked and widespread declines in these basic indicators throughout most of Iraq. As another UN report stated earlier this year, "The gravity of the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people is indisputable and cannot be overstated. Many Iraqi civilians lack adequate food and clean water. Diseases run rampant for lack of basic medicines. Family structures, education levels and living standards are all deteriorating." The scale of this suffering should have been remedied by a prompt, effective response. (*The Situation of Iraq's Children*, March 19, 2003, UNICEF)

After twelve years under economic sanctions imposed at the end of the Gulf War, as well as damage inflicted by the war itself, the economy of Iraq has virtually collapsed. Iraq imported substantial quantities of food and medicine through the Oil-for-Food program under UN supervision. This was an important but inadequate response to the humanitarian crisis. It was never intended to meet the overall needs of Iraqi people. Even with expanded sales permitted under the program in its latter years, this program could not meet basic needs, much less fund the rebuilding of Iraq's infrastructure and civilian economy, which alone can ensure adequate nutrition and health standards.

The economic sanctions were by no means the sole cause of the suffering of the Iraqi people. The Iraqi government's failure to comply with the Gulf War cease-fire resolutions and to take full advantage of existing exemptions to feed and care for its people was indefensible. The regime's apparent diversion of scarce resources to the armed forces and security services was morally reprehensible. These actions clearly made an untenable situation worse. However, the irresponsible actions of the Iraqi government should not have relieved the international community of its responsibility to end the dreadful suffering caused by the embargo. The prolonged implementation of the economic sanctions against Iraq effectively punished the Iraqi people for the misdeeds of an authoritarian regime. The rebellion against an unjust government was seen as an obsolete goal when strictly surviving became such a troublesome and burdensome task for so many of the Iraqi people. The economic sanctions helped to strengthen Saddam Hussein's regime and legitimize its authority, as an opponent of the UN economic sanctions and as a government targeted unfairly by the international community.

The challenges posed by the Iraqi government and its determination to retain weapons of mass destruction were staggering. The continued effort to restrain Iraq's

acquisition of these weapons should have been pursued separately from the enforcement of the economic sanctions. While pursuing Iraqi disarmament, fresh efforts toward regional disarmament should also have been undertaken. In signing UN Security Council Resolution 687 that ended the Gulf War, the United States pledged that disarming Iraq was to be a step toward "the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction." Serious efforts to negotiate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, which would have improved prospects for success in controlling Iraq's arsenals, should have been initiated.

The economic sanctions also failed to induce any compliance by the Iraqi regime due to their lack of political support and enforcement by all the member states of the UN. The political support for the sanctions began to fade as enforcement prolonged. Countries such as France, Russia and China, began to place their economic interests ahead of their political responsibility to enforce the economic sanctions. A more lenient attitude towards the actions of the Iraqi regime was promoted in the Security Council. Some of the Arab countries also engaged in illegal trade with Iraq, despite the economic sanctions. Iraq's neighbors placed their true interests with Iraq above their responsibility of compliance. After the Arab Summit of March 2002, the attitude of compliance with the UN economic sanctions by its Arab neighboring states completely disappeared.

The economic sanctions, due to its inadequacy in achieving the disarmament of Iraq, eventually contributed to a full-scale invasion of Iraq by U.S. and U.K. coalition forces, in an effort to demilitarize Iraq and remove its regime. The economic sanctions not only failed, as a deterrent to war, but became a catalyst for one. Economic sanctions as a political tool should be reviewed by the Security Council quite vigorously and their future implementation carefully considered.

Economic sanctions have always proven to be inadequate and problematic for their purpose due to the long period of time they are enforced. Comprehensive economic sanctions have dire humanitarian consequences when imposed on a targeted country for an extended time. The citizens of this nation rather than the belligerent government feel the effects of the sanctions first. Other options with a limited scope such as military aggression to stop territorial acquisition, or targeted punitive sanctions such as financial pressure, an arms embargo and an oil embargo or the development of a strong liberation struggle to remove an oppressive government from power and establish democracy within a country should be considered. These alternative options should be pursued and developed intensively by the international community as direct and punitive measures to be applied immediately, effectively and multilaterally by all members of the United Nations to deter a target government from undesirable activity. These targeted sanctions affect the regime in power

Comprehensive economic sanctions are vague and have not been uniformly implemented by all of the member states of the UN so that their success has proven to be inadequate and insufficient. Although, they have partially contributed to the success of the implementation of UN resolutions in the past, their success is dependent on other decisive factors. Economic sanctions have never been solely able to implement any of the UN resolutions they were designed to enforce. The consequences of the economic sanctions affect the overall morbidity of a nation. This instrument of international diplomacy is anachronistic and thus should be rarely used in the fast advancing, technological and global economy of today, more effective and rapid solutions are available.

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