

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF
ISLAMIC TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

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In the wake of September 11, 2001, the attention paid to the subject of terrorism and the portrayal of Islamic-style terrorist groups has been grossly over-simplified and misunderstood. This thesis argues that while Islamic-style terrorism has a fact pattern that makes it unique from any other form of terrorism encountered to this date, it is in no way more simplistic or predictable than its other violence-seeking terrorist cousins. In fact, the motivational forces behind Islamic-style terrorism are a complex combination of factors

that include historical context, generational forces, economic competition, religious ideology, sociological group dynamics, and individual psychological pathologies. While comprehending and defining Islamic-style terrorism may prove elusive, attempting to identify the complex motivational factors behind it is the first step in building bridges understanding that will facilitate the cessation of Islamic-style terrorism.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The topic of terrorism has become the subject of much discourse, debate, and controversy in a post 9/11 world. Because of the enigmatic nature of terrorism, dialogue has taken on an over-simplified, emotional tone rather than one of context within empirical fact. While terrorism is not a new phenomenon, Islamic-style terrorism embraces characteristics and methods that make it unique. This paper will explore the history of Islam, the history of terrorism and the traits that make Islamic terrorism divergent from other forms of terrorism. Also, characteristics of terrorists will be analyzed from a psychological perspective to determine if there are any psychopathologies that terrorism as a whole or Islamic-style terrorism contain that explains motives for behavior.

Islamic social, economical, and religious factors will be examined to determine terrorist motivation on a societal plane. Attention will then be given to group dynamics within Islamic terrorist organizations to determine what motivating factors are conducive to producing suicide terrorism. Twentieth century events and a fundamentalist Islamic revival will be examined to show that the revival coupled with recent history proved to be catalyst for the extreme violence witnessed in today's Islamic-funded terrorist attack.

Lastly, multitrack diplomacy will be explored. Though expert forecasts are pessimistic concerning any potential peaceful resolution of Islamic terrorism, viable solutions must be sought. Strengths and weaknesses of using stratified diplomatic models will be analyzed to determine if enduring solutions can be found in the cessation of terrorism against non-Muslim cultures.

Although Islamic terrorism is a unique from any other style of terrorism, the causes of its emergence are multifaceted. This thesis will demonstrate that no one, single stimulus can prove to be causational. Because the motivations for Islamic terrorism are diverse, identifying potential strategies to stop this violent behavior are problematic. Though workable solutions are elusive and predictions are dire, efforts to find feasible solutions must continue if any hope of stopping Islamic terrorism is to be realized.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF ISLAM

Current claims of the global population who claim Islam as their religion range from 12% (Branches of Islam) to nearly 25% (Islam, Empires of Faith, 1:00, 2005). To the West, the history of Islam has been veiled by fear and misunderstanding. Undeniably, however, the histories of Islam and the West have been intertwined over the past fourteen hundred years. Having an understanding of the formation and history of Islam may prove useful in understanding modern day Islamic terrorism.

Sixth Century Arabia

The religion of Islam began in the early seventh century with a man named Muhammad (though there are various spellings of the Prophet Muhammad's name, this spelling will be used in this writing). The Muslim religion credits its origination and foundational document, the Qur'an, to their prophet, Muhammad. Muslims believe he was God's final prophet to whom the Qur'an was revealed. Non-Muslims consider Muhammad to be the founder of Islam. The prevailing religious, social, and economic structures of the late sixth and early seventh centuries affected Muhammad, the man, and are shadowed in his philosophies. Before exploring the beliefs that drove Muhammad to present the Qur'an, a closer look at the world he lived in reveals influences that impacted his worldview, his

writing, and the religion he founded. The Arabian Peninsula is at the juncture of three continents: Africa, Asia, and Europe. The geographical location of the Arabian Peninsula makes it a hub for trade between the three continents today as well in the time of the prophet, Muhammad. Furthermore, the harshness of the arid climate made an agrarian-based society tenuous in at best (Hamidullah, 2, 1969). The unique environmental and geographical factors made animal husbandry and trade the backbone of the Arabian economy

Because an agrarian-based economy was not feasible, citizens of the Arabian Peninsula became nomadic, living and moving with trade caravans along major arteries. Trade routes ranged from modern day Egypt to India. Traveling nomadic groups formed blood-based, family clans (Bedouin tribes) for protection from competing clans, unstable governments, and occupying forces (Byzantine and the Persian Empires) (Hamidullah, 2, 1969). Resource scarcity, such as water wells, ignited vendettas and counter vendettas that lasted generations (Armstrong, 3, 2000). Because of competition between clans, clan protection, and especially that of the clan patriarch, was critical to individual survival as well as personal success.

The social structure of sixth and seventh century Saudi Arabia was that of Bedouin clans, which were patriarchal and family-based in nature. Because of this, those from competing family lines or not within the direct line of descent were shunned. Clans often divided into groups. While part of the clan ran caravans along trade routes, others managed markets at major trade hubs, called oasis towns (Oxtoby, 17, 2002) such as Mecca, Ta'if, and Madina (Hamidullah, 3, 1969). As wealth and success were measured by profit in trade rather than in land holdings, strong ties to family and stature within the clan were critical to material wealth.

Folklore was passed verbally through generations rather than in written tomes. Because of this, people who were gifted in rhetoric were valued members of the Bedouin society. Poets were given particular honor within Bedouin clans as they connected present generations to those of the past, whom they revered (Islam, Empire of Faith, 7:40, 2005).

Because of the transient nature of the Bedouin culture and the large exposure to different cultures due to trade, various religious beliefs were represented in the Arabian Peninsula during the late sixth century. Monotheism, animism, ancestor worship, nature worship, celestial worship, Christianity, and Judaism religions were all present in trade centers offering a variety of beliefs to clan members and trade travelers (Hamidullah, 4, 1969; Oxtoby, 17, 2002) Most clans were polytheistic (Oxtoby, 343, 2002) and worshiped in harams. The Ka'bah (shrine), in Mecca was believed to have been built by Abraham and was considered the chief haram. The primary deities worshipped were water, wind, fire, and night (Islam, Empire of Faith, 10:20, 2005). An example of this was the Black Stone, thought to be a meteorite, which was the most highly valued item in the Ka'bah in Mecca. The Ka'bah was known as a common area for all clans, where rivalries were set aside because it was the place of worship. These regions for religious truces developed into trade centers in which communal and commercial activities thrived. The Qur'an calls this period of time before the writing of the age of "jahiliyah" meaning foolishness or ignorance (Oxtoby, 342, 2002) because of the polytheistic practices.

Muhammad the Man

As the Arabian histories of the time of the prophet Muhammad were primarily carried on through oral tradition, little documented information on the life of the man, Muhammad exists.

The fact is that, despite a great deal of information supplied by later Muslim literary sources, we know pitifully little for sure about the political or economic history of Muhammad's native city of Mecca or of the religious culture from which he came. Moreover, to the extent that we are ignorant of that history and culture, to that same extent we do not understand the man or the movement that followed in his wake (Peters, 293, 1991).

The surviving evidence on Muhammad lies primarily in literary works rather than material evidence. The first comprehensive text of the life of Muhammad appears to have been written by Ibn Ishaq in 767 (hadith), which is more than 100 years after Muhammad's death (Peters, 298, 304, 1991). With a dominantly oral tradition culture, author F. E. Peters asks, "Does any serious scholar doubt that the materials in the Qur'an and/or the Sira. . . were shaped by the needs of the early Islamic community" (Peters, 298, 1991)? To many, the life history of Muhammad, therefore, is subjective to the intent and motives of the teller. Muslims would challenge this assertion, however, as they believe that the Qur'an is the literal dicta of Allah.

Muhammad ibn Abdallah is believed to have been born circa 570 AD (Hamidullah, 2, 1969, *Islam, Empire of Faith*, 3:30, 2005), in Mecca, in present day Saudi Arabia. Born into a trade family of moderate income, Muhammad's father died shortly before his birth and his mother, Aminah, died when Muhammad was 6 (Hamidullah, 2, 1969). After being given to his grandfather, Abdu-l-Muttalib, the chief of the Quraysh clan (Oxtoby, 344, 2002), his grandfather also died when Muhammad was 8. He was then placed into the care of a poor uncle, Abu-Talib, rather than that of another uncle who became chief of the clan, Zuhair (Hamidullah, 3, 1969). Assigned to a lower caste within the clan, Muhammad traveled trade routes with his poor uncle until young adulthood. Upon the death of Zuhair, Abu-Talib became the leader of the clan, extended his protection over Muhammad, and Muhammad worked in the trade city of Mecca increasing the family fortunes.

The financial aptitude of Muhammad attracted the attention of a wealthy widow, Khadijah, who offered her hand in marriage to Muhammad after he successfully accompanied Khadijah's merchandise to Syria, securing her profit. After marrying at the age of 25, he began to work to increase her fortunes in Mecca. With the achievement of financial security, Muhammad turned his attention to spirituality and "reflection on the problems of Mecca" (Hamidullah, 6, 1969).

It was not until age 35, however, that Muhammad began to act upon his religious curiosity. Gifted with rhetoric, Muhammad increasingly became respected for poetic abilities and mediation skills. One particular incident is repeatedly mentioned in literature was his ability to resolve an inter-clan dispute over the rebuilding of the Ka'bah. According to legend, four clan leaders quarreled over who would have the honor of replacing the Black Stone which reportedly fell from Heaven when Abraham worshipped from that location. Muhammad placed the stone on a blanket and had the four leaders carry the stone together avoiding another clan war. In honor of resolving the conflict, the four-clan leaders asked Muhammad and put the Black Stone into place. Muhammad's integrity, ability to mediate, and spiritual hunger earned the respect of his clan until he became known as "al-Amin" (the honest) (Hamidullah, 6, 1969).

Muhammad participated increasingly in religious events sought wisdom from Arab, Christian, and Jewish sages (Islam, Empire of Faith, 15:20, 2005). Because Muhammad was monotheistic, he admired Christians and Jews and called them "people of the book."

At the age of forty years, at an annual retreat during the month of Ramadan, Muhammad claimed that an angel came to visit him, and announced that God had chosen

him as His messenger to all mankind and communicated to him the following “divine” message:

With the name of God, the Most Merciful, the All-Merciful.
 With the name of thy Lord Who created,
 Created man from what clings,
 And thy Lord is the Most Bounteous,
 Who taught by the pen,
 Taught man what he knew not. (Qur'an 96:1-5) (Hamidullah, 8, 1969)

As this poetic stanza was well received and other “inspired messages” followed. It is at this time that the Qur'an began to be written. This marked a change from oral tradition to written text. Muhammad revealed the Qur'an over a period of twenty-two years (610-632), as he “received” it from the angel, Gabriel (Peters, 293, 1991, Oxtoby, 354, 2002). Within twenty years of the death of Muhammad the first recognized text of the Qur'an was completed by Uthman Affan, the third caliph (Oxtoby, 357, 2002). The final form of the Qur'an, was completed in the 9th-century in Iraq with 114 Suras (Suras) (Peters, 297, 305, 1991). The Qur'an provides ethical, religious, and social guidance within the Muslim faith (Islam, Empire of Faith 20:40, 2005). Basic tenets of the Muslim faith emerged (not to be confused with the five pillars of faith):

- There is one all-powerful God without images or symbols (Peters, 301, 1991)
- Islam is for all, not just “the elect”
- No class, ethnic, or racial distinction in Islam are found
- Superiority of individuals is based solely on piety; sanctity of life, property and honor (Oxtoby, 359, 2002)

Resistance to Muhammad's new revelations from within the Arabian clan system was immediate. Rather than being the prophet of God as he claimed, his contemporaries accused him of being “no more than a “seer” or a “poet” (Peters, 293, 1991).

Believing that he shared many beliefs with Jews and Christians, Muhammad wrote the Qur'an anticipating Christian and Jewish admiration and conversion and sought their support. Of

primary importance to Muhammad was their shared monotheistic belief. When this was not reciprocated, Muhammad changed his views of Christianity and the Judaism.

The Qur'an's narratives and worldview are closely akin to the prophetic view of history in the 'Hebrew Bible'. The Prophet expected the Jews of Madinah to recognize this kinship and thus be his natural allies. He adopted a number of Jewish practices, including the fast of the Day of Atonement, Yom Kippur. It seems, moreover, that, as in Jewish usage the Muslims had from the beginning been facing Jerusalem in their prayers (Oxtoby, 346, 2002).

When the Jews and Christians of Medina refused to convert to Islam, they became enemies to the Muslim religion, later Muhammad sought to conquer their lands and convert the people to Islam. Muhammad also stopped trying to accommodate Jewish beliefs by starting praying toward Mecca rather than Jerusalem, adopted his spiritual lineage through Ishmael rather than Isaac, and dropped the feast of Yom Kippur in favor of Ramadan (Oxtoby, 347, 2002, Williams, 2001).

As Muhammad conquered Christian and Jewish land by military force, pressure was put the people to convert to Islam. Though the arrival of Muhammad and his followers in Medina (and their settlement into an immigrant community) brought no opposition from the Jewish inhabitants. The Jews' refusal to convert brought the eventual wrath of Muhammad and his forces.

In 624 Muhammad, joined by more followers, called upon the Qaynuqa, one of the Jewish tribes of Medina, to recognize his prophetic mission. When they refused, he besieged and overcame them. On the intercession of one of their protectors-a recent convert to Islam- their lives were spared, but they were expelled from the city, their lands and a part of their possessions being confiscated by the Muslims. (Ye'or, 43-44, 1985).

Muhammad carried out numerous like attacks against other non-converted cities. One particular attack of note is the conquering of a Jewish tribe in the oasis of Khaybar. In 628, Mohammad took advantage of a "non-belligerency" treaty and launched a month-long siege

of the settlement. When the inhabitants surrendered under Muhammad in the Arabian Peninsula, the terms of the treaty became known as the *dhimma*.

According to this agreement Muhammad allowed the Jews to continue cultivating their oasis, on condition that they ceded to him half of their produce; he also reserved the right to break the agreement and expel them whenever he wished . . . The peasantry were expected to provide assistance and provisions to the Muslim forces and pay a tribute in money or kind known as the *juzya* to be distributed among the Prophet and his followers according to the circumstances of the conquest. (Ye'or, 44, 1985).

Over time, inhabitants of conquered communities who chose not to convert to Islam but continue in their own religion(s) became known as the *d'himmi*. "The legal status of the *dhimmi* was based on the contracts between Muhammad and the Jewish and Christian tribes of Arabia, but it differed from them in its coercive components" (Ye'or, 48, 1985). When Muhammad originally negotiated these agreements, the terms were more lenient. As he consolidated power, the terms became more restrictive and the percentages the protectorates were forced to pay in tribute increased. Though these agreements were intended to be binding to both parties, in many cases, it was only a temporary understanding. As the power of Muslim increase, the less tolerant they were of the differences the *dhimmi* presented.

I received permission to take booty, a privilege that was never accorded to any of my predecessors. . . The infidels forfeit their person and their belongings which they do not use in Allah's service to the faithful believers who serve Allah unto whom Allah restitutes what is theirs; thus is restored to a man the inheritance of which he was deprived, even if he had never before gained possession. – Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) (Ye'or, 174, 1985).

Eventually, (after the death of Muhammad) the cost of "protection" for the *dhimmi* included the forfeiture of their land, restriction from riding animals (horses and camels), forced submission to humiliating clothing regulations, forced to only wear black, forbidden to wear shoes, forced servitude, disposing of dead animals and humans, cleaning latrines (even on Saturdays), forbidding of land ownership, land use taxes, involuntary expulsion, poll taxes,

prohibition of the possession of arms, forced conscription, blackmail, confiscation of private property, torture, forced use of places of worship as barns and stables, collective punishments, forbidding of building new places of worship, the taking of children and raising them to be Muslim when it was learned that conversions to Islam were not sincere, refusal to prevent massacres at the hands of Muslim mobs, forced skilled labor (navigation, agriculture, medicine, science, art), unequal protection under the law, and forbidden to emigrate (Ye'or, 51-70, 1985; Ward, 407-408, 1999) .

Living conditions for the dhimmi was not consistent, however. Treatment of the dhimmi depended on convictions of the rulers and caliphs they were under. Umar al-Khattab said that “it is necessary to faithfully keep the agreements made with them [the dhimmi], fight to defend them and not impose upon them overwhelming burdens” as he passed advice to his heir and Shah Safi allowed “them to revert to Judaism; the Christians were also less oppressed”. As a rule, dhimmi living in Egypt and Turkey lived under more tolerant regimes, while those living in Syria and Iraq (under the Hanbali) suffered more tyranny (Ye'or 70-72, 1985).

As referenced in the second quote of page nine, the degree to which the inhabitants resisted Muslim domination determined how they were treated once conquered. The process of Islamic colonization took place in two stages, the jihad and the dimma. The jihad phase involved a military conquest with the annexation of conquered territories into Muslim territory. The particular circumstances of each territory that was subjugated determined the treatment of the inhabitants. If citizens (the harbis) took up arms and forcefully tried to repel Muslim forces were often put to death and their women and children were taken as slaves. If

the harbis did not resist and submitted to the rule of Islam, the conquerors agreed to “respect their lives, their religion, and their property.

The founding religion also struggled to gain acceptance with Muhammad’s own clans. Leaders from other clans demanded that Muhammad’s uncle remove his clan’s protection over Muhammad and his small group of followers. Abu-Talib refused and the clan protected the growing group until Talib’s death. Persecution immediately followed. Muhammad and his followers were forced to flee Mecca in search of sanctuary. Arriving in Medina after facing rejection from fifteen clans, Muhammad found refuge for himself and his supporters.

During this time, assassinations were carried out against Muhammad’s enemies as well as persecutions against the new Islamic believers. Among Muhammad’s most bitter enemies was his own uncle, Abu Lahab (Oxtoby, 346, 2002).

A number of Muslim sects had used assassination as a technique. It is recorded of Mohammad himself that on several occasions, he exclaimed that one of or the other did not deserve to live; and was then gratified by one of his men finding ways of destroying the enemy (Rapoport, 124, 1998).

As Islam was a “militant religion from the beginning, it was natural for Muhammad to teach the doctrine of Jihad”, Jihad literally means, “struggle.” When applied in a spiritual sense, it takes on the connotation of a holy war in defense of the Islamic religion (Laqueur, 31, 2003). One such group to embrace Jihad was the Nizari. The Nizari became an early assassination sect of Islam whose sole existence was to prepare for Islamic conquest of the Jewish and Christian worlds upon the millennium (Rapoport, 121, 1998). Victims of the Nizari were prominent figures (of varying religions) who were “responsible” for attempting to thwart the spread of Islam. Over time and after the death of Muhammad, the Nazari cult took on martyr characteristics justifying this with the Qur’an through the writings of Al-Khatib Al Tibrizi.

The messenger of God (Muhammad) said, “A martyr has six privileges with God. He is forgiven his sins on the shedding of the first drop of his blood; he is shown his peace in paradise; he is redeemed from the torments of the grave; he is made secure from the fear of hell and a crown of glory is placed on his head of which one ruby is worth more than the world and all that is in it; he will marry seventy-two of the huris with black eyes’ and his intercession will be accepted for seventy of his kinsmen.” (Rapoport, 117-118, 1998).

Justifying terrorism in the name of religion through Jihad is a theme that has remained consistent in time throughout Islam.

Aided by trade, the religion of Islam spread from Medina. In response, violence against Muhammad’s new religion continued to increase from 624 until 630 AD when Muhammad successfully led 10,000 men against his home city of Mecca. With his enemies conquered, the religion of Islam had 100,000 members at the time of Muhammad’s death June 8, 632.

The Spread of Islam

The evolution of Islam is divided into four time periods: The Formative stage—Four Righteous Caliphs, The Early Empires—Classical Islam, The Later Empires, and the Modern Period

Four Righteous Caliphs (632-661)

The death of Muhammad brought immediate division and turmoil to Islam over succession. The split over the next leader of Islam caused a five-year civil war and this schism has remained over the centuries into modern day Islam. Conflicts over their leadership fissured Muslims into blood feuds. Though never clearly articulated, many believed that Muhammad intended his son-in-law, Ali to succeed him as leader of Islam. Abu Bakr, father of one of Muhammad’s wives, however, sought to gain control after Ali

refused to avenge the murder of Uthman, another potential rival (and brother-in-law) to his ascension,. A third rival, Muawiyyah, arose from Syria where Ali's rule was not accepted (Armstrong, 33-35, 2000).

Islam was deeply divided. Only after a battle in which Ali was killed did Muawiyyah emerge as the next leader of Islam. This schism divided Islam into two primary groups. The Sunni's followed Muawiyyah and now number more than 800 million, and the Shiite's, the original followers of Ali, now number over 100 million with most residing in Iran, Iraq, and Palestine (Branches of Islam).

Classical Islam

The world of Classical Islam (661-1258), though still supported by trade, was divided into two separate realities. The rural Arabians lived in much the same manner as their ancestors. They were nomadic, mostly polytheistic, politically unstable clans, with frequent wars between rival clans (Cook, 163,1992). Islamic historians record that "Urban" Arabians that lived in settled areas enjoyed the benefits of peaceful international contact, from Christian and Jewish pilgrims. Though the "Holy City" of Jerusalem was located within the Islamic world, Christian and Jewish pilgrims enjoyed peaceful travel and worship without Islamic persecution (Munro, 329, 1931). During this time, the Islamic Empire spread from Iran to Egypt and up into Spain and Portugal through trade and military conquest.

In the first century of Islam, conquest and military occupation provided the impetus for its spread. Much of the Byzantine and Roman world and all of the Sasanian Persian domains yielded to the Arab armies and came under Umayyad rule (Oxtoby, 421, 2002).

Islam possessed the greatest military power on earth at that time. While other military powers exercised regional control, Islam used this power to extend its borders beyond regional boundaries. “Islam in contrast created a world civilization, poly-ethnic, multiracial, international, one might even say intercontinental” (Lewis, 6, 2001). Using their increasing military might, Muslims established a method of assimilating cultures into Islam. Three consistent techniques emerged during the times of expansion in Islam:

1. Erosion of resistance within societies targeted by Islam but not yet conquered were accomplished by:
 - a. Weakening economic base by demanded tribute
 - b. Chronic warfare (jihad)
 - c. Enslavement of women and children
 - d. Massacres
2. Mass immigration of Muslims
3. The emergence of powerful collaborationist parties that are economically and politically associated with Muslim rulers (Ye’or, 35, 2005)

This led to the complete domination of non-Muslim cultures within the religious, political, intellectual, economic, and social area of a society with Islamic dogma. Eventually, under this chronic pressure, these societies converted to Islam.

According to Muslim scholars, relations between the Islamic, Christian, and Jewish religions were positive during the beginning of the Classical era of Islam. The two exceptions, and the alleged catalysts for the Christian crusades, occurred during mid eleventh century. Most notable, was an attack on a pilgrimage in 1064, led by Bishop Gunther. Kidnapped and held for ransom by Bedouins, this group of pilgrims were rescued and freed by Muslim Saracens. In 1075, however, Pope Gregory VII instigated a “project of an armed expedition against the enemies of God” (Munro, 329-330, 1931). Citing rape, torture, murder, and polygamy, Muslim historians charge Popes Gregory and Urban along with other clerics with exaggerating situations to incite Christian knights and

peasants to march on Muslim-held Jerusalem. For almost 200 years Christians and Muslims fought and killed each other in the name of religion. A total of ten crusades were fought with the final defeat being that of the Crusaders at the fall of Acre, the last Crusader outpost in Palestine. Though the early crusades were successful in taking Jerusalem (in 1099) in the name of Christianity, by the end of the last Christian crusade in 1272 the Muslim empire ranged from central Africa to the edges of India as well as into the southern areas of mainland Europe. When the crusades ended, a residual effect was that the distorted image of Christianity by Muslims and of Islam by Christians. This misconception has endured (Oxtoby, 437, 2002).

The Islamic record of history is contested by some non-Muslim historians, however. When a country or city was conquered by Muslim invading forces, the remaining citizens were faced with a choice, convert or face the consequences.

The Later Empires

The later Islamic Empire dating from 1258 to 1798, witnessed the merging of Islam with Mongol philosophy, the Renaissance of Islam, and its struggles under the spread of European colonial rule into the Muslim world.

Before the end of the Crusades, a new threat from the East emerged against the Muslim world- the Mongols. As Mongol control was spreading west out of Asia and Muslim control was attempting to spread east, the two forces met in what is modern day Iran. From 1219 to 1229, Mongol armies pursued Islamic caliphates from Iran through Asia Minor.

One great Muslim city after another was demolished. Bukhara was reduced to rubble, Baghdad fell after a single battle, and took the

moribund caliphate with it: corpses filled the streets, and refugees fled to Syria, Egypt, or India (Armstrong, 97, 2000).

Met with Muslim resistance, the Mongols fought to gain total control of the Arab world throughout the thirteenth century. Known as the greatest political upheaval in the Middle East since the seventh century, the Mongols conquered only as a political force and brought no spirituality with them. Though tolerant toward other religions, the Mongols tended toward Buddhism. Under the rule of “infidel” leaders, Muslim leaders such as Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), who led the resistance against the Mongol invasion in 1300 said that the Mongols and “quasi-converted” Mongols,

. . . must be fought against and killed if they do not repent. For the jihadis, Ibn Taymiyya’s rulings in fact provided the legal grounds for the attempts to overthrow Islamic political leaders. Ibn Taymiyya’s views of just war also give jihadis the necessary legitimacy to carry out offensive and defensive warfare against unbelievers and “apostate,” “heretical,” and “sinning” Muslims alike” (Habeck, 22, 2006).

Though jailed for his controversial teachings and writings, the teachings of Taymiyya were used by later revolutionaries (including modern) as (violent) models for dealing with non-believers. During the Mongol invasion, however, the long-term effects of an atheistic policy in conquered Muslim territory brought the merging of the Mongol military drive with the religious philosophy of Islam as areas they conquered converted to Islam.

It was Mongol policy to build on local traditions once they had subjugated an area, and so by the end of the thirteenth and beginning of the fourteenth centuries all four of the Mongol empires had converted to Islam

The Mongols therefore became the chief Muslim power in the central Islamic heartlands. But whatever their official allegiance to Islam, the main ideology of their states was “Mongolism,” which glorified the imperial and military might of the Mongols and the dread of world conquest. . . There were two chief political objectives: world hegemony

and the perpetuation of the ruling dynasty, which justified any cruelty.
(Armstrong, 98, 2000).

Ultimately, Military prowess was conquered by religious assimilation. Militarization was not the only impact that the Mongols had when conquering the Muslim world, however. In the fourteenth century, cities that had been destroyed during the conquest were rebuilt, civil codes were established, prolonged political stability was introduced, the arts and sciences flourished, history transferred from oral history to written, and mysticism was explored (Armstrong, 100, 2000). The subjugation and subsequent merging of Mongol and Muslim ideologies strengthened an existing military mark on a religious philosophy. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, three distinct empires emerged within the Muslim world. The Safavid Empire arose in Iran. The Moghul Empire emerged out of India. The Ottoman Empire ranged from Anatolia into Syria and from North Africa into Arabia (Armstrong, 115, 2000). All three empires embraced monarchical forms of government while observing Islamic religious practices. In Iran, the Saafavid Empire established the Shii faith as the official state religion. This increased the rift between the Shii and the Sunnis leading to “intolerance and an aggressive sectarianism that was unprecedented in the Islamic world” (Armstrong, 116, 2000).

Of the three, the Ottoman Empire achieved the greatest prominence. At its zenith, it reached across northern Africa, through the Arabian Peninsula, through parts of Asia Minor and ended in southern Europe in today’s Turkey and Hungary (Armstrong, 131, 2000). Though the term “jihad” had been used in the past to extinguish the enemies of Islam, it was also used with considerable success in the Ottoman Empire. Janissaries, who initially were comprised of newly conquered dhimmi were under the sole command of Ottoman sultans, successfully battled Christians in Europe and other Muslims that

lived within the Ottoman Empire who were Shii (Armstrong, 130, 2000). The Ottoman Empire gained in prominence over the other two Islamic Empires of its time, and “despite Europe’s achievements, the Ottoman state was the most powerful in the world” (Armstrong, 132, 2000). By 1530 the Ottoman Empire extended as far into Europe as the Vienna, Austria.

The Ottoman Empire enjoyed the benefits of military power and trade domination until the end of the sixteenth century. New technologies and improved trade competition from Europe went largely unnoticed in the Muslim world.

Apart from that, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the technological revolution passed virtually unnoticed in the lands of Islam, where they were still inclined to dismiss the denizens of the lands beyond the Western frontier as benighted barbarians, much inferior even to the more sophisticated Asian infidels to the east. These had useful skills and devices to impart; the Europeans had neither. It was a judgment that had for long been reasonably accurate. It was becoming dangerously out of date (Lewis, 8, 2001).

The increase in European prominence coupled with economic corruption and the failure of the agrarian/nomadic based Ottoman economy to keep pace with European commercial expansion weakened the dominant hold the Muslim Empire once enjoyed. Noting the increase in nautical power by Europe, the sixteenth century Ottoman Grand Vizier called for Islam to overcome the Europeans preemptively. His advice received little attention as this had been attempted in the past. Again in the early seventeenth century “another Ottoman official noted an alarming presence of Portuguese, Dutch, and English merchant shipping in Asian waters, and warned of a possible danger from that source” (Lewis, 147, 2001). With little heed given to the occasional dissenting voice of concern, the Islamic world began to stagnate as European power grew.

Because of the Thirty years war in Europe, there was no major change in the balance of power in the Middle East during the first half of the seventeenth century. In 1645, the Turkish Ottomans, seeing an opportunity to take Austria, Poland, and the Ukraine from the preoccupied Europeans, attacked. This failed attempt and the unsuccessful bid to capture Vienna in 1683 was the beginning of a series of other failures by the Muslim Ottomans. These attacks also had another unexpected outcome that the Ottomans did not foresee. The Muslim attacks united the once quarreling European states against the Ottoman Empire.

In March 1684 Austria, Venice, Poland, Tuscany, and Malta, with the blessing of the Pope, formed a Holy League to fight the Ottoman Empire. Russian joined the Catholic powers in this enterprise. Under Czar Peter, known as the Great, they went to war against the Ottomans and achieved signal successes . . . The Ottomans suffered serious territorial losses. They had also been obliged to abandon old concepts and old ways of dealing with the outside world and to learn a new science of diplomacy, negotiation, and mediation” (Lewis, 19, 2001).

Further military and territorial losses we suffered by the Ottomans in 1718, 1730, and 1768 thru 1774. By the end of the eighteenth century, problems within the Ottoman Empire were evident (Armstrong, 134-135, 2000). Though Islam experienced losses in Europe during this time period, this was balanced out by gains in the East. According to Bernard Lewis, The decline of Muslim power “was not, as was once argued, one of decline. The Ottoman state and armed forciers were as effective as they had ever been, in traditional terms. In this as in much else, it was European invention and experiment that changed the balance of power between the two sides” (Lewis, 22, 2001). Failure to modernize with the western powers ended the stalemate between Islam and the European West.

Also of importance was the state of the religion of Islam during the eighteenth century. Because of the greed of Ottoman sultans and the corruption of governmental officials, ensuing economic decline set the stage for a religious reform movement. Considering the sultans worthy of death because they did not ascribe to his vision of “true Islam”, Ibn Abd al-Wahhabi (1703-1792), who based his teachings on the thirteenth century purist, Ibn Taymiyah (Oxtoby, 438, 2002), led a jihad against corruption that further weakened the Ottoman Empire. Wahhabis (Wahabi) “are the Puritans of the Muslims, with the most strict, severely enforced moral standard of conduct, and their call is for a pure Islam regulated by a literal interpretation of the Qur’an” (Gilchrist, 386, 2005).

Wahabis regarded all those who did not share their convictions to be either misbelievers or persons gone astray. They waged a violent campaign aimed at purging Muslim society of what they considered to be its un-Islamic beliefs and practices (Oxtoby, 438, 2002).

Preaching strict egalitarian Islamic practices based solely on a person’s relationship with God, Wahhabis destroyed the Prophet Muhammad’s tomb in Medina. Another primary tenant of Wahhabism is that they believe that Islam is solely an Arab inheritance and should be limited to the Arab societies.

His aggressive techniques would be used by some fundamentalists in the twentieth century. . . Wahhabism is the form of Islam that is still practiced today in Saudi Arabia, a puritan religion based on a strictly literal interpretation of scripture and early Islamic tradition (Armstrong, 134, 2000).

Starting in the eighteenth century, the Wahabbi movement surged in popularity. In an effort to “purify” Islam, the Wahhabi movement further weakened the Ottoman Empire, however.

By the late eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire was in a critical state. Trade had declined still further; the Bedouin tribes were out of control in the Arab provinces, and the local pashas were no longer adequately managed by Istanbul, were often corrupt, and exploited the population (Armstrong, 137, 2000).

The Wahhabi's were not the only movement determined to reform and purify Islam. Tensions between orthodox and puritanical Islam spurred other reform movements in addition to Wahhabism. The Islamic civilization lacks a centralized teaching authority. This has allowed a weakness to develop across the Muslim world as numerous sects interpret the Qur'an in many different ways. The result is a disunified Muslim world in doctrinal interpretation and contradictions in the practice of Islam as more secular and fundamentalist groups disagree on hermeneutics. In response to the seeming prevalence of a more secular interpretation to the Qur'an, the Indian Reform movement, Faraidi Movement, Deoban and Ahl al-Hadith schools, Sanusi order, Fulani jihad, and the Mahdist jihad (all with varying ties to Sufism and Wahhabism) formed to unite the Muslim World under a more puritanical interpretation. The result was that moderate Muslims rose against Islamic jihadists and a more deeply fractured Muslim world emerged. (Rahman, 247, 251, 252, 255, 259, 1966).

The West, however, was gaining in economic, technological, and military power. The increase in power of the west coupled with the economic stagnation and the fracture of the political and religious power base brought the Muslim world to the edge of collapse by colonial occupation.

Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Islam

After more losses to Christian Europe in the early and mid-eighteenth century, Muslim leaders began to question where they had gone wrong.

Also, for the first time, they made comparisons between the Islamic Ottoman Empire and its Christian enemies to the advantage of the latter. In other words, the question now was not only ‘what are we doing wrong?’ but also ‘what are they doing right?’ And of course, the essential question: ‘How do we catch up with them, and resume our rightful primacy?’ (Lewis, 26, 2001).

This was not realized, however. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, European colonial empires were exerting their power over the Muslim world. The once powerful Ottoman Empire was known as the “sick man of Europe, and Napoleon gained control of Egypt while Britain ruled in India and much of the remaining Muslim world (Oxtoby, 440, 2002). The combination of internal Islamic political lethargy, colonial political domination, the influx of Westerners, and arrival Christian missionary schools left the Muslim civilization down-trodden as children were taught by “infidel teachers” and governments were forced to “accept infidel allies in their wars against other infidels” (Lewis, 24, 2001).

The Muslim/Arab world, unable to repel European economic and military power, was ripe for plunder. Unable to help themselves, occupants of lands previously under Muslim control watched as European powers took their land and fought each other for control of their territories.

The impotence of the Islamic world confronted with Europe was brought home in dramatic form in 1798, when a French expeditionary force commanded by a young general called Napoleon Bonaparte invaded, occupied, and governed Egypt. The lesson was harsh and clear- even a small European force could invade one of the heartlands of the Islamic empire and do so with impunity.

The second lesson came a few years later, when the French were forced to leave- not by Egyptians nor by their Turkish suzerains, but by a squadron of the Royal Navy commanded by a young admiral called Horatio Nelson. This lesson too was clear; not only could a European power come and go at will, but only another European power could get them out (Lewis, 26, 2001).

Realizing the depressive state of Islam, Iranian Shi'ite, al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), called for a “rejuvenated Ottoman state” via a balance between Muslim tradition and modernization.

Though he admired the vigor, industry, and [the] seriousness of Europeans, he argued that these are in fact Islamic qualities that Muslims have lost and must recover. Science is not the exclusive property of the West but a universal field of knowledge open to all peoples, regardless of religious and cultural identity (Oxtoby, 441, 2002).

Though unsuccessful in bringing reform in his lifetime, Afghani proved to be the impetus of early twentieth century reform. Another Muslim revolutionary was Sayyid Ahmed Khan. Working for the East India Company during the failed 1857 Indian Revolt, Khan called for the adoption of European values to stop the “rapid decline of the Muslim civilization” (Aslan, 225, 2005) after witnessing the gruesome revenge at the hands of British soldiers upon his fellow Muslims who had rebelled. These incidents, and others, were the beginning of the call for modernization as a means to compete with the west to regain prominence.

20th Century Islam and the Arab World

Early twentieth century found the religion of Islam and the Muslim world in a continued degenerative state. The last powerful Islamic stronghold, the Ottoman Empire, no longer existed (Laquer, 31, 2003); after nearly two centuries of colonial rule, many Arab states were being “liberated.” Struggling to form independent states in a modern world, Muslims were frustrated with “corruption” within their own politics, culture, and clergy. The beginnings of modernization, in order to compete with the west, had brought unexpected by products.

Rashid Rida at first supported the attempts of Muslim scholars to transform their religious faith to meet the demands of modernity. But by the 1920's he began to retreat from his position, arguing that attempts to change Islam had gone too far. Muslims were losing their faith and neglecting the practice of their religion while the liberation of women and other social reforms were destroying the very fabric of Islamic society (Habeck, 28, 2006).

Western ideologies, such as materialism and secularism, had crept into their cultures (Laqueur, 31, 2003). The Muslim world, though trying to close the gap, was woefully behind technologically, and could not compete with Western advances. Not only had they lost their power, they were witnessing the marginalization of their culture through westernization as well. This disillusionment set the stage for the ensuing fundamentalist Islamic revival.

Though nineteenth century moderate Muslims reformists, such as Afghani, failed to realize an equilibrium between Islamic traditional and modernization, their teachings had an impact. Twentieth century moderates who call themselves Muslim progressives or progressive Islam continue to call for more liberal interpretations of the Ijtihad (Islamic law). However, the nineteenth century call for moderate reforms polarized Muslims. Some embraced a moderate Islam while others opted for more a more conservative interpretation. The teachings of Afghani were attractive to older Muslims, while the teachings of fundamentalists, such as the Wahhabi's, strongly appealed to younger, more radical Muslims.

In the Arabian Peninsula, where Islam began, a new Wahhabist revival began the resurgence that changed the modern Islamic world. The revival occurred in Egypt at the same time as the forming of the Salafi movement. Like the Wahhabi movement, the Salafi called for the purification of Islam by a return to its origins (Laqueur, 30, 2003).

Two factors united these two groups ideologically. First, is that their puritanical approach to Islam was the only acceptable interpretation of how to live the Muslim life. In short- they were the true Islam. Second, was the strong emphasis on jihad, or holy war to restore what they had lost.

What was really new was the conviction of the Salafis was that they were Islam, not just one of several factions; that state and society should be based on the principles of the religious law, the Sharai, and not on secular law, and that this aim could be achieved most likely only by violence.

New also was the strong emphasis on jihad (holy war), even though its exact meaning was not always made clear. Many fundamentalists also believed in the necessity to reestablish the Khilafah (unity of political and religious rule) which had vanished . . . (Laqueur, 31, 2003).

To achieve these goals, these groups engaged in educational activities to promote fundamentalist Islamic ideals in all areas of Islam. This included classroom lessons, social activities, and economic enterprises were started all in the “spirit of Islam.” In 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood was also formed (in Egypt) to aid in the purification of the Muslim religion and states. This movement sought to bring unity between religion and government so that no separation was present as in Western governmental models. Hence, the merging of church and state that resulted in the Muslim world brought overt religious policies to governments and this model soon became synonymous with the political identities of the Arab states. This fundamentalist view of government began gaining momentum in the Arab/Muslim World.

One of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, who provided much of this ideology, was Sayed Qutb (1906-1966). He has been credited for being the Muslim Brotherhood’s “philosopher and instigator of terrorism” (Laqueur, 33, 2003).

He taught that Islam was the only true religion; that all other religions and civilizations were barbarian, evil, and animal-like, and that any contact with them was to be shunned. The West was the enemy par excellence of

the Muslims, afraid of Islam and wary of its spiritual superiority.
(Laqueur, 33, 2003).

In his writings, Qutb also claimed that all other Muslims who do not practice fundamentalist Islam were not true believers but pagans “against whom relentless war should be waged up to their destruction.” (Laqueur, 33, 2003). Though hung for his radical, violent actions against Nasser of Egypt, the teachings of Qutb spawned many underground fundamentalist organizations. Among these groups is the Society of Muslims, led by Shukri Mustafa Ta.

Coupled with the political and religious frustration that drove an Islamic fundamentalist revival, another late nineteenth and early twentieth century movement also proved to be a catalyst to Islamic/Arab fury: international support was gathering for a new Zionist state to be located within the Arab world. The year 1897 signaled the first steps toward the reestablishment of an Israeli state as Theodore Herzl, considered the spiritual father of the Jewish State, called for the right of the Jewish people to a “rebirth” of their country. It was not until November 2, 1917, however, that the Balfour Declaration, issued by the British government, gave Jewish hopes of regaining their biblical homeland a realistic possibility (Bard, 2004).

On July 22, 1922, the League of Nations entrusted Great Britain with the Mandate of Palestine. The purpose of the Mandate was to allow Britain a period of approximately twenty years in which to establish functional, autonomous Israeli and Palestinian states recognizing "the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine," Also, Britain recognized the need to have an ally on the Middle East as many states within the Arab community had just won independence from the fallen Turkish Ottoman Empire. In September 1922, the League of Nations and Great Britain declared that the Jewish

national home would not extend to the area east of the Jordan River, an area which constituted three-fourths of the territory included in the Mandate.

This area became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Transjordan). Palestinian resistance to a Jewish homeland (riots in 1929) and Arab pressures caused Britain to limit the number of immigrants and land purchases through the Passfield White Papers in 1930 and the British White Papers of 1939. During this time of transition, conflicts between Arabs and Jews were numerous as Palestinians fought to retain their homelands and Jews fought to establish a home state. Jewish foreign ministers were assassinated, Arab uprisings occurred, Jewish and Palestinian civilians were murdered in Hebron and other places, boycotts of Jewish products occurred, several anti-Jewish riots took place, and synagogues were burned. Despite this, the percentage of the Jewish population in Palestine grew from eleven percent in 1922 to thirty-three percent in 1947 (608,000) (Bard, 2004).

Just prior to the end of World War II, the Arab League formed. The Arab League was a pact between the states of Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq to promote Arab security and interests. In the charter, the Alexandria Protocol, written on October 7, 1944, the League clearly stated that though it denounced the “treatment of Jews by dictatorial European states,” it firmly supported Palestinian Arabs’ rights to preserve their homeland and rights. “The Committee declares its support of the cause of the Arabs of Palestine and its willingness to work for the achievement of their legitimate aim and the safeguarding of their just rights” (Bard, 2004). The Arabs opposed the existence of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Also in the immediate post World War II era, events in Europe unfolded that have played a critical role in the posturing of nations up through the twenty-first century. The humiliation of France during World War II and the loss of their colonial possessions greatly reduced the power and prestige of France during the years following World War II. In the hopes of restoring credibility and power in the international community, France to lead the charge to establish a union of European states to counterbalance hegemonic power of the United States. Also, already possessing a close relationship with many former protectorate states, they actively sought alliances with Middle Eastern and African Muslim states. The common bond they established with the Muslim world was anti-Semitism and hatred of the United States because of their support of Israel and capitalist ideals:

Since the mid nineteenth century, France adopted an Islamophile orientation determined by its ever-growing Arab-Muslim empire in Africa and the Middle East. . . From the 1880's, Paris has been one of the most anti-semitic cities in Europe, competing with Vienna, a tendency that led the Vichy government to collaborate fully with Nazi and Arab anti-Jewish racism. Because of its components and the history of both parties, Frances' Arab policy included a strong underlying anti-Semitism. . . DeGaulle, displeased with London's close links with America, rejected Britain's application to join the European Community in 1961 and again in 1967 (Ye'or, 40, 2005).

Attempts to facilitate an agreement between Arabs and Jews continued to frustrate the British, and other nations, after World War II. Arabs refused to acknowledge a Jewish state that had jurisdiction over any Arabs and Jews wanted more immigration allowances (especially after the magnitude of the Holocaust was realized). With the creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945, Britain handed control of the Palestinian "problem" to the UN in 1947. A delegation of eleven nations studied the conflict. Seven suggested two separate states, three suggested a single state with two provinces, and one nation

abstained (Bard, 2, 2004). With the vote coming in the UN, Jewish Agency representatives David Horowitz and Abba Eban attempted to negotiate with Arab League Secretary Azzam Pasha independently to reach a mutual solution on September 16, 1947.

Pasha's response was:

The Arab world is not in a compromising mood. It's likely, Mr. Horowitz, that your plan is rational and logical, but the fate of nations is not decided by rational logic. Nations never concede; they fight. You won't get anything by peaceful means or compromise. You can, perhaps, get something, but only by the force of your arms. We shall try to defeat you. I am not sure we'll succeed, but we'll try. We were able to drive out the Crusaders, but on the other hand we lost Spain and Persia. It may be that we shall lose Palestine. But it's too late to talk of peaceful solutions (Bard, 3, 2004).

Arab leaders demanded a single, unitary Arab state from the UN. The UN voted to adopt the two independent states recommendation by a vote of 33-13 with 10 abstentions on November 29, 1947 (Katzive, 2002). While neither the Jews nor Arabs approved of the recommended actions, Arab reaction was immediate and violent while Israel's reaction was acceptance. From the date of the partition vote in the UN on November 29, 1947 until February 1, 1948, there were 2,748 deaths and injuries to Arabs, Jews, and British citizens (Bard, 2004). The partition plan divided Palestine West of the Jordan into Arab and Jewish areas. These boundaries were based solely on demographics. The borders of the Jewish State were arranged with no consideration of security. Immediately, complaints arose of favoritism towards Jews concerning arable land. The Jews refuted this claim citing that sixty percent of their land was within the Negev Desert.

The chairman of the Arab Higher Committee said the Arabs would "fight for every inch of their country." Two days later, the holy men of Al-Azhar University in Cairo called on the Muslim world to proclaim a jihad against the Jews (Bard, 2004). This

was the beginning of the 1948 War. The Jewish settlers suffered severe casualties and most of their major roadways were disrupted. In May 4, 1948, the Arab Legion attacked Kfar Etzion. Within two days, the settlers were overwhelmed, and surrendered. Even after surrender, many settlers were massacred (Bard, 2004). This incident and those similar to it caught the attention of the international community.

Though the UN condemned the Arab aggression, Arabs did not allow UN intervention. The Arabs willingly took responsibility for starting the 1948 War. On April 16, 1948, Jamal Husseini told the UN Security Council: "The representative of the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight" (Bard, 2004). In subsequent arguments, however, the Arabs tended to blame Israel for the fighting. Though clearly outnumbered and using a newly organized underground army, Jewish forces began to take initiative and captured the towns of Tiberias and Haifa, before their independence.

On May 14, 1948, with a speech to the UN by Lord Cadogan, Colonial Britain relinquished control of Palestine and adopted a "hands off position." Within hours, United States and the Soviet Union recognized Israel as a sovereign state. Immediately the Arab nations of Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Iraq invaded Israel. Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, claimed at the beginning of the invasion, "This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacres and the Crusades" (Bard, 2002). Despite an inferior military, an embargo, and the refusal of nations to intervene, supplied with arms by the British and French, the Israeli military defended the land given them and seized more

land than the partition plan had originally given them. Israel signed Armistice agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria on dates ranging from February until July, 1949. The "1949 Armistice Line" eventually became known as the "Green Line." The Arab world considered lands lost to Israel to be held "in a state of belligerent occupation" (Imseis, 103, 2005).

Because of this, peace was not to endure. The period between 1949 and 1967 was marked by the annexation of the West Bank and Jerusalem by Jordan (renamed from Transjordan) from which terrorist strikes by the "Fedayeen" against Israelis' were launched. Also, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser began to import arms from Communist Russia and enacted a blockade of the Straits of Tiran from the Suez Canal of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. At that time, Nasser claimed; "I am not solely fighting against Israel itself. My task is to deliver the Arab world from destruction through Israel's intrigue, which has its roots abroad. Our hatred is very strong. There is no sense in talking about peace with Israel. There is not even the smallest place for negotiations" (Nasser, 1955). Shortly afterwards, Nasser also signed a military agreement with Syria and Jordan giving Nasser authority over all three armies. As Israeli Ambassador to the UN, Abba Eban, explained to the Security Council on October 30:

During the six years, during which this belligerency has operated in violation of the armistice agreement, there have occurred 1,843 cases of armed robbery and theft, 1,339 cases of armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces, 435 cases of incursion from Egyptian controlled territory, and 172 cases of sabotage perpetrated by Egyptian military units and Fedayeen in Israel. As a result of these actions of Egyptian hostility within Israel, 364 Israelis were wounded and 101 killed. In 1956 alone, as a result of this aspect of Egyptian aggression, 28 Israelis were killed and 127 wounded (Oren, 7, 2002).

Prime Minister, Golda Meir, appealed to the UN in 1956, 1957 and 1960 for diplomatic intervention of Egyptian infractions of agreements with Israel and the UN. She communicated Israel's desire to live in peace with the Arab nations surrounding Israel as she stated: ". . . our profoundest wish was that the hand of friendship which we then extended to our Arab neighbors would be accepted" (Meir, 146, 1957). The increased terrorist attack with the blockade caused Israel to launch a preemptive attack on Egypt on October 29, 1956, with the backing of Britain and France. The Israeli attack on Egypt was successful, with Israeli forces capturing the Gaza Strip, much of the Sinai, and Sharm el-Sheikh. An UN peacekeeping force was set-up on the Israeli/Egyptian border to protect Israeli settlers. This force protected the Israeli border for ten years.

Israel's victory over Egypt in the Sinai Campaign of 1956 further wounded Arab pride. Nasser desired to avenge Arab losses to Israel since 1948 by driving Israel into the sea. Arab refusals to accept a sovereign Israeli state were evidenced by the following quote from President Nasser to the United Arab Republic National Assembly on March 26, 1964:

Israel and the imperialism around us, which confront us, are two separate things. There have been attempts to separate them, in order to break up the problems and present them in an imaginary light as if the problem of Palestine will also be solved and no residue of the problem will remain. The danger of Israel lies in the very existence of Israel as it is in the present and in what she represents (Bard, 2004).

Three months later, Nasser outlined a plan featuring ". . . the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people. In other words, we aim at the destruction of the State of Israel. The immediate aim: perfection of Arab military might. The national aim: the eradication of Israel" (Bard, 2004). Suicide-terrorist strikes against Israeli targets began

originating from the West Bank. Arab terrorist attacks grew more frequent as in 1965 there were 35 raids against Israel while in 1966 the number increased to 41. In the first four months of 1967, 37 attacks were carried-out against Jewish targets. (Bard, 2005). Confident in the alliance of the Arab states surrounding Israel and knowing that the population of these Arab nations outnumbered Israel by 50:1 (Varner,1, 2005), Nasser began to apply pressure on Israel, provoking them to attack.

It is said that the Six Days War was triggered by a faulty intelligence report by Communist Russia claiming an Israeli military build-up along the Syrian border. Though this report was inaccurate, it started a chain of events that led to the Six Days War, by the end of which Israel controlled the entire Arabian Peninsula, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and eastern Jerusalem while the Egyptian army lay in ruins. The victory of Israel during the Six Days War established the presence Israel internationally as a state. Though many Arab states have refused to acknowledge the existence of Israel as an international entity, the existence of an Israeli state was no longer in dispute for the majority of the international community.

Early Twenty-first Century-Reclaiming of Europe

Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Islam is once again attempting to spread itself through out the world through immigration. As the geographically closest political entity to the part of the world that is dominated by Islam, southern Europe is the first logical place for Islam to re-establish a foot-hold. Because of this, tensions have reemerged on European soil over coexistence of Islam and Christian values due to mass Muslim immigration.

By the early 1990's two-thirds of the migrants in Europe were Muslim, and European concern with immigration is above all concern with Muslim immigration (Huntington, 200, 1996).

. . . a conflict of civilizations is reemerging on European soil in the context of Islamic immigration. . . Numerous Muslims have successfully adapted to Western democracy, but they are still the exceptions. Despite the EU's conciliatory policy, preachers in mosques continue to call Christians and Jews "infidels," descendants of "apes and pigs," "enemies of Allah belonging to the "camp of *kufir*" (unbelief) and to request Muslims to educate their children in the spirit of *jihad*. (Ye'or, 37, 2005).

Muslim immigration into Europe has caused a strain on western social values and structures. The western value of freedom of worship is challenged by those who oppose the existence of any religion other than Islam. Freedom of speech and press has been challenged by riots caused by a cartoon from Denmark. State-wide riots in France have occurred to protest employment challenges to immigrants. Islamic terrorist attacks have even influenced free democratic elections as witnessed in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004. The influx of immigrants from the Middle East has caused enough concern that many states are taking legal action to assure the safety and livelihood of their native citizens.

Across Europe, countries that for decades have provided a generous reception for immigrants and refugees are now pulling away the welcome mat. Anti-immigrant sentiment bordering on the xenophobic once the purview of a few right-wing parties has become mainstream politics in such countries as the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Britain.

New laws are raising the hurdles for newcomers, especially Muslims, and winning cheers from many Europeans. Polls indicate that strong majorities in almost every European country favor not just tightening restrictions on ordinary immigrants but also casting a colder eye on the hard-luck tales of refugees seeking asylum.

The alarms sounding over immigration have some economic basis, such as perennial worry that newcomers are taking jobs from locals. But analysts

say Europeans are mainly fearful of terrorism and the fast spread of Islamic culture.

Islamic immigration into Europe and particularly France, has had an impact on governmental policies as well. (Nickerson, *The Boston Globe*, 22 May 2006).

Muslim immigration has caused concerned the citizens and governments of many European states.

Some European states, such as France, have taken a friendly position towards Islamic values, however. Even after the extent of the Holocaust of World War II was realized by the Western World, France joined the Arab World in an anti-Semite position and sheltered Nazi war criminals from prosecution. "From the 1880's, Paris has been one of the most anti-Semitic cities in Europe, competing with Vienna, a tendency that led the Vichy government to Collaborate fully with Nazi and Arab anti-Jewish racism. (Ye'or, 40, 2005). States, like France, with a conciliatory relationship with the Muslim world are given the classification of Dar-al sulh- land of temporary truce- with the Muslim world. Though still considered infidels, they are given a time of reprieve from jihad because of their lenient policies.

"...while some countries- America, India, Israel, Russia, the Philippines, Sudan, Kenya, Nigeria, and now Spain- are directly targeted by jihadist forces, others are considered to be dar al-sulh, countries of Temporary treaties. The Islamic view of international relations, the European Union can today be placed in the category of "lands of temporary truce as Osama bin Laden implied in his summer 2004 message (Ye'or, 36, 2005).

Understanding the historical relationship between Islam and non-Muslim civilizations and states, D'himmi scholar, Bat Ye'or, is suspicious of the motives behind the Muslim community extending a temporary truce to non-Muslims.

There are two possible motivations for Islamic authorities to conclude a truce with infidels: 1) Muslims are too weak to win the war: 2) the infidel

leaders agree to pay a tribute to the Muslim ruler to obtain the cessation of the hostilities, those latter including rampages, abductions, enslavement, and killings. The countries of dar al-sulh must also abstain from hindering the development of Islam in their lands. . . .Moreover, only the treaties that conform to the stipulations of Islamic jurisprudence are valid, and they must be renewed every ten years (Ye'or, 33, 2005).

If historical models of assimilation of cultures are accurate, states like France are well into the second or even third phase (of a three-step system) of integration process of a culture into Islam.

HISTORICAL CONCLUSION

Muhammad founded the religion of Islam which integrated parts of Christianity and Judaism as tenets of faith in the hopes of merging the faiths under the banner of Islam. When this failed to materialize, Muhammad, and his followers after him, used military power to forcibly spread Islam. Eventually, Islam dominated the Middle East, Northern Africa, western parts of Asia, and parts of Southern and eastern Europe .

From the advent of the Muslim religion, Islam has been in conflict with the predominantly Christian and Jewish West. Through out the thirteen hundred years of conflict neither religion gained a significant upper hand. Despite wars and periods of waxing and waning, neither Christianity nor Islam has been able to vanquish the other. This continued until the eve of the industrial revolution during and the late eighteenth century when the stalemate between the West and Islam was broken as the West advanced technologically.

Religious and political corruption coupled with the establishment of an Israeli state spurred an early twentieth century Muslim fundamentalist revival. Clashing military, economic, societal, and cultural values between the powerful West and the Arab

world has led to overt and covert armed conflict. Uprisings against colonial powers and the Israelis were the impetus for today's Muslim terrorists. What originated as regional terrorism, however, has now grown into international terrorism as Muslim fundamentalist groups claim responsibility for terrorist attack across the globe.

With an understanding of the historical foundations and conflicts of the Muslim world identified, analysis of the motives behind Islamic style terrorism can begin. Knowledge of the growth, influence, pride, eventual decline, and humiliation of Islamic civilization provides insight to the motivations behind today's Muslim terrorists.

CHAPTER III

TERRORISM DEFINED

Because the content and nature of terrorism is enigmatic and has changed with time, it defies any definition but the most general in nature. In fact, Walter Laqueur, an internationally acclaimed expert on terrorism who has written several scholarly books on the subject claims that the term “terrorism” encompasses such a large continuum of methods and intents that it is impossible to give it an adequate, single definition that covers all of its aspects. Even so, the U.S. State department defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of, or threatened use of, force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives” (Hoffman, 38, 1998). Broadly defined, terrorism is an action of violence by an individual, group, or entity against another individual, group, or entity that is intended to elicit feelings of fear in the intended victim (Hoffman, 38, 1998).

Currently, there are 57 recognized international terrorist organizations. Of these, 27 are from countries where Islam is dominant, 9 are from South America, and 6 are Asian in origin (ITC, 2006). When asked to describe terrorism and motivations for terrorism, respondents to a 1988 poll used the following verbs: violent-85%, politically motivated- 65%, for psychological effects- 41.5 %, a strategic tactic 30.5%, to elicit fear-

51%, an emphasis of victimization- 15.5%, and 37.5% associated terrorism with a specific victim or target (Hoffman, 40, 1998). Because of the ever-changing and enigmatic nature of terrorism, and the lack of clarity of what terrorism is, debates have taken an over-simplified, emotional tone. Therefore, understanding the roots of terrorism, in general, is the logical beginning to understanding, and ultimately ending, Islamic terrorism.

The use of violence to control people is a concept that is as old as human history, the word, “terrorism,” however, was first used during the French Revolution in the 1790’s. Unlike today’s definition, the French used the term “terrorism” in connection with the concept of liberty and freedom (McCauley, 33, 2004). To the French revolutionaries, terrorism had a decidedly positive connotation. When King Louis XIV was deposed and beheaded a new revolutionary government was imposed- “Le regime de la terreur” of 1793-1794. Aggrieved by unfair taxation, governmental corruption (Lowell, 128, 1893), and wanting social reform (Krause, 5-7, 1990), much of the non-nobility citizens of France rejected aristocratic monarchy in favor of democracy. The method they used was lethal violence against those who represented or supported the legitimate government of France. What began in France as a concept of freedom and liberty quickly became an instrument of terror and revenge.

The trend of non-state entities committing acts of violence against states, which, in the opinion of the terrorist, have done wrong in some way and must be punished, persists today. Though the methods of terrorism have changed with the advancements in technology, two key characteristics have remained constant. First, is that terrorist strikes are not random, they are deliberate and specific. Second, is that the goal of terrorism is to

bring about some sort of change. This change can be political, social, economical, or religious.

Before continuing on to the nineteenth and twentieth century terrorist history and characteristics, an important distinction must be made. Many writers on terrorism include historical and current leaders such as Stalin, Mussolini, Hitler, Pol Pot, Milosevic, and Saddam Hussein in the list of terrorists. While these leaders have committed reprehensible and immoral acts upon people, a distinction must be made between leaders of states and terrorists and are therefore classified acts of terror committed by the state (state terrorism). Even though corruption and terrorist ties may be proven true of the above mentioned people, they were legitimate leaders of internationally recognized states and used the power “given” them by the state when they ordered these atrocities. Furthermore, the people who carried out these atrocities were uniformed soldiers of legitimate states as well. Terrorists do not lead states with sovereign borders nor do they have paid uniformed standing armies. Many terrorist entities are not governed by sovereign borders and can cohesively exist within and throughout many political boundaries. Reasons for this include interests that extend beyond political borders or that it is politically unwise for a recognized state to openly engage in such behavior. State sponsored terrorism is defined as financial support that is given across international boundaries to terrorist organizations and the families of deceased militants for the purpose of conducting or rewarding attacks on civilians (Wikipedia, 2006). State sponsored terrorism may be employed to achieve strategic goals that can not be achieved through conventional state military actions. Soldiers are distinguishable from citizens of the state they are committed to serve. Many terrorists, however, are not. Terrorists are

neither uniformed representatives of a sovereign state nor do they have consistent uniforms that mark them as such. Though leaders of states are capable of inflicting terror on the people they lead, they differ from terrorists in two key manners: they are legitimate heads of state and they have government support with, uniformed soldiers carrying out their orders. There is a distinction between terrorism, state terrorism, and state sponsored terrorism.

Terrorism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries possessed specific characteristics that Islamic-style terrorism does not embrace. The legacy of the French Revolution was that it left nineteenth century Europe with an anti-monarchial sentiment. Divine right to rule was increasingly challenged as people embraced nationalism, specifically, citizen-based nationalism was commonly used to identify and define citizenship, rather than lineage (Hoffman, 15-17, 1998).

Organizations such as the Narodnaya Volya of Russia (Hoffman, 17-19, 1998; Laqueur, 10-13, 2003) in the 1870's and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), arose during this era. Not all terrorist groups have religious motives. Some have political goals such as the Narodnaya Volya and the IRA. As their goals were to affect specific political issues and elicit change from what they say is political oppression, a primary characteristic is that they struck specific, calculated targets. Tsarist Russia remained oppressive to its "common" people while the majority of European states were embracing a more liberal form of government and trending away from monarchial rule. Because of their oppressive nature, the Volya enjoyed the popular support of the people of Russia. To force change, the Volya organized and carried out the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in March of 1881. Anarchist sentiment was also rife in Ireland. Irate that Catholic Ireland remained an

unwilling protectorate of Protestant, colonial Britain, I.R.A. carried out terrorist hits against British governmental authorities, embassies, and banks connected with imperial Britain.

What these two organizations shared with other terrorist organizations of their time was the methods they used to choose their hits and how they carried them out. Targets of terrorist attacks of this time were specifically chosen because of their connections and alliances. Specific messages to governments and other target entities were made when their representatives or properties were hit. As the “common citizen” was not a party to governmental position and “oppression,” they were specifically avoided.

Until recently, terrorism was by and large, discriminate, selecting its victims carefully- kings, queens, government ministers, generals, and other leading political figures and officials. It was more often than not, “propaganda by deed” (Laqueur, 2003).

An intrinsic element in the group’s (Narodnaya Volya) collective beliefs was that not a drop of superfluous blood should be shed in pursuit of aims, however noble or utilitarian they may be. Even having selected their targets with great care and the utmost deliberation group members still harbored profound regrets about taking the life of a fellow human being (Hoffman, 18, 1998).

During this phase of terrorist history and development, only specific targets were chosen. All others were purposely avoided. This specific attribute of avoiding the innocent was continued until the second half of the twentieth century.

Though suicide missions can be traced back to folk lore and mythology (Laqueur, 2003), the Kamikaze pilots of World War II popularized another aspect of terrorism that is used today- suicide bombing. Though these pilots were not terrorists as they represented Japan in World War II, Islamic terrorists frequently use the model of suicide

to strike their intended targets today. The word “kamikaze” is derived from two Japanese roots that combined mean “a savior in a desperate situation” (Laqueur, 76, 2003). During World War II, Japanese soldiers would volunteer to crash-dive their planes into American Naval ships in the South Pacific. Intended targets were allied (enemy) ships. Again, the civilian population was specifically avoided. Though pilots knew they were fighting a battle that they could not win, yet volunteers were plentiful.

The decision to send pilots to crash-dive their planes on American ships was a counsel of despair, not a strategy with any hope for success and some of the surviving kamikaze admitted in later years the futility of these operations. Several thousand junior officers and cadets volunteered for these missions; there was actually a waiting list of candidates (Laqueur, 76, 2003).

The Kamikaze pilots of 1944 and 1945 set a model that terrorists have used since. The systematic use of suicide terrorism by groups such as the Tamal Tigers, Hamas, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) increased through the mid twentieth century. It was not until the 1980’s, however, that suicide bombing became a popular way to commit acts of terrorism. Muslim (Shi’ite, Sunni), Sikh, Hindu, Jewish, and atheist groups (Kurdish PKK, and Lebanese Communist Party) have all used suicide terrorism increasingly (Laqueur, 78, 2003). Suicide has become a common tool in modern terrorism.

ISLAMIC TERRORISM

To understand the mindset of today’s fundamentalist Islamic terrorists, it is necessary to comprehend the current worldview of Islam. Islamic terrorism, like general terrorism, has changed in its nature and functions in recent history. Placed within

historical context, modern Islam-initiated terrorism seeks to address two separate issues: anti-Israeli sentiments and resistance the Westernization of the Arab world.

The murder of the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics marked another new trend in terrorism- the murder of innocent civilians. At the summer Olympics in Munich, Germany in September 1972, eight terrorists belonging to a sub-organization of the P.L.O, named Black September, kidnapped eleven Israeli athletes who were competing at the Olympics. Founded in response to the Six Days War, the P.L.O. through Black September demanded the release of 236 Palestinians imprisoned in Israeli jails and five other Palestinians held in West Germany in exchange for the release of the Israeli athletes (Laqueur, 76, 2003). By the end of the standoff, all eleven Israelis had been murdered and the attention of the international community was on the terrorist attack. In reaction to the massacre at the 1972 Olympics, the United Nations (UN) Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim called for a UN initiative to address and prevent terrorism to the 27th session of the general assembly. The agenda item was called:

Measures to prevent terrorism and other forms of violence which endanger or take innocent lives or jeopardize fundamental freedoms and study of the underlying causes of those forms of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, frustration, grievance and despair and which cause some people to sacrifice human lives, including their own, in an attempt to effect radical changes (Rogers, 1972).

The response of the international community through the UN was “cautious.” Feedback to the initiative was: “this comprehensive approach of the new era of the East-West conflict may not be achievable under the present conditions of a unipolar world order” (Koechler, 2002). The murder of the eleven Israelis at the 1972 Olympics marked the first time that terrorists killed non-governmental civilians to make political statements and or demand political change.

The 1972 Olympic massacre marked another new trend in terrorism. Before this time, terrorism had been a primarily localized phenomenon. The IRA struck only in the United Kingdom to bring political change to Ireland, and the Narodnaya Volya struck in Russia to elicit social reform. By striking outside of the Islamic world, and at an international function, the P.L.O. brought its plight (and terrorism) to the world. Though Black September failed to gain the release of their comrades, and the international community failed to rescue the athletes, they succeeded in grabbing international attention.

The real lesson of Munich, however, was a somewhat counterintuitive one. The Olympic tragedy provided the first clear evidence that even terrorist attacks which fail to achieve their ostensible objectives can nonetheless still be counted successful provided that the operation is sufficiently dramatic to capture the media's attention. In terms of the publicity and exposure accorded to the Palestinian cause, Munich was an unequivocal success- appoint conceded by even the most senior PLO officials. Black September terrorists admittedly didn't bring about the liberation of any of their comrades imprisoned in Israel as they had hoped, but they did attain the operation's other two objectives: World opinion was forced to take note of the Palestinian drama, and the Palestinian people imposed their presence on an international gathering that had sought to exclude them. (Hoffman, 73, 1998).

The international attention that the P.L.O. and Black September received reinforced their behavior changed the face of terrorism. Moving acts of terrorism from a regional to an international setting increased exposure to their plight by the international media and had the effect of reinforcing that behavior and international terrorism became a reality. The following is a representation of current Islamic terrorist organizations:

Since the emergence of Islamic terrorism into the international consciousness, many Islamic terrorist organizations have formed for many reasons. The most notable, Al Qa'ida is a multi-national group which funds and orchestrates the activities of Islamic

terrorist internationally. It began as result of the Afghan war against the Soviets in approximately 1988 by Osama bin Laden, and its core members consist of Afghan war veterans. To date Al Qa-ida has claimed responsibility for 15 terrorist attacks that have resulted in 4133 deaths and 5742 injuries (reference table 5). A recent organization, Ansar Al-Islam, formed in northern Iraq in opposition to Operation Iraqi freedom. This organization is formed primarily of Kurdish Iraqis and received its seed money form Al-Qa-ida (ITC, 2006).

Islamic terrorist organizations have claimed responsibility for 266 terrorist attacks occurring outside of their claimed national affiliation. Hamas, an anti-Israeli organization, has claimed responsibility for 115 terrorist attacks since the 1960's resulting in 934 deaths and 2326 injuries. From the organizations listed, 5293 deaths and 9929 injuries have been recorded. Though not the only targets, civilian and military individuals have suffered the greatest losses. Shooting, car bombing, and suicide bombing have been the preferred methods used (reference table 5). Lastly, of the ten Islamic groups claiming responsibility for international terrorist strikes, seven list the destruction of Israel as one of their primary objectives.

The murder of the 1972 Israeli athletes marked the beginning of a new era in Islamic terrorism where international civilian targets are used to grab the attention of the global community. This change from specifically identified targets to unassociated individuals is the new reality of Islamic terrorism. Potential reasons for this change in tactics must be analyzed and understood if any hope of a peaceful solution to Islamic terrorism is to be realized.

THEORIES OF TERRORISM

As “terrorism is a complex issue that does not respond well to reductionism” (Stout, xiv, 2004), solely using history to explain motivation is inadequate. Historical information can provide context in analysis, however. Theorists divide motivation for terrorism into two primary categories- first, abuse of power theory and second, unworkable international law theory.

Abuse of power theory is one postulation about the causes of terrorism. Some theorists tout this theory as the primary cause of terrorism. The abuse of power theory applies to entities that use military, political, and economic influence to increase personal wealth.

This is juxtaposed with the concern that wealthy nations are not using their riches to deal with global problems of hunger, illness, or poverty. . . Many see materialism run amok along with the concomitant pretentiousness that accompanies such selfish vulgarity (Stout, 2, 2004).

This theory of the source of terrorism could be applied to Islamic terrorism. The Arab world lived under European Colonial rule during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Also, Western capitalistic values that have begun to take hold in the Arab world are considered to be an abuse of power. In an attempt to modernize the Arab world, Western products and philosophies have become part of daily life.

Today, in mosques all over the country and in Saudi-funded religious schools throughout the Muslim world, clerics advocate Wahhab’s stern program, which is based on a return to the “pure” Islam practiced during the Prophet’s time. Its spirit is at fierce odds with the consumerism that has erupted in Saudi Arabia since oil was discovered, and-fundamentalists charge- with the lavish lifestyles of the Saudi royal family. . . We are being carried in two directions at once, backward and forward. (Viviano, 26-27, 2003)

To defend a way of life and compete economically, Arabs have allowed Western products and ideas to enter their world. The introduction of Western philosophies and the scandal of western liberalism are also what breeds Muslim contempt.

Another theory of the cause of terrorism is that international laws and accords are unworkable. This theory underscores the lack of understanding of differing cultural values in the international community. An example of this is the International Bill of Human Rights statements on universal human rights. Elements of a universal human rights concept were present in the charter of the United Nations. Then United States President, Harry Truman said, "The charter is dedicated to the achievement and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Unless we can achieve these objectives for all men and women everywhere-without regard for race, language, or religion- we can not have permanent peace and security (Merriam, 11, 1946). While the West primarily believes in a universal humanitarian rights dogma, there are many civilizations that see human rights through a cultural definition that is to be determined through that cultures values and mores. This difference in world view can be a major contributing factor to the break-down of peace negotiations. Because of a cultural humanitarian view, Islamic terrorist members see leaders with the "proper authority" make commitments on their behalf, that include a universalist humanitarian view. As this does not coincided with their world view as applied to Islamic dogma, they find these agreements repugnant. Because those who have ruled have acted in a manner that makes their subjects and indigenous people feel that their values and culture have been betrayed, they reject the structure of power in favor of one of their own making. Furthermore, inter-governmental organizations, such as the United Nations, are viewed with suspicion as

peace-keeping forces from different states with conflicting values are sent to restore peace in conflicts that they know nothing about and have no interest in (Stout, 1-5, 2004).

CHAPTER IV

THE SEARCH FOR A PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

The question of the mental health of suicide bombers and Islamic terrorists is a common question. Because individualistic Traditional Christian western values do not comprehend suicide terrorism, the immediate reaction is to question the mental health of those commit such acts of terrorism. To understand Islamic and suicide terrorism an awareness and understanding of causes of terrorism rather than uninformed conjectures must be sought. Analysis of this subject can begin with theoretical causes of violence.

Theorists postulate that violence arises from a combination of stimuli. In their article, "The Anatomy of Hatred," Dr.'s Randall Osborne and Christopher Frost explain that causation of violence is the result of biological, psychodynamic, cognitive, social and integrative processing factors. The biological reasons for violence rest in survival instinct- fight or flight. A person will instinctually act or react violently if survival is threatened, even on a sub-conscious level.

Although anger, sadness, and other emotions certainly enter into the 9/11 experience, it is our contention that the most primal emotion involved in that episode is fear, and "nonintegrated" fear at that. . . Our senses are essentially hard-wired to maintain a state until signaled; otherwise survival becomes something of a crapshoot: "Maybe I need to remain in the fearful arousal state, but maybe not." In situations of life or death, such toss of the coin odds are decidedly insufficient. . . .Essentially, we may say that the brain is more vigilant in its scanning for triggers associated with feared

objects where integration has not occurred (Osborne and Frost, 9, 2004). As citizens of the United States now double-take a man of Middle Eastern descent who boards an airplane, because of 9/11, we have now come to identify people from this region as a possible threat to survival. This elicits a fear response that could be acted upon from an instinctual need for survival.

The second potential source for violent behavior is the psychodynamic dimension. This theory maintains that the internal human need to express disturbing thoughts is tempered by societal mores and norms- even fear of death. Though self-awareness affords the ability to impact the environment, it also makes humans aware of their own mortality and fear of death.

Humans respond to this dilemma by creating shared beliefs and worldviews as shields against existential dread. Such worldviews are “humanly created beliefs about the nature of reality share by groups of people that are developed as a means by which the people manage the potential for terror engendered by the human awareness of mortality.” Because such shared worldviews provide a reassuring armor against death anxiety they become sacred icons of both personal and social psychology. If shared beliefs are to protect against death awareness, they must be protected against all threats- particularly those represented by divergent beliefs. (Osborne and Frost, 11, 2004).

In psychodynamic dimensions, causation of violence stems from a fear of death where threat of the belief system is perceived as if it were an attack against life itself.

Cognitive reasons for violence rest in empirical and perceptual cognitive filters. As the human mind develops from the earliest sensorimotor stage to the final formal operational stage, learning and behavior is built progressively. The more reinforced a perception or behavior along the developmental time-line, the more difficult it is to eradicate.

Children learn patterns of hatred very early in life, by as young as 4 or 5 according to some researchers- while still thinking preoperationally. Where patterns of hatred are formed early in childhood, and registered

neurologically during a period of brain development that is highly plastic, then the likelihood of altering these early categories of hate later on in life is a daunting one. (Osborne and Frost, 12, 2004).

When a person identifies a stimulus and assigns a value to it, it is easy to generalize and engage cognitive filters as a cognitive short cut. Osama Bin Laden did this in his letter to the United States in *The Observer Worldview* newspaper. In his letter he responded to the question why he orchestrated the 9/11 bombings where many innocent civilians died. His response was that as we are a democratic society and we elect our officials and therefore have the power to remove them, there are no innocents (Bin Laden, 2002). Bin Laden generalized from the voting population to the general population, including children to explain his act of violence.

Social motivations also play a role in violent motivation and hatred. Though explained in greater detail in the cult indoctrination section of this thesis, violence can be used to provide identity within a social context between groups. Motivations can include a desire to know who we are (self-knowledge), as a verification of self-concept in a desire to confirm that we are who we think we are, or as a self-enhancement by using violence to put our selves in the most positive, powerful light through comparison of in-groups to out-groups. Socialization provides a basis for evaluative judgment where blame can be shifted from self to others.

By its very nature hatred is extropunitive, which means that the hater is sure that the fault lies in the object of his hate. So long as he believes that he will not feel guilty for his uncharitable state of mind (Allport, 31, 1992).

Identification of self through a social lens can be a motivation for hatred and violence.

Finally, integrative processes are a combination of other theoretical reasons for hatred and violence. Genetic predisposition can be mediated or intensified by a complex

combination internal fears, cognitive filters, reinforced learned behaviors, and social influences. Contradictions to schemas can yields differing results which are dependent upon individual backgrounds, integrations, and tolerance to dissonance.

When analyzing the act of violence in itself, it can be classified in one of two ways. Violence can be classified as an emotional response; or a calculated act of aggression (McCauley, 49, 2004). Emotional-based violence is reactionary and done in retribution. This type of aggression stems from feelings of anger, hatred, envy, and/or hurt and the intent is to inflict pain or injury through retaliation (Aronson, 255, 1999). Instrumental violence is calculated and executed in a precise way to achieve a specific purpose. It is methodically carried out to achieve a specific goal. Historical evidence and the following section will demonstrate that there is evidence that Islamic terrorism is both an emotional response and an instrument used to communicate that anger.

It is generally accepted that terrorism (in general) is a well-thought-out, organized form of violence. It is not random or impulsive. Because of this, theorists are able to formulate theories as to why terrorists commit acts of violence. According to game theory, terrorists strategize to determine when and where they are going to strike. Success for a terrorist depends on the ability to understand the complex systems the intended victims depend on. By carefully selecting whom they intend to strike, how, when, and where; terrorists have learned to maximize the impact of the strike to achieve the most exposure for their cause, popular support of their supporters, and the most fear from their victims. A successful terrorist attack elicits not only fear from the intended victim, but causes side-line sympathizers, who are covert members of the terrorist in-group, to openly join the terrorist cause (Stout, pg 2-13, 2004). When analyzed, terrorist

organizations resemble pyramids with the smallest number of people, who at the top, are the organizers and leaders of terrorist act, the people in the middle are those who carry out the attacks, and the largest group at the bottom are those who support the terrorist position but do not take action against the establishment. (McCauley, 51, 2004). The lowest tier in the terrorist pyramid is considered to suffer from a crisis of confidence. This occurs when the people are disenfranchised from current methods and practices and have lost confidence in the rightness of the policy but are not willing to take action on their disillusionment. Currently, weapons that are at the disposal of Islamic terrorists are biological, radiological, incendiary, chemical, explosive, and nuclear (Stout, 2 -18, 2004).

Terrorism is not a completely random act of violence. While the actual people they injure is random due to who is present when terrorists strike, terrorists attacks are purposeful, and are a calculated act organized to achieve a specific goal. The leaders and organizers of terrorism are highly intelligent and capable. But, to be capable of conceiving, organizing, ordering and carrying out such acts of violence is a person psychologically well? One of the most popular “pop-psychologist” theories is that terrorist are sociopaths and psychopaths. People who have antisocial personality disorders, such as a sociopath or a psychopath, are hallmarked by the following characteristics: A superficial charm and intelligence which make them adept at manipulating people; shallow emotions and lack of empathy, guilt, or remorse; behaviors that indicate little to no life plan or order; failure to learn from previous experiences, absence of anxiety, unreliable; insincerity; and untruthfulness (Sue, Sue, and Sue, 236, 2000). Terrorists, as will be shown later, have great levels of commitment to the cause of their organization. This demonstrates a great level of personal, emotional commitment to

a cause that is external of them. This is inconsistent with anti-social personality disorder behavior. “No one has ever suggested that a psychopath’s moral blindness can take the form of self-sacrifice. In addition, psychopaths are notably impulsive and irresponsible” (McCauley, 36, 2004). Mohamed Atta, the alleged leader of the 9/11 bombings, showed great commitment by his willing sacrifice. Furthermore, Atta was college-educated in architecture, and had successfully held employment (Kean, 160, 2004). Likewise, Marwan Al-Shehhi, the alleged pilot of United Airlines flight 175 that flew into the second tower, had an international education and tried repeatedly to pass a German language competency test (Kean, 162, 2004). Another 9/11 hijacker, Ziad Samir Jarrah, maintained close family connections and even maintained a long-term committed relationship.

Yet Jarrah clearly differed from the other hijackers in that he maintained much closer contact with his family and continued his intimate relationship with Senguen. These ties may well have caused him to harbor some doubts about going through with the plot, even as late as the summer of 2001 (Kean, 168, 2004).

In October [2000], he flew back to Germany to visit his girlfriend, Aysel Senguen. The two traveled to Paris before Jarrah returned to Florida on October 29. His relationship with her remained close throughout his time in the United States. In addition to his trips, Jarrah made hundreds of phone calls to her and communicated frequently by email (Kean, 224-225, 2004).

Jarrah flew through Germany to get home to Beirut. A few weeks later, he returned to Florida via Germany, with Aysel Senguen. She stayed with him in Florida for ten days, even accompanying him to a flight training session. We do not know whether Atta or al Qaeda leaders knew about Jarrah's trips and Senguen's visit. The other operatives had broken off regular contact with their families. At the end of January 2001, Jarrah again flew to Beirut, to visit his sick father. After staying there for several weeks, Jarrah visited Senguen in Germany for a few days before returning to the United States at the end of February. (Kean, 227, 2004).

One of the suicide bombers of the bombing attacks on July 6, 2003 in London and 9/11 “muscle hijacker,” Khalid al-Mihdhar, were married and had children. All of these behaviors are inconsistent with people who have antisocial personality disorders. After thirty years of research, Clark McCauley, and other experts assert that there is no definitive or consistent psychopathology that is shared by terrorists groups. While individual terrorists, such as the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, have displayed traits of anti-social personality disorder, when sought in an organization whose primary purpose is to commit acts terrorism to achieve a specific goal, these characteristics are not consistently found. In fact, “normal” people can become terrorists (Stout, 37, 2004). There is no single current psychopathology that has been identified that can explain terrorism.

There have been two specific correlations in terrorists that have been identified, however. Terrorists tend to share specific individual personality traits and there is a correlation between a disturbed home-life during the formative years and joining terrorist organizations. Growing up in a home without the closeness of family love and contact creates an identity disorder (Gillimore, 73, 2004). With no family support to provide meaning in life, compassion, shared love, guidance, or contextual history, these young people are left with no sense of communal or self-identity.

The basic human needs have been identified as meaning, identity/belonging or connectedness, material well-being, stimulation/creativity, self-actualization, self-determination, and security/safety. These needs are assumed to be universally inherent in human beings. . . People will engage in conflict and extreme violence to satisfy these basic needs. . . Needs are inextricably bound to identity and identity formation. When basic needs are not met, it leads to frustration and ultimately violence (Gillimore, 72, 2004).

According to Gillimore, lack of familial love and security leaves a void in personal identity. Low self-esteem and self-hatred are the most common results of poor home lives which lead to feelings of anger and rage. These emotions are manifested by the acting out of violence and aggression. “There is a strong relationship between shame and anger. It has been called the shame-rage spiral (Gillimore, 73, 2004). As a person commits acts of violence to compensate for the shame and anger they feel for not having a concrete definition of self, the violence itself begins to fill the identity void left by a lack of stable home-life. Lack of family connection that leads to no self-identity can be contributing factor to participation in terrorism.

PSYCHOLOGY OF CRISIS

The psychological aspects of Islamic terrorist groups are rooted in a belief that their world view is in crisis. Insult and frustration are felt because they feel that their values are not valued or respected. “Aggression, human conflict, and war are rooted, at least in part, in the threat posed by those with different beliefs and values to the psychological security and protection from anxiety that are provided by one’s own beliefs and values” (Stout, 5, 2004). As Western philosophies continue to encroach on traditional Muslim mores, faithful Islamic practitioners feel increasingly marginalized. Forces competing with traditional Islam can even arise from within the Muslim world itself as they are educated and influenced by the west.

He believes (Prince Faisal bin Abdullah of Saudi Arabia) that only professional, scientific governance-in a word, technocracy-can thread a rational course between the dangers of both religious fanaticism and mindless mass consumption.

Many in the rising generation of leaders share this conclusion . . . the Shura is arguably the most educated government assembly ever to exist. Of its 120 members, 77 hold doctorates or medical degrees; 87 are

graduates of major Western universities. Remarkably for Saudi Arabia, only 12 hold degrees in religious studies (Viviano, 36, 2003).

A motivation for terrorists to act in a violent manner is to defend their world view. When their ideology is threatened, and the world view of another culture appears to be replacing their own, it rouses passions in the heart of a terrorist that motives them to act in a manner that will defend their belief system. This also explains (in part) the Wahabbi revival of the twentieth century.

As humans, we know that we are finite and we seek to find meaning in our lives- a reason or justification for why we exist. As we face our own mortality, we find comfort in knowing who we are and what we stand for. The increase in influence from the West has left the Muslim world in a cultural flux, however. Cultural absolutes of what it means to be Muslim in the traditional Arab world are being questioned, leaving a societal identity crisis.

The talk was of hunting and camel-raising when I brought the subject up, the essential values of the Bedouin. "What matters most to us are your ancestors, who they were," one man said. "Without a tribe, a person is suspect."

The elder seated next to him took immediate issue. "No, I don't agree. The important thing is what you yourself do in this world, not who your grandparents were. It is you who must choose between good and evil" (Viviano, 18, 2003).

As the Muslim world struggles to define itself between Arab/Muslim tradition and Western thought, the Muslim self-identity weighs in the balance. Terrorists fear that the fundamentalist/traditional Muslim world is being overtaken by Western secularism and materialism.

The fundamentalist Muslim sees their world view as it should be being threatened by Western influence. The more other values are manifest in the Muslim world; the more fundamentalist Muslims see that their world view is threatened (McCauley, 47, 2004).

Fear of the end of traditional Islamic values and culture could be a motivation for Islamic terrorism.

The fear that leads to violence is the result of a progression of events, however. When personal identity, belonging, or connectedness is engrained as much in the individual as the group identity (such as Islam), there is extreme cohesiveness. Therefore, when the value structure of Islam is challenged, the individual whose whole identity is defined by Islam can feel threatened as well.

In other words, people with low-self esteem will not find it terribly difficult to commit immoral acts- because committing immoral acts is not dissonant with their self-concept (Aronson, 232-233, 1999).

With their world view challenged and currently being over-shadowed by Western secular values, a potential reason for Islamic terrorism is a culture-wide identity vacuum which has led to a societal self-esteem crisis.

This threatened world view is on a progression where people go from being concerned with a concept to the outright rejection of an ideal or entity. The first stage of this progression is called a crisis of confidence. In this stage, a person or group objects to specific aspects of a certain system but still supports the system as a whole. An example of this is interpretation of religion on a personal level (For the sake of an example, Protestant Christianity will be used). When a person identifies practices within their own denomination that either do not coincide with individual interpretation of Scripture or teachings that violate individual internalized values and mores cognitive dissonance occurs. By identifying areas of disagreement or inconsistency, more questions arise concerning previously unquestioned teachings practiced in their church. Ultimately the confidence a person once had in the teachings of their particular faith are called into

question. While the person still professes a belief in the teachings of Christianity, they may seek to attend a different denomination. In crisis of confidence, support of a larger system remains while details of may be called into question.

The second phase is “conflict of legitimacy.” In this segment of the progression, the group or individual loses confidence in the system or government and advances conflicting ideologies or cultural values. An example of this can be found in most Christian religious practices. While Catholic and Protestant sects agree on fundamental Christian principles, different organizations disagree on how scripture is interpreted and how Christianity should be practiced. What is challenged between these entities is the legitimacy of each opposing view’s right to say that their interpretation of scripture is correct and should be practiced over the others. Most of these groups work within commonly identified value structures to promote change that supports their religious world view without violence. There is a conflict in legitimacy, not a crisis of legitimacy.

Those who do not work within the law or established mores and resort to violence fall into the final category, “crisis of legitimacy”. Like terrorists, these people reject outright and purposely act against law or government to achieve their goals. When people arrive at the crisis of legitimacy stage, violence is a tool that is available to force change. An example of this can be found in the Suni and Shii sects of Islam. Neither group disputes the supremacy of Islam itself. What is challenged is the legitimacy of each opposing view’s right to say that their interpretation of how Islam should be practiced. This disagreement is so strong that both groups challenge the right of the other group to exist. When enough people reach the crisis of legitimacy stage, organizations for change can begin to take form. Motivation, then, can be on a group basis (McCauley, 41, 2004).

Group anger is derived from and overcomes individual interests. Cultural insult, anger, and frustration that potentially motivate Muslims could be based in fear of threat to state survival, fear for survival of their world view. In fact, statistical data supports the assertion that the Islam Civilization, as a whole, has a low tolerance for difference of interpretation of Islamic practices as well as intolerance of world views other than Islam.

Ethnopolitical conflicts, 1993-1994			
	Intracivilization	Intercivilization	Total
Islam	11	15	26
Others	9	5	14
Total	20	20	40

* Does not include tribal conflicts

Three different compilations of data thus yield the same conclusion: in the early 1990's Muslims were engaged in more intergroup violence than were non-Muslims. . . Islam's borders are bloody, and so are its innards (Huntington, 257-258, 1996).

Muslim against Muslim violence accounted for 27.5% of the ethnopolitical conflicts in 1993 and 1994 and Muslims versus non-Muslim violence accounted for 37.5% for the same years. Of all the ethnopolitical conflicts in 1993-1994, Islam was involved in 65%. The remaining 35% of conflicts is shared between the seven other global civilizations which are Western, African, Sinic, Hindu, Latin American, and Orthodox. When a person or a civilization reaches the point where they feel that another group no longer has a legitimate reason to exist- crisis of legitimacy- violence often breaks out in an effort to eradicate those who do not share the same values.

Violence as a means of exterminating conflicting values is not the only possible explanation for terrorism, however. Aggression in the form of terrorism can also be explained by economic frustration. As documented in history, when the Muslim world failed to modernize with the Western world, economies faltered. This is still witnessed today in many Muslim states. Resource scarcity that drove a trade-based economy during the advent of Islam over an agrarian based economy still exists today. Of the 192 states in the world, 46 claim Islam as their dominant religion. Of these states, 31 have republican or democratic forms of government, 5 are military regimes, 8 are monarchies, one is a theocracy, and one has no discernable form of government at this time. Also, 24 of these states include religious Islamic law in their judicial systems (reference table 2).

Social psychological factors, such as group dynamics, play a critical role in determining participation in a group as well. Terrorist organizations are no different. Kinder, in the *Handbook of Social Psychology* maintains that “opinions are only weakly predicted by narrow self-interest and more strongly predicted by group interest” (Stout, 40, 2004). People will draw from their personal beliefs and opinions more often from what other people think rather than their own initial reaction. As mentioned above, when a young Palestinian is approached by a terrorist group and offered thousands of dollars to be a suicide terrorist, the money he is offered will be enough to lift his family out of abject poverty, including support for parents and aged relatives and dowries for the siblings of the “martyrs”. In collectivistic societies, such as the Arab world, placing the needs of the family over individual needs and desires is strongly encouraged and widely practiced. Providing the means for continued family survival in a collective society can

be a strong motivating factor for individuals to join a terrorist organization. Social factors, such as a collectivist society, can contribute to participation in terrorism.

THE CULT OF TERRORISM

Indoctrination

Religious cults and Islamic terrorist groups share many similarities beyond religion. Though there is no specific psychopathology that determines mental illness in the members of cults and terrorists, there are striking similarities between the two in recruitment techniques and the personalities shared between the leaders of these groups and their followers. These shared characteristics between terrorist organizations and religious cults could shed light upon why terrorists are willing to kill themselves and others.

When persons or an organization seek to have people embrace their ideals or philosophies, there is a progression of four stages that often takes place that changes a person's outlook from old values or opinions to new ones (Aronson, 33-39, 1999). When a person's behavior is motivated by the promise of a reward or the threat of punishment, it is typically a temporary behavior. This is compliance and external in origin.

First, in the softening-up stage, recruits may be physically separated from their normal environment. During meetings, which might include group meals and weekend retreats, recruits are showered with attention and praise from cult members, a technique referred to as "love bombing" (Gass and Seiter, 133, 2003).

Identification is the second stage in which behavior changes in response to the social influence of an individual or group. Motivation for this stage in relationship grows from the desire of one person to please another person or a group. When the values and beliefs of others have been internalized and desires shift from wanting to please to wanting to be

like the influencer(s), the next phase, identification, is complete. The likelihood that a permanent (permanence) change in values will occur when an “individual makes a firm commitment to continue to interact with the person or group of people that induced the original act of compliance (Aronson, 39, 1999).

Regardless of the motivation behind the behavior, once a person makes a commitment to do something, even something small, it becomes easier to convince them to make larger and larger commitments and to persuade them of the worthiness of the goal or organization. This is a persuasion technique called foot in the door.

As an explanation for the foot in the door effect, self-perception theory says this: When you agree to comply with a small request, you see yourself as an altruistic person who is likely to help. Once you form that impression, you are motivated to behave in a manner consistent with that impression. Thus, when a larger request is made, you are more easily persuaded (Gass & Seiter, 221, 2003).

There are several aspects that make foot in the door an excellent recruitment tool for cults and terrorist organizations as well as keeping members in the organizations. Foot in the door technique employs several psychological triggers that elicit not only initial compliance to a request, but also sets the stage for continued and increased compliance.

Initially, requests should be small in foot in the door technique. By keeping the magnitude of the initial request small enough so that the participant is comfortable with complying with the request with little to no cognitive dissonance, the person gets needed positive reinforcement for doing what the requestor has asked and internalizes the outcome as a positive connection between them and the person/organization they complied to. According to this theory; “people come to know about their attitudes, emotions, and other internal states by inferring them from their own behavior” (Gass and

Seiter, 220, 2003). By complying to even small requests, people begin to rationalize their behaviors as their own internal preferences more than that of the external requestor.

Next, is the “pro-socialness” of complying with the request. When the requestor frames the request in a manner that causes the complier to believe that he is meeting the needs of others, he is more likely to comply with the request. This could be as simple as telling a young Muslim that he is helping to free himself and his family from economic and spiritual oppression if they comply by becoming a terrorist. This aspect of the foot in the door technique elevates a cause on a moral level.

Note that it is attachment to a view of what Muslims should be and fear for the future of Muslims that are the emotional foundations of the terrorists. They do not begin from hatred of the West, but from love of their own group and culture that they see in danger of extinction from the power of the West (McCauley, 47, 2004).

The requestor is not asking the person to comply with his request for selfish reasons, but for altruistic reasons. When a person sees himself as the savior of others rather than meeting selfish needs, they are more likely to comply with a request.

Another potential tool of the foot in the door technique is selecting the correct requestor. To increase compliance, the legitimacy of the requestor must be secure. The familiarity, credibility, perceived trustworthiness, attractiveness, expertise, and ability to communicate persuasively (logically and emotionally) of the requestor increases the likelihood that there will be compliance (Aronson, 73-83, 1999). If the requestor is a person whom the potential recruit admires or respects, such as an imam or teacher of Islam, the recruit will be more likely to comply with the request and thus make the first step toward making an emotional commitment to the requestor’s cause.

Labeling is another way that foot in the door technique is so successful in gaining compliance to requests. When a person complies with the request of another, he receives praise or thanks from the requestor and the requestor ascribes a positive label to that person such as, "You are a caring person to do that for our worthy cause," In this situation, the requestor is manipulating the situation by labeling and linking together the desired character traits of the person such as caring and his cause as worthy. The positive personal affirmation, which the compliant person wants to believe, is associated with the positive reference to the requestor's cause and increases the likelihood that the complier will increasingly support the requestor's cause.

Lastly, preference for personal consistency is another tool of the foot in the door technique, as people like to think that their attitudes and behaviors are consistent and logical. The higher the personal need for consistency, the higher the likelihood that they will be motivated to agree to a second request (Gass & Seiter, 233, 2003). Once a request is complied with, a person is more likely to commit to doing subsequent tasks to see himself as consistent.

The person being manipulated into incrementally giving more and more must work harder justify his increased commitment to ease and inner conflict (cognitive dissonance) that may arise from making commitments that do not follow logic or that he knows do not follow their value system. The harder a person must work to maintain a positive self-image, the more committed he is to the justness of his cause. Thus, the cycle is perpetuated as people convince themselves that what they are being asked to do is a good thing and they are good for doing it.

Another similarity between cult and terrorist organization is the profiles of their leaders. Leaders of religious cults are strong, charismatic, central leaders with a firm hierarchy of a selected few. These people are master manipulators using cognitive dissonance and foot-in-door techniques to recruit followers. Men like James Jones of the massacre at Jonestown, Guyana, David Koresh of the Branch Davidians, and Marshall Applewhite of the Heaven's Gate suicides all incrementally gained the trust and material goods of their followers.

Everyone was aware of the potential risk. Koresh's paranoia about the government as the agent of Satan didn't help matters, because the ATF's advance only proved the truth of his prophecies: they would be attacked by the Babylonians (Ramsland, 2005).

What kind of person is likely to be a leader of a terrorist group? Someone who scores high on the PWA and social dominance orientation scales. These people will most likely be highly prejudiced, have a high need for power, possess a strong drive to dominate others, be reactionary or revolutionary, and more conscious of image than substance.

When recruiting new members into terrorist organizations, leaders use identical techniques as cult leaders. Leaders look for key indicators to determine if a person will make a good or bad cult member (McCauley, 45, 2004). Individuals with strong family or social ties make poor cult members and are more likely to leave. The ideal candidate is one who is isolated. As humans are social, we seek to identify ourselves with groups that we respect and want to emulate. If a person has a powerful support group outside of the cult, the power the cult has over the individual will likely be much less. A person who has little to no support-structure in their lives, as young people with poor family relations

mentioned above, is more apt to quickly identify with the values of the group, giving the group power over their decisions.

Another factor is cult recruiters seek out those who have no clear direction in life. Those who are purposeful and focused are less malleable to the cult values and mentality. A person who has no direction in life is more apt to become more committed to the cause that the group has organized to achieve (McCauley, 49, 2004). Because the group schema fills the void in self-identity, once internalized, the person will be reticent to abandon their new schema. To put it in the terms of Dr.'s Timothy Hulsey and Christopher Frost, when a person who has no foundational story and allows the story of others to become their own, they rigidly cling to it when challenged.

. . . where persons are unable to move beyond the story, they are more likely to become the blindly obedient, fanatical types who can seamlessly harm others in the service of their myth (Hulsey & Frost, 89, 2005).

With attention to moral justification high, emotional arousal high, and attention to what is being done in the moment of defensive response low, the formula for moral cruelty is entirely in place (Hulsey & Frost, 99, 2005).

Understanding this, terrorist leaders can recruit people who will go to great lengths to defend the meaning that has just been added to their lives.

Group values are intensely focused in the individual within a group setting. The closer the group, the higher the collective values of the group hold over the individual. Terrorist groups are no different. Connections to competing groups disappear or diminish as the individual progressively identifies with one particular organization and their cause. This is demonstrated in the biographies of Saeed al-Ghamdi and Ahmed Ibrahim al-Haznawi, 9/11 terrorists on United flight 93.

Al-Ghamdi is said to have come from a town called Abha. He did not have a college degree. He may have been in contact with other future hijackers as early as 1999. Al Ghamdi spent time in al Qasim province, Saudi Arabia where he transferred to college but soon dropped out and ceased contact with his family. While there he probably associated with the radical Saudi cleric named Sulayman al Alwan, as several other future hijackers did. ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saeed al-Ghamdi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saeed_al-Ghamdi)).

Al-Haznawi announced he was leaving his family in 1999 to help fight in Chechnya, although his father forbade him. His father and brother Abdul Rahman Al-Haznawi reportedly last heard from him in late 2000, after he made references to training in Afghanistan. ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed Ibrahim al-Haznawi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ahmed_Ibrahim_al-Haznawi))

The group becomes family and previous relationships diminish. The power of the group over the individual extends to personal and moral decisions. As commitment to the group increases, individual values and mores give way to the values of the group.

As the values of the faction become more homogenized, group extremity shift occurs (McCauley, 48, 2004). As individual members hear arguments and begin to agree with them, the intensity of the argument increases and becomes more and more extreme as group consensus emerges. A contributor to this phenomenon is social comparison. Committed members of the group compete for status within the group. As value-statements are made that have group support, those who are vying for leadership positions do not want to “fall behind” letting it be known that they also hold the same position and will often “one-up” the original statement by taking it a step further in intensity. When this dynamic is present, it moves consensus, group-think, and the level of extremity of the positions of the group to a higher, more acute level. This escalation of ideals, if not checked, can lead to violence sanctioned and justified by the group.

The overall psychology of the terrorist members is generally normal; what is abnormal is the intensity of the commitment between comrades (fundamentalism) in

terrorist groups and cults in comparison to other groups. To maintain this cohesiveness in the terrorist group over time and distance, like the 9/11 terrorists, individual terrorists sever family ties, do not build new relationships in their new surroundings, are encouraged to maintain relationships with fellow terrorists, and stress the ideology of the cause as more important than individual relationships and sacrifices (McCauley, 45, 2004). The group theory of social psychology provides a potential explanation of the extreme measure and level of commitment to terrorism by Muslims.

CHAPTER V

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY APPLIED TO ISLAM

When applying psychological theories of violence to the specifics of Islamic terrorism, no single causal theory emerges. For each theory applied to Islamic terrorism that could explain the reasons for violent behavior, an example can be demonstrated that is contrary to the theory. As individual theories overlap onto others, the enigmatic nature of Islamic terrorism demonstrates the complexity of this international dilemma.

Religion

While not all terrorist organizations are religious in nature, it is a defining characteristic. Many believe that religion is the primary base for Islamic terrorism. With the Arab world being overwhelmingly Muslim and the West having been formerly dominated by various forms of Christianity, but whose hallmarks are now secularism and materialism, the question arises if competing theologies alone comprise the majority of the causes of Islamic terrorism. Author Mary Habeck and Harvard Professor, Samuel Huntington, believe that Islam is much broader than just religious ideology, however. They see Islam as more than a religious adherent, but as an enduring global civilizations whose foundations

rest on the Muslim faith. He also asserts that the clash between Islam and the West is more than religion but a clash of civilizations.

In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against (Huntington, 21, 1996).

Future conflicts will be sparked by cultural factors rather than economics or ideology. And the most dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the fault lines between civilizations (Huntington, 28, 1996).

Huntington defines civilizational fault lines as geographic areas that bridge two different civilizations. Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Ukraine, Indonesia, China, the Phillipines, Isreal, Nigeria, Sudan, and India are among the states that Huntington has identified as existing along fault lines. Muslims assert that Islam is more than a religion as well, and their faith encompasses every part of daily life. "Islam for us is not just a religion but a way of life. We Saudis want to modernize, but not necessarily Westernize" –Eisuke Sakakibara (Huntington, 110, 1996).

. . .this marvelous civilization was magnificent, at its height many centuries ago. This marvelous civilization was not an 'Arabic civilization' even for a single day; it was purely an 'Islamic civilization.' It was never a nationality but always a community of belief –Sayyid Qutb (Berman 78, 2003).

Our task in general is to stand against the flood of modernist civilization overflowing from the swamp of materialistic and sinful

desires. This flood has swept the Muslim nation away from the Prophet's leadership and Qur'anic guidance and deprived the world of its guiding light. Western secularism moved into a Muslim world already estranged from its Qur'anic roots, and delayed its advancement for centuries, and will continue to do so until we drive it from our lands. Moreover, we will not stop at this point, but will pursue this evil force to its own lands, invade its Western heartland, and struggle to overcome it until all the world shouts by the name of the Prophet and the teaching of Islam spread throughout the world. Only then will Muslims achieve their fundamental goal, and there will be no more "persecution" and all religion will be exclusively for Allah –Hasan al-Banna (Habeck, 31-32, 2006).

Huntington's assertion that Islamic religious resurgence is a vehicle that has been used to resist Western influence is reinforced by the statements of Muslim leaders.

More broadly, the religious resurgence throughout the [Arab] world is a reaction against secularism, moral relativism, and self-indulgence, and a reaffirmation of the values of order, discipline, work, mutual help, and human solidarity (Huntington, 98, 1996).

Muslim and terrorist leaders use Islam as a rallying point to unite the Muslim Arab world. "Muslims have traditionally divided the world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harab- the abode of peace and the abode of war" (Huntington, 32, 1996). Habeck supports this position as she writes, "To jihadis, the aggression of the unbelievers, their ideological assault, and the military conflicts that they have begun, justify open warfare with them (Habeck, 107, 2006). Though a fundamental part of the Arab world that touches every level of Arab society, Huntington and Habeck see the role of religion as a part of the civilizational conflict between the Arab world and the West.

Paul Berman is not so quick to diminish spiritual matters in the conflict between the Muslim world and the West, however. The twentieth century

fundamentalist Islamic revival brought a puritanical world view to many Muslim states that had an effect on how these states saw the western world. In his writings, Sayyid Qutb observed the following about the West:

“ . . . even in the most affluent and materially advanced of Western societies” - he cited the United States and Sweden - people lead “the most miserable lives. They have lost touch with their own souls” - Sayyid Qutb. He admired economic productivity and scientific knowledge and was not an anti-modernist, . . . (Berman, 69, 2003).

Qutb and his followers found the West’s emphasis on spirituality while ignoring the Mosaic code, secularization of its governmental bodies, sexual freedom, and shallowness of commitment to spiritual matters (materialism) a hideous schizophrenia that could not be diplomatically resolved (Berman, 78-89, 2003). To followers of fundamentalist Islamic beliefs, western values are repugnant.

Religious motivation appears to have played some part in the 9/11 attacks. Mohammed Atta, pilot of the first plane to hit the twin towers in New York, expressed disdain for Israel and the U.S. for supporting Israel. Nine other 9/11 terrorists fought in wars that pitted Islam against other philosophies. Also found among Atta’s possessions was an alleged instruction note and prayer direction for “The last night” before 9/11, which verified the spiritual aspect of their mission. After analyzing the note, John Vohl of Georgetown University Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding said of the note:

Except for the section that talks about going into a plane and the knives, virtually everything else you could find in some medieval devotional manual . . . it seems to be written by a person who lives in a devotional environment that involves a significant amount of memorized material (Woodward, 2001).

This same note was found in the wreckage from United flight 93 in Pennsylvania indicating that the same instruction note was given to many or all of the 9/11 terrorists. Also supporting the theory that religious motivation played a part in the 9/11 terrorist attack is a suicide video from 9/11 terrorist, Abdulaziz al-Omari. In this video al-Omari stated, "I am writing this with my full conscience and I am writing this in expectation of the end, which is near. . . God praise everybody who trained and helped me, namely the leader Sheik Osama bin Laden"

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdulaziz_Alomari). In it, he talked about his plans to bring the "bloodied message" to America and his praise of Allah. Other Anti-American sentiments and pro-Islamic faith statements were also spoken in the suicide videos of Ahmed Ibrahim A. Alhaznawi and Saeed al-Ghamdi.

Al-Ghamdi was from the al Bahah province of Saudi Arabia, an isolated and underdeveloped area, and shared the same tribal affiliation with fellow hijackers Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Hamza al-Ghamdi, and Ahmed al-Haznawi. This group is noted as being some of the more religiously observant of the hijackers.

Ahmed_al-Nami served as a muezzin (calls Muslims to prayers) at the Seqeley mosque after having reportedly become very religious sometime in early 1999. He was also enrolled in the King Khaled University at Abha to study Sharia ("In the Islamic state Sharia governs both the public and private lives of those living within the state. Sharia governs many aspects of day-to-day life; politics, economics, banking, business law, contract law, and social issues" (wikipedia, 2006). The four reportedly pledge themselves to Jihad in the spring of 2000 (wikipedia, 2006). Ziad Samir Jarrah, however, appeared to live a semi-secular

lifestyle having been born to marginally muslim parents, educated Catholic, had a live-in girlfriend, and was seen at bars and beach parties (wikipedia, 2006).

Scholars do not deny that pure religion plays a role in Islamic terrorism. The question is the magnitude that religion plays in compelling people to commit these acts of violence. To some it appears to a primary motivator, to others it is only partial.

In the interest of intellectual fairness, it is appropriate to mention that fundamentalist Islam does not represent all of the modern Muslim world. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, many “moderate” Muslims asserted that the actions of the terrorists did not represent the Islam that they practiced and claimed that their religion was being hijacked by fundamentalist Islam. Many Muslim scholars living within the Muslim world believe that “jihad is understood by present-day Muslims to refer to a specific time and place during Muhammad’s mission, as time that has come and gone” (Habeck, 108, 2006). This same group believes that a “just war” is only a defensive war and that jihadis have subverted the modern understanding of what a jihad is. Even with “creative” definitions of a just defensive war, Habeck suggests that the lack of an overwhelming majority of Muslims joining the jihadis cause suggests that the extremist Muslims are failing to win their argument within their own faith. Even so, though many non-fundamentalist Muslims denounced the terrorist attack of 9/11, there is still reluctance to recognize the role Islamic dogma played in the attack among moderate Muslims. Because of this, Muslim commentator, Ziauddin Sardar commented:

Muslims everywhere are in a deep state of denial. From Egypt to Malaysia, there is an aversion to seeing terrorism as a Muslim problem and a Muslim responsibility. . . . Terrorism is a Muslim problem. . . Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Algeria, Bangladesh,

Lebanon, Iran- there is hardly a Muslim country that is not plagued by terrorism.

. . . Muslims have stubbornly refused to see terrorism as an internal problem. While the Muslim world has suffered, they have blamed everyone but themselves. It is always, 'the West,' or the CIA, or "the Indians,' or 'the Zionists' hatching yet another conspiracy. This state of denial means Muslims are ill-equipped to deal with problems of endemic terrorism (Ziauddin, The Observer, 21 October, 2001).

Many Muslims assert that the Islam they practice and the Qur'an they read does not endorse or justify terrorism

The word "jihad" has become synonymous with terrorism in a post 9/11 world. Groups like al-Qaida have used the term jihad to describe their terrorist acts. The term jihad has been used since the days of Muhammad to which Muhammad is purported to have claimed that the greater jihad is "the struggle within one's soul (Habeck, 109, 2006). Moderate Muslims claim that the inner struggle is what the original meaning of jihad was and those who use jihad to justify terrorism ignore "jihad fi sabil Allah" (the struggle in the cause of God) especially when other religious duties such as prayer, tithing, fasting and the hajj take a subjugated role to warfare.

The main difference between jihadis and other Islamists is the extremists' commitment to the violent overthrow of the existing international system and its replacement by an all-encompassing Islamic state. To justify their resort to violence, they define "jihad" (a term that can mean an internal struggle to please God as well as an external battle to open countries to the call of Islam) as fighting alone (Habeck, 4-5, 2006).

While the motivation for using religion (Islam) as a primary cause for the justification of violence or is only a tool used by leaders with other agendas may be questioned, there is ample evidence from the actual jihadists (like the 9/11

terrorists) to support the position that the role of religious ideology in the minds of Islamic terrorists is critical.

Historical Conflict

Historical evidence clearly shows that there have been hostilities between Islam and the West for over 1400 years. As two competing and proselyting ideologies vie for dominance, a millennia-long conflict has emerged. Though the titles of the conflicts have changed, the Crusades, the Ottomans, colonial powers, and Israel/Palestinians; the roots of these clashes have not changed- Islam versus the West. The difference in perspective between Islam and the West, from a historical point of view, is that these conflicts have been primarily fought in the Muslim world and not in the West. This opens the door to a more negative Muslim cultural memory.

A distinction between the Muslim world and the West is cultural memory. Offenses against Islam that date back to the Crusades are still remembered and resented by the Arab world. In contrast, World War II, though it occurred less than a century ago, is little more than a historical fact to most Americans and does not elicit a culture-wide hatred toward any culture or state.

The memory of the Christian Crusades to recover the Holy Land for the usage of Christian pilgrims and the defeat of Islam at Lepanto and Tours as well as the loss of Spain by the end of the 15th century. This memory has at least two dimensions. Muslims remember with anger that the Crusades were an attempt to undo the military, social, and religious conquest of the Holy Land. . . It is a further matter of pride that Islam at that time comprised a group of related cultures which were very advanced in the arts, architecture, the sciences, and medicine in comparison to Christian Europe. The West derived a great deal of learning from Islam

during this period. Of course the West expanded upon this knowledge and it atrophied among the Muslims. This also irks Muslims (Hippler, 3, 2004).

Adding to the resentment of the historical military aggression against Muslims is the frustration and anger for losing economic dominance as well. (As an aside, many non-Muslim scholars dispute Islam's claim that they were advanced in comparison. Their argument is founded in the assertion that Islam gained knowledge through assimilation of cultures not through research and development.) A by-product of a fourteen hundred year clash with Islam mostly in the Muslim world is that a culture of hatred that becomes ingrained in cultural identity. As conflicts have occurred on the same lands and involving the same families; conflict, loss, and hatred take on a personal dimension. The victim mentality thus infects every level of society as it unites against a single culprit-the West.

When a person or group either perceives themselves or are an actual victim of a crime or wrong-doing, their perception of self-power has been compromised. Victims of a crime feel that their assailants have violated them. In a desire to regain their self-image of power and control over their lives, violence may be used. Mimetic desire is the desire of people to imitate the actions of others (Gallimore, 70, 2004). In this manner, victims feel justified to model the violence that the aggressor used against them to regain their own sense of power. By reciprocating violence on the perpetrator, victims seek to rid themselves of shame, guilt, helplessness, and vulnerability. If a person lives in a culture that has a victim mentality, retributive violence can become normalized at the societal level

(Gallimore, 74, 2004). As an individual, group, or society identity needs are fundamental to the definition of self and are objects of mimetic desire. These include meaning in life, justice, self-esteem, recognition, dignity, and respect of others (Gallimore, 72, 2004). When these needs are not met, emotional stability and healthy psychological functioning are more difficult to achieve.

Applying this psychological theory, Islamic terrorists may see themselves as acting on behalf of their civilization in an effort to right wrongs. To right the loss of life and military embarrassment from historical armed conflict, targets in the West are chosen, such as the Pentagon, to regain their own perception of self-esteem and power and to lessen their feelings of vulnerability. Hitting the Twin Towers in New York, the economic center of the U.S., may have been chosen in symbolic response to the Muslim world losing economic prominence during the Industrial revolution.

Social theorists of conflict postulate that conflict is a natural result of human events that is neither good nor bad. When a person is in conflict and is profoundly impacted by its events, it is impossible for that person not to assign moral value to it. Therefore, understanding the events in a conflict and the perceptions of each party is critical to diplomatic success. While knowing the events that lead to conflict are imperative, the psychology behind victimization, justification, lost trust, ethnic mistrust, and the like must be comprehended and addressed for conflict resolution and the actors to move on and build/rebuild a new, peaceful future. When violence is embedded in a cultural on a generational

level, it is often incorporated into personal identity and difficult to overcome.

Sources of conflict can be competition, class, religious, security, fears, and values.

“Typically rooted conflicts,” which are not based on interests that are negotiable, but on underlying needs that cannot be compromised. The most conspicuous of these are violent conflicts between communities and nations of the preservation of cultures, values, and needs for identity. Traditional methods of conflict management, which deal only with surface issues, simply suppress underlying needs and help lay the seeds for more intense conflicts in the future (Langholtz, 102, 2004).

This is directly applicable to the conflicts between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

Both groups are competing for the most foundational human needs. This is a primary reason why peace negotiations in the past twenty years have failed.

Agreements are made by removed, wealthy high-level dignitaries. The signing of a piece of paper on another continent does not solve the Jewish people's need to preserve a homeland or the Palestinian people's need to regain their properties, homes, and lives. When these types of accords are signed, it has no meaning to the people and as time has proved, a single bullet can completely annul the power of ink on a page.

Israel

The foundation of a Jewish state within the Arab world has been a source of conflict for over fifty years. The first Islamic international terrorist strike was aimed at Israel through its athletes at the 1972 Olympics. Many Arab states as well as non-governmental organizations, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), have been openly hostile toward the continued existence of Israel and actively resisted its formation. In fact the terrorist organization Hamas

exists to extricate the state Israel from existence. The existence of an Israeli state has been mentioned in incidents of Muslim-based international terrorism, and is the primary impetus for organizations like the PLO. For organizations such as the PLO, Hamas, and the PIJ (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) Fathi Shqaqi faction, the removal of an Israeli state from the Arab world is the primary focus of their existence.

The PIJ Fathi Shqaqi faction has in recent years become the most prominent Palestinian terrorist group to adopt the Islamic Jihad ideology. It views Israel, the “Zionist Jewish entity,” as the main enemy of the Muslim Brothers and the first target for destruction. Thus, it calls for an Islamic armed struggle and strives for the liberation of all of Palestine. This is to be accomplished by guerrilla groups, led by a revolutionary vanguard, which carry out terrorist attacks aimed at weakening Israel. Its militants see themselves as those who lay the groundwork for the day when the great Islamic Arabic army will be able to destroy Israel in a military confrontation (ITC, 2006).

Terrorist attacks, however, are directed at Israel and remain in that region.

For international terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, Israel is one of a list of many grievances as to why they employ violence against the West. In a September 24, 2002 article in the British newspaper, *The Observer*, Osama Bin Laden addressed America’s question, “Why are we fighting and opposing you?” In this letter, Bin Laden cites seven reasons why Islam attacked America. Among them are stealing resources, supporting Russia as they attacked Chechnya, supporting an Israeli state and stealing Arab land, using violence against them on a daily basis, colonial occupation, and humiliations at the hands of governments. The existence of an Israeli state, though not the only grievance listed, is pre-eminent and also alluded to other Muslim grievances.

(1) Because you attacked us and continue to attack us.

a) You attacked us in Palestine:

- (i) Palestine, which has sunk under military occupation for more than 80 years. The British handed over Palestine, with your help and your support, to the Jews, who have occupied it for more than 50 years; years overflowing with oppression, tyranny, crimes, killing, expulsion, destruction and devastation. The creation and continuation of Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you are the leaders of its criminals. And of course there is no need to explain and prove the degree of American support for Israel. The creation of Israel is a crime which must be erased. Each and every person whose hands have become polluted in the contribution towards this crime must pay its price, and pay for it heavily (Bin Laden, Observer Worldview, 24 November, 2002).

In addition to offenses against the Muslim world, Bin Laden lists the following attributes of the American culture which he finds repugnant: the U.S. form of government (as the American people choose their government they are not innocent of the atrocities the government partakes in), fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling, trading with interest, separation of religion and politics, immorality in the name of personal freedom, not punishing Bill Clinton for acts in the Oval office, exploitation of the traditional role of women, using sex as a marketing tool, spreaders of the AIDS virus, polluters of the environment, and materialism. In his letter, Bin Laden named the existence of Israel among a long, very extensive, list of offenses against the Muslim world, and criticisms of the American culture that justified the 9/11 attack and other strikes against U.S. targets.

Mohammed Atta, the alleged leader of the 9/11 terrorist attacks cited opposition to the existence of Israel prior to 9/11 and named the U.S. as an ally and stooge of Israel. The 9/11 Commission Report states that "In his interactions with other students [in Germany], Atta voiced virulently anti-Semitic and anti-American opinions, ranging from condemnations of what he described as a global Jewish movement centered in New York City that supposedly controlled the financial world and the media, Saeed al-Ghamdi', 9/11 terrorist on United flight 93 left a suicide note that specifically denounced the United States as well.

Economics

Some maintain that the disparity between the "haves and have not's" is exploited to recruit people. This premise maintains that terrorist leaders show how the people have been economically depressed by the West and that terrorism is the way to rectify the injustice (Stout, 1- 4, 2004). This theory encompasses the cultural memory hypothesis mention earlier as well. When economically disadvantaged individuals join organizations, like terrorist organizations to right supposed injustices against themselves and others, they justify their actions by fighting for what they perceive as a noble cause. Current and past economic vengeance is another potential cause of Islamic Terrorism.

Of the one hundred ninety-one states that are members of the United Nations, forty-six claim Islam as their dominant religion either by simple majority or a plurality (in the case of two states) (reference table 2). Of these states, one hundred thirty-two track poverty rates (United Arab Emirates, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Monaco, Libya, Bahrain, and Iraq are the Muslim states that

do not track poverty rates). The World Bank defines the poverty rate by determining the cost that “is just sufficient to meet a predetermined food energy requirements” in each state. Of the states that track poverty statistics, the global mean is 36.7% of all people live at or below the poverty level for the state that they live in (reference table 3). Of the states that claim Islam as their dominant religion, the mean is 41.7% (reference table 3) and many of these states are not tracked. Furthermore, life expectancy rates in the Muslim world are a little more than three years less than the global average, the unemployment rate is five percentage points higher in the Muslim world than the global average, and there is a fourteen percent negative difference in Muslim literacy rates compared to the global rate (reference table 3).

World literacy:

Definition: age 15 and over can read and write

total population: 82%

male: 87%

female: 77%

note: over two-thirds of the world's 785 million illiterate adults are found in only eight countries (India, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Egypt); of all the illiterate adults in the world, two-thirds are women; extremely low literacy rates are concentrated in three regions, South and West Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Arab states, where around one-third of the men and half of all women are illiterate (2005 est.) (CIA Factbook, 2006).

There is a quantifiable difference in the life expectancy, poverty level, and literacy rates of the Muslim World in comparison to global averages. Regardless of actual causation, these statistics can be used to support the existing supposition that economic inequality in the Muslim world in comparison to the West and the

rest of the globe is due to economic domination. This assumption can be another contributing factor in the justification of Islamic terrorism.

The 9/11 attackers were different from other Islamic terrorist organizations, like the PLO, however. The Palestinian terrorists are typically young, male, poor, undereducated, and underemployed. Their motivation to participate in terrorism is to provide money to support their extended families (Stout, 39-40, 2004). Because of this, it is easy to characterize all Islamic terrorists as frustrated by poverty and hopelessness with frustration being the motivator of anger and violence. Approximately half of the 9/11 attackers, however, were college educated to some extent, their families were considered middle class, had jobs including professionals, and were different from Palestinian terrorists. Mohammed Atta, the alleged leader of the 9/11 attacks, was an architect by trade and his father was a lawyer. Other 9/11 terrorists had training in law, aerospace engineering, economics, and urban planning with fathers in law, business, clergy, farming, and diplomacy. Eight were listed as Al-Qaeda veterans who had fought in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Sudan with no education or had dropped out of high school to fight (reference table 4). Many of the terrorists were educated abroad with Germany and the U.S. being the most common host countries.

Though the 9/11 terrorists showed different demographic information than Palestinian terrorists, economic resentment still existed. Ahmed Ibrahim A. Alhaznawi — one of four hijackers on United Airlines flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania, was reportedly to have stated the following at an al-Jazeera

interview: "The time of humiliation and subjugation is over. It is time we kill the Americans in their heartland, among their children, and next to their forces and intelligence" (El Deeb, 2002). Saeed al-Ghamdi, also on United Airlines flight 93, said in his suicide video that he would "deliver a message that the time of oppression and enslavement is over, a message written in blood" (Brown, 2003). Economic resentment is one of many possible motivations for Islamic terrorism.

CHAPTER VI

THE THEORETICAL APPLICATION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO DIPLOMACY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

With the causes of Islamic terrorism being enigmatic and multiple, working toward an enduring solution should be interdisciplinary. In the past, states have primarily relied on political/diplomatic tools used to achieve an end to Islamic terrorism. In the diplomatic model decisions typically flow from the heads of states to the leads of departments or ministries and back. Other non-governmental entities, such as the United Nations, play roles that can increase the success of diplomatic efforts short-term. The use of psychology, however, has played a minimal role. This section will examine the actions of the states and the potential application of psychology as a tool to the diplomatic environment.

A recent trend in diplomacy is the increased active involvement by heads of state. This was evidenced by multiple communications from the Truman through the Johnson administrations to leaders in the Middle East. Even more recently, though, Presidents Ford and Clinton personally hosted summits with the Prime Ministers of Israel and PLO leader, Yasser Arafat. While this quickens the process as there is less of a communication ladder to relay offers and make state policy, it makes enduring peace

more difficult to attain. The agreement of a few of the highest level does nothing to change the hearts and minds of the millions of people within their jurisdictions. As history has shown it takes only one bullet from a few malcontents' guns to unravel diplomatic efforts. This has been shown with the assassinations of Anwar Sadat, and Yitzhak Rabin. Though these leaders sought peace, a single bullet derailed the peace process. Also, the primary use of heads of state minimizes the contribution lower-level bureaucrats can give in the long-term peace process. Diplomats and other governmental bureaucrats will still be part of the government after the Presidents, Foreign Ministers, and Prime Ministers have left and will potentially fill some of those lead positions in time. If these lower-level bureaucrats are left out of the process, they will not have built the personal relationships with different colleagues that can have a long-term peace benefit. Social psychology principles assert that familiarity is a key component in persuasion. The familiar people are with each other, the more likely they are to like and trust each other. Allowing lower-level officials to work together builds a level of familiarity and legitimacy, over time, that could have more positive long-term outcomes as these players progress up the diplomatic chain.

Another potential problem with the increased use of heads of state is diplomatic training. While these leaders obviously have diplomatic skills, it is only a small part of their functions and most likely they have no formal training in diplomacy. Foreign Service members and diplomats must go through extensive diplomatic training before they are sent to represent the U.S. in foreign states. Each person must also participate in continuing education programs while in the field. The Foreign Service Institute is a branch of the U.S. State Department and is where all diplomats and ambassadors receive

their diplomatic training. Programs range from day-length seminars to 2-year programs. These programs "are designed to promote successful performance in each professional assignment, to ease the adjustment to other countries and cultures, and to enhance the leadership and management capabilities of the U.S. foreign affairs community" (<http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/>). Also of benefit, is that diplomacy has five different career tracks; management, consular, economic, political, and public diplomacy. Each of these tracks focuses on a different function of diplomacy, providing five different ways that diplomats can engage in multi-level diplomacy (discussed later) that could greatly enhance the chances of lasting peace in the Middle East. Greater use of the whole diplomatic structure that is already available to in the peace negotiation process would increase the likelihood of achieving enduring peace.

The international forum of diplomatic training has identified a problem in diplomatic procedures between the Arab world and the West, however. Over time, the West has developed a diplomatic infrastructure which gives its players a common understanding and foundation to work from. It has identified that the Palestinian/Arab model of diplomacy "defies all stereotypes attached to the concept [diplomacy] itself (Hajazi, 2, 2003). Cross training between the Arab World and the West and stratification of diplomatic efforts may yield more positive outcomes over time.

Ambassador Tibor Nagy, who served as U.S. Ambassador to many nations, felt that his training left him very well prepared to handle the challenges of international diplomacy. When asked about psychological training, he stated that the use of psychology was incorporated into other subject matter and that while "psychology" was present in most courses; its role was covert as courses were more applied in nature rather

than in theory. He indicated that the CIA engages in more overt uses of psychology. When asked if there was an area that he would have liked to have had more training, he replied: "It would be nice to have a component that was overtly psychological." While psychological methods are used in diplomacy, having an overt understanding of the complex combinations of personal, cultural, educational, and other experiences each person brings to the negotiation table can be a vital tool that diplomats are not trained to recognize as an entity in itself.

Most important for psychological researchers is the need to remember that terrorism is a complicated, diverse, and multi-determined phenomenon that resists simple definition, undermines all efforts at objectivity, forces upon all researchers moral riddles of confounding complexity, and is as challenging to our intellectual efforts to understand it as it is to our collective efforts to control it. It is an example and product of human interaction gone awry and is worth studying and understanding it in the human terms that befit it: as conflict, struggle, passion, drama, myth, reality, and not least, psychology (Fabick, 97, 2004)

Having touched on psychological components in other courses and not providing continuity by tying them all together in a course in the psychological application of diplomacy is like expecting a tradesman to create a masterpiece while his tools, though present, lay in scattered, disorganized pieces.

Multitrack Diplomacy

The sources of Islamic terrorism, more than fifty years of fighting between the Israeli and the Arab nations, and 1400 years of ill-will between Islam and the West is multi-causal the best way to end the violence is to engage in multitrack diplomacy. All levels of the Israeli, Arab/Muslim, and Western cultures must be reached for the prospect of enduring peace to even have a chance. When engaging in multitrack diplomacy, there are four different tracks that must be utilized simultaneously. The first track is

government to government interaction which can be bilateral or multilateral. The second track is non-official interaction with the citizenry of the nations involved. The third track is peacemaking through commerce, which is a tenet of the idealist philosophy in international relations theory. Trade increases stability, has economic benefits, and builds professional relationships external of governmental machines that strengthen international relations. The fourth track is private citizens getting involved in the peacemaking process. This includes citizen diplomacy, exchange programs, volunteer organizations, and special interest groups. Governmental, private, and business resources as well as the media are utilized to attain the goals of multitrack diplomacy.

The first track is state-level diplomacy. This can be accomplished through UN participation, participation of individual states, and many other non-governmental entities. While the need for heads of state to negotiate will not go away, multiple bureaucratic and diplomatic levels must be included as well. The 9/11 Commission Report found that during the time leading up to the 9/11 attacks (1999-2000) diplomatic discussions concerning Afghanistan harboring the Taliban, and calling it its official form of government, were conducted only at the head of state and senior aid levels.

President Clinton contacted Sharif again in June 1999, partly to discuss the crisis with India but also to urge Sharif, “in the strongest way I can,” to persuade the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin. The President suggested that Pakistan use its control over oil supplies to the Taliban and over Afghan imports through Karachi. Sharif suggested instead that Pakistani forces might try to capture Bin Ladin themselves. Though no one in Washington thought this was likely to happen, President Clinton gave the idea his blessing.

The President met with Sharif in Washington in early July. Though the meeting’s main purpose was to seal the Pakistani prime minister’s decision to withdraw from the Kargil confrontation in Kashmir, President Clinton complained about Pakistan’s failure to take effective action with respect to the Taliban and Bin Ladin (Kean, 108, 2004).

In contrast to using primarily heads of state in diplomacy, Harvard Sociology professor, Herbert Kelman, has studied the Israeli/Arab conflict in his researching the "overcoming of Psychological barriers" and group bias. He proposes a longitudinal approach (my wording) to solving the Middle East crisis and identifying potential future leaders to begin the bridge-building process years before they become leaders in their respective states. These people will meet periodically to discuss non-controversial subject matter on an unofficial basis. The reasoning is to begin building personal relationships over time. By initially focusing on non-controversial subjects, these potential leaders learn to work together and overcome cultural group bias to find positive traits in each other. These workshops have brought international conflict from a governmental level to an inter-social level as representatives examine how new policies are viewed by and enacted upon the general population. Each personal friendship established through working together in non-controversial issues lays the foundation for collaboration in the long-term peace process. As individuals move within their own governments, they bring positive experiences with a historic enemy with them creating the potential for a positive change in group-think toward regional peace. This method has worked for Kelman when he first tried it with Arab and Jewish community members and also as a prototype between young Arab and Israeli government officials. This method of unofficial interstate communication should be expanded. Long-term relationships built on mutual teamwork, at many levels of government, will build a stronger foundation for enduring peace.

The second aspect of multitrack diplomacy is citizen to citizen interaction. The goal is to ease the tensions of group bias from generational hate through education and communication to "rehumanize" the enemy and change public opinion. Engaging in

citizen interaction will re-humanize "the enemy" on both sides as they learn their positions are based group bias, religious bias, as well as a legitimate need for security and survival. In the same manner as state-level meetings, small citizen groups could meet to "brainstorm" non-controversial problems. As bridges are built, and biases are overcome, subject matter can slowly migrate toward applicable social issues. Participants will then engage in issue analysis rather than counter-productive (group) bias-based prejudice.

The desired result of these workshops is that participants who enter believing that there is nothing to be done about the situation except more blood-shed could emerge confident that change and peace can occur and is actually desirable to both. While each side strives to inform the other of its own thinking and reactions to events, then they learn about and re-humanize each other. Track two must be done on the micro and macro levels to ensure that when governments stretch out their hands in trust to their former enemies, the citizenry does as well. This can only be changed if people learn to overcome cultural biases and group dynamics to recognize that the needs of others are as important as their own.

A potentially lethal challenge to the second track of multi-level of diplomacy is the madrasas (madrassa), schools used for the teaching of Islamic theology and religious law. Madrasas arose during the twelfth century from Iran. Patrician families were the originating source of madrasas as they sought institutions to teach their sons the "Muslim sciences-traditions, jurisprudence, and theology". As madrasas spread and were underwritten by vizirs (rulers) they were built around shrines (becoming holy places), in mosques, holy burial places, and eventually some became Muslim universities (Arjomand, 268, 1999). Through out time, however, their mission has remained the

same, to provide Muslims with a higher education in Muslim law and theology. Today's madrasas, though part of this traditional Islamic education structure, have changed in focus. Modern madrasas primary purpose is to preserve the "purity of doctrine" through the training of ulmas, doctors of Islamic religion and law (Binder, 250, 1960). In recent history, however, madrasas have become used for radical Islamic indoctrination.

For centuries, young men have gathered at Islamic seminaries to escape Western influences and quietly study Islamic texts that have been handed down unchanged through the ages. But over the last two decades, revolution, Great Power politics, and poverty have combined to give the fundamental teachings at some of these madrasas a violent twist. And now, in one globalization's deadlier ironies, these "universities of jihad" are spreading their medieval theology worldwide (Haqqani, 58, 2002).

The change from education of Islamic law and theology to the preservation of doctrinal purity is an attempt to maintain homogenous values in an increasingly heterogeneous world. This teaching reinforces existing societal fears and hatred of other values and world views. As American children are taught multiculturalism and increasingly live in a society with daily contact with people from other cultures and societies, positive outcomes help to breakdown potential biases. Children raised in the Muslim world are taught to fear and hate other value structures because they threaten the "purity of the doctrine" and the cycle of hate is continued through educational reinforcement. One hurdle that must be overcome in diplomacy is the teaching of hatred toward the West that is taught in some madrasas.

There is a division in the Muslim world concerning human rights that merits discussion, however. Not all members of the Muslim religion condone the use of violence on a universal human rights basis.

Many in Muslim countries like Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Tunisia, intellectuals are subjected to

harassment by traditionalist and fundamentalist quarters alike as well by governments for their critical study of religion and for opinions that do not meet with approval from the religious establishment. . . Few westerners are aware of the debate within Muslim societies about human rights is fierce in its intellectual rigor as well as its political consequences. (Moosim, 186-186).

There is growing support for a “reconstruction” of Islamic values concerning human rights which includes critiques of traditional Islamic practices and the suggestion of adaptation to the present world. Reconstruction also includes the changing of the premise that human rights were created and implemented by individual cultural values to a universal concept that should be applied to all equally. The emergence of the discussion of the concept of universal human rights in the Muslim world, though resisted by traditionalists, is a step in finding and building a common bridge between conflicting civilizations.

The third track is tied into international relations theories- peace making through commerce. International idealist theorist, Cobden, maintains that as nations become increasingly economically interdependent on each other; they are less apt to go to war as it is not in their best economic interest. The blockade of the Sinai to Israeli vessels and embargos of Israeli goods in 1956 and 1968 were major contributing factors to the Suez War and the Six Days War. Economic competition is only a byproduct of a deeper conflict between Israel in her neighbors, however. For the vast majority, the real conflict lies in territorial survival. Even so, sound trade practices will only help the peace process as more goods meet the needs of the citizenry. Trade stability has psychological benefits as well. As professional (economic/business) relationships form, they can spread over into personal relationships. This can have a positive impact on not only the

economic welfare of citizens but on the perception of "the enemy" as well. Also, positive trade relationships build professional trade relationships, external of governmental machines, strengthen international relations as many sectors of both economies are acting cooperatively.

Also at the business level of multi-track diplomacy is marketing. Whether the conflict is Israel-based or Western philosophy based, marketing campaigns can be designed to alleviate fears, misconceptions, and frustrations. Disparate beliefs in the American pop-culture have over-simplified explanations for Islamic terrorism from it is all Islam's fault, they are nothing but butchers, and the best Arab is a dead Arab; to it is all the U.S.'s fault because we are arrogant, self-righteous, materialistic, imperialist capitalists who deserve everything we get. Marketing campaigns designed to educate the public on the rich culture and history of Islam and the deep commitment to their faith can dispel misinformation and paranoia. The same can be done in Muslim cultures also to bring understanding and education of Western mores and values.

The fourth track is private citizens getting involved in the peacemaking process. This component of multitrack diplomacy is most closely related to citizen activism to bring peace. (After fifty years of fighting there must be people who are weary of their children being used as cannon fodder and would be willing to help bring lasting peace to their people). These non-state actors can help uncover overlooked or unknown information by their governments, contribute information that uncovers the root causes of a conflict from the local level, help identify unknown factors or actors in the conflict, take ownership of the ensuing peace process within their spheres of influence, help the government be realistic about time tables for recovery and rebuilding, be able to evaluate

the successes/failures of strategies from nongovernmental local perspective, and form strategic alliances in and out of the governmental structure that will help build an atmosphere that peace can grow in. Some tools available on a local-level are reeducation through case studies and marketing techniques (mentioned above), and eventually, integration. As most conflicts are fought on the local/individual-level, re-education and re-humanization at this level will bring the greatest potential for realizing lasting peace. A change in heart at the level where people live and die by violence and terrorism will greatly increase the chances of success in the state and international arenas.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The questions that I researched, attempted to understand, and answer in this thesis are only a part of a much larger challenge that experts and nations have struggled with globally for generations. Trying to understand why Islamic terrorists do what they do and why they feel they have no other recourse is only a part of a larger, farther reaching issue. This conflict is a rift between the world view of the Muslim world with any other conflicting world view. At this particular point in history, it is the West. This reaches into religious ideology, economic competition, rights of land use and ownership, history, social structures, and modernization. The scope of this conflict, while touched on in this thesis, is far more comprehensive than the purview of this project. At times it was overwhelming.

My reason for choosing this particular project was not to give me a greater understanding of a subject matter that is now a record of fact in history for a mere academic exercise. I chose this subject because it is a challenge that faces us today. We do not have the answers much less the frame work of a workable solution, we are quick to jump to pop-culture conclusions, and we are paying for it with blood.

Given my long-term goals of diplomacy, I chose a project where diplomatic efforts have failed.. I wanted to understand why. What I now understand is that though there are moderate Muslims that are happy to live in peace with other world views, there is

a dangerous faction of Islam that has no interest in any type of cooperation or mutual compromise. Having been socialized into western values, this logic is baffling. There is an opportunity to build from common ground that have been identified in this project from all strata of societies. At this time, however, I am pessimistic. I believe that short-term diplomatic efforts have failed and will continue to fail until either the Muslim World takes care of its own dark corner (Christianity has one, too), people become weary of blood shed enough to call for a cease, or one civilization wins. Though I see no short-term solution, we must continue to work toward a solution that we can not yet identify. Working toward long-term diplomatic solutions must be coupled with short-term efforts to yield more sustaining cooperation. In this, the use of psychological tools is pivotal.

Even in this there is a challenge. In arriving where we are today in the west, we developed socially and technologically together as a civilization. The Muslim world has not. Because of the benefit of oil in their region, they have gained the financial ability to purchase advanced western technology, are socially not advanced to the point where psychological health has their attention. The ability to focus on mental health on a societal level is a luxury that can not be realized if the survival needs of the people are not yet met. It was only the beginning of the 20th century where the needs of sustainability were adequately enough met where attention could be focused on other needs in our civilization. In short, the ability to focus on mental health is a benefit of a society that has met the survival needs of its people. World poverty rates and mean life expectancies support the position that most Muslim states have not reached that point. Because of this, a major tool to build understanding remains unused. The Arab world's position of "modernization

without westernization” compounds the problem, when tools that could be used to bring peace (psychology) are rejected because they originated in the West.

Understanding the reasons behind aggression is the first step to ending it. When assessing contributing factors of Islamic terrorism comprehending the historical context, religious ideology, and economic aspects that have changed the world-view and self-image of the Muslim civilization we know today. There is no single, simple answer that can comprehensively explain why Muslims feel they must and/or are justified in engaging in terrorism.

Long-term peace from the cessation of Islamic terrorism is not going to be the result of a signed agreement and a handshake by political leaders alone. Intervention and understanding on international, national, cultural, and individual levels must occur to make people aware of their own proclivity to make mistakes. The use of psychology in this process can only be a benefit as people learn of their biases and overcome them. The multi-layered diplomatic bridge that will occur over years will erode group biases that exist today. As each level of their societies engages in cooperative endeavors, the strength of positive relationships grows. Eventually, when governments again attempt to extend their hands in friendship, their people will extend their hands as well.

This will not be an easy or short road. This will take time and restraint on all sides. Given the current political climate in the Middle East with Israel and Lebanon abiding by a fragile cease fire and the recently thwarted terrorist plots against the United States from passenger jets originating in Britain, it appears to be only a matter of time before violence breaks out again. One must not espouse a fatalistic attitude, however. Each day without violence in a tense Middle East or successful terrorist strikes in the West is a

step in the right direction. With an understanding of the fundamentals of human behavior on all sides, we must look for short and long-term goals of building bridges on common ground at every level of society. With societal barriers challenged and weakened, increased understanding that we are more alike than different, players at all levels may be willing to reach a beneficial compromise. Only, then can we hope for enduring peace. Though at this point it is tenuous, if we are to hope to achieve eventual peace, we must continue on and persevere.

APPENDIX

Table 1: Forms of Governments of States With Islam as Dominant Religion

State	Form of Government	Date Established/ Constitution Enacted
Afghanistan	Multiparty Republic, according to the new constitution, no law should be "contrary to Islam	2004
Albania	Emerging Democracy, based on civil law	1998
Algeria	Parliamentary republic, socialist, based on French and Islamic law	Revised many times, latest 1996
Azerbaijan	Constitutional republic, based on civil law	1995
Bahrain	Constitutional Hereditary Monarchy, based on English Common Law and Islamic Law	2002
Bangladesh	Parliamentary democracy, based on English common law	Amended many times, latest 1986
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Emerging Democracy, based on civil law	1995
Burkina Faso	Parliamentary Republic, based on French Law	Amended 2000
Burinei	Constitutional sultanate, based on German and Belgian civil codes	Ratified 2005
Chad	Republic, Based on French Law and local customs	1996
Comoros	Emerging republic, based of French and Islamic law	2001
Egypt	Republic, based on English common law, Islamic law, and Napoleonic codes	Amended 1980
Eritrea	A transitional government committed to a democratic system	Constitution adopted 1997, but implemented
Ethiopia	Federal republic, currently a transitional mix of national and regional courts	1995
Gambia	Republic, based on British common, Islamic, and customary law	1997

Guinea	Republic, based on French and customary law	1990
Indonesia	Republic, based on Roman-Dutch and indigenous law	Amended 2002
Iran	Islamic theocracy, the Constitution codifies Islamic principles of government	1979
Iraq	Emerging Democracy, European civil and Islamic law under the framework outlined in the Iraqi Constitution	2003
Jordan	Constitutional hereditary monarchy, based on Islamic law and French codes	Amended many times, 1984 last
Kazakhstan	Republic; authoritarian presidential rule, with little power outside the executive branch, based on civil law system	1993, 1995
Kuwait	Constitutional hereditary emirate, Islamic law	1962
Kyrgyzstan	Constitutional republic, based on civil law system	1993, currently being reformed due to civil unrest
Libya	Military dictatorship, based on Italian civil law system and Islamic law	1977
Maldives	Republic, based on Islamic law with some English common law	1998
Mali	Republic, based on French civil law system and customary law	1992
Mauritania	Military rule, a combination of Islamic law and French civil law	1991
Morocco	Constitutional monarchy, based on Islamic law and French and Spanish civil law	amended to create bicameral legislature, 1996
Niger	Republic, emerging from military rule, based on French civil law system and customary law	1999
Nigeria	Multiparty Republic transitioning from military to civilian rule, based on English common law and Islamic law	1999
Oman	Absolute monarchy, based on English common law and Islamic law	1650 no constitution
Pakistan	Military rule was instituted in Oct. 1999; a nominal democracy was declared in June 2001 by the ruling military leader, Pervez Musharraf	2001
Qatar	Constitutional monarchy, discretionary system of law controlled by the Amir, mostly Islamic law	2005
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Arabia was an absolute monarchy until 1992, at which time the Saud royal family introduced the country's first constitution based on Islamic law	1992

Senegal	Multiparty democratic republic based on French civil law	1991
Sierra Leone	Constitutional democracy, based on English and indigenous law	2001 amended several times
Somalia	Between Jan. 1991 and Aug. 2000, Somalia had no working government. A fragile parliamentary government was formed in 2000, but it expired in 2003 without establishing control of the country. In 2004, a new transitional parliament was instituted and elected a president.	2004
Sudan	Military government, based on English Common law and Islamic law	Liberated 1956, many failed constitutions, latest 2005
Syria	Republic under a military regime since March 1963, based on a combination of French and Ottoman civil law	1963
Tajikistan	Republic, based on civil law system	1994
Tunisia	Republic, based on French civil and Islamic law	2002
Turkey	Republican parliamentary democracy, civil law system derived from various European continental legal systems	1982
Turkmenistan	One-party republic, based on civil law system	1992
United Arab Emirates	Federation formed in 1971 by seven emirates known as the Trucial States—Abu Dhabi (the largest), Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Umm al-Qaiwain. In addition to a federal president and prime minister, each emirate has a separate ruler who oversees the local government. The judicial system is not integrated into Emirates	1971, made permanent 1996
Uzbekistan	Republic; authoritarian presidential rule, based on Soviet civil law	1992
Yemen	Parliamentary republic, based on Islamic law, Turkish law, English common law, and local tribal customary law	Amended several times, latest 2001

Sources: <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0855613.html>
<https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html>

Table 2: States That Claim Islam as the Prevalent Religion

Afghanistan	Islam (Sunni 80%, Shiite 19%), other 1%
Albania	Islam 70%, Albanian Orthodox 20%, Roman Catholic 10% (est)
Algeria	Islam (Sunni) 99% (state religion), Christian and Jewish 1%
Azerbaijan	Islam 93%, Russian Orthodox 3%, Armenian Orthodox 2%, other 2% (1995 est.)
Bahrain	Islam (Shiite and Sunni) 81%, Christian 9%
Bangladesh	Islam 83%, Hindu 16%, other 1% (1998)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Islam 40%, Orthodox 31%, Roman Catholic 15%, other 14%
Burkina Faso	Islam 50%, indigenous beliefs 40%, Christian (mainly Roman Catholic) 10%
Brunei	Islam (official religion) 67%, Buddhist 13%, Christian 10%, indigenous beliefs and other 10%
Comoros	Sunni Muslim 98%, Roman Catholic 2%
Chad	Islam 51%, Christian 35%, animist 7%, other 7%
Egypt	Islam (mostly Sunni) 90%, Coptic 9%, other Christian 1% and other 6%
Eritrea	Islam, Eritrean Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholic, Protestant
Ethiopia	Islam 45%–50%, Ethiopian Orthodox 35%–40%, animist 12%, other 3%–8%
Gambia	Islam 90%, Christian 9%, indigenous 1%
Guinea	Islam 85%, Christian 8%, indigenous 7%
Indonesia	Islam 88%, Protestant 5%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 2%, Buddhist 1% (1998)
Iran	Islam 98% (Shi'a 89%, Sunni 9%); Zoroastrian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i 2%
Iraq	Islam 97% (Shiite 60%–65%, Sunni 32%–37%), Christian or other 3%
Jordan	Islam (Sunni) 92%, Christian 6% (mostly Greek Orthodox), other 2%
Kazakhstan	Islam 47%, Russian Orthodox 44%, Protestant 2%, other 7%
Kuwait	Islam 85% (Sunni 70%, Shiite 30%), Christian, Hindu, Parsi, and other 15%

Kyrgyzstan	Islam 75%; Russian Orthodox 20%, other 5%
Libya	Islam (Sunni) 97%
Maldives	Islam (Sunni)
Mali	Islam 90%, indigenous beliefs 9%, Christian 1%
Mauritania	Islam 100%
Morocco	Islam 99%, Christian 1%
Niger	Islam 80%, indigenous beliefs and Christian 20%
Nigeria	Islam 50%, Christian 40%, indigenous beliefs 10%
Oman	Islam: Ibadhi 75%, Sunni, Shi'a; Hindu
Pakistan	Islam 97% (Sunni 77%, Shiite 20%); Christian, Hindu, and other 3%
Qatar	Islam 95%
Saudi Arabia	Islam 100%
Senegal	Islam 94%, Christian 5% (mostly Roman Catholic), indigenous 1%
Sierra Leone	Islam 60%, indigenous 30%, Christian 10%
Somalia	Islam (Sunni)
Sudan	Islam (Sunni) 70% (in north), indigenous 25%, Christian 5% (mostly in south and Khartoum)
Syria	Islam (Sunni) 74%, Alawite, Druze, and other Islamic sects 16%, Christian (various sects) 10%; Jewish (tiny communities in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and Aleppo)
Tajikistan	Islam Sunni 85%, Shiite 5%; other 10% (2003 est)
Tunisia	Islam (Sunni) 98%, Christian 1%, Jewish and other 1%
Turkey	Islam (mostly Sunni) 99.8%, other 0.2% (mostly Christians and Jews)
Turkmenistan	Islam 89%, Eastern Orthodox 9%, unknown 2%
United Arab Emirates	Islam 96% (Sunni 80%, Shiite 16%), Christian, Hindu, and other 4%
Uzbekistan	Islam (mostly Sunnis) 88%, Eastern Orthodox 9%
Yemen	Islam (including Sunni and Shiite), small numbers of Jewish, Christian, and Hindu

Source: <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0855613.html>

Table 3: Vital Statistics of Muslim States

Afghanistan LE 43 3 yrs, UEP. 40%, PV 53%, LIT 36% Asia Minor
Albania LE 77.4 yrs, UEP 14.3%, PV 25%, LIT 86.5% Asia Minor
Algeria LE 73.26 yrs, UEP 22.5%, PV 25%, LIT 70% Africa
Azerbaijan LE 63.85 yrs, UEP 1 2%, PV 49%, LIT 98.8% Asia Minor
Bahrain LE 74.45 yrs, UEP 15%, PV -- %, LIT 89.1% Asia Minor
Bangladesh LE 62.46 yrs, UEP 2.5%, PV 45%, Lit 43.1 Asia
Bosnia and Herzegovina LE 78 yrs, UEP 45.5%, PV 25%, 94.6% Europe
Brunei LE 50.81 yrs, UEP --%, PV 68%, LIT 51 6% Asia
Burkina Faso LE 48.85 yrs, UEP -- %, PV 45%, LIT 26 6% Africa
Chad LE 47.52 yrs, UEP-- %, PV 80%, LIT 47.5% Africa
Comoros LE 62.33 yrs, UEP 20%, PV 60%, LIT 56.5% Asia
Djibouti LE 43.17 yrs, UEP 50%, PV 50%, LIT 67.9% Africa
Egypt LE 71.29 yrs, UEP 10%, PV 20%, LIT 57.7% Africa
Eritrea LE 59.03 yrs, UEP --%, PV 50%, LIT 58.6% Africa
Ethiopia LE 49.03 yrs, UEP --%, PV 50%, LIT 42.7% Africa
Gambia LE 54.14 yrs, UEP --%, PV --%, LIT 40 1% Africa
Guinea LE 49.5yrs, UEP --%, PV 40%, LIT 35.89% Africa
Indonesia LE 69.87 yrs, UEP 10.9%, PV 16.7%, LIT 87.9% Asia
Iran LE 70.26 yrs, UEP %, PV %, LIT 79 4% Asia Minor
Iraq LE 69.01 yrs, UEP 30%, PV --%, LIT 40.4%, Asia Minor
Jordan LE 78.4yrs, UEP 12.5%, PV 30%, LIT 91.3%, Asia Minor
Kazakhstan LE 66.89 yrs, UEP 7.6%, PV 19%, LIT 98.4%, Asia Minor

Kuwait LE 77.2yrs, UEP 2.2%, PV --%, LIT 83.5% Asia Minor
Kyrgyzstan LE 68.49yrs, UEP 18%, PV 40%, LIT 98.7% Asia Minor
Lebanon LE 72.88 yrs, UEP 18%, PV 28%, LIT 87.4% Asia Minor
Libya LE yrs, UEP %, PV %, LIT % Africa
Maldives LE 76.69 yrs, UEP 30%, PV --%, 82.6LIT % Asia
Mali LE 49yrs, UEP 14.6%, PV 64%, LIT 46.4% Africa
Mauritania LE 53.12 yrs, UEP 20%, PV 40%, LIT 41 7% Africa
Morocco LE 70.94 yrs, UEP 10.5%, PV 19%, LIT 51 7% Africa
Niger LE 43.76 yrs, UEP %, PV 63%, LIT 17 6% Africa
Nigeria LE 47.08 yrs, UEP 2.9%, PV 60%, LIT 68% Africa
Oman LE 73.37 yrs, UEP 15%, PV --%, LIT 75.8% Asia Minor
Pakistan LE 63.39 yrs, UEP 6.6%, PV 32%, LIT 48.7% Asia Minor
Qatar LE 73.9yrs, UEP 2.7%, PV --%, LIT 89% Asia Minor
Saudi Arabia LE 75.67 yrs, UEP 25%, PV --%, LIT 78.8% Asia Minor
Senegal LE 59.25 yrs, UEP 48%, PV 54%, LIT 40.2% Africa
Sierra Leone LE 40.22 yrs, UEP --%, PV 68%, LIT 29.6% Africa
Somalia LE 48.47 yrs, UEP --%, PV --%, LIT 37 8% Africa
Sudan LE 58.92 yrs, UEP 18 7%, PV 40%, LIT 61 1% Africa
Syria LE 58.92 yrs, UEP 12 3%, PV 20%, LIT 76.9% Asia Minor
Tajikistan LE 64.94 yrs, UEP 12%, PV 64%, LIT 99.6% Asia Minor
Tunisia LE 75.12yrs, UEP 13 5%, PV 7.4%, LIT 74.3% Africa
Turkey LE 72.62 yrs, UEP 10%, PV 20%, LIT 86.5% Asia Minor
Turkmenistan LE 61.83yrs, UEP 60%, PV 58%, LIT 98.8% Asia Minor
United Arab Emirates LE 75.44 yrs, UEP 24%, PV --%, LIT 77.9% Asia Minor
Uzbekistan LE 64.58 yrs, UEP 0.7%, PV 28%, LIT 99.3% Asia Minor

Yemen LE 62.12yrs, UEP 35%, PV 45.2%, LIT 50.2% Asia Minor
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U.S. LE 77.85 yrs, UEP 5.1%, PV 12%, LIT 99%, North America

U.K. LE 78.54yrs, UEP 4.7%, PV 17%, LIT 99%, Europe

Global means: LE 66, UEP 40%, PV 36.7%, 82%

LE: life Expectancy UEP: Unemployment rate, PV: % below poverty line

LIT: literacy rate

Sources:

World Health Organization, 2006

http://www.who.int/whr/1998/media_centre/press_release/en/index.html.

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September, 2006

Table 4: Biographies of the 9/11 Terrorists

Name	Age	Nationality	Occupation	Education	Occupation of parents	Role in 9/11	Other information
Mohamed Atta al-Sayd	33	Egypt	architect	Cairo University with a degree in architectural engineering, Studied urban planning in Germany	Lawyer, 2 older sisters a professor and doctor	Pilot of AM flight 11, 1 st plane to hit towers, believed to be leader of 9/11 attack	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rumor he was gay • Atta was fluent in Arabic, English, German, French, and Hebrew • Birth name: Mohammed Mohammed El Amir • could be easily offended, particularly in the face of ridicule or perceived injustice • "He did not have a lot of friends. He would get upset if someone's jokes went too far with him." • "He knew God, but I never saw him pray once. I never saw him give out money for charity. But he got very affected by bad injustice and bad behavior." • "Atta voiced virulently anti-Semitic and anti-American opinions [in Germany], ranging from condemnations of what he described as a global Jewish movement centered in New York City that supposedly controlled the financial world and the media"

Name	Age	Nationality	Occupation	Education	Occupation of parents	Role in 9/11	Other information
Marwan Al-Shehhi	23	United Emirates	student	Studied in Germany military academy	Muslim Cleric	Pilot of 2 nd plane to hit towers United 175	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Met Mohamed Atta in Hamburg, Germany in 1999
Fayez Rashid Ahmed Hassan al Qadi Banihammad	-	United Emirates	Fought in Chechnya			United 175 “muscle hijacker”	
Ahmed al-Ghamdi	-	Saudi Arabia	Fought in Chechnya	Quit school to fight Russians in 2000	Saudi diplomat	United 175 “muscle hijacker”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> from the al Bahah province of Saudi Arabia, an isolated and underdeveloped area, and shared the same tribal affiliation with three fellow hijackers
Hamza al-Ghamdi	-	Saudi Arabia	Fought in Chechnya	Quit school to fight Russians in 2000	-	United 175 “muscle hijacker”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Member of Islamic Army of Aden, a group w/ ties to Al Qaeda from the al Bahah province of Saudi Arabia, an isolated and underdeveloped area, and shared the same tribal affiliation with three fellow hijackers
Saeed al-Ghamdi	29	Saudi Arabia	Vetran Al-Queda	Quit high school	-	United 93 “muscle hijacker”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Suicide video denounced the U.S. from the al Bahah province of Saudi Arabia, an isolated and underdeveloped area, and shared the same tribal affiliation with three fellow hijackers

Name	Age	Nationality	Occupation	Education	Occupation of parents	Role in 9/11	Other information
Hani Hanjour	31	Ta'if, Saudi Arabia	Flight attendant/ student/ farmer	Studied English at U. of Arizona	Businessman/ farmer	Pilot of American Airlines flight 77 into the Pentagon	
Nawaf al-Hazmi	25	Mecca, Saudi Arabia	Vetran Al-Queda	-	Grocer	American Airlines flight 77 "muscle hijacker"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • experienced mujahideen • Had special training 1999 on plane operations and "Western culture and travel" in Afghanistan & Pakistan
Salem al-Hazmi	20	Mecca, Saudi Arabia	Vetran Al-Queda	-	Grocer	American Airlines flight 77 "muscle hijacker"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A "troublesome teen" • Begged Bin Laden to be on 9/11 team • Many had extended relationships with each other, had studied and/or fought together in other conflicts such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or Sudan
Ahmed Ibrahim al-Haznawi	20	Saudi Arabia	Vetran Al-Queda		Tribal imam	United Airlines flight 93 "muscle hijacker"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suicide video promised a bloody message to America <p>from the al Bahah province of Saudi Arabia, an isolated and underdeveloped area, and shared the same tribal affiliation with three fellow hijackers</p>

Name	Age	Nationality	Occupation	Education	Occupation of parents	Role in 9/11	Other information
Ziad Samir Jarrah	26	Lebanon	Student aerospace engineering	Private catholic school, German University	Wealthy businessman	Piloted plane that failed to hit White House	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • most “secular” of group, had live-in girlfriend
Satam al-Suqami	25	Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	Law Student	Law Student	-	Flight 11 “muscle hijacker”	
Waleed al-Shehri	22-27 ?	Saudi Arabia (Yemen border)	Teaching student	-	-	Flight 11 “muscle hijacker”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 12 of the 13 “muscle hijackers” were Saudi’s. All were between 20 and 28 years old, most were unemployed with no more than a high school education and were unmarried. Had special training in Afghanistan in late 2000 through early 2001. Were taught various terrorist techniques, did not know details of operation until after in the U.S.
Abdulaziz al-Omari	23-29 ?	Saudi Arabia (Yemen border)	-	Graduated w/honors from Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University	-	Flight 11 “muscle hijacker”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Was married and had a daughter • Left suicide video only mentions praise to Allah • maintained family/emotional ties, married

Name	Age	Nationality	Occupation	Education	Occupation of parents	Role in 9/11	Other information
Khalid al-Mihdhar	26	Mecca, Saudi Arabia	Fought in Bosnia	-	-	Flight 77 "muscle hijacker"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close associate of Bin Laden and experienced mujahideen • Had special training 1999 on plane operations and "Western culture and travel" in Afghanistan & Pakistan Was married, had a child
Wail al-Shehri	26	Saudi Arabia	Local teacher	-	-	American Flight 11 "muscle hijacker"	
Majed Moqed	-	Annakhil, Saudi Arabia	Studied law, had economics background	King Fahd University	-	Flight 77 "muscle hijacker"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Moqed was Hebrew, not Arabic
Mohand al-Shehri	22	Asir, Saudi Arabia	Student	Imam Muhammed Ibn Saud Islamic University	-	United Airlines flight 175 "muscle hijacker"	
Ahmed al-Nami	24	Saudi Arabia	muezzin at the Seqeley mosque/ Sharai student	King Khaled University at Abha	-	United Airlines flight 93 "muscle hijacker"	

Flight 11: Mohamed Atta, Satam al-Suqami, Waleed al-Shehri, Wail al-Shehri, Abdulaziz al-Omari

Flight 175: Marwan al-Shehhi, Fayez Banihammad, Mohand al-Shehri, Hamza al-Ghamdi, Ahmed al-Ghamdi

Flight 77: Hani Hanjour, Khalid al-Mihdhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al-Hazmi, Salem al-Hazmi

Flight 93: Ziad Jarrah, Ahmed al-Nami, Saeed al-Ghamdi, Ahmed al-Haznawi

Sources: 9/11 Commission report: http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch7.pdf; Wikipedia: <http://en.wikipedia.org>; Time Magazine, 06 October, 2001.

Table 5: Current International Islamic Terrorist Organization Strike Statistics

Current International Islamic Terrorist Organizations								
Name of Organization	Dates of Formation	National Affiliation	Primary Objectives	Terrorist Strikes	Fatalities	Injuries	Intended Target	Preferred Method of Terrorism *
Al Qa'ida	1988	Afghanistan	Original Anti-Soviet, now Anti-Western	15	4133	5742	Tourist, Governmental	Suicide and car bombing
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)	1969	Palestinian	Anti-Israeli	5	11	11	Civilian, Military	Shooting
Fatah (PLO faction)	1974	Lebanon/ Palestinian	Anti-Israeli	36	23	11	Civilian, Military	Bombing, Shooting
Force 17 (PLO faction)	1980's	Palestinian	Anti-Israeli & Palestinian rivals	9	11	16	Civilian, Military	Shooting
Hamas	1960's, from Muslim Brotherhood of 1920's	Palestinian	Anti-Israeli, Gaza and West Bank focus	115	934	2326	Military, Police, Civilian, Bus Stops, Commercial	Shooting, Suicide Bombing, Car Bombing

Name of Organization	Dates of Formation	National Affiliation	Primary Objectives	Terrorist Strikes	Fatalities	Injuries	Intended Target	Preferred Method of Terrorism *
Jihad Group	1970's	Egypt	Al- Qa'aida operative	4	29	1073	Political Leaders, Commerce	Car Bombing
Martyr's of al-Aqsa	2000	Palestinian	Anti-Israeli	59	121	706	Civilian, Varied	Shooting, Suicide Bombing
Mujahedine Khalq Organization (MEK)	1960's	Iran	Bring democratic reform to Iran, heavily resisted	5	3	5	Governmental Officials and Employees	Shooting
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)	1977	Iraq	Anti-Israeli	2	5	12**	Tourist	Shooting, Hijacking
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	1967	Palestinian	Anti-Israeli	16	23	27	Civilian	Shooting Knifing Car Bombing
Totals				266	5293	9929		
* List not exhaustive, shows only most commonly used method by group								
** Does not include 700 unharmed hostages								

Source: <http://www.ict.org.il/>. Accessed November 14, 2006.

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