Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market
Date
2015-12
Authors
Yu, Ying
Jin, Tongdan
Zhong, Chunjie
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute
Abstract
This paper designs an incentive contract menu to achieve long-term stability for electricity prices in a day-ahead electricity market. A bi-level Stackelberg game model is proposed to search for the optimal incentive mechanism under a one-leader and multi-followers gaming framework. A multi-agent simulation platform was developed to investigate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism using an independent system operator (ISO) and multiple power generating companies (GenCos). Further, a Q-learning approach was implemented to analyze and assess the response of GenCos to the incentive menu. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the incentive contract.
Description
Keywords
stackelberg game, q-learning, multi-agent simulation, electricity market, incentive mechanism, Ingram School of Engineering
Citation
Yu, Y., Jin, T., & Zhong, C. (2015). Designing an incentive contract menu for sustaining the electricity market. Energies, 8(12), pp. 14197-14218.
Rights
Rights Holder
© 2015 The Authors.
Rights License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.