Designing an Incentive Contract Menu for Sustaining the Electricity Market
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This paper designs an incentive contract menu to achieve long-term stability for electricity prices in a day-ahead electricity market. A bi-level Stackelberg game model is proposed to search for the optimal incentive mechanism under a one-leader and multi-followers gaming framework. A multi-agent simulation platform was developed to investigate the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism using an independent system operator (ISO) and multiple power generating companies (GenCos). Further, a Q-learning approach was implemented to analyze and assess the response of GenCos to the incentive menu. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the incentive contract.
CitationYu, Y., Jin, T., & Zhong, C. (2015). Designing an incentive contract menu for sustaining the electricity market. Energies, 8(12), pp. 14197-14218.
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