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dc.contributor.advisorMcKinney, Audrey M
dc.contributor.authorChambers, Thomas H.
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-28T16:14:30Z
dc.date.available2013-08-28T16:14:30Z
dc.date.issued2013-07-08
dc.date.submittedAugust 2013
dc.identifier.urihttps://digital.library.txstate.edu/handle/10877/4691
dc.description.abstractThis paper concerns Saul Kripke's argument against type physicalism and for property dualism. My objection to the argument is that it relies upon a premise for which Kripke does not provide adequate support. The unsupported premise is Kripke's claim that it is possible for pain to occur in the absence of C-fiber stimulation. This premise relies upon what Crispin Wright identifies as the Counter-Conceivability Principle – the notion that if we can clearly conceive a counterexample to a claim of necessity, that serves as evidence against the claim of necessity. This principle is, however, not useful because it does not provide any guidance for what counts as a clear conception. Additionally, providing precise theories of conceivability and imaginability does not lend the support that Kripke's argument needs. Thus, I conclude that this objection to Kripke's argument stands and type physicalism can be maintained.
dc.formatText
dc.format.extent56 pages
dc.format.medium1 file (.pdf)
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectKripke, Saul
dc.subjectProperty dualism
dc.subjectType physicalism
dc.subjectPhilosophy of language
dc.subjectPhilosophy of mind
dc.subjectModal epistemology
dc.subject.lcshPhilosophy of mind
dc.subject.lcshCausation
dc.titleAn Evaluation of Saul Kripke's Argument for Property Dualism
txstate.documenttypeThesis
dc.contributor.committeeMemberFischer, Robert
dc.contributor.committeeMemberCarson, JoAnn
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophy
thesis.degree.disciplineApplied Philosophy and Ethics
thesis.degree.grantorTexas State University
thesis.degree.levelMasters
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Arts


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