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dc.contributor.advisorHutcheson, Peter
dc.contributor.authorHamilton, Christopher
dc.date.accessioned2018-12-18T20:36:35Z
dc.date.available2018-12-18T20:36:35Z
dc.date.issued2018-12
dc.identifier.urihttps://digital.library.txstate.edu/handle/10877/7814
dc.description.abstractThis paper is a defense of theism that addresses the arguments made by J.L. Mackie on the topic of God’s existence. Mackie and some other philosophers allege that the beliefs in both the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God and evil are contradictory. I aim to show that there is no contradiction. In this paper, I will argue that some of the evil that exists in the world may be allowed because of justifying reasons in the form of free will and feelings like sympathy and courage that come from both freedom of choice and the existence of evil. Evil in its most basic form is anything that causes suffering, injustice, or displeasure, such as famine, murder, and disease. God would need a good reason to allow any evil, and the purpose of this paper is to present the modest claim that God would be justified in allowing at least some evil to occur. I will also respond to Mackie’s intervention argument, his saint’s objection, and the argument against creation.en_US
dc.formatText
dc.format.extent23 pages
dc.format.medium1 file (.pdf)
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.subjectProblem of evilen_US
dc.subjectReligious philosophyen_US
dc.subjectFree will defenseen_US
dc.subjectPhilosophyen_US
dc.subjectFree willen_US
dc.titleBetter than Nothing: A Free Will Defense of Theismen_US
txstate.documenttypeThesis
thesis.degree.departmentHonors College
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy
thesis.degree.grantorTexas State University
txstate.departmentHonors College


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